Former employee brought action against village, alleging violations of the whistleblower statute and wrongful termination in violation of public policy due to complaints of criminal conduct which violated environmental protection laws. The Common Pleas Court entered summary judgment for village, and employee appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Village sought review.

The Supreme Court of Ohio held that former employee failed to strictly comply with whistleblower statute as required for him to state a claim for wrongful termination.

Although employee submitted a supervisor’s report which identified equipment failures that resulted from discharge by village’s largest employer, an automotive-parts manufacturer, the report did not qualify as a report that sufficiently identified and described any crimes involving the village, as the statute required. The report did not reveal that village was knowingly placing glycol into the water supply, and report was written too late, as it was filed after years of discussing the equipment failures with Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) officials.

Creditor law firm brought declaratory judgment action against city and city ethics board, seeking declaration that post-election debt forgiveness to mayoral candidate’s campaign committee was not a “contribution” to candidate’s campaign under municipal campaign finance law. The Court of Common Pleas dismissed action based on lack of standing, and the Commonwealth Court affirmed. Firm appealed.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that law firm’s forgiveness of mayoral candidate’s campaign committee’s debt did not constitute a “contribution” to candidate’s political campaign.

Debt incurred in favor of law firm by political campaign committee, for legal fees to defend mayoral candidate in ballot challenge litigation, was not debt incurred for use in advocating or influencing the election of the candidate, and therefore firm’s post-election forgiveness of such debt did not constitute a “contribution” to candidate’s political campaign, as would be subject to contribution limitation of city’s campaign finance law, where firm did not agree to represent candidate in the ballot litigation pro bono or at a discounted rate in an effort to promote him as candidate, and there was no evidence that committee, at time it retained firm, anticipated that firm would forgive debt once election was over.

Former condominium unit owners filed suit against city for inverse condemnation. The County Court granted city’s plea to jurisdiction, and owners appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. City’s petition for review was granted.

The Supreme Court of Texas held that owners failed to allege regulatory taking, as required to state claim for inverse condemnation.

Condominium unit owners’ allegations that city did not specify alleged building code violations and that punishment, namely, order to vacate property within 31 days, was excessive, that safety regulations were misapplied vis-a-vis their property, and that city’s procedure failed to afford them constitutionally adequate notice or hearing, did not allege regulatory taking of their units, as required to state claim for inverse condemnation.

Registered voters petitioned for a writ of quo warranto based on their allegation that attorney’s appointment to the office of city corporation counsel violated city charter. The Superior Court granted the writ, finding attorney failed to demonstrate he was entitled to hold the office of corporation counsel, and declared the office vacant. Attorney appealed.

The Supreme Court of Connecticut held that attorney who lacked the recommendation of the current mayor was not eligible to hold the appointed office of corporation counsel.

Attorney who lacked the recommendation of the current mayor was not eligible to hold the appointed office of city corporation counsel; the city charter required the recommendation of the mayor for appointment of the city’s corporation counsel, and as a specified mode of appointment, strict compliance was required.

Union filed a grievance on police officer’s behalf, alleging that the town violated the parties’ collective bargaining agreement by terminating officer without just cause. Arbitration panel sustained the grievance, and town filed an application to vacate the arbitration award. The Superior Court denied the town’s application to vacate arbitration award, and town sought review. The Appellate Court reversed and remanded. Union appealed.

The Supreme Court of Connecticut held that officer’s dishonesty with independent medical examiner regarding his epilepsy was not so egregious as to require nothing less than officer’s termination.

In 2000, the City of New Orleans issued $170 million of variable rate municipal bonds the principal amount of $170,660,000 to fund the City’s firefighter pension fund.

Defendants (PaineWebber, Inc., later UBS, as successor-in-interest) served as underwriter for the bonds. To manage the variable interest rate risk associated with the bonds, the City entered into an interest rate swap agreement (the “Swap”) with Defendants, whereby the City agreed to pay Defendants a fixed rate of interest, and Defendants paid the weekly variable rate. Unbeknownst to the City, Defendants then entered into a reciprocal swap (“Reciprocal Swap”) with an AMBAC affiliate, AMBAC Financial Services, LLC (“AFS”), whereby Defendants agreed to pay AFS a fixed rate, and AFS assumed the risk of the variable rate. In the financial crisis of 2008, the bonds became unmarketable causing AMBAC to exercise its rights under the Reciprocal Swap, thereby triggering a provision of the Swap between Defendants and the City. As a result, the City was forced to refinance the bonds and terminate the Swap.

The City brought suit against AMBAC, AFS, and Defendants. All claims against AMBAC and AFS were subsequently dismissed. In October of 2011, the parties administratively closed the case pending potential settlement negotiations. After such talks proved ineffective, the City moved to reopen the case in November of 2013, and the Court granted the motion. The Court issued an updated scheduling order indicating that the time to amend pleadings, cross-claims, and counter-claims had passed.

During the additional discovery period, the City served on Defendants answers to interrogatories which included the following new allegations of misrepresentations: (1) UBS provided false information to the City, which allowed UBS to price the Swap at a considerably higher rate; (2) UBS provided false information regarding the savings that the synthetic fixed rate bonds would achieve; (3) UBS assured the City that its 10.7% rate of return was reasonable; and (4) UBS told the City that it was not entering into a novel deal, but the same kind of deal other municipalities had previously conducted.

Defendants moved for a Rule 16 Conference to define the scope of the Second Amended Complaint as it pertained to the “new allegations” of misrepresentation. During that conference, this Court directed the parties to file motions in limine to address the issues raised in their Rule 16 Motion. Specifically, the Court directed the City to indicate why these “new allegations” were being raised at such a late date when evidence of these assertions was available to the parties back in 2008.

The Court granted Defendants’ motion requesting that the Court to limit the City’s claims to the existing causes of action left in the original complaint (fraud in the inducement, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of the Swap agreement) and to prohibit introduction of evidence relating to these four alleged misrepresentation at trial.

The Court rejected City’s argument that it had no intention of raising the misrepresentations as substantive claims, instead, that the City intended to rely on the misrepresentations as evidence “that goes toward the fraud and breach of contract claims already pled.”

“Even if the Court were inclined to disregard the reasons stated above, the Court finds that the misrepresentations are not relevant of materiality to the City’s existing fraud and breach of contract claims under Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, nor are they probative of intent under Rules 403 and 404 such that the Court should allow evidence of these assertions at trial. In particular, the misrepresentations are distinct acts that do no pertain to omissions regarding the structure and risks associated with the structure of the transaction or any alleged conflict of interest, and, thus, they are not relevant to proving any of the elements necessary to the City’s existing claims.”

Several banks brought action for declaratory and injunctive relief against city, challenging ordinances that required property “owners,” which was defined to include mortgagees that had initiated foreclosure proceedings, to maintain property during foreclosure and post a $10,000 cash bond per foreclosure to the city, and that required mortgagees to attempt a settlement before foreclosing. City removed case to federal court. The District Court granted summary judgment for city. Banks appealed. The Court of Appeals certified question.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that:

• Portion of foreclosure ordinance establishing a program requiring mandatory mediation conflicted with state foreclosure statute;
• Portion of ordinance requiring owners to register with the city did not conflict with foreclosure statute;
• Portion of ordinance requiring owners to register with the city conflicted with Oil and Hazardous Material Release Prevention Act;
• Portion of ordinance requiring owner to post a bond to ensure compliance with the ordinance, conflicted with state Sanitary Code; and
• Administrative fee was a lawful fee, rather than a tax.

The Supreme Court of Michigan took of the issue of whether copies of video surveillance recordings created by third parties but received by defendants during the course of pending criminal misdemeanor proceedings constitute “public records” within the meaning of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), MCL 15.231 et seq., thus requiring their disclosure by defendants.

The court held that, contrary to the lower courts’ opinions, the video surveillance recordings are public records within the meaning of FOIA.

Defendant was convicted in the Gage County Court of violating city ordinance prohibiting the prolonged parking of unregistered motor vehicles on private property. Defendant petitioned for further review.

The Supreme Court of Nebraska held that:

• Probable cause, standing alone, is not an exception to the search warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment as applied to real property, but
• Police officer did not conduct a “search” of defendant’s property, since property was an “open field.”

The Town of Black Mountain, North Carolina and the County of Buncombe, North Carolina filed suit against Lexon Insurance Company and Bond Safeguard Insurance Company seeking to enforce a series of subdivision performance bonds. The bonds were entered into in connection with a subdivision to be constructed on County property and thus the County was the obligee. At around the same time, the Town annexed the property covered by the bonds from the County, which assigned the bonds to the Town. Defendants did not consent to the assignment.

Defendants first argued that neither the Town nor the County had standing to bring suit. Specifically, defendants contended that once the Town annexed the property covered by the bonds, the bonds were extinguished, leaving no rights for the County to assign. The court disagreed, finding nothing in the law or within the agreements themselves indicating that assignment of the bonds from the County to the Town was impermissible or without legal effect.

In addition, the court found that plaintiffs were engaged in a governmental function and were therefore exempt from the otherwise applicable statute of limitation.

Owner of vacant building brought putative class action in Minnesota state court against city, challenging city’s special assessments of annual fees under registration program for vacant buildings. The District Court granted summary judgment to city. Owner appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• City’s notices of special assessments complied with requirement in city code of disclosing basis of costs;
• City code required notices of special assessment to disclose availability of deferments but not availability of waivers or suspensions; and
• Statutory deadline for appeal to state court applied to common-law claims challenging special assessments.

An unrecorded storm water sewer was discovered on Plaintiff’s property when a contractor hit and damaged it during the demolition of a house on neighboring property. When the Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District (MSD) discovered the sewer, it disconnected the sewer and rerouted it away from the neighboring demolished property and directly through Plaintiffs’ property.

Plaintiffs sued, alleging that MSD did not have an easement on Plaintiffs’ property, and thus the existence of the sewer was a continuing trespass. Plaintiffs brought inverse condemnation, assault, slander, and negligence claims.

Upon review of Plaintiffs’ petition, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently stated a claim for inverse condemnation sounding in trespass.

City police officer who was injured when she fell from a police flatbed truck while loading wooden police barriers onto it brought action against city and its police department, seeking to recover damages both under common law negligence theory and under statute creating cause of action for a police officer injured by another’s failure to comply with requirements of any statute, ordinance, rule, or order, predicated upon violation of Public Employee Safety and Health Act (PESHA), which set forth safety and health standards for public employees. The Supreme Court, Kings County, granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to officer’s common law negligence claim, but denied it as to statutory claim. Parties cross-appealed. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division affirmed. Defendants appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• PESHA’s general duty clause was proper predicate for police officer’s statutory claim, and
• Defendants failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the statutory claim.

A petition for mandamus was filed by landowner requesting that the court order the Greene County Board of County Commissioners to review and grant landowner’s petitions to annex property located in Beavercreek Township into the City of Beavercreek.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• Rather than exercise discretion, County Commissioners are required to approve annexation if a petition complies with the technical statutory requirements;
• Landowner’s filing of a second, corrected, annexation petition triggered the Commissioners’ clear legal duty to act on the petition within the statutory timeframe;
• The Commissioners had a clear legal duty to grant the petition, and landowner had a clear legal right to have it granted;
• As landowner was entitled to have the petition granted, and there was available no adequate remedy at law, the petition for writ of mandamus was granted.

Two municipal lease agreements were entered into by CIT and Brown County General Hospital (the Hospital). CIT is a company that leases medical equipment. The Hospital is a county hospital created by statute whereby a board of Hospital Trustees (Hospital Trustees) is appointed to govern the Hospital. The lease agreements were entered into by CIT and the Hospital in early 2008 regarding an MRI and related site improvements. Both leases were signed by the president and CEO of the Hospital, Michael C. Patterson, and authorized by the Hospital Trustees.

In 2007, the Hospital was facing financial troubles and to alleviate the budget crisis, the Hospital Trustees presented the Brown County Board of Commissioners (Board of Commissioners) with a request to issue $5 million in bonds. The Board of Commissioners approved the issuance of $5 million worth of revenue bonds. These revenue bonds were secured solely by the Hospital’s revenues as opposed to the full faith and credit of the county.

On January 6, 2011, having defaulted on the leases and facing the insolvency, the Hospital was sold to Southwest Healthcare Services, LLC (Southwest).

On August 7, 2013, CIT filed suit against Southwest and Brown County, claiming that they were jointly and severally liable for default on the two leases. Motions for summary judgment were subsequently filed by CIT and Brown County. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of CIT in regard to its claim against Southwest. Regarding CIT’s claim against Brown County, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Brown County. The trial court found that as a matter of law, no principal/agent relationship existed between Brown County and the Hospital, either by statute or conduct. Further, the trial court found that the language in the previously-executed Forbearance and Assignment and Assumption Agreements was clear that CIT was to look to the Hospital exclusively for satisfaction of the leases. In turn, Southwest had assumed the Hospital’s obligations. CIT appealed as to the grant of summary judgment in favor of Brown County.

The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that Brown County was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because no agency relationship existed between Brown County and the Hospital Trustees. In addition, even if such a relationship did exist, the proper procedures were not satisfied in order to bind the county to the contracts.

Motorist, who paid civil penalty after his vehicle was photographed by automated red light enforcement system during a red light violation, brought putative class action against city and traffic enforcement camera company, alleging that penalty collected was unlawful, and seeking return of such money taken under the doctrine of unjust enrichment. The Court of Common Pleas dismissed complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Motorist appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. City and company sought review.

The Supreme Court of Ohio held that:

• Municipalities act within their constitutional home-rule powers when they establish automated systems for imposing civil liability on traffic-law violators through an administrative enforcement system;
• Constitutional provision and statute do not endow municipal courts with exclusive authority over traffic-ordinance violations;
• Statute that sets the jurisdiction of municipal courts does not confer exclusive jurisdiction over traffic-ordinance violations on municipal courts; and
• Municipalities have home-rule authority to establish presuit civil administrative proceedings.

Arrestee brought action against city to recover for excessive force by police officers. The District Court dismissed the action. Arrestee appealed, and Supreme Court retained the case.

The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that arrestee had no claim against city since cause of action was available under Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act (OGTCA).

Firefighters brought action against mayor, fire chief, and city alleging a variety of state and federal claims stemming from requirement that firefighters serve as part of crew of fire engine in parade to celebrate pride and diversity of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender community. The Superior Court denied mayor’s and chief’s motion for summary judgment. Mayor and chief petitioned for writ of certiorari, which was granted.

The Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that requirement that firefighters participate in LGBT parade did not violate firefighters’ right to freedom of religion, speech, or association.

Town brought action against landowner, seeking declaratory judgment that land contained public right-of-way granting public access to nearby cemetery and permanent injunction preventing landowner’s obstruction of right-of-way. The Superior Court entered judgment for town and granted injunction. Landowner appealed.

The Appellate Court held that:

• Previous landowner manifested intent to dedicate right-of-way, and
• Evidence supported conclusion that general public accepted dedication by its use of right-of-way over period of many years.

City resident filed putative class action lawsuit against city, alleging that city’s telephone users tax was an illegal tax and seeking a refund of the tax. The Superior Court granted city’s motion to strike resident’s class action allegations, and resident appealed. The Court of Appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court granted review, superseding the opinion of the Court of Appeal, and reversed and remanded. City moved to compel resident to return privileged documents city turned over to his counsel pursuant to a Public Records Act (PRA) request and to disqualify his counsel. The Superior Court denied the motion. City appealed.

The Court of Appeal held that:

• City’s inadvertent production of documents under PRA waived any privilege that might have once existed as to them, and
• Attorney’s use of PRA to obtain documents for litigation did not violate Rules of Professional Ethics.

City’s inadvertent production of three documents covered by the attorney-client privilege as part of its response to city resident’s Public Records Act request waived any attorney-client or work product privilege that might have once existed as to those documents, even though the resident was engaged in litigation against the city, and even if the documents were produced by “low level” employees not explicitly authorized to waive the privilege.

Attorney’s use of Public Records Act to request documents relating to the adoption of a citywide tax ordinance which was the subject of the lawsuit in which the attorney represented a resident suing the city did not violate the Rules of Professional Ethics, even though attorney made the records request by contacting a city official while the city was represented by counsel, since the records request was within attorney’s statutory and constitutional rights to petition her government regarding a matter of public importance.

Purported dominant estate owner brought action against city, alleging existence of prescriptive easement over city-owned property. Following a bench trial, the District Court entered judgment in favor of city. Purported dominant estate owner appealed.

The Supreme Court of Idaho held that:

• Federal district court did not have exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over dispute;
• Use of road was not continuous and uninterrupted;
• Use of road was permissive, rather than adverse;
• Easement by necessity claim was tried by implied consent; and
• Purported dominant estate owner did not establish unity of title to support easement by necessity claim.

After the City of Chicago sued Sequoia Financial Solutions, Inc. in Illinois state court for violating the City’s building code, Sequoia demolished the allegedly offending structure rather than continue to defend the suit, which the City then dismissed. Two months later, Sequoia brought a case against the City and several City employees for allegedly falsifying an inspection report and coercing Sequoia into tearing down the structure through its allegedly baseless state court suit.

The District Court dismissed, struggling to make sense of Sequoia’s claims and noting that Sequoia had at all times been entitled to undertake its own inspection and to challenge the City’s findings in state court.

In order to build a sewer extension, the Rock River Water Reclamation District sought to obtain a permanent easement and a temporary construction easement from The Sanctuary Condominiums of Rock Cut to run a trunk line through its property. As a result, plaintiff sought to obtain from defendant both a permanent easement and a temporary construction easement. After discussions to acquire the easements broke down, the District filed a complaint for condemnation in the circuit court. On Condo’s motion, the trial court dismissed the District’s complaint on the bases that the ordinance authorizing construction of the Oak Crest project failed to state that a taking of defendant’s property was necessary and failed to describe with reasonable certainty the property sought to be taken.

Thereafter, the District enacted another ordinance in an effort to cure the deficiencies identified by the trial court. The District then offered defend $2,700 for the easements, double their appraised value. Condo rejected District’s offer and District initiated a new condemnation action. The trial court determined that $1,350 was just compensation for the easements. Condo Appealed.

The Appellate Court held that:

• Condo was not entitled to dismissal of the second condemnation action on the ground of res judicata;
• District had the authority to condemn property; and
• The trial court did not err in refusing to compensate Condo for any damage that installation of the proposed trunk line would cause to its property.

“In light of the foregoing cases, we conclude that the two lawsuits in this case do not share an identity of causes of action, because they are based upon different sets of operative facts. The second condemnation action is based upon the 2011 Ordinance whereas the first condemnation action was based upon the 2010 Ordinance. The 2010 Ordinance provided for the construction of sanitary sewers in the Oak Crest Sanitary Sewer Area and provided for a special assessment to pay for the project. Plaintiff’s first condemnation action was dismissed after the trial court concluded that the 2010 Ordinance neither stated that a taking of defendant’s property was necessary nor described the portion of defendant’s property to be taken. In an attempt to cure these deficiencies, plaintiff enacted the 2011 Ordinance, which states that an easement across defendant’s property is necessary, incorporates a description of defendant’s property by reference, provides that plaintiff’s attempts to negotiate for the easement have been unsuccessful, and authorizes plaintiff to initiate condemnation proceedings to acquire the defendant’s property. In other words, the 2010 Ordinance’s deficiencies identified by the trial court in the first condemnation action were not at issue in the second condemnation action.”

The City of Shepherdsville approved three separate zoning map amendment applications, each of which rezoned property from “Agriculture” to “General Industrial.”

Bardstown Junction Baptist Church, Inc., a neighboring property, appealed the City Council’s by bringing an action in Circuit Court. The Church’s primary objections were that the rezoning would result in increased traffic and flooding. The Circuit Court ruled against Church and Church appealed.

The Court of Appeals noted that the Planning Commission’s findings were as follows: (1) the requested rezonings were not in agreement with the adopted Comprehensive Plan; (2) the existing zoning classification given to the property was not inappropriate; but (3) there had been major changes of an economic, physical, or social nature within the area involved which were not anticipated in the adopted comprehensive plan and which have substantially altered the basic character of the area.

The Court of Appeals reversed the Circuit Court’s decision and found the City Council’s actions void. The record introduced before the Planning Commission, and even after reviewing the numerous other records the applicants and City Council appellees improperly introduced before the Circuit Court, the Court of Appeals could locate no evidence, per KRS 100.213.(1)(b), demonstrating “major changes of an economic, physical, or social nature within the area involved which were not anticipated in the adopted comprehensive plan and which have substantially altered the basic character of the area.”

Plaintiff obtained a special land use zoning permit from Clinton County that allowed it to operate a wind energy system. While plaintiff’s application for a special use permit was pending, two townships located within the county adopted ordinances imposing more restrictive requirements for wind energy systems, which they contended were enacted pursuant to their general police powers, not as a zoning regulation. Plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action requesting the trial court to declare defendants’ ordinances invalid and unenforceable. The trial court granted plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), ruling that defendants’ ordinances were in substance zoning regulations that were unenforceable because they were not enacted under the Michigan Zoning Enforcement Act (MZEA) and conflicted with the county’s ordinance, which had been enacted under the MZEA.

The Court of Appeals affirmed.

The Troy City Council held a closed session meeting for the stated purpose of reviewing applications for the position of City Manager and selecting finalists who would then be interviewed at a subsequent open meeting. Following the closed meeting, five finalist candidates were announced. The City Council then held an open meeting and, after public interviews, selected a new City Manager.

Plaintiff requested a copy of the minutes from the closed session, but defendant denied the request on the basis that the Open Meetings Act (OMA) did not warrant disclosure. Plaintiff then filed suit seeking injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment that defendant violated the OMA by holding the closed session and that the minutes from that session should be disclosed.

The Court of Appeals held that plaintiff did not establish an actual controversy pursuant to MCR 2.605. Even though the Council’s closed session may have violated plaintiff’s rights, declaratory judgment in this circumstance would not guide plaintiff’s future conduct in order to preserve plaintiff’s legal rights. The alleged injuries—the improper holding of a closed session and the improper withholding of the minutes of that session—have already occurred.

Plaintiff did not seek to prevent further injury, only to see the minutes from the closed session and a declaration that the session was improperly held. Any future injury plaintiff would seek to prevent is merely hypothetical, especially given plaintiff’s very specific request for relief, which only related to the closed session. Thus, the court was unconvinced that a declaratory judgment would guide plaintiff’s conduct in order to preserve plaintiff’s legal rights.

Ambulance patient filed a personal injury action against city that alleged he was injured by the negligence of a city fire department emergency medical technician (EMT). The Circuit Court granted city summary judgment. Patient appealed.

The Supreme Court of Mississippi held that EMT’s actions as part of ambulance crew that transported patient to hospital did not constitute fire protection, for the purpose of the police-or-fire-protection exception under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act, and thus city was not shielded from liability based on the exception in patient’s lawsuit against city after EMT, who was a member of city fire department, dropped patient while unloading him at hospital.

Developers brought a petition for declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus seeking the return of development impact fees (DIF) paid to the Town of Pelham. The Town’s DIF ordinance provided that, if the Town had not spent or otherwise encumbered the impact fees within six years, current owners of property on which impact fees had been paid could apply for a full or partial refund of such fees.

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that the Town was within its authority to enact an ordinance directing that any refund of impact fees be paid to the current property owner. “Because there is no dispute that the petitioners no longer own any of the properties for which they paid the impact fees at issue, we conclude that the petitioners have no standing to seek a refund of the unencumbered fees. Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it dismissed the case.”

MA Salazar Inc. (the “Debtor”) appealed the Bankruptcy Court’s decision denying its request to hold the Incorporated Village of Atlantic Beach (the “Village”) in contempt for violating an order of the Bankruptcy Court, and for failing to obtain an order from the Bankruptcy Court regarding the applicability of the automatic stay prior to taking action against the Debtor’s property. The order in question prohibited any party from entering the Debtor’s premises.

Prepetition, the Village after extensive litigation had been authorized to demolish the Debtor’s property, as the State Court ruled that demolition was necessary to protect the public from the unsafe structure on the Debtor’s property. After the order prohibiting any party from entering the Debtor’s premises was entered, the Bankruptcy Court found that the automatic stay did not apply to the proposed acts of the Village. The Village failed to submit an order memorializing the Court’s decision, and immediately proceeded to demolish the building. In denying the request for sanctions, the Bankruptcy Court held that the automatic stay did not apply, therefore the Village could not be sanctioned based on a violation of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). The Bankruptcy Court further held that it did not have the authority to impose sanctions based on a prior order that did not clearly set forth that the Village could be held in contempt for its failure to abide by the prior order.

The District Court reversed in part, holding that the Bankruptcy Court had inherent authority to sanction the Village for a violation of the automatic stay, and that the Bankruptcy Court had the inherent power to impose submission to its lawful mandates. Because the prior order directing parties not to enter the Debtor’s property was specific enough to put the Village on notice, and the Village’s acts violated that order, the matter would be remanded for the Bankruptcy Court to make the following determinations: whether 1) the Court ruled that the stay did not apply to the Village pursuant to section 362(b)(4), or whether the stay applied and the Court vacated the automatic stay to permit the Village to demolish the Debtor’s building, 2) whether the Village should be sanctioned for violating the order prohibiting any party from entering the Debtor’s property, and 3) whether the Village should be sanctioned for its failure to submit an order regarding the applicability of the stay prior to demolishing the Debtor’s property.

First, the Bankruptcy Court clarified that the automatic stay did not apply to the Village as its actions were taken in the exercise of its police and regulatory powers under Bankruptcy Code § 362(b)(4). Second, the Village’s violation of the order prohibiting any party from entering the Debtor’s property was not sanctionable. The Village believed in good faith that its conduct did not run afoul of this order. Its belief stemmed from the fact that the Bankruptcy Court ruled that the stay did not apply to the Village, and parties were prohibited from entering the Debtor’s property for their own protection. If anything, the Village’s actions served to further the protection of the public. In addition, the record in the case demonstrated there was honest confusion over whether this order was meant to keep the Village from demolishing the Debtor’s property once the Court ruled that the automatic stay did not apply. Third, the Village’s failure to submit an order regarding the applicability of the automatic stay prior to demolishing the Debtor’s property did not demonstrate bad faith. Without a finding of bad faith, the Village’s conduct did not warrant the imposition of sanctions.

Mother of student injured when he was struck by motor vehicle while crossing street to attend school fundraiser brought personal injury action against school district and its employees. Defendants moved for summary judgment. The Supreme Court, Monroe County, granted motion. Mother appealed.

The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that school district owed no duty of care to student, where mother had told student to stay on that side of road and school district employees had not yet gained the physical custody or control of student at time of accident.

Lender brought diversity action against borrower and city, who had contracted with borrower for aviation services, alleging judicial foreclosure, accounting, disgorgement of rents, and unjust enrichment claims. City moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The City’s motion was based upon the argument that it was entitled to governmental immunity. The District Court held that by acting in a proprietary, as opposed to governmental, capacity in operating the airport, city waived its governmental immunity and therefore denied the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals held that under North Carolina law, as predicted by Court of Appeals, governmental immunity from equitable claims is waived when a county or municipality acts in a proprietary, rather than governmental, capacity.

Objectors filed a petition under Land Use Petition Act (LUPA), challenging county’s grant of a building permit. County and applicant moved to dismiss the action. The Superior Court dismissed with prejudice. In a second action, objectors filed a complaint and land use petition challenging the dismissal as a violation of their constitutional right to due process. The San Juan County hearing examiner dismissed the appeal as untimely. Objectors then filed a § 1983 claim. The Superior Court dismissed the LUPA petition and granted county and applicant’s motion for summary judgment. Objectors appealed both Superior Court judgments. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Further review was sought.

Following consolidation, the Supreme Court of Washington held that:

• In the first action challenging county’s grant of a building permit, the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the petition;
• In the first action, objectors’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies deprived them of standing to file a LUPA petition;
• County code provision that imposed a height and size limitation on the construction of residential structures, including garages, did not create a property interest in neighbors’ view of the water, or in the denial of a third-party’s building permit for purposes of the Due Process Clause;
• Under statutory provision allowing for an award of attorney fees to a prevailing party on appeal of a land use decision, fees may be awarded to private parties who prevail on procedural or substantive grounds, but may be awarded to a public entity that made the permitting decision only when it succeeds in defending its decision on the merits, disapproving Coy v. City of Duvall, 174 Wash.App. 272, 298 P.3d 134, Witt v. Port of Olympia, 126 Wash.App. 752, 759, 109 P.3d 489, Overhulse Neighborhood Ass’n v. Thurston County, 94 Wash.App. 593, 601, 972 P.2d 470, and Northshore Investors, LLC v. City of Tacoma, 174 Wash.App. 678, 700–01, 301 P.3d 1049;
• Applicants were entitled to an attorney fee award in first action; and
• While applicants were not entitled to attorney fee award with regard to objectors’ § 1983 complaint in second action, they were entitled to attorney fee award to the extent objectors’ action related to their LUPA petition.

City brought an action against requester for a declaratory judgment that city complied with requests under the Public Records Act (PRA). The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of city and denied requester’s request for costs and attorney fees. Requester appealed. The Court of AppealS reversed and remanded.

After grant of city’s petition for review, the Supreme Court of Washington held that:

• City violated requirement of PRA that city provide brief explanation of how disclosure exemptions applied to redacted information, and
• Determination that city violated brief explanation requirement of PRA was a vindication of requester’s right to receive a response, as would entitle requester to attorney fees.

After the Department of Transportation (DOT) recorded an award of damages for a temporary easement on property, property owner challenged the award. The DOT filed a motion in limine to prohibit property owner from introducing any evidence that it was entitled to compensation “for any item whatsoever other than the temporary limited easement.” The Circuit Court granted the motion. Property owner appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. DOT petitioned for review, which was granted.

The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that property owner was not entitled to diminution of value damages caused by previous relocation of access road.

Temporary limited easement that authorized DOT to construct new driveway connecting commercial property to a different road did not cause commercial property to lose direct access and proximity to previous access road, and therefore property owner was not entitled to damages in eminent domain proceeding regarding easement for commercial property’s diminution in value resulting from its loss of direct access and proximity to previous access road. It was the previous access road’s relocation that caused the loss of direct access, rather than the subsequent temporary limited easement.

Landowners, whose property was intentionally set on fire by firefighters under direction of State Department of Forestry to deprive advancing wildfire of fuel, brought constitutional taking and tort claims against the State. The Superior Court entered judgment in favor of State, finding it was immune from tort claims and that action was valid exercise of police powers. Landowners appealed.

The Supreme Court of Alaska held that:

• State’s action in conducting burnouts was exercise of police power, and thus damage was for a public use;
• Landowners’ had no constitutional right to compensation if State’s actions were justified by doctrine of necessity; and
• State was immune from tort claims.

In January 2014, the Mesa Mayor and City Council passed a resolution authorized the issuance of Transportation Project Advancement Notes (TPANS) to finance a light rail project. The resolution required Mesa to secure payment on the TPANS’ interest and principal by a pledge of “Transportation Project Advance Revenues” (TPARS) and “excise taxes” as defined in A.R.S. sections 28–7691 through–7697. The resolution further noted that TPANS did not constitute “an obligation … to levy or pledge any form of ad valorem property taxation nor will [they] constitute an indebtedness of the City … within the meaning of the Constitution of the State of Arizona … but shall instead be limited obligations payable solely out of the pledged sources of funds….”

A Mesa resident brought suit, contending that Mesa’s proposed sale of notes required an election under Article 7, Section 13 of the Arizona Constitution.

Mesa countered that, because it did not assume “a general liability to repay the borrowing,” the TPANS financing scheme was not subject to the indebtedness limit or the constitutional election requirement of Article 9, Section 8 and Article 7, Section 13 of the Arizona Constitution, respectively.

The Court of Appeals of Arizona held that Mesa was not required to obtain voter approval before issuing notes to finance the light rail project, as Mesa had not pledged its general funds.

Shout-out to my peeps at Gust Rosenfeld!

Office manager for the Wayne County Highway Department was terminated and brought a claim for gender discrimination and retaliation. The County moved for summary judgment.

The District Court held that:

• Employee’s actions were not time-barred, citing the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act which provides that the statute of limitations for filing an EEOC charge alleging pay discrimination resets with each paycheck affected by a discriminatory decision;
• Employee had presented sufficient evidence of gender-based pay discrimination to survive summary judgment;
• Employee had presented enough circumstantial evidence for a jury to infer retaliation and therefore to survive summary judgment on her claim of retaliation.

Contractors sought review of Board of Contract Appeals’ decision affirming Department of General Services’ (DGS) denial of their pre-award bid protest challenging inclusion of project labor agreement (PLA) as evaluation factor in state’s request for proposals (RFP) for construction of new detention facility. The Circuit Court affirmed Board’s determinations. Contractors appealed.

The Court of Special Appeals held that:

• Inclusion of PLA did not constitute regulation mandating predicate rulemaking under Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and
• Evidence was sufficient to support Board’s determination that PLA specification was not unreasonably restrictive and advanced legitimate state interests.

First-time inclusion of project labor agreement (PLA) as evaluation factor in state’s request for proposals (RFP) for construction of new detention facility, without more, did not constitute regulation under Administrative Procedure Act (APA), such that inclusion of PLA in RFP did not mandate predicate rulemaking under APA. Inclusion of PLA did not change existing procurement law or formulate new policy or widespread application of future effect, but rather use of PLA was pilot project.

Evidence was sufficient to support Board of Contract Appeals’ determination, in affirming Department of General Services’ (DGS) denial of contractors’ pre-award bid protest challenging state’s inclusion of project labor agreement (PLA) as evaluation factor in state’s request for proposals (RFP) for construction of new detention facility, that inclusion of PLA evaluation factor was not unreasonably restrictive and advanced legitimate interests of state. There was evidence that project would meet critical need for community and that importance of project would benefit from organization and guarantees provided by PLA, record indicated that DGS spent considerable amount of time evaluating PLAs and consulting with various entities regarding efficacy of PLAs, and prediction offered by contractors’ expert that inclusion of PLA would unduly restrict competition was not borne out, as DGS received seven proposals.

The Charter Township of Lansing appealed two separate orders denying it relief regarding a very expensive drain project for which the Township was assessed a substantial portion of responsibility.

In the first order, the trial court dismissed for a want of subject-matter jurisdiction the Township’s claim that the apportionment constituted a deprivation of property without due process. In the second order, the trial court denied the Township’s petition for certiorari review of the Drainage Board of Review’s final determination upholding the apportionment.

The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the Township had not shown that the trial court clearly erred in finding the Board of Review’s conclusion to have been based on competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record and to have not been a product of an incorrect application of the law.

“The Township has simply not shown that the trial court clearly erred in finding that the Board of Review’s decision was either arbitrary or not based on competent, substantial, and material evidence on the whole record. The fact that there is no precise formula specifying the apportionment is not fatal; a certain amount of subjective ‘judgment call’ is inherent in the operation of a drain commissioner and a board of review. The Township provides no evidence tending to show that it would not be benefitted by the Drain; indeed, it concedes the opposite. Rather, the Township’s arguments largely amount to an assertion that the apportionment is disproportionate either because the absolute dollar value is extremely high or because the drain will not directly benefit each individual parcel of property within the Township, neither of which is a valid reason for overturning an apportionment. Courts generally will not reverse drain proceedings ‘except for very substantial faults.’ The Township has not articulated a legally cognizable substantial fault in the apportionment at issue here, so we cannot disturb it, even if the financial burden will be, as seems likely, quite significant.

Pedestrian, who was injured when she tripped and fell while walking on a city sidewalk for which bank maintained an easement, brought a premises liability suit against bank. The Circuit Court granted summary judgment in bank’s favor, and pedestrian appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• Pedestrian’s status as city’s invitee could not be imputed to bank;
• Pedestrian was a licensee with respect to bank; and
• Bank did not breach the duty of care it owed to pedestrian as licensee.

Pedestrian’s status as invitee with respect to city could not be imputed equally to bank, which maintained an easement for sidewalk owned by city, for purposes of determining duty owed by bank to pedestrian who tripped and fell on sidewalk in front of bank. Pedestrian’s status with respect to bank was to be analyzed separately from her status with respect to city.

Shipyard Associates, L.P., a developer, brought a Section 1983 action against the City of Hoboken to invalidate two municipal ordinances. Shipyard owns waterfront property and wishes to construct a two residential towers.

In December 2013, following the aftermath of Superstorm Sandy, Hoboken adopted two municipal Ordinances addressing issues relating to flooding in Hoboken. These Ordinances, among other things, prohibit construction on properties that are located on piers and platforms that project into the Hudson River. The effect of these Ordinances is to prevent construction of Shipyard’s project.

The Fund for Better Waterfront (FBW), a nonprofit public interest group comprised of Hoboken residents focused on issues such as open space preservation and recreation along the Hudson River waterfront in Hoboken brought a motion to intervene as a party defendant pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24.

Shipyard opposed the motion, contending that the FBW had failed to establish the necessary grounds to support intervention. Shipyard argued, in particular, that FBW did not have a sufficient, legally recognized interest in the litigation, and that any interest they could have is adequately represented by the City of Hoboken.

The District Court granted FBW’s motion to intervene, finding that FBW had carried its burden to show the possibility that its interests would not be fully protected by the City of Hoboken.

Local 1813 Union (Union) is a chapter of the International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF), and served as the bargaining unit for twenty-one full-time firefighters employed by the Borough. The Chambersburg Borough and the Union had a CBA) in effect which governed their employment relationship through the beginning of 2012. In addition to paid firefighters, the Borough’s fire department utilized the services of four volunteer fire companies.

In July 2011, during negotiations for a successor CBA between the Borough and the Union, the Borough informed the Union that the Borough would need to downsize the number of paid firefighters due to budget constraints. At the time of the negotiations, Patrick Martin was employed as a shift captain in the Borough’s fire department, and was also president of the Union.

Martin sent a letter to local IAFF members, including twenty-four IAFF members who provided volunteer fire services, informing them of the proposed reductions and exhorting volunteers to refrain from responding to fire calls within the Borough.

The Borough disciplined Martin and also filed a charge of unfair labor practices against the Union based on the issuance of the letter.

A Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board hearing examiner found that, because the Union did not engage in an unlawful secondary boycott by issuing the letter, the Union did not commit any unfair labor practices under Sections 6(2)(d) or 6(2)(e). Finding no unprotected secondary boycott, the hearing examiner determined that Martin’s suspension based on sending the letter was discriminatory, resulting in unfair labor practices under Sections 6(1)(a) and 6(1)(c). Borough Appealed.

The Commonwealth Court reversed, holding that:

• The Union engaged in a secondary boycott when it sent the letter to the volunteer firefighters, who were also members of the IAFF, inducing them to refrain from responding to fires in the Borough; and
• As the Union committed an unfair labor practice in violation of Section 6(2)(d) of the PLRA by engaging in a secondary boycott, Martin’s letter was not protected under the PLRA and thus the Board also erred in finding that the Borough committed violations of Sections 6(1)(a) or 6(1)(c) by disciplining Martin for sending the Letter. Accordingly, the Borough was within its rights to discipline Martin.

Pedestrian, who fell to public sidewalk when her crutch slipped into a hole in the pavement, brought action against tenants of property abutting the sidewalk. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to the tenants. Pedestrian appealed.

The Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that tenants did not owe pedestrian a duty to maintain the sidewalk abutting their premises.

Tenants of property abutting public sidewalk did not owe pedestrian, who fell to the sidewalk when her crutch slipped into a hole in the pavement, a duty to maintain the sidewalk abutting their establishments in a safe condition, and absent duty, pedestrian did not establish negligence claim against either tenant, where there was no evidence that either tenant took action to create the dangerous condition.

The Rochester City Council enacted an ordinance prohibiting “outdoor storage” in all districts except specifically enumerated commercial districts. The ordinance defined “outdoor storage” as “[s]torage of any materials, merchandise, stock, supplies, machines and the like that are not kept in a structure having at least four walls and a roof, regardless of how long such materials are kept on the premises.”

Plaintiffs challenged the ordinance as unconstitutionally void for vagueness and the appeals court agreed.

The court concluded that the ordinance failed to pass either part of the vagueness test. With respect to the first part of the test, the ordinance gave ordinary people virtually no guidance on how to conduct themselves in order to comply with it. With respect to the second part of the test, the vague language of the ordinance did not provide clear standards for enforcement and, thus, a determination of whether the ordinance has been violated leaves virtually unfettered discretion in the hands of the code enforcement officer.

City Fire Chief was informed by Mayor that his employment was terminated following the expiration of his five-year employment agreement with the City. Fire Chief sued the City, challenging the Mayor’s “unilateral” action and alleging that he could be removed from office only upon the recommendation by the mayor with the approval of four council members.

The City, on the other hand, asserted that it was common practice on the part of the mayor and the city council to use employment agreements for specific limited terms to effectuate both the appointment and removal mandates of § 11–43C–38(a) (governing the appointment and removal from office of fire chiefs and police chiefs in Class 5 municipalities) and that once the city council voted to approve the Fire Chief’s agreement for a limited term, no further action was needed to remove him from office in the event he was not reappointed.

The Supreme Court of Alabama agreed with the City, holding that nothing in the plain language of § 11–43C–38(a) prohibits a city from using an employment agreement with a limited term for the purpose of satisfying both the approval and/or removal mandates of the statute. The City Council’s initial action approving the employment agreement that was due to expire on April 19, 2012, impliedly satisfied the removal mandates of § 11–43C–38(a), and it was unnecessary for the City Council to formalize what it had already approved, because requiring it to do so would be illogical and would produce the same result.

State instituted a civil-forfeiture proceeding, seeking forfeiture of items and currency seized during search of bingo gaming facility. Facility operator intervened. The Circuit Court entered judgment condemning 691 allegedly illegal gambling devices, $288,657.68 in cash, and various documents allegedly related to illegal gambling. Operator appealed.

The Supreme Court of Alabama held that:

• Game played on electronic machines was not the game commonly or traditionally known as “bingo,” permitted by amendments excepting bingo from the general constitutional prohibition on lotteries;
• Table game combining elements of roulette and bingo was not the game commonly or traditionally known as “bingo”;
• Prior bond-validation proceeding was not conclusive as to the legality of particular gaming machines; and
• Evidence supported forfeiture of currency and gambling records.

Mobile-home owner brought action against county for negligence, nuisance, trespass, and strict liability for ultra-hazardous activity, alleging that his mobile home was rendered uninhabitable as result of use of tear gas by county’s special weapons and tactics (SWAT) team while attempting to apprehend owner’s son, who allegedly shot at owner. The Superior Court granted county’s motion for summary judgment. Owner appealed.

As a matter of first impression, the Court of Appeal held that decision to use tear gas was discretionary act, and thus county was entitled to discretionary-acts immunity.

Former city employee brought action against city, claiming she was owed compensation and reimbursement for expenses incurred during her employment. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of city, and former employee appealed.

The Supreme Court of Idaho held that former city employee’s failure to file her claim with the city clerk’s office, as required by the notice provisions of the Tort Claims Act, barred any such claim, despite the absence of any prejudice to the city, abrogating Huff v. Uhl, 103 Idaho 274, 647 P.2d 730.

Parent of motorcyclist, individually and as personal representative of motorcyclist’s estate, brought a wrongful-death action against city police officer who was involved in a vehicular collision that resulted in motorcyclist’s death, alleging negligence, gross negligence, battery, and violation of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. At the close of trial, the court entered judgment in favor of police officer on the gross negligence, battery, constitutional, and punitive damages claims.  The negligence claim went to a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of parent in the amount of $3.505 million. Judgment was entered. In response to officer’s subsequent motion, the Circuit Court ordered that officer was entitled to a new trial and, alternatively, ordered the judgment reduced to $200,000 in accordance with the Local Government Tort Claims Act (LGTCA). Parent appealed.

The Court of Special Appeals held that:

• Officer had no authority to waive for his employer, the city’s police department, the LGTCA’s cap on damages that parent could collect from the police department;
• Issue of whether officer was grossly negligent was for the jury;
• Issue of whether contact by police officer’s cruiser with the motorcycle constituted battery by officer was for the jury;
• Issue of whether officer used excessive force, so as to violate the Maryland Declaration of Rights, was for the jury;
• Issue of whether officer’s conduct was so egregious as to call for an award of punitive damages was for the jury; and
• Officer was not operating his cruiser in the performance of emergency services at the time of the collision, for immunity purposes.

Property owners brought action against the Department of Transportation, seeking damages as a result of silt flooding from bypass construction, and alleging trespass.

The Supreme Court of Mississippi held that:

• The Department of Transportation was entitled to immunity for all of property owners’ claims pursuant to the Tort Claims Act provision governing immunity for any act arising out of a plan or design for construction of an improvement to public property, and
• Allegations in property owners’ complaint were insufficient to state a taking claim.

The crux of property owners’ complaint was that the design of the bypass itself changed the naturally occurring drainage and caused silt to flow onto their land, which had not occurred before, and thus, all of property owners’ causes of action, including their request for injunctive relief, fell within the realm of road design, and sounded in tort.

City filed complaint against owners of property located within wildland-urban district for violation of ordinance dictating permissible roofing materials. Owners answered and petitioned for declaratory judgment that ordinance was building regulation that city lacked authority to promulgate. The First Judicial Court entered summary judgment for owners, but denied their motion for attorney fees. City appealed, and owners cross-appealed denial of their motion for attorney fees.

The Supreme Court of Montana held that:

• Ordinance requiring that roofs on property located within wildland-urban district may not have exposed, wooden roofing materials, whether treated or untreated, and must have noncombustible or fire resistant roofing materials rated Class C or higher, was building regulation that city lacked authority to promulgate, and
• Equities warranted award of attorney fees to property owners under Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act.

Abutting landowners brought action against city arising out of dispute concerning the width of public right-of-way constituting avenue. Following a bench trial, the District Court determined the width of the right-of-way, and awarded landowners compensation for a taking, plus a portion of requested costs and fees. City appealed, and landowners cross-appealed.

The Supreme Court of Montana held that District Court’s decision to award landowners appellate attorney fees as prevailing parties was not precluded by the law of the case doctrine.

In an inverse eminent domain action brought by landowners against city, trial court’s decision to award landowners appellate attorney fees as prevailing parties was not precluded by the law of the case doctrine, even though the Supreme Court refused to award fees in its order on rehearing. In its rehearing order, the Supreme Court did not pronounce a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, but rather, simply observed that it had not expressly awarded attorney fees in a prior decision and declined to do so again, and the rehearing order did not address the substantive question of whether the landowners were entitled to appellate attorney fees.

After suffering disabling injuries while saving two victims from a burning building by kicking in the building’s front door, firefighter applied for an accidental disability retirement pension. The Board of Trustees of the Police and Firemen’s Retirement System (PFRS) denied the application, rejecting the legal conclusion of the Office of Administrative Law that the incident was undesigned and unexpected. Firefighter appealed.

The Superior Court, Appellate Division, held that firefighter suffered an undesigned and unexpected traumatic event and was entitled to accidental disability pension.

Firefighter who suffered disabling injuries after saving two victims from a burning building by kicking in building’s front door suffered an undesigned and unexpected traumatic event, and thus firefighter was entitled to an accidental disability retirement pension, even though event was not a classic accident. Event resulted from combination of unusual circumstances that led to firefighter’s injury, including failure of truck company unit that was responsible for forcing entry and rescuing occupants to arrive, discovery of victims trapped inside a fully engulfed burning building that was reported to have been vacant, training that had not prepared firefighter to break into burning buildings without battering rams or other specialized equipment used by truck company unit, and fact that victims would have died had firefighter not responded immediately to break down door.

Public utility filed an action in lieu of prerogative writs alleging that borough had adopted and sought to enforce ordinances that were preempted by state law, and that the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) had exclusive jurisdiction over dam improvement project. The Superior Court permitted flood solution group and water customers to intervene, and following a bench trial, found that NJDEP had exclusive jurisdiction over the project. Intervenors appealed.

The Superior Court, Appellate Division, held that borough was preempted by state law from applying its ordinances to dam project.

Borough was preempted by state Safe Dam Act and Water Supply Management Act from applying its conditional use and tree removal ordinances to public utility’s dam improvement project, where state’s regulatory scheme for dams and reservoirs was pervasive and comprehensive, thereby precluding the co-existence of municipal regulation reflected in borough’s ordinances.

Wife who was stabbed by her husband brought action on behalf of herself and her son against city and city police department, alleging that defendants were negligent in failing to protect plaintiffs from attacks by husband, and asserting claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The Supreme Court, Bronx County granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and wife appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• Fact issues precluded summary judgment on negligence claim, but
• Son was not in zone of danger for purposes of negligent infliction of emotional distress claim.

Genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether special relationship existed between wife, who was stabbed by her husband after husband was arrested in connection with domestic violence incident and then released, and city, and as to whether wife justifiably relied on police officer’s assurances that husband would remain in jail, precluding summary judgment as to wife’s negligence claim arising from city’s failure to protect her from attack.

Child was not in zone of danger at time his mother was stabbed by his father, as would subject city to liability for negligent infliction of emotional distress arising from its handling of domestic violence situation. Child was in broom closet while mother was stabbed, and thus he neither saw incident nor was immediately aware of incident at time it occurred.

Municipality adopted police pension plan (the “Plan”) pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Thereafter, the municipality administered the plan term along the lines of the incomplete or inaccurate assessment that resulted from the incomplete or inaccurate information submitted to the actuary, in effect unilaterally modifying both the plan and the CBA.

The Commonwealth Court determined that because Act 205 had statutory primacy over any CBA, the plan must be administered as understood by the actuary when it made its Act 205 cost study, even if this effectively alters a bargained-for term of the parties.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania took up the case.

“However, we must nevertheless consider how Act 205 affects the proper disposition of this case. Because the Municipality provided the wrong information to the actuary performing the Act 205 cost study with respect to the COLA cap for early retirees, the Municipality failed to obtain a “complete and accurate” actuarial cost estimate, as required by Act 205. Thus, as here, the implementation of a pension plan based on an incomplete and inaccurate cost estimate is a violation of Act 205 in itself. For this reason, the Commission erred by ordering the Plan’s implementation along the lines of the incomplete and inaccurate Act 205 cost study, which was, in turn, based on the incomplete and inaccurate information supplied by the Municipality.”

“The only appropriate remedy available is to remand the matter for an order directing the Municipality to comply with its mandate under Section 305: to make a complete and accurate cost study that includes the correct COLA cap for certain early retirees, as herein determined.”

The Court concluded that it was error to impose a unilateral change to the Plan at odds with its plain language based on the results of an incomplete and inaccurate Act 205 cost study. It therefore reversed the order of the Commonwealth Court and remanded the case to that court for further remand to effectuate a complete and accurate Section 305 cost study.

Distributors of religious tracts brought § 1983 action against municipalities, alleging implementation of Puerto Rico’s Controlled Access Law (CAL), which allowed municipalities to authorize neighborhood associations to erect gates enclosing public streets, violated First Amendment right to free speech. The District Court imposed remedial scheme requiring unmanned gated communities provide distributors with gate keys upon distributors’ disclosure of their identities and purpose. Parties cross-appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• Action was not moot;
• Substantial evidence supported district court’s factual findings;
• Municipalities bore legal responsibility for injury caused to distributors as result of implementation of CAL;
• District court sufficiently explained reasons for issuing injunction;
• District court did not violate mandate rule;
• District court’s remedial scheme was narrowly tailored; and
• Distributors were not prejudiced by district court’s sua sponte dismissal of Commonwealth defendants.

In § 1983 action alleging Puerto Rico’s Controlled Access Law (CAL), which allowed municipalities to authorize neighborhood associations to erect gates enclosing public streets, violated First Amendment rights of religious tract distributors who sought access to those streets for protected speech activities, district court sufficiently explained reasons for issuing injunction requiring municipalities to allow distributors access to gated public streets upon distributors’ disclosure of their purpose and identities, where, in crafting injunction, court sought to balance parties’ rights of free speech and personal security, while avoiding the imposition of undue administrative and financial burdens on municipalities and gated communities.

State college student filed suit against college for head injury sustained during performance of ballroom dance maneuver at direction of instructor. The District Court entered summary judgment for college and dismissed complaint, and student appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed in part based on determination that special relationship exception to public duty doctrine applied. Certiorari review was granted.

The Supreme Court of Utah held that:

• Utah’s limitation of its sovereign immunity did not abrogate public-duty doctrine;
• Public duty doctrine did not apply to harm to plaintiff caused by government defendant’s affirmative misconduct; overruling Webb v. University of Utah, 125 P.3d 906; and
• Public duty doctrine did not apply to state student’s negligence claim against college.

Pedestrian filed suit against owners of property that abutted public sidewalk for injuries sustained in slip and fall on snow and ice that had accumulated on sidewalk. The trial court entered summary judgment for owners, and pedestrian appealed.

The Supreme Court of Connecticut held that town ordinance imposing fines on owners of property abutting public sidewalks for failure to keep sidewalk clear of ice and snow did not transfer town’s civil liability for pedestrian’s injuries to landowners.

Restaurant patron and his wife brought action against off-duty police officers and their employer after officers allegedly assaulted and battered them. Following a jury trial, the Superior Court entered judgment in favor of patrons. Officers and employer appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• Compensatory damage awards to patron and his wife of $60,000 and $10,000, respectively, were not excessive;
• Officers’ conduct in assaulting patron was sufficiently aggravated to support an inference that they intended to injure patron, as required to support award of punitive damages;
• Officers’ assaultive conduct against patron was not within the scope of their employment; and
• Jury’s findings that officers acted within the scope of their employment were not legally sufficient to make employer vicariously liable for punitive damages.

State appealed decision of the Illinois Commerce Commission granting water utility’s request for approval of its annual reconciliation of purchased water and purchased sewage treatment surcharges. The Appellate Court dismissed appeal as untimely. State petitioned for leave to appeal and Commerce Commission filed separate petition to appeal as a matter of right or for leave to appeal, both of which were granted and appeals were consolidated.

The Supreme Court of Illinois held that 35-day period specified in Public Utilities Act, rather than 30-day period in court rule, applied to review of decision of Commerce Commission.

Affordable Recovery Housing (ARH) obtained a license from the Illinois Department of Human Services (DHS) to operate a Recovery Home. The DHS is charged with regulating and licensing Recovery Homes, which provide substance abuse services and housing for recovering alcoholics and substance users.

Pursuant to the statutory authority granted to it in the Alcoholism and Other Drug Abuse and Dependency Act, 20 ILCS 301 et seq., DHS enacted a comprehensive regulatory scheme regarding Recovery Homes. Under the DHS regulations, ARH is not required to install sprinkler systems for fire safety purposes in its buildings. Under the Life Safety Code adopted by the City of Blue Island, however, sprinkler systems are required. ARH challenged the City Code.

The District Court held that the DHS regulations preempt the City’s Life Safety Code such that the City may not enforce its sprinkler requirements against ARH.

Employee brought action against employer, alleging violations of the Wage Act. Following jury verdict in favor of employee, the Superior Court Department denied employer’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), employee’s motion for reinstatement of employment, and employee’s motion for new trial on damages. Employer appealed and employee cross-appealed. The case was transferred from the Appeals Court.

The Supreme Judicial Court held that:

• Civil Service Commission did not have exclusive authority over Wage Act claim filed by housing authority employee;
• Reinstatement of employment was not available remedy under Wage Act; and
• $130,000 award of damages was supported by sufficient evidence.

Civil Service Commission did not have exclusive authority, pursuant to civil service law, over housing authority employee’s claims under the Wage Act, and therefore dismissal of employee’s judicial action against employer was not required under doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

Reinstatement of employment following termination was not an available remedy for violations of the Wage Act, where Act provides that employee claiming to be aggrieved by violation of Act could bring civil action for injunctive relief, for any damages incurred, and for any lost wages and other benefits, and Act did not expressly authorize reinstatement as available remedy.

Fire lieutenants employed by city fire department filed appeal claiming to be aggrieved by practice of appointing out-of-grade acting captains without following provisions of civil service laws. The Civil Service Commission determined that the city violated the civil service laws, but ultimately dismissed the appeal, concluding that compliance with the statutory procedures was ministerial, and that the lieutenants had failed to demonstrate that the appointments did not meet the statutory criteria. Lieutenants appealed. The Superior Court Department vacated and remanded. City appealed.

The Appeals Court held that Superior Court order remanding to Civil Service Commission was interlocutory order not immediately appealable.

High school student was injured when a vertically placed, metal divider fell from the door of the band hall and hit her on the head. Student sued. The school district filed a motion for summary judgment, which the circuit court granted after finding that the school district was immune from liability under the discretionary-function exception. Student appealed.

The Appeals Court reversed, holding that the school district created the dangerous condition by leaving the metal divider unsecured, thereby preventing summary judgment.

Landowners brought declaratory judgment action alleging that town was estopped from enforcing zoning ordinance in regard to landowners’ property. The Superior Court dismissed petition. Landowners appealed.

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that zoning board lacked authority to grant relief requested, and thus landowners were not required to exhaust administrative remedies.

Zoning board lacked authority to grant relief requested by landowners in their declaratory judgment action, and therefore landowners were not required to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing declaratory judgment action asserting that town was estopped from enforcing one-dwelling-per-lot zoning ordinance with regard to landowners’ property, after zoning compliance officer advised landowners that he would not issue certificate of compliance for newly-built home on property due to existence of other dwelling unit on property, even if action required resolution of factual issues. Applicable statutes did not confer general equitable jurisdiction upon zoning board, and landowners failed to meet requirements for either a variance or an equitable waiver from ordinance’s dimensional requirements.

Landowners appealed from a superior court’s order affirming a decision by Franklin County, made by its Board of Adjustment, determining that Landowners could not operate a shooting range on their property without a special use permit, requiring approval by the County’s Board of Commissioners.

Landowners contended that the superior court erred in its interpretation of the Franklin County Unified Development Ordinance (UDO). Specifically, Landowners argued that the UDO does not regulate shooting ranges and, therefore, they did not need any approval from the County to operate a shooting range on the Property. Landowners also argued that the superior court erred by concluding that shooting ranges were regulated by the UDO as an Open Air Game.

The Court of Appeals agreed with the Landowners that the superior court erred in its interpretation of the UDO by concluding that the shooting range fell within the Open Air Games category in the Table. However, it disagreed with the Landowners that the UDO did not regulate shooting ranges at all, and that it did in fact prohibit shooting ranges anywhere in the County by providing that “[u]ses not specifically listed in the Table [ ] are prohibited.” Accordingly, the court held that the superior court did not err in affirming the County’s order that Landowners cease and desist from operating a shooting range on the Property.

Police officer petitioned for review of an adjudication of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board finding that city employer was entitled to recover a portion of the Heart and Lung benefits it paid officer from officer’s third party tort claim settlement.

The Commonwealth Court held that:

• Employer did not waive issue of whether it was entitled to subrogation because Heart and Lung benefits constituted payments under Workers’ Compensation Act; and
• Employer was not entitled to subrogation.

Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law precluded officer from recovering the amount of benefits paid under the Heart and Lung Act from the responsible tortfeasor, and therefore, there could be no subrogation out of a tort recovery that did not include those benefits.

Student who lost her leg when school district bus ran over her filed action against school district under Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). District admitted liability. After jury awarded over $14 million in damages to student, the Court of Common Pleas amended verdict to $500,000 to reflect statutory cap on damages and sanctioned district $5,000 for not timely disclosing an excess insurance policy. Student appealed.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that:

• Classification created by statutory damages cap of PSTCA, distinguishing between plaintiffs suing public tortfeasors and those suing private defendants, did not violate equal protection;
• Damages cap of PSTCA did not violate open courts provision of State Constitution; and
• Damages cap in PSTCA did not violate constitutional right to jury trial of student.

Defendant was convicted in the Court of Common Pleas of three counts of bribery in official and political matters. Defendant appealed.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that:

• Evidence was sufficient to support conviction for bribery in official and political matters;
• The trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury that the default culpability requirement of reckless conduct applied to offense of bribery in official and political matters; and
• The error was harmless.

Defendant, a publicly elected official, stated to purchaser, who was purchasing land from town, that zoning approval could be expedited if purchaser paid an additional $500,000, the bribery statute did not require defendant to act with a corrupt motive, and it did not require that defendant solicit a benefit for himself, rather, benefit was defined to include situations where a public servant solicited money, gain, or an advantage for any other person or entity in whose welfare the servant was interested, and defendant sought to provide a benefit to town.

In January of 1997, Lifespan and New England Medical Center (NEMC) executed an MOU proposing an affiliation in which Lifespan would become NEMC’s corporate parent, and NEMC would in turn become one of the hospital subsidiaries in Lifespan’s system.

At the conclusion of the litigation that ensued following the disaffiliation of the parties, NEMC and the Massachusetts Attorney General obtained a judgment against Lifespan in the amount of $29,605,282.93 stemming from breaches of fiduciary duties and gross negligence in connection with the negotiation of NEMC’s health insurer contracts and an interest rate swap transaction.

The interest rate swap was entered into in connection with the refinancing of $100 million in NEMC revenue bonds. Morgan Stanley served as underwriter of the refi. Lifespan’s CFO had a close, longstanding personal friendship with the Morgan Stanley broker who proposed the swap. Lifespan’s CFO approved the swap over the objection of NEMC’s CFO. Lifespan’s CFO neglected to disclose the relationship and was possibly motivated by his desire to join the broker’s wine club. Spoiler alert: the swap goes bad.

Lifespan sued its D&O insurers after they refused to cover its losses.

The District Court held that the insurance policy’s Unlawful Advantage Exclusion, Deliberate Fraudulent Acts Exclusion, Contractual Liability Exclusion, and Professional Services Exclusion were not applicable to Lifespan’s claim against the policy.

The court then took up the issue of whether the Securities Exclusion – pertaining to claims related to the purchase or sale of securities – applied. The Securities Exclusion reads as follows:

“[t]he Insurer shall not be liable to make any payment for Loss in connection with a Claim made against an insured …

(m) alleging, arising out of, or in any way relating to any purchase or sale of securities by the Named Organization, Subsidiary or Affiliate or Claims brought by securities holders of the Organization in their capacity as such; provided, however, this exclusion shall not apply to the issuance by the Organization of tax exempt bond debt or Claims brought by tax exempt bond debt holders.”

As the court noted, “Whether this exclusion applies depends on which law defines the term “security” and whether the interest rate swap falls within that definition.”

The court began its analysis by holding that New York law governed the swap transaction due to the choice of law provision of the Master Agreement between Morgan Stanley and NEMC.

To be a security under Commercial Code § 8–102, an interest rate swap must fulfill the requirements of subparagraphs (i) (the transferability test), (ii) (the divisibility test) and (iii) (the functional test). The court concluded that the swap fulfilled none of the tests, much less all three. Consequently, the swap was not a security, and thus the Securities Exclusion did not apply.

The court also noted that the swap would not be a security for purposes of either Rhode Island, or Federal, law.

Lastly, the court found that even if the interest rate swap was a “arising out of, or in any way relating to any purchase or sale of securities,” there would be coverage because of the tax-exempt bond debt exception to the exclusion. Exclusion 4(m) states that it “shall not apply to the issuance by the Organization of tax exempt bond debt or Claims brought by tax exempt bond debt holders.” The interest rate swap, as described by the court in the underlying suit, was “a bond refinancing proposal” presented to NEMC by Morgan Stanley. Based on these facts from the underlying suit, Lifespan had met its burden to show that the interest rate swap’s refinancing of the tax-exempt bond debt of non-profit NEMC was part of “the issuance … of tax-exempt bond debt.” Consequently, even if the interest rate swap was “arising out of, or in any way relating to any purchase or sale of securities,” there was insurance coverage because of the tax-exempt bond debt exception to Exclusion 4(m).

Non-profit corporation engaged in performing arts commenced proceeding for review of city’s determination that two properties used to house staff and actors employed in corporation’s seasonal theaters were not tax exempt. The Supreme Court, Cayuga County granted city’s motion, treated as one for summary judgment, and denied corporation’s cross-motion for summary judgment. Corporation appealed. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, reversed. City appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• Corporation was organized exclusively for tax exempt purpose, and
• Primary use of apartment buildings was in furtherance of corporation’s primary purpose.

Court of Appeals holds that primary use of apartment buildings owned by non-profit corporation engaged in performing arts was in furtherance of corporation’s primary purpose of education and promoting moral or mental improvement of area residents, as required for those properties to be granted tax-exempt status. Housing was used to attract talent that would otherwise look elsewhere, living arrangements fostered sense of community, and building residents spent significant portion of their off-hours in furtherance of theater-related pursuits.

Francis and Mary Hussey sued Collier County claiming that the County’s amendment of its comprehensive future land use plan destroyed any reasonable economic use of their land, a large, undeveloped acreage in a rural area known as North Belle Meade. They sought compensation under the Bert J. Harris Private Property Rights Act, § 70.001, Fla. Stat. (2007) (the Harris Act), and on a theory of inverse condemnation.

The Circuit Court dismissed both causes of action with prejudice and the Husseys appealed.

The District Court of Appeal held that:

• The Husseys were not prohibited from seeking compensation under the Harris Act as the amendment to the County’s comprehensive plan reclassified the land use category of their property; and
• The Husseys inverse condemnation claim for a regulatory taking was barred by the statute of limitations.

Bank that had issued loan to developer brought negligence action against city, alleging that city, in approving development of residential project, had failed to ensure that developer posted adequate security and failed to determine legitimacy of purported surety that had issued fraudulent or uncollectible letter of credit as bond for project. The Circuit Court denied city’s motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity. City petitioned for writ of certiorari. The District Court of Appeal granted petition. Bank appealed.

The Supreme Court of Florida held that:

• Certiorari review of non-final order denying motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity was permitted, and
• City was entitled to sovereign immunity.

Action related to a discretionary function of government, rather than an operational function, and therefore city was entitled to sovereign immunity in negligence action brought by bank that had issued loan to real estate developer, alleging that city failed to ensure developer posted adequate security for completion of infrastructure and failed to conduct reasonable investigation to ascertain authenticity and adequacy of a letter of credit. City’s decision that receipt of written guarantee of security was sufficient compliance with municipal code fell within municipality’s inherent, fundamental policy-making authority.

Parents of passenger who died as a result of injuries sustained in rollover accident brought wrongful death action against city. The trial court denied city’s motion for summary judgment, and it appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• Even if city had no duty to provide working lighting at newly constructed intersection, absence of lighting could be considered as evidence on the issue of whether, at the time and place of the accident, the newly constructed intersection was being maintained in a reasonably safe condition, and
• Genuine issue of material fact as to whether city did assume, or should have assumed responsibility for lighting at newly constructed intersection precluded summary judgment on wrongful death action.

Public school teacher brought action against public school district and school board, alleging violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of school district. Teacher appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• School district and school board were not “arms of the state” of Georgia, and thus, were not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, and
• Teacher could not establish ADA retaliation claim.

Public school district and school board were not “arms of the state” of Georgia, and thus, were not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from liability, in terminated school employee’s Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) claims. Although the state set minimum standards for schools and teachers, and the state provided funding to school districts and approved school district budgets, Georgia law viewed school districts and boards as political subdivisions, distinct from the state, Georgia granted school districts significant amount of autonomy, under Georgia law, school districts were subject to control and management of county boards of education, not the state, school district could levy property taxes to raise funds, and state had no obligation to pay any judgment against district or board.

On October 25, 2010, after a public tax sale, the County of Kane and the Kane County treasurer and collector issued to Purchaser pursuant to section 21–250 of the Code, tax sale certificates for 11 tracts of land.

Purchaser later filed a motion requesting a declaration of a sale in error and a refund of its tax sale purchases because the County issued it tax sale certificates that listed a total purchase amount without specifically itemizing that amount into taxes, special assessments, interest, and costs.

The court dismissed, finding that the statute contained no requirement that the County itemize.

Firefighter, who was terminated after his drug test results came back as diluted, appealed his termination. The Municipal Fire & Police Service Board affirmed, and firefighter appealed. The District Court affirmed, and firefighter appealed.

The Court of Appeal held that fire department satisfied statutory minimum standards for terminating firefighter who was under investigation after he delayed drug test and drug test results came back as diluted.

Firefighter signed the Firefighters’ Bill of Rights, which was a reproduction of the provisions of statute governing minimum standards during investigation, firefighter had a letter from fire chief that indicated the nature of the investigation, firefighter was provided with all required written information, he used that information to provide a rebuttal document, he had the written notice with him while he was interrogated, he knew exactly what was occurring in relation to the investigation, and through the written notice and his copies of the bill of rights, he knew the identity of all persons present at each meeting with fire chief.

Community Involved in Sustaining Agriculture, Inc. (CISA) appealed the decision of a single member of the Appellate Tax Board (board) that CISA was not exempt from property taxes. The board concluded that CISA was not a charitable organization as defined in the statute because its dominant purpose is to benefit farmers, and “any benefit derived by the public [is] incidental.” On appeal, CISA argued that the board erred in construing the statute too narrowly.

The Appeals Court agreed, concluding that CISA more closely resembled a traditionally charitable organization than it did a commercial enterprise. “On the facts before it, the board erred in concluding that the primary beneficiaries of CISA’s services are its members, and any public benefit is incidental. Rather, the facts establish that CISA’s programs benefit an indefinite number of people, many of whom are not members, and any benefit to farmers ‘is but the means adopted for this purpose.'”

Lessees brought declaratory judgment action against city seeking determination that lessees were not liable for real estate taxes on properties. The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of city. Lessees appealed.

The Appeals Court held that lessees who remained on Massachusetts Port Authority property after lease terms expired remained liable as lessees for real estate taxes.

Business lessees who remained on property owned by Massachusetts Port Authority after end of lease terms constituted lessees, and therefore continued to remain liable as lessees for real estate taxes assessed during holdover period, where holdover provision in the leases set out the conditions of a continued tenancy after expiration of the lease term, and expressly stated that any holding over was subject to the applicable provisions of the lease.

The Court of Common Pleas of Berks County held that the subject property, an apartment building owned by the Reading Housing Authority (RHA), which houses a mix of 20% low-income and 80% market-rate tenants, was immune from real estate tax. The Board of Assessment Appeals of Berks County appealed.

The Commonwealth Court affirmed, holding that the RHA, which undertook the mixed-use project at issue pursuant to Section 10.1 of the Housing Authorities Law, was using the property for an essential public and governmental purpose such that it is not taxable.

Tourist, who was severely injured in fall from public walkway along oceanside cliff, brought negligence action against state and other defendants.

The Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that:

• Trial court acted within its discretion in denying motion for change of venue;
• Trial court acted within its discretion in taking jury to view walkway;
• Trial court’s determinations during trial did not violate law of case doctrine;
• Any error in admitting irrelevant evidence regarding ownership of land was not prejudicial;
• Trial court acted within its discretion in excluding letter from college president regarding death of student from fall;
• Trial court’s instruction regarding city’s liability insurance did not violate rule barring admission of evidence of such insurance; and
• Trial court acted within its discretion in denying motion to vacate judgment based on claims of newly discovered evidence.

City filed condemnation proceedings for the acquisition of the real property and fixtures of the Blue Mound Water and Wastewater System – a privately owned and operated water and wastewater system that was currently serving residents of the City. The City’s condemnation petition alleged that the City sought to exercise its powers of eminent domain under Texas Local Government Code section 251.001 and Texas Property Code chapter 21 to acquire the entire water and wastewater system.

The Court of Appeals held that no statutory procedures exist permitting a municipality’s condemnation in a Texas district court of a privately-owned public utility as a going concern, affirming the trial court’s grant of summary judgment against the City.

Dog owner appealed hearing examiner’s dangerous dog designation. The Superior Court upheld the dangerous dog designation, and dog owner appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that hearing examiner’s finding that owner’s dog killed neighbor’s cat without provocation was not supported by substantial evidence, as required to uphold dangerous dog designation.

Hearing examiner’s finding that owner’s dog killed neighbor’s cat without provocation was not supported by substantial evidence, as required to uphold dangerous dog designation, even though the killing occurred on neighbor’s property, as required to satisfy the “location” element of the dangerous dog definition. Nobody saw how the fight between dog and cat began, the cat roamed freely and passed through dog owner’s front yard regularly, dog had been trained to stay on owner’s property, and it was possible cat had provoked the attack by scratching dog’s nose when dog stuck it under a bush on owner’s property.

Police dispatcher sought judicial review of city’s decision to terminate her for disciplinary reasons. The Circuit Court upheld city’s decision to discipline dispatcher, but determined that she should only have been suspended. Dispatcher appealed.

The Court of Civil Appeals held that:

• Trial court did not have jurisdiction to consider dispatcher’s constitutional arguments, and
• Failure of mayor to attend hearing did not void dispatcher’s discipline.

County personnel board rule authorizing pre-disciplinary hearings did not require official with decision-making power to attend city police dispatcher’s pre-disciplinary hearing and thus, failure of mayor to attend hearing did not void dispatcher’s discipline. Rule, in referring to the official, or the designated representative of the official charged with responsibility of making disciplinary decision, specifically authorized pre-disciplinary hearings to be conducted by either the official charged with making the disciplinary decision or designated representative of that official, and fact that mayor was identified as designated appointing authority did not amount to declaration that he was designated representative.

Presbyterian Retirement operates Westminster Village, a continuing care retirement community. Presbyterian defaulted on its obligations, which included loans from PNC Bank and revenue bonds guaranteed by Infirmary Health System. Infirmary Health made good on the guarantee, paying out $13.5 million to the bondholders. Presbyterian is contractually obligated to reimburse Infirmary Health. Both PNC Bank and Infirmary Health hold security interests in Westminster Village.

PNC Bank commenced this lawsuit against Presbyterian, seeking expedited appointment of a receiver to manage Westminster Village pending a contemplated foreclosure sale that PNC Bank has noticed for March 2015. PNC did not name Infirmary Health as a party.

Infirmary Health moved to intervene, expressing profound disagreement with PNC Bank’s proposed strategy of appointing a receiver to manage Westminster Village. Infirmary Health asserted that the pathway charted by PNC Bank would impair the value of the facility rather than preserve it, thereby damaging Infirmary Health’s interests in such collateral.

The District Court granted Infirmary Health’s motion to intervene, finding that Infirmary Health had met its burden of showing that existing parties and any duly appointed receiver might not adequately represent its interests.

In two unrelated cases, school employees brought actions against county boards of education, challenging employment decisions. Boards moved to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds. In one case, the United States District Court denied motion, while, in the other, the District Court, granted motion. Parties appealed and appeals were consolidated.

The Court of Appeals held that school boards in Alabama counties were not arms or alter egos of state, and thus did not have Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Student’s mother, on her own behalf and as student’s parent and next friend, brought action against city, seeking damages for injuries student had allegedly sustained when classmate at high school pushed him into broken locker. After jury returned verdict in favor of plaintiffs, the Superior Court granted city’s motion to set aside verdict and rendered judgment in favor of city on governmental immunity grounds. Plaintiffs appealed.

The Supreme Court of Connecticut held that:

• Issue of whether broken locker with exposed jagged edge in high school boys’ locker room created an imminent risk of harm, as required for student who was pushed into locker during horseplay to establish exception to city’s special defense of governmental immunity, was for the jury, and
• The proper standard for determining whether a harm was imminent, as required to establish imminent harm exception to the general rule of governmental immunity, is whether it was apparent to the municipal defendant that the dangerous condition was so likely to cause harm that the defendant had a clear and unequivocal duty to act immediately to prevent the harm, overruling Burns v. Board of Education, 228 Conn. 640, 638 A.2d 1, and Purzycki v. Fairfield, 244 Conn. 101, 708 A.2d 937.

Developer, through his bankruptcy trustee, filed breach of contract action arising out of county’s failure to bring water and sewer utilities to property. The trial court denied county’s motion for summary judgment. County appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• Even if developer impact fee provision was invalid, provision was severable and remainder of contract was enforceable;
• County waived sovereign immunity over breach of contract action; and
• Genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment.

Even if impact fee provision in contract between developer and county was invalid, provision was severable, and thus the remainder of contract was enforceable, including county’s obligation to provide water and sewer utilities to property. Contract specifically provided that invalid or unenforceable parts of contract were severable, contract contained several promises by each party other than the promise to pay impact fees, and those other obligations were severable.

County waived sovereign immunity over developer’s breach of contract claim alleging county breached obligation to bring water and sewer utilities to property, where developer’s action was based on enforceable contract.

Genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether no-damages-for-delay clause in contract between county and developer precluded developer’s claim for damages resulting from delay due to county’s protracted discussions with city about which governmental entity was going to provide water and sewer utilities to property, thus precluding summary judgment on developer’s breach of contract claim against county.

Drainage District filed a petition to annex certain tracts of land and, thereafter, to assess the parcels pursuant to an annual drainage district assessment of $9 per acre. District also sought to assess certain lands currently located in the drainage district at $9 per acre. The circuit court of Christian County denied District’s request to annex the tracts of land and further ruled that those lands already located within the district could not be assessed at $9 per acre.

The Appeals Court affirmed, holding that the Drainage District failed to establish what benefit the Objectors’ lands would receive from being annexed and assessed.

Employees of parish school board who were terminated by reduction in force (RIF) after failing schools in parish were transferred to Recovery School District (RSD) filed putative class action against school board, state, Louisiana Department of Education (LDOE), and State Board of Elementary and Secondary Education for wrongful termination and also asserted claim against LDOE for tortious interference with employment contracts.

The Supreme Court of Louisiana held that:

• Global settlement dismissing with prejudice two actions against school board was valid, final judgment, for res judicata purposes;
• Causes of action arose out of transaction or occurrence that was subject matter of prior lawsuits and arbitrations;
• Causes of action existed at time of final judgment in prior action;
• Identity of parties was the same;
• As a matter of first impression, that former employees only received minimal consideration in settlement in prior action was not “exceptional circumstance” that would have barred application of res judicata;
• As a matter of first impression, that class action was not particularly dismissed in global settlement was not “exceptional circumstance” that would have barred application of res judicata; and
• School board’s method of attempting to rehire teachers following Hurricane Katrina was sufficient to satisfy due process.

Property owners filed a special motion to dismiss town’s amended complaint alleging zoning violations pursuant to the anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) statute. The Superior Court denied motion. Owners appealed.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held that town’s zoning enforcement action against property owners for a violation of shoreland zoning ordinance was not an appropriate occasion for application of the anti-SLAPP statute.

Nothing in the anti-SLAPP statute or its history expressed or implied that it would protect property owners from the town’s efforts to enforce an ordinance limiting the number of trailers that they were permitted to maintain on their land.

Following town’s code enforcement officer’s notice of violation of agricultural composting operator’s conditional use permit, operator appealed to town’s Zoning Board of Appeals. Board denied his appeal and upheld notice of violation. Operator challenged board’s decision and the Superior Court affirmed Board’s decision. Operator appealed.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held that:

• Agriculture Protection Act did not preempt town’s solid waste facilities ordinance, and
• Solid Waste Act did not preempt town’s solid waste facilities ordinance.

Even if agricultural composting operator was a “farm” for purposes of Agriculture Protection Act, producing agricultural products, as defined by the Act, on site, the Act did not preempt town’s solid waste facilities zoning ordinance as applied to operator. Although Act prohibited a municipality from determining that a farm’s method of operation violated a local ordinance if the farm had used best management practices, operator made no showing that it was following best practices when it violated the ordinance by failing to report its annual intake to town or to allow town representatives to inspect its premises.

Solid Waste Act did not preempt town’s solid waste facilities zoning ordinance as applied to agricultural composting operator, where the standards in the ordinance were not stricter than those in the Act, the ordinance’s definitions were not inconsistent with those in the Act, and the ordinance’s provisions did not frustrate the purpose of the Act.

School board sought review of decision of the board of tax appeals that auction sale price of property was the best evidence of its true value for tax purposes.

The Supreme Court of Ohio held that:

• Presumption that auction price does not represent value of property may be rebutted by evidence showing that the sale occurred at arm’s length between typically motivated parties, and
• Auction sale of foreclosed property was voluntary and occurred at arm’s length such that auction price represented value of property for tax purposes.

Following receipt of notice of violation (NOV) of zoning resolution related to operation of rolloff business on property zoned for general business uses, operator of rolloff business and owner of property on which business was operated filed declaratory judgment action against township, claiming that business’s use of property was permitted use under resolution, and in the alternative, that business’s operation on property was nonconforming use for which no permit was necessary. The Court of Common Pleas denied township summary judgment, and following bench trial, dismissed complaint. Operator and owner appealed, and township cross-appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• Rules of Civil Procedure were not applicable to service of NOV; but
• Error in applying Rules was harmless;
• Business operator and property owner had standing to appeal NOV to board of zoning appeals (BZA);
• BZA had ability to provide relief sought by business operator and property owner in declaratory judgment action; and
• Cross-appeal was improper.

Hospital landowner petitioned for judicial review of a decision by city board of zoning appeals (BZA) denying hospital’s application to construct a helipad because proposed helipad was prohibited use for local retail business district. The Court of Common Pleas reversed. Board appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed. Hospital sought further review, which was granted.

The Supreme Court of Ohio held that:

• Appellate court was only permitted to reverse decision of court of common pleas reviewing zoning decision if common pleas court decision was unsupported by substantial, reliable, and probative evidence on whole record, and
• Helipad was permissible accessory use of hospital.

Helipad was accessory use of hospital that was permitted in city’s multi-family district, and therefore was permitted use in area zoned local retail business district, where zoning ordinances contained no express prohibition on helipads, every other hospital in city had a helipad, and 88% of hospitals in the metropolitan area had helipads.

City firefighters who had suffered disabling injuries at work brought breach of contract action against city after city discontinued disability benefits. The Circuit Court granted summary judgment to city. Firefighters appealed.

The Supreme Court of Oregon held that:

• A firefighter’s “required duties,” as used in city charter provision allowing for disability benefits to a firefighter who is unable to perform required duties due to an employment-related injury or illness, refers to the core duties, that is, those that are necessary or essential, of whatever job classification the firefighter held at time he became disabled, and
• Court would decline to apply exhaustion doctrine to particular firefighter plaintiff.

A firefighter’s “required duties,” as used in city charter provision allowing for disability benefits to a firefighter who is unable to perform required duties due to an employment-related injury or illness, refers to the core duties, that is, those that are necessary or essential, of whatever job classification the firefighter held at time he became disabled, not to whatever subset of duties within firefighter’s former job classifications that city chooses to require after firefighter becomes disabled.

Bicyclist’s estate brought negligence action against police officers after police vehicle struck and killed bicyclist. The Circuit Court granted summary judgment to officers. Estate appealed.

The Supreme Court of Virginia held that police officers exercised their judgment and discretion while driving police vehicle in an emergency manner in response to dispatch report of domestic disturbance, as would trigger application of sovereign immunity.

Food and nutrition services manager at middle school, who was suspended for allegedly violating public schools’ regulations, brought declaratory judgment action, seeking declaration that statute, governing grounds and procedure for suspensions, required school boards to conduct a hearing prior to suspending an employee without pay. The Circuit Court granted the school board’s motion for summary judgment, and manager appealed.

The Supreme Court of Virginia held that:

• Any due process rights manager might have had as a non-teaching employee were fulfilled by the grievance process, and
• Education statute, governing grounds and procedure for suspensions, does not require a school board to hold a hearing before suspending a non-teaching employee without pay for fewer than five days.

City sought judicial review of city civil service commission order modifying police officer’s discipline and award of back pay as a remedy. The Superior Court granted city’s application for a statutory writ of review, and officer appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• Statutory writ of certiorari was not available to city as means of seeking judicial review of decision of city civil service commission, and
• The commission acted illegally to the extent it purported to retain jurisdiction over employment dispute to award back pay to police officer.

Statutory writ of certiorari was not available to city as means of seeking superior court’s review of decision of city civil service commission, in which commission found that city did not have cause to terminate police officer, and instead of termination, ordered 60 days without pay, demotion to patrol officer, and back pay. The legislature created a procedure for appeal that gave only the disciplined police officer the right to appeal, and did not provide the city with a right to appeal the commission’s decision.

City civil service commission acted illegally to the extent it purported to retain jurisdiction over employment dispute to award back pay to police officer, after the commission suspended police officer in lieu of removal, set a 60-day period of suspension without pay, and demoted officer to patrol officer. The commission only had the authority granted by statute, which provided it with the authority to affirm, modify, or reverse discipline, but which did not authorize it to award damages or other remedies such as back pay, and if the city does not honor its compensation obligations to officer, his remedy is in court, not before the commission.

Department of Ecology brought action against county, seeking injunction and declaratory judgment alleging that county’s ordinance banning use of most common class of biosolids within county conflicted with state law and, thus, violated state constitution. The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of county. Department appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• County ordinance banning use of biosolids prohibited what state law allowed;
• County ordinance banning use of biosolids thwarted legislative purpose of state law; and
• County ordinance banning use of biosolids exercised power legislature did not confer on local governments.

In February 2013, the Jacksonville Association of Fire Fighters filed suit against the City of Jacksonville and the Jacksonville Police and Fire Pension Fund Board of Trustees (“Board”) in District Court.

All parties voluntarily sought mediation in the federal case. For the next few months, several closed-door mediation sessions were held at a stipulated mediator’s office. No party informed the federal court that the negotiations would entail collective bargaining or that the provisions of the Florida Statutes and Constitution may require such collective bargaining to be conducted in public. There was no public notice of the mediation sessions nor was any transcript made of the proceedings.

The end result of the private mediation sessions was a Mediation Settlement Agreement (MSA), which, on its face, changed the specific, defined pension benefits of City employees in the Unions. The parties were to use their best efforts to obtain approval from their respected officials necessary for implementation of the MSA.

Newspaper editor brought action for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that closed-door federal mediation sessions violated the state Sunshine Law.

The circuit court found that the Board acted as the Unions’ representative and bargaining agent in the negotiations or the Unions themselves participated to some degree in negotiating the MSA. As such, the circuit court held that the federal mediation sessions violated the Sunshine Law, voided the MSA ab initio, and enjoined “the parties from conducting further proceedings entailing collective bargaining of the police officer and firefighter pension funds in private outside of the sunshine.”

The District Court of Appeal affirmed.

Challenger brought action against city, alleging amendment to city’s comprehensive plan was void due to failure to publish notice, and that city violated the Sunshine Law. The Circuit Court rejected the challenge to the amendment, and granted summary judgment in favor of city on challenger’s Sunshine Law claim. Challenger appealed.

The District Court of Appeal held that:

• Commission’s failure to comply with the notice provisions of statute that governed adoption of a municipal ordinance rendered ordinance that purported to amend city’s comprehensive plan null and void;
• Commission’s discussions at a series of seven closed shade meetings exceeded the scope of the Sunshine Law exemption for shade meetings; and
• The doctrine of cure did not apply to reinstate or cure city commission’s violation of the Sunshine Law.

Pedestrian brought action against city seeking damages stemming from trip and fall on city sidewalk. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of city. Pedestrian appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether city had superior knowledge of hazard caused by two-tiered sidewalk, precluding summary judgment.

“I knew I was coming up to the steps, so I paid attention. I just didn’t see the step there…. The next thing, I just sort of-I was going-I just shot out like that, and my head was going towards the car that was parked there, and I thought I was going to hit the car head-on. And then I just splatted on the sidewalk.”

In 2012, the Louisiana Legislature passed House Bill 974, which was enacted as Act 1 of 2012 (“Act 1”). Act 1 is a comprehensive repeal and reenactment of the State’s education laws. Act 1 amended and reenacted nine statutes, enacted two statutes, and repealed twenty-nine statutes.

Teachers filed a petition for declaratory judgment against the State, alleging that Act 1 was passed in violation of the “single object” requirement of La. Const. Art. III, § 15(A) and (C).

The Supreme Court of Louisiana held that Act 1 does not violate the single object requirement of La. Const. art. III, § 15(A).

The court found that analysis of the statutory provisions encompassed by Act 1 led to the conclusion that the main general purpose of Act 1 was improving elementary and secondary education through tenure reform and performance standards based on effectiveness and that all of the provisions of Act 1 were naturally connected with, and incidental or germane to the unifying object of improving education through tenure reform and performance standards based on effectiveness.

In 2012, Flint’s emergency manager established a special assessment district to help pay for improvements to the street-lighting system in the city. The assessment was spread equally among all parcels in the city, for a total cost of $66.05 per parcel.

Petitioner contested the special assessment on his properties, and initiated this suit before the Tax Tribunal. He argued that the special assessment was unlawful because: (1) it did not raise the market value of his property and was not proportional to the value of the services provided; (2) it did not constitute an “improvement” as required by statute; and (3) it included a special assessment for garbage collection, despite the fact that it professed to only raise funds for streetlight maintenance. Respondent stated that: (1) petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence to overcome the statutory presumption that special assessment districts are valid; (2) the special assessment was consistent with the law; and (3) Flint’s garbage disposal services were paid for by a fee imposed on landowners within the city, not the special assessment district, and petitioner offered no evidence to show otherwise.

The Tribunal agreed with respondent and dismissed petitioner’s case. In a written opinion, it held that: (1) petitioner’s case involved only one parcel, as he failed to pay the filing fee for the other parcels he owned, and thus did not invoke the Tribunal’s jurisdiction over those parcels; (2) petitioner did not establish that the cost of the assessment was disproportionate to its benefit; (3) MCL 117.4d(1)(a) allowed the city to levy a special assessment to cover the operational and maintenance costs of street lighting; and (4) the garbage collection service was provided by a fee, not by the instant special assessment district.

The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Former owner of property purchased by town brought action against town for declaratory and injunctive relief, asserting that town violated covenants in deed conveying real property to town. The Superior Court granted town’s motion to dismiss. Former owner appealed.

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that:

• Covenants relating to aesthetics of buildings that town would construct on property were in gross, not appurtenant;
• Section of Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes providing that an entity that holds the benefit of a covenant in gross can enforce it if it can establish a legitimate interest in enforcement would be adopted; and
• Former owner had legitimate interest in enforcing deed’s in gross covenants and thus had standing to bring action.

Natural gas utility brought action against borough and special improvement district, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief from borough’s refusal to issue construction permits so that utility could remove underground gas regulators and replace them with above-ground regulators. The Superior Court entered summary judgment in favor of utility. Borough and district appealed.

The Superior Court, Appellate Division, held that:

• Statute that granted gas utilities the power to lay conductors and install related facilities for conducting gas through municipality covered above-ground gas regulator;
• Utility’s decision to install regulators through public sidewalks did not comply with its obligation to restore street or public place, such as a sidewalk, under borough resolution; and
• Utility’s regulators were not exempt from regulation by borough.

Action was brought against State of New Mexico Public Education Department, challenging constitutionality of provisions of Instructional Material law (IML), providing for the purchase and distribution of instructional material to private schools. The District Court entered summary judgment in favor of State. Plaintiffs appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• IML did not violate state constitutional provision prohibiting the use of state funds for the support of sectarian, denominational, and private schools;
• IML did not violate state constitutional Anti–Donation Clause;
• IML did not violate state constitutional provision prohibiting appropriations for educational purposes to any institution not under the absolute control of the state; and
• IML did not violate federal or state constitutional provisions prohibiting the support of any religious sect or denomination.

Shareholders in investment funds organized as business trusts under Massachusetts law (the “Trusts”) brought shareholder derivative suits alleging that the Trusts and the Trusts’ former investment advisers (“Adviser”) breached their fiduciary duties and wasted corporate assets by causing the trusts to redeem auction rate preferred securities (“ARPS”) at their liquidation value, at a time when the market valued the shares at a lower rate. Plaintiffs further alleged that Morgan Stanley, the parent company of the former investment advisers, aided and abetted the breaches.

These liquidations occurred in 2008 when the ARS market dried up. The Trusts, with the approval of their boards, used tender option bonds (TOBs) or debt financing to redeem the ARPS. Plaintiffs allege that TOBs and debt financing increased the costs and the risks to the Trusts without concomitant benefit. Specifically, TOBs forced the Trusts to sell lower grade bonds into a distressed market and to hold municipal bonds, which paid a lower interest rate and prevented the Trusts from making other investments which would have been more profitable. TOBs also required the Trusts to post more assets to satisfy the debt coverage ratio than the ARPS did and cost additional fees. Plaintiffs alleged that the Trusts could have marked the ARPS down below their liquidation value and redeemed them at market value at much lower cost to investors.

Plaintiffs contended that the Adviser gave priority to their own interests in determining to redeem the ARPS at liquidation value and, thus, breached their fiduciary duties to the common shareholders. Plaintiffs alleged that the redemption of the ARPS at liquidation value benefited ARPS holders—largely institutional investors and high net worth individuals, and broker-dealers—and that the Adviser sought to preserve their business relationships with those investors to the detriment of the shareholders of the Trusts.

In April 2010, plaintiffs sent letters to the Trusts demanding that the boards “take action” against the Adviser and the officers of the Trusts for alleged breaches of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting of those breaches, and corporate waste.

The Trusts responded by forming special litigation committees (“SLCs”) comprised of independent trustees. The SLCs engaged independent counsel, conducted lengthy investigations, and produced voluminous reports concluding that it was not in the best interests of the Trusts to pursue litigation and recommending that the Trusts move to dismiss the pending lawsuits.

All defendants contended that, because the trustees were independent and conducted an investigation through the SLCs, the decision not to prosecute this action was protected by the business judgment rule, and the mandatory language of MBCA Section 7.44 compelled dismissal of this action.

Plaintiffs contended that the SLCs’ investigations and reports, upon which the determination not to proceed with litigation was indisputably based, were not undertaken in good faith after a reasonable inquiry “because the evidence overwhelmingly disproves the SLC’s conclusions.”

The court noted that where a majority of independent trustees reject a plaintiff’s demand to pursue derivative litigation based on the report of an independent SLC, the business judgment rule applies to the decisions of both the trustees and the SLCs.

The court held that plaintiffs’ claims must be dismissed. Applying the burden shifting standards of MBCA section 7.44 and the business judgment rule in reviewing the SLCs’ investigations and the independent trustees’ determinations to reject plaintiffs’ demands based the recommendations, the court holds that plaintiffs had failed to rebut the Trusts’ showing and to demonstrate that the independent trustees’ determinations were not made in good faith after reasonable inquiry. The investigation process was reasonably comprehensive, and the SLCs’ findings, which the trustees’ adopted, were not illogical and could be attributed to a rational business judgment.

The court noted that the plaintiffs misconstrued the standard under the Massachusetts statute for judicial review of the trustees’ determinations. Plaintiffs contended repeatedly that the findings and recommendations of the SLCs were against the weight of the evidence. However, it is not the courts’ role to weigh the evidence or assess the correctness of the SLCs’ or trustees’ reasoning, where, as here, the decision of disinterested trustees, based on a comprehensive report of a disinterested special litigation committee, is protected by the business judgment rule.

The City of New York and the Central Park Conservancy entered into the 2006 Central Park Agreement, a contract between the City and the Conservancy, a nonprofit organization, in which they acknowledged that they had formed an effective “public/private partnership.” Under the Agreement, the Conservancy is required to provide specified maintenance services in Central Park to the “reasonable satisfaction” of the City, and the City is broadly required to indemnify the Conservancy from liability.

In a negligence action against the City, plaintiff moved for leave to amend the complaint to add the Conservancy as a defendant, arguing that it was united in interest with the City. Since the statute of limitations had run as to the Conservancy, plaintiff argued that the relation back doctrine applied.

The Appeals Court held that:

• The City was vicariously liable for the Conservancy’s negligence in the course of providing maintenance in Central Park by virtue of the contractual indemnification provision, and the parties were thus united in interest.
• Since the City has a nondelegable duty to maintain Central Park, it was vicariously liable for negligence committed by the contractor in the course of fulfilling that duty.
• However, the City was correct that its interests were not united with those of the Conservancy with respect to the proposed gross negligence claim, and leave to assert that claim against the Conservancy was therefore denied.

In October, 2010, Twin City Hospital – a small, rural acute-care facility – filed Chapter 11 Bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Trustee subsequently sued Twin City’s former board members, alleging that they had acted improperly by issuing approximately $17.3 million in tax exempt revenue bonds to fund new construction and renovations to Twin City and to refinance the hospital’s outstanding long-term obligations while its finances were in poor condition.

The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Trustee appealed, claiming that issues of fact existed that should be resolved by a jury. Trustee argued that the trial court’s finding that defendants proved their case by a preponderance of the evidence precluded summary judgment and that it was error for the trial court to factor the trial standard of clear and convincing evidence into its decision to grant defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• The trial court did not err in considering the “clear and convincing” burden of proof at trial.
• Trustee was required to present sufficient evidence that members of the board consciously disregarded the risk that approval of the capital project in this matter would result in injury/damage to the hospital and that Trustee failed to satisfy this burden.
• Trustee failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact that would require submitting any of his claims to a jury.

Landowners of property across the road from proposed agronomy facility appealed approval by county commission of applicant’s conditional use permit for the facility. The Circuit Court affirmed. Landowners appealed.

The Supreme Court  of South Dakota held that:

• Commission’s reliance on zoning ordinance criteria was not arbitrary and capricious, and
• Landowners did not meet their burden to prove that commissioner’s pre-hearing investigation and ex parte communication with applicant so that the proceeding violated the landowners’ due process rights.

Initiative proponents brought declaratory judgment action against Lieutenant Governor and County Clerk, alleging amended provisions for placing a local initiative on the ballot were unconstitutional. The District Court found the amendments did not violate any constitutional provisions, and the proponents appealed.

The Supreme Court of Utah held that:

• Statutory amendment that required local initiative proponents to collect signatures equal to ten percent of the votes cast in the most recent presidential election, rather than ten percent of the votes cast in the prior gubernatorial election, did not amount to a per se unreasonable restriction on the right to initiative;
• Amendment did not unduly burden the right to initiative under State Constitution;
• Amendment served a legitimate governmental purpose;
• Amendment did not violate the uniform operation of laws provision of the State Constitution; and
• Amendment did not improperly hinder initiative proponents’ First Amendment right to express their political message by means of a ballot initiative.

Retired firefighter, as class representative, brought action challenging city pension fund’s board of trustees’ decision not to issue supplemental benefit checks. Following settlement, firefighter sought attorney fees on behalf of himself and the class. The Circuit Court awarded fees with a contingency fee multiplier of 2.0. The board appealed. The District Court of Appeal affirmed in part and reversed in part and certified question of great public importance.

The Supreme Court of Florida held that:

• Firefighters were entitled to award of statutory prevailing party attorney fees, and
• Firefighters pleaded claim for attorney fees with sufficient specificity.

Prevailing party attorney fees provisions of statutes governing municipal firefighter and police pensions permitted firefighters to recover attorney fees in action brought to obtain benefits under firefighter pension plan established by local law, where, although the pension plan at issue was a local law plan created by special act of the legislature, that plan existed within and was subject to framework for local plans established by statutes governing municipal firefighter and police pension plans.

Firefighters were not required to specify under which statutory provision or provisions attorney fees were sought, and therefore firefighters pleaded claim for attorney fees with sufficient specificity in class action to obtain benefits under local law firefighter pension plan. Merely pleading a claim for attorney’s fees was sufficient to notify opposing party and allow it to consider claim in decision on whether to proceed.

Developer sued county and county officials, seeking writ of mandamus based on claim that zoning ordinance was invalid.

The Superior Court entered summary judgment for county, and developer appealed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. On remand, the Superior Court entered summary judgment for developer and ruled that ordinance was invalid. County defendants appealed.

The Supreme Court of Georgia held that ordinance that purported to incorporate non-existent maps was void from its enactment.

Mayor brought declaratory judgment action against city, alleging city council’s actions in extending city administrator’s contract were illegal and ultra vires, and sought injunctive relief and attorney fees. The trial court granted mayor a permanent injunction, declared the actions of the council void, and awarded mayor attorney fees. City appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• City council lacked the authority to unilaterally extend city administrator’s employment contract with city beyond the end of the contract term, and thus, any extension beyond the contract term was ultra vires, or void;
• Mayor was entitled to reasonable attorney fees for independent counsel he retained to bring declaratory judgment action against city; and
• Counsel’s affidavit submitted in support of city mayor’s request for attorney fees was sufficient to support an award of reasonable attorney fees.

Council lacked the authority to unilaterally extend city administrator’s employment contract with city beyond the end of the contract term, and thus, any extension beyond the contract term was ultra vires, or void. While city had the power to enter into contracts with private persons under city charter, the position of city administrator existed by virtue of the mayor’s delegation of his authority and his power to appoint officers and employees of city, and thus, any employment of city administrator beyond that provided for in charter and ordinance, was governed by the same procedure set forth in the charter for the mayor’s delegation of authority and power to appoint.

City, to which land had been designated for annexation pursuant to General Assembly’s local act, filed petition seeking declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against city that sought to annex same land pursuant to “100% method” of annexation. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of city to which land had been designated under local act. City that sought annexation through “100% method” appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• Local act went into effect when it was signed by the Governor;
• As an issue of first impression, city was prohibited from annexing land through “100% method” during referendum process under local act; and
• Enforcement of local act did not violate constitutional one-subject-matter rule.

General Assembly’s local act, which identified annexation area for inclusion within city’s corporate limits and directed county elections superintendent to hold referendum to allow a vote on whether designated area should be annexed, went into effect when it was signed by the Governor to initiate the referendum process on the defined annexation area, and the referendum was a condition precedent for annexation, even though annexation, if approved, was not supposed to become effective until end of year. Although language providing that the act would not become effective until end of year was inartfully worded, the act provided that if voters disapproved the annexation, the act not only would “not become effective,” it would also be “automatically repealed,” and there would be no need to repeal an act that was not effective.

City was prohibited from attempting to annex land through “100% method” of annexation, requiring application by all owners of the land, during referendum process of local act by General Assembly, pursuant to which legislature had designated same land for annexation to another city upon voter approval of referendum. “100% method” was not intended to restrict General Assembly’s constitutionally granted annexation powers, allowing city to annex land through “100% method” before referendum took place would, in essence, allow it to unilaterally effectuate an amendment to the local act, and “100% method” did not allow city to race the General Assembly to annex land that had already been designated for annexation under local law.

Enforcement of local act that provided for annexation of land to city upon voter approval of referendum did not violate constitutional one-subject-matter rule that all legislation have a single subject matter by simultaneously deannexing land from city that had purported to annex same land through alternative “100% method” of annexation and annexing land to city upon approval of referendum. City that purported to annex land through “100% method” lacked authority to annex that land during pendency of referendum process, and thus no annexation through the “100% method” had occurred and no violation of one-subject-matter rule arose.

Grading subcontractor, who had not been paid for work on subdivisions by general contractor, brought common law third-party beneficiary breach of contract action against village.

The Circuit Court granted subcontractor summary judgment, and village appealed. The Appellate Court affirmed. Village petitioned for leave to appeal.

The Supreme Court of Illinois held that bonds procured under Public Construction Bond Act were deemed to contain both completion and payment provisions.

Paragraph of the Public Construction Bond Act mandating that a political subdivision of the State, whenever making a contract for public works in excess of the specified dollar threshold, must have the contractor deliver “a bond” with good and sufficient sureties does not require the furnishing of a “completion bond” and a “payment bond” but, rather, the procurement of “a bond” for the public work.

Town filed complain seeking to vacate labor arbitration award, determining that town had violated collective bargaining agreement with firefighters’ union by unilaterally increasing copayment amounts that union members paid for medical services under their health insurance plans.

The Superior Court Department confirmed the portion of the arbitration award compelling the parties to bargain collectively over changes to copayment rates, but vacated two remedial aspects of the award. Union appealed, The Appeals Court affirmed. Union applied for further appellate review.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that arbitrator did not exceed her authority by ordering town to restore prior rates of contribution and requiring restitution.

Abutting landowner appealed zoning board of appeals’ approval of permit to construct a single family home. The Land Court entered summary judgment in favor of abutting landowner. Applicant for permit appealed.

The Appeals Court held that:

• Diagonal measurement of lot depth was not consistent with ordinary meaning of lot depth, and
• Fact that lot was combined with two other lots did not render controversy moot.

Diagonal measurement of lot depth was not consistent with ordinary meaning of “lot depth,” in zoning bylaw that required a minimum lot depth of 125 feet for the construction of a single family home in an “RSA” residential zoning district, where lot was more or less rectangular, use of a diagonal line to measure the depth of a rectangular lot was contrary to the ordinary and accepted meaning of the term, and there was no evidence that there was an established practice of using a diagonal line.

In June 2013, City commenced action against individual members of LLC formed to hold/develop subdivision lots for unpaid interest on deferred special assessments.

Members answered, admitting the nonpayment but denying any individual obligation to pay deferred special assessments or interest on the special assessments. The city subsequently moved for summary judgment arguing that under the plain, unambiguous language of the contracts, appellants are liable for the unpaid assessments and interest. The District Court granted summary judgment to City and the Members appealed.

The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the in rem nature of special assessments precluded personal liability for special assessments against the property and that the district court misconstrued the relevant agreements to unambiguously state that appellants agreed to be personally liable for special assessments and annual assessment interest against the property.

“Because there is no language in the agreements stating that appellants agreed to be personally liable for the assessments and interest, the agreements do not unambiguously confer liability to appellants, and the district court’s conclusion to the contrary is erroneous. The city, which drafted the transfer agreement, is essentially a party to the project as it provided the infrastructure knowing the risks of an ever-changing economy and that this is a long-term project with many lots to sell. The city-drafted transfer agreement does not create individual liability against appellants as there is no separate writing or specific language in the agreement which evidences any intent to impose personal liability. Had the city desired to hold Rutten and Rodenwald individually liable for assessments and interest, the city could have incorporated specific language to that effect, or had the individuals execute a personal guaranty separate from the transfer agreement. And the attorney for the city, who drafted the transfer agreement, acknowledged at oral argument that the agreements could have been drafted better. Therefore, we conclude that the district court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of the city on the basis that the agreements unambiguously confer personal liability to appellants for the assessments and interest.”

City filed a petition in condemnation, seeking to condemn various properties to build a police station and crime lab for public use. The Circuit Court granted the city’s condemnation petition, and following a trial on exceptions to the damages assessed by three appointed commissioners, a jury determined the fair market value of landowner’s property to be $55,000. Landowner appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• City met the statutory notice requirement for good faith negotiations;
• The taking of landowner’s property for police station was for a public use;
• Fact that the same three commissioners were appointed by the same judge in other condemnation cases commenced as part of the city’s police campus project did not render them interested; and
• Landowner was not entitled to an automatic change of judge in condemnation action since her request was untimely.

BEZR Homes appealed from the grant of summary judgment in favor of township’s municipal engineers – Remington & Vernick Engineers and Kenneth Ressler, an engineer with Remington. BEZR argued that the trial court erroneously ruled that Ressler and Remington were public employees under the Tort Claims Act (TCA).

The appeals court affirmed, holding that the Remington defendants were in fact public employees, and thus the TCA’s two-year statute of limitations applied.

Owner of retail building brought hybrid Article 78 proceeding and declaratory judgment action against town, town’s zoning board of appeals (ZBA), ZBA members, owner of neighboring building, and prospective operator of proposed restaurant in neighboring building, challenging ZBA’s granting, for proposed restaurant, of variances from town code’s parking and loading/unloading restrictions, and alleging that proposed restaurant required a use variance rather than an area variance.

The Supreme Court, Nassau County, denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding/action on the merits. Owner of retail building appealed. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, affirmed. Leave to appeal was granted.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• Requests for off-street parking variances should be evaluated by applying the standards for an area variance so long as the property is intended to be used for a purpose permitted in the zoning district, overruling Matter of Off Shore Rest. Corp. v. Linden, 30 N.Y.2d 160, 282 N.E.2d 299, 331 N.Y.S.2d 397, and
  Town ZBA properly considered the application for off-street parking variance as a request for an area variance.

Current and retired city police officers and firefighters brought actions alleging that city’s failure to pay them certain wages and benefits violated federal and state constitutions, Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), and state law. The District Court granted in part and denied in part city’s motions to dismiss, and it appealed. Appeals were consolidated.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• District court’s orders rejecting city’s governmental immunity defense were subject to interlocutory review;
• Officers and firefighters were not required to provide preaudit certificates before bringing suit; and
• Officers and firefighters plausibly satisfied “reduced to writing” requirement of city’s charter.

City appealed county’s decision that bridge was not one of general and public utility, such that county was not responsible for bridge maintenance and repairs. The Court of Common Pleas reversed. County appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed. County sought discretionary review.

The Supreme Court of Ohio held that:

• Doctrine of judicial estoppel did not bar city from arguing that road on which bridge was located was road of general and public utility, and
• Reliable, probative, and substantial evidence supported conclusion of Court of Common Pleas that road that connected village and city was one of general and public utility.

Reliable, probative, and substantial evidence supported conclusion of Court of Common Pleas in city’s administrative appeal that road that connected village and city was one of general and public utility, and thus county was responsible for maintaining and repairing bridge that was located on road. Evidence indicated that road and bridge provided access to national park and only motor-vehicle access to railroad station, and bridge provided only means for accessing portion of road in city, two streets to which road connected in city, and businesses and facilities located off those streets.

Board of education appealed tax commissioner’s decision both denying board’s motion to intervene and granting exemption to city regarding real-property taxes concerning property that constituted part of city’s convention center. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) dismissed appeal. Board appealed.

The Supreme Court of Ohio held that:

• Board failed to comply with statute governing complaints against real property tax exemption and thus failed to invoke BTA’s jurisdiction, and
• Tax commissioner’s statutory authority to extend time for board of education to file statement of intent to submit evidence and participate in any hearing regarding exemption application did not confer jurisdiction on tax commissioner regarding board.

Board of education failed to comply with statute governing complaints against applications for real property tax exemptions and thus failed to invoke jurisdiction of Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) regarding tax commissioner’s decision both denying board’s motion to intervene and granting exemption to city regarding real-property taxes concerning property that constituted part of city’s convention center, where board failed to file request to be informed of exemption applications and failed to file timely statement of its intent to submit evidence and participate in any hearing.

City police chief brought an action for declaratory and injunctive relief against city, city manager, and the mayor after city board of commissioners passed an ordinance removing police chief’s supervisory and management authority over the police department. The District Court issued a permanent injunction against enforcement of the ordinance. Defendants appealed.

The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that:

• Police chief did not have inherent authority to manage police department;
• Police chief was not denied due process protection; and
• Board was authorized to pass ordinance.

Elected home-rule city police chief did not have inherent authority to manage and supervise police department without interference from other local municipal powers, where duty to supervise and manage the police department was not expressly granted in city charter, rather, charter expressly vested only one duty, enforcement of state law and municipal ordinances, with the police chief.

Process afforded to police chief by city board of commissioners, in passing ordinance that removed police chief’s supervisory and management authority over police department, complied with due-process protections even though a property right was not implicated. Police chief was not removed from office and retained emoluments of office, and he was given adequate notice of the proposed ordinance and the opportunity to be heard at a public meeting held to discuss the ordinance.

Home-rule city charter which directed city board of commissioners to set the powers and duties of an elected police chief allowed the board to limit those powers and duties by removing the police chief’s supervisory and management authority over the police department by ordinance, where the ordinance came from a grant of authority in the city charter, and was not contrary to statute, precedent, or Constitution.

City, city manager and city resident filed petitions for judicial review of applications filed by property owners pursuant to legislation permitting landowners with property located on the boundary of the City of Damascus to withdraw that property from the jurisdiction of the city.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• City and city manager were not members of the “the public” having standing to seek judicial review;
• City resident who testified at public hearing had standing to seek judicial review;
• Petition for review was not rendered moot with respect to property owner following approval of boundary change by the Oregon Department of Revenue;
• Legislation allowing interested landowners to fix the boundaries of the city constituted an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.

Legislation permitting landowners with property located on the boundary of the City of Damascus to withdraw that property from the jurisdiction of the city constituted an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to private individuals. Legislation contained no criteria or expression of legislative policy as to how that delegated authority was to be exercised by the landowners, and legislation delegated to self-interested private landowners the fact-finding function of determining their own eligibility under the law without any meaningful procedural safeguards.

Edison Learning, Inc. – a private education services contractor – brought suit against the School District of Philadelphia for breach of contract, claiming that the School District must reimburse Edison Learning for its legal fees and settlement costs from a prior suit in which a School District student was assaulted the “Viruet litigation”).  The School District moved for summary judgment, claiming sovereign immunity.

Edison sought its legal fees and costs of settlement pursuant to two related theories. First, it alleged that the School District breached its contractual obligation to provide “appropriate safety and police protection” to Viruet, which resulted in the Viruet litigation and Edison’s settlement of the claims against it.   Second, Edison claimed that during the Viruet litigation the School District orally agreed to indemnify Edison for the lawsuit.

The District Court held that School District was entitled to sovereign immunity, as Edison’s claims were properly construed as recovery for Viruet’s tort damages, not as a breach of contract.

After board of county commissioners amended its acceptance of dedicated parkland to permit construction of a road serving an adjoining residential development, county taxpayers challenged the legality of the board’s action. The Superior Court dismissed action on standing and for failure to state a claim. Taxpayers appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• Taxpayers had standing to challenge legality of the amendment;
• Taxpayers stated claim that amendment violated deed which dedicated park;
• County received legally sufficient consideration to support its grant of an easement;
• Court properly denied taxpayers’ motion to disqualify county prosecutor.

County taxpayers had standing to challenge legality of county’s amendment to its acceptance of a dedicated parkland to permit construction of a road serving adjoining residential development based solely upon their status as taxpayers and their prior demand on state attorney general to take action.

County received legally sufficient consideration to support its grant of an easement through dedicated parkland, to private real estate developer in order to construct a road, and thus easement was not a gift of public property in violation of state constitution, where county had concluded that the road would be beneficial to area traffic circulation and would relieve pressure on a state highway intersection.

Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendants Judicial Collection Services (“JCS”) and the City of Childersburg (“Childersburg”). Plaintiffs alleged various constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arising out of the contractual relationship between JCS and Childersburg for probation and fee collection services. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as money damages.

Plaintiffs served a subpoena for testimony and production of documents on nonparty Larry Ward, a former part-time municipal court judge for Childersburg and various other municipalities. Otherwise, Ward’s full-time employment over the relevant time-period was as a municipal bond salesman with Morgan Keegan & Company, now known as Raymond James Financial.

Plaintiffs sought various documents from Ward, including (1) any documents relating to JCS whatsoever; (2) procedural manuals or other documents concerning any of the municipal courts at which Ward served; (3) copies of K1 and W–2 forms showing income earned by Ward as a municipal court judge for any municipality in Alabama for the last five years; (4) awards received by Ward for service as a municipal judge; (5) contracts between Ward and any of the municipalities he served; (6) documents showing remuneration from bond activity in any of the municipalities Ward served; (7) documents showing rating adjustments on bonds for any of the municipalities Ward served; and (8) awards received by Ward for participation in bond issues in Alabama for the past five years.

Ward filed a Motion to Quash Subpoena and Motion for Protective Order, claiming judicial immunity.

The District Court held that judicial immunity shielded Ward, with the one exception that he was subject to discovery related to his nonjudicial involvement in negotiating, recommending, and executing the contract for services between JCS and Childersburg.

California Public Employee Retirement System (CalPERS) objected to city’s eligibility for Chapter 9 relief and to its good faith in filing petition.

The Bankruptcy Court held that:

• City’s conduct objectively demonstrated its desire to effect a plan, as mandated by Chapter 9 eligibility requirements;
• City acted in “good faith” when, in response to financial crisis precipitated by dramatic increase in mortgage foreclosures and diminished municipal revenues, it filed for Chapter 9 relief just before it ran out of funds to pay its employees; and
• Even assuming that municipality exhibited lack of good faith in filing for Chapter 9 Relief without engaging in any meaningful prepetition negotiation with its creditors or seriously considering other alternatives to alleviate its financial distress, court would exercise its discretion to refrain from dismissing case.

City’s actions, when faced with inevitable default upon its obligations during time of decreased municipal revenues, in preparing and presenting budget report at public meeting of mayor and common council, preparing and presenting staff report to common council, conducting open public meeting discussions regarding its financial future, voting to declare a fiscal emergency and approving resolutions permitting it to file for Chapter 9 relief, preparing a cash flow analysis report, preparing fiscal emergency plan, which was presented to common council and approved prepetition, and preparing and discussing pre-pendency plan at common council meetings, objectively demonstrated its desire to effect a plan, as mandated by Chapter 9 eligibility requirements.

City acted in “good faith” when, in response to financial crisis precipitated by dramatic increase in mortgage foreclosures and diminished municipal revenues, it filed for Chapter 9 relief just before it ran out of funds to pay its employees without impairing its contracts, though city did not engage in meaningful prepetition negotiations with its creditors and did not seriously consider alternatives to filing for Chapter 9 relief.

Even assuming that municipality exhibited lack of good faith in filing for Chapter 9 relief without engaging in any meaningful prepetition negotiation with its creditors or seriously considering other alternatives to alleviate its financial distress, court would exercise its discretion to refrain from dismissing case, where only one creditor was objecting to municipality’s Chapter 9 filing, municipality’s cash deficit was real and unchallenged, and dismissal would leave city in financial quagmire without orderly court oversight.

Ratepayers sued Pacific Gas & Electric Co. for deceptively representing to the California Public Utilities Commission and the public how much revenue it required to provide safe and reliable natural gas service. The class action complaint sought restitution and disgorgement of profits for PG&E’s wrongful diversion of more than $100 million in rates it collected over a thirteen year period that should have been expended on natural gas pipeline safety projects.

The Superior Court sustained demurrer without leave to amend. Ratepayers appealed.

The Court of Appeal held that ratepayers’ action would interfere with the Public Utilities Commission’s duties and thus was barred.

PUC exercised its authority to adopt a regulatory policy in connection with natural gas utility’s alleged diversion of funds that should have been expended on natural gas pipeline safety projects, as required for a lawsuit against utility based on the alleged diversions to be barred by PUC’s exercise of exclusive jurisdiction, where the PUC established rates for utility’s natural gas transmission operations in five different rate proceedings during the period when funds allegedly were diverted, and PUC initiated four regulatory investigative proceedings after a pipeline explosion.

Ratepayers’ putative class action against natural gas utility for restitution and disgorgement of profits for allegedly diverting funds that should have been expended on natural gas pipeline safety projects would interfere with PUC’s exercise of its regulatory authority in establishing rates for utility’s natural gas transmission operations and initiating regulatory investigative proceedings after a pipeline explosion, and thus ratepayers’ action was barred, where the scope of one of PUC’s investigations included ascertaining “whether safety violations have occurred, and if so to impose fines and remedies,” and the PUC made findings that ratepayers had not been subject to unreasonable costs, and that ratepayers ended up paying rates lower than might have been reasonable due to the absence of the needed safety improvement projects.

Landowners filed action against county, alleging that county confiscated value of lease with cellular telephone company, which constituted an improper taking by inverse condemnation, and other claims. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of county. Landowners appealed grant of summary judgment on inverse condemnation claim.

The Court of Appeals held that landowners had no property right that was taken by county.

Landowners, who had option contract with cellular telephone company to install tower on their property, had no property right that was taken by county when it entered into agreement with company to install tower on county’s nearby property, and thus landowners failed to support inverse condemnation claim against county for alleged lost business opportunity. Landowners did not have a lease with company, but rather merely had expectation of lease, which was extinguished when company chose not to exercise its option, as was its right.

Injured bus passenger brought personal injury action against Regional Transit Authority. The State Court denied Regional Transit Authority’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, which was based on the statute of limitations. Regional Transit Authority applied for interlocutory appeal, which was granted.

The Court of Appeals held that tolling provision applicable to claims against municipal corporations did not apply.

Statute tolling limitations period applicable to claim against municipal corporation during time demand for payment is pending did not apply to injured bus passenger’s personal injury claim against Regional Transit Authority, even though Tort Claims Act stated that other tolling provisions were applicable to claims brought under Act. Only tolling provisions that could be harmonized with Act were applicable, and tolling provision could not be harmonized since its purpose was to encourage municipal compliance with statutory 30-day deadline to reply to demands for payment, while state agencies like Regional Transit Authority had no corresponding obligation to respond to ante litem notices.

Property owner appealed decision of county board of revision that dismissed property owner’s valuation complaint concerning real property tax assessment. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirmed. Property owner appealed.

The Supreme Court of Ohio held that:

• TIF agreement’s no-contest covenant did not impose jurisdictional limitation on county board of revision (BOR);
  County commissioners and board of education (BOE) had burden of advancing covenant as defense; and
  TIF agreement’s section allowing property owners to contest certain taxes, assessments, and government charges did not contradict covenant.

TIF agreement’s no-contest covenant, which precluded developer and property owners from contesting assessed valuations of improvements for real property tax purposes, did not impose jurisdictional limitation on county BOR regarding property owner’s valuation complaint. Source of covenant’s legal force was not statutory.

County commissioners and BOE, as beneficiaries of TIF agreement’s no-contest covenant, which precluded developer and property owners from contesting assessed valuations of improvements for real property tax purposes, had burden of advancing covenant as defense to property owner’s valuation complaint in property owner’s appeal before BTA concerning dismissal of complaint by county BOR, and thus property owner was not required to establish that covenant did not bar complaint.

TIF agreement’s section allowing property owners to contest certain taxes, assessments, and government charges did not contradict agreement’s no-contest covenant, which precluded developer and property owners from contesting assessed valuations of improvements for real property tax purposes. Covenant addressed only valuation for property-tax purposes to extent that it determined amount of service payments by setting value of improvement, and section addressed other taxes and charges that might have become lien on property.

Landowner’s inverse condemnation claim against town was dismissed by the trial court based upon her failure to join her mortgagee, a known lienholder of the property, as a party to the action.

The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the purpose of joining interested parties in a condemnation proceeding is to protect the rights of those parties, not to shield defendants from potential liability and that the joinder of lienholders was not mandatory.

Residents brought action against City to challenge its approval of a conditional zoning agreement (CZA), claiming the CZA was inconsistent with City’s comprehensive plan and violated state statute limiting conditional rezoning. The Superior Court entered summary judgment in favor of residents. City appealed.

The Supreme Judicial Court, Alexander, J., held that:

• CZA was consistent with City’s comprehensive plan, and
  CZA was in basic harmony with existing and permitted uses.

Conditional zoning agreement that permitted renovation of residential space on three floors of historical building for use by nonresident employees of software development company was consistent with City’s comprehensive plan. Comprehensive plan required preservation of unique character of area in which building was located but also recognized as goal the promotion of economic climate that increased job opportunities and overall economic well being, and, in the approved CZA, City approved the rezoning only after attaching conditions to ensure that the CZA was consistent with the comprehensive plan.

Conditional zoning agreement that permitted renovation of residential space on three floors of historical building for use by nonresident employees of software development company was in basic harmony with existing and permitted uses and thus did not violate provision of zoning ordinance statute requiring rezoned areas to be consistent with the existing and permitted uses within the original zones. Existing uses of the area included operation of nursery schools, private clubs, daycare facilities, and group homes, which had the potential to be more disruptive than an office with a maximum of 14 employees and limited visits by the public.

Defendant entered conditional guilty plea in municipal court to operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of .08 or more and moved to suppress evidence obtained as result of traffic stop. The municipal court denied motion. Defendant appealed. The District Court affirmed. Defendant appealed.

The Supreme Court of Montana held that:

• City ordinance providing misdemeanor fine to persons suspected of driving under the influence (DUI) who refuse testing was not preempted by state law;
  Defendant’s refusal of preliminary alcohol screening test (PAST), during traffic stop, did not constitute a refusal of post-arrest testing; and
  City ordinances criminalizing the refusal to submit to a breath test, by a person suspected of DUI, did not impair freedom of speech.

Buzz Stew, LLC, purchased a 20–acre parcel of land located in North Las Vegas in 2002. Around this same time, the City of North Las Vegas was preparing to construct a flood waters drainage system that would traverse Buzz Stew’s property. The City offered to purchase an easement across Buzz Stew’s land, but Buzz Stew refused the offer. In 2003, the City publicly announced its intent to condemn the portion of the land needed for the project. A condemnation action was not filed, however, because the City was unable to secure construction funding.

Notwithstanding its inability to proceed with the project, the City failed to publicly retract its prior public announcement of its intent to condemn the parcel. Buzz Stew subsequently sold the land in 2004 to a third party. In the seller’s disclosures clause in the sale contract, Buzz Stew informed the purchaser of the City’s demand for a drainage easement, and Buzz Stew retained the right to any proceeds resulting from a condemnation of the area proposed in the easement. That purchaser eventually resold the property to a party who thereafter granted the City an easement to accommodate the water drainage project.

Buzz Stew subsequently filed a complaint against the City for inverse condemnation and precondemnation damages. Buzz Stew argued that it had a property interest in the parcel because it reserved an easement over the project site in its land sale contract.

The Supreme Court of Nevada held that Buzz Stew did not retain a property interest following the sale of the parcel, and was therefore not entitled to bring an inverse condemnation action.

The plain language of the sales contract merely notified the purchaser that its title may be subject to a future drainage easement and reserved to Buzz Stew only the right to proceeds arising from a future condemnation action. It did not reserve a property interest to Buzz Stew.

Former teachers initiated Article 78 proceeding, seeking, inter alia, a judgment requiring school district to place them on the preferred eligibility list for their respective areas of tenure. The Supreme Court, Erie County, determined that denial of teachers’ rights of placement on preferred eligibility list was arbitrary and capricious, and reinstated teachers to preferred eligibility list. School district appealed.

The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that:

• Teachers’ claims accrued when school board terminated employment and determined that they would not be placed on preferred eligibility list, and
  School district was required to place teachers on preferred eligibility list.

School district was required to place teachers on preferred eligibility list for possible reemployment in a full-time position after reducing their full-time teaching positions to part-time positions. By reducing their full-time teaching positions to part-time positions, school district effectively abolished full-time positions and created new part-time positions, and teachers’ rejection of part-time positions, which resulted in termination of their employment with school district, did not render teachers ineligible for placement on preferred eligibility list.

Organization of industrial customers of electric utility appealed order of Public Utilities Commission order, permitting utility to recoup underrecovered transmission costs from all customers over three years on nonbypassable basis.

The Supreme Court of Ohio held that:

• Commission did not act outside its statutory authority, and
  Commission did not engage in unlawful retroactive ratemaking.

Public Utilities Commission’s phase-in authority, under statute allowing Commission to authorize any just and reasonable phase-in of any electric distribution utility rate or price, included authority, in proceedings to review and adjust electric utility’s transmission cost recovery rider, to allow utility to recover underrecovered transmission costs from all customers over three years on a nonbypassable basis. Statute did not limit exercise of Commission’s authority to the proceedings that had set the rate or price, but instead allowed Commission to invoke its phase-in authority outside of standard service offer proceedings.

Public Utilities Commission did not engage in unlawful retroactive ratemaking, in proceedings to review and adjust electric utility’s transmission cost recovery rider, by allowing utility to recover underrecovered transmission costs from all customers over three years on a nonbypassable basis. Even if the Commission’s order did amount to retroactive ratemaking, it was not unlawful because Commission had statutory authority to phase in the collection of rates through a nonbypassable surcharge.

Revenue lost due to regulatory delay was not at issue in proceedings to review and adjust electric utility’s transmission cost recovery rider, and thus Commission did not violate rule against retroactive ratemaking by allowing utility to recover underrecovered transmission costs from all customers over three years on a nonbypassable basis. Only issue was whether utility could recover costs from all customers or only from “non-shopping” customers who took generation service from the incumbent distribution utility instead of buying it on the market, and was not a case where Commission altered present rates to make up for dollars lost during the pendency of Commission proceedings.

Union, on behalf of permanent city employee who was subject to discharge only for cause, sought a writ of mandamus to compel the city civil service commission to appoint a neutral referee to conduct a disciplinary hearing at which employee could challenge his discharge. The Court of Appeals and union appealed.

The Supreme Court of Ohio held that union was entitled to writ of mandamus.

Union, on behalf of permanent city employee who was subject to discharge only for cause, was entitled to writ of mandamus to compel the city civil service commission to appoint a neutral referee to conduct disciplinary hearing at which employee could challenge his discharge pursuant to civil service commission rules.

Employee had a clear legal right, as a nonprobationary employee, to disciplinary hearing, city was under a clear legal duty to appoint a referee to conduct disciplinary hearing, and employee had no adequate remedy at law because commission’s decision to deny employee’s request for a disciplinary hearing was not appealable, as commission’s proceeding was not a quasi-judicial proceeding subject to administrative appeal.

After resident’s citations issued by city for parking more than three vehicles on his single-family lot were affirmed by hearing examiner, resident filed petition against city under Land Use Petition Act (LUPA), contesting each of his citations, and filed claims for damages under § 1983, alleging violations of procedural due process. The Superior Court affirmed two of resident’s citations, remanded one citation for mitigation hearing, and granted city summary judgment on § 1983 claims. Resident appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• Resident was not in violation of municipal ordinance, and thus was not subject to citation, and
• City violated resident’s right to procedural due process by preventing him from asserting nonconforming use as defense.

Resident, who had vested right to legal nonconforming use to park five additional cars on his single-family lot, was not in violation of municipal code for failing to limit number of vehicles parked on his lot to three, and thus was not subject to citation by city for such violation, even though resident had not established nonconforming use with Department of Planning and Development and did not have permit for nonconforming use. Establishment procedure did not create legal use, but rather procedure merely verified that legal use existed and had not been abandoned or discontinued at any intervening time.

City violated resident’s right to procedural due process by preventing him from asserting his legal nonconforming use to park five additional cars on his single family lot as defense to city’s citations for violating municipal code by having more than three cars on his lot, such that resident had valid claim for damages under § 1983, since resident was denied meaningful opportunity to be heard. Resident had right to avoid erroneous monetary penalties and vested right to nonconforming use, which was property interest, risk of depravation of resident’s interest was apparent, and no administrative burden would result from providing additional safeguards to ensure that resident would avoid penalties for legal use of his property.

Park visitor brought personal injury action against municipal park agency after suffering injury at park. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to agency. Visitor appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• Statutory waiting period of 60 days between presentment of claim and commencement of tort action against a local government entity is a procedural requirement for which substantial, rather than strict, compliance is required, but
  Visitor failed to substantially comply with such statute.

Court of Appeals holds that statutory waiting period of 60 days between presentment of claim and commencement of tort action against a local government entity is a procedural requirement for which substantial, rather than strict, compliance is required.

County sewer ratepayers appealed Bankruptcy Court’s confirmation of county’s Chapter 9 plan, asserting the plan unconstitutionally gave the Bankruptcy Court the power to approve rate hikes and violated their constitutional right to avoid “overly burdensome debt” without due process. County moved for partial dismissal. Ratepayers moved to consolidate.

The District Court held that:

• Appeal was not constitutionally moot;
• Appellate review of ratepayers’ challenge to confirmation order was not barred by statutory mootness rule;
• Equitable mootness doctrine did not apply to Chapter 9 proceeding;
• Even if District Court considered equitable mootness as appropriate in Chapter 9 proceeding, the Court would not dismiss ratepayers’ appeal as equitably moot; and
• Consolidating ratepayers’ appeals of confirmation order and other orders in related adversary proceedings was not appropriate.

Property owners challenged compensation awarded for portions of land condemned as part of highway construction project. The Circuit Court awarded $73,868.84 in damages. City appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• Trees on condemned property acted as a living fence, whose removal caused compensable damage to property not taken;
• Evidence supported finding that $41,226.25 was the value of loss following removal of living fence;
• Market value of property was for the trial court as the finder of fact;
• Property owner was qualified to render an opinion regarding value of her property; and
• Evidence supported trial court’s finding regarding just compensation for city’s temporary-construction easements.

Taxpayer brought action against county and board of supervisors for waste of public funds, violation of the Brown Act, declaratory relief for ultra vires acts, and conflicts of interest, alleging that procedure by which county enters into Social Program Agreements (SPAs) with social service organizations that provide social services to county residents is subject to the Brown Act‘s open meeting requirements. The Superior Court entered summary judgment for county and in separate judgment denied taxpayer’s request for attorney’s fees. Taxpayer appealed.

The Court of Appeal held that:

• Procedure by which county entered into SPAs did not involve collective deliberation and thus was not subject to the Brown Act’s open meeting requirements;
• Government Code permitted county to delegate its authority to enter into SPAs;
• Board of supervisors retained control over fundamental policy decisions such that delegation of authority to enter into SPAs to county CEO was not unconstitutional;
• Approval process for SPAs had adequate safeguards; and
• Failure to appeal order denying attorney’s fees precluded Court of Appeal from considering whether taxpayer was entitled to catalyst attorney’s fees.

After prospective firefighter participated in required physical ability test (PAT), fell ill, and died, firefighter’s parents filed wrongful death and survival action against District, alleging gross negligence of emergency medical technician (EMT) in charge of evaluating firefighter candidates at PAT. The Superior Court granted District summary judgment. Parents appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• As a matter of first impression, public duty doctrine was applicable;
• There was not direct and continuous contact between District and firefighter, as required for exception to doctrine to apply; and
• Firefighter did not justifiably rely on EMTs monitoring PAT, as required for exception to doctrine to apply.

Public duty doctrine was applicable in wrongful death and survival action against District of Columbia, stemming from death of prospective firefighter after he participated in physical ability test (PAT), with respect to conduct by emergency medical technicians (EMT) who were assigned to provide on-site vital-signs monitoring of firefighter candidates during administration of PAT. Any alleged acts or omissions of EMT in responding to prospective firefighter’s health crisis after he completed PAT were not part of PAT program, but rather were part of District’s provision of emergency services, such that any negligence of EMT in treating firefighter occurred once her role evolved from basic monitor to emergency responder.

Visitor who injured her ankle when she stepped in an unrepaired pothole in college campus parking lot brought negligence action against the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, based on allegedly unsafe condition of parking lot. The Superior Court granted Board’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, based on plaintiff’s failure to provide sufficient ante litem notice to the Board. Plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed. Board appealed.

The Supreme Court of Georgia held that notice did not comply with ante litem provisions.

Ante litem notice did not sufficiently identify the “amount of loss claimed” so as to comply with ante litem notice statute, as required for recovery, where visitor did not include any dollar amount of claimed loss, even though extent of her knowledge and belief at time of notice included, at a minimum, medical expenses she had incurred thus far.

Apartment owner brought suit against city to assert ownership over parking lot that was built by agreement partly on apartment owner’s property and partly on city’s property, and city counterclaimed for declaratory judgment, ejectment, and breach of contract. The Superior Court granted apartment owner’s request for interlocutory injunction prohibiting city from asserting ownership or control over parking lot. City appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed. The Superior Court then determined the agreement under which parking lot was built was not intended to create or reserve public property rights in land owned by apartment owner. City appealed.

The Supreme Court of Georgia held that:

• 1954 agreement between city and apartment owner did not give to the general public unfettered access to the parking area;
• 1954 agreement did not constitute an unlawful dedication of public property to a purely private interest;
• 1954 agreement it was not subject to the statutory prohibition against binding successor councils;
• Apartment owner was not barred by laches or the statute of limitations when bringing its action in equity against city to establish rights in parking lot; and
• Apartment owner did not waive its right of control over the parking area.

Sexually-oriented entertainment club brought action against city, claiming city’s newly enacted sexually-oriented business code was unconstitutional, and that club was exempt from it based on a settlement with county. The trial court granted city’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, and club appealed.

The Supreme Court of Georgia held that:

• Sexually-oriented entertainment club lacked standing to challenge city alcohol code based on a hypothetical denial of its liquor license;
• City’s sexually-oriented business ordinance did not unconstitutionally infringe on club’s free speech rights; and
• A settlement agreement between club and county did not create a vested right to continue operations as a nude dancing club that serves alcohol.

City’s sexually-oriented business ordinance did not unconstitutionally infringe on sexually-oriented entertainment club’s free speech rights. The ordinance was content-neutral in light of the city council’s goal of combatting pernicious secondary effects coupled with a lack of evidence to establish improper motive on the part of city council. The ordinance furthered an important governmental interest of attempting to preserve the quality of urban life and reducing criminal activity which was unrelated to any desire to suppress speech, any incidental restriction on speech caused by the ordinance was no greater than essential to further the governmental interests. The ordinance’s application was narrowly tailored to modes of expression implicated in the production of negative secondary effects, those establishments that provided alcohol and entertainment that required an adult entertainment license.

On August 12, 2012, the City of Martinsville adopted Ordinance 2012–1667, amending the initial proposal and reducing the amount of land to be annexed to 3,030 acres surrounding the City. Remonstrators – landowners in the annexed territory – filed a petition remonstrating against the proposed annexation. A trial was conducted, and after hearing evidence and arguments, the trial court entered its judgment on January 15, 2014 against the Remonstrators and upholding the annexation. The Remonstrators appealed.

On appeal, the Remonstrators argued that the trial court erred in denying their challenge to the proposed annexation by the City. The City, however, contended that the Remonstrators’ appeal should be dismissed as moot because the annexation had become final, and therefore, there was no effective relief that the court could render to the Remonstrators.

The Court of Appeals held that challenges to the annexation of land will become moot when the annexation becomes effective unless the remonstrators request an injunction or a stay ordering the municipality to not proceed with the proposed annexation pending appeal.

Therefore, absent an injunction or a stay of the annexation procedure, if an annexation becomes final before a review of the matter can be completed, any challenge to a proposed annexation will become moot.

At issue was whether municipal ordinance prohibiting of door-to-door canvassing and solicitation after the hour of 9:00 p.m. or sunset, whichever is earlier, comported with the First Amendment.

The District Court held that the ordinance was neither narrowly tailored to the Town’s legitimate government interests, nor did it provide ample alternative methods for communication. Accordingly, the Ordinance cannot survive constitutional scrutiny on its face or as applied.

Minor, through his parents, filed action against three police officers, alleging violation of Maryland Declaration of Rights, false imprisonment, battery, and assault. Following jury award of $465,000 in compensatory damages and $35,000 in punitive damages, the Circuit Court granted, in part, officers’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), striking jury’s $1,000 punitive damages award against one officer and finding the award of compensatory damages to be excessive. Minor agreed to remittitur, and officers appealed.

The Court of Special Appeals held that:

• Evidence of similar prior incident was relevant and its probative value outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice;
• Damages cap under Local Government Tort Claims Act (LGTCA) did not apply as officers were found to have acted with malice;
• Compensatory damages awards for tort and constitutional claims constituted impermissible duplicative recovery;
• Trial court acted within its discretion in reducing compensatory damages award; and
• Overwhelming evidence supported finding that officers acted with malice, as was required to support punitive damages award.

Condemnees brought action against state, seeking to recover greater damages than pro tanto award. The Superior Court entered judgment requiring condemnees to repay difference between pro tanto award and lesser amount that was awarded by jury and issued order denying condemnees’ motion for new trial. Condemnees appealed.

The Appeals Court held that:

• Evidence as to property’s potential uses, which included hotel, manufacturing, and warehouse uses, was admissible;
• Trial court’s error of excluding evidence as to property’s potential uses was not harmless;
• Proper measure of damages was whole subdivision approach, not individual lot method; and
• Pro tanto award was inadmissible.

While a judge in an eminent domain proceeding may infer that a property owner’s failure to develop the property in accordance with what the property owner now claims to be its best and highest use suggests that the potential use was not reasonably likely, a judge is not bound to that inference where other evidence suggests that a reasonable buyer would recognize the reasonable likelihood of the potential use.

That a potential use of property is prohibited or restricted by law at the time of the taking of the property does not preclude its consideration in awarding damages in an eminent domain proceeding if there was a reasonable prospect of rezoning or acquiring a special permit.

Judge has a range of discretion in an eminent domain proceeding in deciding whether to admit evidence that a potential use of the property is reasonably likely in the foreseeable future, particularly when that determination turns on whether the grant of a special permit is reasonably likely.

Task for the judge in an eminent domain proceeding is to avoid unreasonably restricting the efforts of the property owner fairly to show the effect of the taking upon the market value of the affected property at the time of the taking without permitting damages to be inflated by unduly detailed and confusing proof of speculative future uses of property having no very direct relationship to market values at the time of the taking.

Trial court’s error of excluding evidence as to property’s potential uses, which included hotel, manufacturing, and warehouse uses, was not harmless in condemnees’ action to recover greater damages than pro tanto award. Condemnees were unfairly precluded from giving testimony bearing upon relevant aspects of value, and excluded testimony impacted credibility of testimony of condemnees’ engineering and appraisal experts.

Pro tanto award regarding taking of property by state Department of Highways was inadmissible in condemnees’ action to recover greater damages than pro tanto award, as the award was in essence a settlement offer.

Applicant brought declaratory judgment action seeking determination that application to heritage-preservation commission for a certificate of appropriateness was a written request related to zoning, such that city had only 60 days to approve or deny application. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of city. Applicant appealed.

The Supreme Court of Minnesota held that:

• Trial court had subject matter jurisdiction;
• Written request relating to zoning referred to written request that had a connection, association, or logical relationship to the regulation of building development or the uses of property; and
• Application to heritage-preservation commission for certificate of appropriateness was written request relating to zoning.

Minnesota Energy Resources Corporation (“MERC”) is a gas pipeline distribution system located in Minnesota.

MERC’s real property is assessed by the county, city or district in which the property is located; however, its personal property is centrally assessed by the state Commissioner of Revenue.

Here, the parties disagreed about what type of pipeline property is taxable “personal property.” MERC argued that personal property is limited to tangible personal property, whereas the Commissioner argued that personal property includes both tangible and intangible personal property.

The Tax Court held that the phrase “personal property” in Minn.Stat. §§ 272.02, subd. 9(a), and 272.03, subd. 2(5), means tangible personal property.

The New York Republican State Committee and the Tennessee Republican Party sought declaratory and injunctive relief invalidating and enjoining the Securities and Exchange Commission, from enforcing the SEC’s pay-to-play rules for investment advisors, which was adopted over four years ago and codified at 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)–5.

The SEC countered that this case “was filed in the wrong court at the wrong time by the wrong plaintiff,” and should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The District Court agreed with the Commission, holding that the plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden in establishing subject matter jurisdiction because this Court was not the proper forum for their challenge.

Cellular South, Inc., an investor in auction rate securities (“ARS”), brought the standard-issue ARS-related securities action against J.P. Morgan Securities, Inc. (“JP Morgan”), a securities broker-dealer that underwrote, marketed, and sold ARS and conducted the auctions at which the securities’ interest rates were set.

Plaintiff claims that Defendant profited by knowingly misrepresenting and omitting material information concerning the liquidity of its ARS products, and by manipulating the ARS market through the regular placement of support bids in its own auctions.

JP Morgan moved to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim.

The District Court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss, finding that Plaintiff had not pled facts sufficient to show that JP Morgan had the scienter necessary to engage in fraud, either through market manipulation or through misrepresentations and omissions.

Infant brought personal injury action against city health and hospitals corporation. The Supreme Court, Queens County, denied infant’s motion for leave to serve late notice of claim or to deem late notice timely served nunc pro tunc. Infant appealed.

The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that:

• Infant’s mother did not provide reasonable excuse for failing to timely serve the notice of claim;
• Nexus between plaintiff’s infancy and delays in serving notice was not shown; and
• Motion to renew was properly denied.

Residents sought writ of mandamus to compel city council and city clerk to place proposed amendment to city charter on election ballot. The Supreme Court held that proposed amendment was an unlawful delegation of legislative power, and that city properly refused to place the matter on the ballot.

On reconsideration, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that city council was without authority to review the substance of a proposed ballot measure to amend city charter, and thus, acted unlawfully when it failed to pass ordinance to place amendment before the voters.

On remand following judicial review of rates approved for electric utility to recover its capital investment in nuclear generating facility after that facility was retired from service, the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) found the rates just and reasonable, awarded utility interest on unamortized balance, and ordered utility to issue refunds. Ratepayers and ratepayers’ advocacy organization appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Ratepayers and organization petitioned for review.

The Supreme Court of Oregon held that:

• PUC did not exceed scope of remand;
• PUC did not engage in impermissible retroactive ratemaking;
• PUC had authority to order refunds;
• PUC could allow utility to recover interest; and
• Substantial evidence supported PUC’s order.

In proceedings to determine whether electric utility could recover capital investment in nuclear generating facility after the facility had been retired from service, Public Utilities Commission (PUC) did not exceed scope of remand, after reversal by Court of Appeals, by reexamining rates from previous five-year period to determine whether to order refund of rates paid in subsequent period. Although Court had held that PUC had made a legal error in allowing utility to recover a return on its investment in rates, Court did not direct PUC to take any particular action in remand.

Public Utilities Commission (PUC) did not engage in impermissible retroactive ratemaking, on remand after reversal by Court of Appeals in proceedings to determine whether electric utility could recover capital investment in nuclear generating facility after the facility had been retired from service, by reexamining rates from previous five-year period to determine whether to order refund of rates paid in subsequent period. After Court determined that PUC had erroneously allowed utility to recover a return on its investment, PUC properly used ratemaking principles to calculate rates that it would have authorized if the return on investment had not been included, and PUC’s authority on remand included the authority to reconsider all aspects of the decision affected by the error.

Public Utilities Commission (PUC) had authority to order that electric utility provide refunds to ratepayers, on remand after reversal by Court of Appeals in proceedings to determine whether electric utility could recover capital investment in nuclear generating facility after the facility had been retired from service, after Court determined that PUC had erroneously allowed utility to recover a return on its investment. PUC had broad statutory authority to remedy errors in ratemaking orders, and authority to order a refund reasonably could be implied from remand order from the Court of Appeals.

Public Utilities Commission (PUC) did not exceed scope of remand, after reversal by Court of Appeals in proceedings to determine whether electric utility could recover capital investment in nuclear generating facility after the facility had been retired from service, by allowing utility to recover interest, although Court had determined that PUC had erroneously allowed utility to recover a return on its investment. PUC was careful not to recalculate rates using a factor that would allow utility to recover a profit on its investment, instead relying on lower Treasury bond rates to account only for the time value of money.

Taxpayers sought declaratory judgment, challenging township’s imposition of its business privilege tax (BPT) on taxpayers’ lease revenue and application of registration requirements for any “business, trade, occupation or profession.” The Court of Common Pleas found in favor of the Township and against taxpayers. Taxpayers appealed.

The Commonwealth Court held that:

• Imposition of BPT to taxpayers’ gross receipts from leases violated statutory exclusion from township’s taxing authority under Local Tax Enabling Act (LTEA), and
• Taxpayers’ real estate rental activities were subject to ordinance provision imposing registration requirements and related fees.

Association, residents and taxpayers (collectively “Objectors”) who reside within the Borough of Wilkinsburg School District and the Borough of Wilkinsburg appealed from the order of the Court of Common Pleas which approved the School District’s sale of vacant land, known as “Green Street Park” pursuant to Section 707(3) of the Public School Code.

Objectors asserted that the trial court erred when it approved the sale of the Property because: (1) the School District failed to demonstrate that it determined, either by motion or resolution, that the Property was both “unused and unnecessary;” and (2) the Public School Code does not require that the property be “unused and unnecessary” for school purposes.

The Commonwealth Court held that:

• There exists no requirement that a school board’s determination that a property is “unused and unnecessary” must be made by formal vote on a resolution or motion; and
• The correct interpretation of Section 707 of the Public School Code is that the real estate must be “unused and unnecessary” for purposes of the school district which owns the land, not for school purposes in general.

Friends of Pennsylvania Leadership Charter School appealed from the order of the Commonwealth Court which held that the retroactive real estate tax exemption provided in Section 1722–A(e)(3) of the Public School Code, 24 P.S. 17–1722–A(e)(3), was unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the Commonwealth Court, albeit employing different reasoning, concluding that retroactive application of the real estate tax exemption of Section 1722–A(e)(3) is unconstitutional under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it violates the separation of powers doctrine.

Passenger and driver brought action against police officer in his individual capacity for injuries they sustained in automobile accident with officer, who was on his way to work. Following judgment in favor of plaintiffs, city and city’s insurer moved to intervene and sought to limit judgment pursuant to $100,000 municipal damages cap. The Circuit Court entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs. City and insurer appealed.

The Supreme Court of Alabama held that:

• Municipal damages cap did not apply in action against police officer in his individual capacity for negligence that occurred outside his employment;
• City was not obligated to indemnify police officer for negligent actions that occurred outside the performance of his official duties; and
• City was not considered the real party in interest in the action.

Contractor brought action against county board of education, alleging that board had breached a contract for renovation of high school gymnasium. The Circuit Court denied board’s motion to dismiss on ground of sovereign immunity. Board petitioned for writ of mandamus.

The Supreme Court of Alabama held that:

• Board was entitled to sovereign immunity from suit, and
• Trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider motion to amend complaint.

In D.C., the tax-sale process begins with the sale at auction of a tax lien on the property to a third party. The homeowner may satisfy that lien by paying his delinquent tax bill, but the purchaser of the lien is able to add on top of that bill various costs, including attorney’s fees. In Mr. Coleman’s case, that caused what began as a $133.88 tax bill to become a total of over $5,000, all of which needed to be paid before the lien would be satisfied.

Once the lien is sold to the third party, a six-month waiting period begins, during which the homeowner may redeem his home by paying the taxes, along with any penalties, costs, and interest that are owed. If the entire bill is not paid upon expiration of the waiting period, the tax-lien purchaser may initiate proceedings in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia to foreclose. The Superior Court is empowered to enter a judgment vesting a fee simple title in the property in the tax-lien purchaser. In this way, a small sum paid to purchase the lien becomes full title to a property worth hundreds of thousands of dollars (in this case, approximately $200,000). The key detail in this case is that D.C. law provides that any surplus equity the homeowner has in his home is irrevocably lost, no matter how small the tax bill nor how valuable the equity.

Mr. Coleman brought a limited challenge to this law. He does not seek to regain his home, does not dispute that the District may use tax sales to satisfy delinquent property taxes, and agrees with the District that he owed $133.88 in property taxes, plus penalties, costs, and interest. Mr. Coleman’s claim is against the District’s taking of the entire equity in his home. The District, he asserts, has provided him no compensation for the loss of that equity, even though its value far exceeds the taxes, penalties, costs, and interest he owed.

Mr. Coleman claimed that such a practice is forbidden by the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Accordingly, he filed suit seeking an award of “just compensation,” as well as a declaration from the Court that the District’s statute is unconstitutional.

The District moved to dismiss Mr. Coleman’s Complaint, arguing that Supreme Court precedent holds that the District’s actions do not violate the Takings Clause.

The Court rejected the District’s argument that prior Supreme Court precedent had foreclosed Mr. Coleman’s claim under the Takings Clause, denying the District’s motion and stating that Mr. Coleman had stated a valid claim for violation of the Takings Clause.

Petitioners, a “Committee of 10” pursuant to section 7–6(c) of the Illinois School Code, sought to detach their territory from the boundaries of Woodland Community Consolidated School District 50 (Woodland) and Warren Township High School District 121 (Warren) and annex it into the boundaries of Oak Grove School District 68 (Oak Grove) and Libertyville Community High School District 128 (Libertyville). Petitioners filed a petition with the Regional Board of School Trustees of Lake County (Regional Board). The Regional Board conducted a hearing and denied the petition.

On administrative review, the trial court reversed the Regional Board’s decision. The school districts appealed, arguing that the Regional Board correctly denied the petition.

The appeals court affirmed the trial court’s order reversing the Regional Board’s decision.

“Based on our holdings as to the travel times and distances to the schools at issue, the “community of interest” and “whole child” factors, and property values, plus the fact that the evidence on petitioners’ preferences was uncontroverted, and despite the fact that we uphold the finding against petitioners on the educational advantage factor, we conclude that the evidence showed that granting the petition will provide some educational benefit to the Lancaster students. The Regional Board erred in finding otherwise and denying the petition.”

The City of Joliet moved to acquire two large, blighted apartment buildings via eminent domain.

Seven years of litigation, a 100-day trial, and a 19,000 page transcript later…

The District Court found that Joliet had a valid public purpose to use its power of eminent domain. In addition, the court found no discriminatory purpose or effect in the taking.

“an overwhelming smell of urine in the stairwells and hallways.”

Two former sheriff’s deputies brought action against city, alleging that police department breached their employment contract by passing them over for promotion in violation of city ordinance regarding department’s merger with county sheriff’s office. The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of city. Plaintiffs appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• Ordinance did not require city to promote plaintiffs, and
• Plaintiffs could not establish damages.

Ordinance stating that city “shall endeavor” to promote police department members in a manner to ensure proportional representation of former police officers and sheriff’s deputies, following department’s merger with sheriff’s office, did not require city to promote the two former deputies with the highest scores on promotional assessment to captain. The former deputies only had the tenth and 13th highest assessment scores overall, and the scores were based on several objective criteria that provided equal opportunity for advancement for both the former officers and deputies.

Objector brought action against candidate for office of parish district attorney, asserting that candidate had falsely certified having filed his state income tax returns.

The Supreme Court of Louisiana held that candidate falsely certified having filed his state individual income tax returns for four most recent tax years, and thus candidate was disqualified.

Although candidate’s tax preparer stated that tax preparer drove her employee to post office to mail returns, and although tax preparer had a certificate of mailing, Louisiana Department of Revenue (LDR) had no tax returns on file for candidate for relevant tax years, and LDR regulation provided that returns which had not been delivered to LDR by the United States Postal Service had not been filed.

Motorist who was injured in a multi-vehicle accident on a highway during a heavy snowstorm brought negligence claims against drivers and owners of vehicles involved in the accident and, under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (TCA), against New Jersey State Police and South Jersey Transportation Authority. A jury found that the individual defendants were not negligent, apportioned 20 percent negligence to state police and 80 percent negligence to authority, and awarded motorist $8,748,311. State police and authority filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or, in the alternative, for a remittitur or new trial.

Motorist moved for prejudgment interest. The Superior Court denied both motions. State police and authority appealed, and motorist cross appealed. The Superior Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for a new trial on liability of state police and authority. State police and authority petitioned for certification, which the Supreme Court granted.

The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that retrial on liability of state police and authority did not also require retrial on liability of drivers and owners or comparative negligence of motorist.

Issues involved in determining liability of state police and transportation authority under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (TCA) for injuries suffered by motorist during a multi-vehicle accident on a highway were not intertwined with issues involved in determining liability of drivers and owners of vehicles involved in the accident or comparative negligence of motorist, and thus retrial on liability of state police and authority following reversal for instructional error did not also require retrial on liability of drivers and owners or comparative negligence of motorist.

Instructional error related only to liability of state police and authority, and motorist’s case against drivers and owners and comparative-negligence claim against motorist were based on a different theory of negligence than the theory posited against state police and authority.

Motorist brought action against city and police officer to recover for personal injuries he sustained when his vehicle collided with police car. The Supreme Court, Monroe County, entered judgment in defendants’ favor, and plaintiff appealed.

The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that police officer did not drive with reckless disregard for safety of others when he exceeded speed limit while responding to dispatch call concerning domestic dispute, and thus officer and city were not liable for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff when officer’s car struck his vehicle.

Pedestrian, and her husband suing derivatively, commenced action against city to recover damages for injuries allegedly sustained when she fell on sidewalk. The Supreme Court, Kings County, entered judgment as matter of law in city’s favor, and plaintiffs appealed.

The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that:

• Map prepared by Big Apple Pothole and Sidewalk Protection Committee, Inc. and filed with New York City Department of Transportation (DOT) was admissible to show city’s prior notice of alleged defect, and
• Court improvidently exercised its discretion in precluding plaintiffs from presenting evidence that injured plaintiff acquired “C-difficile” infection, her pre-existing Crohn’s disease was exacerbated, and she suffered psychological injury.

Map prepared by Big Apple Pothole and Sidewalk Protection Committee, Inc. and filed with New York City Department of Transportation (DOT) was relevant to issue of whether city had prior written notice of claimed defect in sidewalk that allegedly caused injured plaintiff to fall, and thus was admissible in personal injury action against city, where plaintiffs sought to admit map for nonhearsay purpose of establishing that city had notice of alleged defect at least 15 days prior to injured plaintiff’s accident.

Trial court improvidently exercised its discretion in personal injury action in precluding plaintiffs from presenting evidence that, as result of accident, injured plaintiff acquired “C-difficile” infection, her pre-existing Crohn’s disease was exacerbated, and she suffered psychological injury on ground that plaintiffs’ expert disclosure failed to include substance of facts and opinions upon which he was expected to testify, where expert did state basis of his opinions, albeit tersely.

Citizen filed petition for writ of prohibition to prevent special election to recall city mayor.

The Supreme Court of Ohio held that:

• City charter provision that president of city council shall succeed as mayor if office of mayor becomes vacant after first day of April following last regular municipal election did not implicate First Amendment right to vote;
• Any possible burden of citizen’s right to vote for mayor based on “automatic succession” provision of city charter was outweighed by city’s legitimate interests in filling vacancy promptly and in ensuring that government process were not disrupted by vacancy;
• Petition for special election to recall city mayor and to fill vacancy pursuant to city charter was “demand” for mayor’s “removal” in accordance with city charter provision and statute; and
• Petition to recall mayor was not misleading for failure to identify sitting president of city council who would automatically fill mayor’s vacancy.

City industrial authority brought declaratory judgment proceeding to validate authority’s expenditure of public funds. Taxpayer moved to intervene. The District Court denied the motion. Taxpayer filed writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. On remand, the District Court dismissed taxpayer’s petition with prejudice on the basis that taxpayer did not provide notice to bondholders as necessary parties to the lawsuit. Taxpayer filed application to assume original jurisdiction and petition for writ of prohibition and mandamus.

The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that:

• Bondholders who purchased bonds to finance underlying transaction were necessary parties;
• It was not determined in prior appeal that bondholders were not necessary parties; and
• Taxpayer’s refusal to give notice to bondholders or service notice to join bondholders warranted dismissal with prejudice.

In connection with highway project the Oregon Department of Transportation brought a condemnation action against landowner to acquire land that abutted the highway. The project involved the reconstruction of the sidewalk and the elimination of curb cuts and driveways that had allowed vehicular access from property to the highway.

Before trial, the trial court granted the state’s motion in limine to exclude evidence of the diminution in the value of the land as a result of its loss of access to the highway. The court thereafter entered a general judgment awarding defendant just compensation of $11,792. Defendant appealed the judgment and assigned error to the order granting the state’s motion in limine.

The appeals court affirmed, holding that the denial of access resulting from the elimination of the curb cuts and driveways constituted a denial of access to promote the efficient and safe use of the highway, that is, a regulatory restriction on access to the highway to promote its use as a highway and, consequently, that the denial of access as a result of those restrictions did not constitute a taking of the access for which compensation would be due.

“In summary, the state condemned defendant’s access rights in the context of a project that would—and did—result in a regulatory denial of access to Highway 99W to promote the safe and efficient use of the highway as a highway. Whatever the measure of damages could be in those circumstances, it is not the diminished value of the land resulting from the loss of access to Highway 99W because, as a result of the regulatory elimination of the curb cuts and driveways, the property has no lawful access to Highway 99W irrespective of the condemnation of the access to the highway. As the trial court correctly concluded, evidence addressed to a measure of damages based on the loss of access was irrelevant. I conclude, therefore, that the trial court’s judgment should be affirmed.”

Adjoining landowner challenged the validity of a planned residential development (PRD) ordinance. Township zoning hearing board upheld the validity of the ordinance, and landowner appealed. Landowner also appealed an approval of developer’s tentative PRD plan by township board of supervisors. The Court of Common Pleas affirmed. Landowner appealed. The Commonwealth Court upheld the validity of the PRD ordinance and the approval of the PRD plan. Landowner filed petitions for allowance of appeal, which the Supreme Court granted as to three issues.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that:

• PRD ordinance was consistent with Municipalities Planning Code (MPC) provisions on approval of and potential public hearings on applications for final plan approval;
• PRD ordinance provisions allowing certain changes between approval of a tentative plan and submission or approval of the final plan was consistent with the MPC; and
• Landowner’s procedural due process rights were not implicated by developer’s designation of several possible categories of uses for buildings.

County and its exclusive provider of solid waste collection services sought injunctions prohibiting non-exclusive solid waste collector from providing collection and disposal services in violation of a newly enacted county ordinance.

The Supreme Court of Georgia held that:

• Enforcement of ordinance would not violate non-exclusive collector’s due process rights, and
• County’s alleged anticompetitive conduct was exempt from Sherman Anti-Trust Act.

Enforcement of county’s solid waste ordinance, pursuant to which county commissioners authorized an exclusive franchise for the collection and disposal of solid waste from residents of unincorporated county, would not violate non-exclusive waste collector’s due process rights to continue its existing business, where ordinance’s authorization of an exclusive franchise was reasonably related to county’s goal of providing complete, uniform, and affordable solid waste collection services to county residents.

Defendant was convicted in the District Court, First Circuit, of solicitation with animals in violation of city ordinance. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Defendant’s application for certiorari review was granted.

The Supreme Court of Hawaii held that:

• Ordinance under which defendant was convicted of solicitation with animals required State to prove that an actual request or demand for money or gifts occurred, and
• Evidence was insufficient to establish that defendant made actual requests or demands for money or gifts.

Three actions were brought in which passengers injured on Metropolitan Council buses and having no automobile insurance of their own sought basic-economic-loss benefits from Met Council under the Minnesota No–Fault Automobile Insurance Act. The District Court entered summary judgment in favor of passengers. Met Council appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that buses operated by the Met Council are “motor vehicles” for purposes of the No–Fault Automobile Insurance Act.

After City Industrial Development Authority project failed, Bondholders brought putative class action against bond underwriter – Morgan Keegan – and underwriter’s counsel – Armstrong Teasdale.

The Bondholders’ claims are based in substantial part on alleged material misrepresentations and omissions contained in the Official Offering Statement, and the underwriter’s alleged failure to conduct a due-diligence investigation concerning the accuracy of the representations in the statement.

Bondholders brought a Motion for Class Certification as to all claims contained in the first amended complaint, including negligent underwriting, negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent misrepresentation, Missouri Blue Sky law violations, and unjust enrichment.

The District Court granted the Motion for Class Certification as to Plaintiffs’ claims for violation of the Missouri Blue Sky law and negligent underwriting.

The Court concluded that individualized proof of reliance made class certification inappropriate for Plaintiffs’ negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation claims, rejecting Plaintiffs’ “fraud created the market” theory.

Property owner brought action against city and city officials, alleging claims in lieu of prerogative writs, challenging city council’s resolution designating area including owner’s property as an area in need of rehabilitation pursuant to the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law (LRHL). The Superior Court dismissed the claims, and owner appealed.

The Superior Court, Appellate Division, held that resolution was insufficient to allow determination of whether city had complied with statutory standards for designation of area as in need of rehabilitation.

Resolution of city council designating certain area to be in need of rehabilitation pursuant to the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law (LRHL), stating that council had relied on reports indicating that water and sewer lines in area were at least 50 years old “or” were in need of substantial maintenance, was insufficient to allow determination of whether city had complied with statutory standard requiring majority of water and sewer infrastructure in delineated area be at least 50 years old “and” in need of repair or substantial maintenance, and thus vacation of resolution was warranted for city to reconsider designation.

Police officer brought statutory and common-law negligence claims against a housing authority, claiming that the housing authority failed to properly maintain a fire door, which caused injury to the officer during his pursuit of a suspect. The Supreme Court, Richmond County, granted partial summary judgment to the housing authority. Both parties appealed.

The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that:

• Issue of fact as to whether the housing authority was negligent in maintaining the fire door precluded summary judgment on the common-law negligence claim;
• The police officer’s failure to demonstrate that the fire door failed to comply with the building code precluded statutory negligence claim; and
• The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a plaintiff leave to amend his complaint and bill of particulars.

Student in GED course at county facility leased by non-profit organization brought action against county, county’s social services department, and county’s department of labor, seeking to recover damages for personal injuries sustained when she was sexually assaulted by maintenance worker whom defendants had referred to organization for hire at facility, despite worker’s designation as level three sex offender. The Supreme Court, Suffolk County, denied defendants’ summary judgment motion. Defendants appealed.

The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that:

• Defendants did not voluntarily assume any special duty to student, precluding tort liability, and
• Fact issue existed as to whether defendants breached duty of care to organization.

Taxpayer commenced tax certiorari proceeding challenging real property tax assessments on parcels. School district intervened. The Supreme Court, Westchester County, denied assessor’s motion to dismiss proceedings on ground that notices of petition and petitions were not served upon school district’s superintendent, but granted school district’s motion to dismiss on same ground. Taxpayer appealed, and assessor cross-appealed.

The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that:

• City had standing, in tax certiorari proceeding challenging real property tax assessments, to seek dismissal based on taxpayer’s failure to give notice of proceedings to superintendent of school district where parcel was located; and
• Tax certiorari proceeding challenging real property tax assessments was subject to dismissal based on taxpayer’s failure, without good cause, to give notice of proceedings to superintendent of school district where parcel was located.

Residents sought writ of mandamus to compel city council and city clerk to place proposed amendment to city charter on election ballot.

The Supreme Court of Ohio held that proposed amendment to city charter, which would have rendered a commission composed of five private citizens responsible for recommending a new comprehensive zoning and development plan to city council, was an unlawful delegation of legislative power, where city council would have been required to consider commission’s recommendation and to adopt a final plan, final plan could make adjustments to commission recommendation only to extent that adjustments were consistent with commission’s findings, and amendment did not set forth any standards to govern those findings.

Homeowner filed a motion to seal the city’s nuisance complaint and city’s motion to compel inspection because they referred to homeowner’s expunged convictions, and he also sought sanctions against the city for the release of his sealed criminal records. The Court of Common Pleas denied motion, and homeowner appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that trial court abused its discretion when it denied homeowner’s motion to seal city’s nuisance complaint and city’s motion to compel inspection without holding a hearing or conducting an in camera inspection.

Electric utility companies commenced action against Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (PUC) and its commissioners in their official capacities, alleging violation of filed rate doctrine under Federal Power Act (FPA), confiscatory taking under Fourteenth Amendment, and federal pre-emption of Pennsylvania Electric Competition Act (ECA), and seeking declaratory judgment and injunctive relief to recoup from their customers more than $250 million in costs associated with “line losses,” i.e., energy that was lost when electricity travels over power lines, and interest related to those costs.

The District Court held that companies’ unsuccessful pursuit of relief in state proceeding precluded their effort to claim relief in federal court. Companies appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• Companies waived issue for consideration on appeal of whether ECA as applied to them was pre-empted;
• Issue preclusion applied to bar claim alleging confiscatory taking;
• Prior review of PUC decision by Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania regarding classification of line-loss costs for retail billing purposes was judicial in nature;
• Companies could not avoid application of issue preclusion bar on basis of application of alleged incorrect standard of review by Commonwealth Court in prior review of public utilities commission order;
• Congress did not divest state utility agencies or state courts of jurisdiction to hear cases requiring adjudication of scope filed rate doctrine;
• PUC in its classification of line-loss costs for retail billing purposes, and Commonwealth Court in its affirmation of that decision, had arguable basis for jurisdiction; and
• PUC in its classification of electricity line-loss costs for retail billing purposes, and Commonwealth Court in its affirmation of that decision, was not collateral attack on decision by Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

Water authority filed a declaration of taking to condemn drainage easement across landowners’ property. The Court of Common Pleas sustained landowners’ preliminary objections and dismissed the declaration of taking, and water authority appealed. The Commonwealth Court reversed and remanded. Landowners appealed.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that drainage easement was not for public use and thus could not be subject of taking by water authority.

Drainage easement across landowners’ property was not for public use and thus, pursuant to Property Rights Protection Act (PRPA), could not be subject of taking by water authority, even though easement was to be located side-by-side with water easement and was intended for use by prospective purchasers of developer’s adult-community residential development. Easement was to be acquired at developer’s behest for sole use of developer, and at developer’s sole cost, and there was no suggestion that easement was meant to be used for any purpose broader than servicing development.

Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) brought action against city and city commission on human relations, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, alleging that commission was prohibited from exercising jurisdiction over SEPTA under city fair practices ordinance.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that:

• Whether SEPTA was a Commonwealth agency was not determinative of whether it was subject to jurisdiction of city, and
• SEPTA was not required to exhaust administrative remedies prior to initiating suit.

Whether Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) was an agency of the Commonwealth was not determinative of whether SEPTA was subject to municipality’s authority, and thus subject to city’s fair practices ordinances and jurisdiction of city human relations commission, rather, because the legislature authorized the creation of both entities, and set the limits of each entity’s authority, the court’s task was to determine, through an examination of the relevant statutes, which entity the legislature intended to have preeminent powers.

Beatriz Smith sued the San Antonio Water System (SAWS) for injuries she sustained when she fell into a hole on a sidewalk. SAWS filed a plea to the jurisdiction, asserting it did not receive notice of the claim against it as required by the Texas Tort Claims Act. The trial court denied the plea.

The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that:

• SAWS is not a “governmental unit” entitled to notice under the Act separate and apart from notice to the City of San Antonio; and
• Smith presented sufficient evidence to raise a fact question as to whether the City of San Antonio had actual notice of Smith’s injury claim.

Recognizing that its pension system was underfunded, City raised its employees’ pension contributions by 2.5% of their total compensation. It did so pursuant to an Act passed by the Alabama legislature mandating such an increase for state employees and permitting, but not requiring, localities to do the same.

In response, a class of City firefighters — whose contribution rate was raised from 6% to 8.5% — brought this lawsuit. They alleged that the City’s actions impaired the terms of their employment contracts, in violation of both the United States Constitution and the Alabama Constitution.

The Court of Appeals held that plaintiffs had no contractual right to a static, inviolable 6% contribution rate and thus the City was free to amend the employee contribution rate without constitutional consequence.

Property owner brought action against city for inverse condemnation, claiming airport operation diminished his property value. The Superior Court entered summary judgment for city, and property owner appealed.

The Supreme Court of Alaska held that property owner should have been permitted to testify as to the market value of his property both before and after an alleged taking, based on the premise, that, as an owner, he was informed about the property’s value, both before and after the event that purportedly diminished its value.

Objectors petitioned for writ of mandate challenging city’s land use plans. The Superior Court denied petition. Objectors appealed, and the Court of Appeal affirmed. The Superior Court granted objectors’ motion to tax costs and denied all costs to city. City appealed.

The Court of Appeal held that:

• Trial court was required to award costs to city for its preparation of a supplemental record, but
• Labor costs to review objectors’ record of proceedings “for completeness” were not recoverable.

When a petitioner elects to prepare the record for a California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) action against a public agency but the record is incomplete, and an agency is put to the task of supplementation to ensure completeness, the language of CEQA’s record preparation provision allows, and the purpose of the provision to protect public monies counsels, that the agency recoup the costs of preparing the supplemental record.

Trial court was required to award costs to city for its preparation of a supplemental record under California Environmental Quality Act’s (CEQA) record preparation statute, after city prevailed in objectors’ mandamus action, even though objectors elected to prepare the record, where the city obtained leave from the trial court to prepare the supplemental record, objectors rejected city’s offer to defer supplementation of the record until it filed its opposition to the writ petition, and city’s preparation of a supplemental record did not violate the city’s obligation to minimize record preparation costs.

When a petitioner elects to prepare the record for a California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) action against a public agency, the agency’s labor costs to review the petitioner-prepared record of proceedings “for completeness” in connection with certification are not recoverable record preparation costs under CEQA’s record preparation provision.

Former spouse of police officer sought judicial review of District of Columbia Retirement Board’s (DCRB) denial of spouse’s request for a survivor annuity following officer’s death. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of DCRB. Spouse appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that mayor was not required to comply with posthumous nunc pro tunc order amending divorce settlement.

Mayor was not required to comply with a posthumously-issued nunc pro tunc court order that on its face related back to a date before police officer’s death and retroactively amended a divorce settlement agreement to provide the officer’s former spouse with entitlement survivor annuity in a way that was inconsistent with the last benefits election executed by the officer prior to his death, where order had not been issued prior to officer’s retirement, as officer’s death prior to retirement precluded retirement.