Successor officers of county hospital district sought to invalidate strategic alliance agreement between it and state university that established means for joint or cooperative action between parties for operation of district’s health care system as ultra vires.

The Superior Court granted university summary judgment. District appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that the agreement was not ultra vires, despite contention that agreement delegated district’s core legislative powers to others. The agreement was authorized by statutes governing public hospital districts and Interlocal Corporation Act, agreement was not unlawful delegation of district’s powers, and agreement was binding on successor officers of district, such that mere view of successor officers as to validity of agreement did not render it ultra vires.

In this long-running bond litigation, the District Court granted Stifel, Nicolaus & Company, Inc.’s motion for equitable reformation of its Bond Purchase Agreement with the Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin (the “Band”).

The parties had mistakenly executed version 6 of the BPA – which provided for jurisdiction by the Tribal Court – rather than the final version 8, which granted jurisdiction to the District Court.

However, the court denied Stifel’s motion for declaratory judgment that the Band may not proceed to sue Stifel in a currently-pending action in Tribal Court. The court gave Stifel “yet another” opportunity to proffer additional evidence, “if any,” that the forum selection clause in the Bond Purchase Agreement clearly precluded the Band from proceeding in Tribal Court, given that the jurisdiction of the District Court was not explicitly exclusive.

Personal representative of deceased patient’s estate brought wrongful death action against county hospital district, town, and ambulance service after patient died from complications following his treatment at hospital. The District Court dismissed based on representative’s failure to comply with Wyoming Governmental Claims Act (WGCA). Representative appealed.

The Supreme Court of Wyoming held that:

• Submission of notice of medical malpractice claim to Medical Review Panel did not toll time period representative had to file notice of claim under WGCA;
• Time period for submitting notice of claim under WGCA was not extended by continuous treatment doctrine; and
• Time period for filing notice of claim under WGCA was not extended due to deceased patient’s incapacity.

Motorist and his passenger’s estate filed various negligence claims against city and two of its police officers in connection with police chase that culminated in collision of suspect’s vehicle with motorist’s vehicle. The Circuit Court denied summary judgment motion filed by defendants that was predicated on state-agent immunity. Defendant petitioned for writ of mandamus.

The Supreme Court of Alabama held that:

• There was no evidence that police officers pursuing suspect failed to discharge duties pursuant to detailed rules or regulations, or acted beyond their authority, as necessary to come within an exception to state-agent immunity;
• City was immune to suit on claims as to which officers had state-agent immunity; but
• City failed to establish immunity on claim of negligent training and supervision.

The Superior Court found wardship petition alleging that minor committed vandalism to be true, placed minor on deferred entry of judgment (DEJ), and ordered minor to pay restitution. Minor petitioned for writ of mandate. The Court of Appeal granted petition. The Supreme Court granted review, superseding the opinion of the Court of Appeal.

The Supreme Court of California held that graffiti restitution model that did not reflect actual cleanup cost did not support restitution award.

City’s failure to adopt a Graffiti Removal and Damage Recovery Program ordinance authorizing the probation department to recoup its costs for graffiti abatement as restitution in a juvenile proceeding, and its failure to update its cost findings within the three years preceding minor’s victim restitution order, made the city’s cost model unavailable as a basis for determining restitution for minor’s offense of vandalism based on acts of graffiti, where the model represented an estimate of an average of all costs of graffiti cleanup rather than the actual economic losses incurred as the result of the minor’s conduct, and the model included law enforcement investigative costs.

Inmate filed suit against Department of Corrections for injuries sustained while working on paint detail at warden’s house. Following jury trial, the State Court entered judgment on jury’s verdict for inmate, and then granted inmate’s motion for attorney fees and costs under statute authorizing plaintiff to recover same when offer of settlement is rejected and amount recovered is more than 125 times settlement offer. Department appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and certiorari was granted.

The Supreme Court of Georgia held that:

• Sovereign immunity was waived, under offer of settlement statute, as to award for attorney fees and litigation expenses;
• Trial court could not rely exclusively on contingency fee agreement that inmate had with attorney, in awarding attorney fees; and
• Inmate was not entitled to full amount of fees provided by contingency fee agreement.

Sovereign immunity was waived, under offer of settlement statute, as to award for attorney fees and litigation expenses in inmate’s premises liability action against the Department of Corrections. While payment of attorney fees and litigation expenses under the statute were not made as compensation for a tort “claim” within meaning of the Georgia Tort Claims Act (GTCA), they were made as an incident of Department’s inappropriate conduct in the underlying tort action.

Owner of home in which foundation cracked brought action against city, city engineer, and previous owner of property, alleging negligence and gross negligence stemming from city’s issuance of two permits to previous owner allowing previous owner to place and grade fill. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of city and city engineer. Property owner appealed.

The Supreme Court of Idaho held that:

• City did not act with gross negligence, so as to defeat immunity under Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA);
• Property owner did not act with bad faith so as to warrant award of attorney fees under ITCA; and
• ITCA was exclusive means for award of attorney fees.

Electricity providers, which had entered into agreements with power company for the sale of electricity generated by use of renewable energy, filed motion requesting permissive appeal from Public Utilities Commission’s determination that it had jurisdiction to decide whether force majeure clause in agreements excused electricity providers from their contractual obligations to have their power generation facilities constructed and in operation by specified dates in agreements. Permissive appeal was granted.

The Supreme Court of Idaho held that Commission had authority to adjudicate whether or not event of force majeure occurred.

Public Utilities Commission had authority to adjudicate whether event of force majeure occurred that excused electricity providers’ performance under energy sales agreements with power company, since parties had agreed to have Commission resolve disputes regarding interpretation of agreements. Provision providing that Commission would resolve parties’ disputes included determination of whether electricity providers’ claimed force majeure was within scope of energy sales agreements’ force majeure clause, and central issue of parties’ dispute was determination of whether power company still had obligation under agreements to purchase power from electricity providers.

Resident-taxpayer filed a taxpayer derivative action as a putative class action pursuant to section 104 of the Illinois Recovery of Fraudulently Obtained Public Funds Act against J.P. Morgan Securities, Inc. on behalf of the LaGrange Park Public Library District.

Plaintiff sought to recover alleged overcharges fraudulently charged by defendants in their “yield-burning” scheme in advance-defeasance refinancing of municipal debt held by the District.  Plaintiff argued that defendants conducted this same yield-burning scheme against other municipalities and similarly excessively marked up the Treasuries sold.

The trial court denied plaintiff’s motion for class certification, reasoning that the Code did not permit such an action and that common questions of fact and law would not predominate over questions affecting individual members. The court subsequently granted J.P. Morgan’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff appealed.

The Appellate Court held that:

• Denial of class certification was proper because plaintiff’s action was derivative and not individual.
• Summary judgment was proper where plaintiff failed to present evidence of material fact of whether defendants’ sale price and markup were reasonable.

Property owners brought action against township, township’s engineer, and excavation contractor, asserting that retaining wall and drainage structures, which were built next to road and owners’ land in right of way, caused unauthorized diversion of stormwater runoff onto land. The Superior Court granted township’s motion to dismiss and later denied property owners’ motion to amend complaint to add inverse-condemnation claim. Property owners appealed.

The Superior Court, Appellate Division, held that:

• Trial court was required to determine whether township’s actions constituted continuing tort, for purposes of continuing tort doctrine;
• Property owners were not required to file another notice of claim when retaining wall fell onto their land;
• Trial court was precluded from considering certification of township committee member concerning approval of engineer’s plans; and
• Entire controversy doctrine did not bar property owners from amending complaint.

Former high school student brought action against school district, asserting claims for respondeat superior, negligent hiring, negligent retention, negligent supervision, and negligent infliction of emotional distress arising from student’s alleged sexual abuse by teacher. District moved for summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds. The District Court denied district’s summary judgment motion. The Supreme Court granted district’s application for interlocutory appeal.

The Supreme Court of Iowa held that:

• Common law discovery rule does not apply to actions under a former version of the Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act (IMTCA);
• Special limitations period for child sexual abuse claims did not apply to student’s claims; and
• Absence of a common law discovery rule in the former version of the IMTCA does not violate equal protection.

Bicyclist, who fell while riding on a sidewalk abutting grounds of state university, brought action against city alleging that defect in sidewalk caused accident. City brought the State in as a third-party defendant and cross-claimed for contribution from State. State moved to dismiss cross-claim. The District Court denied State’s motion. State moved for interlocutory review.

The Supreme Court of Iowa held that:

• Statute that stated that an abutting property owner could be required by ordinance to maintain all property outside the lot and property lines and inside the curb lines upon the public streets did not expressly or impliedly provide for private cause of action;
• In a matter of first impression, city ordinance that imposed liability on abutting property owner for injuries caused by sidewalk defects was not preempted by state law;
• Ordinance did not impose an unauthorized tax; and
• State was not protected by sovereign immunity from liability under city ordinance.

The state brought a complaint against farmer for violations of state licensing and labeling laws. The Superior Court entered summary judgment in favor of the state and enjoined farmer from selling milk without a license, selling unpasteurized milk without labeling it as such, and operating a food establishment without a license. It later imposed civil penalties totaling $1000 and costs of $132 and denied farmer’s motion to stay and motion to alter or amend the judgment. Farmer appealed.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held that:

• Previous statement by state veterinarian did not estop the state from requiring farmer to obtain a milk distributor’s license;
• Municipal ordinance would be construed to avoid a preemption issue; and
• Civil penalties could be imposed on farmer for each act that constituted a violation of state licensing and labeling laws.

Municipal water supplier brought action against manufacturer of and distributor of a chemical used by drycleaners and others, i.e., perchloroethylene (Perc or PCE), alleging toxic chemical contamination of supplier’s water wells. Defendants filed motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action.

The Supreme Court, Suffolk County held that water supplier’s allegations were sufficient to invoke market share liability.

Under market share liability of product manufacturers, the burden of identification shifts to defendants if plaintiff establishes a prima facie case on every element of the claim except for identification of the actual tortfeasor or tortfeasors, and plaintiff has joined manufacturers representing a substantial share of the relevant market.

Allegations of municipal water supplier in action against manufacturer of and distributor of a chemical used by drycleaners and others, i.e., perchloroethylene (Perc or PCE), that perc was defective from the moment of its manufacture, that it was a generically fungible product, and that it took many years from seepage into ground until it appeared in one of supplier’s wells, were sufficient to invoke market share liability, for purposes of stating a cause of action against manufacturer and distributor for toxic chemical contamination of supplier’s water wells.

Pedestrian brought action against county, as lessee, and lessor of county building after he allegedly fell down the front exterior stairs, sustaining injuries. The Superior Court denied defendants’ motions for summary judgment. Defendants appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and dismissed in part. Defendants petitioned for discretionary review.

The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that county was entitled to the defense of governmental immunity from pedestrian’s premises liability action.

County’s responsibility with regard to locating, supervising, and maintaining county buildings that served the county’s discretionary, legislative, and public functions, was governmental in nature, and thus, county, as lessee of building in which county’s water department offices were located, was entitled to the defense of governmental immunity from pedestrian’s premises liability action, regardless of the pedestrian’s involvement with the county and the reason for his presence at a governmental facility.

Taxpayer and school district appealed decision of county board of revision, determining taxation value of taxpayer’s real property, an assisted living facility. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) entered decision assigning a value based on taxpayer’s appraisal. School district appealed.

The Supreme Court of Ohio held that:

• Sale of property was not recent, and
• BTA could determine tax value of property based on an appraisal that used comparisons to apartment buildings.

Sale of real property was not recent, and thus sale price was not required to be considered to be the property’s true value for taxation purposes, where sale had occurred 26 months prior to tax lien date, there had been two appraisals of property since sale neither of which had used sale price to determine value, and general market changes had caused a decline in property value since sale.

BTA could determine tax value of real property, an assisted living facility, based on appraisal that used comparisons to apartment buildings in order to distinguish the property’s real-property value from its business-property value, even though city zoning did not permit use of property as an apartment building.

County board of commissioners brought action against the Federal Housing Finance Agency, as conservator for the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) for failure to pay transfer taxes. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia, dismissed the action. The board appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac did not owe county transfer taxes for conveyances of their real estate, and
• Board forfeited Commerce Clause argument on appeal.

Geryville Materials, Inc. and the Board of Supervisors of Lower Milford Township each appealed an order of the Court of Common Pleas of that ruled upon Geryville’s substantive challenge to several provisions of the Township’s Zoning Ordinance.

The trial court held that almost all of Section 523, entitled “Extraction of Natural Resources,” was preempted by the Noncoal Surface Mining Conservation and Reclamation Act (Noncoal Act). The trial court also held that Section 470, entitled “Protection of Natural Resources,” was not unduly restrictive of non-coal surface mining in the Township and, thus, was constitutional and compliant with the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code (MPC).

The appeals court affirmed.

Landowner sued Skamania County, alleging that the County’s former landfill operation on adjacent property caused debris to flow onto his property. The County successfully moved for summary judgment arguing that all of landowner’s claims were barred by applicable statutes of limitations.

Landowner appealed, arguing (1) the trespass from migrating debris was both continuing and abatable and the County was liable for damages until the County removed the debris, (2) if the trespass was not abatable, the County was liable under a theory of inverse condemnation for any takings that had occurred in the 10 years prior to landowner filing suit, and (3) the trial court abused its discretion in failing to exclude evidence of a code violation landowner received four years before filing this lawsuit.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• Genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on landowner’s trespass claim.
• Landowner was precluded by the subsequent purchaser rule from recovering under inverse condemnation.

Surviving family members sued city, alleging negligent and/or wanton hiring, training, or supervision of individual firefighters who allegedly failed to recover all of decedent’s remains from fire scene. City moved for summary judgment. The Circuit Court denied motion. City filed petition for writ of mandamus.

The Supreme Court of Alabama held that:

• Volunteer fire department did not become professional fire department not entitled to immunity by fact that city donated money to it;
• City could not be vicariously liable for firefighters’ alleged negligence; and
• City could not be liable for wanton or intentional conduct.

Administrator of estate of mother of family violence victim brought wrongful-death action against city, alleging that city’s police officers, who responded to victim’s complaint that father of her child appeared at her house, should have remained at scene. The Superior Court granted city’s motion for summary judgment. Administrator appealed. The Appellate Court affirmed. Administrator appealed.

The Supreme Court of Connecticut held that police officers’ duty under city’s police response procedures policy to remain at scene was discretionary, not ministerial, and thus city was entitled to discretionary-act immunity.

City police officers’ duty under city’s police response procedures policy to remain at scene regarding incident in which abuser allegedly violated domestic violence protective order by coming to victim’s residence was discretionary, not ministerial, and thus city was entitled to discretionary-act immunity regarding wrongful-death action arising from fatal shooting of victim’s mother when abuser returned to residence after officers left to obtain arrest warrant, although policy stated that officers shall remain at the scene for a reasonable time if an arrest were not made. Policy language vesting discretion with police officers to determine what constituted reasonable time was inextricably intertwined with policy language stating that police officers “shall remain” at the scene.

Landowners brought inverse condemnation action against city, challenging the city’s refusal to change the comprehensive plan’s designation of former golf course property, which consisted of two parcels, to allow for residential development of property. The Circuit Court entered judgment in favor of city. Landowner appealed.

The District Court of Appeal held that:

• City’s refusal to change its comprehensive plan was not a total taking, and
• City’s refusal to change its comprehensive plan was not a partial taking.

The Supreme Court of Florida took up the issue of whether municipal ordinances imposing penalties for red light violations detected by devices using cameras were invalid because they were preempted by state law.

The Court concluded that such municipal ordinances were preempted by state law.

Workers’ compensation commissioner brought action against State, governor, lieutenant governor, chief of staff to governor, legal counsel to the governor, communications director to the governor, and director of Iowa Workforce Development stemming from alleged demand for commissioner’s resignation and subsequent salary reduction. After the attorney general certified that defendants were acting within the scope of their employment at time of allegations, the District Court granted motion to substitute State for individual defendants on some counts and dismissed other counts. Commissions applied for interlocutory review, which was granted.

The Supreme Court of Iowa held that attorney general’s certification that employees acted within scope of employment was inapplicable to common law claims against employees in individual capacities.

Attorney general’s certification that individual state-employee defendants were acting within the scope of their employment at time of allegations in action by workers’ compensation commissioner, such that certain immunities applied pursuant to Iowa Tort Claims Act (ITCA), was not applicable to commissioner’s common law claims alleging that the individual defendants acted outside the scope of their employment, where provision of ITCA governing such certification expressly applied only to claims under the ITCA, and, when a state employee acted outside the scope of his or her employment, the employee was responsible for the attorney fees and the damages, not the public.

Defendant was convicted, in the District Court of resisting an officer. Defendant appealed.

The Court of Appeal held that:

• Evidence was sufficient to support conviction;
• Police officers had reasonable suspicion that defendant had committed crime of battery so as to warrant investigatory stop to question defendant regarding his actions; and
• Officers had probable cause to arrest defendant for resisting an officer after officers arrived at defendant’s property to question him and defendant repeatedly refused officers’ requests to secure his three dogs.

Parent of high school student who was transferred to another school for three months after hearing on allegations he engaged in sexual misconduct on school bus during field trip filed § 1983 action against public school board and its supervisor of administration, who was disciplinary hearing officer, alleging deprivation of First and Fourteenth Amendment rights and violation of student’s due process rights protected by Louisiana constitution. Parent also raised state law claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) against supervisor of administration, negligence for board’s alleged failure to train and supervise employees, and defamation. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. Parent appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• Supervisor did not violate procedural due process;
• Board did not violate Louisiana law by failing to review supervisor’s finding that student engaged in sexual misconduct and determination that he would be transferred to another school for three months;
• Supervisor was entitled to immunity from liability for defamation; and
• One-year prescriptive period applied to claim for negligent failure to train.

Prospective issuer of variable rate tax-exempt bonds brought action against bank under Louisiana law, seeking rescission of interest-rate swap agreement it had entered into with bank, as prospective issuer of letter of credit for the bonds, which were issued without the letter of credit. The District Court granted summary judgment to bank. Borrower appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that inability of borrower to obtain letter of credit was not failure of cause constituting error, as would provide basis for rescission of swap agreement.

The swap agreement specifically obliged borrower to pay bank any unfavorable difference between fixed interest rate amount and floating interest rate amount as such payments became due, irrespective of whether borrower was able to obtain a letter of credit from bank or any other financial institution.

Interest-rate swap agreement was not ambiguous regarding parties’ intent, as would be required under Louisiana law for admission of parol evidence, as swap agreement specifically obliged borrower to pay bank any unfavorable difference between fixed interest rate amount and floating interest rate amount as such payments became due, irrespective of whether borrower was able to obtain a letter of credit from bank or any other financial institution.

Glennbrook Beach Association is a homeowners association, founded and incorporated under the Summer Resort Owners Corporation Act. Landowner owns property in Glennbrook.

Landowner alleged that the Township did not have authority to exercise zoning powers over territory incorporated by Glennbrook.

Landowner commenced action against Township in circuit court seeking declaratory relief to determine which governmental entity had zoning powers over his land, a writ of prohibition to prevent Township from continuing to exceed the bounds of their offices, a writ of mandamus against Township officials to cease their efforts to prevent the exercise of his property rights, and an order for superintending control over the Township’s zoning board of appeals to prevent it from asserting jurisdiction over plaintiff’s property.

The Court of Appeals held that the Township had jurisdiction and authority to zone property located within Glennbrook’s territory pursuant to the Michigan Zoning Enabling Act (MZEA).

Occupants of vehicle and wrongful death beneficiaries filed personal injury suit against city, stemming from incident in which fleeing suspect collided with plaintiffs’ vehicle following police chase. The Circuit Court found in favor of plaintiffs. City appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. Plaintiffs petitioned for writ of certiorari, which was granted.

The Supreme Court of Mississippi held that:

• Officer’s initiation of pursuit did not violate police department’s policy governing pursuits;
• Officer’s continuing pursuit of suspect constituted violation of department’s policy;
• Officer failed to take sufficient steps required to communicate that pursuit had ended;
• Substantial evidence supported finding that officer pursued suspect at speed well above speed limit;
• Neighborhood in which pursuit occurred weighed in favor of determination that officer pursued suspect in reckless disregard of safety of others; and
• Officer’s conduct in pursuing fleeing suspect evinced reckless disregard for public under totality of the circumstances.

After teacher’s request for hearing on board of education’s decision not to renew her teaching contract was denied, teacher filed suit against board and public school superintendent, seeking declaratory judgment that board and superintendent were required to provide teacher with hearing to contest her termination. The District Court ruled in favor of teacher. Board and superintendent appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that teacher, as certified school employee in her third consecutive year of employment, was entitled to heightened substantive and procedural protections for employees who had been employed for at least three consecutive years, even though teacher had not actually completed all three years of employment at time she received her notice of termination.

Act of termination under School Personnel Act referred to act of not reemploying employee for ensuing school year, such that teacher would have completed her full third year of employment after receiving notice, any difference in treatment between certified and non-certified employees with respect to termination under Act was by design, and sections of Act governing mentorship, evaluation, and professional development did not demonstrate intent that teachers who had not yet completed their third consecutive year of employment would be excluded from heightened protections.

Bicyclist brought action against city for personal injuries sustained when she hit pothole. Following jury verdict for bicyclist, the Supreme Court, New York County, granted city’s motion to set aside the verdict. Bicyclist appealed. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division affirmed. Bicyclist appealed.

The Court of Appeals of New York held that city employee was acting in proprietary capacity at time of bicyclist’s accident.

City employee was engaged in proprietary function at time he failed to warn bicyclist of conditions in transverse when bicyclist hit pothole, as required to hold city liable for breach of proprietary duty to keep its roads and highways in a reasonably safe condition. Employee was in park on the day of accident specifically to oversee road maintenance project in his capacity as a city department of transportation supervisor, at the time he failed to warn bicyclist, he was blocking transverse to vehicular traffic in preparation for road repair, and although maintenance work had not yet begun, employee and his crew could not have repaired roadway without having closed road to traffic.

Village residents and state brought two related actions against village, mayor, and board of trustees, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief predicated on village’s use of alleged dedicated parkland for non-park purposes without legislative approval, in violation of the public trust doctrine.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• The causes of action challenging village’s proposed Department of Public Works (DPW) project were not barred by the statute of limitations;
• The “continuing wrong doctrine” applied to toll the running of the statute of limitations with respect to plaintiffs’ cause of action seeking to enjoin village’s present non-park use of portion of parkland;
• Laches could not bar state’s cause of action; and
• Laches has no application when plaintiffs allege a continuing wrong.

Noteholder, individually and derivatively on behalf of corporate issuer of notes covered by trust indentures, sued issuer’s purported indirect parent company, purported parent’s affiliate, issuer’s board of directors, and issuer as nominal defendant, asserting, inter alia, claims for breach of fiduciary duty, fraudulent transfer, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, tortious interference with contractual relations, and civil conspiracy. The Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed complaint based on noteholder’s failure to comply with indentures’ no-action clauses. Noteholder appealed. The Delaware Supreme Court remanded with directions. The Court of Chancery issued report on remand, holding that motion to dismiss should be granted in part and denied in part. The Delaware Supreme Court certified questions of New York law to the New York Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• No-action clauses of trust indentures, which do not refer to claims arising under the securities, do not apply to such claims, and
• No-action clauses in the case at bar did not apply, in absence of default.

No-action clauses of trust indentures for notes issued by corporation, which clauses applied only to contractual claims arising under the indentures, and which indentures triggered the trustee’s duties only upon an event of default, did not preclude a noteholder, individually and derivatively on behalf of corporate issuer, from bringing claims seeking damages and injunctive relief for breaches of fiduciary duty, fraudulent transfer, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, intentional interference with contractual relations, and conspiracy, against issuer’s purported indirect parent company, purported parent’s affiliate, issuer’s board of directors, and issuer as nominal defendant, relating to alleged scheme to ensure that junior noteholders were paid, despite their inferior status vis-a-vis plaintiff noteholder’s senior notes. There had been no default, and instead, the action was seeking to avoid default on senior notes held by plaintiff noteholder.

Operator of vehicle towing business brought action against city seeking to prevent enforcement of city ordinances relating to regulation of towing practices and mobile phone usage. The Superior Court granted injunction enjoining enforcement of ordinances. City appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed. Operator petitioned for discretionary review.

The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that:

• Municipality was not without the authority to regulate nonconsensual towing from private lots;
• The general authority of municipality to regulate nonconsensual towing from private lots was broad enough to sustain municipal towing ordinance’s notice and signage requirements; but
• Municipality exceeded its authority by imposing a fee schedule for nonconsensual towing from private lots;
• Municipality exceeded its authority by prohibiting towing companies from passing the cost of accepting credit card payments on to those who had been towed for being illegally parked;
• Striking the fee schedule and credit card fee provision of municipal towing ordinance did not hinder the overall purpose of the ordinance to minimize and control the harmful and adverse effects that occur during the non-consensual towing of motor vehicles, and thus, the remainder of the ordinance remained intact;
• Municipality’s mobile phone ordinance’s alleged substantial encumbrance on economic activity constituted a manifest threat of irreparable harm sufficient to invoke the equity jurisdiction of the Superior Court; but
• The legislature’s comprehensive scheme regarding mobile telephone usage on streets and highways precluded municipality from attempting to regulate mobile telephone usage by drivers through its general ordinance-making power.

Plaintiffs brought action against city and city police officers, alleging tort claims arising when pedestrian was struck and killed by car engaged in high-speed chase with officers. The Court of Common Pleas denied immunity-based motion to dismiss, and city and officers appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. On remand, the Court of Common Pleas dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint without prejudice. City and officers brought action for writ of mandamus, seeking to compel trial judge to dismiss the action with prejudice on immunity grounds, as allegedly required by mandate of Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the writ, and city and officers appealed.

The Supreme Court of Ohio held that:

• Decision of Court of Appeals, that city and officers in their official capacities were immune, was law of the case, but
• Court of Appeals did not establish that immunity barred claims against officers in their individual capacity.

Arrestee sued county sheriff’s deputy and sergeant on various tort claims arising from two separate incidents. The District Court denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Defendants appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Defendant filed petition for review, which was granted.

The Supreme Court of Texas held that allegations in arrestee’s petition were based on conduct within general scope of officers’ employment and could have been brought under Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA), compelling dismissal under statute’s election-of-remedies provision.

Arrestee brought action against city based on police officer’s use of handcuffs during arrest. City entered plea to the jurisdiction. The District Court denied city’s plea, and city appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed. City petitioned for review.

The Supreme Court of Texas held that arrestee’s action was an action for battery rather than one for negligence, and thus city had not waived governmental immunity to action.

Pacific Highway Park, LLC (PHP) appealed the trial court’s dismissal on summary judgment of its claims against the Washington State Department of Transportation (WSDOT) for inverse condemnation, trespass, and damage to property under RCW 4.24.630.

PHP alleged that these claims arose from WSDOT’s alterations to surface water drainage facilities in a 2001 project to widen nearby State Route (SR) 99, which allegedly resulted in the deposit of excess stormwater on PHP’s property.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• Because PHP did not purchase the property at issue until after the alleged taking occurred, the subsequent purchaser doctrine precluded PHP from asserting an inverse condemnation claim;
• Questions of fact existed about whether WSDOT’s 2001 drainage work resulted in an invasion of PHP’s property; and
• PHP’s trespass and RCW 4.24.630 claims were not precluded on other legal grounds.

Neighbors petitioned for review of city board of adjustments approval of a request for a special exemption to operate a bed and breakfast in an area zoned residential. The District Court affirmed the board’s decision, and neighbors appealed.

The Supreme Court of Wyoming held that:

• Applicants’ second application for a special exception to operate a bed and breakfast in a residential area was not barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel;
• City board of adjustments had the power to impose parking restrictions on applicants’ bed and breakfast as a condition of granting a special exemption to operate a bed and breakfast in an area zoned residential; and
• Evidence was sufficient to support city board of adjustment’s finding that applicants’ use of their property as a bed and breakfast met the standards set out in the relevant statutes and city ordinances, and that, with parking restrictions, was consistent with city’s master plan.

City filed for Chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy.

City sought, in Bankruptcy Court, to prevent state agencies from withholding disputed tax revenues accrued by the City’s Redevelopment Agency (RDA) from both the debtor City and the third-party non-debtor Successor Agency established when the state abolished all RDAs.

The Bankruptcy Court denied the state agencies’ claim that they were immune from suit under the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments.

State agencies appealed and the District Court reversed, finding that the state agencies were immune from suit.

The Court of Appeal took up a case requiring it to reconcile a Public Utilities Code provision depriving the superior courts of jurisdiction “to enjoin, restrain, or interfere with the Public Utilities Commission in the performance of its official duties” (Pub.Util.Code, § 1759, subd. (a)) with a Government Code provision authorizing any interested person to “commence an action by mandamus, injunction, or declaratory relief for the purpose of stopping or preventing violations or threatened violations” of the state’s opening meeting law. (Gov.Code, § 11130, subd. (a).)

The court concluded that a person desiring to commence such an action against the commission may only do so by filing a petition for writ of mandate in the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeal.

Objectors petitioned for writ of mandate challenging county’s approval of environmental impact report (EIR) for residential development. The Superior Court entered judgment for county and developer. Objectors appealed.

The Court of Appeal held that:

• County general plan did not preclude changing agricultural land use designations by amendment;
• EIR adequately addressed balancing of effluent production, storage, and disposal; but
• EIR was inadequate in its discussion of health impacts of air pollutants;
• EIR’s mitigation measures were improperly vague and unenforceable; and
• EIR improperly allowed for deferred formulation of mitigation measures.

Retired state police officer appealed the decision of the Council on Police Training to revoke his certification as a police officer. The Superior Court reversed and remanded the Council’s decision. Council appealed.

The Supreme Court of Delaware held that officer’s retirement while under suspension was not a sufficient basis to decertify him as a police officer.

Wife of 911 caller brought wrongful death action against county and the director of its 911 emergency telephone system, alleging that director refused to send medical assistance after caller reported that he was having a heart attack. The trial court dismissed action on grounds of sovereign and official immunity. Wife appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• Statute providing that no local government of the state would be liable for death or injury as result of carrying out duties involved in operating emergency 911 system, except in cases of wanton and willful misconduct or bad faith, did not waive sovereign immunity as to claims against county and against director in her official capacity;
• Whether director’s were discretionary or ministerial was factual issue that could not be decided on director’s motion, predicated on qualified immunity, to dismiss claim asserted against her in her individual capacity; and
• Complaint sufficiently alleged wanton and willful misconduct and bad faith on part of director to survive motion, predicated on qualified immunity, to dismiss claim against director in her individual capacity.

Owner of railroad-crossing easement sought review of Utilities Board’s decision that allowed independent transmission company to use pay-and-go procedure under railroad-crossing statute to run electrical power lines across railroad at three locations. The District Court affirmed. Easement owner appealed.

As matters of first impression, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that:

• Board lacked interpretive authority as to statute;
• Owner was successor in interest under statute; and
• Transmission company was not public utility company within meaning of statute.

Taxpayers filed petition for writ of mandamus and temporary injunction challenging municipality’s agreement to transfer to residential developer property originally acquired for use as a road right-of-way, alleging that municipality failed to follow statutory procedures for sale of unused right-of-way. The District Court dismissed action. Taxpayers appealed.

The Supreme Court of Iowa held that land in question constituted unused right-of-way, and therefore municipality was not permitted to sell or transfer it to a developer without first following the statutory procedure mandating notice to the present owners of adjacent property and to the persons who owned the land at the time it was acquired for road purposes.

Statutory requirements were applicable to both land acquired for highway purposes but never used, and land acquired for highway purposes and previously or currently in use, rather than only to property acquired, but never used for, highway purposes.

Kentucky Employees Retirement System (KERS) filed complaint seeking a determination that debtor, a tax-exempt nonprofit employer which operated mental health facilities in Kentucky, was “governmental unit” that was statutorily barred from seeking Chapter 11 relief, as well as to enjoin debtor from seeking to withdraw from KERS and to require debtor to continue to contribute to KERS. Debtor moved to reject its alleged contract with KERS.

The Bankruptcy Court held that:

• Non-profit charitable organization which was established by private individual, and which was only later recognized by the Commonwealth as regional mental health board to operate mental health facilities pursuant to contracts with the Commonwealth, was not department, agency, or instrumentality of the Commonwealth and did not qualify as “governmental unit”;
• Federal statute requiring trustee or debtor-in-possession to manage and operate property postpetition pursuant to valid state laws in effect where property was located could not be interpreted so broadly as to prevent debtor from withdrawing from KERS;
• Debtor’s contributions to KERS were not in nature of “regulatory fees,” “taxes” or “assessments”;
• Arrangement between debtor and KERS was in nature of contract; and
• Contract was still “executory” and could be rejected by debtor.

Renters who suffered loss of personal property when parish fire personnel failed to promptly respond to a fire at the house they were renting during a hurricane brought action against parish and several of its departments and employees responsible for public safety, seeking to hold defendants liable for the loss of their property. Defendants moved for summary judgment, alleging that they were immune from suit. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. Plaintiffs appealed.

The Court of Appeal held that:

• Parish and departments were entitled to absolute immunity from suit under the Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act (HSA) regarding their conduct in activating fire service disaster response plan and in failing to immediately respond to a residential fire on account of hurricane’s high winds;
• Parish and departments were not entitled to absolute immunity from suit under HSA regarding their conduct in formulating, adopting, and reviewing parish fire disaster response plan;
• Parish public safety employees were immune from suit under HSA for their conduct in delaying response to residential fire on account of hurricane’s high winds;
• Parish public safety employees were entitled to discretionary immunity from suit under state discretionary immunity statute for their conduct in delaying response to residential fire on account of hurricane’s high winds; and
• Parish and departments were entitled to discretionary immunity regarding their conduct in formulating, adopting, and reviewing the parish fire service disaster response plan.

Utility companies brought action against the Commissioner of the Maryland Public Service Commission (PSC), challenging the PSC’s order directing Maryland utilities to enter into a contract for differences with new power generation plant to incentivize the construction of the plant. The District Court entered judgment for the utilities. The PSC appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• The PSC’s order was preempted under field preemption, and
• The PSC’s order was preempted under conflict preemption.

Under the Federal Power Act, Congress intended that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) occupy the field of wholesale sales of energy in interstate commerce, thus field preempting PSC’s order, as the PSC order had the effect of functionally setting the rate that the new facility would receive in capacity auctions overseen by FERC.

Maryland PSC’s order directly conflicted with the FERC’s regulation of the wholesale sale of energy in interstate commerce under the Federal Power Act (FPA), and thus the PSC order was preempted on conflict grounds by the FERC. The PSC’s order had the potential of disrupting the FPA’s goal of using price signals in capacity auctions to incentivize new generation sources, and the PSC’s 20-year contract for difference incentive greatly exceeded the three years provided by the FPA for such incentives.

Property developer applied for approval of a comprehensive design plan and a specific design plan for a proposed retail center. County planning board approved the plans. District council decided on its own motion to review the case, held a public hearing, and remanded to the planning board to reconsider certain issues. Planning board held a hearing and again approved the application. District council again decided on its own motion to review the case and, after it heard oral argument, denied the application. Developer petitioned for judicial review. The Circuit Court reversed district council’s decision and reinstated planning board’s approval of the plans. Appeal followed.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• Issue of whether developer could obtain judicial review was one of standing, not subject-matter jurisdiction;
• District council is vested with appellate jurisdiction, not original jurisdiction, over zoning matters; and
• When reviewing the case for the second time, district council was limited to the remand issues expressly considered by planning board.

Retired town employees brought action against town, town board of selectmen, and town manager, seeking declaratory relief and writ of mandamus to require town to implement vote of special town meeting, approving article purporting to establish percentage of the total monthly premium for insurance coverage by a health maintenance organization (HMO) to be paid by the employees. The Superior Court entered summary judgment in favor of defendants, and employees appealed.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that town board of selectmen, not town meeting, had authority to establish the percentage of the total monthly premium for HMO coverage to be paid by employees, under statute governing payment of HMO premiums by municipalities. Statute expressly designated board of selectmen as the municipal entity to implement its provisions and did not make any reference to town meeting.

Child brought action against city housing authority and general contractor, seeking damages for injuries sustained when she tripped over a decorative wicket fence that surrounded planting area and fell onto the pavement. Defendants moved for summary judgment. The Supreme Court, New York County, denied motion. Defendants appealed.

The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that alleged defective condition on housing authority’s premises was open and obvious, and not inherently dangerous.

Oklahoma Department of Transportation (ODOT) brought condemnation proceeding regarding outdoor advertising sign. Following a jury trial, the District Court awarded compensation to owners of sign. ODOT and owners appealed, and appeals were consolidated.

The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that:

• Owners were entitled to the fair market value of the property interests taken, whether real or personal;
• Income generated from rental of sign’s face was relevant factor for consideration in determination of fair market value;
• Trial court acted within its broad discretion in excluding evidence of possibility of relocation;
• Owners had burden of proof as to valuation of sign, even though ODOT was party that demanded jury trial; and
• Burden that owners had in order to secure jury award in excess of ten percent of commissioners’ award so that they could recover attorney fees did not violate owners’ due process rights.

Landowners brought inverse condemnation action against Oregon Department of Transportation (ODOT). Plaintiffs alleged that ODOT, by repeatedly making representations to others about its intention to landlock their property and initiate a condemnation action, created a nuisance that “blighted” their property, resulting in a compensable taking of the property under the Oregon Constitution. The Circuit Court entered judgment in favor of landowners. ODOT appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed. Landowners petitioned for review.

After grant of petition, the Supreme Court of Oregon held that representations made by ODOT regarding ODOT’s intention to landlock landowners’ property and to initiate a condemnation action did not constitute a de facto taking.

ODOT’s actions did not deprive landowners of all economically viable use of property, since landowners were able to sell billboard easements on property, and there was no physical occupation of property.

Parents, as guardians ad litem for student, sued school district seeking writ of mandamus directing district to restore student’s original grade point average (GPA) and class rank, and for an injunction prohibiting district from altering GPA in manner inconsistent with writ. The Circuit Court granted writ and injunction. District appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that parents failed to present justiciable controversy.

Student’s parents who sought writ of mandamus directing school district to restore high school student’s GPA and class rank to the higher levels originally calculated under district’s formula for transfer students, following reduction of student’s GPA after other parent expressed concern that transferor school inflated grades, failed to present justiciable controversy.

There was no evidence that district acted corruptly or in bad faith, or that it abused its power, when it recalculated student’s GPA and ranking, grade calculation was fundamental function of district, and disputes such as whose student would be valedictorian were academic disputes for district to resolve.

Business owner filed constitutional challenge to town’s business license tax ordinance, which required businesses within the town to pay an annual license fee based upon business’s classification and gross income. The Circuit Court entered judgment finding the ordinance valid. Owner appealed.

The Supreme Court of South Carolina held that the business license tax ordinance was not unconstitutional.

Business license fee was a tax on the privilege of doing business within the town, and therefore, it was the manufacturing activity of taxpayer’s business which occurred wholly within the town limits, and not its receipt of income or sales of its products in interstate commerce, that was the business activity being taxed.

Telecommunications company brought declaratory-judgment action against city, asserting that city’s denial of company’s application for franchise to provide cable television services in city was unlawful under Competitive Cable Services Act. The Circuit Court dismissed company’s complaint. Company appealed.

The Supreme Court of South Carolina held that:

• Competitive Cable Services Act creates a private cause of action for aggrieved cable television providers;
• Testimony of individual city council members as to their motivations for denying consent was not competent evidence; and
• Evidence supported trial court’s finding that city’s reasons for denial of application did not violate Competitive Cable Services Act.

California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) brought action against credit rating agencies for negligent misrepresentation after CalPERS lost $1 billion in structured investment vehicles, rated “AAA” by agencies, that subsequently collapsed. The Superior Court denied anti-strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) motion. Agencies appealed and CalPERS cross-appealed.

The Court of Appeal held that:

• Negligent misrepresentation cause of action arose from an act in furtherance of agencies’ right of petition or free speech;
• Ratings potentially were representations of material fact giving rise to negligent misrepresentation liability;
• Agencies potentially lacked a reasonable ground for believing the credit ratings to be true;
• Agencies potentially intended through their ratings to influence CalPERS or a class to which CalPERS belonged; and
• CalPERS potentially relied upon credit rating agencies’ alleged misrepresentations.

Resident filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief challenging city’s and county’s enforcement practices with respect to the impoundment of vehicles. The Superior Court dismissed. Resident appealed.

The Court of Appeal held that:

• Resident’s payment of sales and gasoline taxes as a consumer did not confer taxpayer standing;
• Resident’s payment of fees for services such as water and sewage did not confer taxpayer standing;
• Any disparate treatment based upon wealth was reviewed for rational basis under equal protection clause; and
• Wealth-based classification concerning taxpayer standing to restrain county or city expenditures did not violate equal protection.

In 2009, the Town of Dillon enacted two municipal ordinances, one authorizing a local road improvement project, and the other concerning parking enforcement on the public right-of-way. Owners of the Yacht Club Condominiums (“YCC”) challenged the ordinances. They alleged, among other things, that the ordinances were an unreasonable exercise of the Town’s police power because they eliminated the ability of YCC owners and guests to use the Town’s rights-of-way near the YCC for overflow parking.

The Supreme Court of Colorado held that, in enacting the two ordinances at issue here, the Town did not abuse its police power or deprive the YCC owners of due process.

An ordinance comports with due process where it bears a reasonable relationship to a legitimate government interest. The ordinances here were within the Town’s police power to regulate matters of public health, safety, and welfare. The measures were a reasonable exercise of that power because they were reasonably related to the Town’s objectives of improving traffic safety, improving water drainage, and remedying a missing portion of a recreational bike path.

Landowner appealed from a decision of the city planning and zoning commission, which amended city’s zoning regulations and zoning districts in accordance with city’s amended plan of conservation and development, but which did not recommend any change to the zoning of landowner’s property. The Superior Court dismissed landowner’s appeal. Landowner’s petition for certification to appeal was granted.

The Appellate Court, as matters of first impression, held that:

• Landowner was not statutorily aggrieved by city planning and zoning commission’s sua sponte revision of city’s zoning regulations and zoning districts, which did not alter the zoning of landowner’s property in any manner;
• When a zoning commission, as part of its sua sponte application to amend its zoning regulations, refrains from taking action to alter in any manner the zoning classification of a particular property that is not specified in the application as the subject thereof, that property is not “land involved in the decision” of the commission, and thus, the property owner is not entitled to appeal the commission’s decision amending its zoning regulations; and
• Landowner was not classically aggrieved by commission’s sua sponte revision of city’s zoning regulations and zoning districts, since commission’s decision did not adversely affect landowner’s interests.

Dog owner brought negligence action against hospital, sheriff, deputy sheriff, and operator of county animal control shelter arising from euthanization of dogs after owner was admitted to hospital. The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants. Owner appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. Defendants filed for writ of certiorari, which was granted. The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed and remanded with direction.

On remand, the Court of Appeals held that fact issue as to whether deputy acted with actual malice and intent to injure owner precluded summary judgment.

After civil service board upheld termination of former city firefighter based on positive drug test result, firefighter filed petition for writ of certiorari. The Superior Court denied petition. Firefighter filed petition for discretionary appeal, which was granted.

The Court of Appeals held that failure to give drug test as outlined in employer’s written policy did not violate firefighter’s due process rights.

Employer’s administration of drug screen test to city firefighter that was different from test outlined in employer’s written policy in effect at time of screening, which resulted in firefighter’s termination, did not violate firefighter’s due process rights, since firefighter was given multiple notices and opportunities to be heard. After chief medical officer contacted firefighter with positive test result, firefighter accepted offer to have split specimen tested, firefighter was given written notice of his termination, and firefighter had hearing before civil service board and pursued certiorari in trial court.

City police officer who was terminated from her employment following incident in which she drove while intoxicated, crashed into a parked vehicle, and fled the scene of the accident sought review of city police department’s termination decision. The City Civil Service Commission Orleans, No. 8047, overturned police department’s termination decision and ordered officer’s employment reinstated, based upon department’s alleged failure to complete its administrative investigation within the statutory time limit. Police Department appealed.

The Court of Appeal held that sixty-day limitations period for appointing authority to complete its administrative disciplinary investigation into city police officer’s misconduct was tolled during pendency of criminal investigation into officer’s conduct, and thus, 60-day limitations period for administrative investigation did not begin to run until officer criminal proceedings against officer were completed when officer received a nolle prosequi from traffic court.

Tax Commissioner and Property Tax Administrator appealed from Tax Equalization and Review Commission determination that parcels of land owned by Power and Irrigation District but leased to private parties were not subject to property tax.

The Supreme Court of Nebraska held that:

• Department of Revenue had until June 1st to file its appeals from County Board of Equalization determination;
• Commission lacked jurisdiction to consider whether property taxes could be assessed against the lessees, as the lessees were not parties to the action; and
• District’s payment in lieu of tax exempted District from liability for property taxes regardless of whether the parcels were used for an authorized public purpose.

Suspect’s sister brought action against city and individual police officers to recover damages for personal injuries she allegedly sustained when the city’s police officers searched her home. Defendants moved to dismiss.

The Supreme Court held that:

• Sister was not required to name the individual officers in her notice of claim;
• Sister provided sufficient notice that a claim for civil assault was being asserted;
• Relation-back doctrine permitted sister to add individual officer as a defendant;
• Fact issues precluded summary judgment on sister’s false arrest/false imprisonment claims;
• Officer who did not have any physical contact with sister aside from removing her handcuffs was not liable for assault and battery;
• Fact issue precluded summary judgment on sister’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against officers; and
• Fact issue precluded summary judgment on officers’ qualified immunity defense.

Volunteer firefighter commenced article 78 proceeding to review determination of fire company’s chief officers which, without a hearing, suspended him from active duty for period of one year, and determination of company’s disciplinary review board which, after a hearing, reduced penalty to suspension from active duty for period of six months and suspension from social functions for period of another six months. The Supreme Court, Nassau County, granted petition to extent of remitting matter to company to conduct hearing. Company appealed.

The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that:

• Firefighter’s status as exempt volunteer firefighter, standing alone, did not entitle him to procedural protections under Civil Service Law, but
• Company’s failure to hold hearing prior to suspending firefighter violated his due process rights.

Men’s shelter resident brought negligence action against city, non-profit organization that ran shelter, and security contractor that provided security services for shelter, seeking damages for injuries sustained when he was shot by another resident. Organization cross-claimed against contractor for contractual indemnification, and cross-motions for summary judgment were filed. The Supreme Court, New York County, granted contractor’s motion and denied city’s and organization’s motions. City and organization appealed.

The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that:

• City could not be held liable for resident’s injuries;
• Fact issues precluded summary judgment on resident’s negligence claim against organization; and
• Fact issues precluded summary judgment on organization’s contractual indemnification claim against contractor.

In separate cases, defendants were charged with violation of city ordinance that prohibited them from remaining in public square between hours of 10:00 p.m. and 5:00 a.m. without permit. The Cleveland Municipal Court denied their motions to dismiss. Both defendants entered no contest pleas, and execution of judgments was stayed in both cases pending their appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. State filed discretionary appeal.

The Supreme Court of Ohio held that:

• Ordinance was content-neutral and thus would be subjected to intermediate scrutiny, and
• Ordinance did not violate First Amendment guarantee of free speech.

An ordinance establishing a curfew in a public park is constitutional under the First Amendment right to free speech if it is content neutral, is narrowly tailored to advance a significant government interest, and allows alternative channels of speech.

City ordinance, prohibiting persons from remaining in a public square between the hours of 10:00 p.m. and 5:00 a.m. without a permit, was content-neutral, and thus would be subject to intermediate scrutiny in determining whether it violated the First Amendment guarantee of free speech. Ordinance applied to all persons regardless of their message or their activities.

City ordinance, prohibiting persons from remaining in a public square between the hours of 10:00 p.m. and 5:00 a.m. without a permit, did not violate First Amendment guarantee of free speech. Ordinance advanced significant government interest of protecting the safety of those wishing to use the square after hours and protecting city’s investment in that property, ordinance was narrowly tailored since it allowed unfettered and unrestricted access when curfew was not in effect, and left open alternative avenues of communication because it excluded adjacent streets, sidewalks, and bus shelters.

Two customers of county rural water district brought action contesting the rate charged for providing water to their respective recreational vehicle parks, alleging violations of the Oklahoma Antitrust Reform Act. The District Court entered judgment on jury verdict in favor of customers. Both customers and the district appealed.

The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that:

• Antitrust Reform Act did not apply to rates charged by a rural water district, and
• Customer’s relief to challenge rate charged by district was to seek review first by district, then seek judicial review.

Oklahoma Antitrust Reform Act did not apply to rates charged by a rural water district, where the Antitrust Act did not apply to all pricing activity, but only the pricing activity of a party that met the definition of “person” as set forth in the Act, this section expressly excluded “the State of Oklahoma, its departments and its administrative agencies” from the definition of person, and the Rural Water Act expressly stated that water districts were agencies of the State.

Pursuant to the Rural Water Act, a customer’s sole relief to challenge a rate charged by a rural water district was to seek review by the water district and appeal to district court from any adverse decision by the district of such grievance. A complaint by a customer that a rate was discriminatory would make review of the rate by the district “necessary, convenient and appropriate” within the authority granted to the district by the Act, and the district’s further powers to “regulate” and “adjust” rates evinced legislative intent that the district decide such complaints in the first instance.

Father of motorcyclist who was killed during police pursuit brought wrongful death action against city and county. The trial court dismissed county on grounds of sovereign immunity and granted summary judgment in favor of the City. Father appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. Father and county petitioned for certiorari review.

The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that:

• The mere mention of “policy” in father’s complaint was insufficient to invoke statutory immunity under the Governmental Tort Claims Act (GTCA), and
• In a matter of first impression, statutory provision that granted exemptions to the traffic laws for authorized emergency vehicles did not provide that law enforcement officers of a state or political subdivision engaged in a police pursuit owed a duty of care to a fleeing suspect.

Developer and city sought review of decision of the Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA) remanding the city’s decision granting conditional use and preliminary site plan approval for a waterfront office and hotel development.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• LUBA properly rejected city’s interpretation of comprehensive plan provision on development in flood prone areas;
• Comprehensive plan provision regarding building in flood prone areas required developer’s proposed waterfront hotel and office building project to meet the requirements of the floodplain overlay zone; and
• Comprehensive plan provision did not require developer to map the 100-year floodplain on the site affected by its proposal.

City sued internet service provider (ISP), arguing that city was entitled to collect registration and license fees from ISP for cable modem services under city telecommunications ordinance. The Circuit Court found in favor of ISP. City appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• Cable modem services were subject to fees under ordinance;
• Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA) did not bar license fee;
• Even if registration fee was not discriminatory, fee was tax barred by ITFA; and
• City’s efforts to enforce license fee did not violate Equal Protection or state constitution.

Internet service provider’s (ISP) cable modem service qualified as “transmission for hire” of electronic data within ordinary meaning of those words as used to define telecommunications services under city’s telecommunications ordinance, such that ordinance applied to ISP, despite Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) conclusion that such services were not telecommunication services and testimony from ISP’s telecommunications expert regarding distinction between transmission services and internet access services. ISP provided its cable modem services in exchange for subscriber fees, FCC based its conclusion on language in federal Telecommunications Act, which was materially different from ordinance, and expert did not offer industry meaning of “transmission for hire.”

Federal Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA) did not bar city’s license fee imposed on internet service provider for its cable modem services under telecommunications ordinance, since license fee was not a tax for purposes of IFTA. Fee was imposed in exchange for using city’s right-of-way to provide telecommunications service, and under IFTA, tax was “not a fee imposed for a specific privilege, service, or benefit conferred.

Even if registration fee imposed against internet service provider (ISP) for its cable modem service under city’s telecommunication’s ordinance was not discriminatory, fee was tax on internet access barred by federal Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA). Despite contention that ISP’s predecessor had actual notice that fee would apply to cable modem services; city did not make public proclamation that provided notice that it interpreted and applied such a tax to internet access servers, and predecessor’s comment that mentioned potential for dual-use technologies did not demonstrate actual notice.

City’s efforts to enforce license fee against internet service provider (ISP) for it cable modem service under city’s telecommunication ordinance did not violate Equal Protection Clause or state constitutional article governing uniformity of taxation, absent evidence that city’s decision to impose license fee amounted to intentional and systematic pattern of discrimination or something akin to fraud.

Defendant filed motions to suppress evidence obtained by city police detectives after they arrested him while they were outside their jurisdiction. The Superior Court granted most of the motions. The state appealed.

The Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that:

• The extrajurisdictional arrest was unauthorized and in excess of detectives’ authority;
• Fourth Amendment did not require exclusion of evidence obtained by detectives after the arrest; and
• Statutory exclusionary rule did not require exclusion of evidence obtained by detectives after the arrest.

Former Interim Police Chief of the Town of Elberta, Alabama brought an Equal Pay Act (“EPA”) lawsuit against the town.

The District Court found that the Interim Chief had established a prima facie case under the EPA because her position as Interim Chief was sufficiently comparable to the position of permanent Police Chief.

However, the court found that the evidence clearly supported that the pay differential between the Interim Chief and the permanent Chief of Police was justified by the prior pay and superior experience of the permanent Chief and that this was a “factor other than sex.”

Developers brought action against city for fraud, extortion, assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and promissory estoppel for the alleged tortious conduct of John Tran, a former member of its City Council and former mayor of the City. The Superior Court sustained demurrer without leave to amend. Developers appealed.

The Court of Appeal held that:

• Statute limiting public entities’ liability for intentional torts of their elected officials does not create a new cause of action;
• Claims presentation requirements of Government Claims Act apply to claims governed by the statute limiting public entities’ liability for intentional torts of elected officials;
• Claims filed by developers did not fairly reflect causes of action in their lawsuit; and
• City was immune from promissory estoppel cause of action for city’s failure to approve real estate project.

Developers’ claims were subject to the claim presentation requirements and the immunity provisions of the Government Tort Claims Act. Because they failed to satisfy the claim presentment requirements of the Act with respect to their causes of action for fraud and extortion, assault and battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and because the City is immune from their promissory estoppel claim, the trial court properly sustained the City’s demurrer.

Two mobilehome park operators petitioned for writs of mandate challenging city’s denial of applications to convert the parks to resident ownership. The Superior Court directed city to approve the conversions. City appealed.

The Court of Appeal held that:

• City properly denied conversion application based on unanimous survey of residents; but
• City abused its discretion in denying conversion application based on survey of residents showing opposition of majority of respondents; and
• City council could not deny conversion application on basis that owner’s Tenant Impact Report (TIR) purportedly was incomplete.

The Board of Commissioners of the County of Teller filed a “Petition for Review of Annexations Pursuant to C.R.S. 31–12–116,” seeking the district court’s review of the City of Woodland Park’s annexation of certain real property.

The District Court denied the City’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  The City appealed.

The Supreme Court of Colorado held that:

• The District Court did not have jurisdiction to review the County’s petition under section 31–12–116, C.R.S. (2013);
• Section 31–12–116(2)(a)(II) requires a party to file a motion for reconsideration with the governing body of the annexing municipality within ten days of the effective date of an annexation ordinance as a precondition for obtaining judicial review of a municipal annexation; and
• The County did not file a timely motion for reconsideration with the City Council.

Accordingly, the court reversed the district court’s order, making the rule absolute, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

Student, who slipped and fell in puddle of water that had accumulated on concrete walkway at his elementary school, and his mother brought premises-liability action against school district. The District Court denied school district’s motion to dismiss. School district filed interlocutory appeal. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded with directions. Student and mother petitioned for certiorari review.

The Supreme Court of Colorado held that:

• Waiver provisions in Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA) are not mutually exclusive;
• Walkway was not, in and of itself, “public facility,” for purposes of CGIA’s recreation area waiver; and
• Walkway was not component of larger public facility that was the playground.

The CGIA’s waiver provisions listed in section 24–10–106(1)(a)–(h) are not mutually exclusive. Rather, because the waivers represent alternative avenues for exposing a public entity to tort liability, more than one waiver may be triggered and analyzed by the trial court depending on the factual circumstances in a given case.

For purposes of recreation area waiver of governmental immunity in Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA), walkway that ran between elementary school’s playground and school building was not, in and of itself, “public facility,” as would support conclusion that waiver did not apply regarding claim arising from injuries that student allegedly sustained when he slipped and fell in puddle of water on walkway, although students used walkway as means of accessing playground.  Walkway was designed for multiple purposes, and walkway was not designed to promote specific play activity.

For purposes of recreation area waiver of governmental immunity in Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA), walkway that ran between elementary school’s playground and school building was not component of larger public facility that was the playground, and thus waiver did not apply regarding claim arising from injuries that student allegedly sustained when he slipped and fell in puddle of water on walkway.  Walkway did not promote broader, overall purpose of children’s play in same way that individual components of playground, such as swing set or sand box, did.

County treasurers’ association brought declaratory judgment and mandamus action against director of Department of Revenue and state comptroller, alleging department and comptroller failed to pay county treasurers the full amount of mandated annual stipends. The Circuit Court granted summary judgment to department and comptroller. Association appealed.

The Appellate Court held that:

• Judicial branch could compel payment of statutorily-mandated amount of stipends without violating separation of powers, and
• Officer suit exception to sovereign immunity applied.

Judicial branch could compel payment of county treasurers’ stipends, in amount required by statute, for particular years without violating separation of powers, even though General Assembly had failed to make sufficient appropriation for payment of stipends. Failure to pay stipends in amount required by statute violated constitutional provision prohibiting a decrease in salary of an elected officer of any unit of local government from taking effect during the term for which that officer was elected.

Officer suit exception to sovereign immunity applied to allow declaratory judgment and mandamus action against director of Department of Revenue and state comptroller by county treasurers’ association, seeking to require payment to county treasurers of full amount of mandated annual stipends.  Action was not against the state, and association prayed for a judgment declaring that director and comptroller acted in violation of constitution.

City issued a notice of hearing to liquor licensee, charging a violation of a liquor ordinance prohibiting an agent or employee of a licensee from engaging in conduct in or about the licensed premises that was prohibited by federal law. After a hearing, a local commissioner revoked licensee’s liquor license. Licensee appealed. The Illinois Liquor Control Commission affirmed. Licensee filed a complaint for administrative review. After a hearing, the Circuit Court affirmed the commission’s decision. Licensee appealed. The Appellate Court affirmed. Licensee filed a petition for leave to appeal, which the Supreme Court allowed.

The Supreme Court of Illinois held that:

• Due process did not entitle licensee to relitigate a federal conviction of licensee’s agent for conspiring to structure financial transactions from licensee’s bank account to evade federal reporting requirements;
• Licensee had a meaningful opportunity to test, explain, and refute city’s evidence prior to local commissioner’s determination that licensee violated the liquor ordinance; and
• Any error in local commissioner’s admission of allegedly inadmissible hearsay was not prejudicial error.

Due process did not entitle liquor licensee, in a license-revocation proceeding on a charge that licensee violated a liquor ordinance prohibiting a licensee’s agent from engaging in conduct in or about the licensed premises that was prohibited by federal law, to relitigate a federal conviction of licensee’s agent for conspiring to structure financial transactions from licensee’s bank account to evade federal reporting requirements.  Under the strict-accountability provisions of the Liquor Control Act of 1934, licensee stood in agent’s shoes.

Village filed petitions to enforce administrative adjudication orders finding resident liable for various municipal ordinance violations, and assessing fines against resident. The Circuit Court denied petitions. Village appealed.

The Appellate Court held that:

• Administrative adjudication order entered by a hearing officer of a home-rule municipality may be enforced in circuit court, and
• Method attempted by village to initiate enforcement was appropriate under enforcement provision in Municipal Code.

Kevin Kilgore was one of twelve signatories to a petition to protest the Sun Valley Rural Improvement Zone (“RIZ”) budget for fiscal year 2013.  The Iowa State Appeal Board (“Board”) concluded the petition to protest lacked the requisite number of signatures because only two of the signatories owned property in the RIZ and therefore did not schedule a protest hearing.

Kilgore argued that all eligible voters in the county were authorized to sign a budget protest petition protesting the budget.  He asserted the requirement in Iowa Code section 384.195 that only “persons affected by the budget” may protest the budget includes any resident of the county and not just those residents who own property or reside within the RIZ.

Kilgore filed a petition for judicial review in the district court, and the Board’s decision to deny the budget-protest hearing was affirmed by the district court.

On appellate review, the Court of Appeals agreed the protest petition lacked the requisite number of signatures, and therefore affirmed the ruling of the district court.

Only those persons “in the municipality” are qualified to sign the petition, and the word “municipality” in the statute necessarily refers to the municipality which proposes the budget, expenditure.  The statute specifically excludes “county” from the definition of “municipality.”

Applicants filed suit, seeking reversal of the zoning board’s denial of their request for a variance to allow them to park their recreational vehicle (RV) on the side of their home to assist their disabled child’s needs. The District Court reversed and granted a variance. Zoning board appealed.

The Court of Appeal held that:

• Trial judge did not err by allowing applicants to present additional testimony, and
• Applicants failed to establish that the zoning board’s decision was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.

Applicants failed to establish that the zoning board’s decision to deny them a variance to allow them to park their recreational vehicle on the side of their home to assist their disabled child’s needs was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.  Record of proceedings did not support a finding that the variance would positively affect neighborhood prosperity and welfare, and while the applicants certainly had shown a hardship due to their child’s medical condition, they had not shown that circumstances special to the property created the hardship.

The City of Baltimore enacted an ordinance imposing a charge on outdoor advertising displays.  Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., an outdoor media company, alleged that the ordinance imposing the charge impermissibly regulated commercial speech in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

Principally at issue was (1) whether the charge constituted a tax under the Tax Injunction Act (the “TIA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012), and (2) whether charging outdoor advertising displays directly advanced the government’s interests in traffic safety and aesthetics as required by the First Amendment.

The District Court found that the ordinance is a fee, not a tax, for the purposes of the TIA.  Regarding the First Amendment issue, the court found a legitimate question as to whether charging displays directly advances the government’s interests in traffic safety and aesthetics, denying the City’s motion to dismiss.

In eminent domain proceeding, after parties were unable to negotiate pre-taking fair market value of property, jury trial was held to determine compensation. The District Court entered judgment on jury’s verdict for owners for $53,209. Owners appealed.

The Supreme Court of Nebraska held that:

• Evidence of Nebraska Department of Roads (NDOR) intent to convert United States highway, which adjoining property owners accessed solely by easement over neighbor’s land that connected to driveway that led to highway, into freeway at least ten years prior to taking, was relevant to determination of fair market value of property;
• Testimony of NDOR’s appraiser did not mislead jury into believing that NDOR did not have to compensate owners for taking of easement;
• Appraiser’s testimony as to pre-taking fair market value was not based on misapplication of law;
• Appraiser’s consideration of State’s future land use plan in calculating pre-taking value of property, although impermissibly conjectural and speculative, did not render determination of pre-taking fair market value unreliable;
• NDOR’s former staff appraiser’s proposed testimony that he told owners that property was suitable for commercial use and about comparable commercial sale was inadmissible evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations;
• Structural damage to owners’ property caused by NDOR’s post-taking improvement to highway was not relevant to determination of property’s pre-taking fair market value;
• Evidence did not warrant instructions prohibiting jury from considering any change in fair market value of property caused by public improvement or by knowledge that improvement would be constructed or that owners’ access to improvement would be taken or relating to taking of new permanent easement;
• Owners were not prejudiced by trial court’s refusal of proffered instructions regarding nature of permanent easement and its compensability; and
• Comment by attorney for NDOR during closing argument that “[w]e’re the Nebraska Department of Roads[,] not the Nebraska State Lottery,” although improper hyperbole, did not warrant mistrial.

Developer brought state court action against town, asserting town prevented him from developing his land by employing a decade of unfair and repetitive procedures. Town removed the action. Subsequently, the District Court granted town’s motion to dismiss. Developer appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• Developer’s takings claim was ripe under Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, even though town had not yet reached an official decision concerning his application for subdivision approval, and
• Developer failed to state claim based on § 1981.

Developer’s takings claim against town, including that repeated zoning changes prevented him from developing his land, was ripe under Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, even though town had not yet reached an official decision concerning his application for subdivision approval, where seeking a final decision from the town would be futile because the town had used unfair and repetitive procedures for over ten years to avoid a final decision, and the town had removed the case from state court.

Developer’s allegations that town discriminated against him because he was Jewish and “municipal Defendants” knew he was Jewish, that he heard town citizens express fear at a town board meeting that his proposed subdivision might become a “Hassidic Village,” and that a model home was vandalized with a spray-painted swastika were insufficient to state claim against town based on § 1981, absent allegations linking town officials to the conduct and allegations that any similarly situated non-Jews were treated differently.

Claimants commenced proceeding, seeking damages for diminished value of approximately 16 acres of what they characterized as “remaining land” following state’s taking of approximately 1.22 acres of land from what was their 17.3–acre parcel. Following trial, the Court of Claims entered judgment awarding claimants consequential damages with respect to what the court concluded was 12.835 acres of that parcel, which included 4.63 acres of land sold by claimants to a third party months before the taking of the 1.22 acres. State appealed.

The Supreme Court, Appellate Division held that consequential damages are unavailable relative to property that is sold prior to a planned taking and from which no land is ultimately appropriated.

Nittany Outdoor Advertising, LLC, and Stephanas Ministries filed a complaint seeking redress of College Township’s denial of Nittany’s applications to post three billboards bearing the Ministries’s messages along East College Avenue.

Plaintiffs claimed that the Township’s Sign Ordinance, under which the Township Zoning Officer denied Nittany’s applications, violated the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.  Plaintiffs sought damages as well as declaratory, injunctive and other equitable relief.

In support of its motion for summary judgment and permanent injunctive relief, Nittany argued that the Township’s pre-amendment Sign Ordinance and amended Sign Ordinance violated the First Amendment and the Pennsylvania Constitution for multiple reasons, including the Ordinance’s failure to meet the strict scrutiny standard applicable to content-based regulations, the Ordinance’s preference for commercial over noncommercial speech (together, Nittany’s “substantive” challenges), and the Ordinance’s vesting of unbridled discretion in Township officials.

The District Court held that:

• Nittany lacked standing to pursue its substantive challenges to the Township’s pre-amendment Sign Ordinance;
• Nittany’s substantive challenges to the Township’s amended Sign Ordinance fail on the merits;
• Nittany had standing to mount a facial challenge to the Ordinance on the grounds that the Ordinance invests Township officials with unbridled discretion;
• The Sign Ordinance vested unbridled discretion in Township officials; and
• Those aspects of the Ordinance implementing a permitting scheme, as well as the Ordinance’s variance provision, are unconstitutional, and the court will enjoin enforcement of the permitting scheme in its current form.

Driver sued volunteer firefighter and rural fire protection district after driver was injured when his vehicle was struck by firefighter’s personal truck as firefighter was speeding to a fire station to respond to a fire, asserting that firefighter’s conduct was willful, wanton, or reckless and that fire district was negligent and was vicariously liable for firefighter’s negligence. The Circuit Court granted summary judgment to firefighter and fire district. Driver appealed.

The Supreme Court of South Dakota of  held that:

• Firefighter did not act willfully, wantonly, or recklessly, and thus firefighter did not lose immunity from liability for emergency care under the Good Samaritan statute, and
• The Good Samaritan statute does not protect the acts of a fire department or fire district.

Volunteer firefighter whose personal truck collided with a vehicle that turned in front of the truck as he drove in excess of the speed limit to a fire station to respond to a fire did not act willfully, wantonly, or recklessly, and thus firefighter did not lose immunity from liability for emergency care under the Good Samaritan statute, absent evidence that firefighter consciously realized, before it was too late to avoid the collision, that vehicle’s driver would in all probability turn in front of him.

A wildfire that started on September 4, 2011, in a vacant lot in western Travis County and spread into the surrounding neighborhood, causing personal injury and extensive property damage.  A group of homeowners and insurers brought actions against the city as subrogation claims on behalf of a number of their insured property owners.  Plaintiffs asserted that the City was responsible for the fire, which they allege started when the electric utility’s overhead distribution lines came in contact with each other during high winds, causing electrical arcing, which in turn caused “molten metal globules” to fall to the ground and ignite dry vegetation.

For plaintiffs’  inverse condemnation claims to be valid, the damage from the fire had to be the almost-certain result of the City’s fiscally driven decision to curtail inspection of its overhead power lines. The City had to know at the time it made the decision that the chain of events was “substantially certain” to result from that decision.

The Court of Appeals concluded that the facts pleaded by appellees did not reasonably permit a conclusion that the fire and resulting damage were substantially certain to occur. The relevant power lines, even if not inspected, were not “almost certain” to become so slack that they would contact each other in high winds. Even if they became slack enough to allow for contact, it was not “almost certain” that those wires would actually come in contact with each other in high winds. And even if they did come in contact with each other, it was not “almost certain” that such contact would cause electrical arcing sufficient to create molten metal globules that would then fall to the ground. Nor was it almost certain that any molten globules that fell would fall onto vegetation as opposed to a less flammable surface such as a roadway or parking lot or, for that matter, on green vegetation after the current drought has ended.

“We conclude that the series of events that connects the City’s maintenance decision to the property damage, while arguably foreseeable, was not an almost-certain result of or necessarily incident to that decision. At best, appellees’ factual allegations would show that the City’s conduct furnished a condition that made property damage a substantial risk. That is far different, however, from being the substantial certainty required for a valid takings claim. Toleration of a dangerous condition may or may not set the stage for a subsequent disaster, yet, as discussed above, only if the event causing damage is the substantially certain result of the conduct can the City be charged with the requisite level of intent to constitute a taking. The fact that a disaster happens does not, by virtue of its occurrence, mean that it was a substantial certainty from the outset.”

County resident and neighborhood alliance sought review of a final decision and order of the regional growth management hearings board, which invalidated county resolution amending county’s comprehensive plan to expand county’s urban growth area, on grounds that ordinance failed to comply with relevant provisions of the Growth Management Act (GMA), and a subsequent determination by the board that county’s repeal of invalidated ordinance was sufficient to establish GMA compliance. The Superior Court affirmed the board’s determinations. Resident and neighborhood alliance appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• After county resolution amending county’s comprehensive plan to expand urban growth area was declared invalid for noncompliance with GMA, fact that certain property owners had acquired vested rights to develop urban projects did not excuse county from its obligation to comply with relevant provisions of GMA;
• County failed to carry its burden to establish that existing county development regulations adequately fulfilled GMA’s goals pertaining to transportation and public services, so as to bring county into compliance with GMA; and
• County’s action in repealing the invalid resolution, without more, was not sufficient to establish compliance with GMA.

Although property owners who obtained permits to pursue urban development pursuant to county resolution that amended county’s comprehensive plan to expand urban growth area retained the right to develop the land, under the vested rights doctrine, after the regional growth management hearings board invalidated the resolution under which the permits were issued based on the ordinance’s noncompliance with the Growth Management Act (GMA), the vested rights doctrine did not excuse the county from its obligation to take action to comply with the GMA’s planning goals after the disputed resolution was declared invalid.  Vested rights doctrine protected landowners and developers from unforeseeable changes in rules and regulations, but doctrine did not shield county from liability for its own errors in the process of planning for urban growth and enactment of its resolution.

Following determination of the regional growth management hearings board that county resolution amending county’s comprehensive plan to expand urban growth area was invalid, on grounds that resolution interfered with goals set forth in Growth Management Act (GMA) regarding urban growth, sprawl reduction, transportation, and public services, county’s action in repealing the invalid resolution, without more, was not sufficient to demonstrate county’s compliance with GMA goals.  Urban development rights had vested when property owners filed permit applications for urban development in period of time between ordinance’s enactment date and date on which it was declared invalid, such that, even though county repealed challenged ordinance and reverted land to rural designation, certain urban development remained in place, and county was required to specifically demonstrate how GMA goals could be met despite presence of urban development in rural area of county.

City brought declaratory judgment action against county public utility district, seeking determination that city was authorized to impose utility tax on domestic water sales. The Superior Court entered judgment in favor of district. City appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• State constitutional provisions governing taxing authority did not limit legislative grant of taxing authority;
• District’s domestic water sales were proprietary function, rather than governmental function;
• Governmental immunity did not preclude taxation of district’s proprietary function; and
• Express legislative authorization was only required to impose tax on municipality’s governmental function.

Utility tax for domestic water sales that city levied on county public utility district, a municipal corporation, was on activities that were proprietary (in whole or in large part), rather than governmental, and therefore city had authority, pursuant to statute that granted code cities broad general authority to impose excise taxes for regulation or revenue, to levy and collect the tax from district. Statute granted to code cities authority to impose excises for revenue in regard to all kinds of business and any other lawful activity, and in the erection and operation of waterworks and the like, a municipal corporation acted as a business concern.

Fairmont General Hospital, Inc. (the “Debtor”), and District 1199 West Virginia/Kentucky/Ohio, Service Employees International Union (“District 1199”), requested a declaration from the court that their November 1, 2013 Collective Bargaining Agreement (the “CBA”) was executed in the ordinary course of the Debtor’s business under 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(1) and was consequently an effective agreement under the Bankruptcy Code.

UMB Bank, N.A., as successor indenture trustee with respect to certain hospital revenue bonds (the “Indenture Trustee”), objected on the basis that that the CBA required court approval because the Debtor was in Chapter 11 and sought to sell substantially all its assets. The Indenture Trustee asserted that court approval of the CBA should be denied on the grounds that the existence of the CBA might result in a lower sales price for the Debtor’s business as potential purchasers might not desire to purchase a business with a unionized workforce. In addition, the Indenture Trustee stated that the CBA constituted a settlement agreement under Fed. R. Bankr.P. 9019 which must be approved by the court.

The court found that the CBA was executed in the ordinary course of the Debtor’s business and was effective under § 363(c)(1) without obtaining court approval. The court also found that the CBA did not constitute a settlement as contemplated under Rule 9019.

The primary, and ultimately dispositive, question presented on CVR’s motion to dismiss the Third-Party Complaint was whether Morgan Keegan had plausibly alleged that CVR was liable directly to the Bondholders for the conduct that was the basis of Morgan Keegan’s claims for indemnity and contribution.

Morgan Keegan claimed that CVR was liable to the bondholders for misrepresentations, express or by omission, that CVR allegedly made to Morgan Keegan.  Morgan Keegan also argued that CVR owed a general duty to the bondholders to see that the Official Statement contained accurate information.

The District Court held that:

• CVR was not liable to the bondholders for negligent representation, as CVR had no way of knowing that Morgan Keegan might relay any allegedly misleading information directly to the bondholders to guide them in the transaction;
• CVR was not liable to the bondholders for fraudulent misrepresentation, as the record demonstrated that CVR believed Morgan Keegan was conducting its own due diligence review that involved verifying the accuracy of the information CVR had previously conveyed to Morgan Keegan;
• Morgan Keegan failed to state a claim for fraudulent omission because Morgan Keegan had not alleged that CVR omitted any information with the intent or expectation that its omission would influence the bond purchasers’ investment decision;
• Morgan Keegan’s conclusory assertion that CVR owed a duty to the bondholders to ensure the accuracy of the entire Official Statement, whether premised on CVR’s purported ultimate authority over this document or otherwise, lacked a plausible basis in fact or law; and
• CVR was not jointly and severally liable for the bondholders’ claims under the Missouri Blue Sky Law.

Red Bull Arena, Inc. appealed from the grant of summary judgment to Town of Harrison, and from the dismissal of its complaints, which sought to vacate local property tax assessments on land owned by The Harrison Redevelopment Agency and on a stadium Red Bull constructed on the land. Red Bull contended that the land and stadium were exempt from local property taxes pursuant to the County Improvement Authorities Law and the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law.

Municipal bond holders brought action against financial guaranty insurer, seeking declaration that insurer was still obligated to pay in the event that issuer, which had filed for Chapter 9 bankruptcy, defaulted. Bond holders and insurer filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The Supreme Court, New York County, granted bond holders’ motion and denied insurer’s motion. Insurer appealed.

The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that financial guaranty insurer was not relieved of its obligation to make payments to municipal bond holders in the event of issuer’s default by cancellation of original bonds and replacement with new bonds as result of restructuring plan in issuer’s Chapter 9 bankruptcy proceedings.

Certificates of bond insurance (CBI) required insurer to unconditionally guarantee payment and were noncancellable, with no exclusion for bankruptcy.  Bankruptcy filing was an event of default under trust agreement and served to accelerate holders’ claims against issuer, and restructuring of bonds and reissuance in lower principal amount with longer payment period represented that holders sustained a loss.

Trustee appealed from a summary judgment rendered in favor of County Auditor, contending that the trial court erred in finding, as a matter of law, that the Trust lacked standing to bring a declaratory judgment action challenging the validity of assessments made on real property on which the Trust has the first and best lien.

The facts in this case involved a mortgagee with a first and best lien on property subject to a mortgage in default, seeking a declaration regarding a municipal ordinance imposing a substantial assessment against that property.

The Court of Appeals concluded that the Trust had alleged an injury by the Auditor’s conduct and that this injury was likely to be redressed by the relief requested in the complaint. The facts involved a mortgage that had been declared the first and best lien on a property that allegedly was inadvertently taxed to the point of making the property virtually worthless. Based on the record, the court concluded that the Trust had met the constitutional minimum of standing.

Statute governing the appellate procedure for a terminated member of municipal police pension and retirement system did not provide a right to a probationary police trainee to be terminated only for cause.  Although trainee was a member of the pension and retirement system and was employed by a municipality that had entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with a recognized bargaining agent under the Fire and Police Arbitration Act, due to trainee’s probationary status, trainee was excluded by the terms of the CBA from having access to the arbitration and grievance process contained in the CBA in connection with the termination of her employment.

Statute governing the appellate procedure for a terminated member of municipal police pension and retirement system did not provide a right to a probationary police trainee to a post-termination hearing.  Although trainee was a member of the pension and retirement system and was employed by a municipality that had entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with a recognized bargaining agent under the Fire and Police Arbitration Act, due to trainee’s probationary status, trainee was excluded by the terms of the CBA from having access to the arbitration and grievance process contained in the CBA in connection with the termination of her employment.

The Supreme Court held that, as a matter of first impression, city did not have requisite intent to cause backup. Natural and ordinary consequences test, permitting inference of requisite intent to take in inverse condemnation claim when consequences of governmental action are necessary, inevitable, or substantially certain to result, examines whether government intentionally undertook to act in a manner that necessarily caused injurious invasion of plaintiff’s property. In order for factfinder to infer requisite intent to take in inverse condemnation claim under natural and ordinary consequences test, plaintiff need not prove that governmental actor subjectively intended consequential invasion of property interests or undertook action knowing, even if not desiring, that consequences would follow.

In order for factfinder to infer requisite intent to take in inverse condemnation claim under natural and ordinary consequences test, plaintiff must show that government intentionally undertook its actions and that inevitable result of those actions, in ordinary course of events, was invasion of plaintiff’s property that is basis for plaintiff’s inverse condemnation claim.

City did not have requisite intent to cause sewage backup in property owner’s home under natural and ordinary consequences test when it intentionally used highly pressurized water to clean sewer lines near owner’s home, as required for city’s actions to constitute a taking in owner’s inverse condemnation claim, absent evidence that sewage backup was necessary, certain, predictable, or inevitable result of city’s intentional manner of cleaning adjacent sewer.  City regularly cleaned sewers using highly pressurized water, and backups of sewage into adjacent houses due to city’s cleaning of sewers was rare.

School boards brought suit against the Louisiana State Employees’ Retirement System (LSERS), alleging that it was the state’s responsibility, not theirs, to pay to LSERS the employers’ portion of the retirement contributions made on behalf of plaintiffs’ employees that are needed to fund the “normal” cost and the unfunded accrued liability of the plaintiffs’ employee pensions.

The Court of Appeal held that:

• Plaintiffs failed to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the legislature appropriated the required pension funding through the Minimum Foundation Program (MFP) block grants;
• Plaintiffs failed to show that there was a genuine issue of material fact concerning the funding of the unfunded accrued liability of the plaintiffs’ employee pensions; and
• Plaintiffs failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether requiring them to make the employer pension contributions to LSERS out of the MFP funding constitutes a prohibited unfunded mandate.

Statement by firefighters for resident trapped in burning building to “Hold on” was too vague to manifest assumption by firefighters of voluntary duty to resident beyond that owed to general public, and thus did not create duty of care required to establish negligence claim against city.

Petitioners challenged the annexation of their property, alleging that the annexation, a) violated N.C. Gen.Stat. § 160A–49, which requires that the annexation report be made available to the public at the office of the municipal clerk; and b) violated  N.C. Gen.Stat. § 160A–48, which requires that a municipal governing board use recorded property lines and streets as boundaries when fixing new municipal boundaries.

The court rejected the first argument, finding that N.C. Gen.Stat. § 160A–49(c) does not require that a complete copy of the annexation report be made available for distribution to the public. Instead, the statute only requires that the complete report be made available to the public at the office of the municipal clerk.

The court then rejected Petitioners’ argument that annexation boundaries which cross over streets are not permitted by N.C. Gen.Stat. § 160A–48(e), finding that the statute simply requires the use of streets as boundaries. It does not specify that the boundary must continuously follow a particular side of a street.

The court also rejected Petitioners’ argument that the use of a private street as a boundary was not permitted by N.C. Gen.Stat. § 160A–48(e), finding that the statute merely requires the use of a”“street” as a boundary; there is no requirement that the street be designated as public.

The Galveston Open Government Project (GOGP), an organization that “was organized to examine and critique local government and suggest ways to ‘improve its accountability to the voters,” filed suit to enjoin the rebuilding of public housing projects that had been destroyed by Hurricane Ike.  GOGP’s primary argument was that rebuilding housing projects would perpetuate racial segregation.

“A group like GOGP that serves as a watchdog over local public officials strengthens our system of self-government. But that system of self-government would suffer if anyone had standing file a lawsuit challenging a policy merely on the basis that they disagreed with the policy choices enacted after vigorous public debate. Because it has not suffered a concrete injury from the plan to rebuild Galveston public housing that differentiates it from the numerous people in the Galveston area who have strong views on this issue, GOGP is dismissed from this case for lack of standing.”

However, the court concluded that an individual plaintiff had made a sufficient showing at the pleading stage to allow her claim to go forward on the basis of “neighborhood standing.”  “But—as in those Supreme Court cases—whether she will suffer a concrete injury in terms of living in a more segregated neighborhood as a result of the rebuilt public housing is an issue that will remain in the case pending further factual development.”

Supreme Court of Arkansas holds that statute allowing for attorney fees in certain eminent-domain cases did not apply to condemnation action in which property owners were awarded increased compensation for property at issue in Regional Public Water Authority’s action for condemnation and declaration of taking, since Water Authority brought action pursuant to statutory provisions governing municipal corporations’ power to condemn, under which attorney fees were not available.

This appeal involves two apparently conflicting ordinances that regulate feral cat colonies within Cook County. One of the ordinances was adopted by the county. The other ordinance was adopted by the Village of Bridgeview, a municipality located within Cook County.

Alex Jerome and Ameena Samatar purchased a vacant building that the City of St. Paul previously had declared to be a nuisance. After their purchase, the city suspended its nuisance-abatement process to give them an opportunity to rehabilitate the building. But after several months and multiple hearings, Jerome and Samatar failed to satisfy the city’s requirements for a further suspension of the nuisance-abatement process. After several extensions of time, the city council eventually adopted a resolution that ordered the building to be either repaired or removed within 30 days.

The court concluded that the city council’s decision was not arbitrary, capricious, oppressive, or unreasonable, and was supported by substantial evidence; that the city’s procedures were not unlawful, irregular, or contrary to city ordinance; and that the city did not violate Jerome’s and Samatar’s rights to due process.

Landowners sued City for inverse condemnation, alleging that various actions by the City caused repeated flooding of their property.

The City alleged that the trial court did not have jurisdiction because (1) the evidence established as a matter of law that the City did not know and was not substantially certain that damage to the Property was going to occur when it took the actions complained of, (2) the evidence established as a matter of law that none of the actions of the City proximately caused the flood damages, and (3) the landowners failed to comply with the notice provision of the City’s charter.

The appeals court upheld the trial court’s denial of the City’s plea to the jurisdiction, finding that the City was aware that its actions proximately caused the flooding.

Linda Stone sued the Town of Irasburg alleging that the selectboard had acted unlawfully in ordering her, as town treasurer, to raise her bond to $1,000,000. Following plaintiff’s inability to obtain the bond and her removal from office by the selectboard, she claimed the Town improperly raised her bond and prevented her from obtaining the bond. She sought monetary damages based on common law defamation, tortious interference with office, violation of the Vermont Constitution, and deprivation of due process.

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Town and treasurer appealed.

The Supreme Court of Vermont held that:

• Treasurer did not have a property interest in her elected position  and therefore could not state a claim for relief under § 1983 for deprivation of a liberty interest;
• The intent of 24 V.S.A. § 901(b) is not to provide attorney’s fees to municipal employees who have disputes with a municipality regarding the termination of their employment;
• Treasurer had waived her right to argue that, by raising her bond and then removing her from office, the selectboard unlawfully invalidated the Town vote, which elected plaintiff as treasurer;
• Treasurer was entitled to remand on her claim for defamation; and
• Treasurer failed to meet the requisite elements of tortious interference with office.

Citizens Alliance for Property Rights (CAPR) alleged that members of the San Juan County Council  violated the Open Public Meetings Act (OPMA) by attending a series of closed meetings as part of a working group known as the San Juan County Critical Area Ordinance/Shoreline Master Program Implementation Committee (CAO Team).

Landowners challenged the constitutionality of § 18–59 of the Brighton Code of Ordinances (BCO), which created a rebuttable presumption that an unsafe structure may be demolished as a public nuisance if it is determined that the cost to repair the structure would exceed 100 percent of the structure’s true cash value as reflected in assessment tax rolls before the structure became unsafe.

Specifically, the issue was whether the unreasonable-to-repair presumption violated substantive and procedural due process protections by permitting demolition without affording the owner of the structure an option to repair as a matter of right.

The Supreme Court of Michigan held that BCO § 18–59 did not constitute an unconstitutional deprivation of substantive due process because the ordinance’s unreasonable-to-repair presumption was reasonably related to the city of Brighton’s legitimate interest in promoting the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens. Furthermore, the ordinance was not an arbitrary and unreasonable restriction on a property owner’s use of his or her property because there were circumstances under which the presumption could be overcome and repairs permitted.

The court also held that the city of Brighton’s existing demolition procedures provided property owners with procedural due process. Contrary to plaintiffs’ argument, the prescribed procedures were not faulty for failing to include an automatic repair option.  It is sufficient that aggrieved parties are provided the right to appeal an adverse decision to the city council as well as the right to subsequent judicial review. For the facial challenge to succeed, plaintiffs must show that no aggrieved property owners can meaningfully exercise their right to review or that such review is not conducted impartially. Because they have not done so, plaintiffs have failed to establish that BCO § 18–59, on its face, violates their procedural due process rights.

Borough of Upper Saddle River and citizens brought suit under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1376 (2006) and state common law, alleging that, in the course of operating a sewage treatment facility, Rockland County Sewer District # 1 had polluted-and will likely continue to pollute-the Saddle River.  Plaintiffs brought four causes of action: continuing violations under section 301 of the Clean Water Act; and private nuisance, public nuisance and trespass claims under state common law.  Plaintiffs sought civil penalties, injunctive and declaratory relief.

Both sides moved for summary judgment.  “The issue now before the Court is to what extent Defendant can be held liable for its sewage spills through a citizen suit brought under the Clean Water Act and state common law.”

The District Court held that:

• Plaintiffs had adduced sufficient evidence of injury-in-fact to defeat summary judgment;
• Plaintiffs had Article III standing;
• Plaintiffs had demonstrated “on-going” violations;
• Plaintiffs may pursue relief for violations not covered by the 2006 Consent Order;
• The 2006 Consent Order did not render plaintiffs’ claims moot;
• Defendant was strictly liable for the sewage spills that they had not contested reached the Saddle River, as well as for sewage spills into the Saddle River that their own internal reports confirm;
• The record was insufficiently established with respect to key factors bearing on the appropriateness of civil penalties;
• Plaintiffs were not subject to injunctive relief, given the uncertainty concerning current and future spills;
• Genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment for either party on private nuisance claim;
• Genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment for either party on public nuisance claim; and
• Individual plaintiffs had failed to establish trespass claim.

Moongate Water Company, Inc. appealed the district court’s order awarding costs to the City of Las Cruces as the prevailing party in an inverse condemnation action brought by Moongate.

The sole question on appeal was whether the Eminent Domain Code NMSA 1978, § 42A–1–1 to –33 permitted costs to be taxed against a property owner who exercises the constitutional or statutory right to seek just compensation for a taking of private property.

The court concluded that, “We see nothing unique or particularly novel in awarding costs to a prevailing party in an inverse condemnation proceeding, and we read Section 42A–1–29 of the Code as expressly providing for such an award. Accordingly, the district court correctly ruled that Rule 1–054(D) authorizes an award of costs to the City as a prevailing party in this case.”

Landowner alleged he was deprived of Constitutional due process rights when the City terminated water service to several properties.  The key issue was whether Plaintiff had a property interest under the Fourteenth Amendment in water services provided by the City.

The court found that Plaintiff had not identified a state or local statute which creates a property interest in the receipt of water services by making water available for all users and prohibiting services from being terminated at will and requiring just cause.  Therefore, Plaintiffs had no legitimate claim of entitlement to water service under Ohio or municipal law.  In addition, the court found no implied contract between Plaintiff and the City for water services.

When Upper Arlington officials became aware that church was considering purchasing a commercial office building for use as a school, they met with the listing agent and advised him that schools were not a permitted use for that building.  The church subsequently contracted to purchase the building, contingent upon zoning to allow a school. Upon learning of the buyer, officials advised the church’s school superintendent directly that schools were not a permitted use.

The church was denied a conditional use permit and was informed that it would need to submit a rezoning application if it planned to pursue a private school at that location.

The church filed a complaint alleging violations of its rights to free speech, free exercise of religion, peaceable assembly, equal protection, due process, and the establishment clause under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Ohio Constitution, as well as a violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA).

The District Court held that the city’s Uniform Development Ordinance (UDO) did not violate RLUIPA’s “equal terms” provision, which states that, “No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that treats a religious assembly or institution on less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or institution.”  As the UDO prohibited public schools as well, the prohibition of private schools did not constitute differential treatments.

“As set forth above, RLUIPA requires ‘equal treatment, not special treatment.’  To interpret RLUIPA to require Upper Arlington to allow Plaintiff to operate a religious school in the ORC Office and Research District, would effectively require Upper Arlington to treat Plaintiff more favorably than secular schools, which are prohibited from operating in that district. Stated differently, while RLUIPA operates as a shield to protect religious assemblies or institutions from unequal treatment, Plaintiff attempts to use the equal terms provision as a sword to receive preferential treatment.”

The City of Chattanooga proposed to deannex thirty-six residential lots, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 6–51–201(b).

At issue in this case was whether citizens who reside on real property that is proposed for deannexation by a municipal ordinance may, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 6–51–201 (2011), properly bring a quo warranto or declaratory judgment action against the municipality to challenge adoption of the deannexation ordinance.

The Court of Appeals held that quo warranto relief is not available in cases where referendum elections serve as the check on the governmental exercise of deannexation power via ordinance.

Former city firefighters initiated an action against the City of Martin, Tennessee, alleging deprivation of their property rights without due process of law in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as well as common-law breach of contract.  Plaintiffs were eligible for retirement benefits through, and had properly enrolled in, the Tennessee Consolidated Retirement System (TCRS).

The City recognizes an employee’s unused, accumulated sick leave as creditable service and reports the unused sick leave to TCRS when an employee applies for retirement benefits.  City firefighters worked twenty-four hour shifts.

The TCRS requires participating municipal employers, such as the City, to report the unused sick leave of certain types of employees, including firefighters, in days rather than in hours, but, as far as the TCRS is concerned, there is no standard formula for municipalities to convert unused sick hours to days.  In reporting Plaintiffs’ respective days of unused, accumulated sick leave to TCRS, the City converted every twenty-four hours of unused sick leave into one day.  Plaintiffs argued that the City should have converted every twelve hours of unused sick leave into one day.

The court dismissed Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim, finding that the personnel policy upon which they relied was not a contract.

The court also found that the entitlement Plaintiffs claimed—to a specific formula for counting their unused, accumulated sick leave toward creditable service—was to a process, rather than substance, and was therefore not a property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Scott Houzenga began his employment with the Moline Fire Department on September 8, 1997. On May 17, 2004, Heather Oepping was hired as the first female firefighter on the Department. During his September 2008 annual evaluation, Houzenga commented that he felt he was subject to a hostile work environment from Oepping because he had given her poor evaluations of her work.

This breach of contract claim arose from a public works project to renovate the Shreveport Fire Maintenance Facility. The dispute stemmed from a subcontract to provide the vehicle exhaust system for removing CO gas from the building while fire trucks are being serviced.

The City of Shreveport awarded the general contract to A & R General Contractors. Bernhard Mechanical Contractors won the mechanical subcontract on the job.  Bernhard awarded the exhaust system subcontract to David Akers.

Terminated Police Chief, Timothy Blakeley, brought wrongful termination action against the Town of Taylortown.

The jury was asked to answer four issues: (1) Was the plaintiff’s refusal to participate in conduct which violated public policy a substantial factor in the defendant’s decision to terminate him?; (2) Would defendant have terminated plaintiff if he had not refused to participate in that conduct?; (3) What amount of damages is plaintiff entitled to recover?; and (4) By what amount should the plaintiff’s actual damages be reduced?  The jury returned a verdict and answered the issues as: yes, no, $291,000, and $191,000, respectively.

The appeals court granted the town’s motion to amend the verdict based on the jury’s failure to properly offset the amount of damages by the amount of money plaintiff earned in other jobs and in unemployment benefits, remanding for the trial court to reduce the judgment by $5,886.97.

ION Geophysical Corporation brought a Declaratory Judgment action against Hempfield Township, seeking permission to conduct seismic testing in Hempfield Township and prohibiting the Township from interfering with ION’s operations in conducting seismic testing in connection with natural gas exploration and extraction.

The basic issue was whether a township can prohibit seismic testing on a township road.

The District Court granted ION’s motion for a preliminary injunction, concluding that ION had shown a reasonable probability that it would succeed on the merits on its claim that the Township’s conduct violates ION’s substantive and procedural due process rights and ION’s equal protection rights under the United States Constitution.

The City of Hailey appealed the Memorandum Decision, Order and Judgment entered by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Idaho.  Hailey argued that the Bankruptcy Court erred when it invalidated the annexation fees and community housing provisions imposed by Hailey in connection with the annexation of property owned by the chapter 11 debtor, Old Cutters.

Mountain West Bank, Old Cutters’ principal creditor, agreed with the Bankruptcy Court’s ruling with respect to the annexation fees and community housing provisions, but appealed the Court’s finding that the description of the real property in the relevant annexation agreement satisfied the requirements of the Idaho statute of frauds.

The Court concluded that the description of “Market Rate Lots” was sufficient in the Annexation Agreement and exhibits referenced in the agreement to satisfy the statute of frauds. The Court accordingly affirms the Bankruptcy Court’s finding that Hailey’s lien on the Property was valid under the Idaho statutes.  However, because the Court also affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s holding that Hailey does not hold an enforceable claim to collect any further amounts from Old Cutters under the Annexation Agreement, Hailey’s lien is ultimately unenforceable.

Plaintiff was a convicted prisoner incarcerated at the Hart County Detention Center (HCDC). He sued HCDC Officers Shelby Dixon and James Gossett in their individual and official capacities. Plaintiff alleged that on several occasions Defendants Dixon and Gossett had threatened him with mace and taser guns if he did not stop asking to go to church. He also alleged that he had been denied the right to go to church or have a Bible, although other prisoners are allowed. He stated that Defendant Dixon had called him a “honky and cracker and spit into my food.”

The court held that, as nothing in the complaint demonstrated any purported wrongdoing occurring as a result of a policy or custom implemented or endorsed by Hart County, the complaint failed to establish a basis of liability against the municipality, thus it failed to state a cognizable § 1983 official-capacity claim.

However, the First Amendment retaliation and free-exercise claims and the Eighth Amendment safety/protection claims were allowed to proceed against Defendants Dixon and Gossett in their individual capacities for damages and injunctive relief.