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[Wind Colebrook South, LLC v. Town of Colebrook](#)

Supreme Court of Connecticut - August 2, 2022 - 344 Conn. 150 - 278 A.3d 442

Taxpayer, which was a limited-liability company (LLC) that owned and operated a wind turbine facility, commenced a municipal property tax appeal after town board of assessment denied taxpayer's appeal of town's classification of the wind turbines and their associated equipment as real property for purposes of taxation.

The Superior Court entered judgment for taxpayer on claim that a late-filing penalty was improper but entered judgment for town in all other respects. Taxpayer appealed.

The Supreme Court held that:

- The turbines were "buildings" under statute on taxation of real property;
- The turbines were "structures" under statute on taxation of real property;
- Statute on equalization of assessments did not preclude classifying commercial wind turbines as real property for property-tax purposes;
- The turbines were not "fixtures" of an electric company pursuant to definition of personal property in statute on filing of declarations for personal property; but
- The equipment associated with the turbines constituted "fixtures" of an electric company pursuant to definition of personal property in statute on filing of declarations for personal property.

Commercial wind turbines used for the generation of electricity were "buildings" under statute on taxation of real property and thus were taxable as "real property" rather than "personal property"; turbines were virtually permanent and were suitable for occupancy or storage.

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Commercial wind turbines used for the generation of electricity were not "machines" so as to be taxable as "personal property"; even if the turbines had characteristics of machines, they did not constitute "machinery used in mills and factories," which the statute on filing tax declarations for personal property included in its definition of personal property.

Statute on equalization of assessments did not preclude classifying commercial wind turbines as real property for property-tax purposes, despite argument that the only other commercial wind turbine in the state was assessed as personal property; other turbine was in a different municipality, and statute required only that assessors equalize the assessments of property in the town.

Different property-tax classification of hydroelectricity generating turbine did not preclude classifying commercial wind turbines in different municipality as real property for property-tax purposes; unlike the wind turbines, the hydroelectric generating turbine was moveable and removed when not in use.

Commercial wind turbines were not “fixtures” of an electric company pursuant to definition of personal property in statute on filing of declarations for personal property, and thus such an alleged status could not warrant classifying turbines as personal property as opposed to real property; unlike other articles that had been found to be fixtures, the turbines, as constructed, were not once chattels that only became real property through physical annexation to the land.

Equipment associated with commercial wind turbines constituted “fixtures” of an electric company pursuant to definition of personal property in statute on filing of declarations for personal property, and thus equipment was “personal property” for property-tax purposes.

Statute on remedy for wrongful assessment of property was not a basis on which taxpayer, which was a limited-liability company (LLC) that owned and operated a wind turbine facility, could be entitled to relief in property-tax appeal of assessment of wind turbines and association equipment; although the equipment associated with the turbines was improperly was classified as real property, relief was not available under that statute in the absence of evidence of misfeasance or malfeasance.