Exempt Organizations





IRS LTR: Arrangements Won't Hurt Group's Tax-Exempt Status.

The IRS ruled that modified arrangements in which several senior executive employees of a tax-exempt organization would become employees of a corporation and then would be “seconded” back to the organization would not adversely affect the organization’s tax-exempt status.

Contact Person: * * *
Identification Number: * * *
Telephone Number: * * *
UIL: 501.00-00, 501.03-00, 501.33-00
Release Date: 5/9/2014
Date: February 14, 2014
Employer Identification Number: * * *

LEGEND:

Corporation = * * *
Year = * * *

Dear * * *:

This is in response to your letter dated January 26, 2012, in which you requested a ruling that if you implement a proposed modification to an existing secondment arrangement, you will continue to be recognized as a tax-exempt organization described in § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (Code). This letter supersedes our letter dated December 20, 2013, which is hereby withdrawn.

FACTS

You have been recognized as an organization exempt under § 501(c)(3) of the Code and classified as an organization other than a private foundation because you normally receive a substantial part of your support from contributions from the general public, within the meaning of §§ 509(a)(1) and 170(b)(1)(A)(vi). Your charitable purposes are to receive and administer funds for religious, charitable, scientific, and educational purposes. You also are a sponsoring organization for donor advised funds within the meaning of § 4966(d)(1) that makes grants from your investment income and assets. You are an independent organization associated with Corporation.You propose to make changes to the workforce arrangement that you currently have with Corporation. Under the proposal, three of your senior executive employees would become employees of Corporation and then would be seconded back to you. Currently, all of your staff except for these three employees are employed by Corporationand seconded to you on a full-time basis. Your existing Administrative Services Agreement with Corporation would be amended to cover payroll services and employee benefits for the three additional employees. The Administrative Services Agreement provides that you will pay Corporation annually an administrative fee not to exceed five basis points times the average daily balance of all donor-advised fund accounts maintained by you, which shall be due and payable quarterly. Corporation maintains the right to waive or reduce this fee at any time. Amounts payable are to be reviewed annually to ensure that all amounts payable are priced at or below fair market value. However, you state that Corporation has waived this fee for you and provided these services and infrastructure free of charge since Year.

You will continue to be independent of Corporation. The changes to your Administrative Services Agreement will have no effect on your Board of Directors. Your Board of Directors consists of one employee of Corporation and five independent directors. Your Board of Directors meets three times a year to address your strategy and progress, to approve recommendations from committees, and to review and approve grants made, among other things. The three employees who will be added to the Administrative Service Agreement attend all Board meetings as your top officials and inform the Board of your day-to-day operations. The approval and appointment of these three employees will continue to be made by the Board on an annual basis. You maintain full control of whether or not any seconded employee remains your employee. You maintain the responsibility of interviewing, negotiating compensation and benefits, and approving the hiring of any employee that will be seconded to you. And, you also maintain control over future negotiations and decisions regarding compensation and benefits for any seconded employees.

You state that after the three senior executive employees are seconded back to you, you will continue to be organized and operated for the charitable purpose of promoting philanthropy and will not confer on any party any impermissible private benefit or private inurement. You also represent that corporate law dictates that a duty of loyalty is owed to you, rather than to Corporation, once the employees are seconded to you.

In addition to the independent control and management performed by your Board of Directors, you also offer many options for donor advised funds to make investments in addition to those offered by Corporation. You offer a variety of investment pools featuring top performing mutual funds. Half of these funds are offered through other investment firms. Additionally, donors to larger accounts are permitted to have the funds in such accounts be managed by independent investment advisors who are not associated with Corporation.

RULING REQUESTED
    You will continue to be recognized as a tax-exempt organization described in § 501(c)(3) if you implement the proposed modification to the existing Administrative Services Agreement.
LAW

I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) provides that organizations may be exempted from tax if they are organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes and “no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.”Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)(1) provides that in order to be exempt under § 501(c)(3), an organization must be both organized and operated exclusively for one or more of the exempt purposes specified in that section.

Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) provides that an organization is not organized or operated exclusively for one or more exempt purposes unless it serves a public rather than a private interest. To meet the requirement of this subsection, the burden of proof is on the organization to show that it is not organized or operated for the benefit of private interests, such as designated individuals, the creator or his family, shareholders of the organization, or persons controlled, directly or indirectly, by such private interests.

Revenue Ruling 70-186, 1970-1 C.B. 128, discusses an organization formed to preserve and enhance a lake as a public recreational facility by treating the water. The lake is large, bordering on several municipalities. The public uses it extensively for recreation. Along its shores are public beaches, launching ramps, and other public facilities. The organization is financed by contributions from lake front property owners, members of the adjacent community, and municipalities bordering the lake. The revenue ruling concludes that the benefits from the organization’s activities flow principally to the general public through well-maintained and improved public recreational facilities. Any private benefits derived by the lake front property owners do not lessen the public benefits flowing from the organization’s operations. In fact, it would be impossible for the organization to accomplish its purposes without providing benefits to the lake front property owners.

Revenue Ruling 73-407, 1973-2 C.B. 383, states that a contribution by a private foundation to a public charity that was conditioned upon the agreement of the public charity to change its name to that of a substantial contributor to the private foundation and not to change it again for 100 years was not an act of self-dealing because the resulting benefit to the substantial contributor was incidental and tenuous, and not economic in nature.

Revenue Ruling 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718, provides two scenarios where exempt hospitals enter joint ventures with for-profit hospitals. In the first scenario, the exempt hospital maintains control of the board and the day-to-day operations of the LLC that owns the hospital. The governing documents of the LLC require it to operate any hospital it owns in a manner that furthers charitable purposes by promoting health for a broad cross section of its community. In the event of a conflict between operation in accordance with the community benefit standard and any duty to maximize profits, the members of the governing board are to satisfy the community benefit standard without regard to the consequences for maximizing profitability. In addition, all returns of capital and distributions of earnings made to owners of the LLC are to be proportional to their ownership interests in the LLC. The terms of the governing documents are legal, binding, and enforceable under applicable state law.

In the second scenario of Revenue Ruling 98-15, control and management of the hospital is transferred to an LLC, the board of directors of which consists of three members appointed by the exempt organization and three appointed by the for-profit. Major operating decisions (budgets, distributions of earnings, etc.) have to be approved by a majority of the board.

In both scenarios, the exempt hospitals receive income interests in proportion to the assets contributed to the joint ventures. Only in the first scenario was the hospital activity considered to continue as an exempt activity and not to be operated for the private benefit of the for-profit hospital.

In Church by Mail v. Commissioner, 765 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir. 1985), aff’g 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 471 (1984), the Tax Court found it unnecessary to consider the reasonableness of payments made by the applicant to a business owned by its officers. The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, in affirming the Tax Court’s decision, stated: “The critical inquiry is not whether particular contractual payments to a related for-profit organization are reasonable or excessive, but instead whether the entire enterprise is carried on in such a manner that the for-profit organization benefits substantially from the operation of the Church.”

Broadway Theatre League of Lynchburg, Virginia v. U.S., 293 F. Supp. 346, 355 (D.C. VA. 1968), states that “An organization can incur ordinary and necessary expenditures in its regular activities without losing its exempt status.St. Germain Foundation v. Commission, 26 TC 648 (1956); A. A. Allen Revivals, Inc., PH TC Memo 1963-281. A contract entered into by a foundation, for its benefit, even if the contract is responsible for the creation of the foundation, is not necessarily as a matter of law executed to avoid taxation. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Orton, 173 F.2d 483 (6th Cir. 1949).”

In est of Hawaii v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 1067, 1081-82 (1979), the Tax Court held that compensation need not be unreasonable or exceed fair market value to constitute private benefit, stating “[n]or can we agree with petitioner that the critical inquiry is whether the payments made to International were reasonable or excessive. Regardless of whether the payments made by petitioner to International were excessive, International and EST, Inc., benefited substantially from the operation of petitioner.”

In P.L.L. Scholarship v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 196 (1984), the Tax Court found that an organization that operated charitable bingo on the premises of a bar allowed the bar to increase its sales of food and drinks by its operations in the bar, thereby benefiting the bar in more than an insubstantial way. The organization and bar were controlled by some of the same persons. The Court held that the operations of the organization and bar were so interrelated as to be “functionally inseparable,” the effect of which was that any economic benefit the bar received was not incidental.

In International Postgraduate Medical Foundation v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1989-36; 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 1140 (1989), an organization, the activity of which was to conduct continuing medical education tours abroad and which exclusively used one for-profit travel agency to arrange its travel tours, was found not to be operated exclusively for purposes described in § 501(c)(3). The same individuals controlled both the organization and the for-profit travel agency, and the organization did not solicit bids from any other travel agency. Both entities shared the same office. The Tax Court found that the organization was not operated exclusively for one or more exempt purposes because of its provision of benefits to the travel agency.

ANALYSIS

To continue to qualify as an exempt organization described in § 501(c)(3), you must be organized and operated for one or more exempt purposes. Section 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)(1). An organization is not organized or operated exclusively for one or more exempt purposes unless it serves a public rather than a private interest. To meet this requirement, the burden of proof is on the organization to show that it is not organized or operated for the benefit of private interests, such as designated individuals, its creator or his family, shareholders of the organization, or persons controlled, directly or indirectly, by such private interests. Section 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii).You propose to make changes to your workforce arrangement with Corporation. Under the proposal, three of your current employees will become employees of Corporation. Under the Administrative Services Agreement between you and Corporation, those same three employees would be seconded back to you. In addition, your Administrative Services Agreement would be amended to cover the payroll services and employee benefits for those three employees.

In certain cases, an organization contracting its services away may be found to no longer perform an exempt function because it has contracted out all of its activities and control. This is not the case with you, however, as your Board of Directors continues to be independent of Corporation. Additionally, an organization is permitted to contract out some services for a fee to a for-profit corporation without jeopardizing its tax exemption. See Broadway Theatre, 293 F. Supp. at 355. Your Board of Directors will still meet quarterly to evaluate and approve your grants for charitable purposes, despite the contract for administrative and employment services. Additionally, your funds will be used to pay for the seconded employees, and they will remain responsive to you. You will determine the employees’ compensation and whether or not they will remain employed by Corporation for your purposes. Furthermore, you represent that corporate law cases have determined that such seconded employees owe a duty of loyalty to you, rather than to Corporation. Given your exercise of control over the seconded employees and your operations through your independent Board of Directors, you have not contracted away your exempt activities.

Additionally, in order to be operated for an exempt purpose, you must be operated for a public, rather than private, benefit. Section 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii). When assessing whether an organization is formed for a private benefit, “the critical inquiry is not whether particular contractual payments to a related for-profit organization are reasonable or excessive, but instead whether the entire enterprise is carried on in such a manner that the for-profit organization benefits substantially” from the operation of the exempt organization. Church by Mail, 765 F.2d at 1392. One way in which a for-profit organization might benefit substantially from the operation of an exempt organization is by being the exclusive client of that for-profit. This is especially true in cases where both the for-profit and the non-profit are controlled by the same persons. In Church by Mail, 765 F.2d 1387, the for-profit organization ran a printing business for the church’s publications, which was the non-profit’s sole purpose. The printing company had been started by the founders of the church and operated exclusively to provide printing for that church. The for-profit printing company would not have existed if not for the existence of the church. Also, in est of Hawaii, 71 T.C. 1067, the non-profit school exclusively taught the lessons of a for-profit company run by employees of another, related for-profit company. The non-profit purchased, taught, and promoted exclusively the material of the for-profit company. There, the purpose of the non-profit was determined to be the distribution and collection of income for the for-profit company. Here, however, business from you constitutes less than one percent of the business of Corporation, and you are not controlled by Corporation. The separation of control, combined with the fact that your operations do not serve to “substantially benefit” Corporation, suggests that you are not operated for the private benefit of Corporation.

Additionally, an organization might be operated for private benefit if it exclusively uses a related for-profit to provide its services without seeking out the best possible service provider, International Postgraduate, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 1140, or if its operations are conducted in a manner that any external business is sent exclusively to that for-profit.P.L.L. Scholarship, 82 T.C. 196. This is especially true when the non-profit and for-profit organizations are controlled by the same persons. Again, you and Corporation are not controlled by the same persons. Additionally, you do not exclusively use the investment products of Corporation; rather, you provide donors with the opportunity to invest in outside funds. Furthermore, you allow large donors to select outside fund advisors. The access to outside investment products and advisors also means that the operation of your program does not merely act as a means to provide business opportunities to Corporation through a captive audience, such as the one in P.L.L. Scholarship, 82 T.C. 196.

While you do contract exclusively with Corporation for your Administrative Service Agreement, the agreement provides for the use of the employees at cost, as if you were employing them directly, and Corporation has waived any fees for the administrative services since Year. Therefore, there has been no financial gain to Corporation in the Administrative Services Agreement. Any private benefit that may be gained by Corporation in providing you with seconded employees, including your highest ranking executives, is incidental. See Rev. Rul. 70-186, supra(indicating that specific benefits to a defined group may be incidental to the performance of an exempt organization and, thus, are not incompatible with tax exemption). Rev. Rul. 98-15, supra, describes two scenarios where tax exempt organizations enter joint ventures with for-profit corporations. In the first scenario, the tax exempt organization maintains control over the joint venture and is able to ensure that its operations further the charitable purpose of the tax-exempt organization. The for-profit organization that enters the joint venture receives a proportionate amount of any income generated by the joint venture, but this sharing of revenue is considered to be incidental to the furtherance of the exempt organization’s purpose, furthered by the joint venture. Here, your activities create income for Corporation through the investment activities of your donor-advised funds, but this income represents less than one percent of Corporation‘s overall income, and you maintain control over your funds and activities through an independent board, as described above. Your continued control over your activities allows you to further your own exempt purpose and not the private benefit of Corporation. You are not operated for the private benefit of Corporation, and the inclusion of your highest ranking employees in your Administrative Services Agreement is not incompatible with your tax exemption under § 501(a).

RULING
      Implementation of the proposed modification to the existing secondment arrangement between you and

Corporation

     will not adversely affect your status as a tax-exempt organization described in § 501(c)(3).

This ruling will be made available for public inspection under § 6110 after certain deletions of identifying information are made. For details, see enclosed Notice 437, Notice of Intention to Disclose. A copy of this ruling with deletions that we intend to make available for public inspection is attached to Notice 437. If you disagree with our proposed deletions, you should follow the instructions in Notice 437.This ruling is directed only to the organization that requested it. Section 6110(k)(3) provides that it may not be used or cited by others as precedent.

This ruling is based on the facts as they were presented and on the understanding that there will be no material changes in these facts. This ruling does not address the applicability of any section of the Code or regulations to the facts submitted other than with respect to the sections described. Because it could help resolve questions concerning your federal income tax status, this ruling should be kept in your permanent records.

If you have any questions about this ruling, please contact the person whose name and telephone number are shown in the heading of this letter.

In accordance with the Power of Attorney currently on file with the Internal Revenue Service, we are sending a copy of this letter to your authorized representative.

                  Sincerely,
                  Ronald Shoemaker
                  Manager, Exempt Organizations
                  Technical Group 2

Enclosure
Notice 437

Citations: LTR 201419015




ABA Meeting: IRS Official Addresses Concerns About EO Form.

An IRS official May 9 addressed concerns that have been raised about the recently released draft of a simplified application for tax-exempt status, saying there could be changes as to who is and is not eligible to use the new form.

Speaking at the Exempt Organizations session of the American Bar Association Section of Taxation meeting in Washington, Sunita Lough, commissioner, IRS Tax-Exempt and Government Entities Division, discussed the draft Form 1023-EZ, “Streamlined Application for Recognition of Exemption Under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code,” which the IRS introduced last month and which organizations can use if they have annual gross receipts of $200,000 or less and meet other eligibility requirements.

Practitioners have asked why some categories of EOs — hospitals, colleges and universities, and organizations with donor-advised funds, to name a few — would be ineligible to use the short form. Lough said the draft and its eligibility requirements are not set in stone and that some categories of organizations not eligible to use the simplified application could become eligible later and vice versa. She said the IRS will need to review its eligibility checklist to determine whether to make changes.

Other commentators have noted that unlike the longer Form 1023, the draft Form 1023-EZ does not require a narrative statement of an applicant’s exempt purpose, leading some to wonder how the IRS will determine whether an organization will pursue charitable activities. But Lough said a narrative statement is not necessarily dispositive of how an organization will operate and that the IRS believes looking at what a small organization does after receiving its determination letter will show whether it is furthering exempt functions.

In response to worries that the Form 1023-EZ will not be an adequate learning tool because of its simplicity, Lough said the IRS has tried to make the instructions educational, adding that information will also be available on the EO portion of the IRS website.

The IRS will do some predetermination checks on a sample of Forms 1023-EZ by asking filers about items they have checked on the form, according to Lough. The contacts will give the IRS feedback on areas of the form and instructions that may need improvement, she said.

Lough said she expects the Form 1023-EZ to be ready for electronic filing by midsummer.

MAY 12, 2014

by Fred Stokeld




Exemption Applicants Can Appeal Determinations, Koskinen Says.

The Service has changed its process for reviewing organizations’ appeals of unfavorable determinations for tax-exempt status, IRS Commissioner John Koskinen said May 7 at a hearing of the House Ways and Means Oversight Subcommittee.

Previously, some conservative groups’ appeals were directed to a trio of IRS executives rather than to the independent appeals function established for that purpose by the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998. The changes should safeguard exemption applicants’ right of appeal, whether they originally went through the exempt organizations office in Cincinnati or through IRS headquarters in Washington, Koskinen said.

Koskinen was responding to a question by subcommittee Chair Charles W. Boustany Jr., R-La., who noted that some groups alleged that the IRS had denied their rights to appeal the determinations.

Boustany also inquired about what he called the apparent subversion by former IRS official Lois Lerner of internal agency controls to prevent taxpayer targeting. Koskinen said, “I think the process that I hope will reassure Americans is that, not only do we have a structure in place, [but] we’re trying to build a structure that will accept and be welcoming to people who say there’s a problem that needs to be looked into,” whether the source is Congress, IRS oversight bodies, taxpayers, or IRS employees.

Asked by Boustany about alleged abuse of audit selection criteria by IRS examiners against conservative groups and donors, Koskinen told the committee that the IRS is negotiating with the National Treasury Employees Union, which represents most IRS workers, over performance awards given to employees disciplined for being delinquent on their taxes. The commissioner said he hoped that a ban on such awards would be included in the union’s contracts and in IRS regulations and policies, although he did not specify a time frame.

“Legislation is kind of a blunt instrument,” Koskinen told Rep. Sam Johnson, R-Texas, who is promoting his No Bonuses for Tax Delinquent IRS Employees Act of 2014 (H.R. 4531), which seeks an absolute ban on such awards. “You will be satisfied, I hope, with our union negotiations, that policies we have are appropriate,” Koskinen said.

The NTEU’s contract with the IRS expires October 1, although the two sides can agree to an extension.

The commissioner also weighed in on the debate over reviving private collection of debts owed to the IRS, as included in the Senate Finance Committee’s tax extenders bill (the Expiring Provisions Improvement, Reform, and Efficiency (EXPIRE) Act of 2014 (S. 2260)). Previous experiences with the strategy revealed it to be unexpectedly expensive and inefficient, Koskinen said. Private debt collection was also limited because it did not include enforcement authority, he noted.

Koskinen said a recent phone scam, in which fraudsters representing themselves as IRS employees called taxpayers and threatened them with jail unless they paid supposed tax debts, raises questions about the public reception to private collections. “If you’re surprised to be hearing from us on the phone, you’re probably not hearing from us,” he said, noting that the IRS does not initiate contact by phone.

The commissioner also made a pitch for Congress to enact several administration proposals, including accelerating due dates for information returns to facilitate faster and better matching with tax returns to prevent refund fraud, and authorizing the IRS to regulate return preparers.

Granting the IRS correctible error authority also would allow the Service to make more corrections to taxpayers’ returns using independently verifiable information, without initiating an audit as is required now, Koskinen noted.

Subcommittee ranking minority member John Lewis, D-Ga., expressed concerns about the IRS’s budget.

“Your workload is getting heavier,” Lewis said. “The issues you face are becoming more and more complex. But your appropriation keeps getting smaller.” Noting the Service’s ongoing battles against tax-related identity theft and its grappling with needs of low-income and elderly taxpayers, compared with the Service’s continued funding crunch, Lewis asked, “Are you being set up for failure, for disaster?”

Koskinen replied, “No, we have a very can-do agency.” But he added, “I am very concerned. I’ve never dealt with an organization, even a major one in bankruptcy, that is so consistently understaffed across the board.”

The IRS Oversight Board in a May 7 report said the Service’s shrinking and uncertain budget and “unfunded legislative mandates” are harming both enforcement and taxpayers’ ability to comply with tax laws.

MAY 8, 2014
by William Hoffman



Guidance Requested on Deductibility of Water Right Contributions.

Thomas Hicks of Trout Unlimited has asked the IRS to include on its 2014-2015 priority guidance list (Notice 2014-18) guidance that clarifies the deductibility of a charitable contribution of an entire interest of an appropriative water right to an organization described in section 170(c) and an undivided portion of the taxpayer’s entire interest in an appropriative water right under section 170(f)(3)(B)(ii).

 

April 30, 2014

Internal Revenue Service
Attn: CC:PA:LPD:PR
(Notice 2012-25)
Room 5203
P.O. Box 7604
Ben Franklin Station
Washington, D.C. 20044
RE: IRS Notice 2014-18 Public Comment on Recommendations for 2014-2015 Priority Guidance Plan List
Trout Unlimited submits these recommendations for the 2014-2015 Priority Guidance Plan. There remains a continued and overwhelming need for the IRS to clarify an ambiguity in the federal tax deductibility of charitable contributions of entire and certain partial interest of appropriative water rights.Published administrative guidance is sought to clarify Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) § 170 and the deductibility of a charitable contribution of:

      1. an entire interest of an appropriative water right to an organization described in I.R.C. § 170(c); and

2. an undivided portion of the taxpayer’s entire interest in an appropriative water right under I.R.C. § 170(f)(3)(B)(ii).
This 2014 recommendation is based upon an initial April 2012 recommendation and an October 2012 Revenue Ruling Request. In this interim, there has been increased public interest in the outcome of this Request. Attached is related correspondence between U.S. Senator Max Baucus and the IRS Commissioner. In addition, there are other letters in support from Washington State Department of Ecology, Oregon Water Resources Department, Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife & Parks, and others.Timely resolution of these federal tax ambiguities is important for taxpayers in appropriative water right states. It is particularly important now, in times of climate change and drought, to obtain clarity regarding these questions.

Please call 415.309.2098 if you have any questions or we can be of any further assistance.

                  Sincerely,
                  Thomas Hicks
                  Of Counsel, TU Western Water
                  Project
                  Trout Unlimited
                  Laura Ziemer
                  Senior Counsel and Water Policy
                  Advisor
                  TU Western Water Project
                  Trout Unlimited

cc:
Karin Gross
Internal Revenue Service
Office of Chief Counsel
CC:ITA:01 — Room 4043
1111 Constitution Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20224
E-mail: [email protected]

Ruth Madrigal
Attorney Advisor
Office of Tax Policy
U.S. Department of the Treasury
1500 Pennsylvania Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20220
E-mail: [email protected]




Guidance Requested on Treatment of Charitable Contributions Costs.

Marc Gerson of Miller & Chevalier has asked the IRS to include on its 2014-2015 priority guidance list (Notice 2014-18) guidance clarifying the treatment under current law of current year acquisition costs for charitable contributions of inventory and other property under section 170(e)(3).

 

April 30, 2014
Courier’s Desk Internal Revenue Service
Attn: CC:PA:LPD:PR (Notice 2014-18)
1111 Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20224

Re: Recommendation for the 2014-2015 Priority Guidance Plan Pursuant to Notice 2014-18

To Whom It May Concern:

Pursuant to Notice 2014-18, 2014-15 I.R.B. 1 (the “Notice”), Miller & Chevalier Chartered respectfully requests that guidance in the form of a notice clarifying the treatment under current law of current year acquisition costs with respect to charitable contributions of inventory and other property under Section 170(e)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code1 (as contemplated by Notice 2008-90, 2008-43 I.R.B. 1000) be included on the 2014-2015 Priority Guidance Plan under the jurisdiction of the Office of Associate Chief Counsel (Income Tax & Accounting).

I. Requested Guidance Pursuant to Section 170(e)(3)

Guidance in the form of a notice is requested clarifying the treatment under current law of current year acquisition costs with respect to charitable contributions of inventory and other property under Section 170(e)(3) for the benefit of the ill, the needy, or infants.2 Specifically, such guidance should provide that such current year acquisition costs are treated as cost of goods sold (and, therefore, not classified and deducted as a charitable contribution) under current law. Such guidance will provide certainty that, consistent with the existing regulatory charitable contribution regime, donors of inventory and other property for the benefit of the ill, the needy, or infants will under all circumstances (i) be allowed to recover their basis in donated inventory or other property, and (ii) be able to compute the enhanced charitable contribution deduction available under Section 170(e)(3). For your consideration, (i) enclosed as Exhibit A is a draft notice providing the requested clarifying guidance, and (ii) enclosed as Exhibit B is an example demonstrating the application of such guidance.

It should be noted that the application of Section 170(e)(3) to current year acquisition costs is particularly important in the context of charitable contributions of food to satisfy the increased demand on food banks and other hunger relief agencies as a result of the current economic situation.3 In order to ensure that such contributions continue to satisfy such increased demand, it is respectfully requested that guidance with respect to the treatment of such current year acquisition costs be included on the 2014-2015 Priority Guidance Plan and then be issued in the form of a notice drafted by the Office of Associate Chief Counsel (Income Tax & Accounting) as soon as practically possible thereafter.4

II. Discussion

Section 170(e)(1) provides the general rule that donors are permitted a deduction for charitable contributions of ordinary income and capital gain property equal to the lower of the donor’s basis or the fair market value of the property at the time of donation. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(c)(4) provides that under this general rule (i) current year acquisition costs (i.e., purchases) with respect to contributed property should be treated as cost of goods sold (and, therefore, not classified and deducted as a charitable contribution), and (ii) prior year acquisition costs with respect to contributed property that are included in opening inventory in the year of contribution should be “removed” from inventory and classified and deducted as a charitable contribution (the so-called “removal rule”).5 This longstanding regulation ensures that donors will recover current year acquisition costs through cost of goods sold without regard to the limitations imposed on charitable contributions under Section 170, primarily the taxable income limitation of Section 170(b)(2).

Section 170(e)(3) is a special incentive designed to provide an enhanced charitable deduction (the so-called “bump”) with respect to donations of inventory and other property for the benefit of the ill, the needy or infants equal to the lower of (i) twice the cost basis of the contributed property, or (ii) the cost basis plus one-half of the appreciation in excess of basis. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-4A(c)(3) provides that “[n]otwithstanding the rules of § 1.170A-1(c)(4), the donor of the property which is inventory contributed under this section must make a corresponding adjustment to cost of goods sold by decreasing the cost of goods sold by the lesser of the fair market value of the contributed item or the amount of basis. . . .”

Clarification is necessary with respect to the treatment of current year acquisition costs with respect to charitable contributions of inventory and other property under Section 170(e)(3). Specifically, there is uncertainty regarding the scope and application of Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-4A(c)(3) and, in particular, whether current year acquisition costs with respect to charitable contributions under Section 170(e)(3) are (i) treated as cost of goods sold under the general rule of Section 170(e)(1) and Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(c)(4), or (ii) subject to the removal rule and classified and deducted as charitable contributions under Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-4A(c)(3).6 We respectfully request that clarifying guidance in the form of a notice be issued that such costs are treated as cost of goods sold under current law and regulations, as such treatment is consistent with the intent of the existing regulatory charitable contribution regime as described above.

The regulatory development of Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-4A(c)(3) clearly supports the treatment of current year acquisition costs as cost of goods sold. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-4A(c)(3) originally required the donor to apply the removal rule by reducing its cost of goods sold by the basis of the donated property.7 The Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service (the “IRS”), however, recognized that this rule created a problem with respect to “underwater” inventory having a fair market value less than its basis:

      Where the basis of the contributed inventory property qualifying under section 170(e)(3) exceeds the property’s fair market value, the underlying purpose of the section to encourage contributions of this type of property for the purposes specified in section 170(e)(3) may be frustrated. This is because the entire basis of the contributed property is removed from the cost of goods sold while the charitable contribution is limited to the property’s fair market value. It would be more advantageous for the taxpayer to destroy or sell the property than to contribute it for the care of the ill, the needy, or infants. A taxpayer would then be entitled to deduct its entire basis in the property as a loss deduction under section 165 or as part of the cost of goods sold as compared to a charitable contribution amount limited to the property’s fair market value.

8
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-4A(c)(3) was subsequently amended by T.D. 7962 “[i]n order to remove this disincentive.”9 It is important to note, however, that although not explicit in the text of T.D. 7962 or the regulation itself, it is clear that the amended regulation was directed at limiting the removal rule with respect to prior year acquisition costs10 and was not intended to override the established treatment of current year acquisition costs as cost of goods sold under the general rule of Section 170(e)(1) and Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(c)(4).Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-4A(c)(3) by its terms applies to “property which is inventory.” Designation of property as “inventory” is limited to prior year acquisition costs under the existing regulatory charitable contribution regime as evidenced by Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(c)(4), which distinguishes between (i) “[a]ny costs and expenses pertaining to the contributed property which were incurred in taxable years preceding the year of contribution and are properlyreflected in the opening inventory for the year of contribution” (i.e., prior year acquisition costs subject to the removal rule), and (ii) “[a]ny costs and expenses pertaining to the contributed property which are incurred in the year of contribution” (i.e., current year acquisition costs treated as cost of goods sold). Current year acquisition costs by definition are not “inventory” (i.e., they remain as part of cost of goods sold in the current year and, therefore, are never reflected in inventory) and, therefore, should not be subject to the application of Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-4A(c)(3) which as noted above is limited to “property which is inventory.11

It should be noted that it is our understanding that some parties have interpreted the introductory language of the regulation (i.e., “[n]otwithstanding the rules of § 1.170A-1(c)(4)”) to disregard the established treatment of current year acquisition costs as cost of goods sold, when such language should for the reasons described above be limited to an interpretation of the application of the removal rule to prior year acquisition costs. As detailed above, the context of the amendment to Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-4A(c)(3) was clearly limited to the treatment of prior year acquisition costs and there is nothing to suggest that the established treatment of current year acquisition costs as cost of goods sold under Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(c)(4) was intended to be modified. This is further supported by the fact that Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-4A(c)(3) was amended without being subject to the normal notice and comment procedures and effective date limitations of the Administrative Procedure Act (the “APA”) as the Treasury Department and the IRS determined that the amendment “merely liberalize[d] the provisions of § 1.170A-4A(c)(3).”12Therefore, it was “found unnecessary to issue it with notice and public procedure under [the APA] or subject to the effective date limitation of [the APA].”13 It is respectfully submitted that the amendment to Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-4A(c)(3) was not intended as a restriction on the established treatment of current year acquisition costs as cost of goods sold under Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(c)(4), since if it was intended as such a restriction the Treasury Department and the IRS presumably would not have viewed the amendment as a “liberalization” and, therefore, would have been compelled to follow the required APA procedures.

Despite the fact that the context of the amendment to Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-4A(c)(3) suggests that the removal rule provided by that regulation be limited to prior year acquisition costs, the fact that there is not an explicit reference to such prior year acquisition costs has created uncertainty as to the treatment of current year acquisition costs. In response to taxpayer concerns regarding this uncertainty,14 the Office of Associate Chief Counsel (Income Tax & Accounting) issued Notice 2008-90, which allowed taxpayers to treat current year acquisition costs as cost of goods sold in certain circumstances.15 The notice itself, however, announced a larger study of the treatment of charitable contributions under Section 170(e)(3) and contemplated the issuance of future guidance.16 Consistent with the underlying intent of this study, it is respectfully submitted that such future guidance be included on the 2014-2015 Priority Guidance Plan and ultimately be issued by the Office of Associate Chief Counsel (Income Tax & Accounting) to provide comprehensive clarification that current year acquisition costs are treated as cost of goods sold under current law in all circumstances.

III. Appropriateness of Inclusion of Requested Guidance on the 2014-2015 Priority Guidance Plan

Pursuant to the Notice, the Treasury Department and the IRS consider the following in reviewing recommendations and selecting projects for inclusion on the 2014-2015 Priority Guidance Plan: (i) whether the recommended guidance resolves significant issues relevant to many taxpayers; (ii) whether the recommended guidance promotes sound tax administration; (iii) whether the recommended guidance can be drafted in a manner that will enable taxpayers to easily understand and apply the guidance; (iv) whether the recommended guidance involves regulations that are outmoded, ineffective, insufficient, or excessively burdensome and that should be modified, streamlined, expanded, or repealed; (v) whether the IRS can administer the recommended guidance on a uniform basis; and (vi) whether the recommended guidance reduces controversy and lessens the burden on taxpayers or the IRS.

It is respectfully submitted that the recommended guidance satisfies each of these criteria. With respect to the first criteria, the recommended guidance resolves significant issues relevant to many taxpayers. Specifically, the treatment of current year acquisition costs under Section 170(e)(3) impacts the wide number of donors and recipients of charitable contributions of inventory and other property for the benefit of the ill, the needy, or infants. This is particularly true with respect to donors of food (including grocery stores, food manufacturers and others), as well as food banks and other hunger relief agencies that are the recipients of such donations.17 Uncertainty regarding the treatment of current year acquisition costs has caused such donors to consider suspending or eliminating long-standing charitable donation programs. In this regard, such uncertainty has caused such donors to consider destroying or otherwise disposing of inventory and other property (and claiming a loss deduction) rather than donating it in order to ensure that they recover the basis of such property without being subject to the taxable income limitation of Section 170(b)(2).18

With respect to the fourth criteria, the recommended guidance involves regulations that are ineffective because, as discussed above, such guidance would address the uncertainty regarding the scope and application of Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-4A(c)(3)19 and, in particular, whether current year acquisition costs with respect to charitable contributions under Section 170(e)(3) are (i) treated as costs of goods sold under the general rule of Section 170(e)(1) and Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(c)(4), or (ii) subject to the removal rule and classified and deducted as charitable contributions under Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-4A(c)(3).

With respect to the remaining criteria, the recommended guidance would (i) promote sound tax administration, (ii) be drafted in a manner that will enable taxpayers to easily understand and apply it, (iii) be administered by the IRS on a uniform basis, and (iv) reduce controversy and lessens the burden on taxpayers or the IRS. As evidenced by the draft notice enclosed as Exhibit A and the example demonstrating the application of that draft notice enclosed as Exhibit B, the recommended guidance allows for the simple classification of acquisition costs and the straightforward calculation of the Section 170(e)(3) enhanced deduction. Such classification and calculation is (i) easily applied by taxpayers and easily administered and reviewed by the IRS,20 and (ii) would result in relatively little if any additional recordkeeping or compliance burden for taxpayers.

* * * * * *

Thank you in advance for your consideration of this request. We appreciate the opportunity to submit this request and would welcome the opportunity to meet with the Treasury Department and the IRS to discuss it in greater detail or to answer any questions that you may have.

                  Respectfully submitted,
                  Marc J. Gerson
                  Miller & Chevalier Chartered
                  Washington, DC

Enclosures

cc:
Alexa M. Claybon
M. Ruth M. Madrigal
Treasury Department Office of Tax Policy

Andrew J. Keyso, Jr.
Associate Chief Counsel (Income Tax & Accounting)

Roy A. Hirschhorn
Chief, Branch 6
Associate Chief Counsel (Income Tax & Accounting)

Steven I. Hurok
Citrin Cooperman

* * * * *Exhibit A
Draft Notice

Part III — Administrative, Procedural, and MiscellaneousCharitable Contributions of Inventory And Other Property Under § 170(e)(3)

Notice 2014-[XX]

SECTION 1. OVERVIEW

This notice provides guidance clarifying the treatment under current law of current year acquisition costs with respect to charitable contributions of inventory and other property that constitute qualified contributions as defined in Section 170(e)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.

SECTION 2. GUIDANCE UNDER SECTION 170(e)(3)

For a particular qualified contribution of inventory and other property under § 170(e)(3) that otherwise satisfies the requirements of § 170 and the relevant regulations, any costs and expenses pertaining to the contributed property which are incurred in the year of contribution and would, under the method of accounting used, be properly reflected in the cost of goods sold for such year (“current year acquisition costs”) are to be treated as part of the cost of goods sold for such year.

SECTION 3. RELIANCE ON NOTICE

Taxpayers may rely on this notice unless and until further guidance is issued.

SECTION 4. DRAFTING INFORMATION

The principal author of this notice is [insert] of the Office of Associate Chief Counsel (Income Tax & Accounting). For further information regarding this notice contact [insert] at [insert] (not a toll free call).

Exhibit B
Example

Corporation X has taxable income of $2,000 for 2014. Corporation X makes a charitable contribution of food to a local food bank in 2014. The contribution is a “qualified contribution” under Section 170(e)(3)(A). The food was purchased during 2014 and had a basis of $100 and a fair market value of $150 on the date of contribution. The amount and classification of the resulting deductions for 2014 are as follows: Portion of deduction classified and allowed as cost of goods sold
 ("COGS")

 Cost basis                                                        $100

 Portion of deduction classified as charitable contribution

 Fair market value of contributed property                         $150
 Reduction for 50% of profit ($150 - $100)                        ($25)
 Net                                                               $125

 Twice cost basis of contributed property                          $200

 Lower of net (computed above) or twice cost basis                 $125
 Portion of deduction classified and allowed as COGS             ($100)
 Net Section 170(e)(3) "bump"                                       $25

 Application of Section 170(b) taxable income limitation

 Total 2014 charitable contribution                                 $25
 Taxable income limitation (10% of $2,000)                         $200
 Charitable contribution deduction in 2014                          $25

 Total cost recovery in 2014

 Portion of deduction classified and allowed as COGS               $100
 Charitable contribution deduction in 2014                          $25

FOOTNOTES

1 All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, and the Treasury Regulations promulgated thereunder, unless otherwise specified.2 Because such guidance would clarify the treatment of current year acquisition costs under current law, such guidance should be applicable retroactively.

3 Increased demand on food banks and other hunger relief agencies, and the increased efforts of donors of food to satisfy such demand, has been widely reported. See, e.g., Nixon, “Food Banks Anticipate Impact of Cuts to Food Stamps, New York Times (Jan, 22, 2014); Bello, “Food Stamp Cuts Create High Demand For Food Bank Supplies,” USA Today (Nov. 4, 2013). See also Feeding America, 2013 Annual Report (noting that the Feeding America nationwide network of member food banks provided 3.2 billion meals to 37 million people in the United States in a single year).

4 As discussed in greater detail herein, the requested guidance with respect to the treatment of current year acquisition costs may be issued in a manner that is consistent with the existing regulatory charitable contribution regime (i.e., such that no modification of the existing regulations would be required). Therefore, it is respectfully requested that guidance be issued in the form of a notice such that it may be issued in an expedited fashion. To the extent that the Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service are considering the issuance of broader guidance under Section 170(e)(3) that would in fact require a modification to the existing regulations, it is respectfully requested that the requested guidance with respect to the treatment of current year acquisition costs be issued in the form of a notice in advance of such regulations for the compelling socioeconomic circumstances discussed above.

5 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(c)(4) (“Any costs and expenses pertaining to the contributed property which were incurred in taxable years preceding the year of contribution and are properly reflected in the opening inventory for the year of contribution must be removed from inventory and are not a part of the cost of goods sold for purposes of determining gross income for the year of contribution. Any costs and expenses pertaining to the contributed property which are incurred in the year of contribution and would, under the method of accounting used, be properly reflected in the cost of goods sold for such year are to be treated as part of the cost of goods sold for such year.”).

6 See American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Compendium of Legislative Proposals — Simplification and Technical Proposals, at 74-76 (Feb. 19, 2014) (the “AICPA Legislative Proposals”). Although the AICPA Legislative Proposals suggest that such uncertainty may be resolved through legislation amending Section 170(e)(3), it is respectfully submitted that because the classification of current year acquisition costs is addressed through the existing regulatory charitable contribution regime as described above, such uncertainty may be clarified through the guidance requested in this submission.

7 Former Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-4A(c)(3), T.D. 7807, 1983-2 C.B. 41, 45 (“The donor of property which is inventory contributed under this section must make a corresponding adjustment to cost of goods sold by decreasing the cost of goods sold by the amount of basis. . . .”).

8 T.D. 7962, 1984-2 C.B. 57.

9 Id.

10 The Treasury Department and the IRS could, of course, amend the regulation with respect to the treatment of prior year acquisition costs. Such an amendment, however, is beyond the scope of the requested guidance contained herein.

11 Furthermore, as noted above, Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-4A(c)(3) was amended to address situations involving “underwater” inventory that has decreased in value. T.D. 7962, 1984-2 C.B. 57. Such “underwater” inventory situations are most prevalent with respect to prior year acquisition costs as opposed to current year acquisition costs given the greater opportunity for valuation disparities to occur with respect to prior year acquisition costs. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-4A(c)(4) Ex. 1 (500% increase in fair market value of donated property suggests property was included in beginning of year inventory as prior year acquisition costs).

12 1984-2 C.B. 57.

13 Id.

14 See “Attorneys Alert Treasury to Unintended Consequences of Existing Charitable Contribution Regs,” 2008 TNT 94-19 2008 TNT 94-19: Treasury Tax Correspondence (May 2, 2008) (the “2008 Treasury Submission”).

15 Notice 2008-90 at Section 2. See also “Firm Makes Recommendation for Treatment of Charitable Contributions of Inventory Property,” 2009 TNT 17-21 2009 TNT 17-21: IRS Tax Correspondence (Jan. 22, 2009) (the “2009 Treasury Submission”).

16 Notice 2008-90 at Sections 1, 4.

17 See Footnote 3 and accompanying text

18 See 2008 Treasury Submission. As a result of this uncertainty, the Treasury Department and the IRS issued Notice 2008-90, which allows taxpayers in certain circumstances to recover their tax basis in donated inventory and other property as cost of goods sold. See 2009 Treasury Submission.

19 As noted above, such uncertainty is caused, in particular, by the introductory language of that regulation (i.e., “[n]otwithstanding the rules of § 1.170A-1(c)(4)”).

20 Furthermore, the promulgation of the recommended guidance would not prevent the IRS from challenging other issues with respect to the Section 170(e)(3) enhanced deduction. See CCA 201012061 (Nov. 10, 2009) (Notice 2008-90 does not prevent IRS from challenging other issues under Section 170(e)(3)). In addition, the IRS’s ability to administer the recommended guidance would be enhanced if, consistent with the 2009 Treasury Submission, such guidance was limited to Section 170(e)(3) contributions of inventory and other property and not expanded to apply to Section 170(e)(4) contributions of scientific property used for research and Section 170(e)(5) contributions of computer technology and equipment for educational purposes, despite the cross reference in those sections to Section 170(e)(3). See 2009 Treasury Submission.

END OF FOOTNOTES



Draft of Simplified EO Application Presents Problems, Group Says.

Draft Form 1023-EZ, “Streamlined Application for Recognition of Exemption Under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code,” would decrease the quality of information the IRS needs to make informed decisions, according to Tim Delaney of the National Council of Nonprofits.

 

April 30, 2014

Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
Office of Management and Budget
Attention: Desk Officer for Treasury
New Executive Office Building, Room 10235
Washington, DC 20503

Treasury PRA Clearance Officer
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Suite 8140
Washington, DC 20220

    RE: TREASURY DEPARTMENT’S PROPOSAL TO RADICALLY ALTER THE PROCESS FOR OBTAINING TAX-EXEMPT STATUS VIA AN ALTERNATIVE FORM 1023-EZ APPLICATION FOR RECOGNITION OF EXEMPTION UNDER SECTION 501(c)(3) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE

Dear Office of Management and Budget Officials:The National Council of Nonprofits submits the following comments in response to the Treasury Department’s Notice of Submission for OMB Review published in the Federal Register (79 FR 18124) on March 26, 2014. That Notice invited “comments regarding the burden estimate, or any other aspect of the information collection” associated with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) proposal to radically alter the process for obtaining tax-exempt status by “introducing an ‘EZ’ version of the Form 1023 as an alternative in applying for recognition of exemption from federal income tax under section 501(c)(3).”

As explained below, we are concerned that the proposed new Form 1023-EZ and related streamlined approval process for tax-exemption will:

      1. Decrease, rather than improve, the quality of information the IRS needs to make informed decisions;

2. Reduce public trust; and

3. Inappropriately shift the IRS’ obligations onto others — foisting burdens on the public, existing charitable nonprofits, the funding community, and state charity regulators.
OMB should not approve the proposed Form 1023-EZ; instead, OMB should — consistent with the Paperwork Reduction Act — put the public’s interest in “accountability, transparency, and openness in Government and society” before the interest of simply reducing a backlog at the IRS, significant though it may be. See 44 U.S.C. § 3501.We agree with the IRS that the long-established Form 1023 and application process need review and streamlining. However, we are concerned that the proposed new EZ Form and related express-lane approval process go too far and too fast, representing radical departures from proven protocols. In response to the Treasury Notice seeking “suggestions for reducing the burden,” the IRS should meet first with other key stakeholders — including the public, existing charitable nonprofits, the funding community, and state charity regulators, such as occurred when the IRS redesigned the Form 990. Therefore, we are sending a copy of these Comments to the Commissioner of Tax Exempt and Government Entities and the Director of the IRS Exempt Organizations Division to alert them to our serious concerns and request that they withdraw the proposed new form and gather more input before radically changing the way applications for tax-exemption are evaluated by the IRS.

The Interests of the National Council of Nonprofits

The National Council of Nonprofits is a 501(c)(3) charitable nonprofit that serves as a trusted resource and advocate for America’s charitable nonprofits. Through our network of State Associations and 25,000-plus members — the nation’s largest network of charitable nonprofits — we serve as a central coordinator and mobilizer to help nonprofits achieve greater collective impact in local communities across the country. We identify emerging trends, share proven practices, and promote solutions that benefit charitable nonprofits and the communities they serve. Our core mission is “to advance the vital role, capacity, and voice of charitable nonprofit organizations through our state and national networks.”An IRS decision to grant status as a charitable nonprofit is a momentous one creating cascading results, so it should not be done lightly. Through operation of longstanding interdependent federal and state laws, many things happen once the IRS issues a determination letter recognizing an organization as being exempt from federal income tax under section 501(c)(3). For instance, in many states it activates exemptions from state income taxes and local property taxes. Also, it triggers eligibility for charitable nonprofits to receive donations that are deductible at the federal and usually state levels. In exchange for these and other benefits of being recognized as tax-exempt, charitable nonprofits and private foundations forfeit certain rights. For example, they are not allowed to support or oppose political candidates. Plus, they give up privacy rights afforded to others — they file federal tax information returns annually that are open to public inspection. And the list of inter-related federal, state, local, and private causes and effects/costs and benefits goes on.

The IRS’ proposed new Form 1023-EZ and related process for obtaining express-lane authority to solicit charitable deductions are radical departures from proven protocols that could have a profound impact on the foregoing inter-related balancing that involves the nonprofit community. To underscore the significance of what the proposed changes could mean, consider the following observations we have received from nonprofit leaders across the country in the last several days since learning about the Paperwork Reduction Act review (emphasis added):

  • I counsel new nonprofits weekly, and though I appreciate the IRS’s attempt at efficiency, I think this could be disastrous. I think that we need to look at the overall confidence this move could erode with the American public over time (based on potentially “legitimate” nonprofits seeking funding for causes that have not been thoroughly vetted). This wouldn’t happen immediately, but it could be a bad legacy to leave for the next generation of leadership, one that would be difficult to course correct once people became use to the ease of the process.
  • The current process is slow but it requires effort and energy and pushes away those that are not prepared. At a minimum allows some thoughtfulness and energy in describing who you are and how you will operate. To remove the requirement simply pushes the clean up to 3 years from now as the system falls apart and there is a backlash of onerous exams and audits.
  • We don’t need a proliferation of tax exempt organizations. Already, cultivating and recruiting functional boards is a challenge. Funding is a challenge.
  • Having gone through the application process with a museum I helped start, we were put through the ringer by the IRS which to some extent forced us to think through our plans (mission, vision, intent, how we would operate, etc.) ultimately, I believe, making us stronger.
  • While I recognize the process in and of itself is not necessarily user friendly, it has supported a perception of the awesome responsibility to become tax exempt and serving the community. In making the process more streamlined it may only lessen the perception of the “awesome” responsibility to the community that a group has after being granted the tax status.
  • While the idea of simplifying the application process for smaller organizations is laudable, the proposed Form 1023 EZ goes way too far. Although a charity is supposed to review the requirements in advance and attest to having the requisite purposes and documents, this proposal removes the crucial step of having someone independent (in this case, the IRS) to verify the existence of these documents or ensure that the required provisions are actually in place. Although the IRS estimates that it will take 14 hours to fill out the new Form 1023 EZ, I could easily see many applicants spending as little as an hour or so — not because they deliberately intend to skirt the law, but because they simply don’t know or understand what they are required to certify. Sure, they may (or may not) have the documents, but do they even say the right things? We’ve encountered similar situations through our legal assistance program for startup organizations, simply because people often “don’t know what they don’t know” without a legal review or a competent IRS agent. Clearly,without these safeguards in place, the door could be opened for improper approval of thousands of applications each year.
  • Generally, Form 1023 is not very accessible, too long, and quite cumbersome. The form should be simplified, but this EZ form does this too much. There some useful exercises that are part of the 1023 filing process that are useful in setting up a sustainable organization (bylaws, business/revenue plan, conflict of interest policies, the programs narrative). The full 1023 is overwhelming and is discouraging to some, but also a deterrent to those with only half-baked plans and ideas. I understand that the IRS wants to clear the backlog, but this may not be the best solution as it is in its current draft format. If the 1023 EZ was improved in some ways, it might be a good option.
  • This change could wreak added havoc for regulators, since the rigorous review of EO applications will not have been done beforehand, opening the door for all kinds of problems in terms of non-compliance (again, intentional or otherwise) and enforcement issues for both state and federal regulators. In terms of wise utilization of IRS resources, this may actually cost more in the long run, and could seriously undermine public trust in the sector if problems end up increasing as a result.

Before such a potentially significant change is implemented, it merits far greater public input than just a limited Paperwork Reduction Act review. The IRS should seek the views of not only existing charitable nonprofits (many of which, in hindsight, recognize the value of slowing down to complete the Form 1023), donors and foundations (many of whom — because they already question whether there are too many nonprofits — may want to be heard on the subject of possible proliferation), researchers (who may express concern that a valuable source of information — all parts of the Form 1023 application, plus accompanying documentation — will no longer be available to them), and state charity regulators (whom we understand will be filling separate comments to detail their concerns and reiterate their position in 2012 when they “uniformly oppose[d] a Form 1023-EZ”1).

Background

During the last several years, the IRS has accumulated a backlog of pending applications for tax-exempt status.2According to an internal IRS memorandum dated February 28, 2014, IRS managers have been analyzing how to streamline its processes. That memorandum suggests that the only goals considered in connection with the proposed streamlined process were to reduce (a) the IRS backlog of filings and (b) the informational burden for the applicants. Both are laudable goals. However, focusing on those two exclusively ignored multiple other perspectives and significantly sidestepped the IRS’ obligation to base a determination about tax-exempt status on solid information rather than a mere certification. This excerpt from the memo suggests the IRS focused on its own internal management issues rather than any consideration of the possible external consequences that its proposed radical changes might create:
The assessment concluded that the current process has high inventory, limited resources, inaccurate forms, outdated IRMs, continuously changing procedures, multiple touch points, multiple work streams, and non-standard processes. In addition, inadequate technical tax law training has not equipped the workforce to effectively/ efficiently complete the work.
The memorandum also reveals that the IRS has been working on this issue internally since at least June 2013. However, neither the memo nor a review of the IRS website shows any indication that the IRS invited the public or affected stakeholders to provide their informed perspectives, until Treasury filed its narrow Paperwork Reduction Act Notice in the Federal Register on March 31, 2014. That is most unfortunate, because the proposed Form 1023-EZ is a radical departure from the more meaningful review that multiple stakeholders have relied on the IRS to conduct with profound care.The Notice published in the Federal Register on March 31, 2014 asking for comments on the new form by April 30, 2014 may suffer from a fatal procedural flaw. The Notice referenced a draft Form 1023-EZ that was two pages in length, dated February 19, 2014 (labeled “Version A, Cycle 4”). Yet almost a month later, the IRS disclosed a possible substitute two-and-a-half page draft Form 1023-EZ, dated April 23 (labeled “Version A, Cycle 12”). It appears that Treasury gave OMB and thereby the public one version of the Form 1023-EZ, but the IRS has revised the form during the comment period without resubmitting it for approval. The two forms, while carrying the same title and similar in many respects, contain material differences. The subsequent version expressly allows use by organizations seeking two alternatives for reinstatement after automatic revocation, while the first version does not provide them. If the Paperwork Reduction Act process is to be meaningful, then the document being submitted for public comment and OMB approval should not be a moving target. At a bare minimum, OMB, rather than approve the Form 1023-EZ that the Treasury submitted for public comment on March 26, should require Treasury to resubmit.
I. The Proposed EZ Form and Express-Lane Approval Process Will Decrease, Rather Than Improve, the Quality of Information the IRS Needs to Make Informed Decisions
To ensure that organizations are properly qualified and prepared to earn tax exempt status and thus eligible to receive deductible contributions, the IRS has required organizations seeking tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3) to apply for that benefit. For decades, the IRS has used Form 1023 for groups seeking exemption under section 501(c)(3) (public charities and private foundations). The Form 1023 requires organizations to think through the fiduciary and governance responsibilities of the board of directors as well as identify what the organization will achieve, and how it will be funded.Typically, during a regular review of exemption applications, IRS employees ask questions and require submissions that ensure that start-up groups have at least a passing understanding of such concepts as not furthering non-exempt purposes and private inurement. Unless that sort of verification process is ensured in the streamlined process, there is a risk that recognition for tax-exemptions will be handed to applicants that fail to meet statutory requirements or do not have a threshold understanding of what tax-exempt status requires of their activities and operations. The streamlined procedures only require that a filing organization “certify” compliance (as opposed to the IRS verifying compliance). As enumerated below, in our opinion the 1023-EZ streamlined approval process does not give the IRS enough quality information to determine eligibility for federal tax-exemption. Moreover, there are a few vague questions in the proposed form that may prove problematic for applicants.

The proposed Form 1023-EZ (looking at the official February 19, Version A, Cycle 4):

      1. Has no requirement that the applicant demonstrate it has adopted bylaws.

2. Part II, Lines 5, 6, and 7: Unless the instructions are very detailed, easily understandable, and specific, many applicants will need guidance in order to understand the organizational test and to complete the certifications accurately on a truly informed basis.

3. Part III, Line 2: Rather than asking the applicant to describe what its purposes are (which requires the IRS to have trained examiners to discern whether the description meets the operational test), the Form 1023-EZ invites applicants to “check all that apply” and offers eight categories that may prove confusing to applicants since their perceptions of their own organizations may not fit into those pre-selected legal categories.

4. Part III, lines 4-11: These questions require a “yes” or “no” answer. Many of these questions ask about activities that could go over the line into impermissible conduct by a 501(c)(3) organization, but may also be permissible, depending on the circumstances. If the IRS intends to use the responses to these “yes” or “no” questions to deny tax-exempt status, without probing further into the expected activities of the applicant on, that would be inappropriate and harmful to those attempting to establish legitimate tax-exempt public charities but who misunderstand the concepts or have language differences. Consequently, including these questions on the form requires an investigation of the responses, which therefore must be reflected in the protocol /procedures for the examining IRS agent.

5. Part IV, under the heading: “Part IV is designed to classify you as an organization that is either a private foundation or a public charity. Public charity status is a more favorable tax status than private foundation status.”(Emphasis added.) It seems curious for the IRS, as the regulating entity responsible for evaluating eligibility for tax-exemption, to be advising the filing organization as to the more advantageous tax status.

6. Part IV, Line 1: These three sub-questions require a level of understanding of the federal Tax Code and public support test that we submit most of the applicant using the 1023-EZ will not have. Consequently, these questions are likely to lead to errors by the applicants which will only lead to increased burdens, both on the IRS (unless it has a smooth efficient process planned to educate filing organizations) and the applicants down the road that may inaccurately complete the form, only to have their applications rejected.

7. Unlike in Part V of the existing Form 1023, the proposed Form 1023-EZ does not ask sufficient questions about the family relationships of board members or the business relationships between the applicant and its board members for the IRS to determine whether there is a risk of private inurement or private benefit.

8. The current Form 1023 application process asks the applicant to submit its organizing documents, which then become part of the public record. With the streamlined process, organizing documents will not be required if the applicant uses the certification option. This reduces the amount of data available to researchers and the public about the charitable nonprofit community (and creates a disconnect with the Form 990, which asks filing organizations to submit updates/amendments to their organizing documents).

9. Pointedly, there is no question on the proposed Form 1023-EZ asking whether the filing organization has a conflict of interest policy, which is a fundamental governance document for any tax-exempt organization and should be part of the scrutiny given by the IRS at this critical juncture in evaluating eligibility for tax-exemption. The existing full Form 1023 does.

10. There should be more guidance in the instructions about the annual filing requirement — including the thresholds for which version of the Form 990 should be filed.
We support efficiency and reducing burdens to applicants, but not at the expense of accountability. In filing these comments we find ourselves in an ironic position. In most instances, the National Council of Nonprofits would applaud efforts to simplify and streamline government forms and processes. See, e.g., our statement commending OMB for its work streamlining the government grant process and our Streamlining Reports, such as Partnering for Impact: Government-Nonprofit Contracting Task Forces Produce Results for TaxpayersYet here, in looking at the full picture over the long-term, we are concerned that the advantages of a rapid-fire approval process will not outweigh (a) the risks and ramifications of recognizing groups as tax-exempt that may not be prepared to meet ongoing exempt organization requirements, or (b) the risk of not recognizing eligible groups that make errors completing the Form 1023-EZ due to lack of guidance by the IRS in a streamlined process.
II. Concerns That the Proposed New Form and Related Express-Lane Approval Process Will Reduce Public Trust
We expressly and emphatically reject any notion that smaller organizations are more likely to evade the law or commit errors, purposefully or otherwise. Smaller does not equate to incompetent or fraudulent. Yet if the IRS significantly lowers the bar for recognition for applicants claiming to be smaller, then it stands to reason that bad actors will seek to exploit this weakness in the overall application system and opt to use the EZ express-lane approval process to avoid the transparency mandate that is integral to the current Form 1023 application process. When fraudulent disguises itself in this situation, everyone suffers. Thus, we are concerned that the proposed radical diminishment of information available to the IRS to make informed determinations about Section 501(c)(3) status will erode public trust in charitable nonprofits.For individual charitable nonprofits, earning the public’s trust starts with the application for tax-exemption.3 Federal law has long required each charitable nonprofit to make its organization’s application for tax-exemption, including all supporting documents and related correspondence, freely available for public inspection. Reducing the Form 1023-EZ to a simple check-off form renders the mandate of transparency to public scrutiny a rather empty and meaningless exercise.

The IRS has an obligation to ensure that organizations are properly qualified as tax exempt and thus eligible to receive deductible contributions. Completing the Form 1023 requires organizations to think through and identify their anticipated sources of revenue and planned activities, as well as demonstrate that the filing organization is organized in accordance with the Internal Revenue Code’s requirements for public charity or private foundation status. Typically the process of completing the application is time-consuming, often due to back-and-forth communications between the IRS and the filing organization, all of which are subject to public disclosure. In fact, those communications provide a window of transparency for the public into the process by which applicants are evaluated and recognized by the IRS as tax-exempt. In contrast, with the streamlined process of merely asking filing organizations to certify to the existence of various provisions in their organizing documents, the transparency that the public has come to expect (the ability to view organizing documents and understand why tax-exemption was either recognized or denied) will be eliminated.
III. The IRS Is Inappropriately Shifting Its Duties onto Others — Foisting Burdens on the Public, Existing Charitable Nonprofits, and State Charity Regulators
The IRS recognizes that it is stepping back from its front-end enforcement work in favor of having a “robust compliance process at the back end.”4 Yet, as noted above, a complex interdependent system relies on the IRS to perform its vital front-end duties. Furthermore, as the IRS continues to be underfunded and understaffed to conduct current compliance tasks, it should not rely on expanding back end enforcement as a remedy for lowering the initial barrier to entry. By abandoning aspects of its initial screening role, the IRS is passing its responsibilities onto others, creating new burdens for them. That is fundamentally unfair, especially when the IRS has not conducted a full risk assessment with other partners in the complex system that rely on the IRS to do its duty.Increases Potential Burdens to Taxpayers

By abdicating important aspects of its front-end review of tax-exempt eligibility, the IRS is shifting burdens to others, including the public, which will potentially be faced with more expensive back end enforcement actions for groups that received fast-track tax-exemption, but are not following the procedures expected of tax-exempt organizations. The IRS has indicated that it does not have enough auditors to do needed back end enforcement work, so this effort to create an expedited process to solve an immediate backlog problem may only exacerbate problems at the back end, creating more costs for taxpayers to clean things up when things go awry.

Increases Burdens for Existing Nonprofits

As mentioned earlier, each charitable nonprofit relies on the public’s trust in order to continue to attract resources to advance its mission. The proposed easy-application/easy-approval process portends damaging the public trust that legitimate charitable nonprofits earned and need to operate in local communities across America. When negative stories get published about nonprofits (even non-charitable nonprofits, such as social welfare organizations), it hurts all nonprofits, making it more difficult to recruit board members, volunteers, and obtain donations to advance charitable missions.

Increases Burdens to State Governments

By abdicating its front-end review of tax-exempt eligibility, the IRS is also shifting part of its enforcement duties and costs to state charity officials, who now rely on the IRS’ known-to-be-tough scrutiny in the tax-exempt determinations process. The abdication of the IRS’ scrutiny could lead to problems in the field, adding to the potential distrust of charitable nonprofits and the IRS’ determination process.
IV. The Proposed EZ Form and Approval Overlook the Value of the Full Form 1023
As the IRS ACT report, “Exempt Organizations: Form 1023 — Updating It for the Future,” observed:

    The primary reason we do not recommend the development of a Form 1023-EZ is because Form 1023 serves an important educational purpose for applying organizations. Through its questions, the form forces the applying organization to think somewhat deeply about its activities, finances, and management. The form also signals to the organization that it is entering into a (probably unfamiliar) comprehensive regulatory regime, and working through the questions on the form provides the organization with a great deal of information about compliance with this regime. We agree with the many practitioners we spoke with who believe that the educational benefits of Form 1023 are especially important for small organizations. And we do not believe that a significantly shorter Form 1023 could provide a comparable level of these benefits.

Our concern is that rather than help smaller groups start out on the right foot, the fast-track approval process will loosen the threshold requirements that currently ensure a thoughtful process that makes a newly-forming exempt organization aware of its initial and ongoing obligations. Without a significant effort by the IRS to educate newly formed groups about the obligations of tax-exemption, filing out the proposed Form 1023 EZ will be just as confusing, and perhaps more confusing because of the lack of explanation, than the existing Form 1023. Since by definition the streamlined process will result in the IRS spending less time reviewing the applications, we are equally concerned about applicants using the proposed Form 1023 EZ only to have their applications denied — when in other circumstances a more thorough review would have resulted in recognition of tax-exempt status.

* * *

As a network that assists individuals who are in the process of creating charitable nonprofits, we agree that the existing Form 1023 and associated approval process need to be improved. But we reject a perspective that puts more weight on a short-term myopic perspective of what’s easiest for the IRS today, rather than on a process that over the long-term serves and supports everyone — applicants, charitable nonprofits, funders, state charity regulators, and the public.
V. Recommendations
The National Council of Nonprofits calls on the OMB to not approve the Form 1023 EZ. We also urge the Treasury Department and IRS to:

      1. Withdraw the proposed Form 1023-EZ and streamlined determinations process;

2. Continue the reform effort because the old Form 1023 and application review process need updating, but do so only with guidance from the public, the charitable nonprofit community and its stakeholders, so the appropriate balance can be struck between increasing efficiency, minimizing the burden on the filing organization and the IRS, and enhancing public trust.

                  Respectfully submitted,
                  Tim Delaney
                  National Council of Nonprofits
                  Washington, DC

Copies to:

Sunita Lough
Commissioner of Tax Exempt and Government Entities
Internal Revenue Service
111 Constitution Avenue NW, Room 1519
Washington, DC 20224

Tamera Ripperda
Director, Exempt Organizations
Tax Exempt Organizations Division
Internal Revenue Service
111 Constitution Avenue NW, Room 1519
Washington, DC 20224

FOOTNOTES

1 See IRS Advisory Committee on Tax Exempt and Government Entities (IRS ACT), “Exempt Organizations: Form 1023 — Updating It for the Future,” in Report of Recommendations (June 6, 2012) at 32 of Exempt Organizations report (page 104 of PDF) (emphasis added).2 We recognize that some of the backlog may be due to reduced funding, forcing the IRS workforce to be reduced by about 10 percent since 2010. See Prepared Remarks of Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service John Koskinen before the National Press Club, April 2, 2014. That backlog may have grown when more than 250 IRS employees were diverted to comply with information requests by six investigations dealing with the Exempt Organizations Division that oversees the applications for both 501(c)(3) charitable nonprofits and the 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations that has generated so much negative publicity in the last year.

3 The National Council of Nonprofits’ Public Policy Agenda notes, among other things: “The nonprofit community recognizes that mission-driven nonprofits can be successful only by earning and maintaining public trust through appropriate transparency, which can be guided by reasonable regulation that recognizes the unique role of these organizations in communities.”

4 “A new streamlined process for the Form 1023-EZ . . . will also allow the IRS to concentrate more on compliance for Section 501(c)(3) organizations at the back end.” See Diane Freda, ” IRS to Roll Out Form 1023-EZ in Summer, Anticipates Little Risk of Noncompliance,” Bloomberg BNA (April 25, 2014) (media call with Sunita Lough, IRS




EO Update: e-News for Charities & Nonprofits - May 9, 2014

IRS.gov Banner
 
1.  Register for the IRC 501(c)(6) Organizations phone forum


 

Thursday, May 22 – 11 a.m. Eastern Time

Topics include:

  • To file or not to file an application for recognition of exemption
  • Form 1024: Applying for exemption
  • Annual filing requirements for exempt organizations
  • Permitted501(c)(6) purposes and activities

To receive CE credit (and a certificate of completion) you must view the presentation for a minimum of 50 minutes.

Register for this presentation.


2.  IRS to Exempt Organizations as Filing Deadline Nears: Remember to File and Don’t Include SSNs on Form 990


The IRS has a few important reminders as the May 15 filing deadline nears for tax-exempt organizations who operate on a calendar year basis.
The IRS also cautions not to include personally identifiable information – including unnecessary SSNs or other unrequested personal information could lead to identity theft.

Review the following two items:

 

3.  Treasury and the IRS invite public comment on recommendations for 2014–2015 Priority Guidance Plan


Read Notice 2014–18

In addition, review the third quarter update to the IRS/Treasury Priority Guidance Plan.


4.  EO Business Master File Web page link updated


The link for the Exempt Organization Business Master File Extract (EO BMF) is  updated. Users should update bookmarks.

The EO BMF includes cumulative information on exempt organizations.

The data is extracted monthly and is available by state and region. The files are in comma separated value (CSV) format and can be opened by most computer applications including Excel.

The EO BMF is updated the second Monday of every month.

Next anticipated posting date: 05/12/14


5.  Disaster Relief Resources for Charities and Contributors


In the aftermath of a disaster, individuals, employers and corporations often are interested in providing assistance to victims through a charitable organization.

Find specialized disaster relief resources for charities and contributors on IRS.gov. Special tax rules may apply to exempt organizations affected by a federally declared disaster area.

Find IRS News Releases about the most recent disaster declarations and learn which exempt organization requirements may be postponed in a declared disaster on IRS.gov.

See Disaster Relief Resources for Charities and Contributors


6.  Watch new small business health care tax credit YouTube video


Find out how small businesses and tax-exempts that provide health insurance coverage to their employees may qualify for a special tax credit by watching this new YouTube video.

Watch this and other videos on the IRS YouTube Channel


If you have a technical or procedural question relating to Exempt Organizations, visit theCharities and Nonprofits homepage on the IRS.gov Web site.

If you have a specific question about exempt organizations, call EO Customer Account Services at 1-877-829-5500.




Most Future Benefits Guidance Will Come From Chief Counsel.

All technical legal guidance previously issued by the employee plans division within the IRS Tax-Exempt and Government Entities Division will move to the IRS Office of Chief Counsel as part of the TE/GE reorganization, according to Lauson Green, branch 1 chief (qualified plans), TE/GE.

Speaking May 1 in Philadelphia during a conference sponsored by the American Society of Pension Professionals & Actuaries, Green said that transferring legal guidance to the chief counsel’s office might speed up the guidance process by reducing the number of people involved in guidance projects and streamlining the review process.

According to Green, the chief counsel’s office will assume responsibility over legal guidance that will include all substantive projects, annual guidance projects, and private letter rulings. The employee plans division will likely continue issuing more routine guidance like 60-day rollover letter rulings, determination letters, and guidance lacking significant legal analysis, he said.

MAY 2, 2014

by Matthew R. Madara




Draft Version of Simplified Exemption Application Criticized.

Draft Form 1023-EZ, “Streamlined Application for Recognition of Exemption Under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code,” does not ask for enough information and therefore could hinder the IRS’s ability to ferret out applications filed under false pretenses, according to Arthur Rieman and Jessica Shofler of The Law Firm for Non-Profits P.C.

April 30, 2014

Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs,
Office of Management and Budget
ATTN: Desk Officer for Treasury
New Executive Office Building, Room 10235
Washington, DC 20503

Treasury PRA Clearance Officer
1750 Pennsylvania Ave. NW., Ste 8140
Washington, DC 20220

 

Re: Comment on Draft Form 1023-EZ (OMB Number 1545-0056)

To Whom It May Concern:

This letter is written as a comment to the draft Form 1023-EZ (Rev. 5-2014). The Law Firm for Non-Profits, P.C. has been assisting exempt organizations for more than twenty years and has prepared and submitted hundreds of Forms 1023. We have concerns about the use of the Form 1023-EZ as drafted, which are set forth below along with our recommendations:

Concerns:

  • From our experience, a great many people desire to and do establish 501(c)(3) organizations under false pretenses (e.g., to obtain contributions or avoid taxation). This is borne out by the fact that the Service denies a large number of exemptions for organizations of all sizes on the basis of private inurement.
  • Exemption based on a properly completed Form 1023-EZ will be all-but-automatic. That is, there will be NO SCRUTINY of the applicant other than to ensure that all boxes and blank lines on the application form are properly completed.
  • The narrative portions of Form 1023 enable Exempt Organization Specialists the opportunity to ferret out exemption applications filed under false pretenses. Form 1023-EZ eliminates these narrative portions, eviscerating the Service’s ability to identify such exemption applications and thus deny exemption to those applicants.
  • Rather than requiring applicants to describe their exempt activity, Form 1023-EZ would automatically recognize as exempt any organization whose founder ticks nine boxes “attesting” that he or she complies with certain legal requirements. Signing under penalty of perjury will not stop people from using the Form 1023-EZ under false pretenses. Requiring an applicant to set forth a narrative of the organization’s intentions instead of simply checking boxes increases the likelihood that (1) an applicant understands he or she will be held responsible for the information set forth in the application, and (2) that Exempt Organization Specialists will identify and deny exemption to applicants that file under false pretenses.
  • Form 1023-EZ converts the privilege that is exemption under § 501(c)(3) to something akin to applying for a library card. With its adoption of Form 1023-EZ, the IRS will no longer have the ability to ensure that organizations that claim the privilege of exemption under section 501(c)(3) actually meet that statute’s requirements.
  • An applicant for exemption may use Form 1023-EZ if it attests that its annual revenue during its first three years of operation is not expected to exceed $200,000. The applicant is not required to provide a projected budget with the application. This will lead to abuse in the application process. As there will be no substantive scrutiny of an applicant’s Form 1023-EZ, those filing under false pretenses will certainly claim that their annual expected revenue will not exceed $200,000 in order to avoid the review by an Exempt Organization Specialist that would take place if the applicant instead filed a Form 1023.
  • The Service estimates that 17% of Applicants for exemption under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code will use Form 1023-EZ. The lack of scrutiny afforded organizations that use Form 1023-EZ will incentivize applicants to underestimate their projected revenue in order to use Form 1023-EZ instead of Form 1023. This will result in a far greater percentage of such applicants using Form 1023-EZ, perhaps as much as 50%.
  • The Service vastly overestimates the time it takes to complete Form 1023 and the time it will take to complete Form 1023-EZ, at 101 hours and 14 hours, respectively. Based on our experience, it takes a nonprofessional an average of about 20 hours to complete Form 1023. It will take under an hour for the average person to complete Form 1023-EZ.
  • Form 1023-EZ was developed by the IRS in consultation with Lean Six Sigma consultants. Lean Six Sigma is a methodology used by businesses to manage and improve business processes. Its stated goal is to identify and remove nonessential and non-value added steps in a process. Adoption of Form 1023-EZ by the Service would suggest that review of an applicant’s proposed activities does not add value to the review process.
  • By automatically recognizing as exempt any organization that submits a properly completed Form 1023-EZ, the Service will shift the burden of enforcement almost entirely to the investigation and audit function. This will be a costly mistake. It takes much greater resources to ferret out and stop an organization that is violating the law than it does to review an exemption application and deny exemption.
  • Further, Form 1023-EZ will unleash an unprecedented number of exemption applications — and will in effect encourage individuals to establish unnecessary exempt organizations. In turn this will substantially increase the number of 501(c)(3) organizations. Without a concomitant increase in the exempt organization investigation and audit staff, the Service will not have the resources to effectively monitor and audit 501(c)(3) organizations. In turn, this will lead to increased abuse of exempt organization law, including private inurement and noncharitable activity, by organizations established under false pretenses.

Recommendations:

      1. It may be appropriate for small organizations to submit an abbreviated version of the Form 1023, but the proposed Form 1023-EZ does not include information sufficient for Exempt Organization Specialists to make the exemption determination. The Form 1023-EZ should include information about an applicant’s proposed budget and activities.

2. Where eligibility to file Form 1023-EZ is based on projected annual gross receipts and assets, the projection requirement should be far lower. The Form 1023-EZ is only appropriate for organizations that are similar to those filing the Form 990N-ePostcard. In addition, there must be substantive penalties imposed on organizations that clearly under-project their revenue.

3. It should be made more apparent that the Form 1023-EZ is being filed under penalty of perjury. Filers must be reminded that a fraudulent claim to meeting the Form 1023-EZ’s eligibility requirements is a crime punishable by time in prison.
Thank you in advance for your consideration of this firm’s concerns and recommendations.

                  Very truly yours,
                  Arthur Rieman, Esq.
                  Jessica Shofler, Esq.
                  The Law Firm for Non-Profits, P.C.
                  Studio City, CA

cc:
Rep. Darryl Issa
Rep. Brad Sherman
Rep. Xavier Becerra
Tax Analyst




H.R. 4493 Would Modify Parsonage Rental Exclusion.

H.R. 4493, the Faith and Fairness Act of 2014, introduced by Rep. Bill Cassidy, R-La., would expand the definition of a minister regarding the exclusion of a parsonage’s rental value from gross income to include recognized officials of nontheistic spiritual, moral, or ethical groups.

 

113TH CONGRESS
2D SESSIONH.R. 4493To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to expand the definition
of minister for purposes of excluding the rental value of a parsonage
from gross income to include duly recognized officials of nontheistic
spiritual, moral, or ethical organizations.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

APRIL 28, 2014

Mr. CASSIDY introduced the following bill; which was referred to the
Committee on Ways and Means

A BILL

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to expand the definition of minister for purposes of excluding the rental value of a parsonage from gross income to include duly recognized officials of nontheistic spiritual, moral, or ethical organizations.Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “Faith and Fairness Act of 2014”.

SEC. 2. EXCLUSION OF RENTAL VALUE OF PARSONAGES.

(a) IN GENERAL. — Section 107 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by adding at the end the following:

“For purposes of this section, the term ‘minister of the gospel’ includes any duly recognized official of a religious, spiritual, moral, or ethical organization (whether theistic or not).”.

(b) EFFECTIVE DATE. — The amendment made by this section shall apply to taxable years beginning after the date of the enactment of this Act.

APRIL 28, 2014

Citations: H.R. 4493; Faith and Fairness Act of 2014




Tax-Exempt Orgs Urged Not to Include SSNs on Information Returns.

The IRS has urged (IR-2014-57) tax-exempt organizations facing the May 15 deadline for filing Form 990 series information returns and notices not to include Social Security numbers or other unnecessary personal information on the forms.May 15 is the 2013 filing deadline for organizations that use the calendar year as their fiscal year. Organizations that fail to file annual reports for three consecutive years will have their tax-exempt status automatically revoked as of the due date of the third required filing, the IRS said.

Both the IRS and most tax-exempt organizations are required by law to publicly disclose most parts of form filings, including schedules and attachments. Thus, the IRS asks filers not to include SSNs or other personally identifiable information about donors, clients, or benefactors because the public release of such information contributes to identity theft. The IRS also urged tax-exempt organizations to file forms electronically to reduce the risk of inadvertently including SSNs or other personal information.

 

Many Tax-Exempt Organizations Must File with IRS By May 15
to Preserve Tax-Exempt Status; Do Not Include
Social Security Numbers or Personal Data

April 29, 2014

WASHINGTON — With a key May 15 filing deadline facing many tax-exempt organizations, the Internal Revenue Service today cautioned these groups not to include Social Security numbers (SSNs) or other unneeded personal information on their Form 990, and consider taking advantage of the speed and convenience of electronic filing.Form 990-series information returns and notices are due on the 15th day of the fifth month after an organization’s fiscal year ends. Many organizations use the calendar year as their fiscal year, making Thursday, May 15 the deadline for them to file for 2013.

Many Groups Risk Loss of Tax-Exempt Status

By law, organizations that fail to file annual reports for three consecutive years will see their federal tax exemptions automatically revoked as of the due date of the third required filing. The Pension Protection Act of 2006 mandates that most tax-exempt organizations file annual Form 990-series informational returns or notices with the IRS. The law, which went into effect at the beginning of 2007, also imposed a new annual filing requirement on small organizations. Churches and church-related organizations are not required to file annual reports.

No Social Security Numbers on 990s

The IRS generally does not ask organizations for SSNs and in the form instructions cautions filers not to provide them on the form. By law, both the IRS and most tax-exempt organizations are required to publicly disclose most parts of form filings, including schedules and attachments. Public release of SSNs and other personally identifiable information about donors, clients or benefactors could give rise to identity theft.

The IRS also urges tax-exempt organizations to file forms electronically in order to reduce the risk of inadvertently including SSNs or other unneeded personal information. Details are on IRS.gov.

Tax-exempt forms that must be made public by the IRS are clearly marked “Open to Public Inspection” in the top right corner of the first page. These include Form 990, 990-EZ, Form 990-PF and others.

What to File

Small tax-exempt organizations with average annual receipts of $50,000 or less may file an electronic notice called a Form 990-N (e-Postcard), which asks organizations for a few basic pieces of information. Tax-exempt organizations with average annual receipts above $50,000 must file a Form 990 or 990-EZ depending on their receipts and assets. Private foundations file a Form 990-PF.

Organizations that need additional time to file a Form 990, 990-EZ or 990-PF may obtain an extension. Note that no extension is available for filing the Form 990-N (e-Postcard).

Check Tax-Exempt Status Online

The IRS publishes the names of organizations identified as having automatically lost their tax-exempt status for failing to file annual reports for three consecutive years. Organizations that have had their exemptions automatically revoked and wish to have that status reinstated must file an application for exemption and pay the appropriate user fee.

The IRS offers an online search tool, Exempt Organizations Select Check, to help users more easily find key information about the federal tax status and filings of certain tax-exempt organizations, including whether organizations have had their federal tax exemptions automatically revoked.

APRIL 29, 2014

Citations: IR-2014-57




Small EOs Can Use Short Form to Seek Reinstatement of Exemption.

Small charitable organizations that have had their tax-exempt status revoked automatically for failure to file IRS information returns for three straight years will be able to seek restoration of their exemptions by using a new streamlined exemption application, an official with the agency said April 24.

Tamera L. Ripperda, who in January became director of exempt organizations in the IRS Tax-Exempt and Government Entities Division, discussed draft Form 1023-EZ, “Streamlined Application for Recognition of Exemption Under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code,” in Arlington, Va., at a conference sponsored by the Georgetown University Law Center’s Continuing Legal Education program. Other officials from Treasury and the IRS talked about section 501(c)(4) guidance and the planned realignment of TE/GE with the IRS Office of Chief Counsel.

Ripperda noted that organizations seeking reinstatement after having their exemption automatically revoked currently must complete Form 1023, “Application for Recognition of Exemption Under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.” But after Form 1023-EZ is implemented, automatically revoked organizations whose gross receipts are not more than $200,000 and who meet the requirements of sections four and seven of Rev. Proc. 2014-11, 2014-3 IRB 411  (which provides procedures to regain exemption following automatic revocation) can use the short form, she said, adding that the IRS expects the streamlined application to be ready this summer.

“Many of those EOs, we recognize, are run by volunteers,” Ripperda said. “Being able to use the EZ for the reinstatement is much less burdensome,” if the organization is eligible, she said.

Ripperda said the only way applicants will be able to file the form is electronically, and the form will not be accepted if it is incomplete or if the user fee is missing. She added that unlike Form 1023, for which the amount of the user fee depends on an organization’s size, there is just one fee for all filers of the simplified form.

When asked whether a small organization preparing to apply for exemption in the next month or two should wait for the Form 1023-EZ to come out, Ripperda declined to make a recommendation, explaining that a decision on whether to use the long or short form probably would depend on an organization’s situation and activities. She also said the IRS is not processing applications for reinstatement ahead of applications that have been submitted for the first time.

The existence of the streamlined form was not widely known until recently. TE/GE Commissioner Sunita Lough discussed the form in a phone call with reporters April 23.

Deadline Approaching

Ruth Madrigal, attorney-adviser, Treasury Office of Tax Legislative Counsel, reminded the audience about transition relief in Rev. Proc. 2014-11 that allows an automatically revoked organization that had its exemption reinstated prospectively before the revenue procedure was issued to reapply for retroactive reinstatement if the organization would have met the revenue procedure’s retroactive reinstatement requirements. The deadline for reapplying is May 2, which is coming up “really fast,” she noted.”So if you have organizations that might be able to take advantage of this, take a look at that revenue procedure,” Madrigal said.

Workplan Still Alive

Ripperda also said the IRS did not release an exempt organizations examinations workplan in 2013 because of all the changes and process improvement activities underway at the time. But she said the workplan has not gone by the wayside and the IRS will resume publishing it in the future.

Realignment of TE/GE With Chief Counsel

Victoria Judson, division counsel/associate chief counsel, IRS Office of Associate Chief Counsel (TE/GE), discussed plans to move issuance of revenue rulings, revenue procedures, technical advice memoranda, and some private letter rulings from TE/GE to chief counsel.  When that happens, there will be new administrative guidance as well as directions on where to send private letter ruling requests, she said. Addressing concerns about the timeliness of processing letter ruling requests, she said chief counsel can work requests quickly, though it may need some time to develop a system to handle the new work it receives.

Political Activity Guidance Redo?

Madrigal declined to confirm recent remarks by IRS Commissioner John Koskinen that have led to speculation the agency might scrap controversial proposed regulations (REG-134417-13) on political activities of section 501(c)(4) organizations and start over, saying she did not know what the commissioner has said and that she could not predict where the process will lead.  When asked whether the definition of candidate-related political activity in the proposal might move beyond section 501(c)(4) to cover section 501(c)(3) entities as well, she pointed out that the proposed regs’ preamble asks about extending the definition to other categories of exempt organizations and suggests the definition might need to be tweaked if applied to section 501(c)(3) because of that code section’s absolute prohibition on campaign intervention. She added that Treasury and the IRS will look closely at comments they receive on that question.

APRIL 25, 2014

by Fred Stokeld




IRS Could Expand Types of EOs Eligible to Use Streamlined Form.

An IRS official on April 23 held out the possibility that categories of small charitable organizations ineligible to use a new streamlined application for tax-exempt status eventually could become eligible.

The IRS released the most recent version of draft Form 1023-EZ, “Streamlined Applications for Recognition of Exemption Under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code,” on April 23, and as it stands now, entities such as churches, hospitals, colleges and universities, supporting organizations, and organizations with donor-advised funds cannot use the form. But during a conference call with reporters, IRS Tax-Exempt and Government Entities Commissioner Sunita Lough said the IRS could change its mind and decide that some categories of organizations currently ineligible to file the form should be eligible.

“This is not cut in stone,” Lough said, also pointing out that churches are not required to complete an application. She said that although the deadline for comments is April 30, the IRS would like to receive feedback from exempt organizations and practitioners beyond that date, especially after the form is implemented.

Asked about concerns that the draft form may not give the agency enough information about an applicant, Lough said the document will provide sufficient information to meet the requirements of the regulations and the code. She added that the IRS will devote more resources to determining how an organization is operating after it receives exemption, such as by reviewing its information returns and conducting compliance checks.

Lough predicted the streamlined application, which would be available to organizations whose gross receipts do not exceed $200,000, will be a huge benefit for smaller organizations because it will help them reduce paperwork burdens. “Based on the new form, we think we should be able to complete the applications for these smaller entities much faster, so they can go about doing their business and we can put our resources at the appropriate places,” she said.

APRIL 24, 2014

by Fred Stokeld




IRS LTR: IRS Rules on Treatment of Matching Gifts to Charities.

The IRS ruled that matching gifts a foundation makes to public charities will not constitute self-dealing, will be qualifying distributions within the meaning of section 4942(g), and will not be taxable expenditures under section 4945(d).

Contact Person: * * *
Identification Number: * * *
Telephone Number: * * *

UIL Number: 4941.00-00, 4942.03-05, 4945.00-00
Release Date: 4/25/2014

Date: January 30, 2014Employer Identification Number: * * *

LEGEND:

Company = * * *
W = * * *
X = * * *
Y = * * *
Z = * * *
StateA = * * *

Dear * * *:We have considered your ruling request dated November 8, 2013, submitted by your authorized representative, requesting rulings under I.R.C. §§ 4941, 4942 and 4945.

FACTS

You are an organization exempt from taxation under § 501(c)(3) and classified as a private foundation under § 509(a). Company is your sole contributor and you and Company share the same officers and directors.As part of its charitable undertakings, Company had established a matching gifts program under which it matched employees’ and Company board of director members’ contributions in cash and securities to public charities. All full time employees of Company who were on the active payroll were eligible for the company match program. Employees who give monetary contributions to certain charitable organizations have their gifts matched. The limit of the match varies depending on the employees’ positions. The amount that was matched must have been at least $W and non-executive employees have their gifts matched up to $X; executive employees have their gifts matched up to $Y; and directors have their gifts matched up to $Z.

Pursuant to written policies that you submitted as part of this ruling request, an employee’s contribution must meet certain criteria to be eligible for a match payment. The contribution must go to “an organization that is recognized by the Internal Revenue Service as tax exempt, . . . [is] designated a public charity under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code,” and is not a supporting organization under § 509(a)(3). Therefore, the donee organization could not be a private foundation. Further, a contribution where the employee receives anything in return is not eligible for the match. For example tuition payments, insurance premiums, and membership dues paid by employees to § 501(c)(3) organizations are not eligible. A contribution that an employee is legally required to pay is not eligible. A gift that is used for religious or political purposes is not eligible. Finally, a non-cash gift is not eligible for the match. A Company employee who seeks to have his or her donation matched must submit information about the donation and the recipient charitable organization to CompanyCompany then uses a third party vendor to verify eligibility. Once verified, the charity receives payment.

Company’s employees are informed of these policies through e-mail and Company’s human resources website. These policies also state that Company in its sole discretion may refuse to match an employee’s gift and may modify or end the gift matching program at any time.

A few months before you submitted your ruling request, Company altered a significant component of its employee gift matching program. Prior to this change, Company paid the matches of employee donations to recipient organizations. However, in all but one state, Company has ceased making these payments. Instead, you have assumed the role of payor in Company’s gift matching program (“foundation match program”), and you now pay the matches to recipient organizations. You stated that, under the foundation match program additional restrictions were imposed by you:

  • The charitable organizations eligible for matching gifts are limited to public charities classified as exempt under § 509(a)(1) or (2). You do not pay organizations classified as private foundations. You do not match any gifts made by participants in the Company match pogrom prior to the termination of the Company match program.
  • You do not match any legal obligation of a participant in the foundation match program, and the participant is required to certify that the participant has no legal obligation to make the contribution.
  • You do not match contributions made to any organization which you control or which is controlled by one or more disqualified persons within the meaning of § 4946.
  • Gifts are made to match the fair market cash value of contributions of securities.

The one state where Company did not change its gift matching policy for employees is StateACompany maintained its policy there because of a prior agreement with a state agency. This state agency gave Company approval for a corporate acquisition on the condition that Company continue to make charitable contributions to organizations within StateA for a number of years following the transaction. As such, Company continues to be the payor of the gift match payments in StateA.

RULINGS REQUESTED

You requested the following rulings:

      1. That matching gifts made by you under the foundation match program do not constitute self-dealing within the meaning of § 4941.

2. That the matching gifts made under the foundation match program will be “qualifying distributions” within the meaning of § 4942(g).

3. That the matching gifts made under the foundation match program will not be “taxable expenditures” within the meaning of § 4945(d).

LAW

I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(B) provides the term “charitable contribution” means a contribution or gift to or for the use of a corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals.I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) exempts from federal income taxation corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals.

I.R.C. § 507(d)(2)(A) defines a substantial contributor as any person who contributed or bequeathed an aggregated amount of more than $5,000 to a private foundation, if such amount is more than 2 percent of the total contributions and bequests received by the foundation before the close of the taxable year of the foundation in which the contribution or bequest is received by the foundation from such person.

I.R.C. § 4941 imposes an excise tax on private foundations and foundation managers for each act of self-dealing and between a private foundation and a disqualified person.

I.R.C. § 4941(d)(1) defines self-dealing to include the furnishing of goods, services, or facilities between a disqualified person and a private foundation, the payment of compensation by a private foundation to a disqualified person, or use of the private foundation’s assets, by or for the benefit of a disqualified person.

I.R.C. § 4942(a) imposes a tax on undistributed income of a private foundation for any taxable year, which has not been distributed by the first day of the second taxable year following such taxable year.

I.R.C. § 4942(g)(1) defines “qualifying distribution” as (A) any amount paid to accomplish one or more purposes described in § 170(c)(2)(B), other than any contribution to (i) an organization controlled by the foundation or one or more disqualified persons, or (ii) a private foundation which is not an operating foundation, except as otherwise provided; (B) any amount paid to acquire an asset used directly in carrying out one or more purposes described in § 170(c)(2)(B).

I.R.C. § 4945(a) imposes a twenty percent tax on each taxable expenditure of a private foundation.

I.R.C. § 4945(d) defines taxable expenditure as any amount paid or incurred by a private foundation as a grant to an organization unless the expenditure meets certain criteria unless the private foundation exercises expenditure responsibility with respect to such grant in accordance with § 4945(h) or an amount paid for any purpose other than one specified in § 170(c)(2)(B).

I.R.C. § 4946(a)(1) provides, in part, that the term ‘disqualified person’ means, with respect to a private foundation, a person who is —

      (A) a substantial contributor to the foundation,

(B) a foundation manager,

(C) an owner of more than 20 percent of —

        (i) the total combined voting power of a corporation,

(ii) the profits interest of a partnership, or

(iii) the beneficial interest of a trust or unincorporated enterprise, which is a substantial contributor to the foundation,

      (D) a member of the family of any individual described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C),

(E) a corporation of which persons described in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (D) own more than 35 percent of the total combined voting power,

(F) a partnership in which persons described in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (D) own more than 35 percent of the profits interest,

(G) a trust or estate in which persons described in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (D) hold more than 35 percent of the beneficial interest, and
Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(d)-2(f)(2) provides that the fact that a disqualified person receives an incidental or tenuous benefit from the use by a foundation of its income or assets will not, by itself, make such use an act of self-dealing. Thus, the public recognition a person may receive, arising from the charitable activities of a private foundation to which such person is a substantial contributor, does not in itself result in an act of self-dealing since generally the benefit is incidental and tenuous. For example, a grant by a private foundation to a § 509(a)(1), (2), or (3) organization will not be an act of self-dealing merely because one of the § 509(a)(1), (2), or (3) organization’s officers, directors, or trustees is also a manager of or a substantial contributor to the foundation.Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(d)-2(f)(9) Example 2 gives the following situation. Private foundation X established a program to award scholarship grants to the children of employees of corporation M, a substantial contributor to X. After disclosure of the method of carrying out such program, X received a determination letter from the Internal Revenue Service stating that X is exempt under § 501(c)(3), that contributions to X are deductible under § 170, and that X’s scholarship program qualifies under § 4945(g)(1). A scholarship grant to a person not a disqualified person with respect to X paid or incurred by X in accordance with such program shall not be an indirect act of self-dealing between X and M.

Treas. Reg. § 53.4942(a)-3(a)(2) defines the term “qualifying distribution,” in relevant part, to mean any amount (including program related investments and reasonable and necessary administrative expenses) paid to accomplish one or more purposes described in § 170(c)(1) or (2)(B), other than any contribution to a private foundation which is not an operating foundation or to an organization controlled (directly or indirectly) by the contributing private foundation or one or more disqualified persons with respect to such foundation.

Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-5(a)(1) provides that the term “taxable expenditure” includes any amount paid or incurred by a private foundation as a grant to an organization (other than an organization described in § 509(a)(1), (2), or (3)), unless the private foundation exercises expenditure responsibility with respect to such grant.

Rev. Rul. 73-407, 1973-2 C.B. 383, holds that a contribution by a private foundation to a public charity made on the condition that the public charity change its name to that of the foundation’s substantial contributor for at least 100 years does not constitute an act of self-dealing.

Rev. Rul. 77-160, 1977-1 C.B. 351, concerned the issue of whether payment by a private foundation of a disqualified person’s membership church dues constituted an act of self-dealing within the meaning of § 4941(d)(1)(E). The Revenue Ruling found that the payment was not an incidental or tenuous benefit within the meaning of § 53.4941(d)-2(f)(2). The foundation’s payment resulted in a direct economic benefit to the disqualified person. The payment of the membership fee by the foundation was a substitute for an obligation of the disqualified person. As a result of the payment, the disqualified person was entitled to hold office, vote in congregational meetings to elect officers and conduct other business, and otherwise participate in the religious activities of the congregation. Accordingly, the payment of membership dues by the private foundation on behalf of the disqualified person was an act of self-dealing under § 4941(d)(1)(E).

Rev. Rul. 80-310, 1980-2 CB 319, held that the grants of a private foundation to an educational institution for engineering instruction were not an act of self-dealing, even though a corporation, a disqualified person, intended to hire graduates of the engineering program and encourage its employees to participate in the program. The Revenue Ruling stated that because the corporation would compete on an equal basis for program graduates and admission of its own employees to the program, it would receive only an incidental or tenuous benefit.

Rev. Rul. 85-162, 1985-2 C.B. 275, found no self-dealing where a private foundation, with a disqualified person of a bank, made loans to publicly supported organizations for construction projects in disadvantaged areas where the contractors doing the construction might have been ordinary customers of the bank. Any benefit to the bank from the fact that the loan proceeds were paid by the public charities to the contractors who are ordinary customers of the bank was incidental or tenuous.

ANALYSIS

Ruling 1Section 4941(a) imposes an excise tax on each act of self-dealing between a disqualified person and a private foundation. Under § 4946(a)(1)(A), a disqualified person for the purpose of § 4941 means, with respect to a private foundation, a person who is a substantial contributor to the foundation, a foundation manager, an owner of more than 20 percent of (i) the total combined voting power of a corporation which is a substantial contributor to the foundation; a member of the family of any individual described in above, a corporation in which persons described in above or own more than 35 percent of the total combined voting power. Section 507(d)(2)(A) defines a substantial contributor as any person who contributed or bequeathed an aggregated amount of more than $5,000 to a private foundation, if such amount is more than two percent of the total contributions and bequests received by the foundation before the close of the taxable year of the foundation in which the contribution or bequest is received by the foundation from such person. Here Company is your substantial contributor, and you and Company share the same officers and directors.

Section 4941(d)(1)(E) defines self-dealing as any direct or indirect transfer to, or use by or for the benefit of, a “disqualified person” of the income or assets of the private foundation. You have agreed to take over payment ofCompany’s employee gift matching program. Company has a policy whereby employees are informed that certain charitable gifts that they make will be matched, and you then tender the matching payment. If this agreement entails the exchange of money, merchandise or services between you and Company or the use of your assets to benefit company more than incidentally, then it violates the self-dealing prohibition. You have submitted a number of assurances in your ruling request including a representation that you will not match any gifts made by participants in the Company match program prior to the termination of the Company match program and that you are not taking on any obligation of Company or relieving Company of any financial burden. As such, the foundation match program does not involve any exchange of money, merchandise, or services between you and Company.

Nonetheless, Company derives some benefit from your payments from the good will created by this foundation match program. However, this good will is merely incidental benefit for Company. Section 53.4941(d)-2(f)(2) states a private foundation’s use of assets that results in incidental benefit to a disqualified person is not by itself an act of self-dealing. The benefits of increased loyalty and morale for a business have been found to be incidental and tenuous. Example 2 of § 53.4941(d)-2(f)(9) provides a situation where a private foundation’s action, a scholarship program for children of employees of a disqualified person, likely results in increased employee loyalty and good will for the disqualified person. Nonetheless, the situation is not self-dealing. Similarly, the possibilities of an improved workforce or increased customer loyalty were found to be incidental benefits in Rev. Rul. 80-310 (providing that advantages gained by a local employer from the creation of a new education program were incidental and did not create self-dealing) and Rev. Rul. 85-162 (finding that a private foundation’s funding of construction projects resulted in only incidental benefit to a bank, even though the projects might have employed the bank’s customers).

Company is similar to the disqualified person in Rev. Rul. 73-407 who received only incidental benefit from a private foundation’s directive for a public charity to adopt the disqualified person’s name. The disqualified person derived good will from the charity’s name change, but nonetheless the private foundation’s payment was not an act of self-dealing. Further, unlike the disqualified person in Rev. Rul. 77-160 (finding more than incidental benefit when a private foundation paid a disqualified person’s church membership dues and as a result the disqualified gained the right to be an active participant in the church), Company does not receive any tangible right or privilege from your payments. Thus, Company’s receipt of good will does not render your foundation match program payments as acts of self-dealing. Since your gifts under the foundation match program benefit Company only incidentally between you and Company, they are not acts of self-dealing.

Ruling 2

Your payments under Company’s foundation match program are qualifying distributions. Under § 4942(g)(1), the definition of “qualifying distribution” includes any amount paid to accomplish one or more purposes described in § 170(c)(2)(B). Under § 53.4942(a)-3(a)(2) the term “qualifying distribution” does not include a contribution to a private foundation. You have represented that you will make payments only to organizations that have been recognized by the IRS as public charities under §§ 509(a)(1) or (2). With these safeguards, you are ensuring that your payments under the foundation match program are qualifying distributions.

Ruling 3

Under § 53.4945-5(a)(1), a private foundation’s taxable expenditures include amounts to an organization, other than an organization described in § 509(a)(1), (2), or (3), unless the private foundation exercises expenditure responsibility with respect to such grant. Since you have represented that you will give money in the foundation match program solely to organizations that are classified by the IRS as public charities under §§ 509(a)(1) or (2), then your payment will not constitute a taxable expenditure.

RULINGS
      1. Matching gifts made by you under the foundation match program to qualified public charities do not constitute self-dealing within the meaning of § 4941.

2. The matching gifts made under the foundation match program will be “qualifying distributions” within the meaning of § 4942(g).

3. The matching gifts made under the foundation match program will not be “taxable expenditures” within the meaning of § 4945(d).
This ruling will be made available for public inspection under I.R.C. § 6110 after certain deletions of identifying information are made. For details, see enclosed Notice 437, Notice of Intention to Disclose. A copy of this ruling with deletions that we intend to make available for public inspection is attached to Notice 437. If you disagree with our proposed deletions, you should follow the instructions in Notice 437.This ruling is directed only to the organization that requested it. I.R.C. § 6110(k)(3) provides that it may not be used or cited by others as precedent.

This ruling is based on the facts as they were presented and on the understanding that there will be no material changes in these facts. This ruling does not address the applicability of any section of the Code or regulations to the facts submitted other than with respect to the sections described. Because it could help resolve questions concerning your federal income tax status, this ruling should be kept in your permanent records.

If you have any questions about this ruling, please contact the person whose name and telephone number are shown in the heading of this letter.

In accordance with the Power of Attorney currently on file with the Internal Revenue Service, we are sending a copy of this letter to your authorized representative.

                  Sincerely,
                  Ronald Shoemaker
                  Manager, Exempt Organizations
                  Technical Group 2

Enclosure
Notice 437

JANUARY 30, 2014

Citations: LTR 201417022




IRS LTR: Charity's Status Not Affected by Operating Program Abroad.

The IRS ruled that an organization’s tax-exempt status and its classification as a public charity will not be affected when it operates an educational program in foreign countries and that amounts it receives from the program’s manager, a nonprofit controlled by a for-profit company, will not constitute unrelated business taxable income.

Contact Person: * * *

Identification Number: * * *
Telephone Number: * * *

UIL: 501.03-00, 501.03-08, 170.07-02, 509.02-00, 513.00-00
Release Date: 4/25/2014

Date: January 31, 2014Employer Identification Number: * * *

LEGEND:

Company = * * *
Country = * * *
University = * * *
Program1 = * * *
Program2 = * * *
Foundation = * * *
X = * * *

Dear * * *:This is in response to your letter in which you requested certain rulings with respect to §§ 501(c)(3), 170(b)(1)(A)(ii), and 511

BACKGROUND

You are an organization described in § 501(c)(3) and classified as a public charity under §§ 509(a)(1) and 170(b)(1)(A)(ii). You were originally founded by Company, a for-profit company founded in Country, but Company no longer maintains control over you, though its employees do constitute a minority of your board. Your mission is “to contribute to human and economic development by educating and training individuals to be effective knowledge-based leaders in an increasingly interdependent global economy.”In addition to your programming in conjunction with University, one of two primary programs you offer, you also offer independent classes and seminars open to the general public or to organizational clients seeking programs for its employees. Your other primary program is Program1, a three month global business curriculum delivered at your facilities. You are responsible for the admission policy, candidate selection, and tuition collection as well as choosing the instructors and curriculum for the program.

You are now hoping to alter the structure of Program1 such that it will now be Program2Program2 will be a three-plus month, multi-network program that will be delivered twice a year on campuses in four countries. Program2 will be headquartered and managed by Foundation, a foreign non-profit organization that is controlled by Company.Foundation‘s employees will be mostly employees seconded from Company. Students in Program2 will spend six weeks of the program at your facilities where you will be responsible for the curriculum, the professors, the materials for each course, and the grading of the students for the portion of the overall program that is conducted by you. For these activities Foundation will pay you $x per student that is enrolled in the program. The admission criteria, student selection, and tuition collection will all be handled by Foundation.

RULINGS REQUESTED
      1. Following the operational modifications outlined above, you will continue to be exempt from taxation under § 501(c)(3).

2. Following the operational modifications outlined above, you will continue to qualify as an educational organization under § 170(b)(1)(A)(ii) and therefore a public charity under § 509(a)(1).

3. Following the operational modifications outlined above, amounts received by you from Foundation in connection with Program2 will not constitute unrelated business taxable income under § 511.

LAW

I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A)(ii) describes an educational organization that normally maintains a regular faculty and curriculum and normally has a regularly enrolled body of pupils or students in attendance at the place where its educational activities are regularly carried on.I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) provides that organizations may be exempted from tax if they are organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes and “no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.”

I.R.C. § 509(a)(1) states that an organization described in 501(c)(3) is a private foundation unless it is described in Section 170(b)(1)(A).

I.R.C. § 511 imposes a tax on unrelated business taxable income of every organization described in § 501(c).

I.R.C. § 512 defines unrelated business taxable income as the gross income derived from any unrelated trade or business that is regularly carried on by an organization.

I.R.C. § 513 defines unrelated trade or business as any trade or business the conduct of which is not substantially related (aside from the need for income or funds or the use made of the profits derived) to the exercise or performance by an organization of its charitable, educational, or other purpose or function constituting the basis for its exemption under § 501.

Treas. Reg. § 1.170-2(b)(3)(i) defines educational organization as one “whose primary function is the presentation of formal instruction and which normally maintains a regular faculty and curriculum and normally has a regularly enrolled body of pupils or students in attendance at the place where its educational activities are regularly carried on.”

Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) states an organization will be regarded as operated exclusively for one or more exempt purposes only if it engages primarily in activities which accomplish one or more of such exempt purposes. An organization will not be so regarded if more than an insubstantial part of its activities is not in furtherance of an exempt purpose.

Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3) defines educational as the instruction or training of the individual for the purpose of improving or developing his capabilities, and the instruction of the public on subjects useful to the individual and beneficial to the community.

Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(ii), Example (1) states that an organization such as a primary or secondary school which has a regularly scheduled curriculum, a regular faculty, and a regularly enrolled body of students in attendance at a place where the educational activities are regularly carried on is an educational organization.

Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b) provides that for purposes of § 513 the term trade or business has the same meaning it has in § 162, and generally includes any activity carried on for the production of income from the sale of goods or performance of services. Also, producing or distributing goods or performing services from which a particular amount of gross income is derived do not lose identity as trade or business merely because they are carried on within a larger aggregate of similar activities or within a larger complex of other endeavors which may, or may not, be related to the exempt purposes of the organization.

Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(c) provides that specific business activities of an exempt organization will ordinarily be deemed to be regularly carried on if they manifest a frequency and continuity, and are pursued in a manner, generally similar to comparable commercial activities of nonexempt organizations.

Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(2) provides that a trade or business is “related” in the relevant sense only where the conduct of the business activities has causal relationship to the achievement of exempt purpose, and the relationship to be substantial the performance of the trade or business must contribute importantly to the accomplishment of the organization’s exempt purpose.

Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(3) provides that in determining whether an activity contributes importantly to the accomplishment of an exempt purpose, the size and extent of the activities involved must be considered in relation to the nature and extent of the exempt function which the organization purports to serve.

Revenue Ruling 73-434, 1973-2 C.B. 71, describes an organization whose only activity was the conducting of courses designed to teach young people how to survive in a natural environment. The courses are conducted on an island and most of the classes are conducted out-of-doors rather than in classrooms. A regularly enrolled student body attends the courses. The organization conducts 12 courses a year and each class term lasts for a period of 26 days. The organization has a faculty of full-time instructors who present a course of instruction in survival skills through lectures, demonstrations, and various practical exercises. Instruction is given in such subjects as water survival, seamanship, first aid, fire fighting, climbing, and rescue operations. The organization’s income is from contributions and tuition payments and its expenditures are for the operation of the school. The ruling concludes that this organization is an educational organization described in § 170(b)(1)(A)(ii).

ANALYSIS

RULINGS 1 AND 2In order to be operated for an exempt purpose you must not have as part of your operations a substantial non-exempt purpose. Section 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1). Your primary purpose is educational. Education is an exempt purpose and is defined in the Internal Revenue Code as the instruction or training of individuals for the purpose of improving or developing an individual’s capabilities. Section 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3). Additionally, the examples in the regulations provide that an educational organization is an organization similar to a primary or secondary school, a college, or a professional or trade school, which has a regularly scheduled curriculum, a regular faculty, and a regularly enrolled body of students in attendance at a place where the educational activities are regularly carried on. Section 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(ii), Example (1). Your new program, Program2, anticipates continuing your mission for global learning in order to create “knowledge-based” leaders. The program will consist of traditional in-person classes where one of your instructors will teach a curriculum determined by you in order to advance the student’s leadership and management skills. Program2 furthers your educational purpose.

Program2 does not alter your similarity to the organization described in § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(ii). Example (1), in that you will continue to be an organization described in § 170(b)(1)(A)(ii). Section 170(b)(1)(A)(ii) requires that an organization be one where its primary function is the presentation of formal instruction and which normally maintains a regular faculty and curriculum and normally has a regularly enrolled body of pupils or students in attendance at the place where its educational activities are regularly carried on. Section 1.170-2(b)(3)(i). In addition to your other educational programs, Program2 will provide formal courses taking place within a classroom with all participants present in a building rented by you. You are in charge of the curriculum, instructors, and grading for the portion ofProgram2 that will occur at your facilities. Additionally, the instructors for your courses are your employees. Also, admission to the program will be open to the general public and students will enroll for the entire program requiring attendance at each session. The fact that the students only participate in your section of the program for six weeks and complete the entire program over four countries does not remove you from being described in § 170(b)(1)(A)(ii). Rev. Rul. 73-434, supra. With the addition of Program2 you will continue to be described within § 170(b)(1)(A)(ii).

RULING 3

Section 512 provides that unrelated taxable income is the gross income from an unrelated trade or business as defined in § 513. Section 513 provides that an unrelated trade or business is any trade or business that is actively carried on and is not substantially related to the exempt purpose of the organization. The regulations under § 513 provide that a trade or business is an activity that is carried on for the production of income and which otherwise possesses the characteristics required to be a “trade or business” under § 162. Section 1.513-1(b). A trade or business does not lose its character as such even if it is an aggregate of some larger activity. Id. A trade or business will be considered to be regularly carried on if it manifests a frequency and continuity, and is pursued in a manner similar to comparable commercial activities of non-exempt organizations. Section 1.513-1(c). Finally, a trade or business will be considered to be substantially related only where the conduct of the business activities has a causal relationship to the achievement of exempt purpose, and for the relationship to be substantial the performance of the trade or business must contribute importantly to the accomplishment of the organization’s exempt purpose. Section 1.513-1(d)(2).

Program2 will be conducted as a portion of a larger program conducted by Foundation. In return for the portion of the program under your control you will be compensated by Foundation per each student that is enrolled in the program. Even if we consider your program to be a regularly carried-on trade or business within the meaning of § 513 you are not conducting an unrelated trade or business since Program2 is substantially related to your educational purpose. Your mission is to provide a global perspective within creating “knowledge-based” leadership. Program2 will further this exempt purpose by providing a traditional educational program with a curriculum designed by you and taught by your instructors. Since Program2 furthers your exempt purpose, the money received in the performance ofProgram2 is not unrelated business taxable income. Sections 1.513-1(d)(2) and (3).

RULING
      1. Following the operational modifications outlined above, you will continue to be exempt from taxation under § 501(c)(3).

2. Following the operational modifications outlined above, you will continue to qualify as an educational organization under § 170(b)(1)(A)(ii) and therefore a public charity under § 509(a)(1).

3. Following the operational modifications outlined above, amounts received by you from Foundation in connection with Program2 will not constitute unrelated business taxable income under § 511.
This ruling will be made available for public inspection under section 6110 of the Code after certain deletions of identifying information are made. For details, see enclosed Notice 437, Notice of Intention to Disclose. A copy of this ruling with deletions that we intend to make available for public inspection is attached to Notice 437. If you disagree with our proposed deletions, you should follow the instructions in Notice 437.This ruling is directed only to the organization that requested it. Section 6110(k)(3) of the Code provides that it may not be used or cited by others as precedent.

This ruling is based on the facts as they were presented and on the understanding that there will be no material changes in these facts. This ruling does not address the applicability of any section of the Code or regulations to the facts submitted other than with respect to the sections described. Specifically, this ruling does not address any private benefit concerns that may be present with your operations. Because it could help resolve questions concerning your federal income tax status, this ruling should be kept in your permanent records.

If you have any questions about this ruling, please contact the person whose name and telephone number are shown in the heading of this letter.

In accordance with the Power of Attorney currently on file with the Internal Revenue Service, we are sending a copy of this letter to your authorized representative.

                  Sincerely,
                  Ronald Shoemaker
                  Manager, Exempt Organizations
                  Technical Group 2

Enclosure
Notice 437

JANUARY 31, 2014

Citations: LTR 201417018




IRS Hopes to Publish Final Charitable Hospital Regs by Year-End.

The IRS hopes to release final regulations on the requirements of section 501(r) for tax-exempt hospitals by the end of the year, Preston Quesenberry, senior technical reviewer (exempt organizations), IRS Office of Associate Chief Counsel (Tax-Exempt and Government Entities), said April 25.

Quesenberry spoke in Arlington, Va., at a conference sponsored by the Georgetown University Law Center’s Continuing Legal Education program.

The final regulations appear on the third quarter update to the 2013-2014 priority guidance plan. A Treasury official noted in March that exempt hospitals can rely on previously proposed regs (REG-106499-12, REG-130266-11) until the final regs are published.

Section 501(r) was enacted under the Affordable Care Act and contains new rules for tax-exempt hospitals. In late December the IRS published a proposed revenue procedure in Notice 2014-3, 2014-3 IRB 408, designed to help hospitals correct unintended violations of the new rules.

The IRS received only six comments on the notice, and the comment period is closed, Quesenberry said.

The proposed revenue procedure includes a few “very bare-boned” examples, Quesenberry said. One example he cited was that if a hospital fails to adopt a community health needs assessment report that contains all the required elements, the correction could be adopting a corrected report and posting it online.

“The thought was that once both the IRS and the hospitals gain more experience with implementation of the 501(r) requirements and with the type of failures that tend to occur, that we would be able to provide additional examples that could cover more scenarios and situations,” Quesenberry said.

Form 990 Changes for Hospitals

Exempt hospitals will face two significant changes in completing the hospital schedule of their 2013 Form 990 information return, another IRS official said at the conference.According to Garrett Gluth, a tax law specialist (exempt organizations) in the IRS Tax-Exempt and Government Entities Division, organizations filing Schedule H, “Hospitals,” should complete Part V, Section C, which asks for supplementary information to the answers provided in Part V, Section B. That section asks about a hospital’s community health needs assessments, financial assistance policies, emergency medical care policies, and charges to individuals eligible for assistance under the financial assistance policies. Gluth said a hospital should provide the information in Section C separately for each of its facilities, adding that Section C is designed to provide a cleaner way to supplement responses to section B.

The IRS also changed instructions for the community benefit table in line seven of Part I to say that contributions to a hospital that are restricted for a community benefit purpose should be reported as offsetting revenue for the type of community benefit they provide, Gluth said.

“This change provides more complete, accurate reporting and added transparency, treating restricted grants equally with other offsetting revenue on Schedule H, Part I,” Gluth said. “And of course that change doesn’t change a hospital’s actual community benefit, only how those numbers are presented in the two columns of Schedule H, Part I, line seven.”

APRIL 28, 2014

by David van den Berg




EO Update: e-News for Charities & Nonprofits - April 25, 2014.

 


  1.  IRS releases draft of easier to use Form 1023-EZ for charities seeking tax-exempt status


The draft Form 1023-EZ, “Streamlined Application for Recognition of Exemption Under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code,” announced in the Federal Register March 31, is a shorter and less burdensome version of the Form 1023. Most small exempt organizations will be eligible to use the Form 1023 EZ.

The Office of Management and Budget is accepting comments on the form through April 30. The IRS expects the Form 1023 EZ to be in use by eligible organizations this summer.


  2.  Register for the Form 990 Filing Tips webcast presentation


Thursday, May 8
2 p.m. Eastern Time

Topics include:

  • Preparing the Form 990-series return
  • Managing legal risks more effectively
  • Avoiding penalties
  • Explaining Unrelated Business Income
  • Highlighting online resources
  • Promoting EO resources

To receive CE credit (and a certificate of completion) you must view the presentation for a minimum of 50 minutes.

Register here.


  3.  IRS to amend regulations regarding treatment of U.S. persons owning passive foreign investment company stock through tax-exempt organizations


Read Notice 2014-28 for details.

 

  4.  Register for EO workshop


Register for our upcoming workshop for small and medium-sized
501(c)(3) organizations on:

  • April 30 – Provo, UT
    Hosted by Brigham Young University – Marriott School

 

  5.  Procedural guidance update


IRS Exempt Organizations periodically issues interim guidance to communicate immediate, time-sensitive, or temporary instructions to employees. These instructions are generally incorporated into the Internal Revenue Manual within one year.




IRS Releases Draft Form 1023-EZ.

The IRS has released draft Form 1023-EZ, “Streamlined Application for Recognition of Exemption Under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.”

FEBRUARY 19, 2014




Streamlined Exemption Application Could Pose Compliance Problems.

The IRS has released a draft of a simplified exemption application for charities in an apparent effort to reduce burdens on smaller organizations, but some attorneys worry it could make it more difficult to get charities to comply with the tax laws.

The draft Form 1023-EZ, “Streamlined Application for Recognition of Exemption Under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code,” accompanied by draft instructions, was announced in the Federal Register March 31.The notice described the draft as a shorter and less burdensome version of the 25-page Form 1023 and estimated it would take 14 hours to complete as opposed to 101 hours for the standard form.

The IRS provided a statement to Tax Analysts April 18 saying the Form 1023-EZ is intended to make applying for tax-exempt status easier and quicker for smaller organizations and that the Service has submitted the latest draft of the form to the Office of Management and Budget.

But attorneys who spoke with Tax Analysts said the brevity of the draft could raise compliance issues. Charles M. Watkins of Webster, Chamberlain & Bean LLP, who recently discovered the draft’s existence and brought it to the attention of other exempt organization practitioners, said it might not give the IRS all the information it needs to determine whether an applicant qualifies for section 501(c)(3) status, adding that it appears an applicant would not even have to show the agency its organizing documents.

“I would be concerned that they’re not getting enough information and some people are going to be recognized as exempt when in fact what they’re actually doing is not an exempt function,” Watkins said.

Benjamin Takis of Tax-Exempt Solutions PLLC said the standard Form 1023 provides applicants with a useful educational tool that a streamlined application may not offer.

“As I work with the organizations and we go through all the parts of the 1023, that’s an opportunity for them to learn about all their compliance responsibilities,” Takis said. He listed the exempt purpose test, the commerciality doctrine, and private benefit and private inurement rules as examples, adding, “In the absence of the Form 1023 and the rigor of that process, I think a lot of new organizations are not going to get that education.”

Watkins also noted that the Form 1023-EZ would be available only to organizations whose gross receipts do not exceed $200,000 and that churches, hospitals, colleges and universities, supporting organizations, organizations with donor-advised funds, and other entities could not use it.

Watkins was puzzled about why the IRS so far appears to have made no mention of the draft. “Nobody [at the IRS] has said a word about it,” he said. “If it’s something you’re doing that actually might help the situation, why wouldn’t you talk about it, especially in the context of a situation where you really do need to rebuild trust with the exempt organizations community?”

Treasury has asked for comments on the draft by April 30.

by Fred Stokeld

APRIL 21, 2014




EO Update: e-News for Charities & Nonprofits - April 17, 2014

  1.  Register for the Form 990 Filing Tips webcast presentationThursday, May 8, 2 pm, ETTopics include:

  • Preparing the Form 990-series return
  • Managing legal risks more effectively
  • Avoiding penalties
  • Explaining Unrelated Business Income
  • Highlighting online resources
  • Promoting EO resources

To receive CE credit (and a certificate of completion) you must view the presentation for a minimum of 50 minutes.

Register here.


  2.  IRS Commissioner speaks at National Press Club


Read the April 2 speech by John A. Koskinen.


  3.  IRS issues guidance on treatment of unrelated business income of state chartered credit


This memo provides directions to examiners in the processing of unrelated business income tax issues of organizations described in section 501(c)(14)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code.


  4.  Don’t include Social Security numbers on publicly disclosed forms


Because the IRS is required to disclose approved exemption applications and information returns, tax-exempt organizations should not include personal information, such as Social Security numbers, on these forms.


  5.  IRS phone forum Q&As/presentations posted


See responses to inquiries from attendees of these recent phone forums:

  • Good Governance Makes Sense for Charitable Organizations
  • ABCs of Charitable Contributions for 501(c)(3) Organizations

Review recently posted phone forum presentations posted on the
IRS Stay Exempt Resource Library page:

  • Charities and Their Volunteers
  • 501(c)(7) Social Clubs: What they need to know to qualify for and maintain tax-exempt status
  • Exempt Organizations and Employment Issues

  6.  Register for EO workshop


Register for our upcoming workshop for small and medium-sized
501(c)(3) organizations on:

  • April 30 – Provo, UT
    Hosted by Brigham Young University – Marriott School

If you have a technical or procedural question relating to Exempt Organizations, visit theCharities and Nonprofits homepage on the IRS.gov Web site.

If you have a specific question about exempt organizations, call EO Customer Account Services at 1-877-829-5500.




TE/GE Memo Limits Types of Cases Transferred for E/O Processing.

The IRS Tax-Exempt and Government Entities Division has issued administrative guidance (TEGE-07-0414-0009) limiting the types of cases and issues that are transferred to the Exempt Organizations Technical Unit for processing, including cases involving optional expedited processing for section 501(c)(4) applications.Generally, some cases, including cases without established precedent, cases with significant regional or national impact, technical advice cases, and technical assistance requests, have been transferred to the technical unit for processing. Also transferred have been cases involving the interpretation of a treaty or international agreement, Canadian Treaty Organization determinations that involve unprecedented or novel issues, and specific cases with potential terrorist connections.

As of April 8, 2014, the guidance limits the transferred case types to applications under section 501(c)(3) from hospitals subject to requirements under section 501(r); some applications under section 501(c)(4) on optional expedited processes; and some technical assistance requests.

April 8, 2014Affected IRM: IRM 7.20.1 & 7.20.4

Expiration Date: April 8, 2015

MEMORANDUM FOR
ALL MANAGERS AND EMPLOYEES IN THE EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS DETERMINATIONS
UNIT AND EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS TECHNICAL UNIT

FROM:
Stephen A. Martin
Acting Director, EO Rulings and Agreements

SUBJECT:
Identification of Cases Transferred to EO Technical

The purpose of this memorandum is to provide administrative guidance to the Exempt Organizations Determinations Unit and the Exempt Organizations Technical Unit regarding issues and cases currently transferred to EO Technical as described in IRM sections 7.20.1 and 7.20.4.Pursuant to IRM section 7.20.1, certain cases, including cases without established precedent (set forth in IRM 7.20.1.4.1), cases with significant regional or national impact, technical advice cases, and technical assistance requests, were transferred to EO Technical for processing. In addition, IRM section 7.20.4 requires the transfer of cases involving the interpretation of a treaty or international agreement, Canadian Treaty Organization determinations that involve unprecedented or novel issues, and certain cases with potential terrorist connections (as described in 7.20.4.7.1). However, in the interest of efficient tax administration, effective upon issuance of this memorandum, the types of cases and issues transferred to EO Technical for processing shall be limited to the following:

      (1) Applications under Internal Revenue Code section 501(c)(3) from hospitals subject to requirements under section 501(r). The transfer of these cases will continue until training is completed for EO Determinations personnel on this technical matter. The training is scheduled for summer 2014;

(2) Certain applications under IRC section 501(c)(4), pursuant to the Memorandum issued on December 23, 2013, by the Acting Director, EO, Control No. TEGE-07-1213-24, Expansion of Optional Expedited Process for Certain Exemption Applications under Section 501(c)(4); and

(3) Technical assistance requests, pursuant to the procedures set forth in the Memorandum issued on July 15, 2013, by the Acting Director, EO R&A, Control No: TEGE-07-0713-11, Interim Guidance on Requests for Technical Assistance.
The content of this memorandum will be incorporated in IRM sections 7.20.1 and 7.20.4.Please contact the Senior Manager, Rulings and Agreements, Technical with any questions regarding the application of this memorandum.

cc:
www.irs.gov

Citations: TEGE-07-0414-0009




Government Appeals Decision on Clergy Housing Allowance Exclusion.

The government filed a brief in the Seventh Circuit arguing that a district court erred when it held that section 107(2), which excludes the rental allowance paid to a minister from income, was an unconstitutional violation of the establishment clause, maintaining that the plaintiffs lacked standing and the law is constitutional.

FREEDOM FROM RELIGION FOUNDATION, INCORPORATED,
ANNIE LAURIE GAYLOR AND DAN BARKER,
Plaintiffs-Appellees
v.
JACOB J. LEW, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY,
AND JOHN A. KOSKINEN, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
Defendants-Appellants

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUITON APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
(No. 11-cv-0626; Honorable Barbara B. Crabb)

BRIEF FOR THE APPELLANTS

KATHRYN KENEALLY
Assistant Attorney General

TAMARA W. ASHFORD
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General

GILBERT S. ROTHENBERG (202) 514-3361
TERESA E. MCLAUGHLIN (202) 514-4342
JUDITH A. HAGLEY (202) 514-8126
Attorneys
Tax Division
Department of Justice
Post Office Box 502
Washington, D.C. 20044

Of Counsel:
JOHN W. VAUDREUIL
United States Attorney

                               TABLE OF CONTENTS

 Table of contents

 Table of authorities

 Glossary

 Statement regarding oral argument

 Statement of jurisdiction

 Statement of the issues

 Statement of the case

         A. Procedural overview

         B. Background: § 107

         C. FFRF

         D. The proceedings below

 Summary of argument

 Argument

      I. Plaintiffs lack standing to sue

         Standard of review

         A. Introduction

         B. Plaintiffs lack standing under Article III

         C. Plaintiffs' lawsuit also runs afoul of other limitations on
            standing

         D. The District Court's standing analysis cannot withstand scrutiny

     II. Section 107(2) does not violate the Establishment Clause

         Standard of review

         A. Introduction

         B. Section 107 is a permissible accommodation of religion

              1. Section 107(2) has a secular legislative purpose

                   a. The history and context of § 107

                   b. The statute's history and context disclose the secular
                      purpose of eliminating discrimination against, and among,
                      ministers and of minimizing interference with a church's
                      internal affairs

                   c. The District Court ignored the statute's history and
                      context

              2. Section 107(2) does not have the primary effect of advancing
                 or inhibiting religion

                   a. Section 107 does not endorse religion, but merely
                      minimizes governmental influence on, and entanglement
                      with, a church's internal affairs

                   b. Section 107(2) does not subsidize religion, as the
                      District Court erroneously concluded

              3. Section 107(2) does not produce excessive entanglement

              4. Texas Monthly is not controlling because it is
                 distinguishable in crucial respects

 Conclusion

 Certificate of compliance

 Certificate of service

 Statutory addendum

 Circuit Rule 30(d) certification

 Appendix table of contents

                              TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

 Cases:

 ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012)

 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984)

 Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Cohen, 171 F.3d 460 (7th Cir. 1999)

 Apache Bend Apartments, Ltd. v. United States, 987 F.2d 1174
 (5th Cir. 1993)

 Ariz. Christian School Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011)

 Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997)

 Bartley v. United States, 123 F.3d 466 (7th Cir. 1997)

 Books v. Elkhart County, Ind., 401 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 2005)

 Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564 (1997)

 City of Milwaukee v. Block, 823 F.2d 1158 (7th Cir. 1987)

 Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77 (1977)

 Conning v. Busey, 127 F. Supp. 958 (S.D. Ohio 1954)

 Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
 Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987)

 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005)

 Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 2012), petition
 for cert. filed, No. 12-755 (Sup. Ct. Dec. 20, 2012)

 Droz v. Commissioner, 48 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 1995)

 FFRF v. Geithner, 715 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (E.D. Cal. 2010)

 FFRF v. Obama, 641 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2011)

 FFRF v. Zielke, 845 F.2d 1463 (7th Cir. 1988)

 Finlator v. Powers, 902 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1990)

 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968)

 Flight Attendants Against UAL Offset v. Commissioner, 165 F.3d 572
 (7th Cir. 1999)

 Fulani v. Brady, 935 F.2d 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1991)

 Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971)

 Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728 (1984)

 Hein v. FFRF, 551 U.S. 587 (2007)

 Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989)

 Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88 (2004)

 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC,
 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012)

 Immanuel Baptist Church v. Glass, 497 P.2d 757 (Okla. 1972)

 Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678 (7th Cir. 2005)

 Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982)

 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)

 Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.,
 __ S. Ct. __, 2014 WL 1168967 (Mar. 25, 2014)

 Louisiana v. McAdoo, 234 U.S. 627 (1914)

 Love Church v. Evanston, 896 F.2d 1082 (7th Cir. 1990)

 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992)

 MacColl v. United States, 91 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Ill. 1950)

 Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977)

 McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005)

 McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978)

 Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972)

 Moritz v. Commissioner, 469 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1972)

 Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983)

 Nat'l Taxpayers Union, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1428
 (D.C. Cir. 1995)

 Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997)

 Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010)

 Salkov v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 190 (1966)

 Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 2008)

 Sherman v. Koch, 623 F.3d 501 (7th Cir. 2010)

 Templeton v. Commissioner, 719 F.2d 1408 (7th Cir. 1983)

 Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989)

 U.S. Catholic Conference, In re, 885 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1989)

 United States v. Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co., 283 U.S. 269 (1931)

 United States v. Williams, 514 U.S. 527 (1995)

 Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church &
 State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982)

 Vision Church v. Village of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975 (7th Cir. 2006)

 Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970)

 Warnke v. United States, 641 F. Supp. 1083 (E.D. Ky. 1986)

 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975)

 Williamson v. Commissioner, 224 F.2d 377 (8th Cir. 1955)

 Constitution, Statutes, and Regulations:

 U.S. Constitution:

      Amend. I, cl.1

      Amend. V

      Art. III

 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.:

      § 701(a)(1)

      § 702

      § 702(1), (2)

      § 703

      § 704

 Clergy Housing Allowance Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 107-181,
 116 Stat. 583

 Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26 U.S.C.):

      § 107

      § 107(1)

      § 107(2)

      § 119

      § 134

      § 162

      § 280A

      § 280A(c)(1)

      § 912

      § 6211

      § 6212

      § 6213(a)

      § 6511

      § 6532(a)(1)

      § 6662(a)

      § 6664(c)(1)

      § 6702

      § 7421(a)

      § 7422

 Revenue Act of 1921, Public L. No. 98, sec. 213(b)(11), 42 Stat. 227

 Revenue Act of 1921, Public L. No. 98, sec. 214(a)(1), 42 Stat. 227

 Section 22(b)(6) of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code, 53 Stat. 10 28 U.S.C.:

      § 1291

      § 1331

      § 1341

      § 1346(a)(1)

      § 1491

      § 2107(b)

      § 2201(a)

 Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(c)-5(c)(2)

 Miscellaneous:

 1 Mertens Law of Fed. Income Taxation § 7:196 (2013)

 148 Cong. Rec. 4670-4671 (Apr. 16, 2002)

 Bittker, Churches, Taxes & the Constitution, 78 Yale L. J. 1285 (1969)

 Brunner, Taxation: Exemption of Parsonage or Residence of Minister,
 Priest, Rabbi or Other Church Personnel, 55 A.L.R.3d 356 (1974)

 Clergy Housing Allowance Clarification Act, H.R. 4156, 107th Cong.
 (as introduced April 10, 2002)

 Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B)

 Hearings on Forty Topics Pertaining to the General Revision of the Internal
 Revenue Code (Aug. 1953)

 H.R. Rep. No. 1337 (1954)

 Internal Revenue Manual § 7.25.3.6.5(2) (Feb. 23, 1999)

 Legg, Excluding Parsonages from Taxation: Declaring a Victor in the Duel
 between Caesar & the First Amendment, 10 Georgetown J. of Law & Public
 Policy 269 (2012)

 I.T. 1694, C.B. II-1, at 79 (1923)

 Note, The Parsonage Exclusion under the Endorsement Test,
 13 Va. Tax Rev. 397 (1993)

 O.D. 862, 4 C.B. 85 (1921)

 Savidge, The Parsonage in England (1964)

 S. Rep. No. 1622 (1954)

 Zelinsky, The First Amendment & the Parsonage Allowance, Tax Notes 5
 (Dec. 2013)

                                GLOSSARY
 _____________________________________________________________________

      APA                   Administrative Procedure Act
      The Code              Internal Revenue Code
      Commissioner          Commissioner of Internal Revenue
      FFRF                  Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc.
      IRS                   Internal Revenue Service
      Plaintiffs            FFRF, Annie Gaylor, and Dan Barker
      Secretary             Secretary of the Treasury

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

In this case, the District Court struck down the longstanding exclusion for a parsonage allowance under § 107(2) of the Internal Revenue Code as a violation of the Establishment Clause, at the behest of plaintiffs, an atheist advocacy organization and two of its members. Issues of great administrative importance regarding the constitutionality of the exclusion and plaintiffs’ standing to sue are presented. Counsel for the appellants respectfully inform the Court that they believe that oral argument is essential to the disposition of this appeal.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. (FFRF) and its co-presidents Annie Gaylor and Dan Barker (together, plaintiffs) brought this suit for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Secretary of the Treasury and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. (Doc1,13.)1 FFRF, a Wisconsin corporation, has its principal place of business in Madison, Wisconsin. (Id.) The gravamen of the complaint was that § 107 of the Internal Revenue Code, which excludes from federal income taxation certain housing benefits provided to ministers, violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Equal Protection component of the Constitution’s Due Process Clause. Plaintiffs sought (i) a declaration that § 107 is unconstitutional and (ii) an injunction against the continued allowance of the exclusion. Although plaintiffs invoked the District Court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the Government maintains that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Because they failed to seek the exclusion provided by § 107, plaintiffs lack standing to challenge it. See Argument I, below.The District Court rendered a final judgment on November 26, 2013, disposing of all claims of all parties. (App44-45.) The Government filed its notice of appeal on January 24, 2014, within the 60 days allowed by Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B). (Doc58.) See 28 U.S.C. § 2107(b). This Court’s jurisdiction over the appeal rests upon 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1. Whether plaintiffs have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the exclusion for a parsonage allowance under § 107(2), when they have neither sought nor been denied the exclusion.2. If plaintiffs have standing, whether § 107(2) violates the Establishment Clause.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Procedural overviewPlaintiffs brought this suit against the Secretary and the Commissioner, seeking (i) a declaration that § 107 violates the Establishment Clause and (ii) an injunction barring the allowance of the exclusion. Because plaintiffs did not themselves seek the benefits of § 107, the Government moved to dismiss the case, contending that plaintiffs lacked standing. The District Court denied the motion. (A1-20.) The Government later moved for summary judgment, renewing its argument that plaintiffs lacked standing and contending that § 107 does not violate the Establishment Clause. Plaintiffs did not contest the motion insofar as it concerned their standing to challenge the exclusion under § 107(1) for housing furnished in kind. But they opposed the motion insofar as the exclusion under § 107(2) for a cash parsonage allowance was concerned. The court granted the Government summary judgment regarding § 107(1). After concluding that plaintiffs had standing to challenge the latter exclusion (App1-15), the court granted plaintiffs summary judgment sua sponte regarding § 107(2), striking down the statute as unconstitutional (App15-42). The Government now appeals.

B. Background: § 107

Section 107 is one of several statutory exclusions from gross income for employment-connected housing benefits. Taxpayers who are furnished housing by their employers may exclude the value of that housing from their gross income where (among other things) the housing is furnished for the “convenience of the employer.” § 119. Taxpayers who furnish their own housing, but use it for business purposes for the “convenience of [the] employer,” may deduct from income expenses related to that housing. § 280A(c)(1). In addition, certain federal employees may exclude from gross income cash provided to them for housing purposes. § 134 (military housing allowance); § 912 (foreign housing allowance for Foreign Service, the CIA, etc.).

Section 107 provides an analogous exclusion for housing or its cash equivalent provided to a “minister of the gospel” by his employing church.2 Specifically, when furnished or paid to him “as part of his compensation,” a minister’s gross income does not include “(1) the rental value of a home” or “(2) the rental allowance paid to him . . . to the extent used by him to rent or provide a home and to the extent such allowance does not exceed the fair rental value of the home,” plus utilities. § 107.

Section 107 has its origins in the Revenue Act of 1921, which created an exclusion for “[t]he rental value of a dwelling house and appurtenances thereof furnished to a minister of the gospel as part of his compensation.” Pub. L. No. 98, sec. 213(b)(11), 42 Stat. 227, 239. This exclusion was carried forward in successive revenue acts and was incorporated into the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 without substantive change. See Section 22(b)(6) of the 1939 Code, 53 Stat. 10. When the exclusion was reenacted as § 107(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, the addition of § 107(2) allowed ministers to exclude “rental allowance[s].”

Although the legislative history of the 1921 Revenue Act does not explain why the in-kind exclusion was introduced, the treatment of clergy housing under prior law sheds light on Section 213(b)(11)’s purpose. Immediately before its enactment, the Treasury Department had allowed some employees — but not clergy — to exclude the value of employer-provided housing from income pursuant to the “convenience of the employer” doctrine. See Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 84-90 (1977) (describing history of exclusion for such employer-provided housing). Those benefiting included seamen living aboard ships, workers living in “camps,” cannery workers, and hospital employees. Id. In 1921, the Treasury announced that ministers would be taxed on the fair rental value of parsonages provided as living quarters, O.D. 862, 4 C.B. 85 (1921), even though ministers traditionally resided in parsonages for the church’s convenience (A37-51). Shortly thereafter, Congress changed that treatment by enacting Section 213(b)(11), thereby placing ministers on an equal footing with other employees who already enjoyed an exclusion for housing provided for the employer’s convenience.

When the parsonage exclusion was enacted, churches had differing traditions and practices that influenced how they provided parsonages to their ministers. (A37-65,68-73.) Older or more hierarchical churches tended to furnish church-owned parsonages to ministers; newer churches favored providing ministers cash housing allowances. (Id.) But either way, the minister’s housing was generally used for the church’s religious purposes. (A37-39,41-42,50-51,70-71,73.)

When churches that did not own parsonages provided ministers with cash housing allowances in lieu of in-kind housing, the Treasury ruled that the statutory exclusion was limited to in-kind housing and that housing allowances were includable in gross income. I.T. 1694, C.B. II-1, at 79 (1923). The Treasury noted, however, that the allowance would be deductible by the minister as a business expense, to the extent it was used for “expenses attributable to the portion of the parsonage which is devoted to professional use.” Id. Several courts disagreed. They held that, in order to treat similarly situated ministers equally, cash allowances must also be considered excludable under the statutory parsonage exclusion. E.g., Williamson v. Commissioner, 224 F.2d 377, 380 (8th Cir. 1955); Conning v. Busey, 127 F. Supp. 958 (S.D. Ohio 1954); MacColl v. United States, 91 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Ill. 1950). Whether paid in cash or in kind, the benefits were considered provided for the church’s “convenience” and therefore excludable.Williamson, 224 F.2d at 380.

In 1954, Congress resolved the dispute by codifying the prevailing judicial view in § 107, which excludes compensatory housing furnished to ministers in cash as well as in kind. In doing so, Congress sought to remove “discrimination” against ministers who were paid cash allowances, as the House and Senate Reports explained. H.R. Rep. No. 1337, at 15 (1954); S. Rep. No. 1622, at 16 (1954).

In 2002, Congress amended § 107(2) to clarify that the exclusion was limited to the fair rental value of the parsonage. Pub. L. No. 107-181, 116 Stat. 583. The bill that introduced the proposed amendment reiterated that one of the purposes of § 107 was to “accommodate the differing governance structures, practices, traditions, and other characteristics of churches through tax policies that strive to be neutral with respect to such differences.” Clergy Housing Allowance Clarification Act, H.R. 4156, 107th Cong. § 2(a)(4) (as introduced April 10, 2002). In addition to preventing discrimination, § 107 was also designed, according to this legislative history, to avoid “intrusive inquiries by the government into the relationship between clergy and their respective churches” entailed by the generally available convenience-of-the-employer doctrine codified elsewhere in the Code. Id. at § 2(a)(5). Section 107 avoids such potential church-state entanglement by eliminating any need for the minister to demonstrate that the parsonage or allowance therefor is being used for the church’s convenience under § 119 or § 280A(c)(1), respectively.

C. FFRF

FFRF is a nonprofit membership corporation that promotes the separation of church and state and educates on matters of “non-theism.” (A3.) Gaylor and Barker, FFRF’s co-presidents, are “nonbeliever[s]” who are “opposed to government preferences and favoritism towards religion.”3 (Doc13 at 3.) FFRF provides Gaylor and Barker (formerly an ordained minister) with housing allowances not exceeding housing-related expenses. Plaintiffs complained that the § 107 exclusion, being limited to “ministers of the gospel,” subsidizes, promotes, and endorses religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. (Doc13 at 5.) Although they complained of unequal treatment, neither Gaylor nor Barker had personally sought or been denied the exclusion before filing suit, either by claiming it on their income tax returns or by filing claims for refund with the IRS challenging the statute as unconstitutional unless it applied to them. (A22-23,30.)

D. The proceedings below

The Government moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc12,16-17.) It contended that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue under Article III of the Constitution. The Government contended that there was no injury-in-fact because neither Gaylor nor Barker had personally sought or been denied the exclusion, and it was insufficient merely to allege that it is illegal for third parties to enjoy it. (Doc12 at 17-22.) The Government further contended that entertaining plaintiffs’ claims, and recognizing a waiver of sovereign immunity under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702, would also be at odds with the highly articulated structure of tax litigation, which generally precludes the issuance of declaratory and injunctive relief and confines disputes regarding tax treatment to deficiency actions and suits for refund brought by the affected taxpayers. (Doc27 at 4-7.)

In response, plaintiffs contended that they had standing to challenge § 107(2). They argued that, having received housing allowances, they were similarly situated to clergy enjoying the exclusion. (Doc20.)

The District Court denied the Government’s motion. (A1-20.) The court considered it “clear” that plaintiffs are not entitled to the exclusion and that there was no reason to require them to undergo the “futile” exercise of seeking the exclusion. (A2.)

The Government moved for summary judgment. (Doc44,54.) Besides renewing its jurisdictional arguments (Doc44 at 5-25), the Government defended the constitutionality of § 107 (Id. at 25-52). It contended that § 107 does not violate the Establishment Clause because it has the secular purpose and effect of eliminating discrimination against, and among, ministers, and of limiting government entanglement with religion. (Doc44 at 3.)

Plaintiffs opposed the motion, but only as it related to § 107(2). They argued that the District Court had jurisdiction and that § 107(2) violates the Establishment Clause. (Doc52.)

The District Court granted the Government summary judgment regarding § 107(1). Respecting § 107(2), however, the court granted summary judgment to plaintiffs sua sponte. (App1-3.) The court reaffirmed its conclusion that plaintiffs had standing to challenge § 107(2), finding it “clear from the face of the statute that plaintiffs are excluded from an exemption granted to others.” (App2.) The court further held that § 107(2) violates the Establishment Clause because it “provides a benefit to religious persons and no one else, even though doing so is not necessary to alleviate a special burden on religious exercise.” (App2.) The court held that the case was controlled by the plurality opinion in Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989), striking down a sales tax exemption for religious periodicals. (App2.) The court rejected the Government’s argument that § 107(2) was enacted for the secular purpose of avoiding discrimination among ministers. Although the court observed that other Code provisions provide tax benefits for employer-provided housing, it did not consider whether § 107(2) avoids the potential church-state entanglement posed by ministers being forced to rely upon generally available tax benefits for housing used for an employer’s convenience. (App29-37.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Plaintiffs — an advocacy organization promoting atheism and the separation of church and state, and its co-presidents — challenge the constitutionality of § 107(2), a longstanding exclusion for a cash parsonage allowance paid by a church to its minister. Plaintiffs do not themselves seek the exclusion, but only to nullify its enjoyment by ministers who are not parties to this action. The District Court held that plaintiffs had standing to challenge § 107(2) and that the statute violates the Establishment Clause. Both rulings are flawed.1. Under Article III, a plaintiff lacks standing to sue unless he alleges a personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s alleged unlawful conduct. A mere interest in a problem or a grievance shared in common with the public does not suffice. Where, as here, a plaintiff alleges an injury from unequal treatment, he lacks standing unless and until he personally seeks and is denied the benefit at issue. Without the personal denial of equal treatment, the plaintiff raises only a generalized grievance, not a case or controversy. Plaintiffs here have not personally asked for the § 107(2) exclusion, nor are they litigating their own tax liabilities. Because they seek only to deprive others of the exclusion, they have suffered no actual personal injury at the hands of the Government.

Prudential concerns and statutory limitations under the APA also counsel dismissal. Congress has erected a highly articulated structure that confines tax litigation to suits by taxpayers contesting their own tax liabilities in Tax Court deficiency actions or suits for refund in the district courts and Court of Federal Claims. Injunctive and declaratory relief is generally precluded where federal taxes are concerned. To recognize a plaintiff’s standing to challenge the tax liability of third parties not before the court would disturb this carefully crafted statutory scheme.

2. If the Court were to reach the merits, it should uphold § 107(2) as constitutional. Section 107(2) has a secular purpose and effect and avoids excessive church-state entanglement. The clergy have long been provided with homes at or near their places of worship and use them in connection with their ministries. Just as it has done for lay employees furnished housing for the employer’s convenience under § 119, Congress has merely exercised the discretion that accompanies its taxing power to exempt the value of such professionally used parsonages from taxation. Extension of this “refusal to tax” to the cash equivalent of in-kind housing under § 107(2) merely “eliminates the discrimination,” in the words of the drafters, that would otherwise exist against ministers, and between churches that have historically provided parsonages in kind and those that do not. Permitting ministers to exclude parsonage allowances under § 107(2), rather than forcing them to rely on the generally available deduction for the business use of the home under § 280A(c)(1), may also prevent more intrusive Government inquiries into the church-minister relationship, and avoid the need to evaluate whether activities in a minister’s home are secular or religious. These statutory purposes comport fully with the restraints of the Establishment Clause.

In striking down the law, the District Court erred. It failed to come to grips with the reasons Congress enacted § 107 in the first place. It also disregarded the fact that the housing exclusions provided to ministers are merely part of a larger Congressional design providing exclusions or deductions for certain employer-provided housing benefits for all taxpayers. Given the unique history and context of § 107(2), the plurality opinion in Texas Monthly by no means “controls” this case, as the District Court erroneously assumed (App19). That case concerned a distinctly different tax exemption that lacks the redeeming features present here.

ARGUMENTI

Plaintiffs lack standing to sue

Standard of review

A plaintiff’s standing to sue presents a question of law reviewable de novoLove Church v. Evanston, 896 F.2d 1082, 1085 (7th Cir. 1990).A. Introduction

The standing doctrine has both constitutional and prudential aspects. The “core component” of standing, derived directly from the “cases” or “controversies” requirement of Article III of the Constitution, is grounded on the separation of powers. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-752 (1984). It requires the plaintiff to “allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.” Id.at 751. The injury, moreover, must be “concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent (instead of conjectural or hypothetical).” Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees v. Cohen, 171 F.3d 460, 466 (7th Cir. 1999). “[G]eneralized grievances” “do not present constitutional ‘cases’ or ‘controversies.'” Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., __ S. Ct. __, 2014 WL 1168967, at *6n.3 (Mar. 25, 2014).

In addition to these constitutional requirements, there are also certain prudential limitations on the exercise of federal jurisdiction. This inquiry includes “whether the constitutional or statutory provision” in question “properly can be understood as granting persons in the plaintiff’s position a right to judicial relief.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975).

In this case, the District Court struck down § 107(2), which has been on the statute books for some 60 years, at the behest of plaintiffs who have not been injured by the statute, though they object to § 107(2) as a matter of principle. There is no dispute that the individual plaintiffs, Gaylor and Barker, have never sought the very tax benefit about which they complain. Nor do they seek to litigate their own tax liabilities.4

The Supreme Court has “always insisted on strict compliance with [the] jurisdictional standing requirement,” because the “‘law of Art. III standing is built on a single basic idea — the idea of separation of powers.'” Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819-820 (1997) (citation omitted). The Court also has repeatedly “[w]arn[ed] against premature adjudication of constitutional questions.” Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 79 (1997). In our tripartite system of government, a court does not act as a “constitutional check” on a Congressional enactment unless a bona fide dispute involving an actually injured litigant requires the court to pass on the validity of a statute.

As demonstrated below, the District Court’s ruling is at odds with settled law regarding constitutional standing. In contravention of prudential standing limitations, moreover, the ruling also bypasses the proper channels for tax litigation enacted by Congress that confine tax litigation to suits by taxpayers contesting their own tax liabilities, after the taxpayer first seeks the tax benefit in question from the Internal Revenue Service. These restrictions are by no means “arbitrary” rules (A15) that “waste” time (A8). They are critical components of a constitutional design that ensures that courts are the “‘last'” — not the first — “‘resort.'” Allen, 468 U.S. at 752 (citation omitted).

B. Plaintiffs lack standing under Article III

Here, although they contend that they are similarly situated to the ministers who enjoy it, plaintiffs do not seek to enjoy the parsonage exclusion themselves. Instead, they seek to deprive the ministers of the benefit, even though the clergy are not before the court. Because plaintiffs do not seek to improve their own economic situation, the apparent gravamen of their claim is that they have been stigmatized by the Government’s failure to provide them with equal treatment on account of their atheism. The Supreme Court has held, however, that an injury of this type “accords a basis for standing only to ‘those persons who are personally denied equal treatment’ by the challenged discriminatory conduct.” Allen, 468 U.S. at 755 (emphasis added) (quoting Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 739-740 (1984)). Without the personal denial of equal treatment, the plaintiff raises only a “generally available grievance about government,” which “does not state an Article III case or controversy.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-574 (1992). Insisting on a personalized injury, the Supreme Court “has repeatedly held that an asserted right to have the Government act in accordance with law is not sufficient, standing alone, to confer jurisdiction in federal court.” Allen, 468 U.S. at 754.

In Allen, the Supreme Court held that the parents of African-American children lacked standing to sue Treasury officials to challenge the tax-exempt status of racially discriminatory schools, because they had not been “personally denied equal treatment” by the Government, but were merely seeking to litigate another person’s tax liability. 468 U.S. at 754-756. Similarly, in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 166-167 (1972), the Court held that an African-American plaintiff lacked standing to challenge a racially discriminatory membership policy because he “never sought to become a member.”

In Heckler, by contrast, a widower was found to have standing to challenge a law requiring his spousal Social Security benefits to be offset against his Civil Service pension unless he demonstrated that he had been his late wife’s dependent, where no such showing was required for a widow to escape the offset. The Court stressed, however, that the plaintiff “personally has been denied benefits that similarly situated women receive.” 465 U.S. at 740 & n.9. Given that personal denial, the Court explained, “there can be no doubt about the direct causal relationship between the Government’s alleged deprivation of appellee’s right to equal protection and the personal injury appellee has suffered — denial of Social Security benefits solely on the basis of his gender.” Id.

Applying these principles, the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue an “injury of unequal treatment,” based on their ineligibility for special transition rules extended to other taxpayers that temporarily preserved certain repealed tax benefits. Apache Bend Apartments, Ltd. v. United States, 987 F.2d 1174, 1177-1178 (5th Cir. 1993). The court held that “plaintiffs have not suffered any direct injury in the sense that they personally asked for and were denied a benefit granted to others.”5 Id. In so ruling, the court distinguished the injury in Heckler, emphasizing that the plaintiff there had constitutional standing because he “specifically sought benefits for himself,” was “personally” denied those benefits, and raised “his equal protection argument in the context of litigating his right to receive Social Security benefits.” Id. at 1178 n.3. Unlike the plaintiff in Heckler, the plaintiffs in Apache Bend“were not personally denied benefits” under the tax provision at issue, and “never even sought such benefits.” Id.Consequently, the asserted harm was no more than a “generalized grievance” that could not support standing. Id. at 1178.

These principles apply no less in the Establishment Clause context. The “Establishment Clause does not exempt clergy or lay persons from Article III’s standing requirements.” In re U.S. Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020, 1024 (2d Cir. 1989). In Winn, for example, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge a tax benefit under the Establishment Clause because they had not personally “been denied a benefit on account of their religion,” but were merely complaining in their capacity as taxpayers that the challenged provision unlawfully benefited religious groups. 131 S. Ct. at 1440, 1449. Similarly, in Catholic Conference, certain clergy plaintiffs alleged that the Government’s failure to revoke the tax exemption of the Catholic Church for electioneering against abortion violated the Establishment Clause. The Second Circuit held that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they “do not complain about their own tax status” and had “neither been personally denied equal treatment under the law nor in any way prosecuted by the IRS.” Id. at 1022, 1024-1026. As the court emphasized, it is “not enough to point to an assertedly illegal benefit flowing to a third party that happened to be a religious entity.” Id. at 1025.

As these decisions make clear, a plaintiff alleging unequal treatment lacks the requisite personal injury unless and until the person seeks — and is denied — equal treatment. Until that point, he complains only of a generalized grievance. Put another way, a person does not have standing to ask that another person’s tax benefit be taken away without first seeking and being denied the benefit himself. Any injury would otherwise be too abstract and diffuse.

Although a would-be litigant lacks standing to deprive others of a tax benefit he eschews, he indubitably would have standing, by contrast, to challenge the exaction of an unconstitutional tax from himself, which results in a direct and personal “economic injury.” Hein v. FFRF, 551 U.S. 587, 599 (2007). But in order to have standing to challenge a tax benefit as unconstitutional, the taxpayer must actually seek the tax benefit himself, placing his own liability in suit. E.g., Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 8 (recognizing the standing of a general-interest magazine to raise an Establishment Clause challenge to a tax exemption limited to religious periodicals, where it “paid” the tax and sought a “refund”); Droz v. Commissioner, 48 F.3d 1120, 1122 & n. 1 (9th Cir. 1995) (recognizing that taxpayer had standing to raise Establishment Clause challenge to a religious exemption from the self-employment tax under § 1402(g) for sects opposed to certain insurance, where he claimed, and was denied, the exemption); Moritz v. Commissioner, 469 F.2d 466, 467 (10th Cir. 1972) (addressing Equal Protection challenge brought by a single male who claimed a dependent-care expense deduction that the statute limited to married or widowed men, but allowed to women regardless of marital status); Warnke v. United States, 641 F. Supp. 1083 (E.D. Ky. 1986) (addressing Establishment Clause challenge to regulations under § 107 by taxpayer who claimed, and was denied, the § 107(2) exclusion). In these cases, the taxpayers actually sought the tax benefit from the taxing authority and then litigated their own tax liability, either by way of a deficiency proceeding in Tax Court (as in Droz and Moritz) or by filing a refund suit (as in Texas Monthly and Warnke).

So, too, here, Gaylor and Barker could have sought the § 107(2) exclusion by claiming it on their returns and then petitioning the Tax Court if the IRS were to disallow the exclusion. § 6213(a). Alternatively, they could have paid the resulting taxes due, claimed refunds from the IRS, and then sued for refund if their claims were rejected or not acted upon for six months. §§ 6511, 6532(a)(1), 7422; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(1), 1491. Either way, plaintiffs would have standing to litigate their entitlement to the exclusion and to raise an Establishment Clause challenge in that regard. But perhaps preferring to wreak a greater impact — wresting the benefit from ministers nationwide — Gaylor and Barker did neither. (A22-23,30.)

Although plaintiffs “identify their injury as the alleged unequal treatment they have received from” the IRS and Treasury (A6), they, in fact, have received no treatment from those agency-defendants. As plaintiffs concede, they have not contacted the IRS or Treasury about their housing allowances. They have neither personally sought nor been denied equal treatment. (A24,27,31.) Without that critical step, plaintiffs’ claim is reduced to the allegation that § 107(2) violates the Establishment Clause. But as the Supreme Court has emphasized — and the District Court ignored — plaintiffs have “no standing to complain simply that their Government is violating the law.” Allen, 468 U.S. at 755.

Plaintiffs’ suit suffers from the same flaw that precluded standing in AllenWinnApache Bend, and Catholic Conference. Plaintiffs contend that the Government violates the Establishment Clause by permitting ministers to claim the § 107(2) exclusion. But just as in those cases, plaintiffs here are not litigating their own tax liabilities. They are merely suing to have the Government act in accordance with their view of the law. Because plaintiffs have not sought, and been denied, the § 107(2) exclusion, they have not suffered an actual, concrete, and particularized injury. Without such an injury, plaintiffs lack Article III standing.

This Court recently made a like point when FFRF sought to challenge the constitutionality of a federal statute creating the National Day of Prayer as violating the Establishment Clause. FFRF v. Obama, 641 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2011). The Court held that FFRF lacked standing because — even if the statute violated the Establishment Clause — FFRF was not personally “injure[d]” by the statute, explaining that FFRF’s “offense at the behavior of the government, and a desire to have public officials comply with (plaintiff’s view of) the Constitution, differs from a legal injury.” Id. at 805, 807. A legal injury, the Court emphasized, requires “an invasion of one’s own rights to create standing.” Id. at 806. Similarly, in FFRF v. Zielke, 845 F.2d 1463 (7th Cir. 1988), the Court held that FFRF lacked standing to challenge a Ten Commandments display because FFRF failed to allege an actual, concrete injury. As the Court explained, FFRF’s commitment “to the principle of separation of church and state . . . alone does not satisfy the standing doctrine.” Id. at 1468 n.3. The same is true here.

C. Plaintiffs’ lawsuit also runs afoul of other limitations on standing

Plaintiffs’ complaint also runs afoul of other limitations on standing. To surmount the prudential principles that limit standing in a suit brought (as here) under the APA, plaintiffs must show not only that they fall within the zone of protected interests, but that there is no “evidence that Congress intended to preclude the plaintiff from suing,” such as “‘the structure of the statutory scheme.'” City of Milwaukee v. Block, 823 F.2d 1158, 1166 (7th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted). These limitations counsel against the exercise of jurisdiction and disclose that the APA does not waive sovereign immunity here.

To begin with, although a person who actually claims a tax benefit might arguably fall within the zone of interests protected by the statute conferring it, plaintiffs here fall short. Eschewing any claim to the § 107(2) exclusion they seek to nullify, they likewise cede any claim to being within the statute’s penumbra. To say, moreover, that they fall within the zone of interests protected by the Establishment Clause, merely because of their interest in the separation of church and state, would not meaningfully set them apart from masses of other citizens who also wish the Government to abide by the law.

In any event, the intent of Congress not to allow plaintiffs to contest the tax liability of third parties is manifest. As we explain below, “Congress has created a highly articulated and exclusive structure of federal tax litigation that limits judicial review of tax matters to precisely defined channels.” (Doc27 at 5.) Plaintiffs are attempting to litigate outside of those established channels.

Congress has authorized taxpayers to bring deficiency actions in the Tax Court to obtain review of asserted deficiencies in income, gift, estate and certain excise taxes without first having to pay the amount in dispute. §§ 6211, 6212, 6213(a). Alternatively, Congress has permitted taxpayers to sue for a refund in a federal district court or in the Court of Federal Claims after the taxpayer has duly filed an administrative refund claim and the claim either has been denied or not acted upon for six months. §§ 6511, 6532(a)(1), 7422(a). These remedies are adequate and specific remedies under 5 U.S.C. §§ 703 and 704 that foreclose review under the APA.

Congress has otherwise generally precluded “any person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was assessed,” from maintaining a suit “for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax” (§ 7421(a)), and has likewise generally barred declaratory relief in all actions “with respect to Federal taxes” (28 U.S.C. § 2201(a)). To be sure, the Anti-Injunction Act may not apply of its own terms here, because the effect of plaintiffs’ suit would be to increase tax collections. Cf. Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 104 (2004) (construing Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341). Nevertheless, taken as a whole, this concerted structure generally confines tax disputes to challenges by taxpayers in deficiency actions and refund suits. It expressly — or at least impliedly — forecloses review. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701(a)(1), 702(1), (2).

Against this backdrop, “[i]t is well-recognized that the standing inquiry in tax cases is more restrictive than in other cases.” Nat’l Taxpayers Union, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1428, 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1995). The standing inquiry becomes particularly “restrictive” (id.) where a plaintiff seeks to litigate the tax liability of third parties who are not before the court. In that context, the courts have recognized “the principle that a party may not challenge the tax liability of another.” United States v. Williams, 514 U.S. 527, 539 (1995). As this Court has observed, “[o]rdinarily a person does not have standing to complain about someone else’s receipt of a tax benefit.” Flight Attendants Against UAL Offset v. Commissioner, 165 F.3d 572, 574 (7th Cir. 1999).

These principles apply with special force where, as here, a plaintiff seeks to increase the tax liabilities of third parties who are not before the court. It would be passing strange to allow plaintiffs, who have not sought the exclusion for themselves, to harness the injunctive power of the court to require the IRS to deny the exclusion to other persons. The better view is that Congress intended no such thing. See Louisiana v. McAdoo, 234 U.S. 627, 632 (1914) (declining to adjudicate third-party challenge to favorable tax treatment for another taxpayer, because the maintenance of such actions “would operate to disturb the whole revenue system of the government”).

Tellingly, the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, denied standing in a similar situation in Apache Bend. There, as noted above, the plaintiffs challenged preferential transition relief granted to other taxpayers not before the court. But they did not “seek transition relief for themselves” or “to litigate their own tax liability.” 987 F.2d at 1177. Instead, they “asked only that transition relief be denied to the favored taxpayers.” Id. The Fifth Circuit held that prudential concerns counseled dismissal, explaining that “Congress has erected a complex structure to govern the administration and enforcement of tax laws, and has established precise standards and procedures for judicial review of tax matters.” Id.

Those same concerns counsel dismissal here. As the Fifth Circuit pointed out in Apache Bend, the highly articulated structure of federal tax litigation painstakingly designed by Congress counsels dismissal of a case of this ilk. It is unquestionably “evidence that Congress intended to preclude the plaintiff[s] from suing” outside of that structure.Block, 823 F.2d at 1166. By respecting Congress’s structure, the Fifth Circuit declined to expand its judicial power. The District Court should have exercised the same restraint here.

D. The District Court’s standing analysis cannot withstand scrutiny

The District Court relaxed the standing requirements described above because — in its view — those requirements were “arbitrary” (A15) and a “waste” of “time” (A8). The court considered it “clear” that plaintiffs could not qualify for the exclusion and saw “no reason” to put them through the “futile” exercise of seeking the benefits themselves. (A2.) This approach is flawed for several reasons.

1. As we have already explained, a plaintiff making an unequal-treatment claim has not been injured for standing purposes unless he has sought, and been denied, the benefit at issue. The District Court’s contrary ruling is at odds with this established principle. In Heckler, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff had standing precisely because he “personally has been denied benefits that similarly situated women receive,” and therefore was not merely asserting a generalized grievance. 465 U.S. at 740 n.9. In Allen, by contrast, the Court held that a plaintiff did not have standing to challenge another’s tax liability. It distinguished Heckler on the basis that the plaintiff there was “‘personally denied equal treatment.'” 468 U.S. at 755 (citation omitted). Where, as here, a plaintiff makes an unequal-treatment claim without contesting his own tax liability, the plaintiff, by definition, is attempting to contest the tax liability of another taxpayer. As the courts held in AllenWinnCatholic Conference, and Apache Bend, he lacks standing to do so. Far from being an “arbitrary” step, presenting a “formal claim” to the IRS regarding one’s own tax liability (A2,15), and then having that personal claim denied, provides the concrete and personal injury that Article III requires.

There is no basis for the District Court’s attempt to excuse plaintiffs from seeking and being denied the exclusion by the IRS on the theory that it would be “futile.” (A2.) To begin with, the court was speculating in concluding that the IRS would deny such a claim. But in any event, Article III’s standing requirements must be “strict[ly] compli[ed] with,” Raines, 521 U.S. at 819-820. Moreover, there is no “futility” exception in federal tax litigation, as it was long ago established in the analogous situation regarding the requirement of filing an administrative refund claim under § 6511 before suit. United States v. Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co., 283 U.S. 269, 273 (1931). Applying this fundamental principle, this Court has held that it lacks the “authority to excuse [the taxpayer’s] failure to make a claim as required by section 7422(a), notwithstanding our certainty that the IRS ultimately will reject her claim.” Bartley v. United States, 123 F.3d 466, 469 (7th Cir. 1997). Similarly, here, the court lacked the authority to excuse plaintiffs from personally seeking, and being denied, the § 107(2) exclusion, and to have allowed the plaintiffs to litigate their claims outside the structure that Congress has designed for tax litigation, on grounds of futility.

Other taxpayers whose challenges to the constitutionality of the tax laws have been heard have first sought the tax benefit at issue, even where doing so was arguably futile. For example, in Texas Monthly, a nonreligious magazine sought the exemption provided for “religious” periodicals by paying the tax “under protest” and then suing “to recover those payments in state court.” 489 U.S. at 6. Similarly, in Moritz, the taxpayer claimed the dependent-care expense deduction available to all women regardless of marital status, notwithstanding that he was ineligible for it as an unmarried man, and then brought suit in Tax Court to contest the resulting deficiency determined against him. 469 F.2d at 467. In both cases, seeking the tax benefit may have been futile. But once the benefit was denied, the taxpayer had sustained the requisite injury concerning his own tax liability that gave rise to his standing to sue.

The District Court’s reliance (App7) on Finlator v. Powers, 902 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1990), is misplaced. That decision is both incorrect and distinguishable. There, the court concluded that taxpayers had standing to challenge a state tax exemption, notwithstanding that they had not taken any “minimal steps” to allow the State to “preclude or redress their injuries ab initio,” such as contesting the liability, refusing to pay, paying under protest or suing for refund. Id. at 1161. The court “decline[d] to read such an implicit requirement into” Texas Monthly, “absent a clear statement by the Supreme Court to that effect.” Id. at 1162. This ruling was misconceived. As the court explained inFulani v. Brady, 935 F.2d 1324, 1328 (D.C. Cir. 1991), standing was recognized in Texas Monthly because the plaintiff there “petitioned for a refund of its own taxes,” and therefore “sought to litigate . . . its own liability.” As we have already explained, the Supreme Court has made it clear, in cases such as Heckler and Allen, that the plaintiff must seek from the defendant (and personally be denied) the benefit at issue in order to have standing to litigate an unequal-treatment claim. Moreover, the court in Finlator concluded that there were no “prudential concerns” that militated against finding standing in that state tax case. 902 F.2d at 1162. By contrast, there are prudential concerns that counsel against recognizing standing in this federal tax case. above.

2. The District Court’s conclusion that following the formal rules of standing would be a “waste” of “time” (A8) fails to appreciate the importance of those rules. Article III is “not merely a troublesome hurdle to be overcome if possible so as to reach the ‘merits’ of a lawsuit which a party desires to have adjudicated; it is a part of the basic charter promulgated by the Framers.” Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 476(1982). “In an era of frequent litigation, class actions, sweeping injunctions with prospective effect, and continuing jurisdiction to enforce judicial remedies, courts must be more careful to insist on the formal rules of standing, not less so.” Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1449 (emphasis added). In its eagerness to entertain the suit, the District Court disregarded these important constitutional principles and erroneously engaged in “premature adjudication of constitutional questions.” Arizonans for Official English, 520 U.S. at 79.

The District Court’s exercise of jurisdiction in this federal tax case, where the plaintiffs did not first present the issue to the IRS, is particularly troubling. Whether the § 107 exclusion extends to atheists presents a question of statutory interpretation of apparent first impression. Notably, this Court has held that “atheism” is a “religion” for “Establishment Clause” purposes. Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678, 684 (7th Cir. 2005). Although the District Court had its own views regarding the matter (App8-14), it is the Secretary and the Commissioner, not the courts, who are charged with the responsibility for enforcing the tax laws in the first instance. The court should have allowed them the opportunity to determine whether an atheist could qualify. The court’s arrogation of this Executive Branch prerogative raises serious constitutional concerns.

3. The District Court’s rationales for relaxing the standing requirements are unfounded. The court’s reliance (A7-9) on cases permitting preenforcement challenges is misplaced. “To satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement in a preenforcement action, the plaintiff must show ‘an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and [that] there exists a credible threat of prosecution thereunder.'” ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 590-591 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). Plaintiffs cannot satisfy that standard.

To begin with, unlike the situations presented in the cases cited by the District Court (A7-9), no conduct is proscribed by § 107(2), nor do plaintiffs face a “credible threat of prosecution” under it. And the court’s concern that plaintiffs might be “vulnerable to civil sanctions” (A9) for seeking the exclusion does not excuse a taxpayer from seeking a tax benefit from the IRS first.6 A taxpayer whose position has colorable merit need not fear that a penalty will be imposed against him. Moreover, the District Court’s reservations in this regard are fundamentally at odds with its ultimate conclusion that plaintiffs are similarly situated to the ministers reaping the benefit, but for an invidious and unconstitutional restriction (according to the court) that the compensation so excluded be earned in a religious endeavor.

Similarly lacking in merit is the District Court’s suggestion that the plaintiffs would lack “standing to challenge § 107(2) in the context of a proceeding to claim the exemption.” (App6 (citing Templeton v. Commissioner, 719 F.2d 1408 (7th Cir. 1983), among others).) That aspect of Templeton has since been overruled. In Templeton, this Court held that a taxpayer lacked standing to challenge the underinclusiveness of a tax exemption under the Establishment Clause because the injury was not redressable: if the taxpayer did not qualify, the most he could achieve was to deprive the favored class of the benefit, rather than improve his own situation. Id. at 1412. That rationale, however, was later “rejected” by the Supreme Court in Texas Monthly, because it would “‘effectively insulate underinclusive statutes from constitutional challenge.'” 489 U.S. at 8 (citation omitted). But the plaintiff inTexas Monthly had standing to challenge the underinclusive tax exemption at issue there precisely because it had paid the tax and sought a “refund,” thereby presenting a “live controversy” for the Court to adjudicate. Id. The District Court erred in allowing plaintiffs here to bypass that route.

IISection 107(2) does not violate the Establishment Clause

Standard of review

The District Court’s grant of summary judgment to plaintiffs on their Establishment Clause claim is reviewed de novoBooks v. Elkhart County, Ind., 401 F.3d 857, 863 (7th Cir. 2005).A. Introduction

1. The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” U.S. Const. amend. I, cl. 1. Generally speaking, the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause prohibits Congress from interfering with religious practices and institutions, while the Establishment Clause prohibits Congress from inappropriately advancing religion. Between the “two Religion Clauses,” there is a middle ground — “room for play in the joints” — within which Congress may accommodate religion “without sponsorship and without interference.” Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 668-669 (1970).

The Supreme Court has “‘long recognized that the government may (and sometimes must) accommodate religious practices and that it may do so without violating the Establishment Clause.'” Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334 (1987) (citation omitted); see Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719-720 (2005) (upholding Religious Land Use& Institutionalized Persons Act as a “permissible legislative accommodation of religion,” even though it was not “compelled by the Free Exercise Clause”); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 450 (1971) (upholding religion-specific exemption from military draft).

2. To determine whether the Government’s accommodation of religion is permissible under the Establishment Clause, courts generally apply the three-pronged test set forth by the Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), which “‘remains the prevailing analytical tool for the analysis of Establishment Clause claims.'” Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840, 849 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (citation omitted), petition for cert. filed, No. 12-755 (Sup. Ct. Dec. 20, 2012). In order to comport with the Establishment Clause, (i) “the statute must have a secular legislative purpose,” (ii) “its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion,” and (iii) it “must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.'” Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-613 (citation omitted).

A comparison of Amos and Walz (upholding religious exemptions) to Texas Monthly (invalidating such an exemption) illustrates the contours of permissible accommodation of religion. In Amos, the Supreme Court addressed whether the exemption for religious organizations from the prohibition against religious discrimination under Title VII violates the Establishment Clause. The Court upheld the exemption as a permissible accommodation, even though it was not required by the Free Exercise Clause. 483 U.S. at 336. The Court concluded that the exemption satisfied the Lemon test. First, it served the secular purpose of minimizing governmental interference “with the decision-making process in religions.” Id. Second, it did not advance religion but merely removed a regulatory burden imposed thereon. Id. at 338. Third, it avoided excessive entanglement by “effectuat[ing] a more complete separation” of church and state. Id. at 339. The Court expressly rejected the complaint “that [the exemption] singles out religious entities for a benefit.” Id. at 338. As the Court explained, “[w]here, as here, government acts with the proper purpose of lifting a regulation that burdens the exercise of religion, we see no reason to require that the exemption comes packaged with benefits to secular entities.” Id.

In Walz, the Supreme Court held that exempting religious organizations from a generally applicable property tax did not violate the Establishment Clause. The Court emphasized that the tax exemption served the permissible purpose of “sparing the exercise of religion from the burden of property taxation.” 397 U.S. at 673-674. The exemption, moreover, by no means sponsored religion, but “simply abstains from demanding that the church support the state.”Id. at 675. And it “create[d] only a minimal and remote involvement between church and state and far less than taxation of churches.” Id. at 676. Although the Court observed that the property tax exemption was also available to other nonprofit organizations, its conclusion that the exemption was a “permissible state accommodation to religion” did not depend on that fact. Id. at 673. As the Court explained, the Establishment Clause prohibits government “sponsorship” of “religious activity,” and a property-tax exemption — unlike a “direct money subsidy” — does not run afoul of that prohibition because the “government does not transfer part of its revenue to churches.” Id. at 675.

Finally, in Texas Monthly, the Supreme Court addressed a state sales-tax exemption for periodicals distributed by a “religious faith” that promoted the “teachings of the faith.” 489 U.S. at 5-6. A divided majority of the Court held that this differentiation of literature based upon religious content violated either the Establishment Clause (all but White, J.) or the Press Clause of the First Amendment (White, J.). Id. at 17-25 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall and Stevens, JJ.); Id. at 25-26 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); Id. at 26-29 (Blackmun, J., joined by O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Blackmun’s concurrence provides the rationale for the Court because it provides the narrowest grounds on which the decision is based. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (observing that”[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds'”) (citation omitted). Justice Blackmun believed that, although “some forms of accommodating religion are constitutionally permissible” (citing Amos as an example), the Texas sales-tax exemption was not, because it entailed “preferential support for the communication of religious messages” without any secular justification for doing so. 489 U.S. at 28.

3. As demonstrated below, § 107 is a permissible accommodation of religion under Lemon. Like the exemptions inAmos and Walz, § 107 lifts a burden on religious practice by eliminating governmental discrimination against (§ 107(1)) — and between (§ 107(2)) — religions, and by minimizing governmental interference with a church’s internal affairs, without burdening third parties. Unlike the exemption in Texas Monthly, § 107 does not endorse a religious message. It merely adapts the Code’s general exemptions for certain types of employer-provided housing to the unique context of a church and its minister. See Legg, Excluding Parsonages from Taxation: Declaring a Victor in the Duel between Caesar & the First Amendment, 10 Georgetown J. of Law &Public Policy 269, 271 (2012) (concluding that “the parsonage exclusions are constitutional when (necessarily) viewed as one element of a larger congressional plan to extend tax relief to recipients of employer-provided housing as a principal feature of their employment”).

4. Before turning to those arguments, however, we first highlight three aspects of § 107(2) that are crucial to an understanding of its constitutional soundness. First, § 107(2) involves an exemption from tax, rather than the grant of a direct subsidy. As a general rule, the “grant of a tax exemption is not sponsorship” prohibited by the Establishment Clause, despite the “indirect economic benefit” that goes with it. Walz, 397 U.S. at 674-675. Unlike a “direct money subsidy,” the “government does not transfer part of its revenue to churches but simply abstains from demanding that the church support the state.” Id. at 675. Moreover, the Government’s refusal to “impose a tax” on religion does not impose a burden on third parties. Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1447.

Second, § 107(2) provides an exclusion from gross income for employment benefits provided by a church to its minister. The courts have been particularly solicitous of governmental accommodation regarding the “employment relationship between a religious institution and its ministers.” Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 705 (2012). In Hosanna-Tabor, the Supreme Court held that “there is a ministerial exception grounded in the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment” that precludes the government from applying generally applicable anti-discrimination laws to a church’s minister, even though such laws may be applied to the church’s other employees. Id. at 707. As the Court explained, the church-minister relationship concerns “the internal governance of the church,” given that the minister “personif[ies] its beliefs,” and a church’s decisions regarding its ministers “affects the faith and mission of the church itself.” Id. at 706-707. Indeed, this Court refers to the “ministerial exception” as the “internal affairs” doctrine because the exception is designed to prohibit governmental interference “in the internal management of churches.” Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472, 474-475 (7th Cir. 2008) (applying doctrine to reject ministers’ claim that church violated minimum-wage laws).

Third, § 107(2) is but a single provision in a larger Congressional scheme that exempts qualifying employer-provided housing from taxation. As noted above (at pp. 3-4), and described more fully below, the Code contains several tax benefits for housing used by a taxpayer in the business or for the convenience of his employer, including §§ 119 and 280A(c)(1). Section 107 merely adapts those provisions to the unique church-minister context, so as to avoid the entanglement problems that could arise if ministers had to rely on those provisions to exclude or deduct the value of church-provided housing. “When viewed in the context of other employer-provided housing provisions — both historic and currently-existing — [ § 107(2)] hardly singles out religion for an exclusive benefit in violation of the Constitution.” Legg, above, at 297.

B. Section 107 is a permissible accommodation of religion

As demonstrated below, § 107(2) does not violate the Establishment Clause because it satisfies each part of theLemon test.
1. Section 107(2) has a secular legislative purpose
In reviewing an Establishment Clause challenge, it is critical to consider the historical context of the statute and the specific sequence of events leading to its passage. See Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1816 (2010) (reversing determination that law violated Establishment Clause where the “District Court took insufficient account of the context in which the statute was enacted and the reasons for its passage”). The legislative history and context of § 107(2) demonstrates that the manifest purpose of the statute is to achieve parity among clergy and denominations, irrespective of a minister’s housing arrangements, and to avoid interference in a church’s internal affairs.a. The history and context of § 107Church-provided housing is a tradition that dates back at least to the 13th century. Savidge, The Parsonage in England 7-9 (1964). The patterns of housing members of the clergy in America have deep histories in the churches of Western Europe. The most common feature of this long-held tradition is that clergy lived in housing (called a parsonage) on the church grounds or nearby on church-owned property. (A68-69.) The parsonage system provided a critical means for churches to ensure that the spiritual needs of their congregations were met by housing the clergy in a place available to the congregation that could accommodate the church business conducted there. (A73.)In 1921, when Congress first enacted the parsonage exclusion, most religious denominations in the United States furnished parsonages to ministers in kind. (A72.) The denominations that did not do so were generally very small or were newer sects. (A72,76.) The latter denominations found it more convenient or feasible to furnish parsonages for their ministers by providing them with cash in lieu of the use of a church-owned building. (A72,76.)

Whether provided by means of cash or in kind, parsonages are furnished to ministers for the church’s “convenience.” Williamson, 224 F.2d at 380. Since a minister “will personify” his church, Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706, his residence is traditionally more than mere housing (A70). It is an extension of the church itself and is typically used for “religious purposes such as a meeting place for various church groups and as a place for providing religious services such as marriage ceremonies and individual counseling.” Immanuel Baptist Church v. Glass, 497 P.2d 757, 760 (Okla. 1972); see Brunner, Taxation: Exemption of Parsonage or Residence of Minister, Priest, Rabbi or Other Church Personnel, 55 A.L.R.3d 356, 404 (1974) (observing that “[m]ost ministerial residences can be expected to be incidentally used to some considerable extent as an office, a study, a place of counseling, a place of small meetings, such as boards or committees, and a place in which to entertain and lodge church visitors and guests”).

Against this historical backdrop, Congress enacted an exclusion from gross income for parsonages in 1921, just eight years after the modern federal income tax was authorized by the 16th Amendment to the Constitution. SeeRevenue Act of 1921, Section 213(b)(11). Section 213(b)(11) — the precursor to § 107(1) — excluded from income “[t]he rental value of a dwelling house and appurtenances thereof furnished to a minister of the gospel as part of his compensation.” 42 Stat. 227, 239. Immediately before the enactment of Section 213(b)(11), the Treasury Department had allowed some employees — but not clergy — to exclude the value of employer-provided housing from income under the “convenience of the employer” doctrine.7 See, above, pp. 5-6. In response, Congress enacted Section 213(b)(11). Ministers were thereby placed on an equal footing with other types of employees who were already enjoying the Treasury’s recognition of an exclusion for housing provided for the employer’s convenience. It also spared them the prospect of undergoing an intrusive inquiry regarding the church’s convenience.

Ministers whose churches chose to furnish them with parsonages by way of providing cash allowances for that purpose sought to exclude the parsonage allowance under Section 213(b)(11). The Treasury determined that Section 213(b)(11) “applies only to cases where a parsonage is furnished to a minister and not to cases where an allowance is made to cover the cost of a parsonage.” I.T. 1694. The Treasury advised, however, that such ministers could deduct their payments for the parsonage to the extent that the parsonage was used for “professional” rather than personal reasons.8 Id.

Several courts, however, rejected the Treasury’s determination and permitted ministers to exclude from income the value of parsonages furnished to them in cash as well as in kind. See, above, p. 7. As the Eighth Circuit explained, when a church provides a minister a parsonage allowance in lieu of a parsonage, it was “manifestly for the convenience of the employer,” and such housing should be excluded from income, whether furnished in cash or in kind. Williamson, 224 F.2d at 380.

In 1954, Congress codified those decisions by enacting § 107(2) as an additional exclusion to the existing one, which was redesignated as § 107(1). The statute as a whole leaves it to churches to determine how to provide parsonages — in cash or in kind — free from any influence from the tax laws. As the House and Senate Reports explained (using identical language), the rationale for the new provision was as follows:

      Under present law, the rental value of a home furnished a minister of the gospel as a part of his salary is not included in his gross income. This is unfair to those ministers who are not furnished a parsonage, but who receive large salaries (which are taxable) to compensate them for expenses they incur in supplying their own home.

Your committee has removed the discrimination in existing law by providing that the present exclusion is to apply to rental allowances paid to ministers to the extent used by them to rent or provide a home.
H.R. Rep. No. 1337, at 15 (emphasis added); S. Rep. No. 1622, at 16 (emphasis added). Congress had been alerted to the discrimination in existing law by officials from various religious denominations who complained that the existing “discriminatory” tax provision benefited some clergy and churches but not others. Hearings on Forty Topics Pertaining to the General Revision of the Internal Revenue Code at 1574-1575 (Aug. 1953) (Statement of Hon. Peter Mack). Section 107(2) was enacted “to equalize the disparate treatment among religious denominations.” Legg, above, at 275.Those purposes of preventing discrimination and preserving neutrality were confirmed in 2002, when Congress amended § 107(2) to clarify that the exclusion is limited to the fair rental value of the parsonage. 116 Stat. 583. The bill introducing the proposed amendment explained that § 107 was designed to “accommodate the differing governance structures, practices, traditions, and other characteristics of churches through tax policies that strive to be neutral with respect to such differences.” H.R. 4156, 107th Cong. § 2(a)(4). The bill further confirmed that § 107 was also intended to minimize “intrusive inquiries by the government” into a church’s internal affairs by obviating the convenience-of-the-employer inquiry required by §§ 119 and 280A(c)(1). Id. at § 2(a)(3), (5).

b. The statute’s history and context disclose the secular purpose of eliminating discrimination against, and among, ministers and of minimizing interference with a church’s internal affairsFar from seeking to provide religion a special benefit, Congress enacted § 107(1) and its statutory predecessors to ensure that ministers received the same tax benefit that similarly situated secular employees had received pursuant to the convenience-of-the-employer doctrine (now codified in § 119). All employees — religious or lay — are entitled to exclude from gross income the value of “lodging furnished to him” by his “employer for the convenience of the employer.” § 119. When the convenience-of-the-employer doctrine was initially developed, the Treasury applied it to many secular employees, but not to ministers. By allowing secular employees, but not ministers, to exclude employer-provided housing from income, the Treasury’s 1921 ruling raised serious constitutional concerns. E.g., McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 629 (1978) (determining that law permitting all persons, except for “ministers,” to participate in political conventions violated the First Amendment). Congress quickly reacted to that ruling by enacting Section 213(b)(11) of the Revenue Act of 1921, the predecessor of § 107(1). Consequently, § 107(1) simply levels the playing field between ministers and other types of employees. It is manifestly constitutional.9After eliminating discrimination against ministers who were furnished housing in kind by their churches, Congress next eliminated discrimination among ministers. It addressed the problem that some churches furnished parsonages by providing parsonages in kind, while others did so by providing cash for that purpose. Congress enacted § 107(2) to ensure that all ministers who were similarly situated were treated equally by the Government, tax-wise. Because § 107(2) has the permissible secular purpose of avoiding governmental discrimination among religions, it furthers one of the core purposes of the Establishment Clause. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982) (determining that law that applied to some, but not all, religions violated the Establishment Clause by running afoul of the “principle of denominational neutrality”).

Moreover, by enacting § 107(2), Congress removed tax-related impediments to a church’s decision whether to furnish a parsonage to its minister in cash or in kind, thereby avoiding interference in the church’s internal affairs.See H.R. 4156, 107th Cong. § 2(a)(3) (observing that one purpose of § 107 is to “minimize government intrusion into internal church operations and the relationship between a church and its clergy”). “Under the Lemon analysis, it is a permissible legislative purpose to alleviate significant governmental interference with the ability of religious organizations to define and carry out their religious missions.” Amos, 483 U.S. at 335. Section 107(2) allows each church to decide whether and how best to furnish a parsonage to its ministers.

Finally, § 107 also serves the secular purpose of avoiding problems of entanglement between church and state that could result from administering the convenience-of-the-employer doctrine where ministers are concerned. As Congress and the courts have recognized, the minister’s home is used for the “convenience of the employer,” whether the home is owned by the church or its minister. Williamson, 224 F.2d at 380; 148 Cong. Rec. 4671 (Apr. 16, 2002) (observing that § 107 recognizes “that a clergy person’s home is not just shelter, but an essential meeting place for members of the congregation”). By providing an exclusion for housing provided by churches to ministers, regardless of the form in which it is furnished, § 107 avoids the intrusive convenience-of-the-employer inquiry required by § 119 (when taxpayers seek to exclude employer-provided housing) or § 280A(c)(1) (when taxpayers seek to deduct the cost of housing used in the employer’s business). See H.R. 4156, 107th Cong. § 2(a)(5) (observing that one purpose of § 107 is to accommodate the fact that “clergy frequently are required to use their homes for purposes that would otherwise qualify for favorable tax treatment, but which may require more intrusive inquiries by the government into the relationship between clergy and their respective churches with respect to activities that are inherently religious”). Avoiding entanglement is a secular purpose. See Amos, 483 U.S. at 336.

c. The District Court ignored the statute’s history and contextIn concluding that § 107(2) lacked a “secular purpose” (App31), the District Court ignored the statute’s history and context, including Congress’s articulation of its anti-discrimination purpose in the 1954 House and Senate reports quoted above. That primary purpose has been recognized by the courts and commentators. E.g., Warnke, 641 F. Supp. at 1087 (observing that § 107(2) was enacted “to eliminate discrimination”); 1 Mertens Law of Fed. Income Taxation § 7:196 n.71 (2013) (same). For purposes of the first prong of the Lemon test, the District Court should have deferred to Congress’s articulation of its secular purpose, unless it determined that purpose to be a “sham.”McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 865 (2005). The District Court did not — and could not — find that Congress’s articulated purpose here was a “sham.”The District Court’s error in disregarding the secular purpose asserted by Congress is magnified by the fact that the law in question is a tax statute. The Supreme Court has emphasized that, even in Establishment Clause cases, “‘[l]egislatures have especially broad latitude in creating classifications and distinctions in tax statutes,'” and that courts must give “substantial deference” to a legislative “judgment” regarding a “tax” provision that is challenged under the Establishment Clause. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 396 (1983) (citation omitted).

The District Court nevertheless opined that § 107(2) was intended “to assist disadvantaged churches and ministers” and held that doing so could not be considered a secular purpose when like benefits were withheld from secular organizations and employees. (App34.) In so holding, the court lost sight of the fact (i) that Congress created the exclusion for cash parsonage allowances to “remove[ ] the discrimination in existing law” among ministers, H.R. Rep. No. 1337, at 15; S. Rep. No. 1622, at 16, and (ii) that the original parsonage exclusion was intended to alleviate discrimination against ministers, who had not been accorded the favorable treatment extended to other, secular employees who had also been furnished lodging for the employer’s convenience.10

There is no merit to the District Court’s further suggestion (App32) that any concern about discrimination was unfounded because § 119 treats “secular” employees who purchase their own housing differently than secular employees who receive employer-provided housing. Treating secular employees differently does not raise First Amendment concerns, while treating churches and their ministers differently does. The “principle of denominational neutrality,” which applies to legislation that may “effectively” distinguish between “well-established churches” that own parsonages and “churches which are new” that do not, Larson, 456 U.S. at 246 & n.23, has no parallel with regard to secular organizations and their employees.

By enacting § 107(2), Congress intended to lift the burden of discriminatory tax treatment that had been imposed on churches and ministers by allowing all ministers to exclude the value of the parsonage from income, no matter how each church chooses to provide that housing. In providing that equal treatment, the statute by no means “discriminates against those religions that do not have ministers,” as the District Court protested. (App33.) If a religion has no ministers, then, a fortiori, there is no taxation of a minister’s housing that needs to be accommodated.See Legg, above, at 292 (observing that “religions without clergy have no leaders needing the benefit of the exclusion”). Nor does § 107(2) create an “imbalance” between ministers who receive housing in kind and those who receive a housing allowance, as the court posited. (App33.) The fact that a minister who uses his housing allowance to buy a home may also benefit from the Code’s deductions available to homeowners is not a consequence of § 107(2), but flows from the minister’s independent decision to use the housing allowance to purchase, rather than rent, a home.
2. Section 107(2) does not have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion
To determine whether a law has the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, this Court considers whether “‘irrespective of government’s actual purpose,'” the “‘practice under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval.'” Sherman, 623 F.3d at 517 (citation omitted). A “reasonable observer” would not “view § 107(2) as an endorsement of religion,” as the District Court assumed. (App37.) To the contrary, a reasonable observer, i.e., one who is familiar with “‘the text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute,'” McCreary, 545 U.S. at 862 (citation omitted), would understand that § 107(2) is a tax exemption, not a subsidy, and that it was designed not only to eliminate discrimination among religions, but also to further separate church and state.a. Section 107 does not endorse religion, but merely minimizes governmental influence on, and entanglement with, a church’s internal affairsIn ruling that § 107(2) lacked a secular effect, the District Court failed to appreciate that § 107(2) minimizes governmental interference with a church’s internal affairs. The limited nature of the exclusion in § 107 — which applies only to ministers and not to all religious employees — confirms that its primary effect is not to advance religion, but to preserve the autonomy of churches. Section 107 preserves the “autonomy” of churches by permitting them to determine how best to furnish parsonages to their ministers (whether with cash or in kind) “under the ecclesiastical doctrine of each church,” free of discriminatory tax laws and without any adverse tax consequences hinging on that determination. Legg, above, at 291. In this regard, the § 107 exclusion is similar to the “ministerial exception,” or “internal-affairs doctrine,” that the courts have applied to generally applicable employment laws. Like that doctrine, which minimizes governmental interference “in the internal management of churches,” Schleicher, 518 F.3d at 475, § 107 minimizes both governmental influence on a church’s decision regarding how to furnish a parsonage, and governmental evaluation of church activities that take place in the parsonage.The effect of the § 107 exclusion must also be judged in the context of other housing-related exclusions and deductions provided in the Code. See Zelinsky, The First Amendment & the Parsonage Allowance, Tax Notes 5-8 (Dec. 2013) (critiquing District Court’s opinion for analyzing “section 107 in isolation from other code provisions,” and explaining how applying § 119 to religious employers creates church-state entanglement problems). Section 107 is “similar to other housing provisions in the Tax Code offered to workers who locate in a particular area for the convenience of their employers, and military personnel who receive a tax exclusion for their housing.” 148 Cong. Rec. 4670 (Apr. 16, 2002). All taxpayers may exclude certain employer-provided housing from income. § 119. Likewise, all taxpayers may deduct the cost of their housing to the extent that it is used for their employer’s business and convenience. § 280A(c)(1); I.T.1694. In addition, certain employees of the federal government are entitled to exclude their housing allowance without first demonstrating that the housing was being used for the employer’s convenience. See § 134 (military members); § 912 (civil servants on foreign postings). Section 107 provides similar tax benefits to ministers, but does so in a way that avoids the intrusive inquiries implicit in the employer’s convenience and business exigency requirements inherent in §§ 119, 162, and 280A(c)(1).

Ministers who are furnished parsonages in kind could rely on the Code’s exclusion for housing furnished “for the convenience of the employer” that “the employee is required to accept . . . on the business premises of his employer as a condition of his employment.” § 119. Similarly, ministers who receive parsonage allowances could rely on the Code’s deduction for housing used for the employer’s business and convenience. §§ 162, 280A(c)(1); I.T. 1694. Ministers’ claims of the exclusion or deduction, as the case may be, would raise questions regarding the church’s “convenience,” the scope of the church’s “business premises,” and the terms of the minister’s employment. It has been argued that the “blanket exclusion” under § 107 “does not ‘prefer’ religion but merely reduces the administrative burden of applying § 119 to clergymen.” Bittker, Churches, Taxes & the Constitution, 78 Yale L. J. 1285, 1292 n.18 (1969);11 see Legg, above, at 292 (explaining that § 107 prevents “entanglement” problems under § 280A(c)(1) by “avoid[ing] the need to have the IRS make case-by-case determinations of whether the parsonage was truly granted ‘for the convenience of the employer’ based on the church’s ecclesiastical doctrine or instead granted as a form of compensation not directly for the benefit of the church”); Note, The Parsonage Exclusion under the Endorsement Test, 13 Va. Tax Rev. 397, 418-419 (1993) (comparing§ 107(2) to § 119). If it were necessary for such questions to be answered, it might “require[e] the Government to distinguish between ‘secular’ and ‘religious’ benefits or services, which may be ‘fraught with the sort of entanglement that the Constitution forbids.'” Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 697 (1989) (citation omitted). By obviating the resolution of such questions, § 107 has a salutary effect. Each prong of § 107 removes the potential for entanglement by eliminating the intrusive inquiries that could arise if ministers were forced to rely upon § 119 or § 280A(c)(1). The statute therefore has an indisputably secular effect.

b. Section 107(2) does not subsidize religion, as the District Court erroneously concludedBesides having a secular effect, § 107(2) does not provide government funding for any religious activity, but only a tax exemption for housing. The Supreme Court has made it clear that the “grant of a tax exemption is not sponsorship since the government does not transfer part of its revenue to churches but simply abstains from demanding that the church support the state.” Walz, 397 U.S. at 675. Indeed, observing the long history in the United States of exempting church property from taxation, the Court concluded that “[n]othing” in the “two centuries of uninterrupted freedom from taxation has given the remotest sign of leading to an established church or religion and on the contrary it has operated affirmatively to help guarantee the free exercise of all forms of religious belief.”Id. at 678.Ignoring the analysis of tax exemptions in Walz, the District Court instead based its decision on the proposition that “‘[e]very tax exemption constitutes a subsidy.'” (App18 (quoting Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 14-15).) The court’s reliance on this statement from Texas Monthly is misplaced. The quoted language, endorsed only by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, did not overrule the majority opinion in Walz, where the Court held that a “tax exemption” is not a “subsidy,” and does not advance religion because there “is no genuine nexus between tax exemption and establishment of religion.” 397 U.S. at 675. The Supreme Court continues to recognize the ruling inWalz that, for “Establishment Clause” purposes, “there is a constitutionally significant difference between subsidies and tax exemptions.” Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 590 (1997). In disregarding that critical difference, the District Court erred.
3. Section 107(2) does not produce excessive entanglement
Section 107 does not produce excessive entanglement with religion. Indeed, the District Court did not find otherwise. (App41.) To “constitute excessive entanglement, the government action must involve ‘intrusive government participation in, supervision of, or inquiry into religious affairs.'” Vision Church v. Village of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975, 995 (7th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). As a tax exemption, § 107(2) does not raise this concern. As the Court noted in Walz, a tax “exemption creates only a minimal and remote involvement between church and state and far less than taxation of churches.” 397 U.S. at 676.Moreover, by adapting the tax benefits generally available to taxpayers in §§ 119 and 280A(c)(1) to the unique circumstances of ministers, § 107 prevents the entanglement that would ensue if the tax benefit were contingent on whether the minister acts for the “convenience of the employer” in using his home. By making such scrutiny unnecessary, the exclusion provided in § 107(2) avoids entanglement and promotes the statute’s secular purposes.

Because § 107(2) satisfies each part of the Lemon test, it does not violate the Establishment Clause. For the same reasons, § 107(2) does not violate the Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, an issue raised by plaintiffs but not reached by the District Court (App2). See Amos, 483 U.S. at 338-339 & n.16 (rejecting equal-protection claim for the same reasons that the Court rejected Establishment Clause claim).
4. Texas Monthly is not controlling because it is distinguishable in crucial respects
In concluding that § 107(2) violates the Establishment Clause, the District Court relied almost solely on the Texas Monthly plurality opinion. (App19.) Far from being “control[ling]” (id.), Texas Monthly is readily distinguishable.First, in contrast to the situation in Texas Monthly, where only religious publications could avoid the tax on periodical sales, here, all taxpayers are permitted to exclude, or deduct, the costs of housing provided by the employer for its convenience (§ 119) or by the employee for the employer’s convenience (§ 280A(c)(1)). Section 107 provides tax benefits similar to those provided in §§ 119 and 280A(c)(1), but tailors the benefit to avoid entanglement with the church-minister relationship. Section 107’s “exclusions are similar to the property tax exemption at issue in Walzbecause the exclusions flow to ministers as a part of a larger congressional policy of not taxing qualifying employer-provided housing.” Legg, above, at 288. And “[u]nlike Texas Monthly‘s narrowly tailored religious publication exemption, the parsonage exclusions in § 107 are part of a larger scheme that more closely aligns with the employer discrimination exception at issue in Amos.” Id. at 290. When § 107(2) is examined as merely one component of a larger, integrated tax code, Congress has by no means provided a tax benefit to religious organizations and “no one else” (App2), as occurred in Texas Monthly.

Second, unlike § 107(2), which has a long history and effect of eliminating discrimination and minimizing entanglement between church and state, the religion-specific exemption in Texas Monthly lacked any secular purpose or effect. An objective observer could only conclude that the government was endorsing the subject of the tax exemption — the promotion of a religious message. Here, in sharp contrast, by eliminating discrimination and entanglement problems, § 107(2) would be understood by an objective observer to “alleviate a special burden on religious exercise.” (App2.)

Finally, § 107(2) does not require the Government to determine whether “some message or activity is consistent with ‘the teaching of the faith,'” as was true in Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 20. To the contrary, it precludes such questions from arising by eliminating inquiries into the extent to which the minister’s home is used for religious rather than secular purposes.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the District Court, as it relates to § 107(2), should be vacated, and the case remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Alternatively, that aspect of the judgment should be reversed.

                  Respectfully submitted,
                  Kathryn Keneally
                  Assistant Attorney General
                  Tamara W. Ashford
                  Principal Deputy Assistant
                  Attorney General
                  Gilbert S. Rothenberg
                  (202) 514-3361
                  Teresa E. Mclaughlin
                  (202) 514-4342
                  Judith A. Hagley
                  (202) 514-8126
                  Attorneys
                  Tax Division
                  Department of Justice
                  Post Office Box 502
                  Washington, D.C. 20044

Of Counsel:
John W. Vaudreuil
United States Attorney

APRIL 2014

FOOTNOTES

1 “Doc” references are the documents in the original record, as numbered by the Clerk of the District Court. “A” and “App” references are to appellants’ separately bound record appendix and the appendix bound with this brief, respectively. Unless otherwise indicated, all ” § ” references are to the Internal Revenue Code, as currently in effect. Pertinent statutes are set forth in the Statutory Addendum.2 Although § 107 “is phrased in Christian terms” to apply to a “minister of the gospel,” “Congress did not intend to exclude those persons who are the equivalent of ‘ministers’ in other religions.” Salkov v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 190, 194 apply to a “minister of the (1966) (holding that a Jewish cantor was a “minister of the gospel”). The Commissioner interprets “religion” to include “beliefs (for example, Taoism, Buddhism, and Secular Humanism) that do not posit the existence of a Supreme Being.” Internal Revenue Manual § 7.25.3.6.5(2) (Feb. 23, 1999). Moreover, the employer need not be a church or religious organization, as long as the minister is compensated for ministerial services. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(c)-5(c)(2) (26 C.F.R.).

3 Although Gaylor and Barker also alleged that they were “federal taxpayers,” they did not attempt to maintain suit as taxpayers under Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). (A5.) In a previous attempt to invalidate § 107 brought by FFRF and others, the district court held that the plaintiffs had standing as taxpayers to sue under the Establishment Clause. FFRF v. Geithner, 715 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1059-1061 (E.D. Cal. 2010). But after the Supreme Court held that taxpayers lacked standing to challenge tax benefits under the Establishment Clause unless they personally have “been denied a benefit on account of their religion,” Ariz. Christian School Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1440 (2011), the parties stipulated to dismissal without prejudice. (A29-30.)

4 Because FFRF alleges no injury to itself, its standing depends on that of its members, the individual plaintiffs. The District Court recognized as much. (A4.)

5 The Fifth Circuit framed its decision in terms of prudential standing. It nevertheless observed that its prudential concerns about allowing the plaintiffs to litigate “generalized grievances” outside the normal channels of litigating their own tax liabilities were “closely related to the constitutional requirement of personal ‘injury in fact,’ and the policies underlying both are similar.” 987 F.2d at 1176. Decisions such as Allen and Heckler confirm that the matter likewise affects constitutional standing in the first instance. As the Supreme Court recently opined, “generalized grievances” do not pass muster under Article III. Lexmark, 2014 WL 1168967, at *6 n.3.

6 To be sure, a taxpayer may be liable for a penalty for making a “frivolous” submission to the IRS. § 6702. The accuracy-related penalty under § 6662 with which the court was apparently concerned (A9), however, applies only to underpayments, § 6662(a), not to refund claims, and even then only to positions taken without reasonable cause and good faith, § 6664(c)(1).

7 The convenience-of-the-employer rationale for excluding housing furnished in kind was at first recognized only in Treasury rulings and regulations, but was ultimately codified by Congress in 1954 as § 119. See Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77.

8 Prior to 1976, the costs associated with the business use of the taxpayer’s residence were deductible on the same terms as any other “ordinary and necessary” business expense. E.g., Revenue Act of 1921, § 214(a)(1); § 162. In 1976, however, Congress enacted § 280A, which must be satisfied, in addition to § 162, in order to deduct such expenses. Section 280A(c)(1) requires the residence to be used “for the convenience of [the] employer,” just as the employer-furnished housing must be so used in order to qualify for the coordinate exclusion under § 119.

9 Due to plaintiffs’ uncontested lack of standing, § 107(1) is not even challenged here.

10 Moreover, whether any particular legislator might actually have wished to grant a particular advantage to churches would not have undermined Congress’s legitimate anti-discrimination purpose. See Sherman v. Koch, 623 F.3d 501, 510 (7th Cir. 2010) (observing that “‘what is relevant is the legislative purpose of the statute, not the possibly religious motives of the legislators who enacted the law'”) (citation omitted).

11 Although Professor Bittker adverted only to § 119 at this point, the same logic would also apply to claims of deductions for the minister’s use of the home for church business under § 280A(c)(1), which is likewise infused with the convenience-of-the-employer doctrine.

END OF FOOTNOTES
Citations: Freedom From Religion Foundation Inc. et al. v. Jacob J. Lew et al.; No. 14-1152



IRS LTR: VEBA's Exempt Status Not Affected by Expansion of Its Membership.

The IRS ruled that the tax-exempt status of a voluntary employees’ beneficiary association that provides insurance and other benefits to employees covered under collective bargaining agreements will not be affected when it expands its membership to include employees not subject to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement.

Contact Person: * * *
Identification Number: * * *
Telephone Number: * * *

Uniform Issue List: 501.00-00, 501.09-00, 501.09-02, 501.09-04
Release Date: 4/11/2014

Date: January 17, 2014Employer Identification Number: * * *

LEGEND:Date 1 = * * *
League = * * *
Industry = * * *
Members = * * *
Tri-state Area = * * *
Union = * * *
Workers = * * *

Dear * * *:

We have considered your ruling request dated Date 1 and subsequent amendments, requesting a ruling that the inclusion of certain employees will not adversely affect your status as a tax-exempt Trust under Internal Revenue Code (“I.R.C”) § 501(c)(9).

FACTS

You are a trust, tax-exempt under § 501(c)(9). You fund a voluntary employees’ beneficiary association plan (“VEBA”).You state that you currently provide health coverage to participants, who are covered under collective bargaining agreements (“CBA”), and employed in the Industry.

You propose to add as new participants (“Proposed Participants”) to VEBA. Proposed Participants consist of employees of MembersMembers are members of League. You state that Proposed Participants “all share an employment-related common bond with respect to the individuals otherwise covered by the Fund”.

You state that Proposed Participants “consist solely of common law employees who: (1) are not subject to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) entered into with the [Union]; (2) are employed by organizations whose principals are full or lifetime members of the [ League] who are otherwise bound to a CBA with [ Union] when employing [ Workers]; (3) who work for [League] located only in the [ Tri-state Area].” You state that in other words, the Proposed Participants “will be all non-union common law employees of eligible League organization. They will not include self-employed individuals, sole proprietors, partners, LLC members or any other individuals who are not common law employees of eligible [League] members.”

As a result, Proposed Participants, consist of employees of Members who are not covered under a collective bargaining agreement (Members already has some employees covered under the CBA who are present participants of the VEBA).

Last, you represent that the Proposed Participants will consist only of employees of Members who work in the Tri-state Area. You will monitor closely the non-union participants of VEBA to ensure that, at all times at least 90% of the VEBA’s participants are covered by a CBA with Union in accordance with § 1.419A-2T, Q&A-2.

RULING REQUESTED

You requested the following ruling:That the inclusion of the Proposed Participants located in the Tri-state Area will not adversely impact your exempt status as a VEBA under § 501(c)(9).

LAW

I.R.C. § 501(a) provides that an organization described in subsection (c) or (d) or section 401(a) shall be exempt from taxation under this subtitle (IRC Sections 1 et seq.) unless such exemption is denied under §§ 502 or 503.I.R.C. § 501(c)(9) provides that organizations exempt from income tax under section 501(a) include a VEBA providing for the payment of life, sick, accident, or other benefits to the members of such association or their dependents or designated beneficiaries, if no part of the net earnings of such association inures (other than through such payments) to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.

Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(9)-1 provides that for an organization to be described in § 501(c)(9), it must be an employees’ association; membership in the association must be voluntary; the organization must provide for the payment of life, sick, accident, or other benefits to its members or their dependents, and substantially all of its operations must be in furtherance of providing such benefits; and no part of the net earnings of the organization can inure (other than by payment of permitted benefits) to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.

Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(9)-2(a)(1), provides that the membership of an organization described in § 501(c)(9) must consist of individuals who become entitled to participate by reason of their being employees and whose eligibility for membership is defined by reference to objective standards that constitute an employment-related common bond among such individuals. Typically, those eligible for membership in an organization described in section 501(c)(9) are defined by reference to a common employer (or affiliated employers), to coverage under one or more collective bargaining agreements (with respect to benefits provided by reason of such agreement(s)), to membership in a labor union, or to membership in one or more locals of a national or international labor union. For example, membership in an association might be open to all employees of a particular employer, or to employees in specified job classifications working for certain employers at specified locations and who are entitled to benefits by reason of one or more collective bargaining agreements. In addition, employees of one or more employers engaged in the same line of business in the same geographic locale will be considered to share an employment-related bond for purposes of an organization through which their employers provide benefits. Employees of a labor union also will be considered to share an employment-related common bond with members of the union, and employees of an association will be considered to share an employment-related common bond with members of the association. Whether a group of individuals is defined by reference to a permissible standard or standards is a question to be determined with regard to all the facts and circumstances, taking into account the guidelines set forth in this paragraph. Exemption will not be denied merely because the membership of an association includes some individuals who are not employees (within the meaning of paragraph (b) of this section), provided that such individuals share an employment-related bond with the employee-members. Such individuals may include, for example, the proprietor of a business whose employees are members of the association. For purposes of the preceding two sentences, an association will be considered to be composed of employees if 90 percent of the total membership of the association on one day of each quarter of the association’s taxable year consists of employees (within the meaning of paragraph (b) of this section).

Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(9)-2(c)(1) provides, generally, that to be described in section 501(c)(9), there must be an entity, such as a corporation or trust established under applicable local law, having an existence independent of the member-employees or their employer.

Treas. Reg. § 1.509(c)(9)-2(c)(2) provides that generally, membership in an association is voluntary if an affirmative act is required on the part of an employee to become a member rather than the designation as a member due to employee status. However, an association shall be considered voluntary although membership is required of all employees, provided that the employees do not incur a detriment as a result of membership in the association.

Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(9)-2(c)(3) provides that a VEBA must be controlled by its membership; by independent trustee(s); or by trustees or other fiduciaries at least some of whom are designated by, or on behalf of, the membership.

Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(9)-3(a) provides that the life, sick, accident, or other benefits provided by a VEBA must be payable to its members, their dependents, or their designated beneficiaries.

Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(9)-3(b) through (g) detail the types of benefits that a tax-exempt VEBA may provide and who is eligible to receive the benefits.

Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(9)-3(c) provides that the term “sick and accident benefits” means amounts furnished to or on behalf of a member or a member’s dependents in the event of illness or personal injury to a member or dependent.

Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(9)-4(a) provides that no part of the net earnings of an employees’ association may inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual other than through the payment of benefits permitted by § 1.501(c)(9)-3.

Treas. Reg. § 1-419A, Q&A-2(1) provides that for purposes of Q&A-1, a collectively bargained welfare benefit fund is a welfare benefit fund that is maintained pursuant to an agreement which the Secretary of Labor determines to be a collective bargaining agreement and which meets the requirements of the Secretary of the Treasury as set forth in paragraph 2 below.

Treas. Reg. § 1-419A, Q&A-2(2) provides that notwithstanding a determination by the Secretary of Labor that an agreement is a collective bargaining agreement, a welfare benefit fund is considered to be maintained pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement only if the benefits provided through the fund were the subject of arms-length negotiations between employee representatives and one or more employers, and if such agreement between employee representatives and one or more employers satisfies section 7701(a)(46) of the Code. Moreover, the circumstances surrounding a collective bargaining agreement must evidence good faith bargaining between adverse parties over the welfare benefits to be provided through the fund. Finally, a welfare benefit fund is not considered to be maintained pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement unless at least 50 percent of the employees eligible to receive benefits under the fund are covered by the collective bargaining agreement.

Treas. Reg. § 1-419A, Q&A-2(4) provides that notwithstanding the preceding paragraphs and pending the issuance of regulations setting account limits for collectively bargained welfare benefit funds, a welfare benefit fund will not be treated as a collectively bargained welfare benefit fund for purposes of Q&A-1 if and when, after July 1, 1985, the number of employees who are not covered by a collective bargaining agreement and are eligible to receive benefits under the fund increases by reason of an amendment, merger, or other action of the employer or the fund. In addition, pending the issuance of such regulations, for purposes of applying the 50 percent test of paragraph (2) to a welfare benefit fund that is not in existence on July 1, 1985, “90 percent” shall be substituted for “50 percent”.

ANALYSIS

You seek to add to VEBA’s membership Proposed Participants who work only in the Tri-state Area. Section 501(a) exempts from taxation, in pertinent part, organizations described in § 501(c). Section 501(c)(9) describes VEBAs as providing payment of life, sick, accident or other benefits to their members.Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(9)-2(a)(1), provides that the membership of an organization described in § 501(c)(9) must consist of individuals who become entitled to participate by reason of their being employees and whose eligibility for membership is defined by reference to objective standards that constitute an employment-related common bond among such individuals. Typically, those eligible for membership in an organization described in section 501(c)(9) includes among others to coverage under one or more collective bargaining agreements (with respect to benefits provided by reason of such agreement(s)).

You were established pursuant to a CBA between the League and Union for the purpose of providing health coverage to participants employed in Industry. Under Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(9)-2(a)(1), employees covered under a collective bargaining agreement share an employment-related common bond and are deemed as employees.

Further, exemption will not be denied merely because the membership of an association includes some individuals who are not employees (within the meaning of paragraph (b) of this section), provided that such individuals share an employment-related bond with the employee-members. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(9)-2(a)(1), Thus, although Proposed Participants are not deemed as employee because they are not covered under a CBA for the purpose of Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(9)-2(a)(1), they still share an employment-related common bond with present participants of VEBA (CBA covered employees) because both are employees of Members.

Further, an association will be considered to be composed of employees if 90 percent of the total membership of the association on one day of each quarter of the association’s taxable year consists of employees (within the meaning of paragraph (b) of this section). See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(9)-2(a)(1), Therefore, because 90% of total membership of VEBA on one day of each quarter of VEBA’s taxable year must compose of participants who qualify as employees within the meaning of Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(9)-2(a)(1), the addition of Proposed Participants who are not covered under the CBA and who work only in the Tri-state Area to participate in VEBA will not jeopardize your tax-exempt status as an organization described under § 501(c)(9).

You represent that at all times at least 90% of the individuals covered by VEBA are covered by a CBA in accordance with § 1.419A-2T, Q&A-2. Under Treas. Reg. § 1-419A, Q&A-2(4), a welfare benefit fund will not be treated as a collectively bargained welfare benefit fund for purposes of Q&A-1 if and when, after July 1, 1985, the number of employees who are not covered by a collective bargaining agreement and are eligible to receive benefits under the fund increases by reason of an amendment, merger, or other action of the employer or the fund. In addition, pending the issuance of such regulations, for purposes of applying the 50 percent test of paragraph (2) to a welfare benefit fund that is not in existence on July 1, 1985, “90 percent” shall be substituted for “50 percent”. Thus, to continue to meet the employment-related common bond requirement based as a collective bargaining agreement veba as provided under Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(9)-2(a)(1), 90% of your participants must consist of employees covered under the Union CBA.

RULING

Based on the information submitted, representations made, and the authorities cited above, we conclude that the inclusion of employees of Members of the League located in the Tri-state Area not covered in the CBA with Unionwill not adversely impact your exempt status as a VEBA under § 501(c)(9).This ruling will be made available for public inspection under § 6110 after certain deletions of identifying information are made. For details, see enclosed Notice 437, Notice of Intention to Disclose. A copy of this ruling with deletions that we intend to make available for public inspection is attached to Notice 437. If you disagree with our proposed deletions, you should follow the instructions in Notice 437.

This ruling is directed only to the organization that requested it. I.R.C. § 6110(k)(3) provides that it may not be used or cited by others as precedent.

This ruling is based on the facts as they were presented and on the understanding that there will be no material changes in these facts. This ruling does not address the applicability of any section of the Code or regulations to the facts submitted other than with respect to the sections described. Because it could help resolve questions concerning your federal income tax status, this ruling should be kept in your permanent records.

If you have any questions about this ruling, please contact the person whose name and telephone number are shown in the heading of this letter.

In accordance with the Power of Attorney currently on file with the Internal Revenue Service, we are sending a copy of this letter to your authorized representative.

                  Sincerely,
                  Ronald Shoemaker
                  Manager, Exempt Organizations
                  Technical Group 2

Enclosure
Notice 437

Citations: LTR 201415008




Examiners Given Guidance on State-Chartered Credit Unions and UBIT.

The IRS’s Tax-Exempt and Government Entities Division, in light of two court decisions, has issued a memorandum (TEGE-04-0314-0005) on how examiners should process unrelated business income tax issues of state-chartered credit unions.The memorandum is limited to UBIT issues identified during the examinations of section 501(c)(14) credit unions and does not apply to section 501(c)(1) federal credit unions, nor any other organization exempt from tax.

Generally, to determine whether an activity of a credit union is substantially related for purposes of UBIT, each activity and all the facts and circumstances surrounding that activity must be examined to determine the activity’s relation to the organization’s exempt purpose. According to the memorandum, two district court decisions have held that activities the IRS has previously regarded as subject to UBIT should not be subject to it.

The government has not appealed these decisions. Consequently, the memorandum provides guidance to examiners working cases involving these, and similar, activities.

March 24, 2014
Affected IRM: IRM 4.76.22 and 7.25.14
Expiration Date: March 24, 2015

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS EMPLOYEES

FROM:
Tamera L Ripperda
Director, Exempt Organizations

SUBJECT:
Applicability of Unrelated Business Income Tax (UBIT) to State
Chartered Credit Unions Described in IRC § 501(c)(14)(A)

This memorandum provides direction to Exempt Organization examiners in the processing of unrelated business income tax (UBIT) issues of organizations described in section 501(c)(14)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC).This directive is not an official pronouncement of law, and cannot be used, cited, or relied on as such. In addition, nothing in this directive should be construed as affecting the operation of any other provision of the IRC, regulations, or guidance thereunder.

Background:

There are two types of credit unions:

  • Federal credit unions, which are administered by the National Credit Union Administration and described in IRC § 501(c)(1) as federal instrumentalities.
  • State-chartered credit unions, which are described in IRC § 501(c)(14)(A) and are “without capital stock organized and operated for mutual purposes and without profit.”

Tax-exempt state-chartered credit unions provide savings accounts and loans to their members who may not be served by banks, without profit and for the mutual benefit of their members. Mutuality refers to the fact that a credit union’s members are both borrowers and lenders of the credit union.Under IRC § 511(a)(2)(A), the two types of credit unions are treated differently for UBIT purposes:

  • Federal credit unions described in IRC § 501(c)(1) are not subject to UBIT.
  • State-chartered credit unions described in IRC § 501(c)(14)(A) are subject to UBIT.

Under Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(2), for the conduct of a trade or business from which gross income is derived to be substantially related to the entity’s exempt purposes, the production or distribution of the goods or the performance of the services from which the gross income is derived must contribute importantly to the accomplishment of those exempt purposes. Whether activities that produce gross income contribute importantly to the accomplishment of any purpose for which an organization is granted exemption depends in each case upon the facts and circumstances involved. To determine whether an activity of a credit union is substantially related for purposes of UBIT, each activity and all the facts and circumstances surrounding that activity must be examined to determine the activity’s relation to the organization’s exempt purpose.Two district court decisions have held that activities the IRS has previously regarded as subject to UBIT should not be subject to UBIT. See Bellco Credit Union v. United States, 735 F.Supp. 2d 1286 (2010), and Community First Credit Union v. United States, No. 08-cv-0057 (E.D. Wis. May 15, 2009), ECF No. 84.

Both Bellco and Community First found that the sale of credit life and credit disability insurance to members was not subject to UBIT. Additionally, Bellco found that the sale of accidental death and dismemberment insurance was not subject to UBIT (excluded from UBI as royalty income). Also, Community First found that the sale of Guaranteed Auto Protection (GAP) insurance was not subject to UBIT.

The government has not appealed these decisions. Consequently, this directive provides guidance to examiners working cases involving these, and similar, activities.

Planning and Examination Guidance:

Examiners examining original or amended Forms 990-T or claims for refund by State-chartered credit unions described in IRC § 501(c)(14)(A) should:

      1. Treat income from the following income-producing activities as substantially related income not subject to UBIT:

      • Sale of checks/fees from a check printing company
      • Debit card program’s interchange fees
      • Credit card program’s interchange fees
      • Interest from credit card loans
      • Sale of collateral protection insurance
      2. Treat income from the marketing of the following insurance products as well as certain ATM fees as subject to UBIT:

      • Automobile warranties
      • Dental insurance
      • Cancer insurance
      • Accidental death and dismemberment insurance
      • Life insurance
      • Health insurance
      • ATM “per-transaction” fees from nonmembers
      3. Treat income from the following products if sold to members as not subject to UBIT:

      • Credit life and credit disability insurance
      • GAP auto insurance
      If these two insurance products are sold to non-members, treat the income from these products as subject to UBIT.

4. Unless there is a royalty arrangement (rather than payments for a credit union’s services), treat all other insurance products including accidental death and dismemberment insurance as generally subject to UBIT.

Scope of the Directive:

This directive is limited to UBIT issues identified during the examinations of section 501(c)(14) credit unions. This directive does not apply to section 501(c)(1) Federal credit unions, nor any other organization exempt from tax.

Internal Revenue Manual section 4.76.22 will be updated to reflect the content of this directive, and IRM section 7.25.14 will be updated to the extent that the information contained herein impacts rulings.

Please contact the 501(c)(14) subject matter expert in EO Technical Group 3 with any questions regarding the application of this directive, or issues relating to income on a product other than those mentioned above.

cc:
www.irs.gov
Victoria A. Judson, Division Counsel/Associate Chief Counsel TE/GE
Kirsten B. Wielobob, Chief, Appeals




Grassley Seeks Information on Oversight of Exempt Hospitals.

WASHINGTON — Sen. Chuck Grassley of Iowa is asking the IRS to account for the status of several important oversight measures for nonprofit hospitals enacted in 2010. Grassley co-authored the provisions imposing standards for the tax exemption of nonprofit hospitals for the first time.”These reforms were the culmination of a review of nonprofit hospitals I began in 2005 that revealed that the practices of many nonprofit hospitals were virtually indistinguishable from their for-profit counterparts,” Grassley writes in a letter to IRS Commissioner John Koskinen. “While these new provisions were intended to provide more oversight of nonprofit hospitals, it appears that not all of the requirements have been implemented.”

To date, key legal guidance needed to ensure compliance with the law does not appear to be finalized. The law also requires the IRS and the Department of Health and Human Services to collect information on nonprofit hospitals and report to Congress every year. An annual report should have been issued to Congress for Fiscal Year 2012, but Congress never received any report. Congress has also yet to receive the report for Fiscal Year 2013.

“As a result, Congress still does not have access to the information that was required to be reported by law,” Grassley writes. “This raises serious concerns both about the oversight of nonprofit hospitals and the government’s ability to faithfully execute laws passed by Congress.”

Grassley’s reforms came after oversight and investigative reviews of nonprofit hospitals revealed troubling practices among some nonprofit hospitals, including providing very little charitable patient care or other community benefits; failing to publicize charitable care to patients; charging indigent, uninsured patients more than insured patients; and using very aggressive collection practices. The Government Accountability Office and others, including the former IRS commissioner, have said for a long time that there is often no discernible difference between the operations of taxable and tax-exempt hospitals. Grassley modeled the new accountability measures after principles and polices that the Catholic Health Association has had in place for years.

The text of Grassley’s April 4 letter to the IRS commissioner is available here.

* * * * *April 4, 2014

The Honorable John Koskinen
Commissioner
Internal Revenue Service
U.S. Department of the Treasury
1111 Constitution Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20224

Dear Commissioner Koskinen:The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) included several reforms to nonprofit hospitals that were intended to hold them accountable for their tax-exempt status. These reforms were the culmination of a review of nonprofit hospitals I began in 2005 that revealed that the practices of many nonprofit hospitals were virtually indistinguishable from their for-profit counterparts. While these new provisions were intended to provide more oversight of nonprofit hospitals, it appears that not all of the requirements have been implemented.

The reforms in PPACA created new requirements for nonprofit hospitals. These include requiring hospitals to regularly complete a community needs assessment, establish and make public a financial assistance policy, and restricting certain billing and collection procedures used for those who qualify for financial assistance.1 PPACA also created requirements for the Department of the Treasury, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to ensure nonprofit hospitals comply with the law and provide information to Congress on the effectiveness of the provisions and whether any further legislation may be necessary.2

In June 2012, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) issued a report finding that much of the legal guidance required to be written by the federal government is still incomplete. While TIGTA found that the IRS had begun implementing the PPACA provisions, it noted that “until guidance is published, the public cannot be assured that the IRS has implemented all controls to ensure compliance with [PPACA] provisions designed to protect those served by tax-exempt hospitals.”3 To date, that guidance does not appear to be finalized.

The PPACA also required the IRS and HHS to collect information on nonprofit hospitals and report to Congress every year. An annual report should have been issued to Congress for Fiscal Year 2012, but Congress never received any report. Congress has also yet to receive the report for Fiscal Year 2013. In TIGTA’s 2012 report, it recommended that the IRS enter into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with HHS in order to better coordinate the collection and sharing of information for the report. The IRS agreed with TIGTA’s recommendation, but the MOU has not been finalized. As a result, Congress still does not have access to the information that was required to be reported by law. This raises serious concerns both about the oversight of nonprofit hospitals and the government’s ability to faithfully execute laws passed by Congress.

In order to review the status of the IRS’s work on nonprofit hospitals, I ask that you please provide the following information:

1) What is the status of the MOU between IRS and HHS?

2) When do you expect the MOU to be finalized?

3) Why hasn’t there been an annual report to Congress regarding nonprofit hospitals, as required by law?

4) What is the status of the annual report? When can Congress expect to receive the Fiscal Year 2013 report?

5) What is the current status of regulations implementing the nonprofit hospital provisions of the PPACA? Please indicate what regulations, if any, are final, proposed, or have yet to be proposed. For any regulations that are not final also indicate where they are in the review process and expected timeline for completion.

6) The PPACA requires the IRS to conduct a review of the community benefit activities of nonprofit hospitals at least once every three years. TIGTA indicated in its June 2012 report the IRS had begun conducting these reviews. How many of the approximately 1,700 nonprofit hospitals has the IRS reviewed to date?

7) What were the results of the IRS’s reviews of nonprofit hospitals? In responding to this question, please provide aggregate data on hospitals found to be in compliance, those found to be out of compliance, and the nature of the noncompliance.
Thank you for your cooperation and attention in this matter. I would appreciate a response by April 18, 2014. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact Chris Conlin of my personal office staff at 202-224-3744 or Tegan Millspaw on my Judiciary Committee staff at 202-224-5225.

                  Sincerely,
                  Charles E. Grassley
                  U.S. Senator
FOOTNOTES

1 P.L. 111-148, § 9007.2 Id.

3 Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, “Affordable Care Act: While Much Has Been Accomplished, the Extent of Additional Controls Needed to Implement Tax-Exempt Hospital Provision is Uncertain,” June 21, 2012.

END OF FOOTNOTES



Obama Signs Nonprofits Pension Bill.

President Obama on April 7 signed into law legislation that would give nonprofits the option of a permanent exemption from pension funding requirements.

The measure, the Cooperative and Small Employer Charity Pension Flexibility Act (H.R. 4275), would apply to about 30 pension plans held by more than 127,000 active nonprofit employees, according to a summary  provided by the bill’s sponsors, Rep. Susan W. Brooks, R-Ind., and House Ways and Means Committee member Ron Kind, D-Wis. Congress exempted charity and cooperative pension plans from the Pension Protection Act of 2006, but the exemption is set to expire, the summary says. Many nonprofits are able to provide defined benefit pension plans to their employees only because they can pool their resources with other associations in a multiemployer plan structure, the bill text notes.

The House passed H.R. 4275 March 24. The Senate followed a day later, passing the measure by a voice vote. The measure would reduce revenue by $190 million over 10 years, according to a Joint Committee on Taxation estimate (JCX-24-14).

by Meg Shreve

 




IRS Declines to Limit Retroactive Effect of Revocation of Exemption.

In technical advice, the IRS declined to provide relief from retroactive revocation of an organization’s tax-exempt status. On its exemption application, the organization said it would provide Bible-based financial education. But the IRS subsequently discovered that the organization’s primary activity was promoting and enrolling people in debt management plans for a for-profit entity that processed the debt management plans. The organization also did not offer any educational seminars or workshops even though it had said on its exemption application that it would do so, and it charged fees for services after having said on its exemption application that it would not do that. Also, contrary to what it said on its exemption application, the organization was a direct outgrowth of its founders’ family and marriage counseling organization. The organization did not inform the IRS of these changes in its operations.

Therefore, the IRS concluded that revocation may be retroactive to the year under examination when the agency determined that the organization had made material changes to its operations.

 

UIL: 7805.03-00
Release Date: 3/28/2014

Date: January 3, 2014

Area Director, Area 4 TEGE Appeals,
Philadelphia, PA

Taxpayer’s Name: * * *
Taxpayer’s Address: * * *
Taxpayer’s ID No.: * * *
Year(s) Involved: * * *
Conference Held: * * *

LEGEND:

Taxpayer = * * *

ISSUE

Whether the Commissioner, TE/GE, should exercise discretion to grant the Taxpayer relief under § 7805(b) of the Internal Revenue Code to limit the retroactive effect of revocation of its exempt status under § 501(c)(3).

FACTS

Application for ExemptionTaxpayer applied for tax-exempt status, describing its activities on the Form 1023. It stated it was formed “to meet the needs of persons experiencing financial difficulties by offering Biblical based financial counseling, education, encouragement and empowerment.” Further, its organizing documents provide it is organized and operated exclusively for religious purposes within the meaning of § 501(c)(3). It was founded by two persons who are both clinical psychologists and licensed family and marriage counselors (“Founders”). Its Board of Directors consisted of one of the founders serving as Chairman and President, the other founder as Vice President, and three other individuals; none of the directors were to be compensated.

To achieve its objectives, Taxpayer stated the following programs would form the basis of its services:

      (1)

Telephone Counseling

       — Provide telephone financial counseling for those individuals who are unable to physically access its facilities.

(2) Face-to-Face Counseling — Provide face-to-face financial counseling for those seeking assistance with restoration of credit, financial management, debt management, and debt elimination. This will be accomplished within the context and with the partnership of the local church.

(3) Seminars — Provide seminars and workshops that disseminate information about financial management, budgeting, stewardship and Biblical financial principles, primarily through the local church.

(4) Resource Support — Produce and make available to clients, resources that support its efforts to fulfill its mission. These products will be made available to its clients as they interface with its programs.

(5) Media Ministry — Produce and broadcast various media programs such as radio, television, and Internet communications that fulfill its mission and purpose.
Taxpayer’s financial support, listed in order of size, was to consist of (1) Donations, and (2) a third party organization will provide debt management services. It described its fundraising program as “Initial start-up and seed monies will be acquired from individual donors. Monies acquired from seminars and workshops will be based upon free will offerings. Products will be provided for a suggested donation.”Taxpayer answered “No” when asked if it was the outgrowth of (or successor to) another organization, or had a special relationship with another organization by reason of interlocking directorates or other factors. Taxpayer also answered “No” when asked if recipients are required to pay for Taxpayer’s benefits, services, or products.

Based on these representations, the Service issued a favorable determination letter and classified Taxpayer as a public charity.

Examination

The examination found that Taxpayer’s primary activity was enrolling individuals in debt management plans (“DMP”) in return for fees from debtors and fair share payments from its creditors. Taxpayer’s phone counselors enrolled callers; it did not process the DMP applications itself, but rather forwarded completed DMP packages to a for-profit company for processing. Taxpayer’s DMP agreement required clients to make a monthly “suggested donation” of $29, in addition to payments to creditors. DMP clients made payments directly to the for-profit company. The for-profit company disbursed the payments to creditors, and on a weekly basis, paid Taxpayer for its portion of the “fair share” payments and monthly DMP client’s suggested donation. The examination revealed that 99 percent of Taxpayer’s revenue came from DMP activity.

Taxpayer’s training manual instructed counselors and administrators to aggressively pursue potential clients. It provided a specific script to keep the conversations short, but to collect all the information required by the creditors for DMP enrollment. The manual appears to instruct the counselors to do one thing — sell DMPs to potential clients.

Taxpayer acknowledged that it did not conduct any educational seminars or workshops, through the local church or elsewhere, during the tax years under exam. Taxpayer spent less than $800 on educational activities during the years under exam. The only “resources” that it made available to its clients consisted of a PowerPoint presentation on subjects of money management and finding meaningful employment posted on its website. It did not produce or broadcast any educational programs for a “media ministry.”

The examination revealed that Taxpayer had been conducting transactions with several related for-profit businesses and exempt entities. Such relationships were not disclosed during the application process, including the fact that Taxpayer was an outgrowth of the founders’ family and marriage counseling organization. The Founders received compensation from Taxpayer and the related organizations. However, Taxpayer had no written employment agreements with Founders, and did not offer evidence of the hours each Founder devoted to his position at Taxpayer. Furthermore, Taxpayer paid one of the related organizations rent during one of the exam years.

Taxpayer did not report any of these changes in operation to the Service.

Taxpayer appealed the proposed revocation. Appeals sustained the revocation. Following the appeals process, the National Office received this request for relief from retroactive revocation as a mandatory TAM.

Legal Standard:

Section 7805(b)(8) provides that the Secretary may prescribe the extent, if any, to which any ruling (including any judicial decision or any administrative determination other than by regulation) relating to the internal revenue laws shall be applied without retroactive effect.

Section 1.501(a)-1(a)(2) of the Income Tax Regulations states that an organization that the Commissioner has determined to be exempt under § 501(a) may rely upon such determination so long as there are no substantial changes in the organization’s character, purposes, or methods of operation, and subject to the Commissioner’s inherent power to revoke rulings because of a change in the law or regulations, or for other good cause.

Section 301.7805-1(b) of the Procedure and Administration Regulations grants the Commissioner authority to prescribe the extent to which any ruling issued by his authorization shall be applied without retroactive effect.

Section 4.04 of Rev. Proc. 2013-5, 2013-1 I.R.B.170, states that all requests for relief under § 7805(b) must be made through a request for technical advice (TAM). Section 19.04 states further that when, during the course of an examination by EO Examinations or consideration by the Appeals Area Director, a taxpayer is informed of a proposed revocation, a request to limit the retroactive application of the revocation must itself be made in the form of a request for a TAM and should discuss the items listed in § 18.06 of Rev. Proc. 2013-5, as they relate to the taxpayer’s situation.

Section 18 of Rev. Proc. 2013-5 lists the criteria necessary for granting § 7805(b) relief as well as the effect of such relief. Section 18.06 states, in part, that a TAM that revokes a determination letter is not applied retroactively if:

      (1) there has been no misstatement or omission of material facts;

(2) the facts at the time of the transaction are not materially different from the facts on which the determination letter was based;

(3) there has been no change in the applicable law; and

(4) the taxpayer directly involved in the determination letter acted in good faith in relying on the determination letter, and the retroactive revocation would be to the taxpayer’s detriment.
Rev. Proc. 2013-9, 2013-2 I.R.B. 255, sets forth procedures for issuing determination letters (from EO Determinations) and rulings (on applications for recognition of exempt status by EO Technical) on the exempt status of organizations under § 501. These procedures also apply to revocation or modification of determination letters or rulings.Section 12.01 of Rev. Proc. 2013-9 states, in part, that the revocation or modification of a determination letter or ruling recognizing exemption may be retroactive if the organization omitted or misstated a material fact, or operated in a manner materially different from that originally represented. In certain cases an organization may seek relief from retroactive revocation or modification of a determination or ruling under § 7805(b) using the procedures set forth in Rev. Proc. 2013-5, §§ 18 and 19.

Section 12.01(1) of Rev. Proc. 2013-9 states that where there is a material change inconsistent with exemption in the character, purpose, or method of operation of an organization, revocation or modification will ordinarily take effect as of the date of such material change.

In Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180, 184 (1957), the Supreme Court held that the Commissioner has broad discretion to revoke a ruling retroactively. It further held that a retroactive ruling “may not be disturbed unless . . . the Commissioner abused his discretion vested in him . . .” Id.

In Stevens Bros. Foundation, Inc. v. Commissioner, 324 F.2d 633, 641 (1963), the court found the Foundation’s efforts “far from convincing” to demonstrate that its information reports were adequate and sufficient to apprise the Commissioner of its entry into the business activities which led to denial of its tax-exempt status. Shortly after receiving its tax-exempt ruling, the Foundation contracted with a for-profit company, but failed to disclose this fact to the Commissioner on its Forms 990. The court upheld the Service’s retroactive revocation.

In Variety Club Tent No. 6 Charities, Inc. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 1485 (1997), the court held that petitioner “operated in a manner materially different from that originally represented.” The organization represented in its exemption application and articles of incorporation that no part of its net income would inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual. But the court found instances of inurement over several years, and upheld the Service’s retroactive revocation for such years.

ANALYSIS

During the years under examination, Taxpayer’s operations were materially different from the description it provided in its exemption application. See Variety Club Tent No. 6 Charities, T.C. Memo 1997-575; Rev. Proc. 2013-9, § 12.01; Rev. Proc. 2013-5 at § 18.06 (no misstatement or omission of material facts or materially different facts). In its application, Taxpayer described multiple plans for Bible-based financial education through in-person counseling, seminars and workshops, resource support, and public media. However, the examination established that Taxpayer’s primary activity was promoting, marketing, and enrolling individuals in DMPs for the for-profit entity that processed the DMPs. It also failed to offer any educational seminars or workshops, or media activities, as it had represented in its Form 1023. Contrary to Taxpayer’s representation in its Form 1023, the examination also established that Taxpayer charged customers fees for its services, including a monthly service fee for DMPs. Furthermore, despite representing its source of revenue would be derived from “donations”, Taxpayer did not receive public support nor public donations. Taxpayer also represented in its Form 1023 that it was not the outgrowth of another organization; however, the exam revealed it was a direct outgrowth of the founders’ family and marriage counseling organization. Contrary to Taxpayer’s representations, the examination revealed that it had several business relationships with other related entities that it did not disclose. Taxpayer did not apprise the Service of these material changes in its operations. See Stevens Bros. Foundation, 324 F.2d at 641 (failure to adequately and sufficiently inform the Service of material changes in operations).Therefore, revocation may be retroactive to the year under examination when the Service determined Taxpayer had made material changes in its operations. See Automobile Club of Michigan, 353 U.S. at 184 (Commissioner has broad discretion to revoke a ruling retroactively); Rev. Proc. 2013-9, section 12.01(1) (revocation ordinarily applies as of the date of the material changes in operations).

CONCLUSION

The Commissioner, TEGE, has declined to exercise discretion to limit the retroactive effect of revocation of exempt status under § 501(c)(3). Revocation is effective as of * * *.

Citations: TAM 201413013




Court Holds Document's Privilege Was Waived in Exempt Status Suit.

A U.S. district court denied a foundation’s motion to preclude the use of an allegedly privileged document in a suit challenging the revocation of its tax-exempt status, finding that attorney-client privilege was waived by the inadvertent disclosure of the document and the privilege holders’ failure to act promptly to assert the privilege.

 

EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE FOUNDATION
FOR THE DESCENDANTS OF HUNGARIAN IMMIGRANTS
IN THE PERFORMING ARTS, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The plaintiff, Educational Assistance Foundation for the Descendants of Hungarian Immigrants in the Performing Arts, Inc. (“Foundation”), challenges the Internal Revenue Service’s (“IRS”) decision to revoke its status as a tax-exempt organization under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006). Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment (“Am. Compl.”) ¶¶ 1, 12, 27-31. In reaching its decision to revoke the Foundation’s tax-exempt status, the IRS relied in part upon a document that the Foundation asserts is protected by attorney-client privilege. Plaintiff’s Motion to Preclude the Government From Introducing Privileged Letter From Barrett Weinberger to Attorney Stephen Bolden and the Entire Administrative Record, and For Related Relief (“Pl.’s Mot.”) at 3-4; United States’ Memorandum Regarding Allegedly Privileged Document (“Def.’s Opp’n”) at 2. The Foundation’s motion to preclude the introduction of the allegedly privileged document in these proceedings and a related motion to intervene are currently before the Court. For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that it must deny the motion to preclude the introduction of the contested document and deny the motion to intervene as moot.1

I. BACKGROUND

Effective December 24, 2003, the IRS recognized the Foundation as a tax-exempt organization under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) “created to assist the educational development of descendants of Hungarian [i]mmigrants who had a particular interest and talent in the arts.” Pl.’s Mot. at 5; see also Def.’s Opp’n at 5. The Foundation is funded entirely with a charitable bequest by the Estate of Julius Schaller. Pl.’s Mot. at 5; Def.’s Opp’n at 5. Prior to his death, Julius Schaller engaged attorney Gary B. Freedman to draft his will. Pl.’s Mot. at 5. The will drafted by Freedman was subsequently executed, and Schaller later died on December 28, 2003. Id.In 2005, the co-executors of Schaller’s will, Barrett Weinberger and Frances Odza, along with the will’s beneficiaries, retained attorney Stephen R. Bolden to bring suit against Freedman for malpractice in drafting Schaller’s will. Id. at 6; Def.’s Opp’n at 6. A December 18, 2005 letter from Barrett Weinberger to Stephen Bolden is at the center of the dispute before the Court. In it, Weinberger describes the relationship between the Estate of Julius Schaller and the Foundation. See Pl.’s Mot., Exhibit (“Ex.”) 2 (December 18, 2005 Letter from Barrett Weinberger to Stephen R. Bolden (“Weinberger-Bolden Letter”)).

In March 2007, the IRS initiated an audit of the Foundation. See Pl.’s Mot., Ex. 8 (Case Chronology) at 2.2 The IRS subsequently commenced a criminal investigation of Barrett Weinberger, Pl.’s Mot. at 8 n.4; Def.’s Opp’n at 7, and, in January 2008, conducted an audit of the Schaller Estate’s tax return, Pl.’s Mot. at 7. On April 20, 2009, the IRS sent an Information Document Request to the Foundation in connection with the ongoing investigation. See Pl.’s Mot., Ex. 6 (April 20, 2009 Information Document Request (“April 20 Request”)). In addition to asking for further documentation from the Foundation, the IRS enclosed several documents, including the Weinberger-Bolden Letter, with the following instructions:

    Enclosed with this [Information Document Request] are records received from another IRS operating division with regards to the arrangement between the Estate of Julius Schaller and The Educational Assistance Foundation For Descendants of Hungarian Immigrants in the Performing Arts, Inc. Such records are being provided to you for comment so they can be included in the administrative record. If you have any comments on such records, please respond in writing.

Id. at 6. Barrett Weinberger responded in a letter dated April 29, 2009, with the following:

      I am in receipt of your Information Document Requests #4, #5, and #6 (Form 4564) addressed to the Educational Assistance Foundation for Descendants of Hungarian Immigrants in the Performing Arts, Inc.

While I remain committed to my previous promise to cooperate as fully as possible with your ongoing audit, due to the ongoing and concurrent criminal investigation (from which you obtained some of the records on which you have asked me to comment) and on the advice of my counsel, I cannot presently provide you with any testimony, comment on any documents, nor address any of your inquiries.
Pl.’s Mot., Ex. 9 (April 29, 2009 Letter from Barrett Weinberger to IRS) at 2. In June 2009, the IRS discontinued the criminal investigation of Weinberger. See Pl.’s Mot., Ex. 8 (Case Chronology) at 32.The audit of the Foundation continued, however, culminating in a November 13, 2009 letter to the Foundation proposing the revocation of its tax-exempt status and enclosing a Report of Examination detailing the agency’s reasoning for the proposed revocation. Pl.’s Mot., Ex. 7 (November 13, 2009 Proposed Revocation (“Proposed Revocation”)) at 2. The Weinberger-Bolden Letter is referenced and quoted in the Proposed Revocation. Id. at 14-15. By letter dated January 11, 2010, Weinberger, on behalf of the Foundation, submitted a protest to the Proposed Revocation. Pl.’s Mot., Ex. 10 (January 11, 2010 Protest (“Protest”)) at 3. The Protest raised the following concerns about the records relied upon by the IRS in reaching its decision:

    The letter referenced in the [Proposed Revocation] is problematic in this investigation and action for it is clearly and facially protected from review by the attorney-client privilege. The letter is a correspondence from the undersigned, individually, to Stephen [R.] Bolden, Esq., a partner of the law firm of Fell and Spalding. Mr. Bolden represented the plaintiffs in their claim against Gary Freedman. While it is unclear how this letter found its way into the administrative file for this matter, it is clear that it should be excised and not relied upon.

Id. at 7. A footnote immediately following the quoted passage states that “[i]n an August 17, 2007 Information Document Request . . . from [IRS agent] Andrew Hay to the Taxpayer, Mr. Hay indicates that this letter was obtained ‘from another IRS operating division[,]’ yet requested comment on its contents.”3 Id. at 7 n.5. Aside from disputing the summary of the letter’s contents as “taken out of context and poorly summarized for the purpose of connoting a malicious intent” and as “impl[ying] inappropriate conduct,” these are the sole references to the Weinberger-Bolden Letter in the Foundation’s Protest. Id. at 7, 8-9. The IRS ultimately issued a final revocation of the Foundation’s tax-exempt status. Def.’s Opp’n at 6; see also Pl.’s Mot. at 4.The concurrent audit of the Schaller Estate’s tax return resulted in an assessment for additional taxes and penalties based on the IRS’ disallowance of the Estate’s charitable contribution to the Foundation. Pl.’s Mot. at 7. On December 19, 2008, the Estate filed a petition with the United States Tax Court challenging the assessment. Def.’s Opp’n, Ex. F (Notification of Receipt of Petition and Petition); see also Pl.’s Mot. at 7. During discovery in the litigation before the Tax Court, the IRS produced portions of its criminal investigation file created during the investigation of Barrett Weinberger. Pl.’s Mot. at 7-8. After discovering the Weinberger-Bolden Letter in the file, counsel for the Estate of Julius Schaller sent a letter to the IRS on December 1, 2010, asserting that the letter was a privileged communication and “request[ing] the IRS immediately segregate [the Weinberger-Bolden Letter] from the rest of its files, and return all copies of said document to [the Estate] as soon as possible.” Id. at 8; Pl.’s Mot., Ex. 3 (December 1, 2010 Letter from Ian Comisky to IRS (“Comisky-IRS Letter”)). The Estate also asked the IRS to “advise [it] as to any use that the IRS has made of this document to date, and the manner in which this document came into your possession.” Pl.’s Mot. at 8; Pl.’s Mot., Ex. 3 (Comisky-IRS Letter). The IRS did not respond to the Estate’s letter, Pl.’s Mot. at 8; Def.’s Opp’n at 17, and the Estate subsequently filed a motion with the Tax Court to preclude the IRS from using the Weinberger-Bolden Letter in those proceedings, Pl.’s Mot. at 8. However, the motion was not resolved before the Tax Court litigation was stayed pending resolution of this case. See id. at 6 n.2.

This case was initiated by the Foundation on August 30, 2011. Following the parties’ settlement of issues raised by the United States in a motion to dismiss, the parties filed a joint statement on August 2, 2012, in advance of the initial scheduling conference that was conducted in this case. Joint Report by the Parties, ECF No. 26. In the joint statement, the Foundation stated that it “believes that the administrative record in this matter contains information protected by the attorney-client privilege, and that the IRS used privileged information in making its determination to revoke [the Foundation’s] tax exempt status.” Id. at 6. The Foundation further indicated its intent to file a motion “challenging the use of information protected by the attorney-client privilege during its audit of [the Foundation]” and asserted its position that the administrative record compiled by the IRS should not be filed on the public docket until this motion is resolved by the Court. Id. During the initial scheduling hearing in this case, the Foundation again raised a concern about the inclusion of what it believed were privileged documents in the administrative record. SeeTranscript of August 9, 2012 Initial Scheduling Conference at 4:2-6:1, ECF No. 34. Before the Foundation filed its motion, the United States filed the administrative record containing the Weinberger-Bolden Letter and a memorandum quoting portions of the letter, and the Foundation moved to seal the administrative record and to strike the memorandum from the docket. See Plaintiff’s Motion to Seal Administrative Record and for Related Relief at 1, ECF No. 35; Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike the United States’ Memorandum Regarding Scope of Review in 26 U.S.C. § 7428 Declaratory Judgment Action and for Related Relief at 1, ECF No. 39. The Court granted both motions and ordered both the administrative record and the United States’ memorandum referring to the Weinberger-Bolden Letter stricken from the record. See ECF Nos. 37, 40, 41.

The Foundation subsequently filed the motion currently before the Court challenging the inclusion of the Weinberger-Bolden Letter in the administrative record and its use by the IRS. As its explanation for how it acquired the Weinberger-Bolden Letter, the United States submitted with its opposition to the Foundation’s motion an affidavit from Shaun Thurston, a Special Agent with the IRS Criminal Investigation Division. Def.’s Opp’n, Ex. 1 (Thurston Affidavit) ¶ 1. In it, Thurston avers

      [a]lthough I am not absolutely certain, to the best of my recollection the [Weinberger-Bolden Letter] was provided to me under IRS Summons by the accountant who had been retained with respect to the filing of the federal estate tax return for the Estate of Julius Schaller. That accountant was Craig Cohen. . . .

To the best of my recollection, the [Weinberger-Bolden Letter] was provided to me by Mr. Cohen intentionally, and not inadvertently.
Id. ¶¶ 4-5. In response to Agent Thurston’s representations, the Foundation submitted affidavits from Barrett Weinberger and Craig Cohen. Pl.’s Reply, Ex. 1 (Weinberger Affidavit), Ex. 2 (Cohen Affidavit). In his affidavit, Weinberger asserts that he has never intentionally disclosed the Weinberger-Bolden Letter to any third party and never provided a copy of the letter to Craig Cohen. Pl.’s Reply, Ex. 1 (Weinberger Affidavit) ¶¶ 12, 14. For his part, Cohen states that while he did provide Thurston with documents in response to a summons,

    I have . . . reviewed my files relating to the Estate of Julius Schaller, including copies of the documents my firm provided to IRS Special Agent Thurston. The [Weinberger-Bolden Letter] is not in our files. At no time did I (or anyone else at my firm) ever provide a copy of the [Weinberger-Bolden Letter] to IRS Special Agent Thurston.

Pl.’s Reply, Ex. 2 (Cohen Affidavit) ¶¶ 4, 6.Simultaneously with the filing of the Foundation’s reply brief, Barrett Weinberger and Frances Odza, as co-executors of the Estate of Julius Schaller, and the entire class of beneficiaries of the Estate of Julius Schaller moved to intervene in this litigation in order to assert attorney-client privilege with respect to the Weinberger-Bolden Letter. Mot. Intervene at 1. The Court now turns to the parties’ arguments regarding the acquisition and use of the letter.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standing to Assert the Attorney-Client PrivilegeAs an initial matter, the United States argues that the Foundation lacks standing to assert the attorney-client privilege as to the Weinberger-Bolden Letter because the privilege is held by Weinberger, Frances Odza, and the beneficiaries of the Estate of Julius Schaller.4 Def.’s Opp’n at 13-14. The Foundation argues in response that Barrett Weinberger, who serves as the president and director of the Foundation, can properly assert the privilege here because Stephen Bolden represented him in the malpractice litigation regarding the Schaller will. Pl.’s Reply at 11. Nonetheless, Weinberger, Odza, and the beneficiaries of the Schaller Estate have moved to intervene in order to assert the privilege in the event that the Court disagrees with the Foundation’s arguments on this point, Pl.’s Reply at 11-12; Mot. Intervene at 1, and have adopted the Foundation’s arguments regarding the Weinberger-Bolden Letter as their own,5 Intervene Reply at 2 n.2.

As explained below, the Court finds that the actions taken to assert the privilege of the Weinberger-Bolden Letter and to recover it from the IRS after discovery of its disclosure were inadequate to protect any privilege with respect to the document and that the privilege has therefore been waived. It is undisputed that Barrett Weinberger learned that the IRS had acquired the Weinberger-Bolden Letter in April 2009. Whether he learned this information while he was acting in the capacity of president of the Foundation rather than as a beneficiary of the Estate of Julius Schaller (and thus the client of Stephen Bolden), Weinberger may not willfully ignore his knowledge that this document was disclosed simply because he learned of the disclosure while acting on behalf of the Foundation. Such indifference to the disclosure of the letter is inconsistent with the principle that “the confidentiality of communications covered by the privilege must be jealously guarded by the holder of the privilege lest it be waived.” In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Armed with knowledge of the disclosure, Weinberger had the ability to act to preserve the privilege, yet, he did not. Consequently, the Court need not determine whether the Foundation can raise the privilege because regardless of who holds the privilege, the actions taken by any of the parties involved here were insufficient to preserve it. The motion to intervene by the co-executors and beneficiaries of the Schaller Estate is thus denied as moot.

B. Acquisition of the Weinberger-Bolden Letter

As noted previously, the parties offer differing theories as to how the IRS acquired a copy of the Weinberger-Bolden Letter. Both the Foundation and the United States agree that the letter was likely obtained during the criminal investigation of Barrett Weinberger, see Pl.’s Mot. at 12; Def.’s Opp’n at 7, consistent with the IRS’ initial representations to the Foundation regarding the source of the letter, Pl.’s Mot., Ex. 6 (April 20 Request) at 6 (identifying the records enclosed with the Information Document Request, including the Weinberger-Bolden Letter, as “received from another IRS operating division”). Relying on IRS Special Agent Shaun Thurston’s affidavit, the United States contends that the Weinberger-Bolden Letter “was voluntarily and intentionally provided to it, most likely by the accountant retained to prepare the Schaller Estate’s estate tax return.” Def.’s Opp’n at 7 (citing Def.’s Opp’n, Ex. 1 (Thurston Affidavit) ¶¶ 4-5). However, as the Foundation correctly points out, see Pl.’s Reply at 7, Thurston does not possess personal knowledge of the source of the letter, averring that while “to the best of [his] recollection,” the Weinberger-Bolden Letter was intentionally provided to him by Craig Cohen, he is “not absolutely certain” about how he received it, Def.’s Opp’n, Ex. 1 (Thurston Affidavit) ¶¶ 4-5.

In addition to disputing that Craig Cohen intentionally provided the Weinberger-Bolden Letter to Thurston, Pl.’s Reply at 8 (citing Pl.’s Reply, Ex. 1 (Weinberger Affidavit) ¶¶ 12, 14, Ex. 2 (Cohen Affidavit) ¶ 6), the Foundation asserts that the IRS obtained the letter improperly, see Pl.’s Mot. at 12 n.9; Pl.’s Reply at 8-11. In support of its contention that the IRS illegally acquired the Weinberger-Bolden Letter, the Foundation points to “[t]he conflicting positions taken by the government in its responses” regarding how the IRS acquired the letter, Pl.’s Reply at 8 & n.5, the United States’ inability to conclusively state how the IRS obtained the letter, id. at 10, and the United States’ failure to produce a case chronology log for the criminal investigation of Barrett Weinberger, id. at 10-11, as suggestive of wrongdoing. As to the argument that the alleged inconsistency in the United States’ explanations regarding the acquisition of the letter supports the position that it was improperly obtained, the Court first notes that it discerns no inconsistency in the representations provided by the United States to this Court or the Tax Court, which uniformly maintain that the document was either intentionally or inadvertently provided to the IRS during the criminal investigation of Barrett Weinberger. See Pl.’s Mot. at 11 (quoting counsel for the United States during the initial scheduling hearing in this case as stating that “we believe the document they are referring to was actually submitted to the Internal Revenue Service”); id. at 12 (quoting counsel for the United States during a motion hearing in this case as stating that “[w]e believe it was obtained as part of the . . . criminal investigation . . . of Mr. Weinberger”); Pl.’s Reply at 7 (citing Thurston’s affidavit, which states that he believes the letter was provided to him by Craig Cohen during the criminal investigation of Barrett Weinberger); Pl.’s Reply at 8 n.5 (stating that during briefing on this issue before the Tax Court, the United States represented that the Weinberger-Bolden Letter “was freely provided to Special Agent Thurston and was either a voluntary disclosure or an inadvertent disclosure,” but not identifying that Thurston allegedly received the document from Cohen) (emphasis removed). While the United States’ representations include varying levels of detail regarding the acquisition of the letter, they all reflect the general contention that the Weinberger-Bolden Letter was either intentionally or inadvertently provided to Shaun Thurston during the criminal investigation of Barrett Weinberger.

Most importantly though, like the deficiency identified by the Foundation in Thurston’s affidavit, the Foundation similarly can produce no individual with personal knowledge that the IRS improperly obtained the Weinberger-Bolden Letter and the documents submitted to the Court with its motion provide no evidence whatsoever of such wrongdoing.6 Absent evidence demonstrating the contrary, courts generally accord agencies the presumption of administrative regularity and good faith. FTC v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 626 F.2d 966, 975 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (citations omitted). The Court will not impute wrongdoing to the IRS based on nothing more than the Foundation’s speculation that IRS agents acted improperly, particularly when human error appears to be at least an equally plausible explanation for how the IRS acquired the Weinberger-Bolden Letter. See United Mine Workers of Am. Int’l Union v. Arch Mineral Corp., 145 F.R.D. 3, 6 (D.D.C. 1992) (declining to infer wrongdoing in the acquisition of allegedly privileged documents because the party asserting the privilege produced no evidence to support its allegations).

Having rejected the Foundation’s assertion that the Weinberger-Bolden Letter was improperly acquired by the IRS, the Court concludes that the letter was either intentionally or inadvertently disclosed to the IRS. As noted previously, the parties have produced contradictory evidence regarding whether the disclosure of the letter was made by Craig Cohen. And as to the possibility that the Weinberger-Bolden Letter was inadvertently produced, neither party has proffered evidence on this point. Indeed, the very nature of inadvertent production would in all likelihood result in the individual who accidentally disclosed the document not having a current recollection of disclosure. The Court need not resolve this remaining dispute, however, because, even if the disclosure was inadvertent, the Court finds that the privilege has been waived, as explained below.

C. Waiver of the Privilege

With respect to disclosure of a communication covered by the attorney-client privilege, Federal Rule of Evidence 502 provides that

      [w]hen made in a federal proceeding or to a federal office or agency, the disclosure does not operate as a waiver in a federal or state proceeding if:

(1) the disclosure is inadvertent;

(2) the holder of the privilege or protection took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure; and

(3) the holder promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the error, including (if applicable) following Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B).
Fed. R. Evid. 502(b). The party asserting the privilege, even if disclosure of the communication was inadvertent, bears the burden of establishing each of these three elements. Williams v. District of Columbia, 806 F. Supp. 2d 44, 48 (D.D.C. 2011) (citations omitted). The Advisory Committee Notes for Rule 502(b) set forth several non-dispositive factors often used to evaluate whether an inadvertent disclosure has effected a waiver of the privilege, including “the reasonableness of precautions taken, the time taken to rectify the error, the scope of discovery, the extent of disclosure and the overriding issue of fairness.” Fed. R. Evid. 502 advisory committee’s note (2007).The Foundation argues at the outset that Rule 502 does not apply because Federal Rule of Evidence 101 states that the Rules “apply to proceedings in United States courts,” and when the Foundation first learned that the IRS possessed the Weinberger-Bolden Letter, “there was no litigation, only an administrative audit by the IRS of the Foundation” and thus there was “no ‘proceeding’ in any United States court at that time.” Pl.’s Reply at 17. The plain language of Rule 502, however, expressly contemplates an inadvertent disclosure of a communication “to a federal office or agency,” and sets forth the circumstances under which “the disclosure does not operate as a waiver in a federal or state proceeding.” Fed. R. Evid. 502(b). Moreover, the Advisory Committee Notes specifically state that Rule 502(b) “applies to inadvertent disclosures made to a federal office or agency, including but not limited to an office or agency that is acting in the course of its regulatory, investigative or enforcement authority,” Fed. R. Evid. 502 advisory committee’s note (2007), and courts have used Rule 502(b) to determine whether disclosure to an agency prior to litigation waives any privilege asserted regarding a document in subsequent litigation, see SEC v. Welliver, No. 11-CV-3076 (RHK/SER), 2012 WL 8015672, at *6-8 (D. Minn. Oct. 26, 2012) (assessing whether attorney-client privilege was waived by inadvertent disclosure of documents during pre-litigation investigation by the Securities and Exchange Commission). Rule 502 therefore applies in this proceeding to determine whether the prior inadvertent disclosure of the Weinberger-Bolden Letter to the IRS precludes the assertion of any claim of privilege concerning the letter.

Alternatively, the Foundation contends that even if Rule 502(b) applies, it has taken adequate steps to assert the privilege and redress the disclosure of the Weinberger-Bolden Letter by raising the issue in its January 11, 2010 Protest to the Proposed Revocation and in motions it has filed with this Court and the Tax Court. Pl.’s Reply at 17. The Court disagrees that these half-hearted and untimely attempts to assert the privilege are sufficient to preserve any claim of privilege as to the document. Barrett Weinberger first learned that the IRS possessed a copy of the Weinberger-Bolden Letter when it enclosed a copy of the letter in its April 20, 2009 Information Document Request, but took no action whatsoever to assert the privilege until January 11, 2010, over eight months later. Even then, the Foundation did not make any attempt to recover the Weinberger-Bolden Letter, but merely asserted its position that the document was protected by the privilege and thus “should be excised and not relied upon.” Pl.’s Mot., Ex. 10 (Protest) at 7. Neither the Foundation nor the Schaller Estate beneficiaries demanded the return of the document until December 1, 2010, nearly two years after Weinberger learned that the IRS possessed it. Such an inordinate delay in action to recover the document is inconsistent with the confidentiality objective which underlies the attorney-client privilege. See United States v. Ary, 518 F.3d 775, 784 (10th Cir. 2008) (reasoning that expeditious claims of privilege serve the purposes of the attorney-client privilege by preserving the confidentiality of the allegedly privileged communication); United States v. de la Jara, 973 F.2d 746, 750 (9th Cir. 1992) (concluding that the defendant’s delay in seeking recovery of privileged communication “allowed ‘the mantle of confidentiality which once protected the document[ ]’ to be ‘irretrievably breached,’ thereby waiving his privilege”); see also In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d at 979-80 (“[I]f a client wishes to preserve the privilege, it must treat the confidentiality of attorney-client communications like jewels — if not crown jewels.”). Indeed, much shorter delays in seeking recovery of privileged documents have been deemed to waive the privilege. See, e.g.Ary, 518 F.3d at 785 (finding assertion of privilege six weeks after learning of disclosure to be untimely); Murray v. Gemplus Int’l, S.A., 217 F.R.D. 362, 366 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (finding eleven week delay to be incompatible with maintaining privileged character of communications); see also Amobi v. D.C. Dep’t of Corrs., 262 F.R.D. 45, 55 (D.D.C. 2009) (commenting that it was a “debatable proposition” that attempting to rectify an inadvertent disclosure fifty-five days after discovery qualified as sufficiently prompt to protect attorney-client privilege but finding privilege waived on different ground in any event).

On this point, the Foundation contends that Weinberger’s failure to assert the privilege with respect to the Weinberger-Bolden Letter in response to the April 20, 2009 Information Document Request did not effect a waiver because he did not comment on it and instead, on the advice of counsel, invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination due to the ongoing criminal investigation. Pl.’s Reply at 12-13. The Foundation offers no explanation, however, for Weinberger’s continuing failure to act after June 2009 when the criminal investigation was discontinued. While the record is unclear regarding when Weinberger learned that the IRS had decided not to prosecute him, Weinberger’s assertion of the privilege in the Foundation’s January 11, 2010 Protest indicates that he knew he was no longer under investigation by that point. Yet, nearly a year elapsed before anyone affiliated with the Foundation or the Estate of Julius Schaller made any attempt to actually recover the document. While the concurrent criminal investigation may have excused Weinberger’s failure to act immediately in response to the Information Document Request, it cannot absolve him of his obligation to act for the entire period of time at issue here.

Even if the Court could find that the Foundation or the beneficiaries of the Schaller Estate made timely efforts to recover the Weinberger-Bolden Letter, the intermittent nature of these efforts also weighs in favor of a finding that the privilege was waived. While the Foundation and the beneficiaries of the Schaller Estate have raised the claim of privilege on several occasions since learning of the disclosure of the Weinberger-Bolden Letter in April 2009, long periods of inaction have followed most of the attempts to recover the document. For example, when the IRS failed to respond to the December 1, 2010 letter requesting the segregation and return of all copies of the Weinberger-Bolden Letter, the Foundation identifies no further efforts to assert the privilege or recover the document until the issue was raised in a motion before the Tax Court one year later. See Pl.’s Mot. at 8; Pl.’s Mot., Ex. 4 (December 7, 2011 Order) at 2. Isolated efforts to recover privileged communications do not absolve the party asserting privilege of any further action, but rather put the privilege holder on notice that further action is required. See Williams, 806 F. Supp. 2d at 52 (rejecting alleged privilege holder’s argument that its notification of the inadvertent disclosure and demand for return of the document was sufficient to preclude a finding of waiver under Rule 502(b) because privilege holder took no further steps to recover the document after receiving no response); IMC Chems. v. Niro, Inc., No. 98-2348-JTM, 2000 WL 1466495, at *27 (D. Kan. July 19, 2000) (finding four letters, two of which specifically demanded return of the documents, to be insufficiently persistent to maintain privilege). Here, the IRS consistently ignored the Foundation’s and the Estate’s occasional efforts to retrieve the Weinberger-Bolden Letter. Instead of taking additional steps to recover the letter, the alleged privilege holders allowed the letter to remain with the IRS with full knowledge that the agency continued to use it without limitation. As another court put it, “[t]hat is not how one protects privileged documents.” IMC Chems., 2000 WL 1466495, at *27.

The Foundation claims that “[t]here were no other avenues that Mr. Weinberger, the beneficiaries, the Foundation, or the Estate could have pursued in order to claim this document is privileged and has been wrongfully obtained and used by the government,” other than raising the issue in the litigation pending before this Court and the Tax Court. Pl.’s Reply at 15-17. To be sure, seeking judicial intervention is a powerful way to assert a privilege and seek to recover a privileged communication that has been inadvertently disclosed. Cf. Bowles v. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, Inc., 224 F.R.D. 246, 254-57 (D.D.C. 2004) (holding that failure to seek judicial intervention for fifteen months even though privilege holder repeatedly asserted privilege in correspondence fatally undermined privilege claim). However, the fact that the Foundation and the Estate did seek judicial intervention on two occasions does not excuse their failure to take other steps to protect the privilege, such as engaging in a consistent course of correspondence with the IRS demanding the return of the Weinberger-Bolden Letter. The Court discerns no reason why more persistent and prompt efforts could not have been taken to recover the document, even when litigation was not pending.

This Circuit’s opinion in SEC v. Lavin, 111 F.3d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1997), does not change the result here. Lavininvolved an assertion of the marital privilege as to conversations recorded on tapes in the possession of Jack Lavin’s employer. 111 F.3d at 923-24. In reversing the district court’s finding that the Lavins had waived any privilege in the conversations by failing to promptly assert the privilege and take adequate steps to recover possession of the tapes, the Circuit declined to find an affirmative duty to preemptively assert the privilege when “there was no event that should have triggered their assertion of the privilege,” instead finding it sufficient that the Lavins claimed the privilege once they learned that the Federal Reserve Bank of New York sought production of the tapes. Id. at 931. The Circuit also rejected the district court’s emphasis on the Lavins’ failure to obtain physical possession of the tapes as “irrelevant” because “any access [to the tapes] was encumbered by the Lavins’ assertion of the privilege.” Id. at 931-32. Lavin, however, pre-dates the 2007 revisions to Rule 502 which addressed waiver by inadvertent disclosure. Moreover, the Lavins made far more significant efforts to preserve their privilege, including securing an agreement to maintain confidentiality of the tapes with the possessor of the tapes and immediately asserting the privilege upon learning that the tapes had been requested by the Federal Reserve Bank,id. at 931-32, in contrast to the two discontinuous attempts to assert privilege and protect the confidentiality of the Weinberger-Bolden Letter.

The Foundation further argues that no additional actions should be required of it because “[t]he IRS was aware that the Foundation was not represented by counsel [during the Foundation audit], and it is the IRS [that] should have strictly adhered to its ethical obligations and notified the Foundation, the Estate, and its beneficiaries that a privileged communication had been obtained.” Pl.’s Reply at 13-14. Whether an attorney’s failure to return an allegedly privileged document upon learning of its inadvertent disclosure constitutes an ethical breach has no bearing on this Court’s assessment of whether the privilege holder acted reasonably to rectify the inadvertent disclosure of the Weinberger-Bolden Letter under Rule 502(b), which puts this burden squarely on the shoulders of the privilege holder, not the recipient of a potentially privileged communication. Additionally, the Court notes that while the Foundation was not represented by counsel during its audit by the IRS, the record indicates that Barrett Weinberger holds a juris doctor and was a practicing attorney from 1983 to 1995. See Pl.’s Mot., Ex. 10 (Protest) at 6. The Court thus presumes that Weinberger has some familiarity with the attorney-client privilege and accordingly finds the Foundation’s suggestion that its pro se status imparts some additional obligations on IRS counsel unpersuasive. Cf. Richards v. Duke Univ., 480 F. Supp. 2d 222, 234 (D.D.C. 2007) (holding that pro se plaintiff who is an attorney is “presumed to have a knowledge of the legal system” and thus is not given great latitude normally afforded to pro se litigants).

In addition to the delay in asserting the privilege in the Weinberger-Bolden Letter and seeking its recovery, the Court finds that other factors weigh in favor of finding that the privilege has been waived. The proceedings between the IRS, the Foundation, and the Estate of Julius Schaller did not involve thousands of documents, but rather a relatively small set of records that could be easily reviewed and controlled. Fairness and the extent of the disclosure here also support a finding of waiver. The IRS has possessed and relied on the Weinberger-Bolden Letter since 2009 in reaching decisions in three separate investigations regarding the relationship between the Estate of Julius Schaller and the Foundation. And its ongoing use of the document was well-known to all interested parties. To expunge this document now would require a wholesale rewriting of history between the IRS, the Foundation, and the Schaller Estate. As this Circuit opined with respect to a similar request, “it would be unfair and unrealistic now to permit the privilege’s assertion as to th[is] document[ ] which ha[s] been thoroughly examined and used by the Government for several years” because “the disclosure cannot be cured simply by a return of the document[ ].” In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean Transp., 604 F.2d 672, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1979); see also Ary, 518 F.3d at 784 (noting that a consequence of failing to expeditiously assert a privilege is that a government investigation “may irreparably rely on the protected information, thereby tainting the investigation,” resulting in waiver). Here too, the Court finds that “[t]he privilege has been permanently destroyed.” In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean Transp., 604 F.2d at 675.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that any attorney-client privilege that would otherwise protect the Weinberger-Bolden Letter has been waived through the document’s inadvertent disclosure and the failure of the alleged privilege holders to take appropriate steps to promptly assert the privilege and aggressively seek to recover the letter. Accordingly, the Court must deny the Foundation’s motion regarding the United States’ use of the Weinberger-Bolden Letter in these proceedings and its inclusion of the letter in the administrative record, and deny the motion to intervene as moot.SO ORDERED this 27th day of March, 2014.7

                  Reggie B. Walton
                  United States District Judge
FOOTNOTES

1 In addition to the documents already referenced, the Court considered the following filings in reaching its decision: (1) the Plaintiff’s Reply Memorandum in Support of Its Motion to Preclude the Government from Introducing Privileged Letter from Barrett Weinberger to Attorney Stephen Bolden and the Entire Administrative Record, and for Related Relief (“Pl.’s Reply”), (2) the Motion to Intervene Filed by Barrett Weinberger and Frances Odza, Co-Executors of the Estate of Julius Schaller, and the Entire Class of Beneficiaries of the Estate of Julius Schaller (“Mot. Intervene”), (3) the Supplement to Motion to Intervene Filed by Barrett Weinberger and Frances Odza, Co-Executors of the Estate of Julius Schaller, and the Entire Class of Beneficiaries of the Estate of Julius Schaller (“Intervene Supp.”), (4) the United States’ Opposition to Motion to Intervene by Barrett Weinberger, Frances Odza, and the Beneficiaries of the Estate of Julius Schaller (“Intervene Opp’n”), and (5) the Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Intervene Filed by Barrett Weinberger and Frances Odza, Co-Executors of the Estate of Julius Schaller, and the Entire Class of Beneficiaries of the Estate of Julius Schaller (“Intervene Reply”).2 For ease of reference, the Court has assigned page numbers to each of the parties’ exhibits beginning in each case with the exhibit cover page followed by the order of the pages as submitted to the Court.

3 Although the Foundation’s Protest lists the date of the Information Document Request which referenced the Weinberger-Bolden Letter as August 17, 2007, all other references to this Information Document Request have indicated that it was dated April 20, 2009. Accordingly, the Court assumes that designating the date of the Information Document Request as August 17, 2007 in the Foundation’s Protest is a typographical error.

4 The United States also argues that the Foundation has not established that the Weinberger-Bolden Letter is a privileged communication. Def.’s Opp’n at 9-13. Because the Court determines that any privilege as to the document was waived, it will assume without deciding that the Weinberger-Bolden Letter would otherwise be protected by attorney-client privilege if not for its inadvertent disclosure.

5 The only argument regarding the Weinberger-Bolden Letter advanced solely by the movants is that Barrett Weinberger “did not have the authority to unilaterally waive the privilege on behalf of the entire class of beneficiaries of the Estate of Julius Schaller.” Intervene Reply at 5-6. Relying on In re Teleglobe Communications Corp., 493 F.3d 345 (3d Cir. 2007), and Magnetar Technologies, Corp. v. Six Flags Theme Park Inc., 886 F. Supp. 2d 466 (D. Del. 2012), the movants argue that waiver of a joint-client privilege requires the consent of all joint-clients and that the United States has not shown that all of the Estate beneficiaries consented to waive a claim of privilege in regard to the Weinberger-Bolden Letter. Intervene Reply at 5-6. The movants’ reliance on this line of authority is misplaced, however, because the requirement of universal consent applies when one client seeks to intentionally waive the privilege. By contrast, the question before the Court here is whether the attorney-client privilege was unintentionallywaived by the inadvertent disclosure of the Weinberger-Bolden Letter.

6 In a footnote in its reply brief, the Foundation suggests that discovery should be conducted regarding “the Special Agent’s report and chronology as to when he obtained the [Weinberger-Bolden Letter]; who the Special Agent consulted with at IRS counsel before providing the letter to the revenue agent handling the Foundation audit; and who the revenue agent consulted with before employing the [Weinberger-Bolden Letter] and using it to support the revocation of the Foundation’s tax exempt status.” Pl.’s Reply at 11 n.6. To be sure, “[a] claim of privilege must be ‘presented to a district court with appropriate deliberation and precision’ before a court can rule on the issue.” SEC v. Lavin, 111 F.3d 921, 928 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). Neither party suggests here that the record is insufficiently developed to permit the Court to rule on this issue based on the filings submitted to the Court and the attached exhibits, many of which were culled from an administrative record with which both parties are already familiar. Moreover, the discovery contemplated by the Foundation is focused primarily on the use of the Weinberger-Bolden Letter by the IRS rather than the letter’s acquisition and thus would be of little assistance in reaching a determination on the issues at hand. Accordingly, the Court declines to permit discovery on the issues raised by the Foundation prior to ruling on the Foundation’s motion.

7 An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will be issued contemporaneously.

Citations: Educational Assistance Foundation for the Descendants of Hungarian Immigrants in the Performing Arts Inc. v. United States; No. 1:11-cv-01573




IRS Releases Publication Providing Guidance for Religious Groups.

The IRS has released Publication 1828 (rev. Nov. 2013), Tax Guide for Churches and Religious Organizations, explaining benefits and responsibilities under the federal tax system for churches and religious organizations to encourage voluntary compliance.




IRS LTR: Churches Aren't Required to Apply for Exempt Status.

The IRS advised that although there is no application requirement for a church to operate as a tax-exempt organization, many churches seek recognition of tax-exempt status because it assures church leaders, members, and contributors that the IRS recognizes the church as exempt and that it qualifies for tax-related benefits.

Person to Contact and ID Number: * * *
Contact Telephone Number: * * *
Uniform Issue List 508.02-00
Release Date: 3/28/2014
Date: December 23, 2013
The Honorable Jim Cooper
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
Attention: * * *

Dear Mr. Cooper:

I am responding to your inquiry dated July 30, 2013, on behalf of your constituents and the tax-exempt organizations they represent. You asked questions about the policy of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services that requires religious organizations to provide a determination letter from us with an application for an R-1 (Temporary Religious Worker) visa that the organization is tax-exempt under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), even if that religious organization is otherwise not required to have a determination letter. Specifically, you requested information on the application requirements for places of worship.

I apologize for the delay in responding to your inquiry.By law, churches, their integrated auxiliaries, and conventions or associations of churches are not required to apply with us to operate as tax-exempt organizations. The law also excludes churches from the requirement to file federal annual returns. Churches are excluded from Federal Unemployment Tax (FUTA) liability, but generally are liable for Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) taxes. State and local governments have various exemptions for churches.

Although there is no requirement to do so, many churches seek recognition of tax-exempt status from us because such recognition assures church leaders, members, and contributors that we recognize the church as exempt, and it qualifies for related tax benefits. For example, contributors to a church we recognize as tax exempt would know that their contributions generally are tax-deductible. To get such recognition, the church must file a Form 1023, Application for Recognition of Exemption Under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, and pay the user fee. When we do formally recognize a church’s exempt status, we provide a determination letter to that organization.

Your constituents can find more information about religious organizations and federal tax exemption on our website, www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits and clicking on “Churches & Religious Organizations” in the left column. Additionally, your constituents can find information regarding applying for a determination letter of tax-exempt status on our website, www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits and clicking in “How to Apply to Be Tax-Exempt.”

This letter is for informational purposes only and provides general statements of well-defined law. It is not a ruling and taxpayers cannot rely on it as such.(Rev. Proc. 2013-1, 2013-1 I.R.B. 1; Rev. Proc. 2013-4, 2013-1 I.R.B. 126). We will make this letter available for public inspection after deleting names, addresses and other identifying information, as appropriate, under the Freedom of Information Act (Announcement 2000-2, 2000-2 I.R.B. 295). I have enclosed a copy of this letter with the proposed deletions.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any questions, please contact me at * * * or * * * (Identification Number * * *) at * * *.

Enclosure




IRS LTR: Healthcare Organization Is Denied Exemption.

The IRS denied tax-exempt status to an organization established to be the successor organization to two tax-exempt healthcare organizations that plan to merge, concluding that the organization operates primarily for the benefit of its member-enrollees rather than for the community.
Citations: LTR 201412018

Contact Person: * * *
Identification Number: * * *
Contact Number: * * *

UIL: 501.03-00
Release Date: 3/21/2014

Date: December 11, 2013Employer Identification Number: * * *

Form Required To Be Filed: * * *

Tax Years: * * *

Dear * * *:This is our final determination that you do not qualify for exemption from Federal income tax as an organization described in Internal Revenue Code section 501(c)(3). Recently, we sent you a letter in response to your application that proposed an adverse determination. The letter explained the facts, law and rationale, and gave you 30 days to file a protest. Since we did not receive a protest within the requisite 30 days, the proposed adverse determination is now final.

Because you do not qualify for exemption as an organization described in Code section 501(c)(3), donors may not deduct contributions to you under Code section 170. You must file Federal income tax returns on the form and for the years listed above within 30 days of this letter, unless you request an extension of time to file. File the returns in accordance with their instructions, and do not send them to this office. Failure to file the returns timely may result in a penalty.

We will make this letter and our proposed adverse determination letter available for public inspection under Code section 6110, after deleting certain identifying information. Please read the enclosed Notice 437, Notice of Intention to Disclose, and review the two attached letters that show our proposed deletions. If you disagree with our proposed deletions, follow the instructions in Notice 437. If you agree with our deletions, you do not need to take any further action.

If you have any questions about this letter, please contact the person whose name and telephone number are shown in the heading of this letter. If you have any questions about your Federal income tax status and responsibilities, please contact IRS Customer Service at 1-800-829-1040 or the IRS Customer Service number for businesses, 1-800-829-4933. The IRS Customer Service number for people with hearing impairments is 1-800-829-4059.

                  Sincerely,
                  Karen Schiller
                  Acting Director,
                  Exempt Organizations
                  Rulings and Agreements

Enclosure
Notice 437
Redacted Proposed Adverse Determination Letter
Redacted Final Adverse Determination Letter

* * * * *

Contact Person: * * *
Identification Number: * * *
Contact Number: * * *
FAX Number: * * *

501.03-00

Date: October 30, 2013Employer Identification Number: * * *

LEGEND:Organization 1 = * * *
Organization 2 = * * *
System = * * *
Institute = * * *
Foundation = * * *

Dear * * *:

We have considered your application for recognition of exemption from federal income tax under section 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code. Based on the information provided, we have concluded that you do not qualify for exemption under § 501(c)(3) of the Code. The basis for our conclusion is set forth below.

FACTS

You were formed as a nonprofit membership corporation under state law. You will be the successor to the planned merger between two related healthcare organizations, Organization 1 and Organization 2.Organization 1 is a nonprofit membership corporation. Its members consist of persons who hold insurance contracts directly with Organization 1 or through their employer-subscribers. Organization 1 does not have any corporate members. Organization 1 is recognized by the IRS as an organization described in § 501(c)(4) of the Code. It controls, directly and indirectly, a number of exempt and non-exempt organizations, and serves as the parent of a large integrated healthcare system known as System. The organizations in System include healthcare providers, clinics, and hospitals. Organization 1 is governed by a * * *-member board of directors. * * * directors are elected by Organization 1‘s subscribers or subscribers of plans administered by Organization 1 * * * directors are selected from the directors of Organization 2; and directors are healthcare providers. Organization 1 is licensed to operate an HMO. It offers a number of arranger-type HMO plans to various groups, including small and large employers, individual enrollees, and Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries. Currently, Organization 1 has approximately * * * enrollees.

Organization 2 is a nonprofit membership corporation. Its members consist of Associate Members (persons holding insurance contracts with Organization 2 or through their employer-subscribers) and one Corporate Member,Organization 1Organization 2 is recognized by the IRS as an organization described in § 501(c)(3) of the Code. It is governed by a * * * member board of directors. * * * directors are enrollees in Organization 2‘s HMO plan (or in another plan administered by System); one director is the Chair of the Organization 1 board of directors; and one director is a physician appointed by the president of Organization 2Organization 2 operates a “staff model” HMO and physician clinics, providing healthcare services directly by its employed healthcare providers through clinics and hospitals that are part of SystemOrganization 2‘s enrollees consist of individuals and Medicare beneficiaries.

Organization 1 and Organization 2 plan to merge and transfer to you all of their assets and operations. As a result, you will carry on the activities and HMO plans that Organization 1 and Organization 2 currently carry on as separate organizations. Following the planned merger, you will continue to offer a variety of insurance plans, including traditional HMO plans, plans providing access to out of network providers, tiered network plans, Medicaid, Medicare Cost and Advantage plans, and dental plans. In addition, as a result of the planned merger, you will replace Organization 1 as the parent of System and thereby control the entities comprising the System.

Your bylaws state that you will have one class of members. A member is a contract holder who holds a health maintenance contract with you for medical services, or a contract holder who receives healthcare services through employer-insured contracts that either you or a related organization administer. Thus, a member of the corporation is also an “enrollee” in one of your healthcare plans. (Hereafter, such an individual is referred to as a “Member-Enrollee.”)

Your bylaws state that a * * *-person board of directors governs you. * * * of the directors must be Member-Enrollees. Your bylaws expressly state that all such directors must be covered under an HMO contract or insurance contract that either you or a related organization issue, or under an employer-issued contract that either you or a related organization administer. No more than one Member-Enrollee director may be from any one employer group, unless that group exceeds 1/7 of the total enrollment. For each additional 1/7, there may be an additional director from that group, up to a maximum of three. In addition, a Member-Enrollee director cannot be a person:

    * * *

The other two directors must be healthcare providers, one physician elected by your Medical Board of Governors, and one of your employee-physicians appointed by your president.As a result of the merger, you expect to have total assets of approximately $* * * million, of which $* * * million, or * * * percent, will consist of accumulated surplus. This surplus is not dedicated to any sort of research, charity care, or educational program. You have not described any tax-exempt programs for which you intend to use this surplus.

For the first full year of operation following the merger, you expect that your revenues will be:

For the first full year of operation, you expect that enrollment in your various health plans will be:

You expect that enrollment in your traditional HMO plans will account for approximately * * * of your * * * subscribers (or * * * percent) and $* * * million of your $* * * billion of revenue (or * * * percent). You estimate that the open access, tiered network, and consumer directed plans will account for approximately * * * of your * * * subscribers (or * * * percent) and $* * * of your $* * * of revenue (or * * * percent).Following the planned merger, you expect to pay approximately $* * * (or * * * percent of your total expected healthcare expenditures of $* * *) as direct contractual fee for service payments to non-employee healthcare providers for services rendered to enrollees in your plans.

Organization 1 and Organization 2 currently have financial assistance programs under which they serve those unable to pay. Persons checking in to one of the organizations’ clinics are provided with an information sheet referring to, among other things, the financial assistance program and may fill out an application. Individuals and families who are at or below the federal poverty level are eligible for completely subsidized care, with decreasing subsidies as income rises up to 300 percent of the federal poverty level. You state that in * * *, under these programs, Organization 1 and Organization 2 together provided a total of approximately $* * * million in uncompensated care. You state that, after the merger, you will continue to follow these same programs and that you expect to provide the same amounts of uncompensated care as Organization 1 and Organization 2 provided previously. At this same level, these benefits will constitute approximately * * * percent of your expected total revenues.

You state that you will also continue a premium subsidy plan that is currently operated by Organization 1 andOrganization 2 for Medicare Advantage plan enrollees who meet certain eligibility criteria. As of January * * *, approximately * * * individuals were enrolled in this plan. At this same level, this enrollment will represent approximately * * * percent of your total expected enrollment.

Currently, Organization 2‘s physician employees provide some direct clinical teaching to medical students and interns at various healthcare facilities in System, and your dentist employees conduct a small training program by collaborating with a university to provide clinical rotations for two residents each year. After the merger, you will continue these programs. These student medical and dental education programs are conducted principally byInstitute, a § 501(c)(3) organization that is currently controlled by Organization 1Institute provides training for more than * * * medical residents each year and conducts a variety of continuing medical education programs. After the planned merger, Institute will remain a separate organization that you will control.

Currently, Organization 1, through Organization 2, controls Foundation, a § 501(c)(3) organization that focuses primarily on scientific and medical research. Organization 1 and Organization 2 have funded Foundation in the amount of approximately $* * * per year. Following the planned merger, you will control Foundation and intend to continue to fund it at approximately the same level, which would represent approximately * * * percent of your expected total revenues.

LAW

Section 501(c)(3) of the Code exempts from federal income tax corporations organized and operated exclusively for charitable, educational, scientific, and other purposes, provided that no part of their net earnings inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.Section 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)(1) of the Income Tax Regulations (regulations) provides that, in order to be exempt as an organization described in section 501(c)(3), an organization must be both organized and operated exclusively for one or more of the purposes specified. If an organization fails to meet either the organizational test or the operational test, it is not exempt.

Section 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) of the regulations provides that an organization will be regarded as “operated exclusively” for one or more exempt purposes only if it engages primarily in activities that accomplish one or more of the exempt purposes specified in section 501(c)(3). An organization will not be so regarded if more than an insubstantial part of its activities is not in furtherance of an exempt purpose.

In Better Business Bureau of Washington D.C., Inc. v. U.S., 326 U.S. 279 (1945), the Supreme Court held that the presence of a single non-exempt purpose, if substantial in nature, will destroy the exemption regardless of the number or importance of truly exempt purposes. The Court found that a trade association had an “underlying commercial motive” that distinguished its educational program from that carried out by a university, and therefore, the association did not qualify for exemption.

In BSW Group, Incorporated v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 352 (1978), the Tax Court considered the qualification for exemption under § 501(c)(3) of an organization formed to provide consulting services for a fee to nonprofit and tax exempt organizations in the areas of health and health delivery systems, housing, vocational skills, and cooperative management. In concluding that the organization did not qualify for exemption, the court noted that:
[T]he critical inquiry is whether petitioner’s primary purpose for engaging in its sole activity is an exempt purpose, or whether its primary purpose is the nonexempt one of operating a commercial business producing net profits for petitioner. . . . Factors such as the particular manner in which an organization’s activities are conducted, the commercial hue of those activities, and the existence and amount of annual or accumulated profits are relevant evidence of a forbidden predominant purpose.
Id. at 357.Section 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) of the regulations states, in part, that the term “charitable” in section 501(c)(3) of the Code includes relief of the poor and distressed or of the underprivileged; advancement of religion; advancement of education or science; lessening of the burdens of government; and promotion of social welfare by organizations designed to accomplish any of the above purposes. In addition, the promotion of health has long been recognized as a charitable purpose under common law. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts, §§ 368, 372 (1959).

An organization that promotes health primarily for the benefit of the community as a whole can qualify as charitable. In Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117, the Service found that a non-profit hospital was described in section 501(c)(3) of the Code when it: (1) provided hospital care for all those persons in the community able to pay the cost thereof either directly or through third party reimbursement; (2) operated an emergency room open to all persons; (3) used its surplus funds to improve the quality of patient care, expand its facilities, and advance its medical training, education, and research programs; (4) was controlled by a board of trustees that was composed of independent civic leaders; and (5) maintained an open medical staff, with privileges available to all qualified physicians.

Three court cases have considered whether an HMO qualifies for exemption under § 501(c)(3): Sound Health Association v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 158, 177-181 (1978), Geisinger Health Plan v. Commissioner, 985 F.2d 1210, 1219 (3d Cir. 1993), and IHC Health Plans Inc. v. Commissioner, 325 F.3d 1188, 1197 (10th Cir. 2003). All three cases applied the “community benefit” standard for tax-exempt hospitals, using the specific factors set forth in Revenue Ruling 69-545.

In Sound Health, the Tax Court determined that an organization qualified under § 501(c)(3) of the Code where it provided HMO services combined with direct healthcare services. The organization provided services to both subscribers and members of the general public and also operated an outpatient clinic that treated all emergency patients, regardless of subscriber status or ability to pay. The court found that these characteristics, which were similar to those identified in the exempt hospital in Rev. Rul. 69-545, showed that it was operated for charitable purposes.

In Geisinger, the court held that a pre-paid healthcare organization that arranges for the provision of healthcare services only for its members benefits its members rather than the community as a whole. Under the community benefit standard, the organization must benefit the community as a whole to establish the charitable purpose of promoting health for purposes of § 501(c)(3).

IHC involved an operator of health maintenance organizations and insurance providers that served approximately one-quarter of Utah’s residents and approximately one-half of its Medicaid population. The court held that these organizations, Health Plans, Care, and Group, failed to meet the community benefit standard to qualify for exemption under § 501(c)(3) because their activities were focused on arranging for healthcare services for their members in exchange for a fee. The court said that providing healthcare products or services to all in the community is necessary but not sufficient to meet the community benefit standard. Rather, the organization must provide some additional benefit that likely would not be provided in the community but for the tax exemption, and that this public benefit must be the primary purpose for which the organization operates.

Not every activity that promotes health generally furthers exclusively charitable purposes under § 501(c)(3). For example, a hospital does not primarily further a charitable purpose solely by offering healthcare services to the public in exchange for a fee. See Rev. Rul. 69-545, supra. As IHC noted, “engaging in an activity that promotes health, standing alone, offers an insufficient indicium of an organization’s purpose,” as “[n]umerous for-profit enterprises offer products or services that promote health.” 325 F.3d at 1197. Thus, a health maintenance organization that is operated primarily for the purpose of benefiting its paying subscribers does not qualify for exemption solely because the community also derives health benefits from its activities. SeegenerallyGeisingerand IHC.

To qualify as an organization described in § 501(c)(3), a healthcare organization must make its services available to all in the community plus provide additional community or public benefits. IHC, 325 F.3d at 1198. The additional benefits must give rise to a strong inference that the public benefit is the primary purpose for which the organization operates. Id. The Court of Appeals in IHC identified five factors drawn from relevant case law to determine whether a healthcare organization is operating primarily for the benefit of the community. These factors are enumerated below along with the IHC court’s application of each factor to the facts of that case.

    (1) The size of the class eligible to benefit

The Court of Appeals noted that membership was a precondition to the ability of individuals to qualify for healthcare benefits under its plans, and that a large, diverse enrollment is not indicative per se of the organization’s purpose. Citing Geisinger, the court stated:“The community benefited is, in fact, limited to those who belong to [the HMO] since the requirement of subscribership remains a condition precedent to any service. Absent any additional indicia of a charitable purpose, this self-imposed precondition suggests that [the HMO] is primarily benefitting itself (and, perhaps, secondarily benefitting the community) by promoting subscribership throughout the areas it serves.”
985 F.2d at 1219. Further, while the absence of a large class of potential beneficiaries may preclude tax-exempt status, its presence standing alone provides little insight into the organization’s purpose. Offering products and services to a broad segment of the population is as consistent with self-promotion and profit maximization as it is with any “charitable” purpose.
325 F.3d at 1201.

    (2) Free or below-cost products or services

The Tax Court determined that the organizations provided “virtually no free or below-cost health-care services. [Footnote omitted]. All enrollees must pay a premium in order to receive benefits. [Footnote omitted.]” Id. at 1200. Further, the Court did not consider the organization’s “adjusted community rating system, which likely allowed its enrollees to obtain medical care at a lower cost than might otherwise have been available. [Citations omitted],” as evidence of the organizations’ purpose. Id. Furthermore the court noted that a minimal degree of free services is inconsequential, stating:
As the Eighth Circuit has noted, “a ‘charitable’ hospital may impose charges or fees for services rendered, and indeed its charity record may be comparatively low depending upon all the facts . . . but a serious question is raised where its charitable operation is virtually inconsequential. [Citations omitted.]
Id., n. 27.

    (3) Treatment of persons participating in governmental programs such as Medicare or Medicaid

The organizations provided healthcare services to Medicaid beneficiaries; however, the Court of Appeals noted that:
The relevant inquiry, however, is not “whether [petitioner] benefited the community at all . . . [but] whether it primarily benefited the community, as an entity must in order to qualify for tax-exempt status.” Geisinger I, 985 F.2d at 1219.
Id. at 1201, n. 29.

    (4) Use of surplus funds for research or educational programs

In IHC, none of the organizations conducted research or offered free education programs to the public.

    (5) Composition of the board of trustees

Prior to 1996, the bylaws of one of the IHC organizations provided that employer subscribers represented a plurality of the board. In 1996, the organization amended its bylaws to require that a majority of board members be disinterested and broadly representative of the community. The Court of Appeals did not consider the board composition, either before or after the amendment, as a factor. However, it stated that:
Even if we were to conclude petitioners’ board broadly represents the community, the dearth of actual community benefit in this case rebuts any inference we might otherwise draw.
Id. at 1201.In general, maintaining a board that is representative of the community is a significant factor indicating that an organization will be operated for the benefit of the community as a whole, though it is not essential. See Rev. Rul. 69-545, supraSound HealthGeisingerIHC. For example, in Sound Health, the organization’s board was elected by its member-subscribers and was found to qualify under § 501(c)(3). However, that organization demonstrated other significant factors showing that it was operated for the benefit of the community, such as that initially over 2 percent of its patients would be charity care patients. Sound Health, 71 T.C. at 171. The organization in Sound Health also maintained a significant public health program and subsidized dues program. Id. at 166.

ANALYSIS

You do not meet the community benefit standard because you primarily operate to benefit your Member-Enrollees and not the community as a whole. Thus, you are not described in § 501(c)(3) of the Code. You propose to merge a “staff model” HMO described in § 501(c)(3) with a much larger “arranger” HMO described in § 501(c)(4). You will be the successor to the planned merger of the two organizations. Organization 2, the “staff model” HMO, has approximately * * * members, while Organization 1, the “arranger” HMO, has over * * * enrollees. You expect to have total annual healthcare expenditures of $* * *, of which $* * * billion (or about * * * percent) will consist of direct contractual fee for service payments to non-employee healthcare providers for services rendered to your Member-Enrollees. Therefore, your primary purpose is to operate a § 501(c)(4) arranger HMO, with your direct healthcare services representing a minority of your activities.The IHC court said, “In this case, we deal with organizations that do not provide health-care services directly. Rather, petitioners furnish group insurance entitling enrollees to services of participating hospitals and physicians.” 325 F.3d at 1199. The court reasoned that this is not an inherently charitable activity, and that “the commercial nature of this activity inspire[s] doubt as to the entity’s charitable purpose.” Id. Although you will also operate a “staff model” component, your § 501(c)(4) arranger activities supply the bulk of your revenue. Therefore, as your primary activity is commercial rather than charitable, you are not operated exclusively for § 501(c)(3) purposes.

Additionally, IHC lists several factors used to determine whether a healthcare organization is operating primarily for the benefit of the community. Based on the information you provided, several of these factors suggest that you do not operate primarily for the benefit of the community. Namely, the size of the class eligible to benefit from your activities is not sufficient, you do not provide sufficient free or below-cost services, and you do not use your substantial surplus funds to provide meaningful research and educational programs. Each factor is analyzed below.

    (1) The size of the class eligible to benefit

You are similar to IHC because you limit your healthcare benefits only to persons who are enrolled in one of your plans, a precondition of which is the payment of the required premiums. Although you provide healthcare benefits to some under your financial assistance policy, these benefits are minimal in relation to the total premiums you receive.

    (2) Free or below-cost products or services

Your financial assistance program is expected to result in about $* * * of uncompensated care, which is minimal in relation to your expected operating revenues of $* * * billion, representing only about * * * percent of revenues. In addition, your premium subsidy plan for Medicare Advantage plan enrollees is minimal, serving only * * * persons out of your expected * * * total enrollees, or less than * * *. These programs are unlike the programs described inSound Health, where significant indicia of community benefit outweighed the negative factor that its board was elected by its member-subscribers.

    (3) Use of surplus funds for research or educational programs

You do not use ample surplus funds for research or educational programs to further a § 501(c)(3) purpose. For example, Foundation, a related organization in System that you will control as a result of the proposed merger, will continue to conduct scientific and medical research. You intend to continue to fund this organization in the same amount as your two predecessors, about $* * * per year. At this level, your expected funding will represent only * * * percent of your expected total revenues of $* * *.In addition, as a result of the merger, you expect to have an accumulated surplus of $* * * million, which will represent about * * * percent of your total assets. This surplus is not dedicated to any sort of research, charity care, or educational program. You have not described any tax-exempt programs for which you intend to use this surplus. Maintaining a large surplus such as this is contrary to one of the factors in the community benefit standard established in Rev. Rul. 69-545, supraSee IHC, 325 F.3d at 1196.

Therefore, you will not operate for the primary purpose of providing healthcare services for the benefit of the community. Rather, the evidence shows that you will be controlled by, and operate primarily for the benefit of, your Member-Enrollees. Consequently, you do not qualify as an organization described in § 501(c)(3).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, you do not qualify for exemption as an organization described in § 501(c)(3) of the Code and you must file federal income tax returns.You have the right to file a protest if you believe this determination is incorrect. To protest, you must submit a statement of your views and fully explain your reasoning. You must submit the statement, signed by one of your officers, within 30 days from the date of this letter. We will consider your statement and decide if the information affects our determination.

Your protest statement should be accompanied by the following declaration:
Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have examined this protest statement, including accompanying documents, and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, the statement contains all the relevant facts, and such facts are true, correct, and complete.
You also have a right to request a conference to discuss your protest. This request should be made when you file your protest statement. An attorney, certified public accountant, or an individual enrolled to practice before the Internal Revenue Service may represent you. If you want representation during the conference procedures, you must file a proper power of attorney, Form 2848, Power of Attorney and Declaration of Representative, if you have not already done so. For more information about representation, see Publication 947, Practice before the IRS and Power of Attorney. All forms and publications mentioned in this letter can be found at www.irs.gov, Forms and Publications.If you do not file a protest within 30 days, you will not be able to file a suit for declaratory judgment in court because the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) will consider the failure to protest as a failure to exhaust available administrative remedies. Code § 7428(b)(2) provides, in part, that a declaratory judgment or decree shall not be issued in any proceeding unless the Tax Court, the United States Court of Federal Claims, or the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia determines that the organization involved has exhausted all of the administrative remedies available to it within the IRS.

If you do not intend to protest this determination, you do not need to take any further action. If we do not hear from you within 30 days, we will issue a final adverse determination letter. That letter will provide information about filing tax returns and other matters.

Please send your protest statement, Form 2848 and any supporting documents to this address:

    * * *

You may also fax your statement using the fax number shown in the heading of this letter. If you fax your statement, please call the person identified in the heading of this letter to confirm that he or she received your fax.If you have any questions, please contact the person whose name and telephone number are shown in the heading of this letter.

Thank you for your cooperation. We have sent a copy of this letter to your representative as indicated in your power of attorney.

                  Sincerely,
                  Karen Schiller,
                  Acting Director,
                  Exempt Organizations
                  Rulings & Agreements



IRS Issues TE/GE Memo on Processing Some Pending Exempt Organization Applications.

The IRS Tax-Exempt and Government Entities Division has issued a memorandum (TEGE-07-0314-0003) to provide guidance to its determination and technical units on determining the effective date of exemption of some organizations that have failed to file annual information returns for three consecutive years while their application for tax-exempt status is pending.

 

March 14, 2014Affected IRM: IRM 7.20.2

Expiration Date: March 14, 2015

MEMORANDUM FOR
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS DETERMINATIONS UNIT AND
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS TECHNICAL UNIT

FROM:
Stephen A. Martin
Acting Director,
Exempt Organizations Rulings and Agreements

SUBJECT:
Processing Guidelines for Certain Pending Applications of
Exempt Organizations that Fail to File Annual Information
Returns for Three Consecutive Years

This memorandum provides direction to the Exempt Organizations Determinations Unit (“EOD”) and Exempt Organizations Technical Unit (“EOT”) in determining the effective date of exemption of certain organizations seeking tax-exempt status under IRC section 501(a) that have failed to file annual information returns for three consecutive years while their application is pending.Under IRC section 6033(j), if a tax-exempt organization that is required to file an annual information return under IRC sections 6033(a) or (i) fails to file such return for three consecutive years, such organization’s status as an organization exempt from tax under IRC section 501(a) shall be considered revoked on and after the date set by the Secretary for the filing of the third return.

Due to excess inventory, EOD and EOT have applications from organizations that may have failed to file annual information returns for three consecutive years while their applications have been pending. In such circumstances, the exempt status of these organizations may be revoked before they have received a ruling from EOD or EOT. These applications are treated as requests for reinstatement. If an organization is eventually granted a favorable ruling, determination of the effective date of the tax-exemption of such organization requires additional time and resources on the part of the organization and the IRS. Many of the organizations are operated by volunteers and thus may face challenges in meeting or understanding their filing requirements before receiving a ruling from the IRS.

Accordingly, effective upon issuance of this memoradum, if a specialist is working an application of an organization that (i) filed its application for exemption with the IRS prior to the due date of filing its Form 990-N, 990-EZ, 990, or 990-PF for the third tax year after its formation date, and (ii) he/she has determined that the organization should receive a favorable determination with regard to the exempt status of the organization, then take the following steps:

      1. Check IDRS to see if the organization has filed a Form 990-N, 990-EZ, 990 or 990-PF at least once in the last three years. If it has, grant exemption effective as of the appropriate date under our normal procedures (e.g., formation date or post-mark date).

2. If not, the following must be done:

        a. Update status to IDRS code “97” effective the due date of the third return and wait for the organization to be listed on the revocation list. It will take three weeks on average to be on the revocation list.

b. Input IDRS transaction code “TC 590.”

c. Send e-mail to the Correspondence Unit (*TE/GE-EO-Correspondence Unit)

          i. with the heading “NO GAP CASE — REINSTATEMENT DATE CORRECTION” and

ii. in the body of the e-mail include the following statement: “We are processing the application of [Name of Organization], [EIN], as a no-gap reinstatement case. The reinstatement date of the organization on the auto-revocation list should be [Effective date of revocation from step a.].”

        d. Grant exemption effective as of the date the specialist would have otherwise granted recognition on the determination letter and Form 8670 as if there was no automatic revocation (e.g., formation date or post-mark date).

e. Add the following “no gap” addendum to the letter:

You formed [Date 1] and filed your Form [Application number], Application for Recognition of Exemption under Section 501(a), on[DATE 2]. You failed to file a required annual return or notice (Form 990, Form 990-EZ, Form 990-PF or Form 990-N) for three consecutive years after you were formed and while your application was pending. As a result, your tax-exempt status was automatically revoked on [Date 3], the due date of your third year return or notice. We are treating your Form [Application number] as an application for reinstatement and are recognizing your exemption as reinstated on the same day it was automatically revoked. As a result, you are recognized as tax-exempt continuously from the effective date of exemption as reflected at the top of this letter.

Any questions are to be directed to Jon Waddell, Manager, Rulings and Agreements, Determinations, Area 2.The contents of the memorandum will be incorporated into IRM 7.20.2.

cc:
www.irs.gov




EO Update: e-News for Charities & Nonprofits - March 20, 2014

1.  IRS phone forum scheduled March 27:
Veterans Organizations: Help from the IRS on Key Rules


 

This phone forum, which begins at 2 p.m. EDT, will cover the following topics:

  • Exemption Requirements
  • Exempt Activities
  • Unrelated Business Income (including gaming)
  • Recordkeeping
  • Employment Issues
  • Group Rulings
  • Filing Requirements

Go here to register for this event.

More information: Publication 3386: Veterans’ Organizations Tax Guide


  2.  Changes made to EO Select Check


Exempt Organizations Select Check, the on-line tool that allows users to search for an exempt organization and check certain information about its federal tax status and filings, has been updated.

The changes include:

  • Wording changes throughout the application, most notably changing Tax Deductible Contributions to Tax Deductible Charitable Contribution wherever it appeared
  • Adding the reinstatement date column
  • Removing federal government from the dropdown list of deductibility status codes and removing its explanation from the help text in the Pub 78 section
  • Adding 00 to the dropdown list of exemption types and adding its explanation to the help text in the revocation section
  • Removing 501(c)(1) (Federal Credit Unions) from the dropdown list of exemption types and removing its explanation from the help text in the revocation section

  3.  Exempt Organizations Business Master File Extract page updated


The EO BMF page, which was recently updated, includes cumulative information on exempt organizations. The data are available monthly by state and region.
In addition to the page’s new look:

  • Files are now in comma separated value format, which can be opened by most computer applications including Excel
  • Data is displayed via a map versus by list of states

See the updated documentation guide for further information about the data, including a crosswalk, which shows the changes from one document to another (generally showing where the field was in the first document and where it is in the second document).


  4.  Register for EO workshop


Register for our upcoming workshop for small and medium-sized
501(c)(3) organizations on:

  • April 30 – Provo, UT
    Hosted by Brigham Young University – Marriott School

  5.  Revenue Procedure 2014-22 posted


This revenue procedure revokes Revenue Procedure 79–6, which is inconsistent with the redesigned Form 990. Organizations may no longer use Department of Labor forms to report information requested on the Form 990.


  6.  IRS phone forum Q&As/presentations posted


See responses to inquiries from attendees of these recent phone forums:

Review recently posted phone forum presentations posted on the
IRS Stay Exempt Resource Library page:

Periodically review the phone forums page for registration information on upcoming presentations.




IRS LTR: Organization Is Instrumentality of State and May Receive Contributions.

The IRS ruled that a member institution of a state board that approves operating and capital budgets of each institution in the state’s university and community college system is an instrumentality of the state and may receive charitable contributions under section 170(c)(1).

Index Number: 501.03-26
Release Date: 3/14/2014
Date: August 9, 2013

Refer Reply To: CC:TEGE:EOEG:E0 – PLR-127207-12

Dear * * *:
This is in reply to your letter dated June 18, 2012, requesting a ruling on behalf of Organization. You requested a ruling that Organization is an instrumentality of State and is eligible to receive charitable contributions under Section 170(c)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code (“Code”).

FACTS AND REPRESENTATIONS

State Board was established in Year 1 by act of State legislature; the act was codified at Statute. State Board is an integral part of State. The government, management and control of the State university and community college system are vested in State Board. State Board approves the operating and capital budgets of each of the institutions in the State university and community college system. Organization is a member institution of the State Board and serves a governmental purpose of educating the citizens of the State. Organization was established as an instrumentality of State operating as a public institution of higher learning. The purpose of Organization is to support educational excellence in State. Organization represents that contributions made to it are for exclusively public purposes.
Organization is governed by State Board composed of x members (including four ex officio members who shall be the Governor, the Commissioners of Education and Agriculture, and the Executive Director of Commission. A majority of the members of the State Board are appointed by the Governor of State.

Organization is attached for administrative purposes to Commission, which establishes a formula for distribution of public funds through which Organization receives State operating and capital appropriations. State exercises oversight of Organization’s finances through Commission.

LAW

Revenue Ruling 57-128, 1957-1 C.B. 311, sets forth the factors to be taken into account in determining whether an entity is an instrumentality of one or more governmental units: (1) whether the organization is used for a governmental purpose and performs a governmental function; (2) whether performance of its function is on behalf of one or more states or political subdivisions; (3) whether there are any private interests involved, or whether the states or political subdivisions have the power and interests of an owner; (4) whether control and supervision of the organization is vested in a public authority or authorities; (5) whether express or implied statutory or other authority is necessary for the creation and/or use of the organization, and whether this authority exists; and (6) the degree of financial autonomy of the entity and the source of its operating expenses. Each of these factors must be evaluated in order to determine if Organization is an instrumentality of the State.
Section 170(a)(1) allows, subject to certain limitations, a deduction for charitable contributions as defined in section 170(c), payment of which is made within the taxable year. Section 170(c)(1) includes in the definition of “charitable contribution” a contribution or gift made for exclusively public purposes to or for the use of a state, a possession of the United States, a political subdivision of either a state or possession of the United States, the United States, or the District of Columbia. Entities eligible to receive tax deductible contributions include not only governmental units described in section 170(c)(1), but also wholly owned instrumentalities of states and political subdivisions.

ANALYSIS

Organization satisfies the first factor listed in Rev. Rul. 57-128, which requires it to have a governmental purpose and perform a governmental function. The purpose of Organization is to support education in State.
Organization satisfies the second factor, as it performs its function on behalf of State Board. State Board is established pursuant to Statute. State Board is an integral part of State. Organization therefore performs its function on behalf of State.

Organization satisfies the third factor, because no private interests are involved and the State has the power and interest of an owner. Organization is controlled by State Board, an integral part of the State. State Board approves the operating and capital budgets of Organization.

Organization satisfies the fourth factor. Organization is governed by State Board. State Board was created by act of State legislature. Control and supervision of Organization is therefore vested in a public authority.

Organization satisfies the fifth factor, because State Board was created by an act of the State legislature. Organization is a member institution of State Board and provides educational benefits to the people of State. Thus, statutory authority is necessary for the Organization to provide educational services to State.

Organization satisfies the sixth factor, which considers the source of operating expenses as well as the degree of financial autonomy. Organization’s source of operating funds is from money, services and property from Commission. Organization is statutorily limited to specific purposes.. State indirectly controls Organization’s finances because State controls State Board. A majority of State Board members are appointed by the Governor. Committee requires Organization to maintain financial records consistent with the requirements of Committee.

Organization satisfies all factors enumerated in Revenue Ruling 57-128. Accordingly, Organization is an instrumentality of State and is eligible to receive charitable contributions under Section 170(c)(1) of the Code.

Except as expressly provided herein, no opinion is expressed or implied concerning the tax consequences of any aspect of any transaction or item discussed or referenced in this letter.

This ruling is directed only to the taxpayer requesting it. Section 6110(k)(3) provides that it may not be used or cited as precedent.

A copy of this letter must be attached to any income tax return to which it is relevant. Alternatively, taxpayers filing their returns electronically may satisfy this requirement by attaching a statement to their return that provides the date and control number of this letter.

The rulings contained in this letter are based upon information and representations submitted by the taxpayer. While this office has not verified any of the material submitted in support of the request for rulings, it is subject to verification on examination.

Sincerely,

Casey A. Lothamer
Senior Technician Reviewer
(Exempt Organizations Branch)
(Tax Exempt & Government Entities)

AUGUST 9, 2013
Citations: LTR 201411018




Camp's Proposed Deduction Floor Troubles Charities.

A proposed 2 percent floor for charitable deductions in the tax reform plan introduced by House Ways and Means Committee Chair Dave Camp, R-Mich., has charity groups fearing it could cause donations to drop.

For the last five years, federal budget season has been a time of unease for organizations that promote charities and charitable donations, as each year the Obama administration has proposed capping the deduction for charitable contributions at 28 percent for upper-income taxpayers.

Now those groups must contend with another plan to limit the deduction that has been proposed as part of tax reform.

The Tax Reform Act of 2014, released on February 26 as a discussion draft by House Ways and Means Committee Chair Dave Camp, R-Mich., proposes a 2 percent floor on the deduction as well as several other provisions pertaining to charitable giving.

Although the charitable giving community has reacted favorably to some of the proposals, the proposed floor is prompting worry among some groups and outright opposition from others.

The provision would allow taxpayers to deduct their contributions to charity only to the extent the donations exceed 2 percent of the taxpayers’ adjusted gross income, according to a Ways and Means staff summary.  The reduction would apply first to contributions subject to the 25 percent of AGI limitation, then to qualified conservation contributions, and finally to contributions subject to the 40 percent limitation, the summary explains.

Because charitable giving is linked to the economy’s health, the Camp proposal safeguards and encourages donations to charities, according to the bill’s executive summary, which predicts charitable giving would rise by $2.2 billion a year because of the charitable reforms under the plan. Because 95 percent of Americans would no longer have to itemize, they would enjoy lower taxes without the complexity of itemizing, while the remaining 5 percent who would continue itemizing could still claim the charitable deduction if their donations were more than 2 percent of their income, the executive summary says.

The executive summary also notes that, unlike the Obama administration’s budget proposals, the plan would not cap the amount of the deduction, and it would extend the deadline for making deductible contributions in a tax year to April 15 of the following tax year.

But some observers predict that the impact on the deduction and on charitable giving would be significant. David L. Thompson of the National Council of Nonprofits cited a Congressional Budget Office study that predicted charitable donations would decrease under a 2 percent floor. He also challenged the reality of Ways and Means’ estimate of $2.2 billion more in charitable giving, calling it a guess.

Charities depend on charitable giving to carry out the work they do, which is why the deduction should not be tweaked or played with, Thompson said. Limiting the tax break, he said, is “a bullet point on a list of issues in Washington; in the real world, it’s scaring donors, it’s changing the relationship between the community of nonprofits and government.”

Sue Santa of the Council on Foundations (COF) said her group’s initial reaction is concern, though she added that the COF is still studying the proposed 2 percent floor to figure out what it would mean. She said the Camp plan is more complex than the Obama administration’s proposed 28 percent cap because the reform bill as a whole would cause far more individuals to use the standard deduction.

Other Provisions of Note

The Camp plan also would require all tax-exempt organizations that file Form 990, “Return of Organization Exempt From Income Tax,” and related returns to do so electronically. Under current law, e-filing is required only if an organization files at least 250 returns (such as Form W-2 or Form 1099) a year.Santa said the COF supports the concept of mandatory e-filing but added that smaller organizations may need more time and resources before they can file that way. It is important that information that foundations and charities share with the IRS, such as investment data, can be transferred to an electronic filing medium, she added.

“We don’t doubt this is achievable; we just want to be sure that this is implemented in a reasonable way so that the foundations and charities can conform,” Santa said.

A provision long favored by the philanthropic community would replace the 2 percent excise tax on the net investment income of private foundations (which can drop to 1 percent if a foundation makes greater distributions) with a single flat rate of 1 percent. Santa said her organization is delighted the provision is part of Camp’s package, saying that the two-tier system actually creates a disincentive for foundations to distribute more funds in especially difficult times because it makes it more difficult for them to continue to qualify for the lower rate in subsequent years.

Santa also supports extending to April 15 the deadline for making charitable donations for the prior year. “We’re really encouraged by any provision that might increase the amount of charitable giving,” she said.

What They’d Like to See

Asked what is not in the tax reform plan that should be, Thompson said his organization would like to make permanent the charitable giving extenders that now have to be renewed every year, especially the tax break for food inventory donations. Renewing the extenders in December and making them retroactive does not help people waiting for food donations, he said.”You can’t retroactively give a truckload of bananas in December that rotted in January,” Thompson remarked.

Santa said her organization would like to see the provision permitting tax-free charitable distributions from IRAs expanded and made permanent.

MARCH 14, 2014
by Fred Stokeld



Credit Union Group Urges Preservation of Tax Exemption.

The tax-exempt status of federal credit unions should be preserved because ending it would cost jobs, likely cause banks to raise costs for their customers, and be inconsistent with tax reform efforts, the National Association of Federal Credit Unions said in a March 11 letter to House Ways and Means Committee Chair Dave Camp, R-Mich.

March 11, 2014

The Honorable Dave Camp
Chairman
Committee on Ways and Means
1102 Longworth House Office Building
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Chairman Camp:

On behalf of the National Association of Federal Credit Unions (NAFCU), the only trade association that exclusively represents the interests of our nation’s federal credit unions, I write to thank you once again for your continued support of credit unions and their 97 million members and to respond to the tired attacks that the banking trades continue to make against credit unions.

In the American Bankers Association’s own words, “A specific tax imposed on a single industry sector is wholly inconsistent with the fundamental purpose of tax reform — to broaden the tax base, lower rates, simplify the code, and reduce economic distortions that impede growth.” Yet time and time again they continue to attack credit unions and ask for them to be taxed. Credit unions serve a unique purpose and despite what the bankers claim, there remain significant regulatory and statutory differences between not-for-profit member-owned credit unions and other types of financial institutions — including limits on who they can serve and their ability to raise capital. Taxing credit unions would penalize the members they serve and be wholly inconsistent with the fundamental purpose of tax reform.

As we have communicated to you before, the cumulative benefit credit unions provide the greater economy totals over $17 billion a year according to an independent study released by NAFCU just last month. As the study also shows, altering the tax status of credit unions would have a devastating impact not only on credit union members across the country, but also on consumers and small businesses in general. Eliminating the credit union tax exemption would result in the loss of 150,000 jobs a year, a shrinking of the GDP and a net loss of revenue to the federal government. You can read the study at: www.nafcu.org/cutaxexemption. A summary of the results of the study is enclosed with this letter.

While the banking trades claim credit unions threaten the business done by other financial institutions, this is simply untrue. What they did not tell you is that a 2011 study commissioned by the Small Business Administration’s Office of Advocacy found that bank business lending was largely unaffected by changes in credit unions’ business lending, and credit unions’ business lending can actually help offset declines in bank business lending during a recession (James A. Wilcox, The Increasing Importance of Credit Unions in Small Business Lending, Small Business Research Summary, SBA Office of Advocacy, No. 387 (Sept. 2011)). The study shows that during the 2007-2010 financial crisis, banks’ small business lending decreased, while credit union business lending increased in terms of the percentage of their assets both before and during the crisis. Clearly, credit unions were making loans when banks did not want to.

Furthermore, the banking trades claim that credit unions have unfair advantages and should be taxed. If credit unions have such an extraordinary advantage, why aren’t banks lining up to convert to credit unions? What the bankers forgot to mention in their attack is that nearly 1/3 of banks are Subchapter S corporations and pay no corporate income tax. Yes, they pay other taxes, but so do credit unions and their over 97 million member-owners who pay personal income taxes on the dividends they get from their credit union. Credit unions actually pay many taxes, such as payroll taxes and state and local taxes. Next time a banker complains to you about credit unions, we would urge you to ask them if they have looked at converting to one.

As you know, during the financial crisis credit unions continued to lend to consumers and small businesses that were left behind by our nation’s mega-banks. Credit unions didn’t participate in the TARP bailout and are proud of their continued service to Main Street America. Perhaps if the banking trades put the same focus on serving their customers that they seem to put on credit unions, the banks they represent would not have needed such a massive bailout.

In other countries where the tax exemption has been eliminated for credit unions, the number of credit unions has declined dramatically. Even the bankers have admitted in previous correspondence to you that new taxes on financial institutions would amount to a levy on lending, savings, credit and other financial services to the American consumer and our nation’s small businesses and would adversely impact economic growth and job creation. If the credit union tax exemption was removed, many credit unions would convert to banks or just go away. Without credit unions, which serve to provide checks and balances in the marketplace, for-profit banks would likely increase rates and fees on consumers.

Thank you once again for your support of credit unions and for the opportunity to respond to these attacks against our industry. If my colleagues or I can be of assistance to you, or if you have any questions regarding this issue, please feel free to contact me or NAFCU’s Vice President of Legislative Affairs Brad Thaler at (703) 842-2204.

Sincerely,

B. Dan Berger
President and CEO
National Association of Federal
Credit Unions
Arlington, VA
cc:
Members of the House Ways and Means Committee




IRS Formalizes Decision to Stop Using Labor Department Forms for Parts of Exempt Org Returns.

The IRS has revoked (Rev. Proc. 2014-22, 2014-11 IRB 646) a 1979 revenue procedure (Rev. Proc. 79-6) that provided for the use of some Labor Department forms in the place of some portions of the Form 990 exempt organization annual information return.

The use of these Labor Department forms is no longer appropriate, and the Form 990 and instructions were revised for tax years beginning in 2008 to no longer permit their use, the IRS stated.

Citations: Rev. Proc. 2014-22; 2014-11 IRB 646
26 CFR 601.602: Tax Forms and instructions.

(Also part I, section 6033; 1.6033-2)

Revenue Procedure 79-6, 1979-1 C.B. 485, provided for the use of certain United States Department of Labor forms in place of certain portions of the Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax. The Internal Revenue Service determined that the use of these Department of Labor forms is no longer appropriate, and the Form 990 and Instructions were revised for tax years beginning in 2008 to no longer permit their use. Requiring uniform filing of financial data of all exempt organizations improves transparency by making it easier for the public and the IRS to compare the financial data of organizations. In addition, requiring organizations that must e-file to provide financial information electronically, rather than in a separate attachment, improves tax administration. Accordingly, Revenue Procedure 79-6 is hereby revoked.

DRAFTING INFORMATION

The principal author of this revenue procedure is Melinda Williams of the Exempt Organizations, Tax Exempt and Government Entities Division. For further information regarding this ruling, contact Ms. Williams at 202-317-8532 (not a toll free Number).




EO Update: e-News for Charities and Nonprofits - March 4, 2014.

1.  What if the IRS needs more information on your application?

New sample questions will help you know what to expect.

2.  Review Revenue Procedure 2014-19

Revenue Procedure 2014-19 clarifies that EO Determination letters continue to be eligible for expedited handling under section 9 of Revenue Procedure 2014-4.

3.  Register for EO workshops

Register for our upcoming workshops for small and medium-sized

501(c)(3) organizations on:

March 12 and 13 – Kansas City, MO

Hosted by University of Missouri -Kansas City-Midwest Center for Nonprofit Leadership/Bloch School of Management

March 19 and 20 – Phoenix, AZ

Hosted by ASU – Lodestar Center for Philanthropy & Nonprofit Innovation

April 30 – Provo, UT

Hosted by Brigham Young University – Marriott School

4.  IRS offers Health Care Tax Tips to help individuals understand tax provisions in the Affordable Care Act

The IRS is offering educational Health Care Tax Tips to help individuals understand how the Affordable Care Act may affect their taxes.

The IRS has designed the Health Care Tax Tips to help people understand what they need to know for the federal individual income tax returns they are filing this year, as well as for future tax returns. This includes information on the Premium Tax Credit and making health care coverage choices.

Read the news release.

5.  IRS releases the “Dirty Dozen” Tax Scams for 2014

This annual list of tax scams reminds taxpayers to use caution during tax season to protect themselves against a wide range of schemes ranging from identity theft to return preparer fraud.

6.  Charities and Their Volunteers phone forum presentation posted

Check out this new presentation. Soon all EO phone forums will be posted as Adobe Captivate (an electronic learning tool) presentations on the IRS Stay Exempt Resource Library page. Captivate combines presenter audio and Microsoft PowerPoint to create a more entertaining and informative presentation.

Also, periodically review the phone forums page for registration information on upcoming presentations.

7.  Interactive Form 1023 updated

The form, which incorporates changes suggested by the public, includes updated user fees.

Copyright Notice

This is a work of the U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. IRS Exempt Organizations encourages readers to reuse these articles in their own organization publications and websites and thereby help disseminate the information beyond the scope of EO Update’s subscribers.

If you have a technical or procedural question relating to Exempt Organizations, visit the Charities and Nonprofits homepage on the IRS.gov Web site.

If you have a specific question about exempt organizations, call EO Customer Account Services at 1-877-829-5500.




Proposal to Reduce Value of Charitable Deductions Resurfaces in Obama Budget.

The Obama administration is again proposing to reduce the value of the deduction for charitable contributions and other itemized deductions for upper-income taxpayers.

The Obama administration is again proposing to reduce the value of the deduction for charitable contributions and other itemized deductions for upper-income taxpayers.

The proposal, included in the budget blueprint  the administration released March 4, would reduce the value of itemized deductions to 28 percent for taxpayers in the 33 percent, 35 percent, or 39.6 percent tax brackets. The cap, which has never gone far in Congress, has been proposed by the administration for six straight years.

As they have in the past, groups representing charities expressed unhappiness at the proposal’s return, saying it could cause charitable giving to drop. “Capping the charitable deduction at 28 percent could cost the nonprofit sector up to $9 billion a year, dealing a big blow to our charities and our economy,” Sandra Swirski, executive director of the Alliance for Charitable Reform, said in a statement . “The charitable deduction is a lifeline, not a loophole, and we strongly urge the President to reevaluate his stance on cutting the deduction,” Swirski said.

The Council on Foundations (COF) also voiced its displeasure. “Since 2009, President Obama has proposed a 28 percent cap on itemized deductions, including the charitable deduction,” COF President and CEO Vikki Spruill said in a statement. “Both the Council and nonprofit sector have repeatedly expressed disappointment with this approach because the charitable deduction is a proven way to strengthen communities. Capping it would have a cascading impact on nonprofits and philanthropic organizations across the country. If donors have less incentive to give, donations will decline by billions of dollars — cutting a lifeline for millions of Americans.”

The budget plan also would establish a “Fair Share Tax” — also known as the “Buffett rule” — on upper-income taxpayers. Although the tax would allow for a charitable deduction, Swirski noted, the tax break also would be capped at 28 percent.

“While the so-called Buffett Rule does recognize the unique nature of the charitable deduction, it still caps that deduction, which will ultimately result in decreased charitable giving,” Swirski said.

The 28 percent cap is the second major proposal to limit the charitable deduction to be made in the past week. The tax reform package  introduced February 26 by House Ways and Means Committee Chair Dave Camp, R-Mich., includes a 2 percent adjusted gross income floor on charitable giving. Tim Delaney, president and CEO of the National Council of Nonprofits, said that idea “could have devastating real-world consequences by diminishing charitable resources for communities.”

Another provision that has been proposed before would replace the two rates of tax on the investment income of private foundations with a single rate of 1.35 percent. Swirski said that her organization supports a single rate but that a flat 1 percent rate, as Camp has proposed in his tax reform plan, would be better than 1.35 percent. Spruill also expressed support for a flat 1 percent rate.

The American opportunity tax credit, which is designed to help families afford college, would become permanent under the budget proposal. The provision also appeared in last year’s budget plan. Other provisions in the plan that have come up before would prohibit charitable deductions for contributions of conservation easements on golf courses and curb excessive deductions for contributions of historic preservation easements. There also is a provision to make permanent incentives for donating conservation easements.

Spruill said that proposed new penalties for failure to file IRS information returns electronically could disadvantage small nonprofits and that COF “will assess how this will impact the foundation community.”

by Fred Stokeld




IRS LTR: Association's Exemption Not Affected by Transactions with For-Profit Sub.

Citations: LTR 201409009

The IRS ruled that the transfer of cash from a nonprofit association that operates a cemetery to a for-profit subsidiary and other transactions involved in preparing to own and operate a funeral home will not affect the association’s tax-exempt status and will not result in unrelated business taxable income.

UIL: 501.13-00, 512.00-00, 512.10-00

Release Date: 2/28/2014

Date: December 4, 2013

Dear * * *:

We have considered your ruling request dated August 22, 2013, requesting rulings under §§ 501(c)(13) and 512 of the Internal Revenue Code.

FACTS

You (Taxpayer) are a non-profit association that operates a cemetery. You are recognized as exempt from federal income tax under § 501(c)(13).

You intend to create a wholly owned, for-profit subsidiary corporation, which will be formed as a Subchapter C corporation, for the purpose of owning and operating a funeral home (Subsidiary). As part of this plan, you propose to enter into the following transactions:

In exchange for 100% of the Subsidiary’s stock, you will transfer at least $x of cash and a nonexclusive license to use your name and address.

You will lease approximately 1,250 square feet of your existing building for arrangements and administrative offices for a fair market value rental rate which will be determined by you and the Subsidiary through an arm’s length negotiation. The employees that engage in the operations and marketing of the funeral home will be employees solely of the Subsidiary.

To the extent that any of the Subsidiary’s employees perform services related to your operations, you will reimburse the Subsidiary for the cost of such services on a fair market value basis. Likewise, you may perform certain administrative services for the Subsidiary (e.g., accounting, billing and collection services). However, in the event that you render these services, the Subsidiary will compensate you for such services on a fair market value basis.

The Subsidiary’s Board of Directors will consist of no less than six members. Under no circumstances will the Subsidiary’s Board of Directors include an individual that is then currently serving as one of your Trustees or employees or any other person directly involved in your day-to-day operations of your cemetery business. The Subsidiary will keep its own books and records separate from you.

The business purpose of the transaction is to provide for your customer’s needs in one location in an effort to better serve your customers.

RULINGS REQUESTED

1. The transfer of cash and contributed assets by the Taxpayer to the Subsidiary, ownership of the Subsidiary’s stock, the lease of the Taxpayer’s land to the Subsidiary, the provision of services to the Subsidiary by the Taxpayer and to the Taxpayer by the Subsidiary in exchange for fair compensation, and the receipt of dividends by the Taxpayer from the Subsidiary will not adversely affect the Taxpayer’s status as a tax exempt organization under § 501(c)(13).

2. Based on the facts presented, the Taxpayer will not be deemed to be engaged in the day-to-day management of the Subsidiary.

3. The dividends you receive from the Subsidiary will not constitute unrelated business taxable income to the Taxpayer pursuant to § 512(a)(1) by virtue of § 512(b)(1).

LAW

I.R.C. § 501(c)(13) provides an exemption from federal income tax for cemetery companies owned and operated exclusively for the benefit of their members or which are not operated for profit; and any corporation chartered solely for the purpose of the disposal of bodies by burial or cremation which is not permitted by its charter to engage in any business not necessarily incidental to that purpose, provided no part of the organization’s net earnings inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.

I.R.C. § 511 imposes a tax on the unrelated business taxable income of organizations exempt under § 501(c).

I.R.C. § 512(a)(1) defines “unrelated business taxable income” as the gross income an organization derives from any unrelated trade or business (defined in § 513) it regularly carries on, less allowable deductions, with certain modifications.

I.R.C. § 512(b)(1) excludes dividends received by the tax-exempt organization from the computation of unrelated business taxable income under § 512(a)(1).

Rev. Rul. 64-109, 1964-1 C.B. 190, held that a cemetery may not, consistent with § 501(c)(13), engage in activities not necessarily incidental to its burial purpose. The ruling concluded that, because operating a mortuary is not necessary to procuring, selling, holding, and using land solely as a burial ground, an organization that engaged in such a business was subject to loss of its exempt status.

Rev. Rul. 76-91, 1976-1 C.B. 150, held that an organization will not jeopardize its exemption under § 501(c)(3), even though it deals with related parties in a commercial context, as long as the dealings are at arm’s length and prices are set by qualified and independent appraisers.

In Restland Memorial Park v. United States, 371 F. Supp. 164 (N.D. Tex. 1974), aff’d, 509 F.2d 187 (5th Cir. 1974), a cemetery’s net earnings were found to inure to private individuals, precluding exemption under § 501(c)(13), where it allowed a related for-profit mortuary to benefit from its efforts without compensation. There, an individual who controlled the cemetery also owned a for-profit funeral home located on the cemetery grounds. The funeral home was managed and controlled by the same individual who controlled the cemetery and used the cemetery’s name in joint advertising campaigns. The court held that inurement occurred, inter alia, through the funeral home’s “trade of goodwill” originally built up by the non-profit cemetery; the joint operation had entwined the cemetery’s goodwill with that of the funeral home and related for-profit operations, for the benefit of the for-profit operations.

For federal income tax purposes, a parent corporation and its subsidiaries are separate taxable entities so long as the purposes for which the subsidiary is incorporated are the equivalent of business activities, or the subsidiary subsequently carries on business activities. Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943); Britt v. United States, 431 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1970). That is, where a corporation is organized with a bona fide intention that it will have some real and substantial business function, its existence may not generally be disregarded for tax purposes. However, where the parent corporation so controls the affairs of the subsidiary that it is merely an instrumentality of the parent, the corporate entity of the subsidiary may be disregarded. Krivo Industrial Supply Co. v. National Distillers and Chemical Corp., 483 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1973).

ANALYSIS

1. Tax-Exempt Status under 501(c)(13)

Section 501(c)(13) prohibits cemetery companies from engaging in any business incident to the purpose of the disposal of bodies by burial or cremation and from allowing its net earnings to inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual. You intend to form the Subsidiary for the substantial business purpose of operating a funeral home. Accordingly, the Subsidiary’s business activities will threaten your exempt status if those activities are attributable to you. However, your proposed facts are distinguishable from both Restland Memorial Park v. United States and Rev. Rul. 64-109. First, in Restland Memorial Park, the individual that controlled the cemetery also owned the for-profit funeral home that did business with the cemetery. In this case, the Subsidiary is completely independent from you, and no common ownership or control exists between you and the Subsidiary. Second, the organization in Rev. Rul. 64-109 directly operated a mortuary. Here, the independently operated Subsidiary, not you, will operate the funeral home. Therefore, the proposed transaction will not adversely affect your tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(13).

2. Day-to-Day Management of the Subsidiary

The information and representations presented indicate that you will not control and will not be involved in the day-to-day management of the Subsidiary. The Subsidiary will have its own board of directors and keep its own books and records. You state that, under no circumstances, will the Subsidiary’s board consist of any of your current Trustees or any employee involved in your day-to-day operations. The Subsidiary’s employees will engage solely in the operations and marketing of the funeral home. Nonetheless, the Subsidiary’s employees may perform services related to your operations, and your employees may perform certain administrative duties for the Subsidiary (e.g., accounting, billing and collection services). In this case, you state that reimbursement will be based on the fair market value of the services rendered. See Rev. Rul. 76-91.

3. Unrelated Business Taxable Income

Section 511 imposes a tax on the unrelated business taxable income of organizations exempt under § 501(c). Section 512(a)(1) defines “unrelated business taxable income” as the gross income an organization derives from any unrelated trade or business (defined in § 513) it regularly carries on, less allowable deductions, with certain modifications describe in § 512(b). Specifically, § 512(b)(1) excludes all dividends received by tax-exempt organizations. Accordingly, any dividends you receive from the Subsidiary will be excluded from calculation of UBTI.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we rule as follows.

1. The transfer of cash and contributed assets by the Taxpayer to the Subsidiary, ownership of the Subsidiary’s stock, the lease of the Taxpayer’s land to the Subsidiary, the provision of services to the Subsidiary by the Taxpayer and to the Taxpayer by the Subsidiary in exchange for fair compensation, and the receipt of dividends by the Taxpayer from the Subsidiary will not adversely affect the Taxpayer’s status as a tax exempt organization under § 501(c)(13).

2. Based on the facts presented, the Taxpayer will not be deemed to be engaged in the day-to-day management of the Subsidiary.

3. The dividends you receive from the Subsidiary will be excluded from the calculation unrelated business taxable income under § 512(a)(1) by reason of § 512(b)(1).

This ruling will be made available for public inspection under section 6110 of the Code after certain deletions of identifying information are made. For details, see enclosed Notice 437, Notice of Intention to Disclose. A copy of this ruling with deletions that we intend to make available for public inspection is attached to Notice 437. If you disagree with our proposed deletions, you should follow the instructions in Notice 437.

This ruling is directed only to the organization that requested it. Section 6110(k)(3) of the Code provides that it may not be used or cited by others as precedent.

This ruling is based on the facts as they were presented and on the understanding that there will be no material changes in these facts. This ruling does not address the applicability of any section of the Code or regulations to the facts submitted other than with respect to the sections described. Because it could help resolve questions concerning your federal income tax status, this ruling should be kept in your permanent records.

If you have any questions about this ruling, please contact the person whose name and telephone number are shown in the heading of this letter.

In accordance with the Power of Attorney currently on file with the Internal Revenue Service, we are sending a copy of this letter to your authorized representative.

Sincerely,

Theodore Lieber

Manager, Exempt Organizations

Technical Group 3

Enclosure

Notice 437




JCT Releases Technical Explanation of Camp Exempt Group Reform Proposals.

The Joint Committee on Taxation has released a report dated February 26 providing a technical explanation of exempt organization reform proposals included in the Tax Reform Act of 2014 discussion draft, by House Ways and Means Committee Chair Dave Camp, R-Mich.

TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 2014,

A DISCUSSION DRAFT OF THE CHAIRMAN OF

THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS

TO REFORM THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE:

TITLE V — TAX EXEMPT ENTITIES

Prepared by the Staff

of the

JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION

February 26, 2014

JCX-16-14

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

TITLE V — TAX EXEMPT ENTITIES

A. Unrelated Business Income Tax

1. Clarification of unrelated business income tax treatment

of entities exempt from tax under section 501(a) (sec.

5001 of the discussion draft and sec. 511 of the Code)

2. Name and logo royalties treated as unrelated business

taxable income (sec. 5002 of the discussion draft and

secs. 512 and 513 of the Code)

3. Unrelated business taxable income separately computed

for each trade or business (sec. 5003 of the discussion

draft and sec. 512 of the Code)

4. Exclusion of research income from unrelated business

taxable income limited to publicly available research

(sec. 5004 of the discussion draft and sec. 512(b)(9) of

the Code)

5. Parity of charitable contribution limitation between

trusts and corporations for purposes of computing

unrelated business taxable income (sec. 5005 of the

discussion draft and sec. 512(b)(11) of the Code)

6. Increase in specific deduction against unrelated

business taxable income (sec. 5006 of the discussion

draft and sec. 512(b)(12) of the Code)

7. Repeal of exclusion from unrelated business taxable

income of gain or loss from the disposition of

distressed property (sec. 5007 of the discussion draft

and sec. 512(b)(16) of the Code)

8. Modify rules concerning qualified sponsorship payments

(sec. 5008 of the discussion draft and sec. 513(i) of

the Code)

B. Penalties

1. Increase in information return penalties (sec. 5101 of

the discussion draft and sec. 6652(c) of the Code)

2. Manager-level accuracy-related penalty on underpayment

of unrelated business income tax (sec. 5102 of the

discussion draft and secs. 6662 and 6662A of the Code)

C. Excise Taxes

1. Modification of taxes on excess benefit transactions

(intermediate sanctions) (sec. 5201 of the discussion

draft and sec. 4958 of the Code)

2. Modification of taxes on self-dealing (sec. 5202 of the

discussion draft and sec. 4941 of the Code)

3. Excise tax on failure to distribute within five years a

contribution to a donor advised fund (sec. 5203 of the

discussion draft and new sec. 4968 of the Code)

4. Simplification of excise tax on private foundation

investment income (sec. 5204 of the discussion draft and

sec. 4940 of the Code)

5. Repeal of exception for private operating foundation

failure to distribute income (sec. 5205 of the

discussion draft and sec. 4942 of the Code)

6. Excise tax based on investment income of private

colleges and universities (sec. 5206 of the discussion

draft and new sec. 4969 of the Code)

D. Requirements for Organizations Exempt From Tax

1. Repeal of tax-exempt status for professional sports

leagues (sec. 5301 of the discussion draft and sec.

501(c)(6) of the Code)

2. Repeal of exemption from tax for certain insurance

companies and CO-OP health insurance issuers (sec. 5302

of the discussion draft and sec. 501 of the Code)

3. In-State requirement for certain tax-exempt workmen’s

compensation insurance organizations (sec. 5303 of the

discussion draft and sec. 501(c)(27) of the Code)

4. Repeal of Type II and Type III supporting organizations

(sec. 5304 of the discussion draft and sec. 509(a)(3) of

the Code)

INTRODUCTION

This document1 provides a technical explanation of Title V of the Tax Reform Act of 2014, a discussion draft2 prepared by the Chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means that proposes to reform the Internal Revenue Code. Title V of the proposal addresses tax reform of tax exempt entities.

TITLE V — TAX EXEMPT ENTITIES

A. Unrelated Business Income Tax

PRESENT LAW

Tax exemption for certain organizations

Section 501(a) exempts certain organizations from Federal income tax. Such organizations include: (1) tax-exempt organizations described in section 501(c) (including among others section 501(c)(3) charitable organizations and section 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations); (2) religious and apostolic organizations described in section 501(d); and (3) trusts forming part of a pension, profit-sharing, or stock bonus plan of an employer described in section 401(a).

Section 115 excludes from gross income certain income of entities that perform an essential government function. The exemption applies to: (1) income derived from any public utility or the exercise of any essential governmental function and accruing to a State or any political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia; or (2) income accruing to the government of any possession of the United States, or any political subdivision thereof.

Unrelated business income tax, in general

An exempt organization generally may have revenue from four sources: contributions, gifts, and grants; trade or business income that is related to exempt activities (e.g., program service revenue); investment income; and trade or business income that is not related to exempt activities. The Federal income tax exemption generally extends to the first three categories, and does not extend to an organization’s unrelated trade or business income. In some cases, however, the investment income of an organization is taxed as if it were unrelated trade or business income.3

The unrelated business income tax (“UBIT”) generally applies to income derived from a trade or business regularly carried on by the organization that is not substantially related to the performance of the organization’s tax-exempt functions.4 An organization that is subject to UBIT and that has $1,000 or more of gross unrelated business taxable income must report that income on Form 990-T (Exempt Organization Business Income Tax Return).

Most exempt organizations may operate an unrelated trade or business so long as the organization remains primarily engaged in activities that further its exempt purposes. Therefore, an organization may engage in a substantial amount of unrelated business activity without jeopardizing exempt status. A section 501(c)(3) (charitable) organization, however, may not operate an unrelated trade or business as a substantial part of its activities.5 Therefore, the unrelated trade or business activity of a section 501(c)(3) organization must be insubstantial.

Organizations subject to tax on unrelated business income

Most exempt organizations are subject to the tax on unrelated business income. Specifically, organizations subject to the unrelated business income tax generally include: (1) organizations exempt from tax under section 501(a), including organizations described in section 501(c) (except for U.S. instrumentalities and certain charitable trusts);6 (2) qualified pension, profit-sharing, and stock bonus plans described in section 401(a);7 and (3) certain State colleges and universities.8

Exclusions from Unrelated Business Taxable Income

In general

Certain types of income are specifically exempt from unrelated business taxable income, such as dividends, interest, royalties, and certain rents,9 unless derived from debt-financed property or from certain 50-percent controlled subsidiaries.10 Other exemptions from UBIT are provided for activities in which substantially all the work is performed by volunteers, for income from the sale of donated goods, and for certain activities carried on for the convenience of members, students, patients, officers, or employees of a charitable organization. In addition, special UBIT provisions exempt from tax activities of trade shows and State fairs, income from bingo games, and income from the distribution of low-cost items incidental to the solicitation of charitable contributions. Organizations liable for tax on unrelated business taxable income may be liable for alternative minimum tax determined after taking into account adjustments and tax preference items.

Research income

Certain income derived from research activities of exempt organizations is excluded from unrelated business taxable income. For example, income derived from research performed for the United States, a State, and certain agencies and subdivisions is excluded.11 Income from research performed by a college, university or hospital for any person also is excluded.12 Finally, if an organization is operated primarily for purposes of carrying on fundamental research the results of which are freely available to the general public, all income derived by research performed by such organization for any person, not just income derived from research available to the general public, is excluded.13

Gain or loss from disposition of real property acquired from financial institutions in conservatorship or receivership

Section 512(b)(16) provides an exclusion from unrelated business taxable income for income from sales of property held for sale in the ordinary course of a trade or business by excluding gains and losses from the sale, exchange, or other disposition of certain real property and mortgages acquired from financial institutions that are in conservatorship or receivership. The exclusion is limited to properties designated by the taxpayer within nine months of acquisition as property held for sale, except that not more than one-half of property acquired in a single transaction may be so designated. The disposition generally must occur within 30 months of the date of acquisition.

Specific deduction against unrelated business taxable income

In computing unrelated business taxable income, an exempt organization may take a specific deduction of $1,000. This specific deduction may not be used to create a net operating loss that will be carried back or forward to another year.14

In the case of a diocese, province or religious order, or a convention or association of churches, a specific deduction is allowed with respect to each parish, individual church, district, or other local unit. The specific deduction is equal to the lower of $1,000 or the gross income derived from any unrelated trade or business regularly carried on by the local unit.15

Deduction against unrelated business taxable income for charitable contributions

In computing unrelated business taxable income, an exempt organization may deduct certain charitable contributions made to other organizations (generally, contributions that satisfy the requirements of section 170), whether or not directly connected with the carrying on of the trade or business. For most organizations subject to that tax on unrelated business income — i.e., those described in section 511(a) — the charitable contribution deduction is limited to 10 percent of the unrelated business taxable income, computed without regard to the deduction of charitable contributions.16 A separate rule applies in determining the charitable contribution deduction for charitable trusts described in section 511(b).17 For such trusts, the charitable contribution percentage limitations under section 170(b)(1)(A) and 170(b)(1)(B) generally apply in determining the trust’s charitable contribution deduction, but with the percentage limits being determined with respect to the trust’s unrelated business taxable income instead of its adjusted gross income.18

Qualified sponsorship payments

Under section 513(i), the activity of soliciting or receiving qualified sponsorship payments by a tax-exempt organization is not an unrelated trade or business. As a result, such payments are exempt from UBIT.

“Qualified sponsorship payments” are defined as any payment made by a person engaged in a trade or business with respect to which the person will receive no substantial return benefit other than the use or acknowledgment of the name or logo (or product lines) of the person’s trade or business in connection with the organization’s activities.19 Such a use or acknowledgment does not include advertising of such person’s products or services — meaning qualitative or comparative language, price information or other indications of savings or value, or an endorsement or other inducement to purchase, sell, or use such products or services.20 Thus, for example, if, in return for receiving a sponsorship payment, an organization promises to use the sponsor’s name or logo in acknowledging the sponsor’s support for an educational or fundraising event conducted by the organization, such payment will not be subject to UBIT. In contrast, if the organization provides advertising of a sponsor’s products, the payment made to the organization by the sponsor in order to receive such advertising will be subject to UBIT (provided that the other requirements for UBIT liability are satisfied).

The term “qualified sponsorship payment” does not include any payments where the amount of such payment is contingent, by contract or otherwise, upon the level of attendance at an event, broadcast ratings, or other factors indicating the degree of public exposure to an activity.21 The term also excludes payments that entitle the payor to the use or acknowledgment of the payor’s trade or business name or logo (or product lines) in tax-exempt organization periodicals.22 Such payments are outside the qualified sponsorship payment provision’s safe-harbor exclusion, and, therefore, are governed by generally applicable rules that determine whether the payment is subject to UBIT. Thus, for example, payments that entitle the payor to a depiction of the payor’s name or logo in a tax-exempt organization periodical may or may not be subject to UBIT depending on the application of rules regarding periodical advertising and nontaxable donor recognition. For this purpose, the term “periodical” means regularly scheduled and printed material published by (or on behalf of) the payee organization that is not related to and primarily distributed in connection with a specific event conducted by the payee organization. In addition, the safe-harbor exclusion for qualified sponsorship payments does not apply to payments made in connection with “qualified convention or trade show activities,” as defined in section 513(d)(3).23

To the extent that a portion of a payment would (if made as a separate payment) be a qualified sponsorship payment, such portion of the payment is treated as a separate payment.24

Operation of multiple unrelated trades or businesses

An organization determines its unrelated business taxable income by subtracting from its gross unrelated business income deductions directly connected with the unrelated trade or business.25 Under regulations, in determining unrelated business taxable income, an organization that operates multiple unrelated trades or businesses aggregates income from all such activities and subtracts from the aggregate gross income the aggregate of deductions.26 As a result, an organization may use a loss from one unrelated trade or business to offset gain from another, thereby reducing total unrelated business taxable income.

1. Clarification of unrelated business income tax treatment of entities exempt from tax under section 501(a) (sec. 5001 of the discussion draft and sec. 511 of the Code)

Description of Proposal

The proposal clarifies that an organization does not fail to be subject to tax on its unrelated business income as an organization exempt from tax under section 501(a) solely because the organization also is exempt, or excludes amounts from gross income, by reason of another provision of the Code. For example, if an organization is described in section 401(a) (and thus is exempt from tax under section 501(a)) and its income also is described in section 115 (relating to the exclusion from gross income of certain income derived from the exercise of an essential governmental function), its governmental status under section 115 does not cause it to be exempt from tax on its unrelated business income.

Effective Date

The proposal is effective for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2014.

2. Name and logo royalties treated as unrelated business taxable income (sec. 5002 of the discussion draft and secs. 512 and 513 of the Code)

Description of Proposal

The proposal modifies the UBIT treatment of the licensing of an organization’s name or logo generally to subject royalty income derived from such a license to UBIT. Specifically, the proposal amends section 513 (regarding unrelated trades or businesses) to provide that any sale or licensing by an organization of any name or logo of the organization (including any trademark or copyright related to a name or logo) is treated as an unrelated trade or business that is regularly carried on by the organization. In addition, the proposal amends section 512 (regarding unrelated business taxable income) to provide that income derived from any such licensing of a name or logo of the organization is included in the organization’s gross unrelated business taxable income, notwithstanding the provisions of section 512 that otherwise exclude certain types of passive income (including royalties) from unrelated business taxable income.27

Effective Date

The proposal is effective for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2014.

3. Unrelated business taxable income separately computed for each trade or business (sec. 5003 of the discussion draft and sec. 512 of the Code)

Description of Proposal

For an organization with more than one unrelated trade or business, the proposal requires that unrelated business taxable income first be computed separately with respect to each trade or business and without regard to the specific deduction generally allowed under section 512(b)(12). The organization’s unrelated business taxable income for a taxable year is the sum of the amounts (not less than zero) computed for each separate unrelated trade or business, less the specific deduction allowed under section 512(b)(12). A net operating loss deduction is allowed only with respect to a trade or business from which the loss arose.

The result of the proposal is that a loss from one trade or business for a taxable year may not be used to offset gain from a different unrelated trade or business for the same taxable year. The proposal generally does not, however, prevent an organization from using a loss from one taxable year to offset gain from the same unrelated trade or business activity in another taxable year, where appropriate.

Effective Date

The proposal generally is effective for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2014.

Special transition rules apply for net operating loss carryforwards and carrybacks. In the case of a net operating loss arising in a taxable year beginning before January 1, 2015, and carried over to a year beginning on or after such date, the new rule that allows a net operating loss deduction only with respect to the trade or business from which the loss arose shall not apply. In the case of a net operating loss arising in a taxable year beginning after December 31, 2014, and carried back to a taxable year beginning on or before such date, the net operating loss deduction is allowed only with respect to the trade or business from which the loss arose.

4. Exclusion of research income from unrelated business taxable income limited to publicly available research (sec. 5004 of the discussion draft and sec. 512(b)(9) of the Code)

Description of Proposal

The proposal modifies the exclusion of income from research performed by an organization operated primarily for purposes of carrying on fundamental research the results of which are freely available to the general public (section 512(b)(9)). Under the proposal, the organization may exclude from unrelated business taxable income under section 512(b)(9) only income from such fundamental research the results of which are freely available to the general public.

Effective Date

The proposal is effective for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2014.

5. Parity of charitable contribution limitation between trusts and corporations for purposes of computing unrelated business taxable income (sec. 5005 of the discussion draft and sec. 512(b)(11) of the Code)

Description of Proposal

The proposal modifies the charitable deduction percentage limit that applies under section 512(b)(11) in determining the charitable contribution deduction a charitable trust described in section 511(b) may take in computing its unrelated business taxable income to align with the limit that applies to a corporation. Under the proposal, the trust’s charitable contribution deduction is limited to 10 percent of its unrelated business taxable income computed without regard to the deduction for charitable contributions. The percentage limits of sections 170(b)(1)(A) and 170(b)(1)(B) no longer apply.

Effective Date

The proposal is effective for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2014.

6. Increase in specific deduction against unrelated business taxable income (sec. 5006 of the discussion draft and sec. 512(b)(12) of the Code)

Description of Proposal

The proposal increases the specific deduction described in section 512(b)(12) from $1,000 to $10,000 (or, in the case of a diocese, province or religious order, or a convention or association of churches, the lower of $10,000 or the gross income derived from any unrelated trade or business regularly carried on by each parish, individual church, district or other local unit).

Effective Date

The proposal is effective for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2014.

7. Repeal of exclusion from unrelated business taxable income of gain or loss from the disposition of distressed property (sec. 5007 of the discussion draft and sec. 512(b)(16) of the Code)

Description of Proposal

The proposal repeals the exclusion from unrelated business taxable income of gain or loss from the disposition of real property acquired from financial institutions in conservatorship or receivership (section 512(b)(16)).

Effective Date

The proposal is effective for property acquired after December 31, 2014.

8. Modify rules concerning qualified sponsorship payments (sec. 5008 of the discussion draft and sec. 513(i) of the Code)

Description of Proposal

The proposal modifies the definition of “qualified sponsorship payment” to exclude from the permitted substantial return benefit the use or acknowledgment of the sponsor’s product lines. In other words, if in exchange for a payment from a sponsor the exempt organization uses or acknowledges the sponsor’s product lines, the payment is not a qualified sponsorship payment. The proposal makes a conforming change (regarding the use or acknowledgment of product lines) to the exclusion from the qualified sponsorship payment safe-harbor for periodicals.

The proposal includes a special rule for an event with respect to which an organization receives an aggregate amount of sponsorship payments greater than $25,000. A payment with respect to such an event is not a qualified sponsorship payment unless any use or acknowledgment of the sponsor’s name or logo only appears with, and in substantially the same manner as, the names of a significant portion of the other donors to the organization with respect to such event. A significant portion of the donors to the organization with respect to an event is determined by taking into account both the total number of donors to the event and the amounts contributed to the event by such donors, but in no event shall fewer than two other donors be treated as a significant portion of other donors.

Effective Date

The proposal is effective for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2014.

B. Penalties

1. Increase in information return penalties (sec. 5101 of the discussion draft and sec. 6652(c) of the Code)

Present Law

In general

The Code imposes penalties in the event an exempt organization fails to make certain required disclosures or file required information returns.28 The penalties are not imposed if it is shown that a failure was due to reasonable cause.29 In certain situations, a penalty may also be imposed against certain persons who fail to make such a filing. Solely for this purpose, the term “person” means an officer, director, trustee, employee, or other individual who is under a duty to perform the act in respect to which the failure occurs.30

Failure to file an exempt organization or political organization annual information return (secs. 6652(c)(1)(A) and (B))

In the event of a failure by an exempt organization or political organization to file a return required under section 6033(a)(1) or 6012(a)(6), respectively, or a failure to include any of the information required to be shown on such a return or to show the correct information, section 6652(c)(1)(A) imposes a penalty on the exempt organization of $20 for each day during which the failure continues. The maximum penalty with respect to any one return is limited to the lesser of $10,000 or five percent of the gross receipts of the organization for the year. For organizations with gross receipts exceeding $1 million for the year, the daily penalty amount is increased from $20 to $100, and the maximum penalty is $50,000.

In the event an organization is subject to a penalty under section 6652(c)(1)(A) (described in the preceding paragraph), the Secretary may make a written demand on the organization specifying a reasonable future date by which the return shall be filed or the information furnished. If any person fails to comply with such a demand on or before the date specified in the demand, section 6652(c)(1)(B) imposes a penalty of $10 for each day after the expiration of the time specified in the demand during which the failure continues. The maximum penalty that may be imposed on all persons with respect to any one return is limited to $5,000.

Failure to make annual returns available for public inspection (sec. 6652(c)(1)(C))

Section 6104(d) generally requires certain organizations exempt from tax to make available for public inspection their three most recent annual information returns (Forms 990) and application for tax exemption. Section 527(j) requires certain political organizations to make disclosures of expenditures and contributions. In the event of a failure to comply with section 6104(d) with respect to an annual information return or the disclosure requirements of section 527(j), section 6652(c)(1)(C) imposes on any person failing to meet the requirements a penalty of $20 for each day during which the failure continues. The maximum penalty on all persons for failures with respect to any one return or report is limited to $10,000.

Failure to make application for exemption or notice of status available for public inspection (sec. 6652(c)(1)(D))

In the event of a failure to comply with 6104(d) with respect to any exempt status application materials or notice materials (as defined in section 6104(d)), section 6652(c)(1)(D) imposes on any person failing to meet the requirements a penalty of $20 for each day during which the failure continues.

Charitable trust returns; exempt organizations liquidating, dissolving, or terminating (sec. 6652(c)(2))

In the case of a failure to file a return required under section 6034(b) (relating to certain trusts other than split-interest trusts) or 6043(b) (relating to terminations, etc. of exempt organizations), section 6652(c)(2)(A) imposes a penalty on the organization or trust failing to file equal to $10 per day for each day during which the failure continues (up to a maximum of $5,000 per return).

In the event a penalty is imposed on the organization or trust under section 6652(c)(2)(A), the Secretary may make a written demand on the organization or trust specifying a reasonable future date by which a filing shall be made. If any person fails to comply with such a demand on or before the date specified in the demand, section 6652(c)(2)(B) imposes a penalty of $10 for each day after the expiration of the time specified in the demand during with the failure continues. The maximum penalty that may be imposed on all persons with respect to any one return is limited to $5,000.

In the case of a failure to file a return under section 6034(a) by a charitable split-interest trust, section 6652(c)(2)(C) provides that the penalties generally applicable to the failure to file an exempt organization return (under section 6652(c)(2)(A)) will apply, except that, in general (1) the five-percent limitation shall not apply, and (2) the increase in the penalty from $20 to $100 (and the maximum penalty from $10,000 to $50,000) shall apply to trusts with gross income in excess of $250,000. In addition to any penalty on the trust, if the person required to file the return knowingly fails to file it, the above penalty also is imposed on the person, who is personally liable for the penalty.

Failure to file a reportable transaction disclosure (sec. 6652(c)(3))

Section 6033(a)(2) generally requires an exempt organization to file a disclosure if it is a party to any prohibited tax shelter transaction within the meaning of section 4965(e) . In the case of a failure to file such a disclosure, section 6652(c)(3)(A) imposes a penalty on the organization (or, in some cases, on an entity manager) of $100 for each day during which the failure continues (up to a maximum of $50,000 per return).

In the event a penalty is imposed under section 6652(c)(3)(A), the Secretary may make a written demand on an entity or manager specifying a reasonable future date by which a filing shall be made. If any entity or manager fails to comply with such a demand on or before the date specified in the demand, section 6652(c)(3)(B) imposes a penalty of $100 for each day after the expiration of the time specified in the demand during with the failure continues. The maximum penalty that may be imposed on all entities and managers with respect to any one disclosure is limited to $10,000.

Description of Proposal

As described below, the proposal doubles each of the daily penalty amounts described above.

Failure to file an exempt organization or political organization annual information return (secs. 6652(c)(1)(A) and (B))

The proposal increases the daily penalties under section 6652(c)(1)(A) from $20 to $40 and from $100 to $200. The daily penalty on managers under section 6652(c)(1)(B) is increased from $10 to $20.

Failure to make annual returns available for public inspection (sec. 6652(c)(1)(C))

The proposal increases the daily penalty under section 6652(c)(1)(C) from $20 to $40.

Failure to make application for exemption or notice of status available for public inspection (sec. 6652(c)(1)(D))

The proposal increases the daily penalty under section 6652(c)(1)(D) from $20 to $40.

Charitable trust returns; exempt organizations liquidating, dissolving, or terminating (sec. 6652(c)(2))

The proposal increases the daily penalties under sections 6652(c)(2)(A), (B), and (C)(ii) from $10 to $20 and from $100 to $200.

Failure to file a reportable transaction disclosure (sec. 6652(c)(3))

The proposal increases the daily penalties under sections 6652(c)(3)(A) and (B) from $100 to $200.

Effective Date

The proposal is effective for information returns required to be filed on or after January 1, 2015.

2. Manager-level accuracy-related penalty on underpayment of unrelated business income tax (sec. 5102 of the discussion draft and secs. 6662 and 6662A of the Code)

Present Law

General accuracy-related penalty (sec. 6662)

An accuracy-related penalty under section 6662 applies to the portion of any underpayment that is attributable to (1) negligence, (2) any substantial understatement of income tax, (3) any substantial valuation misstatement, (4) any substantial overstatement of pension liabilities, or (5) any substantial estate or gift tax valuation understatement. If the correct income tax liability exceeds that reported by the taxpayer by the greater of 10 percent of the correct tax or $5,000 (or, in the case of corporations, by the lesser of (a) 10 percent of the correct tax (or $10,000 if greater) or (b) $10 million), then a substantial understatement exists and a penalty may be imposed equal to 20 percent of the underpayment of tax attributable to the understatement.31 Except in the case of tax shelters,32 the amount of any understatement is reduced by any portion attributable to an item if (1) the treatment of the item is supported by substantial authority, or (2) facts relevant to the tax treatment of the item were adequately disclosed and there was a reasonable basis for its tax treatment. The Secretary may prescribe a list of positions that the Secretary believes do not meet the requirements for substantial authority under this provision.

The section 6662 penalty generally is abated (even with respect to tax shelters) in cases in which the taxpayer can demonstrate that there was “reasonable cause” for the underpayment and that the taxpayer acted in good faith.33 The relevant regulations provide that reasonable cause exists where the taxpayer “reasonably relies in good faith on [a professional] tax advisor’s analysis of the pertinent facts and authorities [that] . . . unambiguously states that the tax advisor concludes that there is a greater than 50-percent likelihood that the tax treatment of the item will be upheld if challenged” by the IRS.34

With certain exceptions, section 6662 does not apply to any portion of an underpayment that is attributable to a reportable transaction understatement on which a penalty is imposed under section 6662A (discussed below).35

Accuracy-related penalty on understatements with respect to reportable transactions (sec. 6662A)

A separate accuracy-related penalty under section 6662A applies to “listed transactions” and to other “reportable transactions” with a significant tax avoidance purpose. The penalty rate and defenses available to avoid the penalty vary depending on whether the transaction was adequately disclosed.

Regulations under section 6011 require a taxpayer to disclose with its tax return certain information with respect to each “reportable transaction” in which the taxpayer participates.36 A reportable transaction is defined as one that the Secretary determines is required to be disclosed because it is determined to have a potential for tax avoidance or evasion.37 There are five categories of reportable transactions: listed transactions, confidential transactions, transactions with contractual protection, certain loss transactions and transactions of interest.38 Transactions falling under the first and last categories of reportable transactions are transactions that are described in publications issued by the Treasury Department and identified as one of these types of transaction. A listed transaction is defined as a reportable transaction that is the same as, or substantially similar39 to, a transaction specifically identified by the Secretary as a tax avoidance transaction for purposes of the reporting disclosure requirements.40

Description of Proposal

In the case of a substantial understatement of income tax under section 6662 that is attributable to the unrelated business income tax of an organization imposed under section 511, the proposal imposes a new penalty on any manager of such organization. The tax equals five percent of the underpayment attributable to such understatement. For this purpose, the term “manager” includes any officer, director, trustee, employee, or other individual who is under a duty to perform an act in respect of which the underpayment occurs. If more than one person is liable for the manager-level penalty with respect to an understatement, all such persons are jointly and severally liable with respect to such understatement. The maximum amount of manager-level penalty that may be imposed with respect to an understatement is $20,000.

In the case of any portion of a reportable understatement of unrelated business income tax of an organization imposed under section 511 to which the accuracy-related penalty under section 6662A (relating to reportable transactions) applies, the proposal imposes a new penalty on any manager of such organization. The penalty equals 10 percent of the portion of the underpayment to which the reportable transaction understatement relates. For this purpose, the term “manager” includes any officer, director, trustee, employee, or other individual who is under a duty to perform an act in respect of which the underpayment occurs. If more than one person is liable for the manager-level penalty with respect to a reportable transaction understatement, all such persons are jointly and severally liable with respect to such understatement. The maximum amount of manager-level penalty that may be imposed with respect to a reportable transaction understatement is $40,000.

The proposal includes a conforming change regarding the coordination of penalties under sections 6662 and 6662A (i.e., the rule under which section 6662 generally does not apply to any portion of an underpayment which is attributable to a reportable transaction understatement on which a penalty is imposed under present law). The conforming change is intended to clarify that this coordination rule of present law also applies to the new manager penalties added by the proposal.

Effective Date

The proposal is effective for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2014.

C. Excise Taxes

1. Modification of taxes on excess benefit transactions (intermediate sanctions) (sec. 5201 of the discussion draft and sec. 4958 of the Code)

Present Law

Excess benefit transactions (“intermediate sanctions”)

The Code imposes excise taxes on excess benefit transactions between disqualified persons and charitable organizations (other than private foundations) or social welfare organizations (as described in section 501(c)(4)).41 The excess benefit transaction tax commonly is referred to as “intermediate sanctions.”42 An excess benefit transaction generally is a transaction in which an economic benefit is provided, directly or indirectly, by a charitable or social welfare organization to or for the use of a disqualified person if the value of the economic benefit provided exceeds the value of the consideration (including the performance of services) received for providing such benefit. The excise tax is imposed on any such excess.

Disqualified persons

Disqualified persons generally include: (1) persons who were, at any time during the five-year period ending on the date of the transaction, in a position to exercise substantial influence over the affairs of the organization (including officers and directors); (2) a member of the family of such a person; and (3) certain 35-percent or more controlled entities.43

Special rules apply with respect to charities that are sponsoring organizations of donor advised funds. For such organizations, the term “disqualified person” also includes: (1) donors and certain other persons appointed by a donor to provide advice with respect to the fund (donor advisors); (2) investment advisors; and (3) members of the family and certain 35-percent or more controlled entities of a person described in (1) or (2).44 An investment advisor is a person (other than an employee of the sponsoring organization) compensated by the organization for managing the investment of, or providing investment advice with respect to, assets maintained in donor advised funds owned by the organization.45

Rebuttable presumption of reasonableness

Under the intermediate sanctions regulations, in certain cases an exempt organization may avail itself of a rebuttable presumption with respect to compensation arrangements and property transfers. Payments under a compensation arrangement are presumed to be reasonable, and a transfer of property, or the right to use property, is presumed to be at fair market value, if: (1) the arrangement or terms of transfer are approved in advance by an authorized body of the organization (as defined below) composed entirely of individuals who do not have a conflict of interest with respect to the arrangement or transfer; (2) the authorized body obtained and relied upon appropriate data as to comparability prior to making its determination; and (3) the authorized body adequately documented the basis for its determination concurrently with making that determination.46 If these requirements are satisfied, the IRS may overcome the presumption of reasonableness if it develops sufficient contrary evidence to rebut the probative value of the comparability data relied upon by the authorized body.47

An authorized body is defined as: (1) the governing body of the organization; (2) a committee of the governing body, which may be composed of any individuals permitted under State law to serve on such a committee, to the extent that the committee is permitted by State law to act on behalf of the governing body; or (3) to the extent permitted by State law, other parties authorized by the governing body of the organization to act on its behalf by following procedures specified by the governing body in approving compensation arrangements or property transfers.48

In general, an authorized body has appropriate data as to comparability if, given the knowledge and expertise of its members, it has information sufficient to determine whether the arrangement is reasonable in its entirety or the transfer is at fair market value.49 In the case of compensation, relevant information includes, but is not limited to, compensation levels paid by similarly situated organizations, both taxable and tax-exempt, for functionally comparable positions; the availability of similar services in the geographic area of the applicable tax-exempt organization; current compensation surveys compiled by independent firms; and actual written offers from similar institutions competing for the services of the disqualified person. In the case of property, relevant information includes, but is not limited to, current independent appraisals of the value of all property to be transferred, and offers received as part of an open and competitive bidding process. For organizations with annual gross receipts (including contributions) of less than $1 million, the authorized body is considered to have appropriate data as to comparability if it has data on compensation paid by three comparable organizations in the same or similar communities for similar services. There is no inference with respect to whether circumstances falling outside this safe harbor will meet the requirement with respect to the collection of appropriate data.50

In general, for a decision to be documented adequately, the written or electronic records of the authorized body must note: (1) the terms of the transaction that was approved and the date it was approved; (2) the members of the authorized body who were present during debate on the transaction that was approved and those who voted on it; (3) the comparability data obtained and relied upon by the authorized body and how the data was obtained; and (4) any actions taken with respect to consideration of the transaction by anyone who is otherwise a member of the authorized body but who had a conflict of interest with respect to the transaction.51

Amount of the excise tax

The excess benefit tax is imposed on the disqualified person and, in certain cases, on the organization’s managers, but is not imposed on the exempt organization.

 

An initial tax of 25 percent of the excess benefit amount is imposed on the disqualified person that receives the excess benefit. An additional tax on the disqualified person of 200 percent of the excess benefit applies if the violation is not corrected. A tax of 10 percent of the excess benefit (not to exceed $20,000 with respect to any excess benefit transaction) is imposed on an organization manager who knowingly participated in the excess benefit transaction, if the manager’s participation was willful and not due to reasonable cause, and if the initial tax was imposed on the disqualified person.52 If more than one person is liable for the tax on disqualified persons or on management, all such persons are jointly and severally liable for the tax.53

Standard for knowing violations

A manager participates in a transaction knowingly only if the manager: (1) has actual knowledge of sufficient facts indicating that, based solely upon those facts, such transaction would be an excess benefit transaction; (2) is aware that such a transaction under these circumstances may violate the provisions of Federal tax law governing excess benefit transactions; and (3) negligently fails to make reasonable attempts to ascertain whether the transaction is an excess benefit transaction, or the manager is in fact aware that it is such a transaction.54 The burden of proof in a Tax Court proceeding as to whether an organization manager (or foundation manager) acted knowingly is on the Secretary.55

Knowing does not mean having a reason to know.56 However, evidence tending to show that an organization manager has reason to know of a particular fact or particular rule is relevant in determining whether the manager had actual knowledge of such a fact or rule. Thus, for example, evidence tending to show that a manager has reason to know of sufficient facts indicating that, based solely upon such facts, a transaction would be an excess benefit transaction is relevant in determining whether the manager has actual knowledge of such facts.57

Participation by an organization manager is willful if it is voluntary, conscious, and intentional. No motive to avoid the restrictions of the law or the incurrence of any tax is necessary to make the participation willful. Participation by an organization manager is not willful if the manager does not know that the transaction in which the manager is participating is an excess benefit transaction.58 An organization manager’s participation is due to reasonable cause if the manager has exercised responsibility on behalf of the organization with ordinary business care and prudence.59

Special rules

An organization manager’s reliance on professional advice generally means that the manager has not knowingly participated in an excess benefit transaction. Under Treasury regulations, an organization manager’s participation in a transaction ordinarily is not considered knowing, even though the transaction subsequently is held to be an excess benefit transaction, to the extent that, after full disclosure of the factual situation to an appropriate professional, the organization manager relies on a reasoned written opinion of that professional with respect to elements of the transaction within the professional’s expertise. A written opinion is considered as reasoned even though it reaches a conclusion that is subsequently determined to be incorrect so long as the opinion addresses itself to the facts and the applicable standards. A written opinion is not considered to be reasoned if it does nothing more than recite the facts and express a conclusion. The absence of a written opinion of an appropriate professional with respect to a transaction does not, by itself, give rise to any inference that an organization manager participated in the transaction knowingly.

Appropriate professionals on whose written opinion an organization manager may rely, are: (1) legal counsel, including in-house counsel; (2) certified public accountants or accounting firms with expertise regarding the relevant tax law matters; and (3) independent valuation experts who hold themselves out to the public as appraisers or compensation consultants, perform the relevant valuations on a regular basis, are qualified to make valuations of the type of property or services involved, and include in the written opinion a certification that the three preceding requirements are met.60

An organization manager’s participation in a transaction ordinarily is not considered knowing even though the transaction subsequently is held to be an excess benefit transaction, if an appropriate authorized body that approved the transaction meets the requirements of the rebuttable presumption of reasonableness with respect to the transaction.61

Description of Proposal

Entity-level tax in the event of an excess benefit transaction

Under the proposal, if an initial tax is imposed on a disqualified person under the intermediate sanctions rules,62 the organization is subject to an excise tax equal to 10 percent of the excess benefit. No tax on the organization is imposed if the organization: (1) establishes that the minimum standards of due diligence (described below) were met with respect to the transaction; or (2) establishes to the satisfaction of the Secretary that other reasonable procedures were used to ensure that no excess benefit was provided.

Eliminate rebuttable presumption and establish due diligence procedures

The proposal eliminates the rebuttable presumption of reasonableness contained in the intermediate sanctions regulations. Under the proposal, the procedures that presently provide an organization with a presumption of reasonableness (i.e., advance approval by an authorized body, reliance upon data as to comparability, and adequate and concurrent documentation) generally will establish instead that an organization has performed the minimum standards of due diligence with respect to an arrangement or transfer involving a disqualified person. Satisfaction of these minimum standards will not result in a presumption of reasonableness with respect to the transaction.

Eliminate certain special rules for knowing behavior by organization managers

The proposal eliminates the special rule that provides that an organization manager’s participation ordinarily is not “knowing” for purposes of the intermediate sanctions excise taxes if the manager relied on professional advice. Although the proposal eliminates the special rule, whether an organization manager relies on professional advice is a relevant consideration in determining the manager knowingly participated in an excess benefit transaction.

The proposal also eliminates the special regulatory rule that provides that an organization manager ordinarily does not act knowingly for purposes of the excess benefit transaction excise tax if the organization has met the requirements of the rebuttable presumption procedure.

Treat investment advisors and athletic coaches as disqualified persons

The proposal modifies the definition of a disqualified person for purposes of the intermediate sanctions rules. First, a person who performs services as an athletic coach for the organization is treated as a disqualified person with respect to the organization. Second, the proposal (1) expands to all organizations that are subject to the intermediate sanctions rules the present-law rule that treats investment advisors to donor advised funds as disqualified persons, and (2) modifies the definition of investment advisor for this purpose. For all applicable tax-exempt organizations (including sponsoring organizations of donor advised funds), the term investment advisor means, with respect to an organization, any person compensated by the organization, and who is primarily responsible, for managing the investment of, or providing investment advice with respect to, assets of the organization.63 For a sponsoring organization of a donor advised fund, the term investment advisor also includes any person who is an investment advisor with respect to a sponsoring organization under present law, i.e., a person (other than an employee of the organization) compensated by such organization for managing the investment of, or providing investment advice with respect to, assets maintained in donor advised funds owned by the sponsoring organization.

Application of intermediate sanctions rules to section 501(c)(5) and section 501(c)(6) organizations

The proposal extends application of the section 4958 intermediate sanctions rules to tax-exempt organizations described in sections 501(c)(5) (labor and certain other organizations) and 501(c)(6) (business leagues and certain other organizations).

Effective Date

The proposal is effective for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2014.

2. Modification of taxes on self-dealing (sec. 5202 of the discussion draft and sec. 4941 of the Code)

Present Law

Self-dealing involving private foundations, in general

Excise taxes are imposed on acts of self-dealing between a disqualified person (as defined in section 4946) and a private foundation.64 In general, self-dealing transactions are any direct or indirect: (1) sale or exchange, or leasing, of property between a private foundation and a disqualified person, including transfers of property subject to a mortgage or lien that the private foundation assumes or that was put on the property by the disqualified person within 10 years of the transfer; (2) lending of money or other extension of credit between a private foundation and a disqualified person, except for no-interest loans by a disqualified person, the proceeds of which are used exclusively for charitable purposes; (3) the furnishing of goods, services, or facilities between a private foundation and a disqualified person, unless the goods, services, or facilities are (i) functionally related to the foundation’s exempt purposes and are provided to or by the foundation on the same basis as provided by the foundation or disqualified person to the general public, (ii) reasonable and necessary to performing exempt purposes and not excessive, or (iii) provided by disqualified person without charge; (4) the transfer to, or use by or for the benefit of, a disqualified person of the income or assets of the private foundation, unless the use or benefit is de minimis; and (5) certain payments of money or property to a government official. Leases provided by a disqualified person without charge to a private foundation, even if the foundation pays for maintenance, are permitted.

An initial tax of 10 percent of the amount involved with respect to an act of self-dealing is imposed on any disqualified person (other than a foundation manager acting only as such) who participates in the act of self-dealing. If such a tax is imposed, a five-percent tax of the amount involved is imposed on a foundation manager who participated in the act of self-dealing knowing it was such an act (and such participation was not willful and was due to reasonable cause) up to $20,000 per act. Such initial taxes may not be abated.65 Such initial taxes are imposed for each year in the taxable period, which begins on the date the act of self-dealing occurs and ends on the earliest of the date of mailing of a notice of deficiency for the tax, the date on which the tax is assessed, or the date on which correction of the act of self-dealing is completed. A government official (as defined in section 4946(c)) is subject to such initial tax only if the official participates in the act of self-dealing knowing it is such an act. If the act of self-dealing is not corrected, a tax of 200 percent of the amount involved is imposed on the disqualified person and a tax of 50 percent of the amount involved (up to $20,000 per act) is imposed on a foundation manager who refused to agree to correcting the act of self-dealing. Such additional taxes are subject to abatement.66

Standard for knowing violations

A foundation manager participates in a transaction knowingly only if the manager: (1) has actual knowledge of sufficient facts indicating that, based solely upon those facts, such transaction would be an act of self-dealing; (2) is aware that such an act under these circumstances may violate the provisions of Federal tax law governing self-dealing; and (3) negligently fails to make reasonable attempts to ascertain whether the transaction is an act of self-dealing, or the manager is in fact aware that it is such an act.67 The burden of proof in a Tax Court proceeding as to whether a foundation manager acted knowingly is on the Secretary.68

Knowing does not mean having a reason to know.69 However, evidence tending to show that a person has reason to know of a particular fact or rule is relevant in determining whether he had actual knowledge of such a fact or rule. Thus, for example, evidence tending to show that a person has reason to know of sufficient facts indicating that, based solely upon such facts, a transaction would be an act of self-dealing is relevant in determining whether the person has actual knowledge of such facts.70

Participation by a foundation manager is willful if it is voluntary, conscious, and intentional. No motive to avoid the restrictions of the law or the incurrence of any tax is necessary to make the participation willful. Participation by a foundation manager is not willful if the manager does not know that the transaction in which the manager is participating is an act of self-dealing.71 A foundation manager’s participation is due to reasonable cause if the manager has exercised responsibility on behalf of the organization with ordinary business care and prudence.72

Special rules

A foundation manager’s reliance on advice of legal counsel generally means that the manager has not knowingly participated in an act of self-dealing. Under Treasury regulations, a foundation manager’s participation in a transaction ordinarily is not considered knowing, even though the transaction subsequently is held to be an act of self-dealing, to the extent that, after full disclosure of the factual situation to legal counsel (including in-house counsel), the manager relies on a reasoned written legal opinion that an act is not an act of self-dealing. A written opinion is considered as reasoned even though it reaches a conclusion that is subsequently determined to be incorrect so long as the opinion addresses itself to the facts and the applicable law. A written opinion is not considered to be reasoned if it does nothing more than recite the facts and express a conclusion. The absence of advice of counsel with respect to a transaction does not, by itself, give rise to any inference that a foundation manager participated in the transaction knowingly.73

Description of Proposal

Entity level tax on private foundations

Under the proposal, if an initial tax is imposed on a disqualified person under the self-dealing rules74 the organization is subject to an excise tax equal to 2.5 percent (10 percent in the case of a payment of compensation) of the amount involved with respect to the act of self-dealing for each year (or part thereof) in the taxable period.

Eliminate special rule for knowing behavior by foundation managers

The proposal eliminates the special rule that provides that a foundation manager’s participation ordinarily is not “knowing” for purposes of the self-dealing excise taxes if the manager relied on advice of counsel. Although the proposal eliminates the special rule, whether a foundation manager relies on advice of counsel is a relevant consideration in determining whether the manager knowingly participated in an act of self-dealing.

Effective Date

The proposal is effective for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2014.

3. Excise tax on failure to distribute within five years a contribution to a donor advised fund (sec. 5203 of the discussion draft and new sec. 4968 of the Code)

Present Law

Overview

Some charitable organizations (including community foundations) establish accounts to which donors may contribute and thereafter provide nonbinding advice or recommendations with regard to distributions from the fund or the investment of assets in the fund. Such accounts are commonly referred to as “donor advised funds.” Donors who make contributions to charities for maintenance in a donor advised fund generally claim a charitable contribution deduction at the time of the contribution.75 Although sponsoring charities frequently permit donors (or other persons appointed by donors) to provide nonbinding recommendations concerning the distribution or investment of assets in a donor advised fund, sponsoring charities generally must have legal ownership and control of such assets following the contribution. If the sponsoring charity does not have such control (or permits a donor to exercise control over amounts contributed), the donor’s contributions may not qualify for a charitable deduction, and, in the case of a community foundation, the contribution may be treated as being subject to a material restriction or condition by the donor.

Statutory definition of a donor advised fund

The Code defines a “donor advised fund” as a fund or account that is: (1) separately identified by reference to contributions of a donor or donors; (2) owned and controlled by a sponsoring organization; and (3) with respect to which a donor (or any person appointed or designated by such donor (a “donor advisor”)) has, or reasonably expects to have, advisory privileges with respect to the distribution or investment of amounts held in the separately identified fund or account by reason of the donor’s status as a donor. All three prongs of the definition must be met in order for a fund or account to be treated as a donor advised fund.76

A “sponsoring organization” is an organization that: (1) is described in section 170(c)77 (other than a governmental entity described in section 170(c)(1), and without regard to any requirement that the organization be organized in the United States78); (2) is not a private foundation (as defined in section 509(a)); and (3) maintains one or more donor advised funds.79

Excess business holdings

The excess business holdings rules of section 4943 are applied to donor advised funds.80 In applying such rules, the term disqualified person means, with respect to a donor advised fund, a donor, donor advisor, a member of the family of a donor or donor advisor, or a 35 percent controlled entity of any such person.81

Excess benefit transactions, taxable distributions, and more than incidental benefit

Excess benefit transactions

Under section 4958, an excise tax is imposed in the event of an excess benefit transaction between a disqualified person (generally, an organization insider) and an applicable tax-exempt organization. An excess benefit transaction generally is a transaction in which an economic benefit is provided by an organization to or for the use of a disqualified person if the value of the economic benefit provided exceeds the value of consideration received in exchange for the benefit.82 Applicable tax-exempt organizations include section 501(c)(3) public charities and organizations described in section 501(c)(4) (generally, social welfare organizations) or 501(c)(29) (qualified nonprofit health insurance issuers).83

Section 4958 includes special excess benefit transaction rules for donor advised funds. Any grant, loan, compensation, or other similar payment from a donor advised fund to a person that with respect to such fund is a donor, donor advisor, or a person related84 to a donor or donor advisor automatically is treated as an excess benefit transaction under section 4958, with the entire amount paid to any such person treated as the amount of the excess benefit.85 Any amount repaid as a result of correcting an excess benefit transaction shall not be held in any donor advised fund.

In general, donors and donor advisors with respect to a donor advised fund (as well as persons related to a donor or donor advisor) are treated as disqualified persons under section 4958 with respect to transactions with such donor advised fund (though not necessarily with respect to transactions with the sponsoring organization more generally).86 An investment advisor (as well as persons related to the investment advisor) also is treated as a disqualified person under section 4958 with respect to the sponsoring organization.87 The term “investment advisor” means, with respect to any sponsoring organization, any person (other than an employee of the sponsoring organization) who is compensated by the sponsoring organization for managing the investment of, or providing investment advice with respect to, assets maintained in donor advised funds (including pools of assets all or part of which are attributed to donor advised funds) owned by the sponsoring organization.88

Taxable distributions

Certain distributions from a donor advised fund are subject to tax.89 A “taxable distribution” is any distribution from a donor advised fund to: (1) any natural person; or (2) to any other person for any purpose other than one specified in section 170(c)(2)(B) (generally, a charitable purpose) or, if for a charitable purpose, the sponsoring organization does not exercise expenditure responsibility with respect to the distribution in accordance with section 4945(h).90 The expenditure responsibility rules generally require that an organization exert all reasonable efforts and establish adequate procedures to see that the distribution is spent solely for the purposes for which it was made, to obtain full and complete reports from the distributee on how the funds are spent, and to make full and detailed reports with respect to such expenditures to the Secretary. A taxable distribution does not in any case include a distribution to (1) an organization described in section 170(b)(1)(A) (other than to a disqualified supporting organization); (2) the sponsoring organization of such donor advised fund; or (3) to another donor advised fund.91

In the event of a taxable distribution, an excise tax equal to 20 percent of the amount of the distribution is imposed against the sponsoring organization. In addition, an excise tax equal to five percent of the amount of the distribution is imposed against any manager of the sponsoring organization (defined in a manner similar to the term “foundation manager” under section 4945) who knowingly approved the distribution, not to exceed $10,000 with respect to any one taxable distribution. The taxes on taxable distributions are subject to abatement under generally applicable rules.92

More than incidental benefit

If a donor, a donor advisor, or a person related to a donor or donor advisor of a donor advised fund provides advice as to a distribution that results in any such person receiving, directly or indirectly, a more than incidental benefit, an excise tax equal to 125 percent of the amount of such benefit is imposed against the person who advised as to the distribution, and against the recipient of the benefit. Persons subject to the tax are jointly and severally liable for the tax. In addition, if a manager of the sponsoring organization (defined in a manner similar to the term “foundation manager” under section 4945) agreed to the making of the distribution, knowing that the distribution would confer a more than incidental benefit on a donor, a donor advisor, or a person related to a donor or donor advisor, the manager is subject to an excise tax equal to 10 percent of the amount of such benefit, not to exceed $10,000. The taxes on more than incidental benefit are subject to abatement under generally applicable rules.93

Reporting and disclosure

Each sponsoring organization must disclose on its information return: (1) the total number of donor advised funds it owns; (2) the aggregate value of assets held in those funds at the end of the organization’s taxable year; and (3) the aggregate contributions to and grants made from those funds during the year.94 In addition, when seeking recognition of its tax-exempt status, a sponsoring organization must disclose whether it intends to maintain donor advised funds.95

Description of Proposal

The proposal generally requires that contributions to donor advised funds be distributed for charitable purposes within a specified time period and imposes an excise tax in the event of a failure to make timely distributions. Specifically, in the case of a contribution that is held in a donor advised fund, the proposal imposes a tax equal to 20 percent of so much of the contribution as has not been distributed by the sponsoring organization in an eligible distribution before the beginning of the sixth (or any succeeding) taxable year beginning after the taxable year during which such contribution is made.96

An eligible distribution is a distribution to an organization described in section 170(b)(1)(A) (generally, to a public charity), other than a supporting organization described in section 509(a)(3) or another donor advised fund described in section 4966(d)(2). Distributions are treated as made from contributions (and any earnings attributable thereto) on a first-in, first-out basis.

The tax imposed by the proposal must be paid by the sponsoring organization.

Effective Date

The proposal generally is effective for contributions made after December 31, 2014. In the case of a contribution made before January 1, 2015, any portion of which (including any earnings attributable thereto) is held in a donor advised fund as of such date, such portion is treated as having been contributed on such date.

4. Simplification of excise tax on private foundation investment income (sec. 5204 of the discussion draft and sec. 4940 of the Code)

Present Law

Excise tax on the net investment income of private foundations

Under section 4940(a), private foundations that are recognized as exempt from Federal income tax under section 501(a) (other than exempt operating foundations) are subject to a two-percent excise tax on their net investment income. Net investment income generally includes interest, dividends, rents, royalties (and income from similar sources), and capital gain net income, and is reduced by expenses incurred to earn this income. The two-percent rate of tax is reduced to one-percent in any year in which a foundation exceeds the average historical level of its charitable distributions. Specifically, the excise tax rate is reduced if the foundation’s qualifying distributions (generally, amounts paid to accomplish exempt purposes)97 equal or exceed the sum of (1) the amount of the foundation’s assets for the taxable year multiplied by the average percentage of the foundation’s qualifying distributions over the five taxable years immediately preceding the taxable year in question, and (2) one percent of the net investment income of the foundation for the taxable year.98 In addition, the foundation cannot have been subject to tax in any of the five preceding years for failure to meet minimum qualifying distribution requirements in section 4942.

Private foundations that are not exempt from tax under section 501(a), such as certain charitable trusts, are subject to an excise tax under section 4940(b). The tax is equal to the excess of the sum of the excise tax that would have been imposed under section 4940(a) if the foundation were tax exempt and the amount of the tax on unrelated business income that would have been imposed if the foundation were tax exempt, over the income tax imposed on the foundation under subtitle A of the Code.

Private foundations are required to make a minimum amount of qualifying distributions each year to avoid tax under section 4942. The minimum amount of qualifying distributions a foundation has to make to avoid tax under section 4942 is reduced by the amount of section 4940 excise taxes paid.99

Exempt operating foundations

Exempt operating foundations are exempt from the tax on the net investment income of private foundations.100 Exempt operating foundations generally include organizations such as museums or libraries that devote their assets to operating charitable programs but have difficulty meeting the “public support” tests necessary not to be classified as a private foundation. To be an exempt operating foundation, an organization must: (1) be an operating foundation (as defined in section 4942(j)(3)); (2) be publicly supported for at least 10 taxable years; (3) have a governing body no more than 25 percent of whom are disqualified persons and that is broadly representative of the general public; and (4) have no officers who are disqualified persons.101

Description of Proposal

The proposal replaces the two rates of excise tax on tax-exempt private foundations with a single rate of tax of one percent. Thus, under the proposal, a tax-exempt private foundation generally is subject to an excise tax of one percent on its net investment income. A taxable private foundation is subject to an excise tax equal to the excess (if any) of the sum of the one-percent net investment income excise tax and the amount of the tax on unrelated business income (both calculated as if the foundation were tax-exempt), over the income tax imposed on the foundation. The proposal repeals the special reduced excise tax rate for private foundations that exceed their historical level of qualifying distributions.

The proposal also repeals the exception for exempt operating foundations from the tax on the net investment income of private foundations.

Effective Date

The proposal is effective for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2014.

5. Repeal of exception for private operating foundation failure to distribute income (sec. 5205 of the discussion draft and sec. 4942 of the Code)

Present Law

Public charities and private foundations

An organization qualifying for tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3) is further classified as either a public charity or a private foundation. An organization may qualify as a public charity in several ways.102 Certain organizations are classified as public charities per se, regardless of their sources of support. These include churches, certain schools, hospitals and other medical organizations, certain organizations providing assistance to colleges and universities, and governmental units.103 Other organizations qualify as public charities because they are broadly publicly supported. First, a charity may qualify as publicly supported if at least one-third of its total support is from gifts, grants or other contributions from governmental units or the general public.104 Alternatively, it may qualify as publicly supported if it receives more than one-third of its total support from a combination of gifts, grants, and contributions from governmental units and the public plus revenue arising from activities related to its exempt purposes (e.g., fee for service income). In addition, this category of public charity must not rely excessively on endowment income as a source of support.105 A supporting organization, i.e., an organization that provides support to another section 501(c)(3) entity that is not a private foundation and meets certain other requirements of the Code, also is classified as a public charity.106

A section 501(c)(3) organization that does not fit within any of the above categories is a private foundation. In general, private foundations receive funding from a limited number of sources (e.g., an individual, a family, or a corporation).

The deduction for charitable contributions to private foundations is in some instances less generous than the deduction for charitable contributions to public charities. In addition, private foundations are subject to a number of operational rules and restrictions that do not apply to public charities.107

Tax on failure to distribute income by private nonoperating foundations

Private nonoperating foundations are required to pay out a minimum amount each year as qualifying distributions.108 In general, a qualifying distribution is an amount paid to accomplish one or more of the organization’s exempt purposes, including reasonable and necessary administrative expenses.109 Failure to pay out the minimum required amount results in an initial excise tax on the foundation of 30 percent of the undistributed amount. An additional tax of 100 percent of the undistributed amount applies if an initial tax is imposed and the required distributions have not been made by the end of the applicable taxable period.110 A foundation may include as a qualifying distribution the salaries, occupancy expenses, travel costs, and other reasonable and necessary administrative expenses that the foundation incurs in operating a grant program. A qualifying distribution also includes any amount paid to acquire an asset used (or held for use) directly in carrying out one or more of the organization’s exempt purposes and certain amounts set aside for exempt purposes.111

Private operating foundations

The tax on failure to distribute income does not apply to the undistributed income of a private foundation for any taxable year for which it is an operating foundation.112 Private operating foundations generally operate their own charitable programs directly, rather than serving primarily as a grantmaking entity.

Private operating foundations must satisfy several tests designed to distinguish them from nonoperating (grantmaking) foundations. First, an operating foundation generally must make qualifying distributions for the direct conduct of activities that are related to its exempt purpose (as opposed to making such distributions in the form of grants to other charities) equal to 85 percent of the lesser of its adjusted net income or its minimum investment return, each as defined under section 4942.113 In addition, an operating foundation must satisfy one of the following three alternative tests: (1) an asset test, under which substantially more than half of the organization’s assets (generally, 65 percent) are devoted to the direct conduct of exempt activities or to functionally related businesses; (2) an endowment test, under which the organization normally makes qualifying distributions for the direct conduct of activities related to its exempt purpose in an amount not less than two-thirds of its minimum investment return; or (3) a support test, under which the organization must meet certain measures to show that it receives public support.114

Description of Proposal

The proposal repeals the exception for private operating foundations from the excise tax on a private foundation’s failure to distribute income under section 4942, thereby extending the excise tax to private operating foundations.115

Effective Date

The proposal is effective for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2014.

6. Excise tax based on investment income of private colleges and universities (sec. 5206 of the discussion draft and new sec. 4969 of the Code)

Present Law

Public charities and private foundations

An organization qualifying for tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3) is further classified as either a public charity or a private foundation. An organization may qualify as a public charity in several ways.116 Certain organizations are classified as public charities per se, regardless of their sources of support. These include churches, certain schools, hospitals and other medical organizations, certain organizations providing assistance to colleges and universities, and governmental units.117 Other organizations qualify as public charities because they are broadly publicly supported. First, a charity may qualify as publicly supported if at least one-third of its total support is from gifts, grants or other contributions from governmental units or the general public.118 Alternatively, it may qualify as publicly supported if it receives more than one-third of its total support from a combination of gifts, grants, and contributions from governmental units and the public plus revenue arising from activities related to its exempt purposes (e.g., fee for service income). In addition, this category of public charity must not rely excessively on endowment income as a source of support.119 A supporting organization, i.e., an organization that provides support to another section 501(c)(3) entity that is not a private foundation and meets the requirements of the Code, also is classified as a public charity.120

A section 501(c)(3) organization that does not fit within any of the above categories is a private foundation. In general, private foundations receive funding from a limited number of sources (e.g., an individual, a family, or a corporation).

The deduction for charitable contributions to private foundations is in some instances less generous than the deduction for charitable contributions to public charities. In addition, private foundations are subject to a number of operational rules and restrictions that do not apply to public charities.121

Excise tax on investment income of private foundations

Under section 4940(a), private foundations that are recognized as exempt from Federal income tax under section 501(a) (other than exempt operating foundations)122 are subject to a two-percent excise tax on their net investment income. Net investment income generally includes interest, dividends, rents, royalties (and income from similar sources), and capital gain net income, and is reduced by expenses incurred to earn this income. The two-percent rate of tax is reduced to one-percent in any year in which a foundation exceeds the average historical level of its charitable distributions. Specifically, the excise tax rate is reduced if the foundation’s qualifying distributions (generally, amounts paid to accomplish exempt purposes)123 equal or exceed the sum of (1) the amount of the foundation’s assets for the taxable year multiplied by the average percentage of the foundation’s qualifying distributions over the five taxable years immediately preceding the taxable year in question, and (2) one percent of the net investment income of the foundation for the taxable year.124 In addition, the foundation cannot have been subject to tax in any of the five preceding years for failure to meet minimum qualifying distribution requirements in section 4942.125

Private foundations that are not exempt from tax under section 501(a), such as certain charitable trusts, are subject to an excise tax under section 4940(b). The tax is equal to the excess of the sum of the excise tax that would have been imposed under section 4940(a) if the foundation were tax exempt and the amount of the tax on unrelated business income that would have been imposed if the foundation were tax exempt, over the income tax imposed on the foundation under subtitle A of the Code.

Private foundations are required to make a minimum amount of qualifying distributions each year to avoid tax under section 4942. The minimum amount of qualifying distributions a foundation has to make to avoid tax under section 4942 is reduced by the amount of section 4940 excise taxes paid.126

Private colleges and universities

Private colleges and universities generally are treated as public charities rather than private foundations127 and thus are not subject to the private foundation excise tax on net investment income.

Description of Proposal

The proposal imposes an excise tax on an applicable educational institution for each taxable year equal to one percent of the net investment income of the institution for the taxable year. Net investment income is determined using rules similar to the rules of section 4940(c) (relating to the net investment income of a private foundation).

For purposes of the proposal, an applicable educational institution is an institution: (1) that is an eligible education institution as described in section 25A of the Code (as amended by a separate proposal)128; (2) that is not described in the first section of section 511(a)(2)(B) of the Code (generally describing State colleges and universities); and (3) the aggregate fair market value of the assets of which at the end of the preceding taxable year (other than those assets which are used, or held for use, directly in carrying out the institution’s exempt purpose) is at least $100,000 per student. For this purpose, the number of students of an institution is based on the daily average number of full-time students attending the institution, with part-time students being taken into account on a full-time student equivalent basis.

Effective Date

The proposal is effective for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2014.

D. Requirements for Organizations Exempt From Tax

1. Repeal of tax-exempt status for professional sports leagues (sec. 5301 of the discussion draft and sec. 501(c)(6) of the Code)

Present Law

Tax exemption for section 501(c)(6) organizations

Section 501(c)(6) provides tax exempt status for business leagues and certain other organizations not organized for profit, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual. A business league is an association of persons having some common business interest, the purpose of which is to promote such common interest and not to engage in a regular business of a kind ordinarily carried on for profit.129 Such an organization may not have as its primary activity performing “particular services” for members.130 Contributions to these types of organizations are not deductible as charitable contributions; however, they may be deductible as trade or business expenses if ordinary and necessary in the conduct of the taxpayer’s business. Many organizations known as “trade associations” may qualify for exempt status under this provision.

Professional sports leagues

Since 1966, section 501(c)(6) has included language exempting from tax “professional football leagues (whether or not administering a pension fund for football players).” The Internal Revenue Service has interpreted this language as applying not only to professional football leagues, but to all professional sports leagues.131

Description of Proposal

The proposal strikes from section 501(c)(6) the phrase “professional football leagues (whether or not administering a pension fund for football players).” In addition, the proposal amends section 501(c)(6) to provide affirmatively that section 501(c)(6) “shall not apply to any professional sports league (whether or not administering a pension fund for players).”

Effective Date

The proposal is effective for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2014.

2. Repeal of exemption from tax for certain insurance companies and CO-OP health insurance issuers (sec. 5302 of the discussion draft and sec. 501 of the Code)

Present Law

Section 501(c)(15) exempts from tax: (1) stock property and casualty insurance companies with gross receipts that do not exceed $600,000, more than 50 percent of which consist of premiums; and (2) mutual property and casualty insurance companies with gross receipts that do not exceed $150,000, more than 35 percent of which consist of premiums.

Qualified nonprofit health insurance issuers (within the meaning of section 1322 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act) that have received a loan or grant under the CO-OP program under such section are exempt from tax under section 501(c)(29) of the Code.

Description of Proposal

The provision strikes sections 501(c)(15) and 501(c)(29). Organizations in existence prior to the effective date are provided transition relief as follows. Organizations are given a fresh start with respect to changes in accounting methods resulting from the change from tax-exempt to taxable status. No adjustment is made under section 481 on account of an accounting method change. The basis of assets of such organizations is equal, for purposes of determining gain or loss, to the amount of the assets’ fair market value on the first day of the organization’s taxable year beginning after the effective date.

Effective Date

The provision applies to taxable years beginning after December 31, 2014.

3. In-State requirement for certain tax-exempt workmen’s compensation insurance organizations (sec. 5303 of the discussion draft and sec. 501(c)(27) of the Code)

Present Law

Workers’ compensation reinsurance organizations

Section 501(c)(27)(A) provides tax-exempt status to any membership organization that is established by a State before June 1, 1996, exclusively to reimburse its members for workers’ compensation insurance losses, and that satisfies certain other conditions. A State must require that the membership of the organization consist of all persons who issue insurance covering workers’ compensation losses in such State, and all persons and governmental entities who self-insure against such losses. In addition, the organization must operate as a nonprofit organization by returning surplus income to members or to workers’ compensation policyholders on a periodic basis and by reducing initial premiums in anticipation of investment income.

State workmen’s compensation act companies

Section 501(c)(27)(B) provides tax-exempt status for any organization that is created by State law, and organized and operated exclusively to provide workmen’s compensation insurance and related coverage that is incidental to workmen’s compensation insurance, and that meets certain additional requirements. The workmen’s compensation insurance must be required by State law, or be insurance with respect to which State law provides significant disincentives if it is not purchased by an employer (such as loss of exclusive remedy or forfeiture of affirmative defenses such as contributory negligence). The organization must provide workmen’s compensation to any employer in the State (for employees in the State or temporarily assigned out-of-State) seeking such insurance and meeting other reasonable requirements. The State must either extend its full faith and credit to the initial debt of the organization or provide the initial operating capital of such organization. For this purpose, the initial operating capital can be provided by providing the proceeds of bonds issued by a State authority; the bonds may be repaid through exercise of the State’s taxing authority, for example. For periods after the date of enactment (August 5, 1997), either the assets of the organization must revert to the State upon dissolution, or State law must not permit the dissolution of the organization absent an act of the State legislature. Should dissolution of the organization become permissible under applicable State law, then the requirement that the assets of the organization revert to the State upon dissolution applies. Finally, the majority of the board of directors (or comparable oversight body) of the organization must be appointed by an official of the executive branch of the State or by the State legislature, or by both.

Description of Proposal

The proposal amends section 501(c)(27)(B) to limit tax-exempt status under that subparagraph to organizations that offer no insurance other than workmen’s compensation insurance offered to any employer in the State (for employees in the State or temporarily assigned out-of-State).

Effective Date

The proposal is effective for policies issued, and renewals, after December 31, 2014.

4. Repeal of Type II and Type III supporting organizations (sec. 5304 of the discussion draft and sec. 509(a)(3) of the Code)

Present Law

Requirements for section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status

Charitable organizations, i.e., organizations described in section 501(c)(3), generally are exempt from Federal income tax and are eligible to receive tax deductible contributions. A charitable organization must operate primarily in pursuance of one or more tax-exempt purposes constituting the basis of its tax exemption.132 In order to qualify as operating primarily for a purpose described in section 501(c)(3), an organization must satisfy the following operational requirements: (1) its net earnings may not inure to the benefit of any person in a position to influence the activities of the organization; (2) it must operate to provide a public benefit, not a private benefit;133 (3) it may not be operated primarily to conduct an unrelated trade or business;134 (4) it may not engage in substantial legislative lobbying; and (5) it may not participate or intervene in any political campaign.

Classification of section 501(c)(3) organizations

In general

Section 501(c)(3) organizations are classified either as “public charities” or “private foundations.” 135 Private foundations generally are defined under section 509(a) as all organizations described in section 501(c)(3) other than an organization granted public charity status by reason of: (1) being a specified type of organization (i.e., churches, educational institutions, hospitals and certain other medical organizations, certain organizations providing assistance to colleges and universities, or a governmental unit); (2) receiving a substantial part of its support from governmental units or direct or indirect contributions from the general public; or (3) providing support to another section 501(c)(3) entity that is not a private foundation. In contrast to public charities, private foundations generally are funded from a limited number of sources (e.g., an individual, family, or corporation). Donors to private foundations and persons related to such donors together often control the operations of private foundations.

Because private foundations receive support from, and typically are controlled by, a small number of supporters, private foundations are subject to a number of anti-abuse rules and excise taxes not applicable to public charities.136 Public charities also have certain advantages over private foundations regarding the deductibility of contributions.

Supporting organizations (section 509(a)(3))

The Code provides that certain “supporting organizations” (in general, organizations that provide support to another section 501(c)(3) organization that is not a private foundation) are classified as public charities rather than private foundations.137 To qualify as a supporting organization, an organization must meet all three of the following tests: (1) it must be organized and at all times operated exclusively for the benefit of, to perform the functions of, or to carry out the purposes of one or more “publicly supported organizations”138 (the “organizational and operational tests”);139 (2) it must be operated, supervised, or controlled by or in connection with one or more publicly supported organizations (the “relationship test”);140 and (3) it must not be controlled directly or indirectly by one or more disqualified persons (as defined in section 4946) other than foundation managers and other than one or more publicly supported organizations (the “lack of outside control test”).141

To satisfy the relationship test, a supporting organization must hold one of three statutorily described close relationships with the supported organization. The organization must be: (1) operated, supervised, or controlled by a publicly supported organization (commonly referred to as “Type I” supporting organizations); (2) supervised or controlled in connection with a publicly supported organization (“Type II” supporting organizations); or (3) operated in connection with a publicly supported organization (“Type III” supporting organizations).142

 

Type I supporting organizations

In the case of supporting organizations that are operated, supervised, or controlled by one or more publicly supported organizations (Type I supporting organizations), one or more supported organizations must exercise a substantial degree of direction over the policies, programs, and activities of the supporting organization.143 The relationship between the Type I supporting organization and the supported organization generally is comparable to that of a parent and subsidiary. The requisite relationship may be established by the fact that a majority of the officers, directors, or trustees of the supporting organization are appointed or elected by the governing body, members of the governing body, officers acting in their official capacity, or the membership of one or more publicly supported organizations.144

Type II supporting organizations

Type II supporting organizations are supervised or controlled in connection with one or more publicly supported organizations. Rather than the parent-subsidiary relationship characteristic of Type I organizations, the relationship between a Type II organization and its supported organizations is more analogous to a brother-sister relationship. In order to satisfy the Type II relationship requirement, generally there must be common supervision or control by the persons supervising or controlling both the supporting organization and the publicly supported organizations.145 An organization generally is not considered to be “supervised or controlled in connection with” a publicly supported organization merely because the supporting organization makes payments to the publicly supported organization, even if the obligation to make payments is enforceable under state law.146

Type III supporting organizations

Type III supporting organizations are “operated in connection with” one or more publicly supported organizations. To satisfy the “operated in connection with” relationship, Treasury regulations require that the supporting organization be responsive to, and significantly involved in the operations of, the publicly supported organization. This relationship is deemed to exist where the supporting organization satisfies a notification requirement, a “responsiveness test,” and an “integral part test.” 147 An organization is not operated in connection with one or more supported organizations if it supports any supported organization organized outside of the United States.148

To satisfy the notification requirement for a taxable year, a Type III supporting organization must provide the following documents to each of its supported organizations: (1) a written notice to a principal officer of the supported organization describing the type and amount of all support the supporting organization provided during the supporting organization’s preceding taxable year; (2) a copy of the supporting organization’s most recently filed Form 990 (or other annual information return); and (3) a copy of the supporting organization’s current governing documents, unless such documents have been previously provided and not subsequently amended.149 The notification documents for a taxable year must be provided by the last day of the fifth calendar month following the close of the taxable year.150

In general, the responsiveness test requires that the Type III supporting organization be responsive to the needs or demands of the publicly supported organizations. 151 A supporting organization generally satisfies the test by demonstrating that: (1)(a) one or more of its officers, directors, or trustees are elected or appointed by the officers, directors, trustees, or membership of the supported organization; (b) one or more members of the governing bodies of the publicly supported organizations are also officers, directors, or trustees of, or hold other important offices in, the supporting organization; or (c) the officers, directors, or trustees of the supporting organization maintain a close continuous working relationship with the officers, directors, or trustees of the publicly supported organizations;152 and (2) by reason of such arrangement, the officers, directors, or trustees of the supported organization have a significant voice in the investment policies of the supporting organization, the timing and manner of making grants, the selection of grant recipients by the supporting organization, and otherwise directing the use of the income or assets of the supporting organization.153

For purposes of the integral part test, Type III supporting organizations are further classified as “functionally integrated” or “non-functionally integrated.”

Functionally integrated Type III supporting organizations. — To satisfy the integral part test as a functionally integrated Type III supporting organization, an organization must establish that: (1)(a) substantially all of its activities directly further the exempt purposes of one or more supported organizations by performing the functions of, or carrying out the purposes of, such organizations; and (b) these activities, but for the involvement of the supporting organization, normally would be engaged in by the publicly supported organizations themselves;154 (2) it is the parent of each of its supported organizations;155 or (3) it supports a governmental organization.156

Non-functionally integrated Type III supporting organizations. — To satisfy the integral part test as a non-functionally integrated Type III supporting organization, an organization generally must satisfy a distribution requirement and an attentiveness requirement.157 An organization satisfies the distribution requirement for a taxable year if it distributes to or for the use of one or more supported organizations an amount equal to or greater than the supporting organization’s distributable amount for the taxable year.158 The distributable amount generally is the greater of 85 percent of the supporting organization’s adjusted net income or 3.5 percent of the organization’s non-exempt use assets for the immediately preceding tax year.159 An organization satisfies the attentiveness requirement if: (1) it distributes to its supported organization at least 10 percent of the supported organization’s total support; (2) the amount of support received from the supporting organization is necessary to avoid the interruption of the carrying on of a particular function or activity of the supported organization; or (3) based on facts and circumstances, the amount of support received from the supporting organization is a sufficient part of a supported organization’s total support to ensure attentiveness.160

Description of Proposal

The proposal limits supporting organization status to organizations that are operated, supervised, or controlled by one or more publicly supported organizations (present law Type I supporting organizations). An organization may no longer satisfy the relationship test by being supervised or controlled in connection with one or more publicly supported organizations (Type II supporting organizations) or by being operated in connection with one or more publicly supported organizations (Type III supporting organizations).

Effective Date

The proposal generally is effective on the date of enactment. For Type II and Type III supporting organizations recognized as of the date of enactment as exempt from tax under section 501(a) as an organization described in section 501(c)(3), the proposal is effective for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2015.

FOOTNOTES

1 This document may be cited as follows: Joint Committee on Taxation, Technical Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 2014, A Discussion Draft of the Chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means to Reform the Internal Revenue Code: Title V — Tax Exempt Entities (JCX-16-14), February 26, 2014. This document can also be found on our website at www.jct.gov.

2 Statutory draft version Camp_041.XML.

3 This is the case for social clubs (sec. 501(c)(7)), voluntary employees’ beneficiary associations (sec. 501(c)(9)), and organizations and trusts described in sections 501(c)(17) and 501(c)(20). Sec. 512(a)(3).

4 Secs. 511-514.

5 Treas. Reg. sec. 1.501(c)(3)-1(e).

6 Sec. 511(a)(2)(A).

7 Sec. 511(a)(2)(A).

8 Sec. 511(a)(2)(B).

9 Secs. 511-514.

10 Sec. 512(b)(13).

11 Sec. 512(b)(7).

12 Sec. 512(b)(8).

13 Sec. 512(b)(9).

14 Sec. 512(b)(12).

15 Ibid.

16 Sec. 512(b)(10).

17 For purposes of the trust’s charitable contribution deduction, a distribution by the trust is treated as a gift or contribution. Sec. 512(b)(11).

18 Sec. 512(b)(11).

19 Sec. 513(i)(2)(A).

20 Sec. 513(i)(2)(A).

21 Sec. 513(i)(2)(B)(i).

22 Sec. 513(i)(2)(B)(ii).

23 Sec. 513(i)(2)(B)(ii).

24 Sec. 513(i)(3).

25 Sec. 512(a).

26 Treas. Reg. sec. 1.512(a)-1(a).

27 Specifically, the proposal references sections 512(b)(1), (2), (3) and (5).

28 Sec. 6652.

29 Sec. 6652(c)(4).

30 Sec. 6652(c)(5)(C).

31 Sec. 6662.

32 A tax shelter is defined for this purpose as a partnership or other entity, an investment plan or arrangement, or any other plan or arrangement if a significant purpose of such partnership, other entity, plan, or arrangement is the avoidance or evasion of Federal income tax. Sec. 6662(d)(2)(C).

33 Sec. 6664(c).

34 Treas. Reg. sec. 1.6662-4(g)(4)(i)(B). See also Treas. Reg. sec. 1.6664-4(c).

35 Sec. 6662(b) (flush language).

36 Treas. Reg. sec. 1.6011-4.

37 Sec. 6707A(c)(1).

38 Treas. Reg. sec. 1.6011-4(b)(2)-(6).

39 The regulations clarify that the term “substantially similar” includes any transaction that is expected to obtain the same or similar types of tax consequences and that is either factually similar or based on the same or similar tax strategy. Further, the term must be broadly construed in favor of disclosure. Treas. Reg. sec. 1.6011-4(c)(4).

40 Sec. 6707A(c)(2).

41 Sec. 4958.

42 The excess benefit transaction rules were enacted in 1996 to provide a sanction short of revocation of tax exemption, an “intermediate” sanction, for abusive self-dealing transactions (i.e., private inurement) between an organization insider and the organization. Prior to enactment of the excess benefit transaction rules, there was no sanction in the Code on organization insiders or disqualified persons for engaging in self-dealing transactions with respect to a public charity.

43 Sec. 4958(f)(1).

44 Secs. 4958(f)(1)(E) and (F).

45 Sec. 4958(f)(8).

46 Treas. Reg. sec. 53.4958-6(a). See also H. Rep. No. 506, 104th Congress, 2d Sess. 1996, pp. 53, 56-7.

47 Treas. Reg. sec. 53.4958-6(b).

48 Treas. Reg. sec. 53.4958-6(c)(1)(i).

49 Treas. Reg. sec. 53.4958-6(c)(2)(i).

50 Treas. Reg. sec. 53.4958-6(c)(2)(ii).

51 Treas. Reg. sec. 53.4958-6(c)(3).

52 Sec. 4958(d)(2). Taxes imposed may be abated if certain conditions are met. Secs. 4961 and 4962.

53 Sec. 4958(d)(1).

54 Treas. Reg. sec. 53.4958-1(d)(4)(i).

55 Sec. 7454(b).

56 Treas. Reg. sec. 53.4958-1(d)(4)(ii).

57 Ibid.

58 Treas. Reg. sec. 53.4958-1(d)(5).

59 Treas. Reg. sec. 53.4958-1(d)(6).

60 Treas. Reg. sec. 53.4958-1(d)(4)(iii).

61 Treas. Reg. sec. 53.4958-1(d)(4)(iv).

62 Sec. 4958(a)(1).

63 Under the proposal, the existing rules that treat as disqualified persons certain family members and 35-percent controlled entities of investment advisors to sponsoring organizations of donor advised funds will apply more broadly to investment advisors that are disqualified persons with respect to any organization subject to the intermediate sanctions rules.

64 Sec. 4941. In general, a private foundation is a section 501(c)(3) organization (generally, a charitable organization) that does not meet the requirements of section 509(a) for being treated more favorably as a public charity.

65 Sec. 4962(b).

66 Sec. 4961.

67 Treas. Reg. sec. 53.4941(a)-1(b)(3).

68 Sec. 7454(b).

69 Treas. Reg. sec. 53.4941(a)-1(b)(3).

70 Ibid.

71 Treas. Reg. sec. 53.4941(a)-1(b)(4).

72 Treas. Reg. sec. 53.4941(a)-1(b)(5).

73 Treas. Reg. sec. 53.4941(a)-1(b)(6).

74 Sec. 4941(a)(1).

75 Contributions to a sponsoring organization for maintenance in a donor advised fund are not eligible for a charitable deduction for income tax purposes if the sponsoring organization is a veterans’ organization described in section 170(c)(3), a fraternal society described in section 170(c)(4), or a cemetery company described in section 170(c)(5); for gift tax purposes if the sponsoring organization is a fraternal society described in section 2522(a)(3) or a veterans’ organization described in section 2522(a)(4); or for estate tax purposes if the sponsoring organization is a fraternal society described in section 2055(a)(3) or a veterans’ organization described in section 2055(a)(4). In addition, contributions to a sponsoring organization for maintenance in a donor advised fund are not eligible for a charitable deduction for income, gift, or estate tax purposes if the sponsoring organization is a Type III supporting organization (other than a functionally integrated Type III supporting organization). In addition to satisfying generally applicable substantiation requirements under section 170(f), a donor must obtain, with respect to each charitable contribution to a sponsoring organization to be maintained in a donor advised fund, a contemporaneous written acknowledgment from the sponsoring organization providing that the sponsoring organization has exclusive legal control over the assets contributed.

76 See sec. 4966(d)(2)(A). A donor advised fund does not include a fund or account that makes distributions only to a single identified organization or governmental entity. A donor advised fund also does not include certain funds or accounts with respect to which a donor or donor advisor provides advice as to which individuals receive grants for travel, study, or other similar purposes. In addition, the Secretary may exempt a fund or account from treatment as a donor advised fund if such fund or account is advised by a committee not directly or indirectly controlled by a donor, donor advisor, or persons related to a donor or donor advisor. The Secretary also may exempt a fund or account from treatment as a donor advised fund if such fund or account benefits a single identified charitable purpose. Secs. 4966(d)(2)(B) and (C).

77 Section 170(c) describes organizations to which charitable contributions that are deductible for income tax purposes can be made.

78 See sec. 170(c)(2)(A).

79 Sec. 4966(d)(1).

80 Sec. 4943(e).

81 Sec. 4943(e)(2).

82 Sec. 4958(c).

83 Sec. 4958(e).

84 For this purpose, a person is treated as related to another person if such person bears a relationship to such other person similar to the relationships described in sections 4958(f)(1)(B) and 4958(f)(1)(C).

85 Sec. 4958(c)(2).

86 Sec. 4958(f)(1)(E).

87 Sec. 4958(f)(1)(F).

88 Sec. 4958(f)(8).

89 Sec. 4966.

90 Sec. 4966(c)(1).

91 Sec. 4966(c)(2).

92 Secs. 4966(a) and (b).

93 See generally sec. 4967.

94 Sec. 6033(k).

95 Sec. 508(f).

96 For example, if such a contribution remains undistributed as of the beginning of the seventh taxable year following the year in which the contributions is made, a tax will be imposed for both the sixth and seventh taxable years following the contribution year.

97 Sec. 4942(g).

98 Sec. 4940(e).

99 Sec. 4942(d)(2).

100 Sec. 4940(d)(1).

101 Sec. 4940(d)(2).

102 The Code does not expressly define the term “public charity,” but rather provides exceptions to those entities that are treated as private foundations.

103 Sec. 509(a)(1) (referring to sections 170(b)(1)(A)(i) through (iv) for a description of these organizations).

104 Treas. Reg. sec. 1.170A-9(f)(2). Failing this mechanical test, the organization may qualify as a public charity if it passes a “facts and circumstances” test. Treas. Reg. sec. 1.170A-9(f)(3).

105 To meet this requirement, the organization must normally receive more than one-third of its support from a combination of (1) gifts, grants, contributions, or membership fees and (2) certain gross receipts from admissions, sales of merchandise, performance of services, and furnishing of facilities in connection with activities that are related to the organization’s exempt purposes. Sec. 509(a)(2)(A). In addition, the organization must not normally receive more than one-third of its public support in each taxable year from the sum of (1) gross investment income and (2) the excess of unrelated business taxable income as determined under section 512 over the amount of unrelated business income tax imposed by section 511. Sec. 509(a)(2)(B).

106 Sec. 509(a)(3). Supporting organizations are further classified as Type I, II, or III depending on the relationship they have with the organizations they support. Supporting organizations must support public charities listed in one of the other categories (i.e., per se public charities, broadly supported public charities, or revenue generating public charities), and they are not permitted to support other supporting organizations or testing for public safety organizations.

Organizations organized and operated exclusively for testing for public safety also are classified as public charities. Sec. 509(a)(4). Such organizations, however, are not eligible to receive deductible charitable contributions under section 170.

107 Unlike public charities, private foundations are subject to tax on their net investment income at a rate of two percent (one percent in some cases). Sec. 4940. Private foundations also are subject to more restrictions on their activities than are public charities. For example, private foundations are prohibited from engaging in self-dealing transactions (sec. 4941), are required to make a minimum amount of charitable distributions each year, (sec. 4942), are limited in the extent to which they may control a business (sec. 4943), may not make speculative investments (sec. 4944), and may not make certain expenditures (sec. 4945). Violations of these rules result in excise taxes on the foundation and, in some cases, may result in excise taxes on the managers of the foundation.

108 Sec. 4942.

109 Sec. 4942(g)(1)(A).

110 Sec. 4942(a) and (b). Taxes imposed may be abated if certain conditions are met. Secs. 4961 and 4962.

111 Sec. 4942(g)(1)(B) and 4942(g)(2). In general, an organization is permitted to adjust the distributable amount in those cases where distributions during the five preceding years have exceeded the payout requirements. Sec. 4942(i).

112 Sec. 4942(a)(1).

113 Sec. 4942(j)(3)(A); Treas. Reg. sec. 53.4942(b)-1(c).

114 Sec. 4942(j)(3)(B).

115 The proposal does not modify the rules for deducting charitable contributions to private operating foundations. As a conforming amendment to the Code, the proposal moves the definition of an operating foundation from section 4942 to section 170(b)(1).

116 The Code does not expressly define the term “public charity,” but rather provides exceptions to those entities that are treated as private foundations.

117 Sec. 509(a)(1) (referring to sections 170(b)(1)(A)(i) through (iv) for a description of these organizations).

118 Treas. Reg. sec. 1.170A-9(f)(2). Failing this mechanical test, the organization may qualify as a public charity if it passes a “facts and circumstances” test. Treas. Reg. sec. 1.170A-9(f)(3).

119 To meet this requirement, the organization must normally receive more than one-third of its support from a combination of (1) gifts, grants, contributions, or membership fees and (2) certain gross receipts from admissions, sales of merchandise, performance of services, and furnishing of facilities in connection with activities that are related to the organization’s exempt purposes. Sec. 509(a)(2)(A). In addition, the organization must not normally receive more than one-third of its public support in each taxable year from the sum of (1) gross investment income and (2) the excess of unrelated business taxable income as determined under section 512 over the amount of unrelated business income tax imposed by section 511. Sec. 509(a)(2)(B).

120 Sec. 509(a)(3). Supporting organizations are further classified as Type I, II, or III depending on the relationship they have with the organizations they support. Supporting organizations must support public charities listed in one of the other categories (i.e., per se public charities, broadly supported public charities, or revenue generating public charities), and they are not permitted to support other supporting organizations or testing for public safety organizations.

Organizations organized and operated exclusively for testing for public safety also are classified as public charities. Sec. 509(a)(4). Such organizations, however, are not eligible to receive deductible charitable contributions under section 170.

121 Unlike public charities, private foundations are subject to tax on their net investment income at a rate of two percent (one percent in some cases). Sec. 4940. Private foundations also are subject to more restrictions on their activities than are public charities. For example, private foundations are prohibited from engaging in self-dealing transactions (sec. 4941), are required to make a minimum amount of charitable distributions each year, (sec. 4942), are limited in the extent to which they may control a business (sec. 4943), may not make speculative investments (sec. 4944), and may not make certain expenditures (sec. 4945). Violations of these rules result in excise taxes on the foundation and, in some cases, may result in excise taxes on the managers of the foundation.

122 Exempt operating foundations are exempt from the section 4940 tax. Sec. 4940(d)(1). Exempt operating foundations generally include organizations such as museums or libraries that devote their assets to operating charitable programs but have difficulty meeting the “public support” tests necessary not to be classified as a private foundation. To be an exempt operating foundation, an organization must: (1) be an operating foundation (as defined in section 4942(j)(3)); (2) be publicly supported for at least 10 taxable years; (3) have a governing body no more than 25 percent of whom are disqualified persons and that is broadly representative of the general public; and (4) have no officers who are disqualified persons. Sec. 4940(d)(2).

123 Sec. 4942(g).

124 Sec. 4940(e).

125 Under a separate proposal, the private foundation excise tax would be simplified by replacing the two-tier rate structure with a single-rate tax set at one percent.

126 Sec. 4942(d)(2).

127 Secs. 509(a)(1) and 170(b)(1)(A)(ii).

128 Section 25A, as amended by a separate proposal, defines an eligible educational institution as an institution (1) which is described in section 481 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1088), as in effect on August 5, 1977, and (2) which is eligible to participate in a program under title IV of such Act.

129 Treas. Reg. sec. 1.501(c)(6)-1.

130 Treas. Reg. sec. 1.501(c)(6)-1.

131 See General Counsel Memorandum 38179, November 29, 1979 (“We continue to believe that professional sports leagues, including football leagues, do not qualify for exemption if the ordinary standards of section 501(c)(6) are applied. However, while the answer is far from clear, we have concluded upon reflection that the specific exemption of football leagues in 1966 can be viewed as providing support for recognition of exemption of all professional sports leagues as a unique category of organizations under section 501(c)(6). Since other professional sports leagues are indistinguishable in any meaningful way from football leagues, we think it is fair to conclude that by formally blessing the exemption it knew football leagues had historically enjoyed, Congress implicitly recognized a unique historical category of exemption under section 501(c)(6). The specific enumeration of football leagues can be viewed as merely exemplary of the category thus recognized, and as necessitated only by the problem of insuring that football’s pension and merger arrangement would not endanger its exemption”).

132 Treas. Reg. sec. 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1). The Code specifies such purposes as religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster international amateur sports competition, or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals. In general, an organization is organized and operated for charitable purposes if it provides relief for the poor and distressed or the underprivileged. Treas. Reg. sec. 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2).

133 Treas. Reg. sec. 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii).

134 Treas. Reg. sec. 1.501(c)(3)-1(e)(1). Conducting a certain level of unrelated trade or business activity will not jeopardize tax-exempt status.

135 Sec. 509(a). Private foundations are either private operating foundations or private non-operating foundations. In general, private operating foundations operate their own charitable programs in contrast to private non-operating foundations, which generally are grant-making organizations. Most private foundations are non-operating foundations.

136 Secs. 4940 – 4945.

137 Sec. 509(a)(3).

138 In general, supported organizations of a supporting organization must be publicly supported charities described in sections 509(a)(1) or (a)(2).

139 Sec. 509(a)(3)(A).

140 Sec. 509(a)(3)(B).

141 Sec. 509(a)(3)(C).

142 Treas. Reg. sec. 1.509(a)-4(f)(2).

143 Treas. Reg. sec. 1.509(a)-4(g)(1)(i).

144 Ibid.

145 Treas. Reg. sec. 1.509(a)-4(h)(1).

146 Treas. Reg. sec. 1.509(a)-4(h)(2).

147 Treas. Reg. sec. 1.509(a)-4(i)(1).

148 Treas. Reg. sec. 1.509(a)-4(i)(10).

149 Treas. Reg. sec. 1.509(a)-4(i)(2)(i).

150 Treas. Reg. sec. 1.509(a)-4(i)(2)(iii).

151 Treas. Reg. sec. 1.509(a)-4(i)(3)(i).

152 Treas. Reg. sec. 1.509(a)-4(i)(3)(ii).

153 Treas. Reg. sec. 1.509(a)-4(i)(3)(iii). For an organization that was supporting or benefiting one or more publicly supported organizations before November 20, 1970, additional facts and circumstances, such as an historic and continuing relationship between organizations, also may be taken into consideration to establish compliance with either of the responsiveness tests. Treas. Reg. sec. 1.509(a)-4(i)(3)(v).

154 Treas. Reg. secs. 1.509(a)-4(i)(4)(i)(A) & -4(i)(4)(ii).

155 Treas. Reg. secs. 1.509(a)-4(i)(4)(i)(B) & -4(i)(4)(iii).

156 Treas. Reg. sec. 1.509(a)-4(i)(4)(i)(C). Regulations describing this means of satisfying the integral support test have been reserved. Treas. Reg. sec. 1.509(a)-4(i)(4)(iv).

157 Treas. Reg. sec. 1.509(a)-4(i)(5)(i)(A). Special rules exist for certain pre-November 20, 1970 trusts. See Treas. Reg. secs. 1.509(a)-4(i)(5)(i)(B) & -4(i)(9).

158 Treas. Reg. sec. 1.509(a)-4(i)(5)(ii).

159 Treas. Reg. secs. 1.509(a)-4T(i)(5)(ii)(B) & (C).

160 Treas. Reg. sec. 1.509(a)-4(i)(5)(iii)(B).

Citations: JCX-16-14




Obama Administration Opposes Barring IRS From Changing Tax-Exemption Requirements.

The Obama administration strongly opposes H.R. 3865, which would temporarily prevent the IRS from changing tax-exemption requirements for social welfare groups, because it could interfere with tax administration and with providing clarity for applicants, the White House said in a February 25 statement of administration policy.

H.R. 3865 — Temporary Prohibition on IRS from Modifying

Tax-Exemption Requirements for Social Welfare Organizations

(Rep. Camp, R-Michigan, and 66 cosponsors)

STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY

February 25, 2014

(House Rules)

The Administration strongly opposes H.R. 3865, which would prohibit the Department of the Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) from clarifying the standards that organizations must satisfy to qualify for tax-exempt status. Under current law, organizations qualify as tax-exempt organizations “operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare” if they are primarily engaged in promoting in some way the common good and general welfare of the people. The relevant Treasury and IRS rules have been in place since 1959 and are broadly recognized as unclear. The proposed legislation would prevent any revisions or clarifications to those rules. Thus, it could prevent the IRS from administering the tax code more effectively and from providing greater clarity to organizations seeking tax-exempt status.

H.R. 3865 would prevent Treasury and the IRS from issuing, for one year from the date of enactment, any generally applicable guidance relating to the standards for tax-exemption under section 501(c)(4) as a social welfare organization. In addition, H.R. 3865 would require the IRS to continue to use the standard and definitions in effect on January 1, 2010, to determine whether an organization qualifies for tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(4). The lack of clarity of these standards has resulted in confusion and difficulty administering the Code, as well as delays in the processing of applications for tax-exempt status. The Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration and the National Taxpayer Advocate, among others, have recommended clarifying the current rules.

Consistent with these recommendations, Treasury and the IRS recently issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) that provides guidance on the definition of candidate-related political activity for purposes of determining the “primary activity” of a social welfare organization and solicits public comment on a number of related issues. This NPRM is the first step in a standard rulemaking process intended to clarify the rules and to provide greater certainty for organizations seeking tax-exempt status. The notice and comment process allows for all concerned parties to provide input and comments before any changes to the rules are effected. Treasury and the IRS will carefully consider any and all such comments before issuing any further guidance, and they will follow standard agency rulemaking procedures.

For the reasons described above, the Administration strongly opposes the proposed legislation. If the President were presented with H.R. 3865, his senior advisors would recommend that he veto the bill.




IRS Corrects TE/GE Ruling Procedures.

The IRS has corrected (Rev. Proc. 2014-19) the procedures (Rev. Proc. 2014-4) for furnishing ruling letters, information letters, and other guidance on matters regarding sections of the code under the jurisdiction of the Tax-Exempt and Government Entities Division commissioner.

Rev. Proc. 2014-4 contains errors in sections 2.06 and 9.03(3) regarding the expedited handling of exempt organization determination letter requests. Effective January 2, 2014, Rev. Proc. 2014-19 corrects those errors to clarify that EO determination letters are still eligible for expedited handling under section 9 of Rev. Proc. 2014-4.

Part III — Administrative, Procedural, and Miscellaneous

26 CFR 601.201: Rulings and determination letters.

SECTION 1. BACKGROUND

.01 Revenue Procedure 2014-4 as published on January 2, 2014 (2014-1 I.R.B. 125) contains unintentional errors in sections 2.06 and 9.03(3). The errors are:

1. Section 2.06 of Rev. Proc. 2014-4 should have stated that section 9.03(3) has been modified only with respect to EP determination letter requests and not EO determination letter requests, and

2. Section 9.03(3) of Rev. Proc. 2014-4 should have stated that only EP Determination Letter requests (and not EO determination letter requests) are not eligible for expedited handling, and

3. All references in Section 9.03(3) of Rev. Proc. 2014-4 to “letter ruling” should have also included references to “determination letter.”

SECTION 2. MODIFICATIONS TO REVENUE PROCEDURE 2014-4

.01 Section 2.06 of Rev. Proc. 2014-4 is modified to add “EP” before “determination letter requests are not eligible for expedited handling.”

.02 The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 9.03(3) of Rev. Proc. 2014-4 is modified to add “EP” before “Determination Letter requests are not eligible for expedited handling.”

.03 Section 9.03(3) of Rev. Proc. 2014-4 is modified to add the phrase “or EO determination letter” after all references to the phrase “letter ruling” in this Section.

SECTION 3. EFFECTIVE DATE

.01 The modification in this revenue procedure will be treated as in effect as of the effective date of Rev. Proc. 2014-4, January 2, 2014.

SECTION 4. EFFECT ON OTHER DOCUMENTS

.01 This Rev. Proc. modifies Rev. Proc. 2014-4 to ensure that EO Determination Letters remain eligible for expedited handling under Section 9.03(3) of Rev. Proc. 2014-4.

SECTION 5. DRAFTING INFORMATION

The principal author of this Revenue Procedure is Dave Rifkin of Exempt Organizations, Tax Exempt and Government Entities Division. For further information regarding this Revenue Procedure, contact Dave Rifkin at (202) 317-8525 (not a toll-free call).

Citations: Rev. Proc. 2014-19; 2014-10 IRB 1




Why is the U.S. Olympic Committee Tax Exempt?

Every two years, I sit in front of my TV watching the Olympics. Like clockwork, in the midst of some competition I can’t understand, my mind wanders to tax wonkdom and I ask myself: Why is the U.S. Olympic Committee a tax exempt organization?

The law says tax exempt status is granted to groups that “foster national or international amateur sports competition.” But do the hyper-marketed modern games even remotely fit the ideal of amateur sports? Sure, some athletes who represent the U.S. are amateurs but a great many others are highly paid professionals or marketing magnets. Snowboarder Shaun White–who won no medals– makes a reported $8 million-a-year in endorsements.

And then there is USOC itself. By almost any standard, it is a commercial enterprise. It exists primarily to help organize a bi-annual made-for-TV entertainment extravaganza.  Yes, it provides some support for athletes (though surprisingly little). But its real business is marketing itself and playing its part in a two-week orgy of athletic commercialization.

USOC’s total revenue for 2012 (the last publicly available data) was $353 million. Of that, $263 million, or nearly 75 percent, was generated by broadcast rights, trademark income, and licensing agreements, according to its financial statement. About $46 million came from (mostly corporate) contributions.

How did the committee spend that money in 2012? Its total expenses were $249 million. Nearly $21 million went to fundraising, $17 million to sales and marketing,  $3 million to public relations, and $14 million to administrative and general expenses.

Of what was left, about $74 million went to “member support,” or to fund individual National Governing Bodies such as the US Ski & Snowboard Association, USA Track & Field, US Speedskating and the like.

How much went to direct support for athletes? It’s hard to tell but according to one estimate, it was less than 6 percent of total USOC spending. Top ranked athletes get monthly stipends ranging from $400 to $2,000. Others get nothing. Athletes have access to Olympic training centers though most have to pay to use and stay at them and therefor don’t. A watchdog group called the U.S. Athletic Trust has a nice explanation here, though it reported on USOC expenses from 2009-2011.

About $24 million went to support U.S. Paralympics, and $4 million to sports science and sports medicine.

And USOC paid its senior staff handsomely. A dozen of its top executives made $250,000 or more in 2012, and its CEO, Scott Blackmun, received $965,000. After all that, it still had nearly $100 million in surplus revenue.

To be fair, USOC isn’t the only sports behemoth to enjoy tax-exempt status. The National Football League, the National Hockey League, the Professional  Golfers Association, and other big-bucks professional sports leagues are also tax-exempt–though under a different code subsection than USOC.  Last year, Sen. Tom Coburn (R-OK) introduced a bill to take away the tax-exemption for the pro outfits. It has gone nowhere.

USOC is somehow different, perhaps because it so successfully clings to the myth of the amateur athlete who competes for the love of sport, and not the big bucks.

But reading through its financials, USOC sure looks like a business. Yes, it probably does foster enough international amateur competition to satisfy the law, but I’m still left with the question I had as I tried to figure out what the heck slopestyle is: Why does the government grant tax-exempt status to businesses like USOC?

Howard Gleckman | Posted on February 13, 2014, 4:13 pm




Credit Union Federal Tax Exemption Study.

Benefits of the Credit Union Federal Tax Exemption

With debate about comprehensive tax reform heating up in Washington, NAFCU commissioned a study to take a look at the benefits of the credit union federal income tax exemption to consumers, businesses and the U.S. economy. Download the 2014 study and key findings at the links to the right.

Background

The 1934 Federal Credit Union Act (FCUA) states that credit unions receive a federal income tax exemption because “credit unions are mutual or cooperative organizations operated entirely by and for their members.” In 1998, as part of the findings of the Credit Union Membership Access Act (P.L. 105-219), Congress reaffirmed that exemption. Still, credit unions do pay many taxes and fees, including payroll and property taxes. It is also important to note that share dividends paid to credit union members are taxed at the membership level. Critics argue that credit unions today are no different than banks.

However, the defining characteristics of a credit union, no matter what the size, remain the same today as they did in 1934—credit unions are not-for-profit cooperatives that serve defined fields of membership, generally have volunteer boards of directors and cannot issue capital stock. Credit unions are restricted in where they can invest their members’ deposits and are subject to stringent capital requirements. A credit union’s shareholders are its members and each member has one vote, regardless of the amount on deposit, while a bank has stockholders.

Download 2014 Key Findings

http://www.nafcu.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=28446

A convenient two-page document to print and share with your elected officials.

Download 2014 Full Study

http://www.nafcu.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=28447




IRS LTR: Exempt Organization's Stream Mitigation Activities Won't Result in UBTI.

Citations: LTR 201408031

The IRS ruled that an organization’s stream mitigation activities in a watershed it protects are substantially related to its exempt purpose and don’t constitute trade or business under section 513(a) and that income the organization receives from the sale of related mitigation credits isn’t unrelated business taxable income.

UIL: 511.00-00, 512.00-00, 513.00-00

Release Date: 2/21/2014

Date: November 27, 2013

Dear * * *:

This is in response to your ruling request for a ruling as to whether certain activities conducted by you constitute an unrelated trade or business and whether the sale of proceeds derived from those certain activities are taxable as unrelated business taxable income under sections 511 through 514 of the Internal Revenue Code (“Code”).

FACTS

You are a State non-profit corporation described in § 501(c)(3). You were organized for cultural and other educational purposes within the meaning of § 501(c)(3) and were specifically formed to educate individuals about the arts and natural sciences. You built and manage a nature center, as well as related facilities including nature trails to provide formal and participatory environmental education to students and the general public. In furtherance of your exempt purpose, you educate the public about the environment through museum exhibits, special programs, and interactive experiences in Preserve. You serve over 30,000 students from more than 35 school systems and an additional 25,000 visitors each year. You are supported by program fees, memberships, fundraising events, museum admissions, and donations from corporations and individuals.

You later amended your articles of incorporation to expand the description of your exempt purposes. Your purposes now include protecting the natural and scenic spaces of real property, protecting natural resources, and maintaining or enhancing water and air quality. In furtherance of these amended purposes, you protect the natural resources of Watershed, which includes Preserve. Preserve is owned by Commission and is leased to you.

You have represented that Commission was created as a public corporation by the State Legislature under an act of the general assembly of State, and Commission is considered a political subdivision of State. An act of State Legislature passed in 1980 reads, “There is hereby created a body corporate and politic to be known as [ Commission under its former name], which shall be deemed to be a political subdivision of [ State ] and a public corporation by that name . . .” An act of State Legislature passed in 1988 reads, “The body corporate and politic . . . known as [ Commission under its former name], is hereby renamed as [ Commission ] . . . the general purposes of the commission are declared to be: acquiring, constructing, equipping, maintaining, and operating a recreational center and area or centers and areas . . . and doing any and all things deemed by the commission necessary, convenient, or desirable for and incident to the efficient and proper development and operation of such types of undertakings.” Further, nine of eleven members of Commission are appointed by County or City. The 1988 Act reads, “[ Commission ] shall consist of 11 members . . . Four of such members shall be appointed by the commissioners of [ City ] . . ., five members shall be appointed by the board of commissioners of [ County ] . . ., and two members shall be appointed by [ Commission ].”

In Year 1, Commission entered into an agreement whereby it leased to County the acreage necessary for constructing an environmental center on Preserve. Commission then subleased this land back from County and assumed “total responsibility” for the operation, regulation and maintenance of the center. Commission selected you as the sole managing agent and operator of the center and leased that portion of land to you for a substantial term. It also forbade you from making any capital improvements to the land (other than regular maintenance) without first notifying and seeking its approval. In Year 2, Commission leased additional acreage in the Watershed to you and extended the term of your lease. This amended contract clarified that during the lease period you may not “erect any currently unplanned substantial improvements, substantially alter the topography, nor substantially alter the vegetation growing upon said leased premises without the prior consent of Commission entered upon the Commission minutes.” Under a Declaration of Conservation Covenants and Restrictions, Commission covenants to maintain the majority of this additional land as stream buffers. Commission then executed a Deed of Conservation Easement to you in which the entire acreage is subject to your management for conservation purposes.

Thus, you hold a perpetual conservation easement over Preserve and some additional tracts in Watershed that contain streams. You indicate that this perpetual easement ensures that Preserve is kept undeveloped and its conservation values are preserved by maintaining the woodland and natural character of the property. Additionally, you are responsible for complying with Commission’s covenant regarding maintaining stream buffers.

A few years ago, you hired a consultant to perform an environmental assessment of Watershed. The assessment pointed out significant problems with the stream quality in Watershed and determined the steps necessary to remediate Watershed’s waterways. You received a Clean Water Act Section 319 grant to address certain storm water detention and stream restoration, and could possibly obtain other such grants in the future. A national program to address nonpoint sources of water pollution provides funds for the grants that originate from the Federal government, and are then allocated to state nonpoint source agencies. The state agencies may award the grants to awardees such as you. The state agencies must ensure that awardees comply with Federal laws and that their projects are designed in compliance with those laws. However, since grant funding may be sporadic, in order to complete the remediation activities, you plan to form a stream mitigation bank with support of Commission.

By conducting stream mitigation activities to restore deeply eroded, degraded streams to a functional form, as part of operating the stream mitigation bank, you will generate mitigation credits that can be sold within an environmental conservation program created and managed by various state and Federal agencies. More specifically, as inducement to invest in the significant costs associated with stream restoration, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”), with the cooperation and participation of other Federal and state agencies, oversees a program, pursuant to authority under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act or Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, that allows the owner of impaired streams to create value by restoring and preserving the streams and receive “credits” from the restoration and preservation activities. A stream mitigation bank is the legal structure that provides the mitigation credits. The creation of credits occurs under a mitigation banking instrument that must be approved by the Corps, and the number of credits to be awarded for completed work is established in the mitigation banking instrument. Releases of credits in the mitigation bank occur when the work has been satisfactorily performed under the requirements of the mitigation banking instrument. Once all of the mitigation credits are sold, as discussed below, there are no additional proceeds from the mitigation bank. However, the owner/sponsor of the mitigation bank is responsible for the monitoring and maintenance of the restored stream reaches for seven years after completion of the final phase. In your case, after this seven year period, you, as Trustee for the Preserve, are charged with management of the water resources in perpetuity.

The mitigation credits generated by your stream mitigation activities can be sold to private developers or governmental units who have projects which may cause any stream disturbance or impact on a stream somewhere else in the primary service watershed. Such projects include the construction of bridges or piped road crossings. The Corps is responsible for providing permits to developers as pertinent to stream effects, and for public review and comment of permits. In order to receive construction permits, the Corps requires developers to mitigate the environmental impacts of their projects as feasible. The intent of the Corps in its mitigation programs is to ensure that there is “no net loss” to the stream or wetland environments. Mitigation credits serve as a preferred option for meeting the requirements. If the developer proposes this option, the amount of credits a developer must buy is dependent on the length and severity of the impact on the given streams within a developer’s project, and is determined by the Corps. The pricing of mitigation credits is market-driven. The Corps does not regulate the pricing of the mitigation credits. However, the Corps is the entity that issues the mitigation credits when the mitigation work is completed in accordance with the terms of the mitigation banking instrument. Sale of mitigation credits is restricted to developers of projects in the primary service area watershed or, after certain penalties are applied, in secondary zones.

Commission entered into a contractual agreement with you authorizing you to form a stream mitigation bank (Bank). Commission appointed you as the manager of Bank and delegated to you the authority to negotiate the banking instrument with the Corps and other state and Federal agencies. You and Commission submitted the mitigation banking instrument to the Corps, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and the State Department of Natural Resources. The banking instrument was approved and is administered by the Corps on behalf of itself and the other agencies. Under the terms of the banking instrument, Commission is the sponsor of Bank. The banking instrument makes clear that as the sponsor, Commission is solely responsible for “planning, funding, developing, managing and monitoring Bank in accordance with the Mitigation Banking Instrument.” As noted above, in addition to signing the banking instrument, Commission also executed the Deed of Conservation Easement and restrictive covenant related to Watershed to you. As manager of the Bank and under the Deed and contractual agreement with Commission, you provide the financing, supervision and future monitoring of preservation construction requirements, and conduct and fund the mitigation activities. Commission authorized you to sell all the mitigation credits generated from Bank.

You state that your activity of protecting Watershed lessens the governmental burdens of Commission, “to care for [ Preserve ] and [ Watershed ].” You state that the effect of the Deed of Conservation Easement is to require you to perform the obligations of Commission, as owner of the Preserve, including those requiring affirmative action under the Declaration of Conservation Covenants and Restrictions and those arising under the Bank instrument. You represent that this arrangement with Commission was in accordance with all laws of State, including contracting provisions. You expect to spend several million dollars in performing your obligations to Commission. In addition, a commitment has been made by you, County, and City to address storm water management issues in the developed areas surrounding Preserve.

RULINGS REQUESTED

1. That your stream mitigation activities are substantially related to your exempt purpose under § 501(c)(3) of the Code and do not constitute an unrelated trade or business within the meaning of § 513(a).

2. That the income you receive from the sale of credits by Bank is not unrelated business taxable income under § 512(a)(1).

LAW

Section 501(c)(3) of the Code provides in part for the exemption from federal income tax of organizations organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, or educational purposes.

Section 511(a) imposes a tax on the unrelated business taxable income of organizations described in § 501(c).

Section 512(a)(1) defines the term “unrelated business taxable income” as the gross income derived by any organization from any unrelated trade or business regularly carried on by it, less certain allowable deductions and modifications.

Section 513(a) defines the term “unrelated trade or business” as any trade or business the conduct of which is not substantially related (aside from the need of such organization for income or funds or the use it makes of the profits derived) to the exercise or performance by such organization of the functions constituting the basis for its exemption.

Section 513(c) provides that the term “trade or business” includes any activity which is carried on for the production of income from the sale of goods or the performance of services.

Section 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(i) of the Income Tax Regulations (“Treas. Reg.”) provides that an organization may be recognized as an organization described in § 501(c)(3) of the Code if it is operated exclusively for one or more of the following purposes: religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, educational, or prevention of cruelty to children or animals.

Section 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) of the Treas. Reg. provides a definition of the term “charitable” as it is used in § 501(c)(3) of the Code. The term “charitable” is used in its generally accepted legal sense and includes lessening of the burdens of government.

Section 1.513-1(a) of the Treas. Reg. provides that gross income of an exempt organization subject to the tax imposed by § 511 of the Code is includible in the computation of unrelated business taxable income if: (1) it is income from a trade or business; (2) such trade or business is regularly carried on by the organization; and (3) the conduct of such trade or business is not substantially related (other than through the production of funds) to the organization’s performance of its exempt functions.

Section 1.513-1(c)(1) of the Treas. Reg. provides that in determining whether trade or business from which a particular amount of gross income derives is “regularly carried on,” within the meaning of § 512 of the Code, regard must be had to the frequency and continuity with which the activities productive of the income are conducted and the manner in which they are pursued. For example, specific business activities of an exempt organization will ordinarily be deemed to be “regularly carried on” if they manifest a frequency and continuity, and are pursued in a manner, generally similar to comparable commercial activities of non-exempt organizations.

Section 1.513-1(d)(1) of the Treas. Reg. provides that gross income derives from “unrelated trade or business” within the meaning of § 513(a) of the Code if the conduct of the trade or business which produces the income is not substantially related (other than through the production of funds) to the purposes for which exemption is granted.

Section 1.513-1(d)(2) of the Treas. Reg. provides that a trade or business is “related” to exempt purposes, in the relevant sense, only where the conduct of the business activities has a causal relationship to the achievement of exempt purposes, and it is “substantially related” only if the causal relationship is a substantial one. For the conduct of trade or business from which a particular amount of gross income is derived to be substantially related to purposes for which exemption is granted, the production or distribution of the goods or the performance of the services from which the gross income is derived must contribute importantly to the accomplishment of those purposes.

Rev. Rul. 85-1, 1985-1 C.B. 177 and Rev. Rul. 85-2, 1985-1 C.B. 178, recognize as charitable certain organizations that assist state and local governments in carrying out their functions. The criteria for determining whether an organization’s activities lessen the burdens of government are first, whether the governmental unit considers the organization’s activities to be its burden; and second, whether these activities actually lessen the burden of the governmental unit. An activity is a burden of the government if there is an objective manifestation by the governmental unit that it considers the activities of the organization to be its burden. The interrelationship between the governmental unit and the organization may provide evidence that the governmental unit considers the activity to be its burden. Whether the organization is actually lessening the burdens of government is determined by considering all of the relevant facts and circumstances. A favorable working relationship between the government and the organization is strong evidence that the organization is actually “lessening” the burdens of the government. However, the fact that the government or an official of the government expresses approval of an organization and its activities is not sufficient to establish that the organization is lessening the burdens of government. See Rev. Rul. 85-2, supra (concluding that the organization’s activity of training guardians ad litem actually lessens the burdens of the juvenile court, in part because the court uses the volunteers trained by the organization). Thus, the functions that constitute the burdens of government must be identified and the organization’s activities must actually lessen those burdens.

In Virginia Professional Standards Review Foundation v. Blumenthal, 466 F. Supp. 1164 (D.D.C. 1979) (“Virginia PSRO”), two organizations were formed pursuant to a federal law that provided for the establishment of professional standards review organizations (“PSROs”) to ensure the effective, efficient and economic delivery of health care services to Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare was charged with implementation of the PSRO program. The district court stated that “[t]he legislative history of the statute indicates that the PSRO programs were created essentially to act in the government’s place in ensuring the ‘effective, efficient and economic’ delivery of health care services to Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries.” Id. at 1166. The court also stated that “[i]t is well established that a corporation which provides a community benefit . . . or lessens the burdens of government . . . may be regarded as engaged in charitable activities.” Id. at 1170. The court concluded that these organizations operated exclusively for charitable purposes under § 501(c)(3) of the Code.

In Professional Standards Review Organization of Queens County, Inc. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 240 (1980), acq., 1980-2 C.B. 2 (“Queens County PSRO”), the Tax Court held that an organization created pursuant to a federal statute that reviewed the appropriateness and quality of healthcare services provided to Medicare and Medicaid recipients was exempt under § 501(c)(3) of the Code because it lessened the burdens of government. The Tax Court held that the PSRO’s activities of lessening the burdens of the Federal Government and promoting public health far outweighed any incidental benefit that individual physicians, or even the profession as a whole, would derive from petitioner’s purposes and activities.

In Columbia Park and Recreation Assoc. v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1 (1987), aff’d without published opinion, 838 F.2d 465 (4th Cir. 1998), the court of appeals upheld the decision of the Tax Court that the organization did not lessen any burden of government and thus, was not exempt under § 501(c)(3) of the Code. The organization provided a wide range of services and facilities to the residents of Columbia, Maryland. The organization contended that if it did not provide these services and facilities the local or state government would have to provide them. The Tax Court stated that this assertion does not mean that the organization’s activities are, in fact, a burden of government. Instead, the organization must demonstrate that the State of Maryland and/or the county accept the organization’s activities as their responsibility and recognize the organization as acting on their behalf. In addition, the organization must further establish that its activities actually lessen the burden of the state or local government.

In Indiana Crop Improvement Association, Inc. v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 394 (1981), acq. 1981-2 C.B. 1, the Tax Court found that the organization was described in § 501(c)(3) of the Code because, among other purposes, it was lessening the burdens of government. The organization’s primary activity was the certification of crop seed within the State of Indiana; a substantial amount of time was also spent conducting scientific research in seed technology and providing instruction in modern seed technology in conjunction with Purdue University. The State of Indiana did not have a department of agriculture to regulate agricultural products within the State and delegated by law agricultural regulatory functions to Purdue University and the director of the Purdue University Agricultural Experiment Station; the function of seed certification was in turn delegated by Purdue University to Indiana Crop Improvement Association, Inc. The Tax Court found that as the official seed certifying agency for the State of Indiana, the organization was directly assisting the U.S. Department of Agriculture in enforcing the standards and procedures established under federal statute rather than primarily promoting the economic interests of commercial seed producers and commercial farmers.

In Better Business Bureau of Washington, D.C. v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283, 66 S. Ct. 112, 90 L. Ed. 67, 1945 C.B. 375 (1945), the Court stated that “the presence of a single . . . [nonexempt] purpose, if substantial in nature, will destroy the exemption regardless of the number or importance of truly . . . [exempt] purposes.”

ANALYSIS

You have requested a ruling that your stream mitigation activities in Watershed are substantially related to your exempt purposes and do not constitute an unrelated trade or business within the meaning of § 513(a) of the Code.

“Unrelated business taxable income” is gross income derived from any unrelated trade or business that is regularly carried on by the organization. Section 512(a)(1). Gross income of an exempt organization is taxable income if: (1) it is income from a trade or business; (2) such trade or business is regularly carried on by the organization; and (3) the conduct of such trade or business is not substantially related (other than through the production of funds) to the organization’s performance of its exempt functions. Section 1.512-1(a) of the Treas. Reg.

A trade or business is an activity carried on for the production of income from the sale of goods or the performance of services. Section 513(c) of the Code. You will sell credits from Bank to a variety of entities and intend to receive income from that activity. Therefore, it meets the definition of a trade or business under § 513(c).

Under § 1.513-1(c)(1) of the Treas. Reg., we examine the frequency and continuity of the activities and the manner in which they are conducted to determine whether a trade or business is “regularly carried on.” While the ultimate number of credits that you can sell is finite, you will be selling the credits regularly to various parties over a period of several years. Therefore, this activity is regularly carried on within the meaning of the Code and Regulations. See § 1.513-1(c)(1).

The remaining issue is whether the sale of these credits is substantially related to your exempt purposes. A trade or business is substantially related to exempt purposes if the business activities have a substantial causal relationship or contribute importantly to the achievement of exempt purposes. Section 1.513-1(d)(2).

Under the terms of the conservation easement, you are required to protect the conservation values of Watershed and Preserve on behalf of Commission. Through the arrangements discussed above, this responsibility was bestowed upon you by Commission, a political subdivision of State. By conducting stream mitigation activities, you are undertaking activities that lessen the burdens of government. Lessening the burdens of government is regarded as an exempt purpose. Rev. Rul. 85-1, supra; Rev. Rul. 85-2, supra; Virginia Professional Standards Review Foundation v. Blumenthal, supra; and Professional Standards Review Organization of Queens County, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra. The issue is whether your activities in creating a mitigation bank and selling the resulting mitigation credits is related to this purpose.

Commission was created as a public corporation by the State Legislature under an act of the general assembly of State to oversee all activities within Preserve. As a political subdivision, Commission is a governmental unit.

You are lessening the burdens of Commission because (1) there is an objective manifestation that Commission considers the activity of operating Bank, including the water remediation activities conducted through Bank in Watershed, to be its burden; and (2) you are actually lessening Commission’s burden by operating Bank on behalf of Commission. See Rev. Rul. 85-2, and Columbia Park and Recreation Assoc. v. Commissioner, supra.

Under a Declaration of Conservation Covenants and Restrictions, Commission agreed to maintain a significant part of the Preserve land as stream buffers. Furthermore, as a signatory to the banking instrument and the listed sponsor of Bank, Commission is legally obligated to plan, fund, develop, manage, and monitor the Bank. By assuming this specific obligation in addition to its general conservation obligations, Commission demonstrated that it considers the activity of operating Bank, including the stream remediation activities in Watershed performed as a part of Bank, to be its burden.

In addition, Commission assigned its conservation obligations contained in the conservation easement to you, requiring you to maintain the land in essentially pristine condition and seek Commission’s approval before making any capital improvements. Commission authorized you to negotiate the mitigation banking instrument and remediate these waterways. Furthermore, Commission delegated the operation of Bank, its legal obligation as sponsor of Bank, to you through a contractual agreement. In meeting minutes, Commission specified that it wanted you to be responsible for all “financing, supervision and future monitoring of preservation and construction requirements” associated with Bank. Commission also provided that you were authorized to sell all credits generated by Bank. You have assumed all responsibilities for the planning, funding, developing, and monitoring of Bank as well as the authority to sell credits generated by Bank. By carrying out these activities, you are fulfilling Commission’s conservation and legal obligations and lessening Commission’s burden. Rev. Rul. 85-1, supra; Rev. Rul. 85-2, supra.

In order for the income derived from the sale of the credits to be taxable to you as unrelated business income under § 512(a)(1) of the Code, the income must be derived from an unrelated trade or business that is regularly carried on by you. Because the sale is not an unrelated trade or business as defined by § 513, any mitigation credit income you receive would not be taxable. Here, the activity is substantially related to your exempt purposes within the meaning of § 513(a) because it lessens the burdens of government.

RULING

1. Your stream mitigation activities are substantially related to your exempt purpose under § 501(c)(3) of the Code and do not constitute an unrelated trade or business within the meaning of § 513(a).

2. The income you receive from the sale of mitigation credits created by Bank is not unrelated business taxable income under § 512(a)(1).

This ruling will be made available for public inspection under § 6110 of the Code after certain deletions of identifying information are made. For details, see enclosed Notice 437, Notice of Intention to Disclose. A copy of this ruling with deletions that we intend to make available for public inspection is attached to Notice 437. If you disagree with our proposed deletions, you should follow the instructions in Notice 437. This ruling is directed only to the organization that requested it. Section 6110(k)(3) provides that it may not be used or cited by others as precedent.

This ruling is based on the facts as they were presented and on the understanding that there will be no material changes in these facts. This ruling does not address the applicability of any section of the Code or regulations to the facts submitted other than with respect to the sections described. In particular, this ruling does not address whether the sale of any other form of credits would be considered unrelated business income and be taxable as such.

Because it could help resolved questions concerning your federal income tax status, this ruling should be kept in your permanent records.

If you have any questions about this ruling, please contact the person whose name and telephone number are shown in the heading of this letter.

In accordance with the Power of Attorney currently on file with the Internal Revenue Service, we are sending a copy of this letter to your authorized representative.

Sincerely,

Ronald J. Shoemaker

Manager, Exempt Organizations

Technical Group 2




IRS LTR: IRS Denies Community Organizing Group Exempt Status.

Citations: LTR 201408029

The IRS ruled that an organization formed to engage in community organizing services to promote the advantages of expanded broadband access in unserved and underserved areas failed to qualify for tax-exempt status because it is not organized and operated exclusively for one or more exempt purposes.

UIL: 501.00-00

Release Date: 2/21/2014

Date: November 26, 2013

Dear * * *:

This is our final determination that you do not qualify for exemption from Federal income tax under Internal Revenue Code section 501(a) as an organization described in Code section 501(c)(3).

We made this determination for the following reason(s):

You do not operate exclusively for an exempt purpose and your activities appear to provide more than incidental benefit to private parties.

Because you do not qualify for exemption as an organization described in Code section 501(c)(3), donors may not deduct contributions to you under Code section 170. You must file Federal income tax returns on the form and for the years listed above within 30 days of this letter, unless you request an extension of time to file. File the returns in accordance with their instructions, and do not send them to this office. Failure to file the returns timely may result in a penalty.

If you decide to contest this determination under the declaratory judgment provisions of Code section 7428, you must initiate a suit in the United States Tax Court, the United States Court of Federal Claims, or the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia before the 91st day after the date that we mailed this letter to you. Contact the clerk of the appropriate court for rules for initiating suits for declaratory judgment. Filing a declaratory judgment suit under Code section 7428 does not stay the requirement to file returns and pay taxes.

We will make this letter and our proposed adverse determination letter available for public inspection under Code section 6110, after deleting certain identifying information. Please read the enclosed Notice 437, Notice of Intention to Disclose, and review the two attached letters that show our proposed deletions. If you disagree with our proposed deletions, you should follow the instructions in Notice 437. If you agree with our deletions, you do not need to take any further action.

If you have any questions about this letter, please contact the person whose name and telephone number are shown in the heading of this letter. If you have any questions about your Federal income tax status and responsibilities, please contact IRS Customer Service at 1-800-829-1040 or the IRS Customer Service number for businesses, 1-800-829-4933. The IRS Customer Service number for people with hearing impairments is 1-800-829-4059.

Sincerely,

Karen Schiller

Acting Director,

EO Rulings and Agreements

Date: January 23, 2013

Dear * * *:

We have considered your application for recognition of exemption from Federal income tax under § 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”) as an organization described in § 501(c)(3). Based on the information submitted, we conclude that you do not qualify for exemption under that section. The basis for our conclusion is set forth below.

FACTS

You filed your Articles of Incorporation (the “Articles”) with your Secretary of State on Date 1 and submitted a Form 1023, Application for Recognition of Exemption Under Section 501(c)(3) to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) later that year.

Purpose & Activities

Your original Articles of Incorporation state that your purpose is:

to expand and improve internet service to underserved and unserved areas, improve affordability and access for education, health services and community institutions and to support economic development within the 16 county service area of [your state’s] Northeast Commission . . . provide a single point of contact for businesses and community groups interested in improving broadband service in their area . . . provide access to technical, financial and physical resources for developing broadband access . . . be an advocate for improving broadband access in our service area. . . .

You submitted an amendment to your articles, dated Date2, adding a statement that you will operate exclusively for charitable and educational purposes in a manner consistent with § 501(c)(3) of the Code. However, you did not demonstrate that this amendment had been formally adopted by your Board or filed with your Secretary of State. When we asked whether you would be willing to amend your Articles to include proper purpose and dissolution clauses you responded that you would revise your Bylaws.

Your efforts to improve internet service in your region take place in the context of a national effort to do so. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (Recovery Act) established a program, including large federal grants, to develop and expand broadband service, named the Broadband Technology Opportunities Program (BTOP). Its purpose is to stimulate economic growth and job creation, and provide benefits to education, healthcare, public safety and expand broadband access and adoption. The Assistant Secretary of the Department of Commerce found it in the public interest to permit for-profit corporations an non-profit entities (not otherwise encompassed by section 6001(e)(1)(B)) that are willing to promote the goals of the Recovery act and comply with the statutory requirements of BTOP to be eligible for a grant.

In your state, N, a non-profit research center operates “middle mile” internet lines. These middle mile lines branch off from a “central backbone” internet line. N was awarded the state grant through the program authorized under the BTOP. Internet Service Providers (ISPs), in turn, operate “last mile” internet lines by branching off from the middle mile lines. AN ISP provides internet service directly to subscribers and users via these last mile internet lines. You stated that you will not receive any of the BTOP funds awarded to N.

O is a regional economic development organization created by your state’s legislature to further business development and improve the quality of life for residents in the sixteen counties of the Northeast region. You state that O refers ISPs within your region to you, which generally are for-profit entities.

You explain your role in expanding broadband coverage as providing a single point of contact for “stakeholder groups” interested in improving broadband service in your region in an effort to address the accessibility and affordability of internet coverage. These stakeholder groups will consist of community groups, local businesses and business groups, local governments, school boards, community colleges, local internet users, and commercial internet service providers (“ISPs”), among others. You will negotiate with N to gain low-cost or no-cost access to N’s middle mile internet lines for ISPs. You state that you will assist the ISPs on the condition that they intend (at least in part) to provide last mile internet line services to unserved and underserved areas of your region. Each project in which you participate will develop its own targets based on the circumstances in the project area, and that you will not participate in any project that does not adopt and demonstrate progress toward a specific target for improving access to broadband service by access to service and/or decreasing cost.

You will engage in “community organizing services” to carry out your purpose. You will hold “stakeholder meetings” to explain the opportunity that N investment in middle mile infrastructure represents for your region, and to explain the processes that other communities have used to expand access to broadband services. Though these meetings, working groups will be formed that represent a variety of community interests. These working groups will identify “community resources” that can be aggregated in a program to expand access to broadband.

You provided examples of the types of community resources that will be identified by the working groups, which include: free or reduced charge access to public rights of way; “repurposing” existing grant funds; cost-savings driven by broadband access that could be “repurposed” into the expansion of broadband access; locations in public buildings that could house network infrastructure at no cost; and publicly owned towers that could host wireless network sites for free or at a reduced cost.

You will also advocate for improving broadband access in your service area, and work with the community groups to provide support with grant writing, technical planning, market analysis, and to develop a “final plan” for improving service to the targeted areas of your region. You also will work to gain low cost or no cost access to N-owned fiber optic cable as a part of the final plan. One example you provide states that “an existing downtown business group interested in improving service could encourage all its members to use the community broadband service thereby providing a revenue stream for expanding broadband service.”

You anticipate that your funding will come from government grants and private sources and you do not plan to charge for your community organizing services. You may enter “cost-sharing agreements” with community partners to pay for service-related expenses. Furthermore, you state that most for-profit entities that benefit from your services will be charged market rate or a reduced fee for broadband access, and that you anticipate that the associated revenue will help to fund your operations, although you did not provide details about such arrangements.

Governance

The region in which you work is split into four four-county “districts,” and each district is represented by one member of your Board of Directors (referred to individually as the “Directors,” and collectively as the “Board”). In addition, you have three at-large Directors. The Chairs of P and of O are non-voting ex officio members of your Board. You have selected Directors to serve in the positions of Chairperson, Secretary, and Treasurer (collectively referred to as the “Officers”).

Your Officers and Directors currently work on a volunteer basis. If funding is secured, these individuals may receive reasonable compensation for services rendered, and you intend to fix such amounts based on industry standards within the non-profit sector.

You state that other staff currently work on a volunteer basis. If funding is secured, you plan to hire an Executive Director, a Consultant, and staff familiar with broadband engineering and marketing. None of your directors or officers fit this description at the present time, but they may be considered for these positions if they are qualified, and “after a cooling off period similar to that in place for many federal agencies.”

You state that no member of your Board owns, in whole or in part, an ISP or other business entity that will benefit from your services.

LAW

Section 501(a) of the Code exempts from Federal income taxation organizations described in § 501(c).

Section 501(c)(3) recognizes entities that are organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes no part of the net earnings of which inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting to influence legislation (except as otherwise provided in § 501(h)), and which does not participate in, or intervene in any political campaign.

Section 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)(1) of the Income Tax Regulations (the “Regulations”) states that in order to be exempt as an organization described in § 501(c)(3) of the Code, an organization must be both organized and operated exclusively for one or more of the purposes specified in that section.

Section 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(i) of the Regulations states that an organization is “organized exclusively” for one or more exempt purposes only if its articles of organization limit the purposes of the organization to one or more exempt purposes and do not expressly empower the organization to engage, other than as an insubstantial part of its activities, in activities which are not in furtherance of one or more exempt purposes. An organization is not considered organized exclusively for exempt purposes, if its articles, describe purposes that are broader than the purposes specified in § 501(c)(3).

Section 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(iii) of the Regulations states that an organization is not organized exclusively for one or more exempt purposes if its articles of organization expressly empower it to carry on, as more than an insubstantial part of its activities, activities which are not in furtherance of one or more exempt purposes, even though its articles describe a purpose no broader than the purposes specified in § 501(c)(3).

Section 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(2) defines “articles” to mean the trust instrument, the corporate charter, the articles of association, or any other written instrument by which an organization is created.

Section 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(4) requires that the assets of an exempt organization be dedicated to an exempt purpose. Upon dissolution, such assets must continue to be so dedicated, by reason of a provision in the organization’s articles or by operation of law or by a court order, for one or more exempt purposes, to another exempt organization or to a government, for a public purpose.

Section 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) provides that an organization will be regarded as “operated exclusively” for one or more exempt purposes only if it engages primarily in activities that accomplish one or more of such exempt purposes specified in § 501(c)(3). An organization will not be regarded as exempt if more than an insubstantial part of its activities further a non-exempt purpose.

Section 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2) provides that an organization is not operated exclusively for one or more exempt purposes if its net earnings inure in whole or in part to the benefit of private shareholders or individuals, who are defined in § 1.501(a)-1(c) as persons having a personal and private interest in the activities of the organization.

Section 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) provides that an organization is not organized or operated exclusively for exempt purposes unless it serves a public rather than a private interest, such as designated individuals, the creator or his family, shareholders of the organization, or persons controlled, directly or indirectly, by such private interests.

Section 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) explains that the term “charitable” is used in § 501(c)(3) of the Code in its generally accepted legal sense. The term includes: relief of the poor and distressed or of the underprivileged; advancement of religion; advancement of education or science; erection or maintenance of public buildings, monuments, or works; lessening of the burdens of Government; and promotion of social welfare by organizations designed to accomplish any of the above purposes, or (i) to lessen neighborhood tensions, (ii) to eliminate prejudice and discrimination, (iii) to defend human and civil rights secured by law, or (iv) to combat community deterioration and juvenile delinquency. The Service has long held that poor and distressed beneficiaries must be needy in the sense that they cannot afford the necessities of life. See Rev. Proc. 96-32, 1996-1 C.B. 717, section 2.01.

Section 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3) explains that the term “educational,” as used in § 501(c)(3) of the Code, relates to the instruction or training of the individual for the purpose of improving or developing his or her capabilities, or the instruction of the public on subjects useful to the individual and beneficial to the community. This includes an organization whose activities consist of presenting public discussion groups, forums, panels, lectures, or other similar programs. See § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(ii), Example (2), of the Regulations.

Rev. Rul. 85-1, 1985-2 C.B. 177, states that to determine whether an organization is lessening the burdens of government, it must be considered whether a governmental unit considers such activities to be its burden, and whether the activities actually lessen such governmental burden. An activity is a burden of the government if there is objective manifestation by the government unit that it considers the activities of the organization to be its burden. All relevant facts and circumstances are considered in this analysis. See also Rev. Rul. 85-2, 1985-2 C.B. 178 (stating that an organization is lessening the burdens of government if: (1) its activities are activities that a governmental unit considers to be its burdens; and (2) the activities actually lessen such government burden).

In Rev. Rul. 77-111, 1977-1 C.B. 144, the Service found that two organizations did not qualify for tax exemption under § 501(c)(3) because they provided more than incidental private benefit. The organization in Situation 1 was formed to increase business patronage in a deteriorated area mainly inhabited by minority groups by providing information to the public on the area’s shopping opportunities, local transportation, and accommodations. This assisted businesses operated by minorities and those operating in depressed areas, as well as businesses not owned by minority groups and not experiencing difficulty because of their location. The Service concluded that the primary purpose of the organization was to promote business, which is not an exempt purpose. The purpose of the organization in Situation 2 was to revive retail sales in an area of continued economic decline by constructing a shopping center. The organization purchased land, which it sold to the city at no profit, and the city acquired additional land for the project. The city required that minorities be employed in both the construction and the operation of the project, and stores located within the project likewise were required to employ a certain percentage of minority group employees. The Service concluded that the organization’s activities resulted in major benefits for the stores that would locate in the shopping center, and was thus not eligible for exemption.

In Better Business Bureau of Washington, D.C., Inc. v. United States, 326 U.S. 279 (1945), the Supreme Court held that a trade association did not qualify for exemption, because it had an “underlying commercial motive” that distinguished its educational program from the type provided by a university. In so holding, the Court ruled that the presence of a single non-exempt purpose, if substantial in nature, destroys an organization’s basis for tax exemption, regardless of the number or importance of that organization’s truly exempt purposes.

“Tax exemptions are matters of legislative grace and taxpayers have the burden of establishing their entitlement to exemptions.” Christian Echoes National Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 857 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973) (citing Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389, 74 S. Ct. 152, 98 L. Ed. 132 (1953)). In Bubbling Well Church of Universal Love, Inc. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 531, 534 (1980), aff’d, 670 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1981), the Tax Court stated that meeting this burden requires an “open and candid disclosure of all facts bearing upon [the applicant’s] organization, operations, and finances . . . [and if] such disclosure is not made, the logical inference is that the facts, if disclosed, would show that [the applicant] fails to meet the requirements [for exemption].”

Rev. Proc. 2012-9, 2012-2 I.R.B. 261, section 4.03, states that exempt status may be recognized in advance of an organization’s operations if the proposed activities are described in sufficient detail to permit a conclusion that the organization will clearly meet the particular requirements for exemption pursuant to the section of the Code under which exemption is claimed. A mere restatement of exempt purposes or a statement that proposed activities will be in furtherance of such purposes will not satisfy this requirement. The organization must fully describe all of the activities in which it expects to engage, including the standards, criteria, procedures, or other means adopted or planned for carrying out the activities, the anticipated sources of receipts, and the nature of contemplated expenditures. Where the organization cannot demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Service that it qualifies for exemption pursuant to the section of the Code under which exemption is claimed, the Service will generally issue a proposed adverse determination letter or ruling.

ANALYSIS

An entity must be both organized and operated exclusively for exempt purposes to qualify for exemption from federal income tax See §§ 501(c)(3) and 1.501(c)(3)-1(a). You are neither organized nor operated exclusively for exempt purposes and appears that you will engage in commercial activities which will benefit private interests.

Not Organized Exclusively for Exempt Purposes

An organization is “organized exclusively” for one or more exempt purposes only if its articles of organization limit its purposes to one or more exempt purposes, and do not expressly empower it to engage (other than as an insubstantial part of its activities) in activities which are not in furtherance of one or more exempt purposes. See § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(i)-(iv).

You have not submitted adopted and filed articles that contain the required purpose and dissolution clauses. An amendment to your Articles dated Date 2, states that you will operate exclusively for charitable and educational purposes and in a manner consistent with § 501(c)(3) of the Code. Such a broad restatement of the language of the Code can be acceptable as a purpose. However, your articles continue to include a more specific purpose: “to expand and improve internet service to underserved and unserved areas.” Expanding internet service is not among the enumerated exempt purposes. Nor would it be considered within the “general legal understanding of charity.” Charity has been, and continues to be understood as, providing the necessities of life to the poor and distressed. This specific purpose is broader than the purposes specified in the Code, and empowers you to engage in activities which are not in furtherance of one or more exempt purposes.

Moreover, you did not explain how this amendment to your Articles was formally adopted or enacted by your Board, or whether it was filed with the Secretary of State of State. See Christian Echoes National Ministry, supra; Bubbling Well, supra; Rev. Proc. 2012-9, section 4.03, supra. Finally, your Articles lack a clause stipulating that your assets will be irrevocably dedicated to § 501(c)(3) purposes. When asked, you did not represent that you would amend your Articles as requested. Instead, you stated that you would amend your bylaws.

Pursuant to section 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(2), the term “articles” means “the trust instrument, the corporate charter, the articles of association, or any other written instrument by which an organization is created.” Accordingly, the organizational test cannot be met by reference to any document that is not the creating document. In the case of a corporation, the by-laws cannot remedy a defect in the corporate charter. Subsidiary documents that are not amendments to the creating document may not be relied on. A charter must be amended in accordance with State law, which generally requires filing the amendments with the chartering authority.

Thus, your Articles do not contain a statement of purposes required by § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1) of the Regulations, or a clause stipulating the distribution of assets on dissolution as described under § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(4). Consequently, you do not meet the organizational test set forth under § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b) of the Regulations.

Not Operated Exclusively for an Exempt Purpose

In order to be recognized as an organization described in § 501(c)(3) of the Code, an organization must also be operated exclusively for one or more of the purposes specified in that section. See § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)(1) of the Regulations. While your activities may have some indirect charitable and educational effects, you are not exclusively operated for exempt purposes.

You do not serve a charitable purpose. The term “charitable” is used in its generally accepted legal sense, and includes: relief of the poor and distressed or of the underprivileged; advancement of religion; advancement of education or science; erection or maintenance of public buildings, monuments, or works; lessening of the burdens of Government. See § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2).

You do not limit your services to a “charitable class” of the poor and distressed, aged, sick, handicapped or underprivileged. The Service has long held that poor and distressed beneficiaries must be needy in the sense that they cannot afford the necessities of life. See Rev. Proc. 96-32, sec. 2.01, supra. Broadband internet access has yet to be recognized as such a necessity, and individuals without broadband access are not recognized as a charitable class. Therefore, it follows that expanding and improving access to broadband internet service does not constitute a charitable purpose within the meaning of § 501(c)(3). Furthermore, your services are available to and appear to benefit all members of the community, including commercial entities, and are not limited to one or more charitable classes. Therefore, you do not serve a charitable purpose by relieving the poor and distressed or the underprivileged.

Nor do you serve an educational purpose. The term “educational,” as used in § 501(c)(3), relates to the instruction or training of the individual for the purpose of improving or developing his or her capabilities, or the instruction of the public on subjects useful to the individual and beneficial to the community. See § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3). Your activities may ultimately and indirectly assist the educational purposes of other organizations. For example, you intend to help connect libraries and schools to the high speed broadband. However, you cannot claim their educational purposes as your own and it is not your exclusive purpose. Informing the public of the benefits of expanded and improved broadband internet service is more like promotion than it is education. You have not established that you serve an educational purpose.

You do not lessen the burdens of government. No governmental entity has accepted as its burden providing internet to all, nor specifically organizing local businesses and organizations to bargain for such services. You have not offered any objective manifestation by a governmental unit that it considers your activities to be its burden. See Rev. Rul. 85-2, supra. Moreover, you have failed to demonstrate that a governmental unit considers you to be acting on its behalf. See Rev. Rul. 85-1, supra. Although you may be organized to assist other entities in carrying out the purposes of the BTOP, the program is not a manifestation of governmental responsibility. Rather it is an attempt to motivate businesses and non-profits to expand the broadband system. Thus, you have not established that you serve a charitable purpose by lessening the burdens of government.

Non-Exempt Commercial Purpose

You are operating for a substantial non-exempt commercial purpose. You explained that your role is to promote the advantages of expanded broadband to all members of the community, convene stakeholder meetings to discuss how to attract ISPs to the communities at the end of the “last mile,” and negotiate with the middle mile on behalf of the ISP’s.

You will engage in “community organizing services,” which include holding stakeholder meetings to explain the processes that other communities have used to expand access to broadband services, form working groups representing a variety of community interests, and assisting those groups to identify resources that can be aggregated in a program to expand access to broadband. You provide examples such as donations of publicly owned space for wireless network towers, public rights of way that could be accessed at reduced or no charge, locations in public buildings that could house infrastructure at no cost. In these examples, the government would essentially subsidize the commercial internet providers. One of your primary activities is negotiating with N for low cost or no cost access to the middle mile broadband lines for the ISPs. Thus, a central part of your activities will be coordinating donations from public entities to reduce ISPs business-related expenses and increase the demand for their services. This is a commercial purpose.

Although you expect the ISPs to “repurpose” the amounts they save in expenses toward more affordable and accessible broadband services for the unserved and underserved populations of Region, you will not have any control over the future activities of the ISP’s. Based on the information you provided, it appears that more than an insubstantial part of your activities are in furtherance of non-exempt commercial purposes. See § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1).

Thus, you cannot argue that you are operated exclusively to promote exempt purposes. See § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) of the Regulations: see also Better Business Bureau, supra.

More than incidental Private Benefit

Your “community organizing services” will bestow measureable and significant benefits on commercial entities while the benefit to the poor and distressed is indirect and unquantified. Your efforts to reduce business expenses and increase revenue of commercial ISPs, sell broadband access to generate revenue, and expand the customer bases will benefit privately owned for-profit ISPs.

Your expectation of shared cost savings with “community partners” and possible revenue from the fees paid by for-profit beneficiaries, show that the commercial participants recognize the financial benefits and may share them with you.

Furthermore, the unserved and underserved populations will become future customers for commercial ISPs. In effect, you will be creating a new customer market for ISPs. Thus, whether you are viewed as directly or indirectly involved in the subsequent commercial transactions between ISPs and end-users, you intend to create a marketplace for free, reduced cost, and market rate broadband access that would not exist without your community organizing services. And under the circumstances, it appears that this serves a private, rather than a public interest. See § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) of the Regulations. Therefore, as a practical matter, you will be engaged in commercial activity, because you will help facilitate the generation of income, cost-savings, and the expansion of customer bases for the benefit of commercial ISPs.

Your activities will generate major benefits for commercial ISPs that would experience lower costs and higher revenue from providing broadband access to businesses, non-profits, and individuals in your region. You will also provide private benefit to for-profit businesses that would receive enhanced accessibility to broadband internet due to the “aggregated community demand” you aspire to produce. Thus, like the organization in Situation 2, your activities are directed to benefit commercial entities, rather than to accomplish exclusively § 501(c)(3) purposes. As such, like the organizations described in Rev. Rul. 77-111, you do not qualify for exemption under § 501(c)(3) of the Code.

CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, we have determined that you do not qualify for exemption from Federal income tax under § 501(a) of the Code as an organization described in § 501(c)(3), because you are not organized and operated exclusively for one or more exempt purpose. Your Articles lack sufficient purpose and dissolution clauses. Even if your Articles contained the required clauses, the purposes for which you are created are not exempt purposes as specified in § 501(c)(3) of the Code. And even if it is assumed that you are organized for an exempt purpose, you nevertheless would fail to qualify for tax exemption because a substantial part of your activities further non-exempt purposes and benefit commercial entities.

You have the right to file a protest if you believe this determination is incorrect. To protest, you must submit a statement of your views and fully explain your reasoning. You must submit the statement, signed by one of your officers, within 30 days from the date of this letter. We will consider your statement and decide if the information affects our determination.

Your protest statement should be accompanied by the following declaration:

Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have examined this protest statement, including accompanying documents, and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, the statement contains all the relevant facts, and such facts are true, correct, and complete.

This declaration must be signed by an elected officer, a member of the board of directors, or a trustee rather than an attorney or accountant.

You also have a right to request a conference to discuss your protest. This request should be made when you file your protest statement. An attorney, certified public accountant, or an individual enrolled to practice before the Internal Revenue Service may represent you. If you want representation during the conference procedures, you must file a proper power of attorney, Form 2848, Power of Attorney and Declaration of Representative, if you have not already done so. For more information about representation, see Publication 947, Practice before the IRS and Power of Attorney. All forms and publications mentioned in this letter can be found at www.irs.gov, Forms and Publications.

If you do not file a protest within 30 days, you will not be able to file a suit for declaratory judgment in court because the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) will consider the failure to protest as a failure to exhaust available administrative remedies. Section 7428(b)(2) of the Code provides, in part, that a declaratory judgment or decree shall not be issued in any proceeding unless the Tax Court, the United States Court of Federal Claims, or the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia determines that the organization involved has exhausted all of the administrative remedies available to it within the IRS.

If you do not intend to protest this determination, you do not need to take any further action. If we do not hear from you within 30 days, we will issue a final adverse determination letter. That letter will provide information about filing tax returns and other matters.

Please send your protest statement, Form 2848 and any supporting documents to this address:

Internal Revenue Service

Attn: * * *

* * *

You may also fax your statement using the fax number shown in the heading of this letter. If you fax your statement, please call the person identified in the heading of this letter to confirm that he or she received your fax.

If you have any questions, please contact the person whose name and telephone number are shown in the heading of this letter.

Sincerely,

Karen Schiller,

Acting Director

EO Rulings and Agreements




IRS LTR: Parent of Healthcare System Not a Qualified Organization.

Citations: TAM 201407024

In technical advice, the IRS concluded that the parent company of a healthcare system is not an educational organization and therefore isn’t a qualified organization in determining whether its income from investment partnerships may be excluded from unrelated business taxable income.

The parent organization received recognition of its section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status and was classified as a publicly supported organization. Its stated primary purpose was to be the parent company of a healthcare system, and one of its main roles was to hold or manage portions of the healthcare system’s investment portfolio. The parent has several subsidiaries — each with its own employer identification number and exemption — that control hospitals and clinics in the system. After obtaining its exemption, the parent began operating schools that were moved to the parent from a subsidiary to become a division of the parent. The schools represent 13 percent of the parent organization’s functional expenses. Less than 20 percent of the parent’s employees — half of whom are residents and other students — come from the educational program in the parent’s payroll and benefits system, according to the IRS.

The parent asserted that it is a qualified organization because it is an educational organization and therefore does not have to treat indebtedness from acquiring or improving real property as acquisition indebtedness for purposes of section 514. Based on this position, the parent reported unrelated debt-financed income for its investments in several partnerships holding debt-financed real property. According to the IRS, the parent should have reported different amounts of unrelated debt-financed income if it is not a qualified organization within the meaning of section 514(c)(9)(A).

In reaching its conclusion, the IRS stated that the parent’s status as an educational organization depends on whether it has as its primary function the presentation of formal instruction. The IRS concluded that while the parent’s schools may provide formal instruction, that instruction is not the parent’s primary function. Rather, its primary function is to serve as the parent of an integrated enterprise that is educational in a broad sense of the word. Its schools’ formal educational activities are incidental to its primary function, the IRS concluded. Because the parent’s primary function is not formal instruction, the IRS stated, it does not qualify as an educational organization within the meaning of section 170(b)(1)(A)(ii). Therefore, it is not a qualified organization within the meaning of section 514(c)(9)(C), the IRS concluded.

UIL Code: 501.07-30

Release Date: 2/14/2014

Date: November 18, 2013

Taxpayer’s Name: * * *

Taxpayer’s Address: * * *

Taxpayer’s Identification Number: * * *

Years Involved: * * *

LEGEND:

Parent = * * *

Date = * * *

Schools = * * *

$x1 = * * *

$x2 = * * *

$x3 = * * *

$x4 = * * *

This memorandum responds to a request dated June 3, 2010, from TEGE Exempt Organizations Examinations for technical advice. We have been asked to determine whether Parent was a “qualified organization” within the meaning of I.R.C. § 514(c)(9)(C) during its 2005 and 2006 tax years. Our findings are set forth below.

ISSUE

Whether Parent was a qualified organization within the meaning of § 514(c)(9)(C) for purposes of determining whether income Parent derived from investment partnerships can be excluded from unrelated business taxable income.

FACTS

The Parent was originally incorporated on Date. The Parent filed an Application for Exemption (“Application”) stating that among other activities that the main purpose of the organization was to be the parent company of the healthcare system. The Application stated that the “Parent will conduct the usual activities associated with parent corporations in the tax-exempt healthcare field, including coordination of system-wide activities, overall strategic planning, overall policy development, system-wide medical education and medical research planning, capital and operating budgeting, capital and resource allocation, system-wide fundraising, system-wide human resource planning, legal compliance, system-wide accounting and reporting, oversight of taxable entities within the system and so forth.” One of the main roles of the Parent is to hold and/or manage portions of the significant investment portfolio of the health care system.

According to its articles of incorporation, Parent is organized and operated:

. . . To conduct, execute, and perform a public trust to support, aid, and advance the study and investigation of human ailments and injuries and the causes, prevention, relief, and cure thereof, and the study and investigation of problems of hygiene, health, and public welfare, and the promotion of medical, surgical, and scientific learning, skill, education, and investigation, to conduct the practice of medicine and surgery and allied sciences, to provide medical, surgical, nursing, and hospital services, and to establish, operate, and coordinate clinics, medical and surgical centers, hospitals, and similar facilities, to assist and conduct or coordinate the conduct of, programs of medical education and medical research and to offer programs of graduate and undergraduate education and instruction in all fields of medicine, surgery, and related scientific study or coordinate the same, and, in the broadest sense, to engage in and conduct and to aid and assist in medical, surgical, and scientific education and research, and to make such educational, charitable, and public gifts and carry on such programs of public charity as may be incidental or related to the carrying out of the other stated purposes of the corporation. . . .

The organization was granted tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3) and was classified as a publicly supported organization under §§ 509(a)(1) and 170(b)(1)(A)(vi).

The Parent is set up as the parent entity of several separate subsidiaries, each of which has their own EIN and tax-exempt status. These separate subsidiaries control the various hospitals and clinics in the system, including a holding company that controls certain for-profit entities owned by the Parent.

In addition to acting as the parent of the healthcare system, the Parent also operates the Schools. The Schools were not part of the Parent when it was originally recognized as described in § 501(c)(3) but were moved from another subsidiary to become an operating division of the Parent at a later date. The Schools are not separately incorporated. The Parent remained a publicly supported organization described in §§ 509(a)(1) and 170(b)(1)(A)(vi) after the addition of the Schools as an operating division of the Parent. The School’s represent 13% of the Parent’s total functional expenses, with the remaining 87% of expenses attributable to fundraising and development, system-wide management, a medical journal, and “management and general.” Fewer than 20% of the Parent’s employees, half of which are residents and other students, are attributed to the educational program in the Parent’s benefits and payroll system. Educational revenues in 2006 constituted 6% of the Parent’s total program service revenue. Contributions categorized as educational normally represent about 7% of all contributions received; of the remaining 93%, about 80% is categorized as “research,” “clinical,” “charity/other,” or “capital” and 13% is categorized as “unrestricted.”

The Parent takes the position that it is a “qualified organization” within the meaning of § 514(c)(9)(B)(vi) because it is an “educational organization” described in § 170(b)(1)(A)(ii) and therefore does not have to treat indebtedness incurred in acquiring or improving real property as “acquisition indebtedness” for purposes of § 514. Based on this position, the Parent filed Form 990-Ts for the 2005 and 2006 tax years to report unrelated debt-financed income in the amounts of $x1 and $x2 for investments that the Parent made in several partnerships holding debt-financed real property. However, if Parent is not a qualified organization within the meaning of § 514(c)(9)(A), the Parent should have reported unrelated debt-financed income in the amounts of $x3 and $x4, respectively.

LAW

I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A)(ii) describes an educational organization as an organization that normally maintains a regular faculty and curriculum and normally has a regularly enrolled body of pupils or students in attendance at the place where its educational activities are carried on.

I.R.C. § 511 imposes a tax on the unrelated business taxable income of organizations otherwise exempt from federal income tax under section 501(c).

I.R.C. § 512(a) defines the term “unrelated business taxable income” as the gross income derived by any organization from any unrelated trade or business (as defined in § 513) regularly carried on by it, less the deductions allowed by Chapter 1 of the Code that are directly connected with the carrying on of such trade or business, both computed with the modifications provided in § 512(b).

In computing unrelated business taxable income, § 514(a)(1) includes as an item of gross income derived from an unrelated trade or business an amount that is the same percentage (but not in excess of 100 percent) of the total gross income derived during the taxable year from or on account of debt-financed property as (A) the average acquisition indebtedness for the taxable year with respect to the property is of (B) the average amount of the adjusted basis of such property during the period it is held by the organization during the taxable year.

I.R.C. § 514(c)(9) provides that certain categories of exempt organizations are excused from the debt-financed property rules with respect to the acquisition and improvement of real property. Specifically, the term “acquisition indebtedness” does not include indebtedness incurred by a “qualified organization” in acquiring or improving real property. Among the types of exempt organizations that are defined as “qualified organizations” are educational organizations described in § 170(b)(1)(A)(ii). When debt-financed real property is held by a partnership, the exception under § 514(c)(9) does not apply unless the partnership meets the requirements of § 514(c)(9)(B)(i)-(vi).

Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(c)(1) provides that an educational organization is described in § 170(b)(1)(A)(ii) if its primary function is the presentation of formal instruction and it normally maintains a regular faculty and curriculum and normally has a regularly enrolled body of pupils or students in attendance at the place where its educational activities are regularly carried on. The term does not include organizations engaged in both educational and non-educational activities unless the latter are merely incidental to the educational activities. For example, the operation of a school by a museum does not necessarily qualify the museum as an educational organization.

Rev. Rul. 76-416, 1976-2 C.B. 57, states that a hospital described in § 170(b)(1)(A)(iii) that has established that it meets the public support requirements of § 170(b)(1)(A)(vi) (describing organizations that receive a substantial part of their support from governmental units or the general public) may qualify as an organization described in § 170(b)(1)(A)(vi). See also Rev. Rul. 78-95, 1978-1 C.B. 71 (a church described in § 170(b)(1)(A)(i) is not prevented by the regulations from also being described in § 170(b)(1)(A)(vi) if it meets the requirements for being publicly supported).

Rev. Rul. 56-262, 1956-1 C.B. 131, concerns an organization that was incorporated for the primary purpose of engaging in research into the cause, origin, prevention, and cure of certain diseases. The organization also provides advanced instruction and training of personnel seeking to become qualified to engage in effective research operations in this field. Two groups of students are maintained: research specialists of professional rank and graduate students seeking the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in science. Research specialists attend lectures and seminars which provide the opportunity for acquiring knowledge and techniques relating to the research and the experimental treatment of certain diseases. The graduate student program is carried out under an agreement with a medical college whereby the facilities of the research organization are made available to certain graduate medical students of the college. Formal instruction taken by such students, who may or may not be employees of the research organization, is deemed to be work done “in residence” at the medical college. The ruling states that an organization which has educational activities in the broad sense of the word and which, incidental to its primary functions, regularly maintains a faculty and a curriculum and regularly has students in attendance at the place where its educational activities are conducted, is not an “educational organization” referred to in § 170(b)(1)(A)(ii) of the Code. Only those “educational organizations” organized primarily for, and engaged in, the presentation of formal education in the instructive sense constitute “educational organizations” within the meaning of § 170(b)(1)(A)(ii) of the Code.

Rev. Rul. 58-433, 1958-2 C.B. 102, concerns an organization that collects coins and medals, maintains a museum and library that conduct summer seminar and scholastic research projects, and provides instruction and supervision of post-graduate students. The organization has an average of 35 persons on the post-graduate level during a regular academic year studying numismatics and the history of numismatics, with each student under the supervision and guidance of one of the organization’s staff of experts. In addition, the facilities of the organization are employed by scholars the world over, either by attendance or by use of the organization’s publications to further their research. The ruling holds that where the principal purpose and functions of the organization are the collection and preservation of coins and medals and the maintenance of a museum, library, and other facilities for research, with secondary activities consisting of the employment of its museum, library, and other facilities in furtherance of the organization’s educational aims in the graduate and post-graduate study of numismatics and related fields, the organization does not constitute an educational organization of the type referred to in § 170(b)(1)(A)(ii).

ANALYSIS

Based on the facts and representations we rule as follows:

Parent was organized and operated during its 2005 and 2006 tax years as the parent of an integrated health group practice. As part of its activities, Parent coordinates the operation of Schools. The Parent also performs administrative duties for both the Schools and the entire healthcare system, which includes hospitals, research centers, clinics, and several taxable entities.

Parent maintains that it is an educational organization described in § 170(b)(1)(A)(ii). Although, for foundation classification purposes, the IRS recognizes Parent as an organization described in § 170(b)(1)(A)(vi), Parent may also be “described in” § 170(b)(1)(A)(ii) if it meets the requirements of that section. See Rev. Rul. 76-416; Rev. Rul. 78-95. The Schools, which are an operating division of the Parent and not separately incorporated, normally maintain a regular faculty and curriculum and normally have an enrolled body of students in attendance at the place where the educational activities are carried on. Thus, whether the Parent is an organization described in § 170(b)(1)(A)(ii) hinges on whether it has, as its primary function, the presentation of formal instruction.

While the Schools operated by the Parent may engage in the presentation of formal instruction, we do not find, under the facts and circumstances presented, that the Parent’s primary function is the presentation of formal instruction for the students of the Schools. Nor do we find that the clinical and research practices are merely incidental to the healthcare system’s formal educational program. Rather, we note that Parent’s formal instruction through the Schools represents only 13% of the Parent’s total functional expenses, with the remaining 87% of expenses being attributable to the Parent’s fundraising, system-wide management activity, development program, medical journal, and “management and general.” About 20% of the Parent’s employees, half of which are residents and other students, are attributed to the educational program in the Parent’s benefits and payroll system. Educational revenues in 2006 constituted a mere 6% of the Parent’s total program service revenue, while contributions categorized as educational normally represent only about 7% of all contributions the Parent receives. Thus, the Parent’s formal instruction through the Schools is not the Parent’s primary function. Rather, the Parent’s primary function consists of acting as the parent company of a healthcare system by coordinating and planning system-wide activities and conducting system-wide fundraising and development.

In this respect, Parent is similar to the organization described in Rev. Rul. 56-262 that, although it maintained a regular faculty, curriculum, and student body, did not qualify as an educational organization described in § 170(b)(1)(A)(ii) because formal instruction was only incidental to its primary function of conducting research into the cause, prevention, and cure of diseases. Like that organization, Parent’s primary function is not the presentation of formal education in the instructive sense, but is, instead, serving as the parent of an integrated enterprise that is educational in the broad sense of “advanc[ing] the study and investigation of human ailments and injuries and the cause, prevention, and cure thereof” (see Articles of Incorporation). The formal educational activities of the Schools are incidental to that primary function.

Parent is similar, as well, to the organization described in Rev. Rul. 58-433 which also did not qualify as an educational organization described in § 170(b)(1)(A)(ii) because, though it used its museum and library to provide formal training for a small body of postgraduate students, its primary purpose and function was to collect and preserve coins and medals for general research. Like that organization, Parent, although it uses its facilities for the formal training of students in its Schools, has as its primary purpose and function the coordination of, and fundraising for, the clinical, research, and educational components of the organization. Consequently, because we find that Parent’s primary function is not the presentation of formal instruction, we conclude that it does not qualify as an educational organization within the meaning of § 170(b)(1)(A)(ii).

CONCLUSION

Parent is not an educational organization as defined in § 170(b)(1)(A)(ii), therefore it is not a qualified organization within the meaning of § 514(c)(9)(C).

This ruling is based on the facts as they were presented and on the understanding that there will be no material changes in these facts. This ruling does not address the applicability of any section of the Code or regulations to the facts submitted other than with respect to the sections described. Because it could help resolved questions concerning your federal income tax status, this ruling should be kept in your permanent records.

A copy of this memorandum is to be given to Parent. Section 6110(k)(3) provides that it may not be used or cited as precedent.




IRS LTR: Disposition of Intellectual Property Rights Won't Result in UBIT.

Citations: LTR 201407022

The IRS ruled that a tax-exempt supporting organization’s proposed liquidation of its intellectual property rights in several IPv4 addresses won’t adversely affect its tax-exempt status and that income from the disposition of the addresses doesn’t constitute unrelated business income and isn’t subject to unrelated business income taxation.

Contact Person: * * *

Identification Number: * * *

Telephone Number: * * *

UIL: 512.00-00

Release Date: 2/14/2014

Date: November 14, 2013

Employer Identification Number: * * *

Dear * * *:

We have considered your ruling request dated April 26, 2013, concerning the tax consequences under Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) §§ 501(c)(3) and 511, related to a proposed liquidation of your intellectual property rights in several IPv4 addresses.

FACTS

You are recognized as a tax-exempt supporting organization under § 501(c)(3) of the Code. You are governed by and support the public university system in the state in which you are incorporated. You provide research and development in the field of telecommunications and internet information technology. Your exempt activities included the initial research and development and operation of a non-profit telecommunications network serving your university system (later extended to other tax-exempt non-governing affiliates, including schools, colleges, libraries, law enforcement, non-profit hospitals).

Several decades ago, you received a distribution of several million IPv4 addresses, which you use as part of your tax-exempt activities. These IPv4 addresses were assigned to you to permit you to do your research and development work, and to develop and build this network to serve the exempt educational and research mission of you and your governing members (later extended to other tax-exempt non-governing affiliates). Your interest in these IPv4 addresses is the intellectual property rights to use the addresses and assign these rights subject to restrictions. You represented that you have never characterized or used your IPv4 addresses as inventory in any sense and never had reason to reflect these addresses on your balance sheet or property schedules. At the time of this distribution, and continuing into the present, IPv4 addresses were and still are distributed to public, private and governmental entities and individuals. Presently, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”), a non-profit, continues to distribute IPv4 addresses globally. Distribution of IP addresses is conducted via regional registries: your region is governed by the American Registry for Internet Numbers (“ARIN”).

You represented that the global supply of IPv4 addresses is finite, and the supply of unallocated IPv4 addresses is diminishing due to increased demand for wireless internet communication. In response, IPv6 addresses are being “phased-in” to replace IPv4 addresses. However, IPv6 addresses are not “backwards compatible” to IPv4 addresses, and thus devices with addresses on one version can only communicate with devices with addresses of the same version. As such, internet service providers who wish to immediately offer customers full functionality must use IPv4 addresses in addition to IPv6 addresses, and will need to do so until some unknown future time.

You represented that of the IPv4 addresses that were distributed to you decades earlier, you have several million addresses that you did not use and will not be able to use in your exempt activities before the migration to IPv6 addresses; therefore, you propose to liquidate these unused IPv4 addresses. You represented that although you would prefer to liquidate all your surplus addresses to a single buyer in a single transaction, there are several legal and financial barriers, described below, that preclude a single-sale transaction.

Any transfer of IPv4 address must be approved by ARIN. You represented that the ARIN review process is detailed and has several requirements. One requirement of the ARIN review process is that the prospective transferee demonstrates to ARIN that they have a need for up to a 24 month supply of the IPv4 address before ARIN will approve the transfer. All transferees must adhere 10 ARIN rules and sign a service agreement with ARIN to this effect. Furthermore, the transferor will be ineligible to receive any further IPv4 address allocations from ARIN for a 12 month period after the transfer. You represented that you have no intent or interest to acquire any additional IPv4 addresses, and even if you did, the above described transfer restriction would preclude ARIN from assigning you any additional IPv4 addresses.

In addition to the ARIN review process, you represented that the lack of an established market for the sale of IP addresses is a barrier that makes it impossible to simply list and trade these addresses. Although information of two notable transfers of IPv4 addresses is publicly available because they were conducted by the United States Bankruptcy Court, you represented that generally, little or no public information is released regarding IPv4 address sales, other than limited registration information with ARIN. As such, you represented that you will utilize an outside firm that specializes in intellectual property to locate and negotiate with prospective buyers for the liquidation of your IPv4 addresses and you will not engage in any marketing activity. You represented that you will not undertake any action to improve or develop your interest in the right to use the IPv4 addresses you propose to liquidate. All transactions will be kept confidential under non-disclosure agreements.

RULINGS REQUESTED

1. The IPv4 addresses are not property held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of a trade or business regularly carried on by the taxpayer within the meaning of § 512(b)(5)(B).

2. That the income from the disposition of your IPv4 addresses does not constitute unrelated business income under § 512 and is not subject to unrelated business income taxation under § 511.

3. Your disposition of the IPv4 addresses will not adversely affect your current § 501(c)(3) exempt status.

LAW

I.R.C. § 501(a) generally provides an exemption from federal income taxation for any organization described in § 501(c)(3).

I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) provides in part for the exemption of organizations that are organized and operated exclusively for educational purposes, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.

Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)(1) states that for an organization to be exempt under § 501(c)(3), it must be operated exclusively for one or more of the purposes specified in such section.

Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) provides that an organization will be regarded as “operated exclusively” for an exempt purpose only if it engages primarily in activities which accomplish one or more of such exempt purposes specified in § 501(c)(3). An organization will not be so regarded if more than an insubstantial part of its activities is not in furtherance of an exempt purpose.

Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(e)(1) provides, in part, that an organization may meet the requirements of § 501(c)(3) although it operates a trade or business as a substantial part of its activities, if the operation of such trade or business is in furtherance of the organization’s exempt purpose and if the organization is not organized or operated for the primary purpose of carrying on an unrelated trade or business as defined in § 513.

I.R.C. § 512(a)(1) defines “unrelated business taxable income” as the gross income derived by any organization from any unrelated trade or business (as defined in § 513(a)) regularly carried on by it, less allowable deductions directly connected with the carrying on of such trade or business, both computed with the modifications provided in § 512(b).

I.R.C. § 512(b)(5) excludes from the computation of unrelated business taxable income all gains or losses from the sale, exchange, or other disposition of property other than (A) stock in trade or other property of a kind which would properly be includible in inventory if on hand at the close of the taxable year, or (B) property held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of the trade or business.

Rev. Rul. 55-449, 1955-2 C.B. 599, holds that the construction and sale of 80 houses by a foundation otherwise exempt under § 501(c)(3) over a period of 18 months for the sole purpose of raising funds for the support of a church constituted an unrelated trade or business within the meaning of § 513 because construction and sale of houses is a business of a kind ordinarily carried on for profit.

Rev. Rul. 59-91, 1959-1 C.B. 215, holds that where a taxpayer engages in extensive land development activities, such as lot subdivision, installation of utilities, and paving streets, all in order to facilitate the sale and derive the maximum proceeds from the disposition of the property, the taxpayer is holding property for sale to customers in the ordinary course of trade or business.

In Brown v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1944), the taxpayer owned 500 acres of unimproved land used for grazing purposes. To facilitate the sale of land, the taxpayer subdivided the land into lots, built streets, installed storm sewers, constructed gas and electric lines and undertook other activities of the kind usually carried out by a real estate development company. Each year 20 to 30 lots were sold. The court held that taxpayer was holding lots for sale to customers in the regular course of business.

In Farley v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 198 (1946), the taxpayer purchased platted land to use in his nursery business. Twelve years later, the city built streets through the property that made it less useful for his business. Even though taxpayer made no active sales effort and made no improvements, he sold 26 and a half lots in one year. The court opined that the sales were essentially made “in the nature of a gradual and passive liquidation of an asset” and not in the ordinary course of a trade or business.

In Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569, 86 S. Ct. 1030 (1966), the Supreme Court defined the standard to be applied in determining whether property is held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business. The Court interpreted the word “primarily” to mean “of first importance” or “principally.” By this standard, ordinary income would not result unless a sales purpose is dominant.

In Mauldin v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 714 (1952), the taxpayer initially purchased land not for resale to customers, but throughout the years subdivided the land and resold parcels sporadically, primarily as the market dictated. The court indicated that the taxpayer engaged in continuous sales and concluded that the property was held primarily for sale to customers as part of the taxpayer’s business. The court stated that “[t]here is no fixed formula or rule of thumb for determining whether property sold by the taxpayer was held by him primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business. Each case must, in the last analysis, rest upon its own facts. There are a number of helpful factors, however, to point the way, among which are the purposes for which the property was acquired, whether for sale or investment; and continuity and frequency of sales as opposed to isolated transactions.”

In Adam v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 996 (1973), acq. in result, 1974-2 C.B., the Tax Court held that a taxpayer who purchased 11 parcels and sold 9 parcels of undeveloped land over four years was not engaged in the trade or business of buying and selling land for purposes of § 1221. The taxpayer utilized brokers to aid him in disposing of some of the land. However, neither the taxpayer nor the brokers ever sought out or solicited prospective buyers or advertised the properties for sale. The court analyzed the following factors to determine that the taxpayer was not engaged in the operation of the trade or business of buying and selling land:

(1) the purpose for which the property was acquired;

(2) the frequency, continuity, and size of the sales;

(3) the activities of the owner in the improvement and disposition of the property;

(4) the extent of improvements made to the property;

(5) the proximity of sale to purchase; and

(6) the purpose for which the property was held.

In Adam and subsequent cases, courts have found that no one of these factors is controlling but all are relevant to consider in determining whether the sale of property occurred in the regular course of a taxpayer’s trade or business.

ANALYSIS

As an organization described under § 501(c)(3), you are exempt from federal income tax. See I.R.C. § 501(a). To maintain your tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3), you must be operated exclusively for exempt purposes. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)(1). You will not be considered as operated exclusively for exempt purposes under § 501(c)(3) if you engage in a substantial amount of unrelated business activities. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) and (e)(1). An organization that holds property “primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of [a] trade or business” within the meaning of § 512(b)(5) is considered engaging in an unrelated business activity. See also I.R.C. § 512(a)(1). Here, you propose to liquidate your intellectual property rights in several million IPv4 addresses.

The primary issue in this ruling is whether the liquidation of your IPv4 addresses will be treated as a sale of property held “primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of [a] trade or business” within the meaning of § 512(b)(5). Whether property is held “primarily” for sale to customers in the ordinary course of an organization’s trade or business is a facts and circumstances determination. See Mauldin v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 714 (1952), and Adam v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 996 (1973), acq. in result, 1974-2 C.B. In Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569, 86 S. Ct. 1030 (1966), the Court interpreted the meaning of the word “primarily” to mean “of first importance or principally.”

You represented that you received your right to use several million IPv4 addresses several decades ago for use as part of your exempt activities. Your exempt activities included the initial research and development and operation of a non-profit telecommunications network serving your university system (later extended to other tax-exempt non-governing affiliates, including schools, colleges, libraries, law enforcement, non-profit hospitals). However, you are unable to utilize all your IPv4 addresses in your exempt activities before the migration to IPv6 addresses; therefore, you propose to liquidate these unused addresses. You represented that you would be inclined to liquidate your surplus IPv4 address to a single buyer in a single transaction. However, the legal and financial barriers would preclude such a single sale. Specifically, ARIN restrictions, the lack of an established market for IPv4 addresses, and the huge volume of IPv4 addresses that you wish to liquidate, would, in essence, preclude a single buyer. You also represented that you have never characterized or used your IPv4 addresses as inventory in any sense and never had reason to reflect these addresses on your balance sheet or property schedules.

When determining whether a taxpayer is holding property “primarily” for sale to customers in the ordinary course of its trade or business, we consider the frequency, continuity and size of sales. We also consider the activities undertaken to improve the property, the proximity of sale to purchase and the purpose for which the property was held during the taxable year. You have not improved any rights you hold in the IPv4 addresses. The proposed sale of your IPv4 addresses is taking place several decades after you acquired them as donations, and at all times, you held these IPv4 addresses for use in your exempt activities. The long duration you held these IPv4 addresses, the lack of tax classification of these addresses as inventory or property, and your initial receipt of these addresses as part of your exempt activities all indicate that you were not holding the property “primarily” for sale to customers in the ordinary course of its trade or business.

Your facts are distinguishable from those in Rev. Rul. 55-449, supra, in which a foundation constructed and sold 80 houses over a period of 18 months for the sole purpose of raising funds to support a church. They are also distinguishable from the facts in Brown v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1944), in which a taxpayer subdivided and developed property for the purpose of selling the property, then sold 80 lots. In both of these cases, the taxpayers’ efforts in acquiring and developing the properties for sale suggested that they were holding the property primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of a trade or business. In contrast, your activities are similar to the taxpayer’s activities in Farley v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 198 (1946), in which the court held that the taxpayer’s activities were “in the nature of a gradual and passive liquidation of an asset.” The liquidation of your IPv4 address is governed by a third-party, ARIN, whose approval is required and precludes you from selling your IPv4 addresses on terms solely of your choosing. Your IPv4 addresses were received by you for use in your exempt activities and held for several decades. You have no plans to develop or improve these rights, you will utilize an outside firm specializing in intellectual property to locate and negotiate with prospective buyers, you will not engage in any marketing activity, and you will not acquire any additional IPv4 addresses after the liquidation.

Accordingly, based on your representations, under the primary purpose test of Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569, 86 S. Ct. 1030 (1966), and the facts and circumstances test of Adam v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 996 (1973), acq. in result, 1974-2 C.B., we conclude that you do not hold your interests in IPv4 addresses primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of a trade or business. Therefore, your liquidation of IPv4 addresses will not generate unrelated business taxable income under §§ 511 and 512(b)(5), and will not adversely affect your exempt status under § 501(c)(3).

CONCLUSION

1. Your IPv4 addresses are not property held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of a trade or business regularly carried on by the taxpayer within the meaning of § 512(b)(5)(B).

2. The income from the disposition of your IPv4 addresses does not constitute unrelated business income under § 512 and is not subject to unrelated business income taxation under § 511.

3. Your disposition of the IPv4 addresses will not adversely affect your current § 501(c)(3) exempt status.

This ruling will be made available for public inspection under § 6110 after certain deletions of identifying information are made. For details, see enclosed Notice 437, Notice of Intention to Disclose. A copy of this ruling with deletions that we intend to make available for public inspection is attached to Notice 437. If you disagree with our proposed deletions, you should follow the instructions in Notice 437.

This ruling is directed only to the organization that requested it. Section 6110(k)(3) provides that it may not be used or cited by others as precedent.

This ruling is based on the facts as they were presented and on the understanding that there will be no material changes in these facts. This ruling does not address the applicability of any section of the Code or regulations to the facts submitted other than with respect to the sections described. Because it could help resolve questions concerning your federal income tax status, this ruling should be kept in your permanent records.

If you have any questions about this ruling, please contact the person whose name and telephone number are shown in the heading of this letter.

In accordance with the Power of Attorney currently on file with the Internal Revenue Service, we are sending a copy of this letter to your authorized representative.

Sincerely,

Theodore R. Lieber

Manager, Exempt Organizations

Technical Group 3

Enclosure

Notice 437




The Constitutionality of the Cash Parsonage Allowance.

Alan L. Feld rebuts Edward A. Zelinsky’s claim that parsonage allowances are excludable, contending that taxing the housing allowance is “no more intrusive than taxing a minister’s salary.”

To the Editor:

Professor Zelinsky has made a valiant effort to defend the constitutionality of section 107(2), the provision that excludes from gross income cash housing allowances of a minister of the gospel. (Prior coverage: Tax Notes, Jan. 27, 2014, p. 413 ; see also Tax Notes, Feb. 3, 2014, p. 569 .) A U.S. district court granted summary judgment to plaintiffs attacking the provision on First Amendment and Equal Protection grounds. Zelinsky criticizes the decision for failing to give due weight to the secular purposes of the exemption. Unfortunately, Zelinsky’s argument is ultimately unpersuasive.

To find a sufficient secular purpose for the exclusion so as to satisfy the prevailing constitutional test of Lemon v. Kurtzman (403 U.S. 602), Zelinsky relies on Walz v. Tax Commission (397 U.S. 664), a case he says the district court inappropriately discounted. Walz involved a challenge to the property tax exemption granted by New York state to churches, among other institutions. The majority opinion in Walz upheld the exemption, speaking of it as a proper way to diminish entanglement between church and state. Subjecting church property to annual property tax assessment would involve more entanglement than exemption. Similarly, Zelinsky argues, the exclusion of ministers’ housing allowances from gross income minimizes entanglement.

Here is where the analogy to Walz falters. This proposition plausibly could apply to section 107(1), which exempts from ministers’ gross income the rental value of a home furnished in kind. The intrusion wrought in the process of valuing the in-kind benefit to the minister resembles that of assessing the value of a church building. But the cash allowances exempted under section 107(2) present no such difficulty. Taxing the housing allowance cash as income is no more intrusive than taxing the balance of the minister’s salary. In practice, the church board decides to pay the minister a sum, say $100,000, and adds a clause specifying that some part, say 30 percent, represents a housing allowance. The government’s entanglement with the religious function is minimal.

Alan L. Feld

Professor of Law and

Maurice Poch Faculty

Research Scholar

Boston University

School of Law

Feb. 3, 2014

by Alan L. Feld




Treasury, IRS Will Issue Proposed Guidance for Tax-Exempt Social Welfare Organizations: Initial Proposed Guidance Clarifies Qualification Requirements and Seeks Public Input.

WASHINGTON — The U.S. Department of the Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service today will issue initial guidance regarding qualification requirements for tax-exemption as a social welfare organization under section 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code. This proposed guidance defines the term “candidate-related political activity,” and would amend current regulations by indicating that the promotion of social welfare does not include this type of activity. The proposed guidance also seeks initial comments on other aspects of the qualification requirements, including what proportion of a 501(c)(4) organization’s activities must promote social welfare.

The proposed guidance is expected to be posted on the Federal Register later today.

There are a number of steps in the regulatory process that must be taken before any final guidance can be issued. Given the significant public interest in these and related issues, Treasury and the IRS expect to receive a large number of comments. Treasury and the IRS are committed to carefully and comprehensively considering all of the comments received before issuing additional proposed guidance or final rules.

“This is part of ongoing efforts within the IRS that are improving our work in the tax-exempt area,” said IRS Acting Commissioner Danny Werfel. “Once final, this proposed guidance will continue moving us forward and provide clarity for this important segment of exempt organizations.”

“This proposed guidance is a first critical step toward creating clear-cut definitions of political activity by tax-exempt social welfare organizations,” said Treasury Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy Mark J. Mazur. “We are committed to getting this right before issuing final guidance that may affect a broad group of organizations. It will take time to work through the regulatory process and carefully consider all public feedback as we strive to ensure that the standards for tax-exemption are clear and can be applied consistently.”

Organizations may apply for tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(4) of the tax code if they operate to promote social welfare. The IRS currently applies a “facts and circumstances” test to determine whether an organization is engaged in political campaign activities that do not promote social welfare. Today’s proposed guidance would reduce the need to conduct fact-intensive inquiries by replacing this test with more definitive rules.

In defining the new term, “candidate-related political activity,” Treasury and the IRS drew upon existing definitions of political activity under federal and state campaign finance laws, other IRS provisions, as well as suggestions made in unsolicited public comments.

Under the proposed guidelines, candidate-related political activity includes:

1. Communications

Communications that expressly advocate for a clearly identified political candidate or candidates of a political party.

Communications that are made within 60 days of a general election (or within 30 days of a primary election) and clearly identify a candidate or political party.

Communications expenditures that must be reported to the Federal Election Commission.

2. Grants and Contributions

Any contribution that is recognized under campaign finance law as a reportable contribution.

Grants to section 527 political organizations and other tax-exempt organizations that conduct candidate-related political activities (note that a grantor can rely on a written certification from a grantee stating that it does not engage in, and will not use grant funds for, candidate-related political activity).

3.  Activities Closely Related to Elections or Candidates

Voter registration drives and “get-out-the-vote” drives.

Distribution of any material prepared by or on behalf of a candidate or by a section 527 political organization.

Preparation or distribution of voter guides that refer to candidates (or, in a general election, to political parties).

Holding an event within 60 days of a general election (or within 30 days of a primary election) at which a candidate appears as part of the program.

These proposed rules reduce the need to conduct fact-intensive inquiries, including inquiries into whether activities or communications are neutral and unbiased.

Treasury and the IRS are planning to issue additional guidance that will address other issues relating to the standards for tax exemption under section 501(c)(4). In particular, there has been considerable public focus regarding the proportion of a section 501(c)(4) organization’s activities that must promote social welfare. Due to the importance of this aspect of the regulation, the proposed guidance requests initial comments on this issue.

The proposed guidance also seeks comments regarding whether standards similar to those proposed today should be adopted to define the political activities that do not further the tax-exempt purposes of other tax-exempt organizations and to promote consistent definitions across the tax-exempt sector.




EO Update: e-News for Charities & Nonprofits - February 5, 2014.

1.  Register for Upcoming Phone Forum: Form 990-N and 990-EZ filing tips (Part 1 of the Form 990-Series).

February 20, 2 p.m., ET

Register for this presentation:

http://ems.intellor.com/index.cgi?p=204939&t=71&do=register&s=&rID=417&edID=305

This phone forum will explain:

2.  Register for EO Workshops.

Register for our upcoming workshops for small and medium-sized

501(c)(3) organizations on:

March 12 and 13 – Kansas City, MO

Hosted by University of Missouri -Kansas City-Midwest Center for Nonprofit Leadership/Bloch School of Management

March 19 and 20 – Phoenix, AZ

Hosted by ASU – Lodestar Center for Philanthropy & Nonprofit Innovation

Register at:

http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Upcoming-Workshops-for-Small-and-Medium-Sized-501(c)(3)-Organizations

3.  Cost of Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance May Appear on Form W-2.

The Affordable Care Act requires employers to report the cost of coverage under an employer-sponsored group health plan on an employee’s Form W-2, Wage and Tax Statement, in Box 12, using Code DD.

Many employers are eligible for transition relief for tax year 2012 and beyond, until the IRS issues final guidance for this reporting requirement.

More information about the reporting, and which employers are, or are not, required to report this on the Form W-2 can be found on the Form W-2 Reporting of Employer-Sponsored Health Coverage page.

http://www.irs.gov/uac/Form-W-2-Reporting-of-Employer-Sponsored-Health-Coverage

4.  Want to File Forms 941 instead of Form 944?

You must file Form 944 if the IRS has notified you to do so, unless you contact the IRS before April 1 to request and receive written notice to file quarterly Form 941 instead.

IRS.gov has more information for employers who want to opt in or opt out of filing the annual Form 944 vs. the quarterly Form 941.

http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/Certain-Taxpayers-May-Now-File-Their-Employment-Taxes-Annually

5.  PTIN Expiration Letters Sent.

The IRS may contact you if you have not renewed your 2014 PTIN.

If you have an online PTIN account, you’ll receive an email explaining your PTIN has expired and advised to check the secure mailbox within your PTIN account for more information.

If you do not have an online account, you’ll receive a letter by regular mail.

Even if your PTIN has expired, you can still renew online or by paper. The IRS will continue processing renewals throughout the year.

To date, 554,000 people have renewed 2013 PTINs for 2014 and 56,000 people have registered for new PTINs for 2014.




IRS LTR: Foundation's Website Is a Periodical.

The IRS ruled that a private operating foundation’s website that publishes material that used to be in the organization’s now-defunct print publication is a periodical for purposes of the unrelated business income tax cost allocation rules.

Contact Person: * * *

Identification Number: * * *

Contact Number: * * *

FAX Number: * * *

Uniform Issue List: 511.00-00, 512.05-00

Release Date: 1/31/2013

Date: November 8, 2013

Employer Identification Number: * * *

Dear * * *:

This is in response to the ruling request dated November 21, 2011, submitted by your authorized representative regarding whether your website constitutes a “periodical” for purposes of the unrelated business income tax costs allocation rules of section 1.512(a)-1(f) of the Income Tax Regulations.

FACTS

You are an organization described in section 501(c)(3) of the Code. You are classified as a private operating foundation described in section 4942(j)(3), operated for educational purposes.

For several years your primary activity has been publishing an educational magazine. Originally, you published a print version every other month. More recently, to reduce costs and increase readership, you discontinued the print version and now publish the content exclusively on your website, free of charge. The website includes essentially the same kind of content, addressing the same or similar subjects that appeared in the print version of the magazine. The website contains all of the material available in the former print version, plus new features such as documentary videos that can only exist in an online form. All past articles are archived and searchable on your website. You represent that the website is updated regularly, at least weekly. It appears from recent posts on the website that it is updated ordinarily every business day. Each article shows its publication date.

Although you receive grants and contributions, you are supported, in part, by advertising revenues. You employ and/or contract with writers, researchers, a creative director and an editorial director to produce the editorial content of the website (as you did for the print magazine). You also incur expenses for website maintenance and overall administration.

LAW

Section 511 of the Code imposes a tax on the unrelated business taxable income of exempt organizations described in section 501(c).

Section 512(a)(1) of the Code defines the term “unrelated business taxable income” as the gross income derived by any organization from any unrelated trade or business regularly carried on by it, less the allowable deductions which are directly connected with the carrying on of such trade or business, both computed with the modifications provided in section 512(b).

Section 513(a) of the Code defines the term “unrelated trade or business” as any trade or business the conduct of which is not substantially related (aside from the need of such organization for income or funds or the use it makes of the profits derived) to the exercise or performance by such organization of its exempt purpose or function.

Section 513(c) of the Code provides that the term “trade or business” includes any activity, which is carried on for the production of income from the sale of goods or the performance of services.

Section 1.512(a)-1(d)(1) of the regulations provides, in pertinent part, that in certain cases, gross income is derived from an unrelated trade or business which exploits an exempt activity. One example of such exploitation is the sale of advertising in a periodical of an exempt organization which contains editorial material related to the accomplishment of the organization’s exempt purpose. Except as specified in subparagraph (2) of this paragraph and paragraph (f) of this section, in such cases, expenses, depreciation and similar items attributable to the conduct of the exempt activities are not deductible in computing unrelated business taxable income.

Section 1.512(a)-1(d)(2) of the regulations provides, in pertinent part, that where unrelated trade or business activity is of a kind carried on for profit by taxable organizations and where the exempt activity exploited by the business is a type of activity normally conducted by taxable organizations in pursuance of such business, expenses, depreciation and similar items which are attributable to the exempt activity qualify as directly connected with the carrying on of the unrelated trade or business activity.

Section 1.512(a)-1(f) of the regulations provides that under section 513 and 1.513-1, amounts realized from the sale of advertising in a periodical constitute gross income from an unrelated trade or business activity involving the exploitation of an exempt activity, namely the circulation and readership of the periodical developed through the production and distribution of the readership content of the periodical. Thus, subject to the limitations of paragraph (d)(2) of this section, where the circulation and readership of an exempt organization periodical are utilized in connection with the sale of advertising in the periodical, expenses, depreciation, and similar items of deductions attributable to the production and distribution of the editorial or readership content of the periodical shall qualify as items of deductions directly connected with the unrelated advertising activity. Subparagraphs (2) through (6) of this paragraph provide rules for determining the amount of unrelated business taxable income attributable to the sale of advertising in exempt organization periodicals.

Section 1.513-4 of the regulations provides rules for qualified sponsorship payments, and excepts from such rules the income from the sale of advertising or acknowledgements in exempt organization periodicals. A “periodical” is defined as regularly scheduled and printed material published by or on behalf of an exempt organization that is not related to and primarily distributed in connection with a specific event conducted by the organization. For this purpose, printed material includes material that is published electronically.

In section 1.513-4(f) of the regulations, Example 11, W, a symphony orchestra, maintains a Web site containing pertinent information and its performance schedule. The Music Shop makes a payment to W to fund a concert series, and W posts a list of its sponsors on its Web site, including the Music Shop’s name and Internet address. W’s Web site does not promote the Music Shop or advertise its merchandise. The Music Shop’s Internet address appears as a hyperlink from W’s Web site to the Music Shop’s Web site. W’s posting of the Music Shop’s name and Internet address on its Web site constitutes acknowledgment of the sponsorship. The entire payment is a qualified sponsorship payment, which is not income from an unrelated trade or business.

In section 1.513-4(f) of the regulations, Example 12, X, a health-based charity, sponsors a year-long initiative to educate the public about a particular medical condition. A large pharmaceutical company manufactures a drug that is used in treating the medical condition, and provides funding for the initiative that helps X produce educational materials for distribution and post information on X’s Web site. X’s Web site contains a hyperlink to the pharmaceutical company’s Web site. On the pharmaceutical company’s Web site, the statement appears, “X endorses the use of our drug, and suggests that you ask your doctor for a prescription if you have this medical condition.” X reviewed the endorsement before it was posted on the pharmaceutical company’s Web site and gave permission for the endorsement to appear. The endorsement is advertising. The fair market value of the advertising exceeds 2% of the total payment received from the pharmaceutical company. Therefore, only the portion of the payment, if any, that X can demonstrate exceeds the fair market value of the advertising on the pharmaceutical company’s Web site is a qualified sponsorship payment.

ANALYSIS

Advertising income derived by exempt organizations in connection their periodicals is subject to the tax on unrelated business income. As noted above, rules for the determination of unrelated business taxable income derived from the sale of advertising in exempt organization periodicals are contained in section 1.512(a)-1(f) of the regulations.

Section 1.513-4 of the regulations holds that the term periodical means regularly scheduled and printed material published by or on behalf of an exempt organization that is not related to and primarily distributed in connection with a specific event conducted by the exempt organization, and for this purpose, printed material includes material that is published electronically. In section 1.513-4(f), Examples 11 and 12, the rules for qualified sponsorship payments rather than periodical advertising were applied to the exempt organization’s website, indicating that a website is ordinarily not regarded as a periodical. In your case, however, you argue for treatment of your website as a periodical so that you may use your excess readership costs to offset your advertising income like commercial publications do.

We agree. Your primary purpose and function is to publish educational information, which you do on the website. Your prior print periodical has in effect moved onto the website. The website is operated similarly to that of many newspapers and magazines with an online presence, with new material published regularly and old content also readily available. Under the circumstances, the website serves the function of a traditional periodical and should be treated as such.

RULING

Based on your representations, we rule that your website meets the definition of the term “periodical” which appears at section 1.513-4 of the regulations. Thus, the website constitutes a periodical for purposes of the unrelated business income tax cost allocation rules of section 1.512(a)-1(f).

This ruling is based on the understanding that there will be no material changes in the facts upon which it is based.

Except as specifically ruled upon above, no opinion is expressed concerning the federal income tax consequences of the transactions described above under any other provision of the Code.

Pursuant to a Power of Attorney on file in this office, a copy of this letter is being sent to your authorized representative. A copy of this letter should be kept in your permanent records.

If there are any questions about this ruling, please contact the person whose name and telephone number are shown in the heading of this letter.

Sincerely,

Theodore R. Lieber

Manager, EO Technical Group 3

Citations: LTR 201405029




IRS Withdraws, Reissues Proposed Regs on UBTI Determinations for Some Exempt Organizations.

The IRS has withdrawn proposed regulations published in 1986 and reissued proposed regulations that provide guidance on how some exempt organizations providing employee benefits must calculate unrelated business taxable income. (REG-143874-10)

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-02-06/pdf/2014-01625.pdf




IRS LTR: Organization Formed to Promote Conservation Easements Loses Exemption.

The IRS revoked the tax-exempt status of an organization established to encourage the donation of conservation easements after concluding the organization operated as a conduit for its president — a CPA — to help the president’s clients obtain sizable deductions.

Person to Contact/ID Number: * * *

Contact Numbers:

Telephone: * * *

Fax: * * *

UIL Code: 501.03-00

Release Date: 1/31/2014

Date: February 18, 2009

Taxpayer Identification Number: * * *

Form: * * *

Tax Year(s) Ended: * * *

LEGEND:

ORG = * * *

ADDRESS = * * *

Dear * * *:

We have enclosed a copy of our report of examination explaining why we believe revocation of your exempt status under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) is necessary.

If you accept our findings, take no further action. We will issue a final revocation letter.

If you do not agree with our proposed revocation, you must submit to us a written request for Appeals Office consideration within 30 days from the date of this letter to protest our decision. Your protest should include a statement of the facts, the applicable law, and arguments in support of your position.

An Appeals officer will review your case. The Appeals office is independent of the Director, EO Examinations. The Appeals Office resolves most disputes informally and promptly. The enclosed Publication 3498, The Examination Process, and Publication 892, Exempt Organizations Appeal Procedures for Unagreed Issues, explain how to appeal an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) decision. Publication 3498 also includes information on your rights as a taxpayer and the IRS collection process.

You may also request that we refer this matter for technical advice as explained in Publication 892. If we issue a determination letter to you based on technical advice, no further administrative appeal is available to you within the IRS regarding the issue that was the subject of the technical advice.

If we do not hear from you within 30 days from the date of this letter, we will process your case based on the recommendations shown in the report of examination. If you do not protest this proposed determination within 30 days from the date of this letter, the IRS will consider it to be a failure to exhaust your available administrative remedies. Section 7428(b)(2) of the Code provides, in part: “A declaratory judgment or decree under this section shall not be issued in any proceeding unless the Tax Court, the Claims Court, or the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia determines that the organization involved has exhausted its administrative remedies within the Internal Revenue Service.” We will then issue a final revocation letter. We will also notify the appropriate state officials of the revocation in accordance with section 6104(c) of the Code.

You have the right to contact the office of the Taxpayer Advocate. Taxpayer Advocate assistance is not a substitute for established IRS procedures, such as the formal appeals process. The Taxpayer Advocate cannot reverse a legally correct tax determination, or extend the time fixed by law that you have to file a petition in a United States court. The Taxpayer Advocate can, however, see that a tax matter that may not have been resolved through normal channels gets prompt and proper handling. You may call toll-free 1-877-777-4778 and ask for Taxpayer Advocate Assistance. If you prefer, you may contact your local Taxpayer Advocate at:

* * *

If you have any questions, please call the contact person at the telephone number shown in the heading of this letter. If you write, please provide a telephone number and the most convenient time to call if we need to contact you.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

Renee B. Wells

Acting Director, EO Examinations

Enclosures:

Publication 892

Publication 3498

Report of Examination

* * * * *

LEGEND:

ORG = Organization name

EIN = ein

XX = Date

State = state

Agent = agent

President = president

RA-1 & RA-2 = 1st & 2nd RA

CO-1 THROUGH CO-5 = 1st THROUGH 5TH COMPANIES

PRIMARY ISSUE

Whether the IRC Section 501(c)(3) tax exempt status of ORG should be revoked because it is not operated exclusively for tax exempt purposes.

FACTS

ORG (the “Organization” or “ORG”) was incorporated in the State of State on October 16, 20XX. The purposes of the Organization as stated in the Articles of Incorporation are “exclusively for charitable, educational, religious or scientific purposes, within the meaning of Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue (or corresponding section of any future Federal tax code).”

The Articles state that the Organization will not have members. The Articles contain a proper dissolution clause and address the prohibition on political activity and limited legislative activity in a general way by stating that the Organization shall not carry on any activities that are not allowed by a section 501(c)(3) organization.

The Bylaws do not contain a stated purpose for the Organization. The Bylaws do state that there shall be four initial board members and that number may increase or decrease at the Board’s discretion. The Bylaws call for regular meetings, at a time and place to be determined by the Board. Officers of the corporation are chosen by the Board and consist of a President, Vice President, Treasurer, and Secretary. The Bylaws further state that at each annual meeting, the Board would pick the officers for the coming year.

The Bylaws further address the fact that the President, initially and currently President, Certified Public Accountant, would be the chief executive and administrative officer of the corporation. The President may execute all deeds, bonds, mortgages and conveyances in the name of the Organization.

President was the Organization’s sole incorporator, was and is a member of the board of directors and has served as president since the Organization’s inception. President solicits and receives all cash and non-cash contributions from donors and operates the Organization at his own discretion.

President is a member of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants and a member of the State Association of Certified Public Accountants. President’ vast knowledge and experience in the field of public accounting is demonstrated in his being one of less than 250 non-lawyers, nationwide, to be admitted to practice before the United States Tax Court.

Beginning in 20XX President has been a member of the State State Board of Certified Public Accountant Examiners, which is the governing body for licensing certified public accountants in State. President was the president of this organization during 20XX-20XX, and was again elected president for the organization in 20XX. President is a current member of the executive committee and is a former member of the Professional Standards Committee.

President is a member of the State General Assembly’s Revenue Laws Study Committee, and is a member of the Ethics committee of the National Association of state Boards of Accountancy.

The Organization, through President, applied for tax exempt status under section 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code as an organization described in section 501(c)(3) on October 20, 20XX. In the Application for Recognition of Exemption filed with the Internal Revenue Service (the “Service”), the corporation stated that the purpose of the Organization was to accept, hold and enforce conservation easements. It also stated that it was concentrating on getting hunting clubs to donate conservation easements. Financial support was to come from contributions made by the general public and from contributions received from donors of conservation easements.

On November 24, 20XX, the Organization was issued a Determination Letter stating that the Organization was found to be exempt from federal income tax under section 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code as an organization described in section 501(c)(3). As a newly formed organization, the Service did not make a final determination of foundation status, but did determine that the Organization would be treated as a publicly supported organization as described in sections 509(a)(1) and 170(b)(1)(A)(vi). The advance ruling period was to run from October 16, 20XX to May 31, 20XX.

The Determination Letter further states that if after the advance ruling period ends the organization does not meet the public support requirements, then the organization will be classified as a private foundation for future periods. The Determination Letter also states that if the organization is classified as a private foundation, the organization will be treated as a private foundation from its beginning date for purposes of sections 507(d) and 4940 of the Code.

Form 8734, Support Schedule for Advance Ruling Period, was received from President on May 29, 20XX. On the form, President calculated the public support percentage under section 509(a)(1) as * * *% and under section 509(a)(2) as * * *%.

An interview was conducted with President on January 3, 20XX. In that interview President stated that the purpose of the Organization was to accept, hold and enforce conservation easements. The objective from the Organization’s beginning was to convince owners of hunting land to make conservation easement donations to protect the land in a relatively natural state.

During the January 3, 20XX interview, President was unclear as to why the idea of donating conservation easements began. He stated that he came up with the idea to start ORG after conducting some research. At first he approached a conservation organization that accepted conservation easements, but that did not go through because that organization wanted too much control over the land and wanted $* * * as a contribution. It was at that time that President decided to start ORG.

President performs all of the baseline studies and performs all of the annual inspections of each property. During the January 3, 20XX interview, President acknowledged that he has not received any specialized training or even general training in any area relating to the accurate or general analysis of land, conservation aspects relating to a potential donation or any area relating to the environment. President further acknowledged in the January 3, 20XX interview that he does not possess any specialized experience that would qualify him to perform these studies and inspections. However, he believes that the studies and inspections conform to the law as written.

During the January 3, 20XX interview, President acknowledged that contrary to what is required in the Organization Bylaws, there have not been any meetings of the Board of Directors since the initial meeting to start the corporation. Whereas the Organization Bylaws call for annual appointment of officers, the officers have remained the same since the Organization’s inception in 20XX. There is no indication that any of the board members have special expertise or training in the area of environmental conservation.

During the January 3, 20XX interview, President acknowledged that the Organization has never solicited contributions from the general public, does not perform any educational services, does not produce any brochures or newsletters describing the Organization’s purpose and has little activity with regard to acquiring conservation easements. The Organization uses printed materials distributed by the Land Trust Alliance, a national conservation organization, for the purpose of providing information to prospective conservation easement donors.

From the Organization’s inception in 20XX, through January, 20XX, the Organization has received two conservation easements and one outright property transfer. The first conservation easement received was donated by CO-1. (CO-1) on December 31, 20XX.

CO-1:

During the January 3, 20XX interview, President stated that at one time he hunted on the CO-1 land as a guest of two members. Due to health concerns, President stopped hunting on the land sometime before he created ORG. President prepares the annual tax returns for two of the partners of CO-1. At the time that he created this Organization, and for the year that the donation was made from CO-1 to the Organization, he did not prepare the CO-1 partnership return. President did prepare the CO-1 partnership return for the year after the donation was made.

The CO-1 covers 1807 acres of forested land located near the coast of State and was granted in perpetuity. CO-1 is a partnership of sixteen individuals who use the land exclusively for hunting.

The land has been used for hunting for generations and the intention is to keep the land in a natural state to continue hunting. The stated purpose of the conservation easement is “to assure that the Protected Property will be retained in perpetuity predominately in its natural, scenic, and open condition, as evidenced by the Report.”

The easement does not allow public access and the recreational hunting is for members only. The easement does not allow any building on the property except for a 20XX square foot shed. Dividing or sub-dividing is not allowed. The grantor does have the right to convey easements and rights of way over and across roads and easements, to include the conservation easement.

Under grantor’s reserved rights, the grantor is allowed to lease the Property for any use permitted under the easement. The grantor is also allowed to build and maintain one dock for use by the grantor and can have two burrow pits, not to exceed two acres each. The burrow pits would be used for providing fill material for road repair on the property. The grantor is permitted to construct a well at the dock and at the storage shed and has the right to develop and maintain those water resources and wetlands necessary for wildlife, private recreation, farming, and other agricultural uses permitted under the easement.

The grantor is also given the right to engage in not-for-profit and for-profit agricultural, farming, and aqua cultural activities. The grantor is allowed to construct and maintain watering facilities and ponds and can encumber the property with agricultural easements to meet their agricultural objectives. The grantor can use agrichemicals to accomplish agricultural and residential activities permitted by the easement. To the extent that the property is restored back to its natural state, the grantor reserves the right to extract minerals, gases, oil, and other hydrocarbons.

During the January 3, 20XX interview, President expressed surprise at the favorable rights retained by the donor. He stated that CO-1 attorney prepared the conservation easement deed document and that he did not review it prior to his signing for the Organization.

The first appraisal of the property was performed by CO-2, certified land appraisers in State. That appraisal valued the conservation easement at $* * *. President stated in the January 3, 20XX interview that he requested that CO-1 obtain a second appraisal because he thought the appraised value was too high. A second appraisal of the land was performed by CO-3, certified land appraisers in State. The second appraisal was performed on February 5, 20XX and the appraised value of the conservation easement was $* * *.

The baseline study for the CO-1 was conducted by President on December 28, 20XX. The baseline study is a one page document that states that the only man-made structures on the property are deer stands, feeders, foot bridges and fiber glass wraps around some trees. It also describes the trails on the property, the one main access road and it also states that there are no recent signs of timber cutting. Attached to the baseline study is a hand drawn map. This map does not set forth the boundaries of the property, or provide any descriptive information beyond identifying fields, trails and a duck pond. The baseline study does not meet the requirements imposed in the Treasury Regulations.

The conservation easement deed states that “the specific conservation values of the Protected Property on the date of this easement are documented in the Baseline Documentation Report.” The deed further states that both “parties agree the Report provides an accurate representation of the Protected Property and the condition of the same as of the date of this Easement as required by Treasury Reg. 1.170A-14(g)(5), and is intended to serve as an objective informational baseline for monitoring compliance with the terms of this easement.”

President signed the Form 8283 acknowledging the donee’s gift, sent the required gift acknowledgement letter and has performed annual monitoring of the property. The monitoring reports consist only of written statements referencing the lack of changes on the property. The reports do not reference the baseline study and do not mention specific findings of any kind.

In a meeting at the property with Revenue Agent Agent, President had trouble identifying the exact or approximate boundaries of the property encumbered by the easement. In a January, 20XX meeting at the property between this agent and President, he appeared to be familiar with the boundaries, even though they were not marked in any way.

The CO-1 partnership tax return for the year ended December 31, 20XX was examined by the Small Business/Self-Employed Division of the Internal Revenue Service and it was determined that the conservation easement had zero value as the proposed plan to build on the property was severely flawed. The entire deduction for the conservation easement was denied. CO-1 acknowledged the Service’s findings and signed an agreement with the Service as to the Service’s determinations. Subsequent to the Service’s findings and CO-1 agreement, CO-1 requested that the conservation easement donated to the Organization be returned.

CO-4 Property Transfer:

The second transaction that the Organization conducted was the acceptance of 12.624 acres of land donated by CO-4. (CO-4) on December 18, 20XX. In a letter from CO-4 to the Organization, dated November 26, 20XX * * * stated that his group was interested in donating 12.8 acres of land to the Organization. The letter did not mention the term conservation easement.

Per the Warranty Deed, the purpose of the conveyance was to ensure that the land is utilized for conservation purposes as defined in section 170(h)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code.

During the January 3, 20XX interview, President was asked about this transaction in relation to the Organization’s stated purpose of receiving conservation easements. President stated that he was unsure how the Organization received the entire property instead of just a conservation easement. He stated that there was a miscommunication between the donor and himself. President believed this transaction was to be a conservation easement donation and was surprised when he received the Warranty Deed showing a complete transfer of the property.

President, in his capacity of Certified Public Accountant, prepares the annual tax returns for one of the two partners in CO-4. For 20XX he received $* * * for that service. President performed the baseline study and it is composed of a single piece of paper with one paragraph describing the land. The paragraph states; “The land upon which the conservation easement was given to ORG by CO-4 * * * is in a natural wooded state, with no signs of recent timbering, and no man made structures.” Just as was the case with the CO-1, the baseline study for CO-4 does not meet the standards imposed in the Treasury Regulations.

President signed the Form 8283 and on February 20, 20XX, President sent CO-4 the required donor acknowledgement letter. In that letter he acknowledged receiving the land and $* * * as a cash donation for performing inspections and enforcing the easement. As this transaction was for the transfer of the entire property and not just a conservation easement, President was asked in a telephone interview, on or about May 15, 20XX, why CO-4 provided a contribution for inspections and enforcement. President had no answer.

In a May 28, 20XX letter from President to the examining agent, President stated that “there are no written inspection reports. I often go by this property when riding my bicycle, but never made notes about it. The important thing is nothing has been disturbed.” This admission is in stark contrast to the requirements for annual monitoring and inspection reports. With no reports of any kind, there is no way to tell if the property has been disturbed since the original baseline study was completed.

CO-5 Conservation Easement:

The third and final transaction for the Organization for the period of October, 20XX through January, 20XX was the acceptance of a conservation easement consisting of 1.52 acres donated by CO-5 (CO-5) on December 30, 20XX.

President, in his capacity as Certified Public Accountant, prepares the annual tax return for one of the two partners in CO-5. For 20XX, he received $* * * for those services.

The only baseline documentation provided by President is a one page, unsigned and undated document that was attached as exhibit “A” to the conservation easement deed. The document states that the easement area is currently vacant land and consists of undeveloped wetlands, woodlands and vegetation. It further states that no disturbances nor construction is anticipated nor allowed within the easement area. As is the case with the baseline documentation for the first two transactions the Organization entered into, the baseline documentation for this transaction fails to meet the standards imposed in the Treasury Regulations.

The conservation deed states that the characteristics of the property, its current use and state of improvement are described in Exhibit “A,” and that Exhibit “A” is the appropriate basis for monitoring compliance with the objectives of preserving the conservation and water quality values.

The conservation easement deed does not contain a specific conservation purpose, but rather uses a broad approach by stating that; “The property shall be maintained in its natural, scenic, wooded and open condition and restricted from any development or use that would impair or interfere with the conservation purposes of this conservation easement set forth above.”

The wording of the preceding paragraph indicates that the Organization could intend the conservation easement to cover both; 1) Protection of a significant relatively natural habitat in which a fish, wildlife, or plant community, or similar ecosystem normally lives, and 2) The preservation of open space.

Article III of the conservation easement deed stipulates that there will be no industrial, commercial or residential use. There will be no agricultural, timber harvesting, grazing or horticultural uses permitted. The vegetation is not to be disturbed and there is to be no mining, excavation or dredging. There shall be no diking, draining or other alteration of the land that would be detrimental to water purity or alter the natural water levels or drainage.

There is to be no dumping, construction or any disturbance of natural features. There are to be no signs unless said signs relate to; no trespassing signs, signs identifying the conservation values of the property, signs giving directions or proscribing rules for use of the land.

The conservation easement deed does not mention public access or any restriction to public access. The abbreviated baseline study does not address this area, and there is no indication as to what access is allowed or not allowed.

The grantee is allowed to prevent any activity which is not consistent with the purposes of the easement. The grantee is allowed to inspect the property to determine if any violations have occurred. If enforcement is necessary to correct a violation, the grantor agreed to bear the cost of enforcing the terms of the easement to include any restoration necessary.

President provided a letter dated May 26, 20XX which was addressed to RA-1 and RA-2 that acknowledged the CO-5 conservation easement donation and receipt of $* * * from each party.

On January 3, 20XX, at the initial meeting between President and this agent, President was unable to provide the baseline study for either the CO-4 donation or for the CO-5 easement. He also could not produce the Form 8283 for either donation. He stated that he would have to get a copy of those documents from the donors.

President was asked by this agent on several occasions from January 3, 20XX through mid-May, 20XX to produce these documents and failed to do so until May 30, 20XX. President provided the excuse that he was too busy and had health issues. As of the issuance date of this report, the Form 8283 for CO-4 has not been provided and the Form 8283 provided for CO-5 shows that it was not signed by the Organization.

With regard to books and records, the Organization does not maintain any except for the bank statements for the Organization’s one account. President stated that with the limited transactions involved and with the low levels of income received, he didn’t see the need to maintain books and records that detail every transaction.

Specific Examination Findings

The Organization did not file Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt From Income Tax, for the tax years ending May 31, 20XX, 20XX, 20XX or 20XX. The reason supplied by President was that the income level was below the $25,000 threshold required for filing. The examination of the Organization covered the tax years ending May 31, 20XX and May 31, 20XX.

The financial documentation provided by President supports his claim that filing was not required for either year ending May 31, 20XX or 20XX. President submitted Form 8734, Support Schedule for Advance Ruling Period, and the information contained therein matched the financial information in the Organization bank statements. The information submitted by the Organization on Form 8734 is summarized below;

On the Form 8734 that President submitted he claims that the Organization qualifies for Foundation status of 509(a)(2). The form shows the public support percentage under section 509(a)(2), as calculated by President, as * * *%.

Calculation of Public Support under Section 509(a)(1) of the Code:

Total support received for the five year period from June 1, 20XX through May 31, 20XX, as reported by the Organization on Form 8734 was $$* * *. Two percent of total support equals $$* * *. There were four substantial contributors, all of whom contributed in excess of the $$* * * two percent threshold. Therefore, the percentage of public support to total support is zero. Subsequently, the Organization fails to qualify for foundation status under section 509(a)(1) of the Code.

Calculation of Public Support under Section 509(a)(2) of the Code:

Total support received for the five year period from June 1, 20XX through May 31, 20XX, as reported by the Organization on Form 8734 was $$* * *. Of that amount $$* * * came from interest income and $$* * * came from substantial contributors. Neither of those sources of income qualifies for public support, and as such the percentage of public support to total support is zero. Subsequently, the Organization fails to qualify for foundation status under section 509(a)(2) of the Code.

The Organization does not include any non-cash contributions on the form 8734. That stance is consistent with the lack of reporting conservation easements as assets on the Form 990.

LAW

IRC § 501(c)(3) exempts from Federal income tax: corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting to influence legislation and which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office.

Treasury Regulation § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) provides that an organization will be regarded as “operated exclusively” for one or more exempt purposes only if it engages primarily in activities which accomplish one or more of such exempt purposes specified in § 501(c)(3). An organization will not be so regarded if more than an insubstantial part of its activities is not in furtherance of an exempt purpose.

Treasury Regulation § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2) provides that an organization is not operated exclusively for one or more exempt purposes if its net earnings inure in whole or in part to the benefit of private shareholders or individuals. The words “private shareholder or individual” refer to persons having a personal and private interest in the activities of the organization per Treas. Reg. sec. 1.501(a)-1(c)

Treasury Regulation § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) provides an organization is not organized or operated exclusively for one or more exempt purposes unless it serves a public rather than a private interest. Thus, to meet the requirement of this subdivision, it is necessary for an organization to establish that it is not organized or operated for the benefit of private interests such as the creator or his family, shareholders of the organization, or persons controlled, directly or indirectly, by such private interests.

Treasury Regulation 1.170A-14(c) provides that to be considered an eligible donee, an organization must be a qualified organization, have a commitment to protect the conservation purposes of the donation, and have the resources to enforce the restrictions. For purposes of this section, the term qualified means:

(i) a governmental unit described in section 170(b)(1)(A)(v);

(ii) An organization described in section 170(b)(1)(A)(vi);

(iii) A charitable organization described in section 501(c)(3) that meets the public support test of section 509(a)(2);

(iv) A charitable organization described in section 501(c)(3) that meets the requirements of section 509(a)(3) and is controlled by an organization described in paragraphs (c)(1)(i), (ii), or (iii) of this section.

Treasury Regulation 1.170A-14(d)(2) provides that a donation to preserve land areas for the outdoor recreation of the general public or for the education of the general public will meet the conservation purposes of this section. The preservation of land areas for recreation or education will not meet the test of this section unless the recreation or education is for the substantial and regular use of the general public.

Treasury Regulation 1.170A-14(d)(3), Protection of environmental system — provides that the donation of a qualified real property interest to protect a significant relatively natural habitat in which fish, wildlife, or plant community, or similar ecosystem normally lives will meet the conservation purposes of this section. Alteration of the land will not result in a deduction being denied under this section if the fish, wildlife, or plants continue to exist there in a relatively natural state. The example provided in this section refers to land alteration that is allowed if the lake or pond were a nature feeding area for a wildlife community that included rare, endangered, or threatened native species. This section allows for the denial of public access.

Treasury Regulation 1.170(A)-14(d)(4), Preservation of open space — provides that the donation of a qualified real property interest to preserve open space will meet the conservation purposes test of this section if such preservation is:

(A) Pursuant to a clearly delineated federal, state, or local government conservation policy and will yield a significant public benefit, or

(B) For the scenic enjoyment of the general public and will yield a significant public benefit.

Treasury Regulation 1.170(A)-14(d)(4)(B) — Illustrations, The preservation of an ordinary tract of land would not in and of itself yield a significant public benefit, but the preservation of ordinary land areas in conjunction with other factors that demonstrate significant public benefit or the preservation of a unique land area for public enjoyment would yield a significant public benefit.

Treasury Regulation 1.170(A)-14(g)(5) — Protection of conservation purpose where taxpayer reserves certain rights. In the case of a donation made after February 13, 1986, of any qualified real property interest when the donor reserves rights the exercise of which may impair the conservation interests associated with the property, for a deduction to be allowable under this section the donor must make available to the donee, prior to the time the donation is made, documentation sufficient to establish the condition of the property at the time of the gift. Such documentation is designed to protect the conservation interests associated with the property, which although protected in perpetuity by the easement, could be adversely affected by the exercise of the reserved rights. Such documentation may include:

(A) The appropriate survey maps from the United States Geological Survey, showing the property line and other contiguous or nearby protected areas;

(B) A map of the area drawn to scale showing all existing man-made improvements or incursions (such as roads, buildings, fences, or gravel pits), vegetation and identification of flora and fauna (including, for example, rare species locations, animal breeding and roosting areas, and migration routes), land use history (including present uses and recent past disturbances), and distinct natural features (such as large trees and aquatic areas);

(C) An aerial photograph of the property at an appropriate scale taken as close as possible to the date the donation is made; and

(D) On-site photographs taken at appropriate locations on the property. If the terms of the donation contain restrictions with regard to a particular natural resource to be protected, such as water quality or air quality, the condition of the resource at or near the time of the gift must be established. The documentation, including the maps and photographs, must be accompanied by a statement signed by the donor and a representative of the donee clearly referencing the documentation and in substance saying “This natural resources inventory is an accurate representation of [the protected property] at the time of the transfer.”.

In Better Business Bureau v. United States, 326 U.S. 279 (1945), the United States Supreme Court held that regardless of the number of truly exempt purposes, the presence of a single substantial non-exempt purpose will preclude exemption under section 501(c)(3).

In Benedict Ginsberg and Adele W. Ginsberg v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 47 (1966), the United States Tax Court held that the organization used its funds primarily to foster private interests and the benefit to the general public was only incidental. As such, the organization was denied exemption under section 501(c)(3).

In Charles Glass et ux. v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 16 (2005), the United States Tax Court held that the conservation easement was donated exclusively for conservation purposes. The Tax Court also stipulated that the donee organization operated at arms length and was a qualified organization.

In Turner v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 16 (2006), The United Sates Tax Court held that the voluntary restriction to develop less land in and of itself does not meet the qualifications necessary for a charitable deduction. To be a qualified conservation contribution under section 170(h)(1), the conservation easement has to be exclusively for conservation purposes.

In Rev. Rul. 70-186 it was held that the organization was exempt from Federal income tax under section 501(c)(3) of the Code because the benefits derived from their activities flowed principally to the general public and benefits to private landholders did not lessen the public benefit received.

In Rev. Ruls. 76-204 and 78-384 it was held that the land must be “ecologically significant” and that preservation of ordinary farmland was not sufficient to justify charitable status.

GOVERNMENT’S POSITION

The IRC § 501(c)(3) tax exempt status of ORG and * * * (the “Organization”) should be revoked because it is not operated exclusively for tax exempt purposes.

The facts show that the Organization is not operated exclusively for a tax exempt charitable purpose. Rather, the Organization has operated as a conduit for President, CPA to help his clients obtain sizable deductions on their tax returns.

All three land transactions that the Organization has entered into were with entities that are in some way connected to President and his accounting practice. For CO-1, President prepared the annual tax returns for two of the sixteen partners. For CO-4, President prepared the annual tax returns for one of the two partners. For CO-5, President prepared the annual tax returns for one of the two partners.

This type of pattern is not coincidental. Instead it shows President’ intent and goals are not concerned with environmental or conservation issues, but rather that he has used the Organization as a vehicle for the enrichment of his clients. This type of private benefit runs counter to the requirements set forth in IRC Section 501(c)(3) with regard to private benefit.

President is considered an expert in the field of public accounting. This position is evidenced by his membership on at least one ethics committee, membership on a revenue laws study committee, and former membership on a professional standards committee, as well as being admitted to practice before the United States Tax Court. In addition, all of these qualifications demonstrate that President is an accountant who understands how to utilize the tax laws for the benefit of his clients.

In stark contrast to his vast experience and knowledge as a certified public accountant, President does not possess the knowledge, training or experience to make educated decisions on whether each conservation easement serves a conservation purpose under section 170(h)(4)(A).

Moreover, he has no expertise in valuing land for conservation purposes. He has acknowledged that he read a few articles and conducted some research on how an organization that accepts conservation easements should perform. The lack of knowledge and experience are strong indicators that the Organization does not possess the level of commitment required under section 1.170A-14(c) of the Treasury Regulations and is not operated a charitable purpose.

As is evidenced by his baseline documentation and inspection reports, President has chosen to follow his own path. Neither the baseline reports nor the inspection reports conform to the requirements set forth in the Treasury Regulations. These documents do not in any way provide the necessary information that the Organization would need to enforce the conservation easements received. These documents and the lack of substantial information contained therein show that the main concern of President was not the protection of open space or natural habitats, but the amount of deductions he could claim for his clients.

The baseline documentation for all three transactions consists of the barest of facts and is not substantiated by pictures, analysis, or expert opinion. There is no description of flora or fauna and each report contains a generic statement that references the natural characteristic of the land. President states that the baseline documentation is in accordance with Treasury Regulation 1.170A-14(g)(5) because the regulation uses the word “may” instead of “shall” with regard to what should be contained in a baseline report.

President reliance on performing the bare minimum with regard to the protection of conservation values is an indication that the Organization does not pursue conservationism as a primary goal. The lack of detail in the baseline studies shows that the Organization does not possess the level of commitment required under section 1.170A-14(c) of the Treasury Regulations.

The monitoring or annual inspection reports are less descriptive than the baseline documentation. The inspection reports for CO-1 contain one or two handwritten sentences that state that no changes were noted.

For CO-4, there are no inspection or monitoring reports. After several months of inquiring as to the inspection report whereabouts, President wrote that: “there are no written inspection reports. I often go by this property when riding my bicycle, but never made notes about it. The important thing is nothing has been disturbed.” This statement reflects the fact that monitoring for compliance was not and is not a top priority for President. This lack of vital documentation also demonstrates that the Organization does not possess the commitment necessary for accepting, holding and monitoring conservation easements.

For CO-5, the inspection reports are available but do not indicate what was done by President in the way of ensuring compliance. For the inspection visit on September 28, 20XX, the report states the following; “For sale sign on adjacent property. According to * * * only 2 buildings could be put on property. Called building inspector to make sure he knew of easement.” The inspection report for April 12, 20XX was extremely brief and stated; “Walked by property. OK.”

Baseline documentation reports and annual inspection reports that do not contain more descriptive information as to the type, quality or full description of the land as well as the boundaries, are indicators of an organization that is not operating for conservation or environmental purposes and do not meet the requirements of section 1.170(A)-14(g)(5) of the Treasury Regulations.

With the CO-1, President stated in the January 3, 20XX interview that he did not review the easement deed prior to signing. Since he did not read the document, he was unaware as to the rights granted and retained by the donor. President was unaware of the extensive rights retained by the donor until it was brought to his attention by this agent. This situation shows that President does not possess the knowledge, experience or willingness to follow the Treasury Regulations as written with regard to the commitment necessary. This situation also demonstrates a business practice that could be described as poor.

For the CO-4 transaction, President failed to secure a conservation easement deed, but instead received title to the land in its entirety. President has no explanation that would demonstrate how this transaction was a proper business practice for a conservation organization. What this transaction does demonstrate is President lack of experience, knowledge and willingness to act as a proper fiduciary for the Organization. Again, like the CO-1 transaction, President has failed to demonstrate the proper commitment required by section 1.170(A)-14(c) of the Treasury Regulations.

The Organization is not run as a section 501(c)(3) charitable organization. There are no financial records beyond what is contained in the bank statements. There are no solicitations from the general public for support, no receipts, no expense vouchers, and no balance sheets prepared at year end. Considering the fact that President is a certified public accountant, and is considered an expert in this field, this situation is disturbing at best, and at worst demonstrates that President has not been working in the best interests of the Organization.

Considering that the Organization has only received two conservation easements and one land transfer in four plus years shows that the commitment to perform as a conservation organization as described in the Treasury Regulations is not present.. There are no educational events developed and sponsored by the Organization. The Organization does not appear to hold itself out to the public as a charitable conservation organization, except through word-of-mouth, and of course, President’ clients.

The Organization has not been operated in accordance with the Organization Bylaws. There are no meetings of officers or board members, and there are no elections. In essence, President has sole control and is operating his own business under his own terms. There are no internal controls and only the bare minimum with regard to records and recordkeeping.

President’ lack of expertise in the area of conservation easements and the lack of detail in the baseline studies and inspection reports show that the Organization does not have clear established criteria for accepting easements, nor adequate procedures in place for enforcing the easements. President prepares the baseline studies and makes decisions on whether or not easements qualify as valid conservation easements. Neither of the two conservation easement deeds state exactly what the purpose of the easement is. Instead there are generic statements that do not provide a clear representation as to the purpose as stated under section 1.170(A)-14 of the Regulations. The Organization does not take the steps necessary to ensure that each easement accepted serves a conservation purpose under section 170(h)(4)(A) of the Code. There is no one associated with the Organization that has any formal education, training or expertise in conservation matters and it is not known whether the appraisers that appraised the donated easements had qualifications in valuing conservation easements. However, any mention of conservation purposes in the appraisals does not aid the Organization because no one on the Organization’s governing body has any formal education on conservation matters. The Organization’s monitoring activities (such as they are) cannot further a charitable purpose uner these circumstances where there is no knowledge as to whether the easements the Organization has accepted serve the conservation purposes under section 170(h)(4)(A). Moreover, there is no evidence that the Organization possesses sufficient resources to enforce easement restrictions in instances where any donor were to use an underlying property contrary to a conservation purpose.

The Organization fails to meet the requirements set forth in Regulation § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1), in that it is not operated exclusively for an exempt purpose. More than an insubstantial part of its activities are the acceptance of conservation easements or property transfers for which there is not proper documentation. The organization has failed to establish that the acceptance of these easements furthers an exempt purpose under section 501(c)(3) of the Code. In short, ORG fails to operate for a charitable conservation purpose.

The Organization also fails to meet the requirements set forth in Regulation § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii), in that they are not operated exclusively for one or more exempt purposes because it serves the private interests of President and his clients.

The presence of a single substantial non-exempt purpose precludes exemption under section 501(c)(3). See Better Business Bureau v. United States, 326 U.S. 279 (1945). This Organization exists not to serve the greater good of the general public, but rather fits the needs of President clients to have sizable deductions on their tax returns.

President, who is a certified public accountant, submitted Form 8734, Support Schedule for Advance Ruling Period and it was calculated incorrectly. On the form he calculated the public support percentage for foundation status 509(a)(1) as * * *% and for foundation status 509(a)(2) as * * *%. President failed to take into account that all monies that were received came from substantial contributors, which by definition are disqualified persons. Any income received from disqualified persons is excluded from the calculation of public support, both for 509(a)(1) and 509(a)(2).

When the monies received from substantial contributors is removed from the calculation, public support under both 509(a)(1) and 509(a)(2) equal zero. As such, the Organization can not be considered publicly supported and if revocation of exempt status is not pursued, reclassification to a private foundation should occur.

The first year under examination is the first year that the Organization operated, the fiscal year ending May 31, 20XX. The Organization’s status as an organization described under § 501(c)(3) should be revoked, effective October 16, 20XX, because it did not operate exclusively for exempt purposes. If revocation of exempt status is not upheld, then the Organization should be reclassified as a private foundation and be subject to Chapter 42 excise taxes.

TAXPAYER’S POSITION

The taxpayer wishes to keep its exempt status and believes its activities serve a significant public benefit with regard to preservation and conservation of natural land areas.

President also believes that if the Organization is reclassified to a private foundation based on not meeting the public support requirements, then the Organization would still be able to hold the conservation easements already in the Organization’s possession. President has stated that there is no mention in either the Code or the Treasury Regulations that would prohibit a private foundation from holding conservation easements that were acquired during an Organization’s advance ruling period.

CONCLUSION

The Organization is not being operated as an exempt IRC § 501(c)(3) organization. The charitable exempt status should be revoked effective October 16, 20XX.

ALTERNATIVE ISSUE #1

Should ORG be reclassified as a private foundation?

FACTS

President submitted Form 8734, Support Schedule for Advance Ruling Period, and the information contained therein matched the financial information in the Organization bank statements. The information submitted by the Organization on Form 8734 is summarized below;

On the Form 8734 that President submitted it purports that the Organization qualifies for Foundation status of 509(a)(2). The public support percentage as reflected on the form shows * * *%.

Calculation of Public Support under Section 509(a)(1) of the Code:

Total support received for the five year period from June 1, 20XX through May 31, 20XX, as reported by the Organization on Form 8734 was $$* * *. Two percent of total support equals $$* * *. There were four substantial contributors, all of whom contributed in excess of the $$* * * two percent threshold. Therefore, the percentage of public support to total support is zero. Subsequently, the Organization fails to qualify for foundation status under section 509(a)(1) of the Code.

Calculation of Public Support under Section 509(a)(2) of the Code:

Total support received for the five year period from June 1, 20XX through May 31, 20XX, as reported by the Organization on Form 8734 was $$* * *. Of that amount $$* * * came from interest income and $$* * * came from substantial contributors. Neither of those sources of income qualifies for public support, and as such the percentage of public support to total support is zero. Subsequently, the Organization fails to qualify for foundation status under section 509(a)(2) of the Code.

The Organization does not include any non-cash contributions on the form 8734. That stance is consistent with the lack of reporting conservation easements as assets on the Form 990.

LAW

IRC § 509 Private Foundation Defined:

509(a) GENERAL RULE — For purposes of this title, the term “private foundation” means a domestic or foreign organization described in section 501(c)(3) other than —

509(a)(1) an organization described in section 170(b)(1)(A) (other than in clauses (vii) and (viii));

509(a)(2) an organization which —

509(a)(2)(A) normally receives more than one-third of its support in each taxable year from any combination of —

509(a)(2)(A)(i) gifts, grants, contributions, or membership fees, and

509(a)(2)(A)(ii) gross receipts from admissions, sales of merchandise, performance of services, or furnishing of facilities, in an activity which is not an unrelated trade or business (within the meaning of section 513), not including such receipts from any person, or from any bureau or similar agency of a governmental unit (as described in section 170(c)(1)), in any taxable year to the extent such receipts exceed the greater of 5,000 or 1 percent of the organization’s support in such taxable year,

from persons other than disqualified persons (as defined in section 4946) with respect to the organization, from governmental units described in section 170(c)(1), or from organizations described in section 170(b)(1)(A) (other than in clauses (vii) and (viii)).

IRC § 170 Charitable, Etc., Contributions and Gifts:

170(b)(1)(A)(vi) an organization which normally receives a substantial part of its support (exclusive of income received in the exercise or performance by such organization of its charitable, educational, or other purpose or function constituting the basis for its exemption from a governmental unit referred to in subsection or from direct or indirect contributions from the general public,

IRC § 4946: Definitions and Special Rules

4946(a) DISQUALIFIED PERSON. —

4946(a)(1) IN GENERAL — for purposes of this subchapter, the term “disqualified person” means, with respect to a private foundation, a person who is —

4946(a)(1)(A) a substantial contributor to the foundation,

Treasury Regulation § 1.507-6. Substantial contributor defined

(a) Definition

(1) In general. — the term “substantial contributor” means, with respect to a private foundation, any person (within the meaning of section 7701(a)(1)), whether or not exempt from taxation under section 501(a), who contributed or bequeathed an aggregate amount of more than $5,000 to the private foundation, if such amount is more than 2 percent of the total contributions and bequests received by the private foundation before the close of the taxable year of the private foundation in which a contribution or bequest is received by the foundation from such person.

GOVERNMENT’S POSITION

As set forth above, it is the government’s primary position that the tax exempt status of ORG should be revoked. Alternatively, ORG should be reclassified as a private foundation.

The Organization was created in 20XX and since that time has failed to meet the requirements for public support as outlined in the Code. The Organization has only received contributions from substantial contributors which by definition are disqualified persons. Public support does not include any receipts from disqualified persons as defined in IRC section 4946. As such, the Organization does not qualify for foundation status under sections 509(a)(1) or 509(a)(2) of the Code.

If revocation of exempt status is not achieved, then the Organization should be reclassified as a private foundation effective June 1, 20XX, the end of the advance ruling period, as it fails to qualify for any foundation status as described in section 509(a) of the Code.

TAXPAYER’S POSITION

President also believes that if the Organization is reclassified to a private foundation based on not meeting the public support requirements, then the Organization would still be able to hold the conservation easements already in the Organization’s possession. President has stated that there is no mention in either the Code or the Treasury Regulations that would prohibit a private foundation from holding conservation easements that were acquired during an Organization’s advance ruling period.

CONCLUSION

ORG does not qualify for tax exempt status under IRC section 501(a) as an organization described in section 501(c)(3) of the Code. The lack of any qualified exempt activity indicates that the Organization should not be allowed to continue as a tax exempt organization. Revocation of the tax exempt status of ORG is proposed with an effective date of October 16, 20XX.

Alternately, ORG should be reclassified as an organization that is a private foundation as defined in section 509(a) of the Code effective June 1, 20XX, the end of the advance ruling period.

A closing conference was held by telephone with President, president of ORG on July 28, 20XX

Citations: LTR 201405018




The First Amendment and the Parsonage Allowance: A Response.

Kenneth H. Ryesky responds to Edward A. Zelinsky’s article, making the case for allowing the parsonage exemption as socially beneficial to productivity.

To the Editor:

In his well-reasoned article regarding the constitutionality of the section 107 parsonage exemption, prof. Edward A. Zelinsky states that “as a matter of tax policy, there is a strong argument for taxing cash parsonage allowances.” (Prior coverage: Tax Notes, Jan. 27, 2014, p. 413 .)

There are also some strong policy arguments for exempting parsonage allowances from taxation.

Section 107 is part of IRC Subchapter B, Part III items specifically excluded from gross income. Other exclusions to be found in Part III include, but are not limited to, combat pay for military members (section 112), foster care payments for foster parents (section 131), and payments to adoptive parents to cover qualified adoption expenses (section 137).

There is practical reason to accord parsonage allowances a favored exemption from gross income. In 1909 the Country Life Commission, constituted by President Theodore Roosevelt, found the productivity of America’s farming sector to be dependent upon the functionality of its social systems, and further found that churches (of whatever denomination) played a key role in the vitality and productivity of the rural society. The commission specifically noted that:

There should be better financial support for the clergyman. In many country districts it is pitiably small. There is little incentive for a man to stay in a country parish, and yet this residence is just what must come about. Perhaps it will require an appeal to the heroic young men, but we must have more men going into the country pastorates, not as a means of getting a foothold, but as a permanent work. [Report of the Country Life Commission, S. Doc. No. 705, at 60-63 (60th Cong., 2d Sess., 1909).]

Generically favoring the provision of living quarters for clergy, without regard to the particular religion, can thus be justified on productivity grounds as socially beneficial. For similar reasons of productivity and morale, the military services commission chaplains as officers.

Kenneth H. Ryesky

Queens College CUNY

Jan. 28, 2014




Priest, Church Allowed to Intervene in Suit to Enforce Church Political Activity Restrictions.

A U.S. district court granted a priest and his church’s motion to intervene in an organization’s suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the IRS for nonenforcement of section 501(c)(3) political campaign restrictions against churches and religious organizations.

FREEDOM FROM RELIGION FOUNDATION, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

JOHN KOSKINEN, COMMISSIONER OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,

Defendant.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

DECISION AND ORDER

Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code exempts entities that are organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, or other specified purposes from having to pay federal income taxes. A condition of this exemption is that the entity not participate or intervene in any political campaign on behalf of, or in opposition to, any candidate for public office. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3). The plaintiff in this case, the Freedom from Religion Foundation, alleges that the Internal Revenue Service has a policy of not enforcing this condition to tax-exempt status against churches and religious organizations. At the same time, the Foundation alleges, the IRS enforces the condition against other tax-exempt organizations. The Foundation, which is itself a § 501(c)(3) organization, contends that the IRS’s policy of disparate treatment violates its rights under both the Establishment Clause and the equal-protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. For relief, the Foundation seeks a declaratory judgment stating that the IRS’s alleged policy of providing preferential treatment to churches and religious organizations is unlawful, as well as an injunction requiring the IRS to abandon that policy. The IRS denies that it has a policy of not enforcing § 501(c)(3)’s electioneering restrictions against churches and religious organizations.

Before me now is a motion to intervene filed by Father Patrick Malone and the Holy Cross Anglican Church. The church is a tax-exempt organization that does not obey the electioneering restrictions of § 501(c)(3). See Decl. of Father Patrick Malone ¶¶ 4, 29. In particular, Father Malone, the vicar of the church, regularly makes statements during worship services and church gatherings in which he urges members of the congregation to vote for or against certain candidates for public office. Id. ¶¶ 11-12, 20. So far, however, the IRS has not taken any action in response to the church’s activities. Id. ¶ 29. But the church and Father Malone are concerned that if the Foundation obtains the relief it seeks in this lawsuit, then the IRS will be required to “punish” them for having engaged in political activity. Id. ¶¶ 25-26. Thus, the church and Father Malone claim that they have an interest in this suit and seek to intervene as defendants. They seek intervention as of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) or, in the alternative, permissive intervention under Rule 24(b)(1)(B). If allowed to intervene, the movants would argue that they have a legal right to participate in political campaigns without forfeiting their tax-exempt status. The movants contend that their position is supported by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) and the Free Speech, Free Exercise, and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment.

For a movant to have a right to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2), the movant must claim “an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action” that might be “impair[ed] or imped[ed]” by the disposition of that action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). In the present case, the interest that the movants seek to protect is their interest in having Father Malone preach to the church about whom to vote for without jeopardizing the church’s tax-exempt status. They believe that if the Foundation obtains an injunction requiring the IRS to enforce § 501(c)(3)’s electioneering restrictions against churches and religious organizations, the IRS will be required to initiate proceedings to possibly revoke the church’s tax-exempt status on the ground that Father Malone has and will continue to preach about candidates for political office. However, the threat to this interest is at least one step removed from this lawsuit. If the Foundation prevails, it will not obtain an order requiring the IRS to immediately investigate whether Father Malone and Holy Cross have violated § 501(c)(3)’s electioneering restrictions. Rather, because the IRS does not have infinite resources and must exercise discretion in choosing which tax-exempt entities to investigate, it is uncertain whether the IRS, if compelled to enforce the electioneering restrictions against churches, would ever take any action against Father Malone or Holy Cross.

Still, in litigating this lawsuit, the Foundation will advance legal arguments that if accepted would impair or impede the movants’ interests. The Foundation intends to argue that any policy of non-enforcement of § 501(c)(3)’s electioneering restrictions against churches and religious organizations violates the Establishment Clause. The movants contend that the IRS’s enforcing those restrictions against churches and religious organizations would violate the Establishment Clause. So if the Foundation prevails, a cloud would be cast over the movants’ argument that the Establishment Clause prevents the IRS from enforcing the electioneering restrictions against churches and religious organizations. The movants should be permitted to intervene in this case for the purpose of protecting their argument.

It is true that even if the Foundation prevails, the movants will still have a chance to litigate the issue of whether the Establishment Clause and other laws grant them a right to both preach about candidates for office and maintain their tax-exempt status. Because the movants, if denied intervention, would not be bound by any of the orders entered in this case or be precluded from advancing contrary legal arguments in the future, they will be free to assert the Establishment Clause as a defense in any IRS action to revoke their tax-exempt status. “But the possibility that the would-be intervenor if refused intervention might have an opportunity in the future to litigate his claim has been held not to be an automatic bar to intervention.” City of Chicago v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 660 F.3d 980, 985-86 (7th Cir. 2011). Rather, “[c]ases allow intervention as a matter of right when an original party does not advance a ground that if upheld by the court would confer a tangible benefit on an intervenor who wants to litigate that ground.” Id. Here, the movants wish to advance the argument that the IRS may not enforce the electioneering restrictions of § 501(c)(3) against churches and religious organizations, an argument that the original party, the IRS, does not intend to advance and which, if successful, would confer a tangible benefit on the movants.

The Foundation points out that the Tax Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a), generally forbids courts from entertaining suits to prevent the IRS from enforcing the Tax Code, and that therefore the movants could not commence a separate action against the IRS to obtain a ruling that they may engage in political campaigning without jeopardizing their tax-exempt status. The Foundation contends that the movants should not be permitted to use intervention to obtain relief that would otherwise be barred by § 7421(a). But the movants are not intervening for the purpose of obtaining relief against the IRS; they are intervening for the purpose of preventing the Foundation from obtaining relief against the IRS that would be inconsistent with their argument that the IRS may not enforce the electioneering restrictions of § 501(c)(3) against them. Even if the movants are successful in showing in this action that they have a legal right to both participate in political campaigns and keep their tax-exempt status, they would not obtain any relief against the IRS. Indeed, the movants propose to intervene as defendants — on the side of the IRS — and have not indicated that they would bring a cross-claim against the IRS. Really what the movants seek is not to establish their right to engage in political activity while maintaining their tax-exempt status, but to prevent the Foundation from obtaining relief that would be inconsistent with, and therefore impair or impede, their later establishing that right. Thus, allowing the movants to intervene would not implicate the Tax Anti-Injunction Act.

To have a right to intervene, the movants must show not only that the disposition of the suit could impair or impede their interests, but also that the existing parties will not adequately represent their interests. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). In the present case, the IRS will adequately represent the movants’ interests to some extent. Like the movants, the IRS wishes to prevent the Foundation from obtaining an order requiring it to enforce § 501(c)(3)’s electioneering restrictions against churches and religious organizations. But the IRS’s defense is that it does not have a policy against enforcing those restrictions against churches and religious organizations in the first place. The IRS does not intend to argue that, if it is determined that it has such a non-enforcement policy, the policy is justified or compelled by the Establishment Clause and other laws. Thus, the IRS does not fully represent the movants’ interests. However, unless the Foundation is able to prove that the IRS has a policy of not enforcing the electioneering restrictions against churches and religious organizations, the movants will have no occasion to advance their legal arguments. As discussed, the movants do not (and because of the Tax Anti-Injunction Act probably cannot) assert a cross-claim against the IRS. So if the IRS succeeds in showing that it does not have a policy against enforcing § 501(c)(3)’s electioneering restrictions against churches and religious organizations, the case will be over and the movants will have nothing to do. Still, this does not mean that the movants cannot intervene now and wait on the sidelines in case there comes a time in the suit when their legal interests require protection.

A final requirement for intervention is that the motion to intervene be timely, and the Foundation contends that the present motion is untimely. However, the Foundation has not pointed to any prejudice caused by the timing of the motion, and I cannot detect any. The primary issue in this case is the factual one of whether the IRS has a policy of not enforcing the electioneering restrictions of § 501(c)(3) against churches and religious organizations. As noted, only if this issue is resolved in favor of the Foundation will the movants have any need to present their legal arguments. The earliest time to present those arguments would be summary judgment, and motions for summary judgment are not due until April 1, 2014. The movants have not indicated that they wish to take any discovery, and because the issues they seek to litigate are pure legal issues, it is hard to envision them having a need to take discovery. Here, the motion to intervene was filed on December 12, 2013, well in advance of the summary-judgment deadline, and in the context of this case that was early enough to render the motion timely.

Accordingly, the motion to intervene is GRANTED.

Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin this 3rd day of February, 2014.

Lynn Adelman

District Judge




EO Update - e-News for Charities and Nonprofits - January 17, 2014.

1.  Phone forum: Governance help for exempt organizations

Register now for this informative IRS presentation scheduled January 23, at 2 p.m. ET.

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2.  Current Form 990 series forms/instructions & significant changes

Go here for list of current Form 990 series forms and instructions:

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See the Form 990 filing thresholds page to determine which form(s) an organization must file. See Tax Year 2013 Significant Changes or Tax Year 2012 Significant Changes, for an overview of changes made to these forms.

http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/2013_Form990_SignificantChanges.pdf

http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/2012_Form990_Significant%20Changes.pdf

For materials on how to complete the Form 990 and other forms for exempt organizations, go to Form 990 Resources and Tools for Exempt Organizations.

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IRS Publishes Proposed Regs on Determining Basis in Interests in Tax-Exempt Trusts.

The IRS has published proposed regulations (REG-154890-03) that provide rules for determining a taxable beneficiary’s basis in a term interest in a charitable remainder trust (CRT) upon a sale or other disposition of all interests in the trust to the extent that basis consists of a share of adjusted uniform basis. Comments and hearing requests are due by April 17.

In October 2008 the IRS designated (Notice 2008-99) a CRT transaction, and other substantially similar transactions as transactions of interest under reg. section 1.6011-4(b)(6). In the identified transaction, a sale or other disposition of all interests in a CRT after the contribution of appreciated assets to, and their reinvestment by, the CRT results in the grantor or other non-charitable beneficiary — the taxable beneficiary — receiving the value of the taxable beneficiary’s trust interest while claiming to recognize little or no taxable gain. The taxable beneficiary contends that the entire interest in the CRT has been sold, and thus, section 1001(e)(1) does not apply to the transaction. As a result, the taxable beneficiary computes gain on the sale of its term interest using the portion of the uniform basis allocable to the term interest under reg. sections 1.1014-5 and 1.1015-1(b). The taxable beneficiary takes the position that this uniform basis is derived from the basis of the new assets acquired by the CRT rather than the grantor’s basis in the assets contributed to the CRT.

In response to Notice 2008-99, commentators agreed that a taxable beneficiary of a CRT shouldn’t benefit from a basis step-up attributable to tax-exempt gains and supported amending the uniform basis rules to prevent this benefit. The IRS and Treasury also believe that it is inappropriate for a taxable beneficiary to share in the uniform basis obtained through the reinvestment of income not subject to tax due to a trust’s tax-exempt status.

Accordingly, the proposed regs provide a special rule for determining the basis in some CRT term interests in transactions to which section 1001(e)(3) applies. Under the regs, the basis of a term interest of a taxable beneficiary is the portion of the adjusted uniform basis assignable to that interest reduced by the portion of the sum of the following amounts assignable to that interest: (1) the amount of undistributed net ordinary income described in section 664(b)(1) and (2) the amount of undistributed net capital gain described in section 664(b)(2). The regs don’t affect the CRT’s basis in its assets, but the IRS and Treasury may consider whether there should be any change in the treatment of the charitable remainderman participating in such a transaction.

The rules in the proposed regs apply only to charitable remainder annuity trusts and charitable remainder unitrusts as defined in section 664. Comments are requested on whether the rules also should apply to other types of tax-exempt trusts. The regs don’t affect the disclosure obligation provided in Notice 2008-99. The regs are proposed to apply to sales and other dispositions of interests in CRTs occurring after January 15, 2014, except for sales or dispositions occurring under a binding commitment entered into before January 16, 2014. However, the inapplicability of the regs to an excepted sale or disposition doesn’t preclude the IRS from applying all available legal arguments to contest the claimed tax treatment of such a transaction.

AGENCY: Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Treasury.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.

SUMMARY: This document contains proposed regulations that provide rules for determining a taxable beneficiary’s basis in a term interest in a charitable remainder trust upon a sale or other disposition of all interests in the trust to the extent that basis consists of a share of adjusted uniform basis. The regulations affect taxable beneficiaries of charitable remainder trusts.

DATES: Written or electronic comments and requests for a public hearing must be received by April 17, 2014.

ADDRESSES: Send submissions to CC:PA:LPD:PR (REG-154890-03), room 5205, Internal Revenue Service, P.O. Box 7604, Ben Franklin Station, Washington, D.C., 20044. Submissions may be hand-delivered Monday through Friday between the hours of 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. to CC:PA:LPD:PR (REG-154890-03), Courier’s Desk, Internal Revenue Service, 1111 Constitution Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C., or sent electronically via the Federal eRulemaking Portal at www.regulations.gov (IRS REG-154890-03).

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Concerning the proposed regulations, Allison R. Carmody at (202) 317-5279; concerning submissions of comments and requests for hearing, Oluwafunmilayo (Funmi) Taylor, at (202) 317-6901 (not toll-free numbers).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

Statutory and Regulatory Rules

Charitable Remainder Trusts

A charitable remainder trust (CRT) is a trust that provides for the distribution of an annuity or a unitrust amount, at least annually, to one or more beneficiaries, at least one of which is not a charity, for life or for a limited term of years, with an irrevocable remainder interest held for the benefit of, or paid over to, charity. Thus, there is at least one current income beneficiary of a CRT, and a charitable remainder beneficiary. A CRT is not subject to income tax. See section 664(c).

Uniform Basis Rule

Property acquired by a trust from a decedent or as a gift generally has a uniform basis. This means that property has a single basis even though more than one person has an interest in that property. See §§ 1.1014-4(a)(1) and 1.1015-1(b). Generally, the uniform basis of assets transferred to a trust is determined under section 1015 for assets transferred by lifetime gift, or under section 1014 or 1022 for assets transferred from a decedent. Adjustments to uniform basis for items such as depreciation are made even though more than one person holds an interest in the property (adjusted uniform basis).

When a taxable trust sells assets, any gain is taxed currently to the trust, to one or more beneficiaries, or apportioned among the trust and its beneficiaries. If the trust reinvests the proceeds from the sale in new assets, the trust’s basis in the newly purchased assets is the cost of the new assets. See section 1012. Thus, the adjusted uniform basis of that taxable trust is attributable to basis obtained with proceeds from sales that were subject to income tax.

However, a CRT does not pay income tax on gain from the sale of appreciated assets. A CRT may sell appreciated assets and accumulate undistributed income and undistributed capital gains, and may reinvest the proceeds of the sales in new assets. The treatment of distributions from a CRT to its income beneficiary depends upon the amount of undistributed income and undistributed capital gains in the CRT. Sections 664(b)(1) and (2).

Basis in Term and Remainder Interests in a CRT

Section 1001(e) governs the determination of gain or loss from the sale or disposition of a term interest in property, such as a life or term interest in a CRT. In general, section 1001(e)(1) provides that the portion of the adjusted basis of a term interest in property that is determined pursuant to sections 1014, 1015, or 1041 is disregarded in determining gain or loss from the sale or other disposition of such term interest. Thus, the seller of such an interest generally must disregard that portion of the basis in the transferred interest in computing the gain or loss.

Section 1001(e)(3), however, provides that section 1001(e)(1) does not apply to a sale or other disposition that is part of a transaction in which the entire interest in property is transferred. Therefore, in the case of a sale or other disposition that is part of a transaction in which all interests in the property (or trust) are transferred as described in section 1001(e)(3), the capital gain or loss of each seller of an interest is the excess of the amount realized from the sale of that interest over the seller’s basis in that interest. Each seller’s basis is the seller’s portion of the adjusted uniform basis assignable to the interest so transferred. See § 1.1014-5(a)(1).

The basis of a term or remainder interest in a trust at the time of its sale or other disposition is determined under the rules provided in § 1.1014-5. See also §§ 1.1015-1(b) and 1.1015-2(a)(2), which refer to the rules of § 1.1014-5. Specifically, § 1.1014-5(a)(3) provides that, in determining the basis in a term or remainder interest in property at the time of the interest’s sale or disposition, adjusted uniform basis is allocated using the factors for valuing life estates and remainder interests. Thus, the portions of the adjusted uniform basis attributable to the interests of the life tenant and remaindermen are adjusted to reflect the change in the relative values of such interests due to the lapse of time.

Notice 2008-99

The IRS and the Treasury Department became aware of a type of transaction involving these provisions and, on October 31, 2008, the IRS and the Treasury Department published Notice 2008-99 (2008-47 IRB 1194) (“Notice”) to designate a transaction and substantially similar transactions as Transactions of Interest under § 1.6011-4(b)(6) of the Income Tax Regulations, and to ask for public comments on how the transactions might be addressed in published guidance. In this type of transaction, a sale or other disposition of all interests in a CRT subsequent to the contribution of appreciated assets to, and their reinvestment by, the CRT results in the grantor or other noncharitable beneficiary (the taxable beneficiary) receiving the value of the taxable beneficiary’s trust interest while claiming to recognize little or no taxable gain.

Specifically, upon contribution of assets to the CRT, the grantor claims an income tax deduction under section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) for the portion of the fair market value of the assets contributed to the CRT (which generally have a fair market value in excess of the grantor’s cost basis) that is attributable to the charitable remainder interest. When the CRT sells or liquidates the contributed assets, the taxable beneficiary does not recognize gain, and the CRT is exempt from tax on such gain under section 664(c). The CRT reinvests the proceeds in other assets, often a portfolio of marketable securities, with a basis equal to the portfolio’s cost. The taxable beneficiary and charity subsequently sell all of their respective interests in the CRT to a third party.

The taxable beneficiary takes the position that the entire interest in the CRT has been sold as described in section 1001(e)(3) and, therefore, section 1001(e)(1) does not apply to the transaction. As a result, the taxable beneficiary computes gain on the sale of the taxable beneficiary’s term interest by taking into account the portion of the uniform basis allocable to the term interest under §§ 1.1014-5 and 1.1015-1(b). The taxable beneficiary takes the position that this uniform basis is derived from the basis of the new assets acquired by the CRT rather than the grantor’s basis in the assets contributed to the CRT.

Explanation of Provisions

In response to the request for comments in the Notice, the IRS and the Treasury Department received three written comments. All three commenters agreed that a taxable beneficiary of a CRT should not benefit from a basis step-up attributable to tax-exempt gains, and each supported amending the uniform basis rules to foreclose this benefit. The IRS and the Treasury Department agree that it is inappropriate for a taxable beneficiary to share in the uniform basis obtained through the reinvestment of income not subject to tax due to a trust’s tax-exempt status.

Accordingly, these proposed regulations provide a special rule for determining the basis in certain CRT term interests in transactions to which section 1001(e)(3) applies. In these cases, the proposed regulations provide that the basis of a term interest of a taxable beneficiary is the portion of the adjusted uniform basis assignable to that interest reduced by the portion of the sum of the following amounts assignable to that interest: (1) the amount of undistributed net ordinary income described in section 664(b)(1); and (2) the amount of undistributed net capital gain described in section 664(b)(2). These proposed regulations do not affect the CRT’s basis in its assets, but rather are for the purpose of determining a taxable beneficiary’s gain arising from a transaction described in section 1001(e)(3). However, the IRS and the Treasury Department may consider whether there should be any change in the treatment of the charitable remainderman participating in such a transaction.

In addition to the comments supportive of a basis limitation described above and proposed to be adopted herein, the commenters addressed additional issues in response to the Notice. One commenter requested guidance specifying what valuation methods the IRS will accept as a reasonable method for determining the amount of a life-income recipient’s gain on the termination of certain types of CRTs. Another commenter suggested that the IRS and the Treasury Department could create a rule requiring a zero basis for all interests in CRTs in order to prevent an inappropriate result while still allowing for early termination of CRTs. The commenter also proposed that this rule be made applicable to all early terminations of CRTs. The IRS and the Treasury Department did not adopt a rule requiring a zero basis for all interests in CRTs because the IRS and the Treasury Department believe that the rule provided in the proposed regulations will prevent inappropriate results while treating parties to the transaction fairly. Additionally, the IRS and the Treasury Department believe that rules addressing early terminations other than those arising from a transaction described in section 1001(e)(3), and rules prescribing valuation methods, are beyond the scope of the issues intended to be addressed in these proposed regulations, and thus will not be considered as part of this guidance.

Finally, the rules in these proposed regulations are limited in application to charitable remainder annuity trusts and charitable remainder unitrusts as defined in section 664. The IRS and the Treasury Department request comments as to whether the rules also should apply to other types of tax-exempt trusts.

Effect on Other Documents

The issuance of these proposed regulations does not affect the disclosure obligation set forth in the Notice.

Proposed Effective/Applicability Date

These regulations are proposed to apply to sales and other dispositions of interests in CRTs occurring on or after January 16, 2014, except for sales or dispositions occurring pursuant to a binding commitment entered into before January 16, 2014. However, the inapplicability of these regulations to an excepted sale or disposition does not preclude the IRS from applying legal arguments available to the IRS before issuance of these regulations in order to contest the claimed tax treatment of such a transaction.

Availability of IRS Documents

The IRS notice cited in this preamble is published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin or Cumulative Bulletin and is available at the IRS website at http://www.irs.gov or the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402.

Special Analyses

It has been determined that this notice of proposed rulemaking is not a significant regulatory action as defined in Executive Order 12866, as supplemented by Executive Order 13563. Therefore, a regulatory assessment is not required. It also has been determined that section 553(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. chapter 5) does not apply to these regulations, and the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. chapter 6) does not apply to these regulations because the regulations do not impose a collection of information on small entities. Therefore, a Regulatory Flexibility Analysis is not required. Pursuant to section 7805(f) of the Code, this notice of proposed rulemaking has been submitted to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration for comment on its impact on small business.

Comments and Requests for Public Hearing

Before these proposed regulations are adopted as final regulations, consideration will be given to any written (a signed original and 8 copies) or electronic comments that are submitted timely to the IRS. The IRS and the Treasury Department also request comments on the administrability and clarity of the proposed rules, and how they can be made easier to understand. All comments will be available for public inspection and copying at www.regulations.gov or upon request. A public hearing will be scheduled if requested in writing by any person who timely submits written or electronic comments. If a public hearing is scheduled, notice of the date, time, and place of the public hearing will be published in the Federal Register.

Drafting Information

The principal author of these proposed regulations is Allison R. Carmody of the Office of Associate Chief Counsel (Passthroughs and Special Industries). Other personnel from the IRS and the Treasury Department participated in their development.

List of Subjects in 26 CFR Part 1

Income taxes, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

Proposed Amendments to the Regulations

Accordingly, 26 CFR part 1 is proposed to be amended as follows:

PART 1 — INCOME TAXES

Paragraph 1. The authority citation for part 1 continues to read in part as follows:

Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805 * * *

§ 1.1001-1 [Amended]

Par. 2. Section 1.1001-1, paragraph (f)(4), is amended by removing the language “paragraph (c)” and adding “paragraph (d)” in its place.

§ 1.1014-5 [Amended]

Par. 3. Section 1.1014-5 is amended by:

1. In paragraph (a)(1), first sentence, removing the language “paragraph (b)” and adding “paragraph (b) or (c)” in its place.

2. Re-designating paragraph (c) as newly-designated paragraph (d) and adding new paragraph (c).

3. In newly-designated paragraph (d), adding new Example 7 and Example 8.

The additions read as follows:

§ 1.1014-5 Gain or loss.

* * * * *

(c) Sale or other disposition of a term interest in a tax-exempt trust — (1) In general. In the case of any sale or other disposition by a taxable beneficiary of a term interest (as defined in § 1.1001-1(f)(2)) in a tax-exempt trust (as described in paragraph (c)(2) of this section) to which section 1001(e)(3) applies, the taxable beneficiary’s share of adjusted uniform basis, determined as of (and immediately before) the sale or disposition of that interest, is —

(i) That part of the adjusted uniform basis assignable to the term interest of the taxable beneficiary under the rules of paragraph (a) of this section reduced, but not below zero, by

(ii) An amount determined by applying the same actuarial share applied in paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this section to the sum of —

(A) The trust’s undistributed net ordinary income within the meaning of section 664(b)(1) and § 1.664-1(d)(1)(ii)(a)(1) for the current and prior taxable years of the trust, if any; and

(B) The trust’s undistributed net capital gains within the meaning of section 664(b)(2) and § 1.664-1(d)(1)(ii)(a)(2) for the current and prior taxable years of the trust, if any.

(2) Tax-exempt trust defined. For purposes of this section, the term tax-exempt trust means a charitable remainder annuity trust or a charitable remainder unitrust as defined in section 664.

(3) Taxable beneficiary defined. For purposes of this section, the term taxable beneficiary means any person other than an organization described in section 170(c) or exempt from taxation under section 501(a).

(4) Effective/applicability date. This paragraph (c) and paragraph (d), Example 7 and Example 8, of this section apply to sales and other dispositions of interests in tax-exempt trusts occurring on or after January 16, 2014, except for sales or dispositions occurring pursuant to a binding commitment entered into before January 16, 2014.

(d) * * *

Example 7. (a) Grantor creates a charitable remainder unitrust (CRUT) on Date 1 in which Grantor retains a unitrust interest and irrevocably transfers the remainder interest to Charity. Grantor is an individual taxpayer subject to income tax. CRUT meets the requirements of section 664 and is exempt from income tax.

(b) Grantor’s basis in the shares of X stock used to fund CRUT is $10x. On Date 2, CRUT sells the X stock for $100x. The $90x of gain is exempt from income tax under section 664(c)(1). On Date 3, CRUT uses the $100x proceeds from its sale of the X stock to purchase Y stock. On Date 4, CRUT sells the Y stock for $110x. The $10x of gain on the sale of the Y stock is exempt from income tax under section 664(c)(1). On Date 5, CRUT uses the $110x proceeds from its sale of Y stock to buy Z stock. On Date 5, CRUT’s basis in its assets is $110x and CRUT’s total undistributed net capital gains are $100x.

(c) Later, when the fair market value of CRUT’s assets is $150x and CRUT has no undistributed net ordinary income, Grantor and Charity sell all of their interests in CRUT to a third person. Grantor receives $100x for the retained unitrust interest, and Charity receives $50x for its interest. Because the entire interest in CRUT is transferred to the third person, section 1001(e)(3) prevents section 1001(e)(1) from applying to the transaction. Therefore, Grantor’s gain on the sale of the retained unitrust interest in CRUT is determined under section 1001(a), which provides that Grantor’s gain on the sale of that interest is the excess of the amount realized, $100x, over Grantor’s adjusted basis in the interest.

(d) Grantor’s adjusted basis in the unitrust interest in CRUT is that portion of CRUT’s adjusted uniform basis that is assignable to Grantor’s interest under § 1.1014-5, which is Grantor’s actuarial share of the adjusted uniform basis. In this case, CRUT’s adjusted uniform basis in its sole asset, the Z stock, is $110x. However, paragraph (c) of this section applies to the transaction. Therefore, Grantor’s actuarial share of CRUT’s adjusted uniform basis (determined by applying the factors set forth in the tables contained in § 20.2031-7 of this chapter) is reduced by an amount determined by applying the same factors to the sum of CRUT’s $0 of undistributed net ordinary income and its $100x of undistributed net capital gains.

(e) In determining Charity’s share of the adjusted uniform basis, Charity applies the factors set forth in the tables contained in § 20.2031-7 of this chapter to the full $110x of basis.

Example 8. (a) Grantor creates a charitable remainder annuity trust (CRAT) on Date 1 in which Grantor retains an annuity interest and irrevocably transfers the remainder interest to Charity. Grantor is an individual taxpayer subject to income tax. CRAT meets the requirements of section 664 and is exempt from income tax.

(b) Grantor funds CRAT with shares of X stock having a basis of $50x. On Date 2, CRAT sells the X stock for $150x. The $100x of gain is exempt from income tax under section 664(c)(1). On Date 3, CRAT distributes $10x to Grantor, and uses the remaining $140x of net proceeds from its sale of the X stock to purchase Y stock. Grantor treats the $10x distribution as capital gain, so that CRAT’s remaining undistributed net capital gains amount described in section 664(b)(2) and § 1.664-1(d) is $90x.

(c) On Date 4, when the fair market value of CRAT’s assets, which consist entirely of the Y stock, is still $140x, Grantor and Charity sell all of their interests in CRAT to a third person. Grantor receives $126x for the retained annuity interest, and Charity receives $14x for its remainder interest. Because the entire interest in CRAT is transferred to the third person, section 1001(e)(3) prevents section 1001(e)(1) from applying to the transaction. Therefore, Grantor’s gain on the sale of the retained annuity interest in CRAT is determined under section 1001(a), which provides that Grantor’s gain on the sale of that interest is the excess of the amount realized, $126x, over Grantor’s adjusted basis in that interest.

(d) Grantor’s adjusted basis in the annuity interest in CRAT is that portion of CRAT’s adjusted uniform basis that is assignable to Grantor’s interest under § 1.1014-5, which is Grantor’s actuarial share of the adjusted uniform basis. In this case, CRAT’s adjusted uniform basis in its sole asset, the Y stock, is $140x. However, paragraph (c) of this section applies to the transaction. Therefore, Grantor’s actuarial share of CRAT’s adjusted uniform basis (determined by applying the factors set forth in the tables contained in § 20.2031-7 of this chapter) is reduced by an amount determined by applying the same factors to the sum of CRAT’s $0 of undistributed net ordinary income and its $90x of undistributed net capital gains.

(e) In determining Charity’s share of the adjusted uniform basis, Charity applies the factors set forth in the tables contained in § 20.2031-7 of this chapter to determine its actuarial share of the full $140x of basis.

John Dalrymple

Deputy Commissioner for Services

and Enforcement.

[FR Doc. 2014-00807 Filed 01/16/2014 at 8:45 am; Publication Date: 01/17/2014]




Treasury Comments on Coming Guidance on Treatment of Volunteer Emergency Responders Under ACA.

Final regulations on the Affordable Care Act employer shared responsibility provisions generally won’t require volunteer hours of volunteer firefighters and emergency personnel to be counted when determining full-time employees or equivalents, Treasury Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy Mark Mazur said in a January 10 blog post.

—————————————————–

Treasury Ensures Fair Treatment for Volunteer Firefighters and Emergency Responders Under the Affordable Care Act

By: Mark J. Mazur, Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy

1/10/2014

The Affordable Care Act requires that an employer with 50 or more full-time employees offer affordable and adequate health care coverage to its employees. For this purpose, full time means 30 hours or more per week on average, with the hours of employees working less than that aggregated into full-time equivalents. Employers that do not fulfill this obligation may be required to make a payment in lieu of meeting their responsibilities, which are described in what are called the employer shared responsibility provisions. An important question arises about how the hours of volunteer firefighters and other volunteer emergency responders should be taken into account in determining whether they are full-time employees and for counting toward the 50-employee threshold. Treasury is acting to ensure that emergency volunteer service is accorded appropriate treatment under the Affordable Care Act.

Treasury and the IRS issued proposed regulations on the employer shared responsibility provisions (Section 4980H of the Tax Code) in December 2012 and invited public comments. Numerous comments were received from individuals and local fire and Emergency Medical Service departments that rely on volunteers. The comments generally suggested that the employer responsibility rules should not count volunteer hours of nominally compensated volunteer firefighters and emergency medical personnel in determining full-time employees (or full-time equivalents). In addition, Treasury heard from numerous members of Congress who expressed these same concerns on behalf of the volunteer emergency responders in their states and districts.

Treasury and the IRS carefully reviewed these comments and spoke with representatives of volunteer firefighters and volunteer emergency personnel to gain a better understanding of their specific situations. Treasury and the IRS also reviewed various rules that apply to such volunteer personnel under other laws. These include the statutory provisions that apply to bona fide volunteers under Section 457(e)(11) of the Tax Code (relating to deferred compensation plans of state and local governments and tax-exempt organizations) and rules governing the treatment of volunteers for purposes of the Federal wage and hour laws. As a result of that review and analysis, the forthcoming final regulations relating to employer shared responsibility generally will not require volunteer hours of bona fide volunteer firefighters and volunteer emergency medical personnel at governmental or tax-exempt organizations to be counted when determining full-time employees (or full-time equivalents).

These final regulations, which we expect to issue shortly, are intended to provide timely guidance for the volunteer emergency responder community. We think this guidance strikes the appropriate balance in the treatment provided to traditional full-time emergency responder employees, bona fide volunteers, and to our Nation’s first responder units, many of which rely heavily on volunteers.

Mark J. Mazur is the Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy at the United States Department of the Treasury.




IRS Issues Proposed Regs for Determining Basis in Interests in Tax-Exempt Trusts.

The IRS has issued proposed regulations that provide rules for determining a taxable beneficiary’s basis in a term interest in a charitable remainder trust upon a sale or other disposition of all interests in the trust to the extent that basis consists of a share of adjusted uniform basis. (REG-154890-03)

http://www.ofr.gov/(X(1)S(2zp4glzpco5drgatg4rwdiyp))/OFRUpload/OFRData/2014-00807_PI.pdf




IRS Updates Guidelines for Issuing Determination Letters, Rulings on Exempt Organizations.

The IRS has issued guidance (Rev. Proc. 2014-9, 2014-2 IRB 281) providing the procedures for issuing determination letters and rulings on the exempt status of organizations under sections 501 and 521.

The procedures also apply to the revocation or modification of determination letters or rulings. The revenue procedure, which is effective January 6, 2014, also provides guidance on the exhaustion of administrative remedies for purposes of declaratory judgment under section 7428. Rev. Proc. 2013-9 is superseded.

26 CFR 601.201: Rulings and determination letters.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION 1. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THIS REVENUE PROCEDURE?

.01 Description of terms used in this revenue procedure

.02 Updated annually

SECTION 2. NATURE OF CHANGES AND RELATED REVENUE PROCEDURES

.01 Rev. Proc. 2013-9 is superseded

.02 Related revenue procedures

.03 What changes have been made to Rev. Proc. 2013-9?

SECTION 3. WHAT ARE THE PROCEDURES FOR REQUESTING RECOGNITION OF

EXEMPT STATUS?

.01 In general

.02 User fee

.03 Form 1023 application

.04 Form 1024 application

.05 Letter application

.06 Form 1028 application

.07 Form 8871 notice for political organizations

.08 Requirements for a substantially completed application

.09 Terrorist organizations not eligible to apply for

recognition of exemption

SECTION 4. WHAT ARE THE STANDARDS FOR ISSUING A DETERMINATION

LETTER OR RULING ON EXEMPT STATUS?

.01 Exempt status must be established in application and

supporting documents

.02 Determination letter or ruling based solely on

administrative record

.03 Exempt status may be recognized in advance of actual

operations

.04 No letter if exempt status issue in litigation or under

consideration within the Service

.05 Incomplete application

.06 Even if application is complete, additional information may

be required

.07 Expedited handling

.08 May decline to issue group exemption

SECTION 5. WHAT OFFICES ISSUE AN EXEMPT STATUS DETERMINATION

LETTER OR RULING?

.01 EO Determinations issues a determination letter in most cases

.02 Certain applications referred to EO Technical

.03 Technical advice may be requested in certain cases

.04 Technical advice must be requested in certain cases

SECTION 6. WITHDRAWAL OF AN APPLICATION

.01 Application may be withdrawn prior to issuance of a

determination letter or ruling

.02 § 7428 implications of withdrawal of application under

§ 501(c)(3)

SECTION 7. WHAT ARE THE PROCEDURES WHEN EXEMPT STATUS IS

DENIED?

.01 Proposed adverse determination letter or ruling

.02 Appeal of a proposed adverse determination letter issued by

EO Determinations

.03 Protest of a proposed adverse ruling issued by EO Technical

.04 Final adverse determination letter or ruling where no appeal

or protest is submitted

.05 How EO Determinations handles an appeal of a proposed

adverse determination letter

.06 Consideration by the Appeals Office

.07 If a protest of a proposed adverse ruling is submitted to EO

Technical

.08 An appeal or protest may be withdrawn

.09 Appeal or protest and conference rights not applicable in

certain situations

SECTION 8. DISCLOSURE OF APPLICATIONS AND DETERMINATION LETTERS

AND RULINGS

.01 Disclosure of applications, supporting documents, and

favorable determination letters and rulings

.02 Disclosure of adverse determination letters or rulings

.03 Disclosure to State officials when the Service refuses to

recognize exemption under § 501(c)(3)

.04 Disclosure to State officials of information about §

501(c)(3) applicants

SECTION 9. REVIEW OF DETERMINATION LETTERS BY EO TECHNICAL

.01 Determination letters may be reviewed by EO Technical to

assure uniformity

.02 Procedures for cases where EO Technical takes exception to a

determination letter

SECTION 10. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT PROVISIONS OF § 7428

.01 Actual controversy involving certain issues

.02 Exhaustion of administrative remedies

.03 Not earlier than 270 days after seeking determination

.04 Service must have reasonable time to act on an appeal or

protest

.05 Final determination to which § 7428 applies

SECTION 11. EFFECT OF DETERMINATION LETTER OR RULING RECOGNIZING

EXEMPTION

.01 Effective date of exemption

.02 Reliance on determination letter or ruling

SECTION 12. REVOCATION OR MODIFICATION OF DETERMINATION LETTER OR

RULING RECOGNIZING EXEMPTION

.01 Revocation or modification of a determination letter or

ruling may be retroactive

.02 Appeal and conference procedures in the case of revocation

or modification of exempt status letter

SECTION 13. EFFECT ON OTHER REVENUE PROCEDURES

SECTION 14. EFFECTIVE DATE

SECTION 15. PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT

DRAFTING INFORMATION

SECTION 1. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THIS REVENUE PROCEDURE?

This revenue procedure sets forth procedures for issuing determination letters and rulings on the exempt status of organizations under §§ 501 and 521 of the Internal Revenue Code other than those subject to Rev. Proc. 2014-6, last bulletin (relating to pension, profit-sharing, stock bonus, annuity, and employee stock ownership plans). Generally, the Service issues these determination letters and rulings in response to applications for recognition of exemption from Federal income tax. These procedures also apply to revocation or modification of determination letters or rulings. This revenue procedure also provides guidance on the exhaustion of administrative remedies for purposes of declaratory judgment under § 7428.

Description of terms used in this revenue procedure

.01 For purposes of this revenue procedure —

(1) The term “Service” means the Internal Revenue Service.

(2) The term “application” means the appropriate form or letter that an organization must file or submit to the Service for recognition of exemption from Federal income tax under the applicable section of the Internal Revenue Code. See section 3 for information on specific forms.

(3) The term “EO Determinations” means the office of the Service that is primarily responsible for processing initial applications for tax-exempt status. It includes the main EO Determinations office located in Cincinnati, Ohio, and other field offices that are under the direction and control of the Manager, EO Determinations. Applications are generally processed in the centralized EO Determinations office in Cincinnati, Ohio. However, some applications may be processed in other EO Determinations offices or referred to EO Technical.

(4) The term “EO Technical” means the office of the Service that is primarily responsible for issuing letter rulings to taxpayers on exempt organization matters, and for providing technical advice or technical assistance to other offices of the Service on exempt organization matters. The EO Technical office is located in Washington, DC. For purposes of this Revenue Procedure the term “EO Technical” includes EO Guidance. (EO Guidance is the office of the Service that is responsible for working with the Department of the Treasury and the Office of Chief Counsel to issue formal guidance items, and also reviews letter rulings, technical advice, and technical assistance, among other things.)

(5) The term “Appeals Office” means any office under the direction and control of the Chief, Appeals. The purpose of the Appeals Office is to resolve tax controversies, without litigation, on a fair and impartial basis. The Appeals Office is independent of EO Determinations and EO Technical.

(6) The term “determination letter” means a written statement issued by EO Determinations or an Appeals Office in response to an application for recognition of exemption from Federal income tax under §§ 501 and 521. This includes a written statement issued by EO Determinations or an Appeals Office on the basis of advice secured from EO Technical pursuant to the procedures prescribed herein and in Rev. Proc. 2014-5.

(7) The term “ruling” means a written statement issued by EO Technical in response to an application for recognition of exemption from Federal income tax under §§ 501 and 521.

(8) The term “Code” means the Internal Revenue Code.

Updated annually

.02 This revenue procedure is updated annually, but may be modified or amplified during the year.

SECTION 2. NATURE OF CHANGES AND RELATED REVENUE PROCEDURES

Rev. Proc. 2013-9 is superseded

.01 This revenue procedure is a general update of Rev. Proc. 2013-9, 2013-2 I.R.B. 255, which is hereby superseded.

Related revenue procedures

.02 This revenue procedure supplements Rev. Proc. 2014-10, this Bulletin, with respect to the effects of § 7428 on the classification of organizations under §§ 509(a) and 4942(j)(3). Rev. Proc. 80-27, 1980-1 C.B. 677, sets forth procedures under which exemption may be recognized on a group basis for subordinate organizations affiliated with and under the general supervision and control of a central organization. Rev. Proc. 72-5, 1972-1 C.B. 709, provides information for religious and apostolic organizations seeking recognition of exemption under § 501(d). General procedures for requests for a determination letter or ruling are provided in Rev. Proc. 2014-4. User fees for requests for a determination letter or ruling are set forth in Rev. Proc. 2014-8. Information regarding procedures for organizations described in § 501(c)(29) can be found in Rev. Proc. 2012-11, 2012-7 I.R.B. 368.

What changes have been made to Rev. Proc. 2013-9?

.03 Notable changes to Rev. Proc. 2013-9 that appear in this year’s update include —

(1) Dates, cross references, and names have been changed to reflect the appropriate annual Revenue Procedures.

SECTION 3. WHAT ARE THE PROCEDURES FOR REQUESTING RECOGNITION OF EXEMPT STATUS?

In general

.01 An organization seeking recognition of exempt status under § 501 or § 521 is required to submit the appropriate application. In the case of a numbered application form, the current version of the form must be submitted. A central organization that has previously received recognition of its own exemption can request a group exemption letter by submitting a letter application along with Form 8718, User Fee for Exempt Organization Determination Letter Request. See Rev. Proc. 80-27. Form 8718 is not a determination letter application. Attach this form to the determination letter application.

User fee

.02 An application must be submitted with the correct user fee, as set forth in Rev. Proc. 2014-8.

Form 1023 application

.03 An organization seeking recognition of exemption under § 501(c)(3) and § 501(e), (f), (k), (n), (q), or (r) must submit a completed Form 1023, Application for Recognition of Exemption Under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. In the case of an organization that provides credit counseling services, see § 501(q). In the case of an organization that is a hospital and is seeking exemption under § 501(c)(3), see § 501(r).

Form 1024 application

.04 An organization seeking recognition of exemption under § 501(c)(2), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (12), (13), (15), (17), (19), or (25) must submit a completed Form 1024, Application for Recognition of Exemption Under Section 501(a), along with Form 8718. In the case of an organization that provides credit counseling services and seeks recognition of exemption under § 501(c)(4), see § 501(q).

Letter application

.05 An organization seeking recognition of exemption under § 501(c)(11), (14), (16), (18), (21), (22), (23), (26), (27), (28), or (29), or under § 501(d), must submit a letter application along with Form 8718.

Form 1028 application

.06 An organization seeking recognition of exemption under § 521 must submit a completed Form 1028, Application for Recognition of Exemption Under Section 521 of the Internal Revenue Code, along with Form 8718.

Form 8871 notice for political organizations

.07 A political party, a campaign committee for a candidate for federal, state or local office, and a political action committee are all political organizations subject to tax under § 527. To be tax-exempt, a political organization may be required to notify the Service that it is to be treated as a § 527 organization by electronically filing Form 8871, Political Organization Notice of Section 527 Status. For details, go to the IRS website at www.irs.gov/polorgs.

Requirements for a substantially completed application

.08 A substantially completed application, including a letter application, is one that:

(1) is signed by an authorized individual;

(2) includes an Employer Identification Number (EIN);

(3) for organizations other than those described in § 501(c)(3), includes a statement of receipts and expenditures and a balance sheet for the current year and the three preceding years (or the years the organization was in existence, if less than four years), and if the organization has not yet commenced operations or has not completed one accounting period, a proposed budget for two full accounting periods and a current statement of assets and liabilities; for organizations described in § 501(c)(3), see Form 1023 and Notice 1382;

(4) includes a detailed narrative statement of proposed activities, including each of the fundraising activities of a § 501(c)(3) organization, and a narrative description of anticipated receipts and contemplated expenditures;

(5) includes a copy of the organizing or enabling document that is signed by a principal officer or is accompanied by a written declaration signed by an authorized individual certifying that the document is a complete and accurate copy of the original or otherwise meets the requirements of a “conformed copy” as outlined in Rev. Proc. 68-14, 1968-1 C.B. 768;

(6) if the organizing or enabling document is in the form of articles of incorporation, includes evidence that it was filed with and approved by an appropriate state official (e.g., stamped “Filed” and dated by the Secretary of State); alternatively, a copy of the articles of incorporation may be submitted if accompanied by a written declaration signed by an authorized individual that the copy is a complete and accurate copy of the original copy that was filed with and approved by the state; if a copy is submitted, the written declaration must include the date the articles were filed with the state;

(7) if the organization has adopted by-laws or similar governing rules, includes a current copy; the by-laws need not be signed if submitted as an attachment to the application for recognition of exemption; otherwise, the by-laws must be verified as current by an authorized individual; and

(8) is accompanied by the correct user fee and Form 8718, when applicable.

Terrorist organizations not eligible to apply for recognition of exemption

.09 An organization that is identified or designated as a terrorist organization within the meaning of § 501(p)(2) is not eligible to apply for recognition of exemption.

SECTION 4. WHAT ARE THE STANDARDS FOR ISSUING A DETERMINATION LETTER OR RULING ON EXEMPT STATUS?

Exempt status must be established in application and supporting documents

.01 A favorable determination letter or ruling will be issued to an organization only if its application and supporting documents establish that it meets the particular requirements of the section under which exemption from Federal income tax is claimed.

Determination letter or ruling based solely on administrative record

.02 A determination letter or ruling on exempt status is issued based solely upon the facts and representations contained in the administrative record.

(1) The applicant is responsible for the accuracy of any factual representations contained in the application.

(2) Any oral representation of additional facts or modification of facts as represented or alleged in the application must be reduced to writing over the signature of an officer or director of the taxpayer under a penalties of perjury statement.

(3) The failure to disclose a material fact or misrepresentation of a material fact on the application may adversely affect the reliance that would otherwise be obtained through issuance by the Service of a favorable determination letter or ruling.

Exempt status may be recognized in advance of actual operations

.03 Exempt status may be recognized in advance of the organization’s operations if the proposed activities are described in sufficient detail to permit a conclusion that the organization will clearly meet the particular requirements for exemption pursuant to the section of the Code under which exemption is claimed.

(1) A mere restatement of exempt purposes or a statement that proposed activities will be in furtherance of such purposes will not satisfy this requirement.

(2) The organization must fully describe all of the activities in which it expects to engage, including the standards, criteria, procedures, or other means adopted or planned for carrying out the activities, the anticipated sources of receipts, and the nature of contemplated expenditures.

(3) Where the organization cannot demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Service that it qualifies for exemption pursuant to the section of the Code under which exemption is claimed, the Service will generally issue a proposed adverse determination letter or ruling. See also section 7 of this revenue procedure.

No letter if exempt status issue in litigation or under consideration within the Service

.04 A determination letter or ruling on exempt status ordinarily will not be issued if an issue involving the organization’s exempt status under § 501 or § 521 is pending in litigation, is under consideration within the Service, or if issuance of a determination letter or ruling is not in the interest of sound tax administration. If the Service declines to issue a determination or ruling to an organization seeking exempt status under § 501(c)(3), the organization may be able to pursue a declaratory judgment under § 7428, provided that it has exhausted its administrative remedies.

Incomplete application

.05 If an application does not contain all of the items set out in section 3.08 of this revenue procedure, the Service may return it to the applicant for completion.

(1) In lieu of returning an incomplete application, the Service may retain the application and request additional information needed for a substantially completed application.

(2) In the case of an application under § 501(c)(3) that is returned incomplete, the 270-day period referred to in § 7428(b)(2) will not be considered as starting until the date a substantially completed Form 1023 is refiled with or remailed to the Service. If the application is mailed to the Service and a postmark is not evident, the 270-day period will start to run on the date the Service actually receives the substantially completed Form 1023. The same rules apply for purposes of the notice requirement of § 508.

(3) Generally, the user fee will not be refunded if an incomplete application is filed. See Rev. Proc. 2014-8, section 10.

Even if application is complete, additional information may be required

.06 Even though an application is substantially complete, the Service may request additional information before issuing a determination letter or ruling.

(1) If the application involves an issue where contrary authorities exist, an applicant’s failure to disclose and distinguish contrary authorities may result in requests for additional information, which could delay final action on the application.

(2) In the case of an application under § 501(c)(3), the period of time beginning on the date the Service requests additional information until the date the information is submitted to the Service will not be counted for purposes of the 270-day period referred to in § 7428(b)(2).

Expedited handling

.07 Applications are normally processed in the order of receipt by the Service. However, expedited handling of an application may be approved where a request is made in writing and contains a compelling reason for processing the application ahead of others. Upon approval of a request for expedited handling, an application will be considered out of its normal order. This does not mean the application will be immediately approved or denied. Circumstances generally warranting expedited processing include:

(1) a grant to the applicant is pending and the failure to secure the grant may have an adverse impact on the organization’s ability to continue to operate;

(2) the purpose of the newly created organization is to provide disaster relief to victims of emergencies such as flood and hurricane; and

(3) there have been undue delays in issuing a determination letter or ruling caused by a Service error.

May decline to issue group exemption

.08 The Service may decline to issue a group exemption letter when appropriate in the interest of sound tax administration.

SECTION 5. WHAT OFFICES ISSUE AN EXEMPT STATUS DETERMINATION LETTER OR RULING?

EO Determinations issues a determination letter in most cases

.01 Under the general procedures outlined in Rev. Proc. 2014-4, EO Determinations is authorized to issue determination letters on applications for exempt status under §§ 501 and 521.

Certain applications referred to EO Technical

.02 EO Determinations will refer to EO Technical those applications that present issues which are not specifically covered by statute or regulations, or by a ruling, opinion, or court decision published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin. In addition, EO Determinations will refer those applications that have been specifically reserved by revenue procedure or by other official Service instructions for handling by EO Technical for purposes of establishing uniformity or centralized control of designated categories of cases. EO Technical will notify the applicant organization upon receipt of a referred application, and will consider each such application and issue a ruling directly to the organization.

Technical advice may be requested in certain cases

.03 If at any time during the course of consideration of an exemption application by EO Determinations the organization believes that its case involves an issue on which there is no published precedent, or there has been non-uniformity in the Service’s handling of similar cases, the organization may request that EO Determinations either refer the application to EO Technical or seek technical advice from EO Technical. See Rev. Proc. 2014-5, sections 4.04 and 4.05.

Technical advice must be requested in certain cases

.04 If EO Determinations proposes to recognize the exemption of an organization to which EO Technical had issued a previous contrary ruling or technical advice, EO Determinations must seek technical advice from EO Technical before issuing a determination letter. This does not apply where EO Technical issued an adverse ruling and the organization subsequently made changes to its purposes, activities, or operations to remove the basis for which exempt status was denied.

SECTION 6. WITHDRAWAL OF AN APPLICATION

Application may be withdrawn prior to issuance of a determination letter or ruling

.01 An application may only be withdrawn upon the written request of an authorized individual prior to the issuance of a determination letter or ruling. The issuance of a determination letter or ruling includes the issuance of a proposed adverse determination letter or ruling.

(1) When an application is withdrawn, the Service will retain the application and all supporting documents. The Service may consider the information submitted in connection with the withdrawn request in a subsequent examination of the organization.

(2) Generally, the user fee will not be refunded if an application is withdrawn. See Rev. Proc. 2014-8, section 10.

§ 7428 implications of withdrawal of application under § 501(c)(3)

.02 The Service will not consider the withdrawal of an application under § 501(c)(3) as either a failure to make a determination within the meaning of § 7428(a)(2) or as an exhaustion of administrative remedies within the meaning of § 7428(b)(2).

SECTION 7. WHAT ARE THE PROCEDURES WHEN EXEMPT STATUS IS DENIED?

Proposed adverse determination letter or ruling

.01 If EO Determinations or EO Technical reaches the conclusion that the organization does not satisfy the requirements for exempt status pursuant to the section of the Code under which exemption is claimed, the Service generally will issue a proposed adverse determination letter or ruling, which will:

(1) include a detailed discussion of the Service’s rationale for the denial of tax-exempt status; and

(2) advise the organization of its opportunity to appeal or protest the decision and request a conference.

Appeal of a proposed adverse determination letter issued by EO Determinations

.02 A proposed adverse determination letter issued by EO Determinations will advise the organization of its opportunity to appeal the determination by requesting Appeals Office consideration. To do this, the organization must submit a statement of the facts, law and arguments in support of its position within 30 days from the date of the adverse determination letter. The organization must also state whether it wishes an Appeals Office conference. Any determination letter issued on the basis of technical advice from EO Technical may not be appealed to the Appeals Office on issues that were the subject of the technical advice.

Protest of a proposed adverse ruling issued by EO Technical

.03 A proposed adverse ruling issued by EO Technical will advise the organization of its opportunity to file a protest statement within 30 days and to request a conference. If a conference is requested, the conference procedures outlined in Rev. Proc. 2014-4, section 12, are applicable.

Final adverse determination letter or ruling where no appeal or protest is submitted

.04 If an organization does not submit a timely appeal of a proposed adverse determination letter issued by EO Determinations, or a timely protest of a proposed adverse ruling issued by EO Technical, a final adverse determination letter or ruling will be issued to the organization. The final adverse letter or ruling will provide information about the filing of tax returns and the disclosure of the proposed and final adverse letters or rulings.

How EO Determinations handles an appeal of a proposed adverse determination letter

.05 If an organization submits a protest of the proposed adverse determination letter, EO Determinations will first review the protest, and, if it determines that the organization qualifies for tax-exempt status, issue a favorable exempt status determination letter. If EO Determinations maintains its adverse position after reviewing the protest, it will forward the protest and the exemption application case file to the Appeals Office.

Consideration by the Appeals Office

.06 The Appeals Office will consider the organization’s appeal. If the Appeals Office agrees with the proposed adverse determination, it will either issue a final adverse determination or, if a conference was requested, contact the organization to schedule a conference. At the end of the conference process, which may involve the submission of additional information, the Appeals Office will either issue a final adverse determination letter or a favorable determination letter. If the Appeals Office believes that an exemption or private foundation status issue is not covered by published precedent or that there is non-uniformity, the Appeals Office must request technical advice from EO Technical in accordance with Rev. Proc. 2014-5, sections 4.04 and 4.05.

If a protest of a proposed adverse ruling is submitted to EO Technical

.07 If an organization submits a protest of a proposed adverse exempt status ruling, EO Technical will review the protest statement. If the protest convinces EO Technical that the organization qualifies for tax-exempt status, a favorable ruling will be issued. If EO Technical maintains its adverse position after reviewing the protest, it will either issue a final adverse ruling or, if a conference was requested, contact the organization to schedule a conference. At the end of the conference process, which may involve the submission of additional information, EO Technical will either issue a final adverse ruling or a favorable exempt status ruling.

An appeal or protest may be withdrawn

.08 An organization may withdraw its appeal or protest before the Service issues a final adverse determination letter or ruling. Upon receipt of the withdrawal request, the Service will complete the processing of the case in the same manner as if no appeal or protest was received.

Appeal or protest and conference rights not applicable in certain situations

.09 The opportunity to appeal or protest a proposed adverse determination letter or ruling and the conference rights described above are not applicable to matters where delay would be prejudicial to the interests of the Service (such as in cases involving fraud, jeopardy, the imminence of the expiration of the statute of limitations, or where immediate action is necessary to protect the interests of the Government).

SECTION 8. DISCLOSURE OF APPLICATIONS AND DETERMINATION LETTERS AND RULINGS

Sections 6104 and 6110 provide rules for the disclosure of applications, including supporting documents, and determination letters and rulings.

Disclosure of applications, supporting documents, and favorable determination letters or rulings

.01 The applications, any supporting documents, and the favorable determination letter or ruling issued, are available for public inspection under § 6104(a)(1). However, there are certain limited disclosure exceptions for a trade secret, patent, process, style of work, or apparatus, if the Service determines that the disclosure of the information would adversely affect the organization.

(1) The Service is required to make the applications, supporting documents, and favorable determination letters or rulings available upon request. The public can request this information by submitting Form 4506-A, Request for Public Inspection or Copy of Exempt or Political Organization IRS Form. Organizations should ensure that applications and supporting documents do not include unnecessary personal identifying information (such as bank account numbers or social security numbers) that could result in identity theft or other adverse consequences if publicly disclosed.

(2) The exempt organization is required to make its exemption application, supporting documents, and determination letter or ruling available for public inspection without charge. For more information about the exempt organization’s disclosure obligations, see Publication 557, Tax-Exempt Status for Your Organization.

Disclosure of adverse determination letters or rulings

.02 The Service is required to make adverse determination letters and rulings available for public inspection under § 6110. Upon issuance of the final adverse determination letter or ruling to an organization, both the proposed adverse determination letter or ruling and the final adverse determination letter or ruling will be released pursuant to § 6110.

(1) These documents are made available to the public after the deletion of names, addresses, and any other information that might identify the taxpayer. See § 6110(c) for other specific disclosure exemptions.

(2) The final adverse determination letter or ruling will enclose Notice 437, Notice of Intention to Disclose, and redacted copies of the final and proposed adverse determination letters or rulings. Notice 437 provides instructions if the organization disagrees with the deletions proposed by the Service.

Disclosure to State officials when the Service refuses to recognize exemption under § 501(c)(3)

.03 The Service may notify the appropriate State officials of a refusal to recognize an organization as tax-exempt under § 501(c)(3). See § 6104(c). The notice to the State officials may include a copy of a proposed or final adverse determination letter or ruling the Service issued to the organization. In addition, upon request by the appropriate State official, the Service may make available for inspection and copying the exemption application and other information relating to the Service’s determination on exempt status.

Disclosure to State officials of information about § 501(c)(3) applicants

.04 The Service may disclose to State officials the name, address, and identification number of any organization that has applied for recognition of exemption under § 501(c)(3).

SECTION 9. REVIEW OF DETERMINATION LETTERS BY EO TECHNICAL

Determination letters may be reviewed by EO Technical to assure uniformity

.01 Determination letters issued by EO Determinations may be reviewed by EO Technical, or the Office of the Associate Chief Counsel (Passthroughs and Special Industries) (for cases under § 521), to assure uniform application of the statutes or regulations, or rulings, court opinions, or decisions published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin.

Procedures for cases where EO Technical takes exception to a determination letter

.02 If EO Technical takes exception to a determination letter issued by EO Determinations, the manager of EO Determinations will be advised. If EO Determinations notifies the organization of the exception taken, and the organization disagrees with the exception, the file will be returned to EO Technical. The referral to EO Technical will be treated as a request for technical advice, and the procedures in sections 14, 15, and 16 of Rev. Proc. 2014-5 will be followed.

SECTION 10. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT PROVISIONS OF § 7428

Actual controversy involving certain issues

.01 Generally, a declaratory judgment proceeding under § 7428 can be filed in the United States Tax Court, the United States Court of Federal Claims, or the district court of the United States for the District of Columbia with respect to an actual controversy involving a determination by the Service or a failure of the Service to make a determination with respect to the initial or continuing qualification or classification of an organization under § 501(c)(3) (charitable, educational, etc.); § 170(c)(2) (deductibility of contributions); § 509(a) (private foundation status); § 4942(j)(3) (operating foundation status); or § 521 (farmers cooperatives).

Exhaustion of administrative remedies

.02 Before filing a declaratory judgment action, an organization must exhaust its administrative remedies by taking, in a timely manner, all reasonable steps to secure a determination from the Service. These include:

(1) the filing of a substantially completed application Form 1023 under § 501(c)(3) pursuant to section 3.08 of this revenue procedure, or the request for a determination of foundation status pursuant to Rev. Proc. 2014-10, this Bulletin, or its successor;

(2) in appropriate cases, requesting relief pursuant to Treas. Reg. § 301.9100-1 of the Procedure and Administration Regulations regarding the extension of time for making an election or application for relief from tax;

(3) the timely submission of all additional information requested by the Service to perfect an exemption application or request for determination of private foundation status; and

(4) exhaustion of all administrative appeals available within the Service pursuant to section 7 of this revenue procedure.

Not earlier than 270 days after seeking determination

.03 An organization will in no event be deemed to have exhausted its administrative remedies prior to the earlier of:

(1) the completion of the steps in section 10.02, and the sending by the Service by certified or registered mail of a final determination letter or ruling; or

(2) the expiration of the 270-day period described in § 7428(b)(2) in a case where the Service has not issued a final determination letter or ruling, and the organization has taken, in a timely manner, all reasonable steps to secure a determination letter or ruling.

Service must have reasonable time to act on an appeal or protest

.04 The steps described in section 10.02 will not be considered completed until the Service has had a reasonable time to act upon an appeal or protest, as the case may be.

Final determination to which § 7428 applies

.05 A final determination to which § 7428 applies is a determination letter or ruling, sent by certified or registered mail, which holds that the organization is not described in § 501(c)(3) or § 170(c)(2), is a public charity described in a part of § 509 or § 170(b)(1)(A) other than the part under which the organization requested classification, is not a private foundation as defined in § 4942(j)(3), or is a private foundation and not a public charity described in a part of § 509 or § 170(b)(1)(A).

SECTION 11. EFFECT OF DETERMINATION LETTER OR RULING RECOGNIZING EXEMPTION

Effective date of exemption

.01 A determination letter or ruling recognizing exemption of an organization described in § 501(c), other than § 501(c)(29), is usually effective as of the date of formation of an organization if: (1) its purposes and activities prior to the date of the determination letter or ruling have been consistent with the requirements for exemption; (2) it has not failed to file required Form 990 series returns or notices for three consecutive years; and (3) it has filed an application for recognition of exemption within 27 months from the end of the month in which it was organized. Special rules may apply to an organization applying for exemption under § 501(c)(3), (9) or (17). See §§ 505 and 508, and Treas. Reg. §§ 1.508-1(a)(2), 1.508-1(b)(7) and 301.9100-2(a)(2)(iii) and (iv). In addition, special rules apply with respect to organizations described in § 501(c)(29). See Rev. Proc. 2012-11, 2012-7 IRB 368.

(1) If the Service requires the organization to alter its activities or make substantive amendments to its enabling instrument, the exemption will be effective as of the date specified in a determination letter or ruling.

(2) If the Service requires the organization to make a nonsubstantive amendment, exemption will ordinarily be recognized as of the date of formation. Examples of nonsubstantive amendments include correction of a clerical error in the enabling instrument or the addition of a dissolution clause where the activities of the organization prior to the determination letter or ruling are consistent with the requirements for exemption.

(3) An organization that otherwise meets the requirements for tax-exempt status and the issuance of a determination letter or ruling that does not meet the requirements for recognition from date of formation will generally be recognized from the postmark date of its application.

(4) Organizations that claim exempt status under § 501(c) generally must file annual Form,990 series returns or notices, even if they have not yet received their determination letter or ruling recognizing exemption. If an organization fails to file required Form 990 series returns or notices for three consecutive years, its exemption will be automatically revoked by operation of § 6033(j). Such an organization may apply for reinstatement of its exempt status, and such recognition may be granted retroactively, only in accordance with the procedure described in Notice 2011-44, 2011-25 IRB 883.

Reliance on determination letter or ruling

.02 A determination letter or ruling recognizing exemption may not be relied upon if there is a material change, inconsistent with exemption, in the character, the purpose, or the method of operation of the organization, or a change in the applicable law. Also, a determination letter or ruling may not be relied upon if it was based on any inaccurate material factual representations. See section 12.01.

SECTION 12. REVOCATION OR MODIFICATION OF DETERMINATION LETTER OR RULING RECOGNIZING EXEMPTION

A determination letter or ruling recognizing exemption may be revoked or modified: (1) by a notice to the taxpayer to whom the determination letter or ruling was issued; (2) by enactment of legislation or ratification of a tax treaty; (3) by a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States; (4) by the issuance of temporary or final regulations; (5) by the issuance of a revenue ruling, revenue procedure, or other statement published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin; or (6) automatically, pursuant to § 6033(j), for failure to file a required annual return or notice for three consecutive years.

Revocation or modification of a determination letter or ruling may be retroactive

.01 The revocation or modification of a determination letter or ruling recognizing exemption may be retroactive if there has been a change in the applicable law, the organization omitted or misstated a material fact, operated in a manner materially different from that originally represented, or, in the case of organizations to which § 503 applies, engaged in a prohibited transaction with the purpose of diverting corpus or income of the organization from its exempt purpose and such transaction involved a substantial part of the corpus or income of such organization. In certain cases an organization may seek relief from retroactive revocation or modification of a determination letter or ruling under § 7805(b). Requests for § 7805(b) relief are subject to the procedures set forth in Rev. Proc. 2014-4.

(1) Where there is a material change, inconsistent with exemption, in the character, the purpose, or the method of operation of an organization, revocation or modification will ordinarily take effect as of the date of such material change.

(2) In the case where a determination letter or ruling is issued in error or is no longer in accord with the Service’s position and § 7805(b) relief is granted (see sections 13 and 14 of Rev. Proc. 2014-4), ordinarily, the revocation or modification will be effective not earlier than the date when the Service modifies or revokes the original determination letter or ruling.

Appeal and conference procedures in the case of revocation or modification of exempt status letter

.02 In the case of a revocation or modification of a determination letter or ruling, the appeal and conference procedures are generally the same as set out in section 7 of this revenue procedure, including the right of the organization to request that EO Determinations or the Appeals Office seek technical advice from EO Technical. However, appeal and conference rights are not applicable to matters where delay would be prejudicial to the interests of the Service (such as in cases involving fraud, jeopardy, the imminence of the expiration of the statute of limitations, or where immediate action is necessary to protect the interests of the Government). Organizations revoked under § 6033(j) will not have an opportunity for Appeal consideration.

(1) If the case involves an exempt status issue on which EO Technical had issued a previous contrary ruling or technical advice, EO Determinations generally must seek technical advice from EO Technical.

(2) EO Determinations does not have to seek technical advice if the prior ruling or technical advice has been revoked by subsequent contrary published precedent or if the proposed revocation involves a subordinate unit of an organization that holds a group exemption letter issued by EO Technical, the EO Technical ruling or technical advice was issued under the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 or prior revenue acts.

SECTION 13. EFFECT ON OTHER REVENUE PROCEDURES

Rev. Proc. 2013-9 is superseded.

SECTION 14. EFFECTIVE DATE

This revenue procedure is effective January 6, 2014.

SECTION 15. PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT

The collection of information for a letter application under section 3.05 of this revenue procedure has been reviewed and approved by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. § 3507) under control number 1545-2080. All other collections of information under this revenue procedure have been approved under separate OMB control numbers.

An agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless the collection of information displays a valid OMB control number.

The collection of this information is required if an organization wants to be recognized as tax-exempt by the Service. We need the information to determine whether the organization meets the legal requirements for tax-exempt status. In addition, this information will be used to help the Service delete certain information from the text of an adverse determination letter or ruling before it is made available for public inspection, as required by § 6110.

The time needed to complete and file a letter application will vary depending on individual circumstances. The estimated average time is 10 hours.

Books and records relating to the collection of information must be retained as long as their contents may become material in the administration of any internal revenue law. The rules governing the confidentiality of letter applications are covered in § 6104.

DRAFTING INFORMATION

The principal author of this revenue procedure is Mr. Jonathan Carter of the Exempt Organizations, Tax Exempt and Government Entities Division. For further information regarding this revenue procedure, please contact the TE/GE Customer Service office at (877) 829-5500 (a toll-free call), or send an e-mail to [email protected] and include “Question about Rev. Proc. 2014-9” in the subject line.




IRS Updates Guidelines for Issuing Rulings and Determination Letters Affecting Some Foundations.

The IRS has updated (Rev. Proc. 2014-10, 2014-2 IRB 293) procedures for issuing rulings and determination letters on private foundation status under section 509(a), operating foundation status under section 4942(j)(3), and exempt operating foundation status under section 4940(d)(2), of organizations exempt from federal income tax under section 501(c)(3).

The updated procedures also apply to the issuance of determination letters on the foundation status under section 509(a)(3) of nonexempt charitable trusts. Rev. Proc. 2013-10 is superseded.

SECTION 1. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

The purpose of this revenue procedure is to set forth updated procedures of the Internal Revenue Service (the “Service”) with respect to issuing rulings and determination letters on private foundation status under § 509(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, operating foundation status under § 4942(j)(3), and exempt operating foundation status under § 4940(d)(2), of organizations exempt from Federal income tax under § 501(c)(3). This revenue procedure also applies to the issuance of determination letters on the foundation status under § 509(a)(3) of nonexempt charitable trusts described in § 4947(a)(1).

SECTION 2. WHAT CHANGES HAVE BEEN MADE TO REV. PROC. 2013-10?

.01 This revenue procedure is a general update of Rev. Proc. 2013-10, 2013-2 I.R.B. 267.

.02 Dates and cross references have been changed to reflect the appropriate annual Revenue Procedures.

SECTION 3. BACKGROUND

.01 All § 501(c)(3) organizations are classified as private foundations under § 509(a) unless they qualify as a public charity under § 509(a)(1) (which cross-references § 170(b)(1)(A)(i)-(vi)), (2), (3), or (4). See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.170A-9, 1.509(a)-1 through 1.509(a)-7. The Service determines an organization’s private foundation or public charity status when the organization files its Form 1023. This status will be included in the organization’s determination letter.

.02 In its Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt From Income Tax Under section 501(c), 527, or 4947(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code (except black lung benefit trust or private foundation), a public charity indicates the paragraph of § 509(a), and subparagraph of § 170(b)(1)(A), if applicable, under which it qualifies as a public charity. Because of changes in its activities or operations, this may differ from the public charity status listed in its original determination letter. Although an organization is not required to obtain a determination letter to qualify for the new public charity status, in order for Service records to recognize any change in public charity status, an organization must obtain a new determination of foundation status pursuant to this revenue procedure.

.03 If a public charity no longer qualifies as a public charity under § 509(a)(1)-(4), then it becomes a private foundation, and as such, it must file Form 990-PF, Return of Private Foundation or Section 4947(a)(1) Nonexempt Charitable Trust Treated as a Private Foundation. It is not necessary for the organization to obtain a determination letter on its new private foundation status (although it is permitted to do so pursuant to this revenue procedure). The organization indicates this change in foundation status by filing its Form 990-PF return and following any procedures specified in the form, instructions, or other published guidance. Thereafter, the organization may terminate its private foundation status, such as by giving notice and qualifying as a public charity again under § 509(a)(1)-(3) during a 60-month termination period in accordance with the procedures under § 507(b)(1)(B) and Treas. Reg. § 1.507-2(b).

.04 This revenue procedure applies to organizations that may have erroneously determined that the organization was a private foundation and wish to correct the error. For example, an organization may have erroneously classified an item or items in its calculation of public support, causing the organization to classify itself as a private foundation and to file Forms 990-PF. Pursuant to this revenue procedure, the organization can request to be classified as a public charity by showing that it continuously met the public support tests during the relevant periods. See section 7 below

.05 A private foundation may qualify as an operating foundation under § 4942(j)(3) without a determination letter from the Service, but the Service will not recognize such status in its records without a determination letter from the Service. An organization claiming to be an exempt operating foundation under § 4940(d)(2) must obtain a determination letter from the Service recognizing such status to be exempt from the § 4940 tax on net investment income.

SECTION 4. DETERMINATIONS OF FOUNDATION STATUS

.01 EO Determinations will issue determination letters on foundation status, including whether an organization is:

(1) a private foundation;

(2) a public charity described in §§ 509(a)(1) and 170(b)(1)(A) (other than clauses (v), (vii), and (viii));

(3) a public charity described in § 509(a)(2) or (4);

(4) a public charity described in § 509(a)(3), whether such organization is described in § 509(a)(3)(B)(i), (ii), or (iii) (“supporting organization type”), and whether or not a Type III supporting organization is functionally integrated;

(5) a private operating foundation described in § 4942(j)(3); or

(6) an exempt operating foundation described in § 4940(d)(2).

.02 EO Determinations will also issue determination letters on whether a nonexempt charitable trust described in § 4947(a)(1) is described in § 509(a)(3).

.03 EO Determinations will issue such determinations in response to applications for recognition of exempt status under § 501(c)(3), submitted by organizations pursuant to § 508(b). EO Determinations will also issue such determinations in response to separate requests for determination of foundation status submitted on Form 8940, Request for Miscellaneous Determination, pursuant to this revenue procedure or its successor revenue procedures.

SECTION 5. APPLICABILITY OF ANNUAL REVENUE PROCEDURES

.01 Rev. Proc. 2014-9 (updated annually) provides procedures of the Service in processing applications for recognition of exemption from Federal income tax under § 501(c)(3). Rev. Proc. 2014-4 (updated annually) governs requests for rulings and determination letters. Rev. Proc. 2014-8 (updated annually) prescribes user fees for applications, rulings, and other determinations. Except as specifically noted herein, those revenue procedures and their annual successors also apply to requests for determinations of foundation status.

.02 The provisions of Rev. Proc. 2014-9 and any successor revenue procedure regarding § 7428, protest, conference, and appeal rights also apply to all determinations of foundation status described in section 4.01 (except section 4.01(6) relating to exempt operating foundation status) and section 4.02, whether or not the request for determination is made in connection with an application for recognition of tax-exempt status.

.03 Where the issue of exemption under § 501(c)(3) is referred to EO Technical for decision under the procedures of Rev. Proc. 2014-9, the foundation status issue will be referred along with it.

SECTION 6. GENERALLY NO NEW DETERMINATION LETTER IF SAME STATUS IS SOUGHT

The Service generally will not issue a new determination letter to a taxpayer that seeks a determination of private foundation status that is identical to its current foundation status as determined by the Service. For example, an organization that is already recognized as described in §§ 509(a)(1) and 170(b)(1)(A)(ii) as a school generally will not receive a new determination letter that it is still described in §§ 509(a)(1) and 170(b)(1)(A)(ii) under the currently extant facts. However, the organization in such case could request a letter ruling, pursuant to Rev. Proc. 2014-4, that a given change of facts and circumstances will not adversely affect its status under §§ 509(a)(1) and 170(b)(1)(A)(ii).

SECTION 7. FORMAT OF REQUEST

.01 Organizations that are seeking to change their foundation status, including requests from public charities for private foundation status and requests from public charities to change from one public charity classification to another public charity classification, or seeking a determination or a change as to supporting organization type or functionally integrated status, or seeking operating foundation or exempt operating foundation status, or subordinate organizations included in a group exemption letter seeking a change in public charity status, must submit Form 8940, Request Miscellaneous Determination Under Section 507, 509(a), 4940, 4942, 4945, and 6033 of the Internal Revenue Code, along with all information, documentation, and other materials required by Form 8940 and the instructions thereto, as well as the appropriate user fee pursuant to Rev. Proc. 2014-8 or its successor revenue procedures.

.02 For complete information about filing requirements and the submission process, refer to Form 8940 and the Instructions for Form 8940.

SECTION 8. REQUESTS BY NONEXEMPT CHARITABLE TRUSTS

.01 A nonexempt charitable trust described in § 4947(a)(1) seeking a determination that it is described in § 509(a)(3) should submit a written request for a determination pursuant to Rev. Proc. 2014-4 or its successor revenue procedure.

.02 The request for determination must include the following information items, from the date that the organization became described in § 4947(a)(1) (but not before October 9, 1969) to the present:

(1) A subject line or other indicator on the first page of the request in bold, underlined, or all capitals font indicating “NONEXEMPT CHARITABLE TRUST REQUEST FOR DETERMINATION THAT IT IS DESCRIBED IN § 509(a)(3)”;

(2) The name, address, and Employer Identification Number of the beneficiary organizations, together with a statement whether each such beneficiary organization is described in § 509(a)(1) or (2);

(3) A list of all of the trustees that have served, together with a statement stating whether such trustees were disqualified persons within the meaning of § 4946(a) (other than as foundation managers);

(4) A copy of the original trust instrument and all subsequently adopted amendments to that instrument;

(5) Sufficient information to otherwise establish that the trust has met the requirements of § 509(a)(3) as provided for in Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-4 (other than § 1.509(a)-4(i)(4)); If the trust did not qualify under § 509(a)(3) in one or more prior years (after October 9, 1969) in which it was described in § 4947(a)(1), then it cannot be issued a § 509(a)(3) determination letter except in accordance with the procedures for termination of private foundation status under § 507(b)(1)(B); and

(6) Such other information as is required for a determination under Rev. Proc. 2014-4 or any successor revenue procedure.

SECTION 9. DETERMINATIONS OPEN TO PUBLIC INSPECTION

Determinations and rulings as to foundation status are open to public inspection pursuant to § 6104(a).

Section 10. Not Applicable to Private Foundation Terminations Under § 507 or Changes of Status Pursuant to Examination

These procedures do not apply to a private foundation seeking to terminate its status under § 507. These procedures also do not apply to the examination of an organization which results in changes to its foundation status.

SECTION 11. EFFECT ON OTHER REVENUE PROCEDURES

Rev. Proc. 2013-10 is superseded.

SECTION 12. EFFECTIVE DATE

This revenue procedure is effective January 6, 2014.

SECTION 13. PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT

The collections of information contained in this revenue procedure have been reviewed and approved by the Office of Management and Budget in accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. § 3507) under control number 1545-1520.

An agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless the collection of information displays a valid OMB control number.

The collections of information in this revenue procedure are in sections 7.02 and 8.02. This information is required to evaluate and process the request for a letter ruling or determination letter. The collections of information are required to obtain a letter ruling or determination letter. The likely respondents are tax-exempt organizations.

DRAFTING INFORMATION

The principal author of this revenue procedure is Mr. Dave Rifkin of the Exempt Organizations, Tax Exempt and Government Entities Division. For further information about this revenue procedure, contact Customer Account Services at 877-829-5500. Dave Rifkin can be reached by e-mail at [email protected]. Please include “Question about Rev. Proc. 2014-10” in the subject line.

26 CFR 601.201: Rulings and determination letters. (Also: Part I, sections 25, 103, 143, 1.25-4T, 1.103-1, 6A.103A-2)




Taxpayer Advocate Calls on IRS to Stop Erroneous Revocations.

The IRS needs to take steps to stop the erroneous revocation of some organizations’ tax-exempt status for failure to file required information returns, the Taxpayer Advocate Service said in a report released January 9.

In her annual report  to Congress, National Taxpayer Advocate Nina Olson addressed a Pension Protection Act provision that mandates the automatic revocation of exemption of any organization that does not file information returns or e-Postcards for three straight years. She said that since the policy took effect in 2010, about 9,000 of the roughly 550,000 automatic revocations have been made in error. Organizations that automatically lose their exempt status because of IRS mistakes may suffer by losing grants and donations, she said.

Olson said the errors were partly due to the IRS systems failing to recognize subordinate organizations as part of a group return when the subordinates and parent had different accounting periods. Another reason is a programming change that caused IRS computers to calculate the three-year nonfiling period as beginning when an organization received its employer identification number, not when it received its IRS determination letter.

“By computing the three-year nonfiling period with reference to the EIN date,” the IRS exempt organizations function “is perpetuating erroneous revocations,” Olson said.

Olson also faulted the IRS for including in the nonfiling period the periods in which filers of e-Postcards, which are submitted by smaller organizations, were waiting for their exemption applications to be processed. She said this is unfair because the code requires filing of the postcard but it cannot be done without IRS input.

“It is impossible to submit an e-Postcard in that period without assistance from the IRS,” Olson said.

Olson made several recommendations. She said that when the IRS is about to treat an organization’s exemption as automatically revoked, it should inform the organization and give it 30 days to correct the problem. The IRS also should clearly communicate the availability of administrative review “for organizations raising concerns [that] the IRS is proceeding in error,” she said.

Also, when notifying organizations that they have failed to file, the IRS should explain that it calculates the nonfiling period by using the EIN and that they can contact the agency if that method could lead to erroneous revocation, according to Olson. The nonfiling period should not include the time during which an organization could not submit an e-Postcard without contacting the IRS, she said.

When asked to comment, the IRS did not address the erroneous revocations section of the report specifically. But it said it would review closely the report’s overall contents and recommendations. It added that it is making progress on a number of issues addressed in the report, adding that it must balance limited resources to meet its dual mission of providing taxpayer service and enforcing the tax laws.

Eve Rose Borenstein of the Borenstein and McVeigh Law Office LLC told Tax Analysts the TAS report “hits the nail on the head” in describing the problems with the IRS’s approach, in particular the agency’s “filing clock” administrative assumptions, such as the EIN reliance. “That assumption has exposed many organizations to erroneous revocation and attendant ‘reinstatement’ procedures, which typically surface once an organization files an initial exemption application,” she said. She agreed there needs to be a mechanism for administrative review.

The problem of erroneous revocations is not new. In May 2012 Lois Lerner, then director of exempt organizations in the IRS Tax-Exempt and Government Entities Division, said the IRS was more than willing to look at an organization that may have had its exemption revoked by mistake. Such organizations should approach the IRS, she said, adding that the agency had made corrections after the organizations had explained why the revocations were unwarranted.

by Fred Stokeld




EO Update: e-news for Charities & Nonprofits January 3, 2014.

1.  New options for automatically revoked organizations to apply for reinstatement

Organizations that have had their tax-exempt status automatically revoked for not filing required 990 series returns may apply for reinstatement. Revenue Procedure 2014-11 provides four options for applying for reinstatement and explains how the new procedures apply to pending and recently approved applications.

http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/rp-14-11.pdf

Revenue Procedure 2014-11 modifies and supersedes the procedures described in Notice 2011-44.

http://www.irs.gov/irb/2011-25_IRB/ar10.html

Also see: Automatic Revocation – How to have your tax-exempt status retroactively reinstated

http://www.irs.gov/portal/site/irspup/menuitem.143f806b5568dcd501db6ba54251a0a0/?vgnextoid=e18ce2d3a7543410VgnVCM1000003b4d0a0aRCRD&vgnextchannel=7c8246d964264310VgnVCM1000004e0d010a____

2.  IRS issues proposed correction and disclosure procedures for failures to meet new requirements for charitable hospitals; invites public comments

Notice 2014-3 contains a proposed revenue procedure that provides correction and disclosure procedures under which certain failures to meet the requirements of § 501(r) of the Internal Revenue Code will be excused for purposes of § 501(r)(1) and 501(r)(2)(B). This notice invites comments regarding the procedures set forth in the proposed revenue procedure, including what additional examples, if any, would be helpful and whether hospitals should be required to make additional disclosures.

http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-14-03.pdf

3.  IRS confirms charitable hospitals may continue to rely on proposed regulations pending further guidance

Notice 2014-2 confirms that hospital organizations can rely on proposed regulations under section 501(r) of the Internal Revenue Code published on June 26, 2012, and April 5, 2013, pending the publication of final regulations or other applicable guidance.

http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-14-02.pdf

4.  Read current guidance on user fees for employee plans and exempt organizations

Review Revenue Procedure 2014-8 on page 242.

http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb14-01.pdf




EO Update: e-News for Charities & Nonprofits January 10, 2014.

1.  Phone forum: Good governance makes sense for exempt organizations

Register now for this informative IRS presentation scheduled January 23, at 2 p.m. ET.

http://ems.intellor.com/index.cgi?p=204871&t=71&do=register&s=&rID=417&edID=305

Topics include:

2.  Review revenue procedures for 2014

Rev. Proc. 2014-4

This revenue procedure is a general update of Rev. Proc. 2013-4, 2013-1 I.R.B. 126, which contains the Service’s general procedures for Employee Plans and Exempt Organizations letter ruling requests.

http://www.irs.gov/irb/2014-1_IRB/ar08.html

Rev. Proc. 2014–5

This revenue procedure is a general update of Rev. Proc. 2013-5, 2013-1 I.R.B. 170, which contains the general procedures for technical advice requests for matters within the jurisdiction of the Commissioner, Tax Exempt and Government Entities Division.

http://www.irs.gov/irb/2014-1_IRB/ar09.html

Rev. Proc 2014-9

This document sets forth procedures for issuing determination letters and rulings on the exempt status of organizations under sections 501 and 521 of the Code. The procedures also apply to the revocation and modification of determination letters or rulings, and provide guidance on the exhaustion of administrative remedies for purposes of declaratory judgment under section 7428 of the Code. Rev. Proc. 2013-9 superseded.

http://www.irs.gov/irb/2014-2_IRB/ar17.html#d0e2710

Rev. Proc. 2014-10

This document sets forth procedures for issuing determination letters and rulings on private foundation status under section 509(a) of the Code, operating foundation status under section 4942(j)(3), and exempt operating foundation status under section 4940(d)(2), of organizations exempt from federal income tax under section 501(c)(3). It supersedes Rev. Proc. 2013-10.

http://www.irs.gov/irb/2014-2_IRB/ar18.html

3.  Interactive Form 1023 update

The IRS’s Exempt Organizations (EO) office has updated its alternate version of Form 1023, Application for Recognition of Exemption. The application, which incorporates changes suggested by the public, became available at the end of December and includes information about the current user fee.

View the application at:

http://www.stayexempt.irs.gov/StartingOut/InteractiveForm1023Application.aspx

The Interactive Form 1023 (i1023) features pop-up information boxes for most lines of the form. These boxes contain explanations and links to related information on IRS.gov and StayExempt.irs.gov, EO’s educational website. Once completed, applicants will print and mail the form and its attachments, just like the standard Form 1023.

Please send your comments about this form to [email protected].

Anticipated i1023 benefits:

The i1023 is based on recommendations by the IRS’s external Advisory Committee on Tax-Exempt and Government Entities (ACT).




IRS: Proposed Revenue Procedure Addresses Requirements for Tax-Exempt Hospitals.

The IRS has issued a proposed revenue procedure (Notice 2014-3) that provides correction and disclosure procedures under which some failures by charitable hospital organizations to meet the requirements of section 501(r) will be excused.

Under section 501(r), a section 501(r)(2) hospital organization will not be treated as an exempt organization described in section 501(c)(3) unless it meets the requirements described in section 501(r)(3) through 501(r)(6). Proposed regs (REG-130266-11) published in June 2012 addressed the requirements of section 501(r)(4), (r)(5), and (r)(6). Proposed regs (REG-106499-12) published in April 2013 addressed the consequences for failing to meet any of the section 501(r) requirements.

To provide an incentive for hospital organizations to take steps not only to avoid failures but to remedy and disclose them when they occur, the 2013 proposed regs specify that a hospital organization’s failure to meet one or more of the requirements described in section 501(r) and proposed reg. section 1.501(r)-3 through 1.501(r)-6 that is neither willful nor egregious will be excused if the hospital organization corrects the failure and makes disclosure in accordance with the rules set forth in additional guidance to be issued by Treasury and the IRS.

If adopted, Notice 2014-3 will provide that guidance. A hospital organization will be able to rely on the revenue procedure to correct and disclose any failure to meet a requirement of section 501(r) that is not willful or egregious, provided that the hospital organization has begun correcting the failure in accordance with the terms of the guidance and that it has disclosed the failure before the hospital organization is first contacted by the IRS concerning an examination of the organization. If the annual return for the tax year in which the failure is discovered is not yet due (with extensions), the hospital organization need only to have begun correcting the failure in accordance with the revenue procedure before the hospital organization is first contacted by the IRS concerning an examination.

Under the proposed revenue procedure, a failure that is willful includes a failure due to gross negligence, reckless disregard, or willful neglect. A hospital organization’s correction and disclosure of a failure does not create a presumption that the failure was not willful or egregious. However, the fact that correction and disclosure in accordance with the revenue procedure were made will be considered a factor and may indicate that an error or omission may not have been willful or egregious.

http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-14-03.pdf




IRS: Tax-Exempt Hospitals May Rely on Proposed Regulations.

The IRS has issued a notice (Notice 2014-2) confirming that tax-exempt hospital organizations can rely on proposed regulations (REG-130266-11, REG-106499-12) under section 501(r) pending the publication of final regulations or other applicable guidance.

In June 2012 the IRS published proposed regs that provide guidance on the new section 501(r) requirements for charitable hospital organizations regarding financial assistance and emergency medical care policies, charges for specified care provided to individuals eligible for financial assistance, and billing and collections. In April 2013 the IRS published proposed regs that provide guidance to charitable hospital organizations on the community health needs assessment (CHNA) requirements and related excise tax and reporting obligations. The regs also clarify the consequences for failing to meet those and other requirements for charitable hospital organizations.

Although the statutory requirements of section 501(r) are already in effect, hospital organizations won’t be required to comply with the 2012 and 2013 proposed regs until they are published as final or temporary regs. Because the preamble to the 2013 proposed regs did not expressly mention whether taxpayers could rely on sections other than proposed reg. section 1.501(r)-3 pending the publication of final or temporary regs, some commentators have asked whether they can rely currently on the other sections of the 2013 proposed regs. Treasury and the IRS confirm that tax-exempt organizations may rely on all the provisions of both the 2012 and 2013 proposed regs pending the publication of final or temporary regs or other applicable guidance. Also, organizations may rely on reg. section 1.501(r)-3 of the 2013 proposed regs for any CHNA conducted or implementation strategy adopted on or before the date that is six months after final or temporary regs are published.

http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-14-02.pdf




IRS: Reinstatement Procedures for Revocations under Section 6033(j).

Revenue Procedure 2014-11 provides procedures for reinstating the tax-exempt status of organizations that have had their tax-exempt status automatically revoked under section 6033(j) of the Internal Revenue Code for failure to file required annual returns or notices for three consecutive years.

http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/rp-14-11.pdf




IRS Issues Interim Guidance on Supporting Organizations.

The IRS has issued interim guidance for Type III supporting organizations seeking to qualify as functionally integrated by supporting a governmental supported organization.

http://services.taxanalysts.com/taxbase/eps_pdf2013.nsf/DocNoLookup/29584/$FILE/2013-29584-1.pdf




FASB Agrees to Amend Guidance for Nonprofit Expense Reporting.

The Financial Accounting Standards Board on December 18 tentatively decided to adjust some existing guidance on the reporting of expenses among nonprofit entities so that donors and other parties can better understand how those organizations are allocating their resources.

The Financial Accounting Standards Board on December 18 tentatively decided to adjust some existing guidance on the reporting of expenses among nonprofit entities so that donors and other parties can better understand how those organizations are allocating their resources.

At a meeting in Norwalk, Conn., Don Kim, a postgraduate technical assistant at FASB, said U.S. generally accepted accounting principles don’t require all nonprofit organizations to disclose information about expenses according to both their functional and natural classifications, adding that only voluntary health and welfare entities are required to provide information about natural expenses in their statement of functional expenses.

Kim said members of the board’s Not-for-Profit Advisory Committee agreed with the staff that requiring the natural classification of expenses wouldn’t subject most nonprofit organizations to significant costs regarding financial statement preparation and auditing.

FASB members tentatively supported the staff recommendation to modify U.S. GAAP and require all nonprofit entities to disclose information about their natural expenses — a disclosure that existing guidance only encouraged most nonprofits to provide in their financial statements. The board also agreed to retain the current requirement under FASB Statement No. 117, “Financial Statements of Not-for-Profit Organizations,” to provide information about functional expenses.

FASB member Marc Siegel said the reporting of expenses by nature could give financial statement users a better understanding of how nonprofit entities are spending their money. He also noted that nonprofits are already required to provide similar information on Form 990, “Return of Organization Exempt From Income Tax.”

The board decided that it would not modify the existing guidance that permits a nonprofit entity to present expenses by nature or function in its statement of activities after the staff couldn’t identify sufficient reasoning to mandate more prescriptive presentation requirements.

The staff recommended that nonprofit entities be required to provide information about expenses by function and nature in a matrix format because that disclosure would provide incremental benefits to the users of financial statements. The staff said the information could be provided either as a basic financial statement or as a schedule in a footnote disclosure.

According to Kim, the Not-for-Profit Advisory Committee generally agreed that the matrix format adds understandability, clarity, and transparency to the reporting of expenses, which are useful for donors and the governing boards of nonprofit organizations when they are assessing how a nonprofit allocates its resources.

FASB members agreed that an analysis of a nonprofit entity’s reporting of expenses should be presented in a single location in its financial statements, but they decided against requiring the analysis to be presented in a matrix format, thinking that would be overly prescriptive. The board also agreed to grant nonprofit entities some flexibility by permitting them to provide the analysis of expenses either on the statement of activities or in the financial statement footnotes.

FASB member Lawrence Smith said that because nonprofit entities do not maintain the same level of regular communication that public companies can provide to users, they should be allowed more flexibility for presenting the analysis in whatever way they think is most appropriate. He added that most users of nonprofit financial statements are more inclined to review the entire document.

The board tentatively decided that under the newly proposed guidelines, nonprofit entities should be reporting information about all of their natural expenses and not only about those that are classified as operating expenses. The board also agreed not to provide relief to any types of nonprofit entities from the tentative decisions made on the content and presentation of expenses.

FASB’s latest decisions were made as part of its project on reexamining the standards for nonprofit financial statement presentation. The board decided in October to modify the existing requirements that dictate how some nonprofit organizations present their operating cash flows.

by Thomas Jaworski




IRS EO Update-e-News for Charities and Nonprofits - December 16, 2013.

Inside This Issue:

1.  IRS to employers:  Hire veteran by December 31 and save on taxes

If you plan to hire soon, consider hiring veterans. If you do, you may be able to claim the federal Work Opportunity Tax Credit worth thousands of dollars.

You must act soon. The WOTC is available to employers who hire qualified veterans before the new year.

Read about the six key facts about the WOTC in this tax tip:

http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/IRS-to-Employers-Hire-Veterans-by-Dec-31-and-Save-on-Taxes

2.  2014 standard mileage rates for business, medical, and moving announced

The IRS recently issued the 2014 optional standard mileage rates used to calculate the deductible costs of operating an automobile for business, charitable, medical or moving purposes.

Beginning on Jan. 1, 2014, the standard mileage rates for the use of a car (also vans, pickups or panel trucks) will be:

For more information, read news release:

http://www.irs.gov/2014-Standard-Mileage-Rates-for-Business,-Medical-and-Moving-Announced

3.  Register for the phone forum:  ABCs of charitable contributions for 501(c)(3) organizations

This phone forum on December 19 at 2 p.m. ET will help charity leaders, tax practitioners and others understand the rules involving charitable donations.

Register now:

http://ems.intellor.com/index.cgi?p=204857&t=71&do=register&s=&rID=417&edID=305

Presentation topics include:

For more information on EO phone forums, go to the IRS Exempt Organizations Phone Forums page:

http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Phone-Forums-Exempt-Organizations

4.  Copies of scanned EO returns available

Electronic copies of certain scanned Exempt Organization returns are available for purchase from the IRS. Tax year 2013 returns will be available when filed beginning in January 2014. The IRS is also updating the pricing for scanned returns.

http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Copies-of-Scanned-EO-Returns-Available

5.  Don’t fall for charity scams following disasters

The IRS warns consumers not to fall for bogus charity scams. They often occur in the wake of major disasters like the recent tornadoes in the Midwest or the typhoon in the Philippines. Thieves play on the goodwill of people who want to help disaster victims. They pose as a real charity in order to steal money or get private information to commit identity theft.

The scams use different tactics. Offering charity relief, criminals often:

For more information, read tax tip:

http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/Dont-Fall-for-Charity-Scams-Following-Disasters




IRS Provides Tax Tips on End-of-Year Giving.

The IRS has reminded (IR-2013-98) individuals and businesses making charitable contributions of some tax law changes in recent years, including a provision that is set to expire at the end of 2013 allowing for special donations by some IRA owners, rules on donating clothing and household items, and guidelines for monetary donations.

IRS Offers Tips for Year-End Giving

December 16, 2013

WASHINGTON — Individuals and businesses making contributions to charity should keep in mind several important tax law provisions that have taken effect in recent years. Some of these changes include the following:

Special Tax-Free Charitable Distributions for Certain IRA Owners

This provision, currently scheduled to expire at the end of 2013, offers older owners of individual retirement arrangements (IRAs) a different way to give to charity. An IRA owner, age 70 1/2 or over, can directly transfer tax-free up to $100,000 per year to an eligible charity. This option, first available in 2006, can be used for distributions from IRAs, regardless of whether the owners itemize their deductions. Distributions from employer-sponsored retirement plans, including SIMPLE IRAs and simplified employee pension (SEP) plans, are not eligible.

To qualify, the funds must be transferred directly by the IRA trustee to the eligible charity. Distributed amounts may be excluded from the IRA owner’s income — resulting in lower taxable income for the IRA owner. However, if the IRA owner excludes the distribution from income, no deduction, such as a charitable contribution deduction on Schedule A, may be taken for the distributed amount.

Not all charities are eligible. For example, donor-advised funds and supporting organizations are not eligible recipients.

Amounts transferred to a charity from an IRA are counted in determining whether the owner has met the IRA’s required minimum distribution. Where individuals have made nondeductible contributions to their traditional IRAs, a special rule treats amounts distributed to charities as coming first from taxable funds, instead of proportionately from taxable and nontaxable funds, as would be the case with regular distributions. See Publication 590, Individual Retirement Arrangements (IRAs), for more information on qualified charitable distributions.

Rules for Charitable Contributions of Clothing and Household Items

To be tax-deductible, clothing and household items donated to charity generally must be in good used condition or better. A clothing or household item for which a taxpayer claims a deduction of over $500 does not have to meet this standard if the taxpayer includes a qualified appraisal of the item with the return.

Donors must get a written acknowledgement from the charity for all gifts worth $250 or more that includes, among other things, a description of the items contributed. Household items include furniture, furnishings, electronics, appliances and linens.

Guidelines for Monetary Donations

To deduct any charitable donation of money, regardless of amount, a taxpayer must have a bank record or a written communication from the charity showing the name of the charity and the date and amount of the contribution. Bank records include canceled checks, bank or credit union statements, and credit card statements. Bank or credit union statements should show the name of the charity, the date, and the amount paid. Credit card statements should show the name of the charity, the date, and the transaction posting date.

Donations of money include those made in cash or by check, electronic funds transfer, credit card and payroll deduction. For payroll deductions, the taxpayer should retain a pay stub, a Form W-2 wage statement or other document furnished by the employer showing the total amount withheld for charity, along with the pledge card showing the name of the charity.

These requirements for the deduction of monetary donations do not change the long-standing requirement that a taxpayer obtain an acknowledgment from a charity for each deductible donation (either money or property) of $250 or more. However, one statement containing all of the required information may meet both requirements.

Reminders

To help taxpayers plan their holiday-season and year-end giving, the IRS offers the following additional reminders:

Contributions are deductible in the year made. Thus, donations charged to a credit card before the end of 2013 count for 2013. This is true even if the credit card bill isn’t paid until 2014. Also, checks count for 2013 as long as they are mailed in 2013.

Check that the organization is eligible. Only donations to eligible organizations are tax-deductible. Exempt Organization Select Check, a searchable online database available on IRS.gov, lists most organizations that are eligible to receive deductible contributions. In addition, churches, synagogues, temples, mosques and government agencies are eligible to receive deductible donations, even if they are not listed in the database.

For individuals, only taxpayers who itemize their deductions on Form 1040 Schedule A can claim deductions for charitable contributions. This deduction is not available to individuals who choose the standard deduction, including anyone who files a short form (Form 1040A or 1040EZ). A taxpayer will have a tax savings only if the total itemized deductions (mortgage interest, charitable contributions, state and local taxes, etc.) exceed the standard deduction. Use the 2013 Form 1040 Schedule A to determine whether itemizing is better than claiming the standard deduction.

For all donations of property, including clothing and household items, get from the charity, if possible, a receipt that includes the name of the charity, date of the contribution, and a reasonably-detailed description of the donated property. If a donation is left at a charity’s unattended drop site, keep a written record of the donation that includes this information, as well as the fair market value of the property at the time of the donation and the method used to determine that value. Additional rules apply for a contribution of $250 or more.

The deduction for a car, boat or airplane donated to charity is usually limited to the gross proceeds from its sale. This rule applies if the claimed value is more than $500. Form 1098-C or a similar statement, must be provided to the donor by the organization and attached to the donor’s tax return.

If the amount of a taxpayer’s deduction for all noncash contributions is over $500, a properly-completed Form 8283 must be submitted with the tax return.

And, as always it’s important to keep good records and receipts.




Cuomo Vetoes Volunteer Firefighter Benefits Bills.

ALBANY, N.Y. — Gov. Andrew Cuomo vetoed legislation that would have guaranteed job leaves for volunteer firefighters and ambulance workers during emergencies and another bill that would have extended coverage for their injuries in the line of duty outside the areas they regularly serve.

Authorizing leave when New York or the federal government declares a state of emergency would force staffing shortages and a financial burden on private and public employers, Cuomo said. Extending the injury coverage, similar to workers’ compensation, would impose “an undue burden” on municipalities before they have the opportunity to opt out of its provisions, he said.

“I laud the sponsor’s goal of better facilitating the efforts of volunteers to help with disasters,” Cuomo said in a veto message. “However, this bill provides no standard by which an employer could reject an employee’s request for leave even if the employee’s services were needed.”

The bills would have amended New York’s labor and municipal benefit laws. The vetoes were announced Thursday.

Noting that federal law requires employers provide leave to National Guard and military reservists, sponsors urged similar protection for emergency responders, including for long-term call-ups to local emergencies and disasters. Under existing law, they can be forced to use vacation or sick time, forfeit pay or even lose their jobs for not going to work.




Law Firm Explains Proposed Rules for Social Welfare Groups.

Under proposed regulations (REG-134417-13), section 501(c)(4) groups would be barred from participating in various not explicitly partisan activities, additional information disclosures would likely be required, and other types of exempt groups would likely be affected, according to a December 3 memo from Trister, Ross, Schadler & Gold PLLC.

December 3, 2013

TO:

Clients

FROM:

Trister, Ross, Schadler & Gold, PLLC

RE:

IRS Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Political Activities of

501(c)(4) Social Welfare Organizations and Potentially Other

Groups

OVERVIEW

Last week, the Internal Revenue Service released a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) to substantially revise the treatment of political activities by Internal Revenue Code (IRC) section 501(c)(4) “social welfare organizations.” 78 Fed. Reg. 71535 (Nov. 29, 2013). Contrary to some reports, no new rules are in effect yet, and there is no set timetable for final regulations.

Although this rulemaking is directed to 501(c)(4)s, the NPRM asks whether similar rules should apply to charities (501(c)(3)s), labor organizations (501(c)(5)s) and trade associations (501(c)(6)s). And, the NPRM asks how a redefinition of “political” activity for these groups should affect the treatment of political activity for section 527 “political organizations” themselves (in IRS terminology, “exempt function” activity). Because many 501(c) groups (except (501(c)(3)s) sponsor and rely for much of their political spending on separate segregated funds that are regulated by section 527, any IRS changes on this subject could have broad impact.

The proposed 501(c)(4) regulations seek to more clearly define the activities and expenditures that will be treated as “political,” as distinct from “social welfare,” for 501(c)(4) groups — and the new rules would substantially expand the former at the expense of the latter. Relatedly, the IRS asks for comments on whether and how its longstanding and unquantified “primary purpose” standard for 501(c)(4) “social welfare” activity should be revised to specify how much, if any, political activity (as redefined) a social welfare organization may conduct.

The NPRM requests comments from the public by February 27, 2014, regarding the proposed regulations and the other issues raised by the IRS in its accompanying explanation. Although the NPRM suggests no timetable for adopting final rules, nothing is likely to be issued or effective until sometime after the November 4, 2014 general election.

The following Q&A explains the IRS proposal and the potential consequences if it were adopted as proposed.

Q. What prompted this rulemaking?

A. The IRS doesn’t say; it refers generally to “recent[ ] increased attention [to] potential political campaign intervention” by 501(c)(4) groups. It seems likely that the controversy over the IRS’s handling of applications for 501(c)(4) tax qualification by “tea party” groups, which prompted media scrutiny of the subjective nature of IRS judgments about what is “political activity,” triggered this formal effort to revise the rules for the first time in 54 years.

Q. What are the current IRS rules that apply to 501(c)(4) political activity?

A. Current IRS regulations that date from 1959 provide that a 501(c)(4) organization is operated “exclusively for the promotion of social welfare” (as the IRC says) if it is “primarily” engaged in activities that promote the common good and general welfare of the people of the community. The regulations (though not the IRC) provide that participation in political campaigns does not qualify as an activity that promotes social welfare. Therefore, if an organization’s primary purpose or activity is partisan political activity, the organization does not qualify as a 501(c)(4) group. Generally, partisan political activities of 501(c)(4) (and other 501(c)) groups are those that support or oppose a candidate for elected public office or a political party, and the IRS has used a flexible “facts and circumstances” approach rather than specific guidelines to determine what they are.

In addition to the primary-purpose restriction, 501(c)(4) organizations that have net investment income (interest, dividends, capital gains, rents and royalties) may be subject to a 35% federal tax on the lesser of their investment income or the expenditures for their political activities under IRC section 527(f)(1) & (2), unless they conduct these activities through a “separate segregated fund” that is organized under IRC section 527(f)(3). So, a 501(c)(4) group’s programmatic choices can entail substantial and costly consequences depending on the IRS’s classification of activities as “political.”

Q. What is the main difference between the current “facts and circumstances” test and the proposed standard for defining political activity?

A. The NPRM introduces a new term — “direct or indirect candidate-related political activity” — to define the activities and expenditures that would be treated as political, meaning that, specifically, they would not be “social welfare” activities, and, in the aggregate, they could not comprise the “primary purpose” of a 501(c)(4) organization.

This new category is much broader than what the “facts and circumstances” test covers. That test tries to identify partisan political activity — conduct that is designed to achieve particular election outcomes or to favor particular political parties. In contrast, the proposed standard includes inherently partisan spending on such activities as express advocacy and political contributions, but it also covers any near-election references of any kind to any candidate (including incumbents) in any media, even if purely legislative, as well as nonpartisan voter registration, GOTV efforts and voter guides, and advocacy about appointed executive branch and judicial officeholders. The NPRM’s stated overriding goal is “greater certainty” and “reduc[ing] the need for detailed factual analysis” in defining what is “political.”

Q. What activities that plainly are partisan would be included in the revised “political” category?

A. The following activities that are self-evidently partisan in nature would be included:

1. Express advocacy and its functional equivalent. Communications regarding the nomination or election of either a clearly identified candidate for elective office or the candidates of a particular political party that either:

Contain so-called magic words that expressly advocate for or against that result, such as “vote,” “oppose,” “support,” “elect,” “defeat,” or “reject”, or

Are susceptible to no reasonable interpretation other than as a call for or against that result (what is often called “the “functional equivalent” of express advocacy)

This covers all forms of communication, including “oral” messages, regardless of how many recipients are intended or reached. And, this includes, but is not limited to, “independent expenditures” that are reported to the Federal Election Commission (FEC).

2. Contributions and solicitations of contributions. Either a contribution of money or anything of value to, or the solicitation of contributions on behalf of, either:

Any person, if the contribution is recognized by federal, state, or local campaign finance law as a reportable contribution to a candidate for elective office; or

Any section 527 organization (so, this includes a 501(c)(4) group’s own PAC)

3. Republication of candidate or 527 group materials. Distribution of any written, electronic or other material that is prepared by or on behalf of a candidate or a section 527 organization.

4. FEC-reported membership communications. Express-advocacy communications about federal candidates by a 501(c)(4) that are reportable to the FEC on Form 7.

5. Recall elections. Express advocacy or its functional equivalent with respect to whether or not an incumbent officeholder should be subjected to a recall, a procedure that exists in numerous states and localities but not at the federal level. The IRS has not previously definitively addressed whether or not contributions or expenditures in recall elections qualify as political activity in the same manner as regular elections.

Q. What activities that are not necessarily partisan would be included in the revised “political” category?

A. The new “political” standard would cover many activities that either are not partisan or are not necessarily partisan, and it would not matter that, in fact, the activity as undertaken is indisputably nonpartisan and permissible for even a 501(c)(3) organization to undertake. These activities include:

1. Contributions to another section 501(c) organization that itself engages in any “candidate-related political activity.” The current standard for “political” activity by 501(c)(4)s only reaches contributions if they are earmarked for political purposes or if the 501(c)(4) does not take reasonable steps to ensure that the recipient does not use the funds for 527 exempt function activities. The new standard effectively would reverse that by covering all contributions to another 501(c) group of any kind (including 501(c)(3), (4), (5) or (6)) that engages in any “political activity” (as redefined), regardless of whether the contribution is either restricted or used for non-political activity. The proposal does not explain what time period applies to evaluate the recipient’s status as a group that does not engage in “political” activity.

And, in order for a such a contribution to avoid treatment as “political” spending, the contributor 501(c)(4) must obtain a written representation from the recipient stating that the recipient does not engage in candidate-related political activity (and, the contributor must neither know nor have reason to know that this representation is inaccurate or unreliable), and there must be a written restriction prohibiting use the contribution for political activity.

This would create a tremendous deterrent against contributions by 501(c)(4) groups to other tax-exempt groups, as well as a tremendous deterrent against engaging in “political” activity as redefined.

2. Advocating the appointment or confirmation of government executives and judges. This provision covers both express advocacy and its functional equivalent regarding whether or not a clearly-identified individual should be appointed, nominated or confirmed to a federal, state or local executive branch or judicial position. The proposal incorrectly asserts that under current law this activity is treated as “political” activity. Rather, following review of the issue in the aftermath of the 1988 Robert Bork Supreme Court nomination, the IRS has stated that activities to influence a legislature’s consideration of an appointment comprise lobbying and do not constitute participation or intervention in a political campaign within the meaning of IRC section 501(c)(3).

3. “Electioneering communications.” Any “public communication” within 30 days of a primary election or 60 days of a general election that refers (without express advocacy or its functional equivalent) in any manner to one or more clearly-identified federal, state or local candidates (including an incumbent officeholder) in that election, or, in the case of a general election, refers to one or more political parties in that election is treated as candidate-related. “Public communications” include messages via broadcast, cable, satellite, website, newspaper, magazine, other periodical, any form of paid advertising, or that otherwise are intended to or do reach more than 500 persons. So, this category is far broader than what the FEC defines as “electioneering communications,” which are confined to references to federal candidates in broadcast media. The coverage of “electioneering communications” is also broader than many state law provisions that regulate these types of communications; and, in fact, most states do not regulate them.

4. Voter registration and “get-out-the-vote” drives. These activities are covered regardless of whether the activity is nonpartisan and can, at least currently, be conducted by a 501(c)(3) organization.

5. Voter guides. These are included if they either refer to or attach anything that refers to any clearly identified candidate or, in a general election, any political party, also regardless of whether they are nonpartisan. It is unclear what would be considered a voter guide, and the rule could include voting records frequently circulated even by 501(c)(3) public charities.

6. Candidate appearances. Candidate appearances may take many forms, only some of which are partisan. Nonpartisan candidate debates and other events, even within 30 days of a primary election or 60 days of a general election, in which one or more candidates participate, may currently be sponsored by public charities and 501(c)(4)s and not be treated as partisan political activity. And, under current IRS standards, there are many circumstances in which incumbent officeholders who are also candidates in an upcoming election meet, speak and appear in their official capacities, and the event is treated as nonpartisan.

Q. Does the IRS suggest how 501(c)(4) “primary purpose” should be calculated?

A. No. The NPRM asks whether and how to quantify how much of an organization’s activity must promote social welfare for the organization to qualify under section 501(c)(4). The NPRM suggests that the IRS might conclude that — like 501(c)(3)s – 501(c)(4)s can’t engage in any political activity. The IRS also asks for comment about how it should “measure” political activity for applicants for 501(c)(4) status. And, although the IRS proposes no specific rule to define “primary purpose,” it is possible that the final rules may do so without the IRS first proposing anything specific on the subject.

Q. Would the amount of a group’s political activity be determined only by its spending?

A. No. Activities conducted by a 501(c)(4) organization that would be considered in evaluating its “political” activity include those that are either paid for by the organization, conducted by an officer, director, or employee acting in that capacity, or conducted by a volunteer acting under the organization’s direction or supervision. So, the IRS does not propose simply an “expenditure” test for calculating “primary purpose”; non-spending would be counted, but the NPRM doesn’t suggest how it would be quantified or affect the determination of primary purpose.

Q. Would these rules require additional disclosures by 501(c)(4) groups?

A. Indirectly, most likely yes. The new standard for political activity would cause many groups to forgo certain activity completely or substantially in order to maintain their “social welfare” purpose, in order to avoid the 35% 527(f) tax, or both. Many groups likely would shift “political” activity as redefined to a self-financed, sponsored 527 “separate segregated fund” (SSF) that, under current law, must itemize most of its spending and receipts in periodic public reports.

An issue that is raised by the NPRM, but not addressed, is whether the option of shifting political activities from a 501(c)(4) to a 527 as suggested above will be impossible in some circumstances. IRS rules currently bar SSFs from spending more than an “insubstantial” amount on anything except “exempt function” activity under section 527. So, if what is “political” for a 501(c)(4) is broader and does not align with what is 527 “exempt function” activity, a 501(c)(4) group could find itself facing unpalatable choices outside of its power to resolve. For example, the 501(c)(4) would be precluded from undertaking an activity because it would jeopardize its exempt status by conducting excessive political activity, and the 527 SSF would also be precluded from engaging in the activity because it does not constitute an “exempt function” activity.

Q. How would these rules affect a 501(c)(4) group’s website?

A. Websites would be fully covered. For example, the IRS explains that “content previously posted by an organization on its website that clearly identifies a candidate and remains on the website during the specified pre-election period would be treated as candidate-related political activity.” So, an organization may have to choose between counting some or all of the website costs as “political” or scrubbing its website during those periods of all references to “candidates,” regardless of the fact that they only pertain to incumbents’ official conduct and regardless of their importance and immediacy to the group’s legislative and advocacy programs and needs. The NPRM also asks for comments on: whether and under what circumstances material posted by a third party on an organization’s website should be attributed to the organization, and whether establishing and maintaining a link to another website that contains candidate-related political activity, where the linking organization has no control over the content, should be attributed to the 501(c)(4) as its own activity.

Q. Would the 501(c)(4) definition of political activity be the same for 501(c)(3) organizations, which are prohibited from engaging in any direct or indirect participation or intervention in political campaigns?

A. Not necessarily. While the IRS requests comments on whether there should also be new rules for 501(c)(3) organizations’ political activities, the NPRM asks whether 501(c)(4) “political” activities should overlap but differ from those for 501(c)(3) groups. The IRS says a “more nuanced” approach may be necessary for 501(c)(3)s because they are prohibited from undertaking any political activities.

Q. Would the same definition be used for labor organizations and trade associations to determine their activities that are political and do not constitute their primary purpose?

A. Possibly. Although the IRC and the IRS regulations do not specify that labor organizations or trade associations must have a particular “exclusive” or “primary” purpose, the IRS does apply a primary-purpose standard to them. And, like 501(c)(4)s, they are subject to the 527(f) tax on their political activities. The NPRM explicitly asks for comments about whether they should be subject to the same “political” activity standards as 501(c)(4)s. The NPRM asserts that any such revised rules for those groups would be adopted only after another rulemaking (which could be initiated at any time). So, how the IRS redefines political activities for 501(c)(4)s effectively could determine how they are redefined for unions and trade associations as well.




IRS Releases Publication on Tax-Exempt Status for Organizations.

The IRS has released Publication 557 (rev. Oct. 2013), Tax-Exempt Status for Your Organization, which explains the rules and procedures for organizations to obtain recognition of exemption from federal income tax under section 501(a) and discusses the procedures to obtain an appropriate ruling or determination letter recognizing the exemption.

http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p557.pdf




Firm Suggests Ways for Public Hospitals to Relinquish Exemption.

T.J. Sullivan of Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP, in comments on proposed regulations (REG-106499-12) that provide guidance to charitable hospital organizations on the community health needs assessment requirements and related excise tax and reporting obligations, has suggested ways that a governmental entity could voluntarily terminate its section 501(c)(3) status.

October 17, 2013

Internal Revenue Service

Office of Chief Counsel

CC:PA:LPD:PR (REG-106499-12)

Room 5203

PO Box 7604

Ben Franklin Station

Washington, DC 20044

RE: Public Hospital Relinquishment of Exemption Under Section 501(c)(3)

Dear Sir or Madam:

I am writing on behalf of East Alabama Healthcare Authority (EAHA) and similarly situated public hospitals, all of the income of each of which is excluded from federal income tax under Section 115 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the “Code”) and which have, voluntarily at some point in the past, sought and received recognition of exemption as a hospital described in Section 501(c)(3) of the Code. EAHA appreciates this opportunity to comment on the proposed regulations implementing new Code Section 501(r). EAHA believes some of the requirements imposed by Code Section 501(r) on all Section 501(c)(3) hospitals may be unnecessarily burdensome if applied to public hospitals and requests that the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) adopt an administrative mechanism to allow EAHA and similarly situated public hospitals to voluntarily relinquish their Section 501(c)(3) recognition if they so choose.

Although already effectively exempt from federal and state income taxation as a governmental entity, or instrumentality thereof, under the intergovernmental immunity doctrine, many local governmental hospital organizations like EAHA previously obtained determinations from the IRS that they were tax-exempt organizations described in Section 501(c)(3) of the Code. A common reason for voluntarily seeking Section 501(c)(3) recognition (in addition to the entity’s exclusion from gross income through intergovernmental immunity as a governmental entity) was to allow the organization’s employees to participate in Section 403(b) qualified retirement plans. Many such organizations, including EAHA, also have been determined to be exempt from the Form 990 filing obligation which, prior to enactment of Section 501(r), was the only real disadvantage to Section 501(c)(3) status for such organizations. Enactment of Section 501(r), however, has placed a substantial burden on these governmental hospital organizations that, like EAHA, have obtained Section 501(c)(3) determinations. Since they have a solid alternate exemption to rely on, such governmental hospital organizations likely will reconsider whether the additional Section 501(c)(3) recognition is necessary or even advisable. Unfortunately, it appears that there presently is no effective process for a public hospital to voluntarily relinquish Section 501(c)(3) status after it has been recognized.

In addition to requesting that such a process be adopted in the final Section 501(r) regulations, if not beforehand, the remainder of this comment letter is intended to offer possible suggestions for a process under which a governmental entity, or an affiliate or instrumentality thereof, could voluntarily terminate its Section 501(c)(3) recognition as seemingly contemplated by Rev. Proc. 2013-4, Section 7.04(14).

In Rev. Proc. 2012-4, the IRS added the following as Section 7.04(14):

In exempt organization matters, the Exempt Organizations Determinations office issues determination letters involving: Government entity voluntary termination of § 501(c)(3) recognition (must include documentation of tax-exempt status other than under § 501(a)).

This exact same language appeared again in Rev. Proc. 2013-4, Section 7.04(14). However, the IRS apparently has never fully implemented a procedure to permit governmental entities with Section 501(c)(3) recognition to voluntarily terminate their Section 501(c)(3) recognition. Without a specific procedure in place, it appears that a governmental hospital organization with a Section 501(c)(3) determination may be treated like all other Section 501(c)(3) recognized entities in that it may not voluntarily relinquish its Section 501(c)(3) status absent some organizational or operational change in character sufficient to remove it from the description of Section 501(c)(3). See, e.g., Gen. Couns. Mem. 37165 (June 14, 1977).

We would like to propose three alternative procedures under which the IRS could allow a governmental entity to pursue the course of action apparently contemplated in Section 7.04(14) of Rev. Proc. 2013-4. Initially, we would suggest a clarification that Section 7.04(14) applies not only to governmental entities but also to affiliates and instrumentalities of governmental entities. Certain affiliates and instrumentalities of governmental entities are exempt organizations through both the intergovernmental immunity doctrine and Section 501(c)(3) recognition by virtue of their relationship with a governmental entity. Therefore, it makes sense to permit such public hospital organizations to voluntarily terminate their Section 501(c)(3) recognition as well.

The first alternative proposed procedure is for the IRS to amend Part II of Form 8940, Request for Miscellaneous Determination Under Section 507, 509(a), 4940, 4942, 4945, and 6033 of the Internal Revenue Code. This amendment would provide the option for such organizations to request a determination letter in accordance with Rev. Proc. 2013-4, Section 7.04(14) by checking the applicable box on the revised Form 8940. This is the most efficient procedure in our opinion for both the taxpayer and the IRS and the most likely to produce a timely result.

A second alternative proposed procedure is for the IRS to permit such organizations to submit a determination letter request pursuant to the current procedures provided in Rev. Proc. 2013-4, but as amended as described below. This procedure would allow the Exempt Organizations Determinations office to issue determination letters to taxpayers submitting properly formatted and documented requests with the applicable user fee provided in the Rev. Proc. In connection with this proposal, we would propose an amendment to the current language of the Rev. Proc. requiring the governmental entity to include documentation of tax-exempt status other than under Section 501(a). Instead, we propose requiring the requesting taxpayer to certify (under penalties of perjury) that all of its income is excluded under Section 115 within its determination letter request.

Since governmental entities are effectively exempt from federal income taxation under the intergovernmental immunity doctrine, many do not have written documentation from the IRS to establish their tax-exempt status or gross income exclusion other than under Section 501(a). Instead, these entities have made their own determination of their tax-exempt status. If their determination is found by the IRS to be incorrect, the entity is deemed taxable. Requiring a taxpayer requesting a determination letter under Section 7.04(14) of Rev. Proc. 2013-4 to certify its tax-exempt status other than under Section 501(a) provides the IRS with assurance that entity assets will remain devoted to tax-exempt or governmental purposes. If an entity’s certification is erroneous, the entity would be treated as any other taxable entity that misclassified itself as tax-exempt. Requiring more determinative evidence of alternate tax-exempt status other than under Section 501(a) seems unnecessary for an entity requesting voluntary termination of its Section 501(c)(3) recognition when such evidence is not required absent previously obtaining a Section 501(c)(3) determination, and likely would be costly and fraught with delay.

The third alternative proposed procedure is to permit such organizations to submit a determination letter request pursuant to the procedure provided in Rev. Proc. 2013-4. This would allow the Exempt Organizations Determinations office to issue determination letters to taxpayers submitting properly formatted and documented requests with the applicable user fee provided in the Rev. Proc. As the current language of the Rev. Proc. requires the governmental entity to include documentation of tax-exempt status other than under Section 501(a), we would propose that the IRS incorporate an expedited process for obtaining a private letter ruling to fulfill this requirement. The private letter ruling could be processed by the Chief Counsel’s office, but requested by the taxpayer submitting one overall determination letter request that also contains an expedited private letter ruling request.

This comment letter proposes three alternative suggestions for a governmental entity, or an affiliate or instrumentality thereof, that operates a public hospital to voluntarily terminate its Section 501(c)(3) recognition. The administrative burden of each of these options for the taxpayer and the IRS varies. We prefer, and therefore recommend, the first alternative. However, all three would provide a viable method to allow a governmental entity, or an affiliate or instrumentality thereof, to voluntarily terminate its Section 501(c)(3) recognition.

We appreciate your consideration and would be happy to answer any questions.

Very truly yours,

T.J. Sullivan

Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP

Washington, DC




Fitch 2014 Outlook: Nonprofit Continuing Care Retirement Communities.

Read the report at:

https://www.fitchratings.com/creditdesk/reports/report_frame.cfm?rpt_id=726239




IRS Releases Publication on Charitable Contributions.

The IRS has released Publication 526 (rev. 2013), Charitable Contributions, which explains how to claim a deduction for charitable contributions and discusses organizations that are eligible to receive deductible charitable contributions.

http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p526.pdf




Contracts and Grants between Nonprofits and Government.

This brief summarizes the results of the 2013 National Survey of Nonprofit-Government Contracts and Grants. Expanding on the 2010 study of human service nonprofits, we examine most types of nonprofits with expenses of $100,000 or more. This report documents the size and scope of government financing, administration of contracts and grants, and nonprofit perceptions of problems and improvements in these processes and reports on the financial status of nonprofits at the end of the Great Recession. Nearly 56,000 nonprofits have government contracts and grant, and we estimate that governments paid $137 billion to nonprofits in 2012.

Read the full report at:

http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412968-Contracts-and-Grants-between-Nonprofits-and-Government.pdf

Sarah L. Pettijohn, Elizabeth T. Boris




Capping Charitable Deduction Will Reduce Giving, AEI Predicts.

Although recent tax increases may stimulate charitable giving in the short term, enacting a proposed limit on the charitable deduction would significantly reduce donations and result in “serious — maybe catastrophic” harm to many nonprofits, the American Enterprise Institute predicted in a December report.

http://www.aei.org/papers/economics/fiscal-policy/taxes/the-great-recession-tax-policy-and-the-future-of-charity-in-america/




EOs Should Pay Attention to Tax Reform, Panel Says.

Although prospects of passing a tax reform package anytime soon are slim, tax-exempt organizations should be alert to what tax reform could mean to them, panelists at a program on legislation and exempt organizations said December 4.

Although prospects of passing a tax reform package anytime soon are slim, tax-exempt organizations should be alert to what tax reform could mean to them, panelists at a program on legislation and exempt organizations said December 4.

Alexander L. Reid of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, moderating a program sponsored by the District of Columbia Bar Taxation Section’s Exempt Organizations Committee, said that based on his recent conversation with a House Ways and Means Committee tax counsel, the exempt organizations portion of the tax reform bill being drafted by committee Chair Dave Camp, R-Mich., is significant and far-reaching. Topics that have been the subject of committee hearings in recent years — colleges and universities, political and lobbying activities, and commercial activities, among others — are areas that members have found interesting, Reid said, adding, “Anything that there has been a hearing on is on the table.”

Reid also said that although committee members want to preserve the deduction for charitable contributions, “they also want to envision the [charitable] sector as it is today and maybe as it will be in the next five to 10 years.”

Alan Lee, Ways and Means Democratic tax counsel, who spoke on his own behalf, said there are rumors that Camp is not committed to maintaining the charitable deduction in its current form, although that does not mean he wants to repeal it or cap it at 28 percent, as has been proposed before.

Camp, who had originally intended to introduce and have his committee mark up a tax reform bill by the end of 2013, told reporters December 4 that that won’t be possible. (Related coverage .)

Lee said that while a bill next year is possible, it would be difficult to act on tax reform when there are so many budget issues to deal with. “Getting tax reform through the House, I think, is a very difficult prospect,” Lee said. “Once members start realizing this is not just a rate reduction exercise and that this actually has real impacts because these are real policies, you’re going to have a lot of members in the Republican caucus taking a step back and wanting to really take a closer look at the bill.”

Alexander Brosseau, Democratic tax policy analyst for the Senate Budget Committee, said that for a tax reform bill to succeed, it would have to have bipartisan support. “Certainly, coming out of the House, it has to, so long as the Senate is controlled by Democrats and the White House [is] the same,” he said.

by Fred Stokeld




TE/GE Memo Revises Procedures for Verifying Membership Requirements of Veterans' Organizations.

The IRS has issued a memorandum (TEGE-04-1113-21) revising examination guidelines for section 501(c)(19) tax-exempt veterans’ organizations to eliminate an agent’s discretion to request military service discharge certificates at the start of exams for purposes of determining whether the organization meets statutory membership requirements.

November 26, 2013

Affected IRM: IRM 4.76.26

Expiration Date: Nov 26, 2014

MEMORANDUM FOR

ALL EO EXAMINATIONS MANAGERS,

ALL EO EXAMINATIONS REVENUE AGENTS

FROM:

Nanette M. Downing

Director, EO Examinations

SUBJECT:

Verification of Statutory Membership Requirements

of Veterans’ Organizations

This memorandum revises examination guidelines for tax-exempt veterans’ organizations described in section 501(c)(19) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) by eliminating an agent’s discretion to request DD Forms 214 at the outset of examinations for the purpose of determining whether the organization meets statutory membership requirements.

IRC sections 501(c)(19) and 170(c)(3) provide statutory membership requirements for certain tax-exempt veterans’ organizations. Compliance with these requirements has a direct effect on the qualification for tax-exempt status and the deductibility of contributions.

In order to confirm whether a veterans’ organization meets statutory membership requirements, IRM 4.76.26.12(1) provides that examining agents may request, among other documents, DD Forms 214, Certificate of Release or Discharge from Active Duty, of veterans’ organizations. DD Form 214 is a military service discharge certificate issued to veterans, providing proof of military service. However, DD Form 214 also contains private information, such as medical information.

Effective immediately, if an agent needs to determine the composition of membership of a veterans’ organization, the agent shall initially request and collect from the organization four sets of documents, as follows:

1. Membership list(s) that contain the names of the members, the military service dates, and the status of each individual member. This status information is to indicate whether the member is active duty, veteran, cadet, or spouse. The organization may provide list(s) from its affiliated parent organization.

2. A document that shows the dues structure and classes of memberships.

3. The documentary information used by the organization to create the membership list(s) noted above. Organizations should be informed that to satisfy this request they may provide membership applications, membership cards, or other similar documents, other than DD Form 214.

4. Documents showing the organization’s policies and procedures on how it decides an individual is eligible for membership, including documents which show the means by which it enforces its membership requirements.

If an agent possesses information that contradicts documentary information provided or if the organization fails to satisfy a reasonable request, agents may then request DD Forms 214 or other discharge documents from the organization in order to ascertain compliance with the federal tax laws cited herein. DD Forms 214 must include the name, department, component and branch of service, and record of service dates. All other personal information may be redacted.

The contents of this memorandum will be incorporated in IRM 4.76.26.

Please submit your questions to Mandatory Review via *TEGE EO Review Staff.




Impact of Clergy Rental Exclusion Holding Could Be Big, Practitioners Say.

A U.S. district court decision striking down the rental allowance exclusion for ministers could have a major impact on churches and clergy if it is upheld, practitioners and representatives of religious denominations said November 25.

A U.S. district court decision striking down the rental allowance exclusion for ministers could have a major impact on churches and clergy if it is upheld, practitioners and representatives of religious denominations said November 25.

In a November 22 holding  on a suit brought by the Freedom From Religion Foundation Inc. (FFRF) against the IRS, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin said that section 107(2), which provides for the exclusion, violates the establishment clause of the First Amendment because it benefits only religious people even though the benefit is not needed to ease a special burden on the exercise of religion. Although the exclusion benefits many ministers who may feel its loss if it is taken away, it violates the First Amendment principle that a person’s religion should not affect one’s legal rights, duties, or benefits, Judge Barbara B. Crabb wrote.

The FFRF rejoiced at the news. “This decision agrees with us that Congress may not reward ministers for fighting a ‘godless and anti-religious’ movement by letting them pay less income tax. The rest of us should not pay more because clergy pay less,” FFRF co-presidents Annie Laurie Gaylor and Dan Barker said in a statement .

FFRF’s attorney, Richard L. Bolton, said the holding is not hostile to religion and should not be considered controversial: “The Court has simply recognized the reality that a tax free housing allowance available only to ministers is a significant benefit from the government unconstitutionally provided on the basis of religion.”

Michael E. Batts of Batts Morrison Wales & Lee, who has served as chair of the Commission on Accountability and Policy for Religious Organizations, told Tax Analysts the decision, if upheld, would have a massive impact on houses of worship and clergy across the United States. It would affect the ability of churches and other religious organizations to compensate clergy, he said, adding that churches might have to devote more of their budgets to clergy compensation at the expense of other areas.

In a statement , Russell D. Moore, president of the Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention, said the holding ultimately could harm clergy serving small congregations. “The clergy housing allowance isn’t a government establishment of religion, but just the reverse,” he said. “The allowance is neutral to all religions. Without it, clergy in small congregations of all sorts would be penalized and harmed.”

Crabb stayed enforcement of her decision pending an appeal.

The court’s decision did not implicate the section 107(1) exclusion for clergy living in parsonages provided by churches.

by Fred Stokeld




Court Holds Ministers' Housing Allowance Exemption Is Unconstitutional.

A U.S. district court held that section 107(2), which excludes the rental allowance paid to a minister from gross income, is an unconstitutional violation of the establishment clause and enjoined its enforcement, finding that it provides a benefit to religious persons that it does not give to others.

The Freedom From Religion Foundation (FFRF) and its co-presidents filed a suit in U.S. district court challenging the availability of federal income tax exemptions for “ministers of the gospel” under section 107, arguing that the exemptions violate the Constitution’s establishment and equal protection clauses.

U.S. District Judge Barbara B. Crabb rejected the government’s argument that FFRF and its co-presidents lacked standing to challenge the law, finding that the injury is clear from the face of the statute and that the co-presidents weren’t required to first claim the exemption and have it rejected before filing suit. Crabb said she found it difficult to take seriously the government’s argument that FFRF’s co-presidents may qualify as ministers of the gospel. The court concluded that the statute denied FFRF’s co-presidents an exemption, that they suffered an injury, and that the injury was traceable to those in the government who implement the tax code.

Crabb then addressed the merits of the case and found that based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Texas Monthly Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989), the exemption in section 107(2) violates the establishment clause. In that decision, the Supreme Court held that a state sales tax exemption provided only to publishers of religious writings was unconstitutional. Crabb acknowledged that the withdrawal of the exemption would greatly affect ministers and their churches, but she said that only underscores the preferential treatment that she found to have violated the First Amendment. Crabb concluded her opinion by saying the government isn’t powerless to provide exemptions to benefit religion and that Congress can rewrite the provision so that it complies with the principles established by the Supreme Court.

FREEDOM FROM RELIGION FOUNDATION, INC.,

ANNIE LAURIE GAYLOR AND DAN BARKER,

Plaintiffs,

v.

JACOB LEW AND DANIEL WERFEL,

Defendants.1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. and its two co-presidents, plaintiffs Annie Laurie Gaylor and Dan Barker, brought this lawsuit under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702, contending that certain federal income tax exemptions received by “ministers of the gospel” under 26 U.S.C. § 107 violate the establishment clause of the First Amendment and the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment. Defendants Timothy Geithner and Douglas Schulman (now succeeded by Jacob Lew and Daniel Werfel) have filed a motion for summary judgment, dkt. #40, which is ready for review.

In their complaint, plaintiffs challenged both § 107(1) and § 107(2), but in response to defendants’ motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs narrowed their claim to § 107(2), which excludes from gross income a minister’s “rental allowance paid to him as part of his compensation.” (Section 107(1) excludes “the rental value of a home furnished to [the minister] as part of his compensation.”) Because plaintiffs have not opposed defendants’ argument that plaintiffs lack standing to challenge § 107(1), I will grant defendants’ motion as to that aspect of plaintiffs’ claim.

With respect to plaintiffs’ challenge to § 107(2), I adhere to my conclusion in the order denying defendants’ motion to dismiss, dkt. #30, that plaintiffs have standing to sue because it is clear from the face of the statute that plaintiffs are excluded from an exemption granted to others. With respect to the merits, I conclude that § 107(2) violates the establishment clause under the holding in Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989), because the exemption provides a benefit to religious persons and no one else, even though doing so is not necessary to alleviate a special burden on religious exercise. This conclusion makes it unnecessary to consider plaintiffs’ equal protection argument.

Although plaintiffs did not file their own motion for summary judgment, “[d]istrict courts have the authority to enter summary judgment sua sponte as long as the losing party was on notice that it had to come forward with all its evidence.” Ellis v. DHL Exp. Inc. (USA), 633 F.3d 522, 529 (7th Cir. 2011). In this case, the parties have fully briefed the relevant issues, which are primarily legal rather than factual. Further, plaintiffs asked the court to enter judgment in their favor in their brief in opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Dkt. #52 at 66. Although defendants objected to this request in their reply brief, dkt. #53 at 3, it was on the same grounds that defendants believe that they are entitled to summary judgment. Defendants do not suggest that they would have raised any other arguments or presented any additional facts if plaintiffs had filed their own motion. Under these circumstances, I conclude that it is appropriate to deny defendants’ motion for summary judgment and grant summary judgment in plaintiffs’ favor with respect to § 107(2).

In concluding that § 107(2) violates the Constitution, I acknowledge the benefit that the exemption provides to many ministers (and the churches that employ them) and the loss that may be felt if the exemption is withdrawn. Clergy Housing Allowance Clarification Act of 2002, 148 Cong. Rec. H1299-01 (Apr. 16, 2002) (statement of Congressman Jim Ramstad) (in 2002, estimating that § 107 would relieve ministers of $2.3 billion in taxes over next five years). However, the significance of the benefit simply underscores the problem with the law, which is that it violates the well-established principle under the First Amendment that “[a]bsent the most unusual circumstances, one’s religion ought not affect one’s legal rights or duties or benefits.” Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 715 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Some might view a rule against preferential treatment as exhibiting hostility toward religion, but equality should never be mistaken for hostility.

It is important to remember that the establishment clause protects the religious and nonreligious alike. Linnemeir v. Board of Trustees of Purdue University, 260 F.3d 757, 765 (7th Cir. 2001) (“The Supreme Court has consistently described the Establishment Clause as forbidding not only state action motivated by a desire to advance religion, but also action intended to ‘disapprove,’ ‘inhibit,’ or evince ‘hostility’ toward religion.”). If a statute imposed a tax solely against ministers (or granted an exemption to everyone except ministers) without a secular reason for doing so, that law would violate the Constitution just as § 107(2) does. Stated another way, if the government were free to grant discriminatory tax exemptions in favor of religion, then it would be free to impose discriminatory taxes against religion as well. Under the First Amendment, everyone is free to worship or not worship, believe or not believe, without government interference or discrimination, regardless what the prevailing view on religion is at any particular time, thus “preserving religious liberty to the fullest extent possible in a pluralistic society.” McCreary County, Kentucky v. American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844, 882 (2005) (O’Connor, J., concurring).

OPINION

A. Standing

As they did in their motion to dismiss, defendants argue that plaintiffs do not have standing to challenge § 107(2). To obtain standing, plaintiffs must show that they suffered an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to defendants’ conduct and capable of being redressed by a favorable decision from the court. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).

Plaintiffs Gaylor’s and Barker’s alleged injury is the unequal treatment they receive under § 107(2):

In the case of a minister of the gospel, gross income does not include —

* * *

(2) the rental allowance paid to him as part of his compensation, to the extent used by him to rent or provide a home and to the extent such allowance does not exceed the fair rental value of the home, including furnishings and appurtenances such as a garage, plus the cost of utilities.

In particular, plaintiffs argue that “ministers of the gospel” receive a tax exemption under § 107(2) that Gaylor and Barker do not, even though a portion of the salary Gaylor and Barker receive from Freedom from Religion Foundation is designated as a housing allowance. Plts.’ PFOF ¶ 2, dkt. #50; Dfts.’ Resp. to Plts.’ PFOF ¶ 2, dkt. #55. In addition, plaintiffs argue that an order enjoining § 107(2) would redress their injury because it would eliminate the unequal treatment. The parties agree that Gaylor and Barker are both members of the foundation and that the purpose of the foundation is related to the claims in this case, so if the individual plaintiffs have standing, then the foundation does as well. Sierra Club v. Franklin County Power of Illinois, LLC, 546 F.3d 918, 924 (7th Cir. 2008).

Defendants do not deny that a person who is denied a tax exemption that others receive has suffered an injury in fact. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1989) (general interest magazine had standing to challenge state tax exemption received by religious publications); Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 224-25 (1987) (same). See also Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1439 (2011) (“[P]laintiffs may demonstrate standing on the ground that they have incurred a cost or been denied a benefit on account of their religion. Those costs and benefits can result from alleged discrimination in the tax code, such as when the availability of a tax exemption is conditioned on religious affiliation.”). In addition, defendants do not deny that a discriminatory tax exemption may be redressed by eliminating the exemption for everyone. Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 740, (1984) (“We have often recognized that the victims of a discriminatory government program may be remedied by an end to preferential treatment for others.”). However, defendants argue that the lawsuit is premature because plaintiffs have never tried to claim the exemption. Until the Internal Revenue Service denies a claim, defendants say, plaintiffs have not suffered an injury.

As an initial matter, it is not clear whether plaintiffs would have standing to challenge § 107(2) in the context of a proceeding to claim the exemption. In several cases, courts have rejected establishment clause challenges to tax exemptions brought by parties who filed claims for the exemption that were denied. In each of those cases, the court held that the party could not receive the exemption if the court declared it to be unconstitutional, so a favorable decision could not redress their injury. Templeton v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 719 F.2d 1408, 1412 (7th Cir. 1983); Ward v. Commissioner of Internal Revnue, 608 F.2d 599, 601 (5th Cir. 1979); Kirk v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 425 F.2d 492, 495 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Thus, if accepted, defendants’ view could insulate § 107 from challenge by anyone.

In any event, I considered and rejected defendants’ argument in the context of denying their motion to dismiss. Dkt. #30. In particular, I concluded that plaintiffs’ alleged injury is clear from the face of the statute and that there is no plausible argument that the individual plaintiffs could qualify for an exemption as “ministers of the gospel,” so it would serve no legitimate purpose to require plaintiffs to claim the exemption and wait for the inevitable denial of the claim. Finlator v. Powers, 902 F.2d 1158, 1162 (4th Cir. 1990) (concluding that nonexempt taxpayers had standing to challenge exemption without first claiming exemption because plaintiffs’ “injury is created by the very fact that the [law] imposes additional [tax] burdens on the appellants not placed on” those entitled to exemption). See also California Medical Association v. Federal Electric Commission, 453 U.S. 182, 192 (1981) (concluding that plaintiffs had standing, noting that they “expressly challenge the statute on its face, and there is no suggestion that the statute is susceptible to an interpretation that would remove the need for resolving the constitutional questions raised”); Harp Advertising Illinois, Inc. v. Village of Chicago Ridge, Illinois, 9 F.3d 1290, 1291-92 (7th Cir. 1993) (“Challenges to statutes as written, without inquiring into their application, are appropriate when details of implementation are inconsequential.”).

The Supreme Court has not addressed this question explicitly, but in Walz v. Tax Commission of City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 666-67 (1970), the plaintiff was an owner of real estate in New York City who objected to the issuance of “property tax exemptions to religious organizations.” Although there was no indication in the opinion that the owner requested an exemption for himself before bringing his lawsuit, the Court reached the merits of his claim under the establishment clause. In Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1449, the Court acknowledged that it had omitted a discussion of standing from the decision in Walz but suggested that the plaintiff could have relied on the alleged discriminatory treatment among different property owners to demonstrate standing to sue.

In their motion for summary judgment, defendants do not ask the court to reconsider the conclusion that plaintiffs have standing to challenge § 107(2) if it is clear from the face of the statute that they are not entitled to the exemption. Instead, defendants expand an argument that was relegated to a footnote in their motion to dismiss, dkt. #23 at 10 n.3, which is that it is not clear from the face of the statute and the implementing regulations that plaintiffs are ineligible for the exemption under § 107(2). Rather, defendants say that it is “conceivable” that atheists such as Gaylor and Barker could qualify as “ministers of the gospel” under § 107, so they should be required to claim the exemption before challenging the statute.

Although defendants devote a substantial amount of their briefs to this argument, it is difficult to take it seriously. Under no remotely plausible interpretation of § 107 could plaintiffs Gaylor and Barker qualify as “ministers of the gospel.” However, for the sake of completeness, I will address the primary arguments that defendants raise in their briefs on this issue.

Much of defendants’ argument rests on Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678, 682 (7th Cir. 2005), in which the court concluded that atheism could qualify as a religion under the free exercise clause in the context of a claim brought by an atheist prisoner who wanted to start an atheist study group. (The court went on to reject the prisoner’s claim because he could not show that the absence of an atheist study group imposed a substantial burden on his religious exercise, id. at 683, without explaining how an atheist could make that showing in a different case.) However, the issue in this case is not the scope of the free exercise clause of the First Amendment as interpreted in the context of one case decided in 2005, but the proper interpretation of the phrase “ministers of the gospel” in a statute enacted in 1954, so cases such as Kaufman provide little guidance.

Alternatively, defendants says that the IRS regulations promulgated under § 107 do not discriminate against “nontheistic beliefs” and that the IRS does not evaluate the “content” of a claimant’s professed religion, but these arguments are red herrings as well. As I noted in the order denying defendants’ motion to dismiss, the IRS has interpreted § 107 liberally to include members of non-Christian faiths. E.g., Salkov v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 46 T.C. 190, 194 (1966) (approving tax exemption for Jewish cantor after rejecting interpretation of term “gospel” as being limited to books of New Testament and instead construing term to mean “glad tidings or a message, teaching, doctrine, or course of action having certain efficacy or validity”). However, even if I assume that IRS would continue to stretch the plain meaning of § 107, there is a difference between non-theistic faiths such as Buddhism and having no faith at all. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961) (distinguishing “those religions based on a belief in the existence of God,” “those religions founded on different beliefs” and “non-believers”). Defendants point to no regulations or decisions suggesting that a person who did not subscribe to any faith could qualify for an exemption under § 107(2).

Regardless whether the IRS might recognize atheism as a religion, this does not answer the question whether it would recognize an atheist “minister,” which is the only question that matters. Defendants cite no evidence that atheists have “ministers” as that term is used in § 107, which is sufficient reason to reject an argument that an atheist could qualify for an exemption under that statute.

Even if I assume that there are atheists ministers, neither plaintiff Gaylor nor plaintiff Barker could qualify as one. Under the federal regulations, the key question is whether the claimant is seeking an exemption for “services performed by a minister [that] are performed in the exercise of his ministry.” 26 C.F.R. § 1.1402(c)-5(b)(2). The tax court has struggled to come up with a consistent framework to answer that question, applying different tests in cases such as Good v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 104 T.C.M. (CCH) 595 (T.C. 2012), Mosley v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 708 (T.C. 1994), and Lawrence v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 50 T.C. 494 (1968), but both sides in this case cite Knight v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 92 T.C. 199, 205 (1989), as identifying all the relevant factors. In Knight, the court considered whether the claimant: (1) performs sacerdotal functions under the tenets and practices of the particular religious body constituting his church or church denomination; (2) conducts worship services; (3) performs services in the control, conduct, and maintenance of a religious organization that operates under the authority of a church or church denomination; (4) is ordained, commissioned, or licensed; and (5) is considered to be a spiritual leader by his religious body.

Plaintiffs do not come close to meeting any of these factors. Defendants cite no persuasive evidence that either Gaylor or Barker is ordained, that they perform “sacerdotal” functions or conduct “worship” services, that anyone in the foundation considers Gaylor and Barker to be “spiritual” leaders or that the foundation is under the authority of a “church.”

Again, even assuming that atheism is a religion, the Freedom from Religion Foundation is not an “atheist” organization in the sense that the purpose of the group is to “practice” atheism like the prisoner in Kaufman. Rather, the foundation is open to non-atheists, Barker Decl. ¶ 19, dkt. #48, and the purpose of the foundation, according to its bylaws, is to advocate and educate. Gaylor Decl., dkt. #47 exh. 1 at 1 (purpose of foundation is to promote “the constitutional principle of separation of church and state and to educate the public on matters related to non-theistic beliefs”). Defendants do not identify a single “religious” belief espoused by the foundation. In fact, defendants admit that the foundation is not a church or a religious organization operating under the authority of a church, that plaintiffs Gaylor’s and Barker’s roles as co-presidents of the foundation do not constitute an ordination, commissioning or licensing as ministers and that the foundation does not engage in worship. Dfts.’ Resp. to Plts.’ PFOF ¶¶ 14, 22, 29, dkt. #55.

Although some of Gaylor’s and Barker’s work may relate to religious issues, this is in the context of political and legal advocacy, similar to organizations such as the American Center for Law and Justice or the Anti-Defamation League. Tanenbaum v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 58 T.C. 1, 8 (1972) (denying exemption for employee of American Jewish Committee because he “was not hired to perform ‘sacerdotal functions’ or to conduct ‘religious worship’; rather, his job is to encourage and promote understanding of the history, ideals, and problems of Jews by other religious groups”). See also Flowers v. United States, No. CA 4-79-376-E, 1981 WL 1928, *6 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 25, 1981) (upholding denial of exemption because housing allowance was for educational rather than sacerdotal functions); Colbert v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 449 (1974) (taxpayer did not qualify for exemption because his “primary emphasis . . . was in warning and awakening people to the dangers of communism and in educating them as to the principles of communism” rather than “religious instruction in the principles laid down by Christ”). In other words, even if I were to assume that the foundation is an “atheist organization,” that is not enough to qualify plaintiffs as ministers because they do not engage in the activities that a minister performs. Kirk, 425 F.2d at 495 (affirming denial of claim under § 107 by church employee in part because “all the services performed by petitioner in this case were of secular nature”).

Defendants argue that plaintiff Barker engages in a number of activities that could be classified as “sacerdotal,” such as performing “de-baptisms,” lecturing, performing marriages, counseling, promoting free thought and writing “free thought” songs. (The regulations do not define the term “sacerdotal” except to say that it “depends on the tenets and practices of the particular religious body constituting [a claimant’s] church or church denomination.” 26 C.F.R. § 1.1402(c)-5(b)(2)(i).) Defendants’ argument is a nonstarter because it does not apply to Gaylor, only to Barker; defendants admit that Gaylor is not a minister. Dfts.’ Resp. to Plts.’ PFOF ¶ 14, dkt. #55. “Where at least one plaintiff has standing, jurisdiction is secure and the court will adjudicate the case whether the additional plaintiffs have standing or not.” Ezell vs. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 696 (7th Cir. 2011).

In any event, none of this evidence provides any support for a view that Barker could qualify as a minister of the gospel. As an initial matter, defendants do not deny that Barker engaged in some of the activities (such as writing songs and books) before working for the foundation, Dfts.’ Rep. to Plts.’ Resp. to Dfts.’ PFOF ¶ 6, dkt. #54, and that any marriages he officiates are done on his own time, not as an employee of the foundation. Barker Decl. ¶ 24, dkt. #48. See also Tanenbaum, 58 T.C. at 8 (refusing to consider “[a]ny other functions [the claimant] may perform . . . by virtue of his own personal desires but are not cause for remuneration by the” employer). The counseling Barker performs relates to issues such as “how to deal with religious relatives,” “how to start an FFRF chapter” and “how to teach children about morality without religion.” Dfts.’ PFOF ¶ 6(a), dkt. #41 (emphasis added). The “debaptismal certificate” can be downloaded by anyone off the internet and will be signed by Barker for five dollars. Dkt. #42-15. Each certificate includes the saying “With soap, baptism is a good thing.” Id. Barker describes the certificates as “a tongue-in-cheek way to bring attention to opting out of religion.” Barker Decl. ¶ 25, dkt. #48. I do not see how any of this conduct could relate “to the tenets and practices” of a particular religious body and defendants do not even attempt to develop an argument on this point.

In their reply brief, defendants argue that it “does not matter whether Ms. Gaylor or Mr. Barker would or would not be eligible for the exclusion provided in § 107 if they claimed it. What matters is that an atheist may lawfully make a claim for the exclusion.” Dkt. #53 at 6. This argument is puzzling because it rests on a premise that a plaintiff’s own experience is irrelevant to the question of standing. That is obviously incorrect. A plaintiff’s standing to sue is determined not by asking whether some hypothetical third party is being injured, but by whether the plaintiff is being injured. Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129 (2004) (“We have adhered to the rule that a party generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.”) (internal quotations omitted). Defendants seem to concede now that plaintiffs have been injured because they cannot qualify for the exemption. Defendants do not explain why that injury “does not matter” so long as it would be possible for some atheist to qualify under some set of circumstances, but they seem to be confusing standing with the merits. To the extent defendants are arguing that § 107(2) is constitutional if it would allow an exemption for an “atheist minister” in the abstract, that argument has nothing to do with standing.

Defendants make a related argument in their reply brief that plaintiffs’ alleged injury would not be fairly traceable to any “religious discrimination” by defendants if § 107 were interpreted as encompassing an “atheist minister.” Dfts.’ Br., dkt. #53, at 12. Again, this argument rests on a misunderstanding of standing requirements. The question is whether the plaintiff’s injury is fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 536 (2007), not whether the plaintiff will be able to prove that the injury was caused by a violation of a particular right, which is another question on the merits. Arreola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 794-95 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Although the two concepts unfortunately are blurred at times, standing and entitlement to relief are not the same thing.”).

Accordingly, I conclude that plaintiffs have standing to bring a facial challenge to § 107(2) because the statute denies them an exemption that others receive, the injury is fairly traceable to the conduct of defendants as those responsible for implementing the tax code and plaintiff’s injury is redressable by a declaration that § 107(2) is unconstitutional and an order enjoining its enforcement.

Finally, defendants raise other arguments about whether the case is ripe for adjudication and whether the Administrative Procedure Act waives the government’s sovereign immunity under the facts of this case, but both of these arguments are contingent on a finding that § 107(2) does not harm plaintiffs. Because I have rejected that argument, I need not address defendants’ other arguments separately.

B. Merits

1. Standard of review

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion. . . .” U.S. Const., Amend. I. The first question in every case brought under the establishment clause is the proper standard of review.

The test applied most commonly by courts was articulated first in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Under Lemon, government action violates the establishment clause if (1) it has no secular purpose; (2) its primary effect advances or inhibits religion; or (3) it fosters an excessive entanglement with religion. Although individual justices have criticized the test, e.g., Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 319 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Tangipahoa Parish Board of Education v. Freiler, 530 U.S. 1251 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), the Supreme Court as a whole continues to apply it. E.g., McCreary County, Kentucky v. American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844, 859-67 (2005). Further, it is the test the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has employed in recent cases brought under the establishment clause. E.g., Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook School District, 687 F.3d 840, 849 (7th Cir. 2012); Sherman ex rel. Sherman v. Koch, 623 F.3d 501, 507 (7th Cir. 2010); Milwaukee Deputy Sheriffs’ Association v. Clarke, 588 F.3d 523, 527 (7th Cir. 2009); Vision Church v. Village of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975, 991-92 (7th Cir. 2006).

In Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 691 (1984), Justice O’Connor offered what she later described as a “refinement” of the first two parts of the Lemon test, under which the court asks “whether the government’s purpose is to endorse religion and whether the statute actually conveys a message of endorsement,” Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring), viewed from the perspective of a “reasonable observer.” Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 34 (2004) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). The Supreme Court has applied Justice O’Connor’s test in several subsequent cases, e.g., McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 866; Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 654-55 (2002); County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 620 (1989), as has the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Clarke, 588 F.3d at 529; Linnemeir v. Board of Trustees of Purdue University, 260 F.3d 757, 764 (7th Cir. 2001); Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. City of Marshfield, Wisconsin, 203 F.3d 487, 493 (7th Cir. 2000). See also Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 721 (2010) (assuming that “reasonable observer” test applied).

Although the Supreme Court has articulated other tests as well over the years, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 787 (1983), the parties rely on the modified version of the Lemon test, so I will do the same.

2. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock

Consideration of the question whether § 107(2) violates the establishment clause must begin with Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989), the only case in which the Supreme Court has addressed the constitutionality of a tax exemption granted solely to religious persons. In Texas Monthly, the statute at issue exempted from the state sales tax “[p]eriodicals that are published or distributed by a religious faith and that consist wholly of writings promulgating the teaching of the faith and books that consist wholly of writings sacred to a religious faith.”

The justices in the plurality opinion (Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens) and those concurring in the judgment (Justices Blackmun and O’Connor) agreed that the statute violated the establishment clause. The plurality applied the familiar test under Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612, as well as the endorsement test. In concluding that the statute did not have a secular purpose or effect and conveyed a message of religious endorsement, the plurality emphasized that the exemption provided a benefit to religious publications only, without a corresponding showing that the exemption was necessary to alleviate a significant burden on free exercise:

Every tax exemption constitutes a subsidy that affects nonqualifying taxpayers, forcing them to become indirect and vicarious “donors.” Insofar as that subsidy is conferred upon a wide array of nonsectarian groups as well as religious organizations in pursuit of some legitimate secular end, the fact that religious groups benefit incidentally does not deprive the subsidy of the secular purpose and primary effect mandated by the Establishment Clause. However, when government directs a subsidy exclusively to religious organizations that is not required by the Free Exercise Clause and that either burdens nonbeneficiaries markedly or cannot reasonably be seen as removing a significant state-imposed deterrent to the free exercise of religion, as Texas has done, it provides unjustifiable awards of assistance to religious organizations and cannot but convey a message of endorsement to slighted members of the community.

Id. 14-15 (internal quotations, citations and alterations omitted). In addition, the plurality stated that the statute seemed “to produce greater state entanglement with religion than the denial of an exemption” because the statute required the government to “evaluat[e] the relative merits of differing religious claims” in order to determine whether a publication qualified for the exemption. Id. at 20.

In the concurring opinion, Justices Blackmun and O’Connor concluded that “a tax exemption limited to the sale of religious literature by religious organizations violates the Establishment Clause” because it results in “preferential support for the communication of religious messages.” Id. at 28. They added that “[a] statutory preference for the dissemination of religious ideas offends our most basic understanding of what the Establishment Clause is all about and hence is constitutionally intolerable.” Id.

Because no single opinion garnered at least five votes in Texas Monthly, “the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.” Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the rule in Marks likely would make Justice Blackmun’s opinion controlling, the differences between the plurality and concurring opinions in Texas Monthly are minimal for the purpose of this case. Under either opinion, a tax exemption provided only to religious persons violates the establishment clause, at least when the exemption results in preferential treatment for religious messages. Haller v. Commissioner of the Dept. of Revenue, 728 A.2d 351, 354-55 (Pa. 1999) (“[A] majority of the Court in Texas Monthly clearly recognized that tax exemptions that include religious organizations must have an overarching secular purpose that equally benefits similarly situated nonreligious organizations.”).

Because a primary function of a “minister of the gospel” is to disseminate a religious message, a tax exemption provided only to ministers results in preferential treatment for religious messages over secular ones. Accordingly, I conclude that Texas Monthly controls the outcome of this case. Although this case involves an income tax exemption instead of a sales tax exemption, neither the plurality nor the concurrence placed any importance on the type of tax involved and defendants do not provide any grounds for distinguishing the two types. Even Justice Scalia in his dissent in Texas Monthly stated that § 107 is a “tax exemptio[n] of the type the Court invalidates today.” Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 33 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

3. Accommodation of religion

Tellingly, defendants make little effort to distinguish Texas Monthly. They make a fleeting reference to the plurality’s statement that preferential treatment for religious groups may be permissible if it “remov[es] a significant state-imposed deterrent to the free exercise of religion,” Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 14, but they do not explain how that statement might apply to this case. Of course, “[a]ny [government action] pertaining to religion can be viewed as an ‘accommodation’ of free exercise rights,” Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 347 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment), but the “principle that government may accommodate the free exercise of religion does not supersede the fundamental limitations imposed by the Establishment Clause.” Lee, 505 U.S. at 587.

Although it is undoubtedly true that taxes impose a burden on ministers, the same is true for all taxpayers. Defendants do not identify any reason why a requirement on ministers to pay taxes on a housing allowance is more burdensome for them than for the many millions of others who must pay taxes on income used for housing expenses. In any event, the Supreme Court has rejected the view that the mere payment of a generally applicable tax may qualify as a substantial burden on free exercise. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization of California, 493 U.S. 378, 391 (1990) (“[T]o the extent that imposition of a generally applicable tax merely decreases the amount of money appellant has to spend on its religious activities, any such burden is not constitutionally significant.”).

Defendants cite several cases in which courts have found that 26 U.S.C. § 1402(e) and (g), which give exemptions to certain religious persons from paying taxes related to Social Security, are permissible accommodations of religion. E.g., Droz v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 48 F.3d 1120, 1121 (9th Cir. 1995); Hatcher v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 688 F.2d 82, 84 (10th Cir. 1979). See also Templeton, 719 F.2d at 1413-14 (rejecting equal protection challenge to same provisions). However, the exemptions in § 1402 are limited to those who have a religious objection to receiving public insurance and belong to a religion that will provide the assistance that others ordinarily would receive under Social Security. Thus, § 1402 is distinguishable from § 107 because § 1402 limits the exemption to those whose religious exercise would be substantially burdened. In addition, there is no preferential treatment to religious persons because the exemption is limited to those who will receive from their religious sect (rather than the government) the benefits the tax is designed to provide. Droz, 48 F.3d at 1121 (§ 1402(g) is a permissible accommodation because it is “an exemption narrowly drawn to maintain a fiscally sound Social Security system and to ensure that all persons are provided for, either by the Social Security system or by their church”); Hatcher, 688 F.2d at 84 (“That the principal purpose of the legislation is not to advance or inhibit religion is evident in the mandate that those who receive the exemption forego the benefit of the program. To further assure that one claiming the exemption does not become a public charge Congress required that the exemption only be given to persons belonging to organizations that make provision for dependent members.”).

Along the same lines, the cases in which the Supreme Court has upheld religious accommodations are in contexts that otherwise would result in severe restrictions on free exercise. Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 705 (1994) (“The Constitution allows the State to accommodate religious needs by alleviating special burdens.”) (emphasis added). For example, in Amos, 483 U.S. at 335, the Court upheld a religious exemption in an antidiscrimination law that otherwise would have required religious groups to violate their own religious beliefs, such as by requiring Catholic churches to ordain women as priests. And in Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005), the Court concluded that a law requiring administrators to provide religious accommodations to persons housed in state institutions was justified by the reality of institutionalization, which is “severely disabling to private religious exercise.” Id. at 720-21. Thus, in both situations, the accommodations are best described not as singling out religious persons for more favorable treatment, but as an attempt to prevent inequality caused by government-imposed burdens. School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 299 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[H]ostility, not neutrality, would characterize the refusal to provide chaplains and places of worship for prisoners and soldiers cut off by the State from all civilian opportunities for public communion.”).

As noted above, in this case, the burden of taxes is borne equally by everyone who pays them, regardless of religious affiliation, so concerns about free exercise do not justify a special exemption. In 1984, the Treasury Secretary himself recognized this point in a memorandum in which he recommended the repeal of § 107 because “[t]here is no evidence that the financial circumstances of ministers justify special tax treatment. The average minister’s compensation is low compared to other professionals, but not compared to taxpayers in general.” U.S. Dept. of Treasury, Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth: The Department Report to the President, vol. II 49 (1984). In fact, the Secretary argued that § 107 “provides a disproportionately greater benefit to relatively affluent ministers, due to the higher marginal tax rates applicable to their incomes.” Id. (The Treasury Department withdrew the recommendation after many members of the clergy objected to it. Gabriel O. Aitsebaomo, Challenges to Federal Income Tax Exemption of the Clergy and Government Support of Sectarian Schools through Tax Credits Device and the Unresolved Questions after Arizona v. Winn, 28 Akron Tax J. 1, 15 (2013).) Under these circumstances, I see no basis for concluding that § 107(2) may be justified as an accommodation of religion.

4. Walz v. Tax Commission of City of New York

Instead of Texas Monthly, defendants rely on Walz, 397 U.S. 664, in which the Supreme Court rejected a challenge under the establishment clause to a statute that gave a tax exemption to property used for “religious, educational or charitable purposes.” Id. at 666-67. The obvious distinction between Walz and this case is that the statute in Walz was not a tax exemption benefiting religious persons only, but a wide variety of nonprofit endeavors. See also Schempp, 374 U.S. at 301-02 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (no establishment clause violation when “certain tax deductions or exemptions . . . incidentally benefit churches and religious institutions, along with many secular charities and nonprofit organizations” because, in that situation “religious institutions simply share benefits which government makes generally available to educational, charitable, and eleemosynary groups”).

Defendants argue that the broader scope of the statute in Walz “was not dispositive for the majority,” Dfts.’ Br., dkt. #44, at 42, but that view is contradicted by the opinion itself as well as later decisions applying it. In concluding that the purpose of the exemption was not to advance religion, the Court observed that the state “has not singled out one particular church or religious group or even churches as such; rather, it has granted exemption to all houses of religious worship within a broad class of property owned by nonprofit, quasi-public corporations which include hospitals, libraries, playgrounds, scientific, professional, historical, and patriotic groups.” Walz, 397 U.S. at 673. It went on to say that the statute applies to groups that have “beneficial and stabilizing influences in community life” as opposed to “private profit institutions.” Id. See also id. at 687, 689 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“These organizations are exempted because they, among a range of other private, nonprofit organizations contribute to the well-being of the community in a variety of nonreligious ways, and thereby bear burdens that would otherwise either have to be met by general taxation, or be left undone, to the detriment of the community. . . . Government may properly include religious institutions among the variety of private, nonprofit groups that receive tax exemptions, for each group contributes to the diversity of association, viewpoint, and enterprise essential to a vigorous, pluralistic society.”); id. at 697 n.1 (Harlan, J., concurring) (tax exemption does not violate establishment clause “because New York has created a general class so broad that it would be difficult to conclude that religious organizations cannot properly be included in it”).

In Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 11, the plurality stated that “[t]he breadth of New York’s property tax exemption was essential to our holding [in Walz ] that it was not aimed at establishing, sponsoring, or supporting religion, but rather possessed the legitimate secular purpose and effect of contributing to the community’s moral and intellectual diversity and encouraging private groups to undertake projects that advanced the community’s well-being and that would otherwise have to be funded by tax revenues or left undone.” Further, the plurality reviewed other cases in which the Court had upheld benefits to religious organizations and concluded that they too involved a broader array of groups. “[W]ere those benefits confined to religious organizations, they could not have appeared other than as state sponsorship of religion; if that were so, we would not have hesitated to strike them down for lacking a secular purpose and effect.” Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 10-11 (plurality opinion) (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); and Walz, 397 U.S. 664). See also Grumet, 512 U.S. at 704 (“We have frequently relied explicitly on the general availability of any benefit provided religious groups or individuals in turning aside Establishment Clause challenges,” including in Walz.).

To support their argument that the holding in Walz was not limited to exemptions that include nonreligious groups, defendants cite the statement by the Court that it was “unnecessary to justify the tax exemption on the social welfare services or ‘good works’ that some churches perform for parishioners and others-family counselling, aid to the elderly and the infirm, and to children.” Walz, 397 U.S. at 674. However, defendants are taking the statement out of context. The Court went on to explain that it did not want the government to have to evaluate whether a religious body’s good works were “good enough” to qualify because that could “produc[e] a kind of continuing day-to-day relationship which the policy of neutrality seeks to minimize.” Id. Thus, the Court’s observation is best read as an attempt to avoid a justification for an exemption that would lead to greater entanglement between church and state. The Court did not suggest that the government was free to provide tax exemptions to religious entities without including other groups.

Defendants also rely on Walz for the proposition that a “tax exemption does not implicate the same constitutional concerns as a direct subsidy,” Dfts.’ Br., dkt. #44, at 43, quoting the Court’s statement that “[t]he grant of a tax exemption is not sponsorship since the government does not transfer part of its revenue to churches but simply abstains from demanding that the church support the state.” Walz, 397 U.S. at 675. Taken to its logical conclusion, an argument relying on a distinction between exemptions and subsidies would permit the government to eliminate all taxes for religious organizations, an extreme position that defendants do not advance. However, in the absence of a categorical approach, it is not clear how exemptions could be treated differently from subsidies and defendants do not provide any suggestions.

In any event, to the extent that Walz suggested a different analysis for exemptions, that view is inconsistent with both the plurality and concurring opinions in Texas Monthly, neither of which made a distinction between the two types of support. It was rejected explicitly by the plurality, which stated that “[e]very tax exemption constitutes a subsidy that affects nonqualifying taxpayers, forcing them to become ‘indirect and vicarious ‘donors.'” Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 14 (quoting Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983)). The Court has resisted the distinction in other opinions as well. Ragland, 481 U.S. at 236 (“Our opinions have long recognized — in First Amendment contexts as elsewhere — the reality that tax exemptions, credits, and deductions are a form of subsidy that is administered through the tax system.”) (internal citations omitted); Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983) (“Both tax exemptions and tax-deductibility are a form of subsidy that is administered through the tax system.”). See also Walz, 397 U.S. at 701 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“[O]ne of the best ways to ‘establish’ one or more religions is to subsidize them, which a tax exemption does.”); Adler, The Internal Revenue Code, The Constitution, and the Courts: The Use of Tax Expenditure Analysis in Judicial Decision Making, 28 Wake Forest L. Rev. 855, 862 n.30 (1993) (“[T]he large body of literature about tax expenditures accepts the basic concept that special exemptions from tax function as subsidies.”), quoted with approval in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 861 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).

Defendants cite Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1439, as an example of a recent case in which the Court distinguished between exemptions and subsidies. However, Winn was a case about determining a plaintiff’s injury for the purpose of taxpayer standing, a doctrine the Court has taken great effort to cabin. Id. at 1445 (emphasizing “the general rule against taxpayer standing”). The Court did not rely on Walz for the distinction it made between exemptions and subsidies in the standing context and defendants do not explain how the distinction in Winn applies to a case about the substantive scope of the establishment clause. In sum, I conclude that defendants cannot rely on Walz or Winn to preserve § 107(2).

5. Other cases

In addition to Texas Monthly, there are other cases in which the Supreme Court has held that it violates the establishment clause to single out religious beliefs for preferential treatment without providing a similar benefit to secular individuals or groups. For example, in Community for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 793 (1973), the Court concluded that tax exemptions for parents of children in sectarian schools violated the establishment clause, reasoning that “[s]pecial tax benefits . . . cannot be squared with the principle of neutrality established by the decisions of this Court.” And in Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985), in an opinion by Chief Justice Burger (the author of Walz), the Court held that it violated the establishment clause to give employees an “unqualified” right not to work on the Sabbath because it meant “that Sabbath religious concerns automatically control over all secular interests at the workplace” and “the statute takes no account of the convenience or interests of the employer or those of other employees who do not observe a Sabbath.” Id. at 709. See also Grumet, 512 U.S. at 708-09 (“[A] statute [may] not tailor its benefits to apply only to one religious group.”).

In addition to these Supreme Court cases, there are several cases in which other courts have concluded that tax exemptions violated the establishment clause when they benefited religious groups only. E.g., Finlator, 902 F.2d at 1162 (striking down sales tax exemption for Bibles); Haller, 728 A.2d at 355 (striking down sales tax exemption for “religious publications”); Appeal of Springmoor, Inc., 498 S.E.2d 177 (N.C. 1998) (striking down property tax exemption for nursing homes “owned, operated and managed by a religious or Masonic organization”); Thayer v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 413 S.E.2d 810, 813 (S.C. 1992) (striking down sales tax exemption for “religious publications”). See also American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Louisiana v. Crawford, CIV.A. 00-1614, 2002 WL 461649 (E.D. La. Mar. 21, 2002) (granting preliminary injunction against tax exemption provided to places of accommodation “operated by religious organizations for religious purposes”). Defendants cite no cases to the contrary, with the exception of cases involving § 1402, which are distinguishable for the reasons explained above.

6. Purpose and effect of § 107(2)

In an attempt to show that neither the purpose nor the effect of § 107(2) is to advance or endorse religion, defendants argue that the provision actually eliminates discrimination among different religions and between religious and nonreligious persons. In support of this view, defendants say that the impetus for both § 107(1) and § 107(2) can be traced to the “convenience of the employer” doctrine, under which employees would not be taxed under certain circumstances on the value of housing provided by their employer. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 85-86 (1977). The Treasury Department began applying the doctrine in 1919, shortly after the federal government began collecting income tax, using the rationale that housing should not be viewed as compensation if it is provided by the employer to enable an employee to do his job properly. Id. at 84-90. Examples of employees who received the exemption included seamen and hospital workers who were required to be on call 24 hours a day. Id. at 84, 86. In 1954, Congress codified the exemption in 26 U.S.C. § 119, which allows an employee to exclude from his gross income “the value of any . . . lodging furnished to him, . . . but only if . . . the employee is required to accept such lodging on the business premises of his employer as a condition of his employment.”

According to defendants, in 1921 the Treasury Department refused to apply the convenience of the employer doctrine to ministers who lived in church-provided housing. (Plaintiffs dispute that view, but I need not resolve that dispute for the purpose of this opinion.) Defendants say that, in response, Congress passed § 213(b)(11) of the Revenue Act of 1921, which allowed ministers of the gospel to exclude from their gross income the rental value of housing they received as part of their compensation. (That exemption later became § 107(1).) Finally, defendants say that the purpose of § 107(2) when it was enacted in 1954 was to eliminate discrimination against ministers who could not claim the already existing exemption for ministers who lived in parsonages. In particular, defendants say that § 107(2) was needed to help “less-established and less wealthy religions [that] were not able to provide housing for their spiritual leaders.” Dfts.’ Br., dkt. #44, at 33. Defendants cite a committee report from the House of Representatives in support of their view:

Under present law, the rental value of a home furnished a minister of the gospel as a part of his salary is not included in his gross income. This is unfair to those ministers who are not furnished a parsonage, but who receive larger salaries (which are taxable) to compensate them for expenses they incur in supplying their own home.

Your committee has removed the discrimination in existing law by providing that the present exclusion is to apply to rental allowances paid to ministers to the extent used by them to rent or provide a home.

H.R. Rep. No. 1337, at 15, available in U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News, 83rd Congress, Second Session, at 4040 (1954).

Plaintiffs challenge defendants’ view that the purpose of § 107(2) was to eliminate religious discrimination by quoting a statement from Representative Peter Mack, the sponsor of the 1954 law,:

Certainly, in these times when we are being threatened by a godless and anti-religious world movement we should correct this discrimination against certain ministers of the gospel who are carrying on such a courageous fight against this. Certainly this is not too much to do for these people who are caring for our spiritual welfare.

Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 83rd Cong. 1, at 1574-75 (June 9, 1953) (statement of Peter F. Mack, Jr.), dkt. #51-9. Plaintiffs argue that Mack’s statement shows that § 107(2) “was deliberately intended to send a message of support for religion during the Cold War.” Plts.’ Br., dkt. #52, at 52.

The difference between plaintiffs’ and defendants’ view of the purpose of § 107(2) is more semantic than substantive. Under either view, the point of the law was to assist a subset of religious groups, which, as I will explain below, is not a secular purpose under the establishment clause.

Because the validity of § 107(1) is not before the court, I must assume for the purpose of this case that Congress did not violate the establishment clause by granting a tax exemption on the rental value of a home provided to a minister as part of his compensation. However, by defendants’ own assertion, the purpose of § 107(1) was to eliminate discrimination between secular and religious employees by giving ministers a similar exemption to the one now codified in 26 U.S.C. § 119 for housing provided to an employee for the convenience of the employer. Assuming this is correct, it does little to help justify the later enactment of § 107(2), which expanded the exemption to include not just the value of any housing provided but also the portion of the minister’s salary designated for housing expenses. Defendants say that § 107(2) was needed to eliminate discrimination against certain religious sects, particularly those that were “less wealthy and less established,” but there are multiple problems with that argument.

To begin with, defendants are wrong to suggest that § 107(2) was needed to eliminate religious discrimination. Section 107(1) is not discriminatory in the sense that it singles out certain religions for more favorable treatment; rather, it gives a benefit to ministers who meet certain housing criteria, just as § 119 gives a benefit to employees who meet certain housing criteria. Although not all ministers can qualify for the exemption, the same is true for secular employees under § 119. In other words, § 107(1) no more “discriminates” against ministers who purchase their own housing than § 119 “discriminates” against secular employees who purchase their own housing. Because the distinction made in both statutes relates to the type of housing the employee has rather than religious affiliation, there is no religious discrimination. Under defendants’ view, if one religious person received a tax exemption, then Congress would be compelled to give every religious person the same exemption, even if the exemption had nothing to do with religion.

Further, to the extent that § 107(1) discriminates among religions, § 107(2) does not eliminate that discrimination but merely shifts it. In particular, § 107(2) discriminates against those religions that do not have ministers. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Parsonage Exemption Violates the Establishment Clause and Should Be Declared Unconstitutional, 24 Whittier L. Rev. 707, 723 (2003) (“[S]ection 107(2) itself discriminates among religions: It offers a huge financial benefit to those religions and churches that have clergy as compared to those which do not. Moreover, it discriminates among clergy based on the specific tasks they are performing.”); Thomas E. O’Neill, A Constitutional Challenge to Section 107 of the Internal Revenue Code, 57 Notre Dame L. Rev. 853, 865-66 (1982) (“Section 107(2) may unconstitutionally prefer certain religions over others. For example, a congregational religion with no permanent or specifically designated ministers would not receive section 107(2)’s financial benefits as would a centralized religion with a designated ministry.”). In addition, § 107(2) creates an imbalance even with respect to those ministers who benefit from § 107(1) because ministers who get an exemption under § 107(2) can use their housing allowance to purchase a home that will appreciate in value and still can deduct interest they pay on their mortgage and property taxes, resulting in a greater benefit than that received under § 107(1). Chemerinsky, 24 Whittier L. Rev. at 712; 26 U.S.C. § 265(a)(6) (“No deduction shall be denied under this section for interest on a mortgage on, or real property taxes on, the home of the taxpayer by reason of the receipt of an amount as . . . (B) a parsonage allowance excludable from gross income under section 107”).

In any event, even if I assume that the exemption in § 107(2) applies equally to all religions, that would not solve the problem because the provision applies to religious persons only. Congress did not incorporate an exemption for secular employees into § 107(2) or expand § 119 to accomplish a similar result. Kowalski, 434 U.S. at 84-96 (rejecting interpretation of § 119 that would extend it to cash allowances). A desire to assist disadvantaged churches and ministers is not a secular purpose and it does not produce a secular effect when similarly disadvantaged secular organizations and employees are excluded from the benefit. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 788-89 (law motivated by desire to help “low-income parents” send children to sectarian schools “can only be regarded as one ‘advancing’ religion”). The establishment clause requires neutrality not just among the various religious sects but between religious and secular groups as well. McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 875-76 (“[T]he government may not favor one religion over another, or religion over irreligion, religious choice being the prerogative of individuals under the Free Exercise Clause.”); Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 771 (“[I]t is now firmly established that a law may be one ‘respecting an establishment of religion’ even though its consequence is not to promote a ‘state religion,’ and even though it does not aid one religion more than another but merely benefits all religions alike.”) (internal citation omitted); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 450 (1971) (“[T]he Establishment Clause prohibits government from abandoning secular purposes . . . to favor the adherents of any sect or religious organization.”). Under defendants’ view, there would be no limit to the amount of support the government could provide to religious groups over secular ones.

Alternatively, defendants cite provisions in the tax code granting housing allowance exemptions for nonreligious reasons as evidence that § 107(2) does not advance religion. First, under 26 U.S.C. § 134, members of the military may exclude from their gross income any “qualified military benefit,” which includes a housing allowance. 37 U.S.C. § 403. Second, under 26 U.S.C. § 911, United States citizens who live abroad may deduct a portion of their housing expenses from their gross income. Finally, under 26 U.S.C. § 912, certain federal employees who live abroad may exclude from their gross income “foreign area allowances,” which may include housing expenses.

In Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 14, the plurality acknowledged that a tax exemption benefiting sectarian groups could survive a challenge under the establishment clause if the exemption was “conferred upon a wide array of nonsectarian groups as well.” However, the Court rejected the argument that it was enough to point to a small number of secular groups that could receive a similar exemption for a different reason:

The fact that Texas grants other sales tax exemptions (e.g., for sales of food, agricultural items, and property used in the manufacture of articles for ultimate sale) for different purposes does not rescue the exemption for religious periodicals from invalidation. What is crucial is that any subsidy afforded religious organizations be warranted by some overarching secular purpose that justifies like benefits for nonreligious groups.

Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 15 n.4.

In this case, defendants have not identified an “overarching secular purpose” that justifies both § 107(2) and the other exemptions they cite. Defendants suggest vaguely that all of the recipients have “unique housing needs,” Dfts.’ Br., dkt. #44, at 39, but they never identify how the needs of ministers who do not live in employer housing are different from those of any other taxpayer. In their reply brief, defendants say that § 107 is like the other statutes in that all of them involve “[p]eople whose housing is dictated by their work,” Dfts.’ Br., dkt. #53, at 20, but that argument is disingenuous because it applies only to § 107(1), which is not at issue in this case. Section 107(2) does not include any limitations on the type or location of housing that a minister purchases or rents, so it cannot be described as being related to the convenience of the employer doctrine.

Each of the other statutes defendants cite involving exemptions for secular employees was motivated by a purpose specific to the particular group involved. For example, the purpose of § 911 is to protect American business people living overseas from double taxation, Brewster v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 473 F.2d 160, 163 (D.C. Cir. 1972), and the purpose of § 912 is to insure that “federal civilian employees should be adequately reimbursed for additional expenses necessarily incurred because of their overseas services.” Anderson v. United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 530, 534 (1989). Thus, both of these statutes are less about giving a particular group preferential treatment and more about attempting to avoid penalizing particular taxpayers for engaging in work that provides a benefit to the United States.

Although I did not uncover a discussion of the purpose of § 134 in the case law, it seems obvious that it would be a mistake to rely on any benefit members of the military receive as providing an “overarching secular purpose” for giving a similar benefit to ministers or anyone else. Because members of the military are unique in the level of service they give to the government and the sacrifices they make, it is not surprising that they receive certain benefits not available to the general public. A housing allowance is only one of many “qualified military benefits” that may be excluded from gross income.

Defendants say that § 912 (relating to federal civilian employees living overseas) is similar to § 107 in that its original scope was limited to employees who lived in housing provided by the government, but Congress expanded the exemption to cover housing allowances as well. Anderson, 16 Cl. Ct. at 534-35. This argument is a nonstarter because it does not change the fact that, unlike § 107(2), the purpose of both exemptions in § 912 is to alleviate special burdens experienced by certain taxpayers as a result of their living situation. In any event, any superficial similarity between § 107 and § 912 is irrelevant because a decision by the federal government to expand the scope of an exemption to more of its own employees as it did in § 912 does not implicate the establishment clause as does an exemption that singles out religious persons for more favorable treatment.

In sum, defendants cite no evidence that the concerns that motivated § 134, § 911 and § 912 have anything to do with § 107(2). Accordingly, I agree with plaintiffs that § 107(2) does not have a secular purpose or effect and that a reasonable observer would view § 107(2) as an endorsement of religion.

7. Applicability of § 107(2) to atheists

As discussed above, defendants argued in the context of addressing plaintiffs’ standing to sue that it is “conceivable” that an atheist could qualify as a “minister of the gospel” under § 107. Dfts.’ Br., dkt. #44, at 10. In the context of discussing the merits in their reply brief, defendants make a similar statement that an atheist could “make a claim” that he or she is a minister of the gospel under § 107. Dfts.’ Br., dkt. #53, at 27. In support of an argument that construing § 107(2) to include atheists would defeat plaintiffs’ claim, defendants cite a passage in Justice Blackmun’s concurring opinion in Texas Monthly that the tax exemption at issue in that case “might survive Establishment Clause scrutiny” if it included “atheistic literature distributed by an atheistic organization.” Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 49 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). However, defendants never go so far as to argue that the phrase “minister of the gospel” § 107 could be interpreted reasonably as applying to an atheist. In fact, they decline expressly to take a position on that issue. Dfts.’ Br., dkt. #44, at 10 (“The United States is not taking the position that any particular person would, in fact, qualify to claim the exclusion under § 107(2).”).

I am not aware of any decision in which a majority of the Supreme Court considered whether a claim under the establishment clause would be defeated if the particular benefit at issue were granted to atheists, but still excluded secular groups. At least in the context of this case, there is a plausible argument that the claim would survive. Under Lemon, the question is whether the government has “advanced religion.” Thus, if atheism were included under the umbrella of “religion,” § 107(2) still would advance religion over secular interests, even if the provision applied to atheists, because secular taxpayers still would be excluded from the benefit. Further, regardless whether § 107(2) could be read to include an “atheist minister,” the statute still discriminates against religions that do not employ ministers, as noted above.

Regardless, to the extent defendants mean to argue that § 107(2) is constitutional because of an abstract possibility that an atheist could qualify as a minister of the gospel, I disagree. Defendants are correct that courts must construe statutes to “avoid constitutional difficulties,” Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381-382 (2005), but that canon applies only if the statute is “readily susceptible to such a construction.” Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 884 (1997). A court may not “rewrite a . . . law to conform it to constitutional requirements.” Id. at 884-885.

In this case, no reasonable construction of § 107 would include atheists. In the concurring opinion in Texas Monthly that defendants cite, Justice Blackmun rejected as “facially implausible” an argument that atheistic literature could be included as part of “[p]eriodicals that are published or distributed by a religious faith and that consist wholly of writings promulgating the teaching of the faith and books that consist wholly of writings sacred to a religious faith.” Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 29 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). Defendants do not explain why they believe interpreting § 107 to include atheists is any more plausible. Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 83rd Cong. at 1574-75 (sponsor of § 107(2) stating that purpose of law was to help ministers who are “fight[ing] against” a “godless and anti-religious world movement”).

The only authority defendants cite is Kaufman, 419 F.3d at 682, in which the court concluded that atheism could qualify as a religion under the free exercise clause for the purpose of that case. However, the question under § 107 is not whether atheism is a religion but whether an atheist can be a “minister of the gospel,” a very different question. In Kaufman, the court cited Reed v. Great Lakes Cos., 330 F.3d 931, 934 (7th Cir. 2003), for the proposition that religion under the free exercise could be defined simply as “taking a position on divinity,” Kaufman, 419 F.3d at 682, but, as discussed above, qualifying as a “minister of the gospel” is much more complicated. Defendants cite no evidence that an “atheist minister” exists (a term that many might view as an oxymoron), let alone an atheist that satisfies the IRS’s criteria for a “minister of the gospel,” by performing “sacerdotal” functions, conducting “worship” services or acting as a “spiritual” leader under the authority of a “church.”

8. Entanglement

With respect to the question whether § 107(2) fosters excessive entanglement between church and state, I see little distinction between this case and Texas Monthly, in which the plurality concluded that the Texas statute “appear[ed], on its face, to produce greater state entanglement with religion than the denial of an exemption” because granting the exemption required the government to “evaluat[e] the relative merits of differing religious claims” and created “[t]he prospect of inconsistent treatment and government embroilment in controversies over religious doctrine.” Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 20 (plurality opinion). Defendants argue that “it is constitutionally permissible for a government to determine whether a person’s belief is ‘religious’ and sincerely held,” Dfts.’ Br., dkt. #53, at 25, but, as discussed above, § 107 and its implementing regulations go well beyond a determination whether a belief is “religious,” involving a complex and inherently ambiguous multifactor test. Compare Kaufman, 419 F.3d at 682 (concluding in four paragraphs that atheism could qualify as a religion under free exercise clause) with Foundation of Human Understanding v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 203 (Fed. Cl. 2009) (32-page decision devoted entirely to question whether organization qualified as “church” under tax code). See also Justin Butterfield, Hiram Sasser and Reed Smith, The Parsonage Exemption Deserves Broad Protection, 16 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 251, 264 (2012) (arguing in favor of the constitutionality of § 107, but acknowledging that “there is an entanglement problem” with the implementing regulations).

More persuasive is defendants’ reliance on Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 694, 699 (2012), in which the Supreme Court concluded that a “minister” could not sue a church for employment discrimination under Title VII. Although the Court did not consider expressly whether a “ministerial” exception to Title VII created excessive entanglement, the Court applied the exception to the facts of the case without expressing any reservations.

Hosanna-Tabor is not on all fours with this case because, like Amos, it involved countervailing concerns that a contrary rule would lead to interference with “a religious group’s right to shape its own faith and mission through its appointments.” Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706. In any event, because I have concluded that § 107(2) does not have a secular purpose or effect, I need not decide whether the provision fosters excessive entanglement between church and state. Doe, 687 F.3d at 851 n. 15 (“Since we conclude that the District acted unconstitutionally on other grounds, we need not . . . consider the District’s actions under Lemon’s entanglement prong.”).

C. Conclusion

Although I conclude that § 107(2) violates the establishment clause and must be enjoined, this does not mean that the government is powerless to enact tax exemptions that benefit religion. “[P]olicies providing incidental benefits to religion do not contravene the Establishment Clause.” Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 768 (1995) (plurality opinion). In particular, because “[t]he nonsectarian aims of government and the interests of religious groups often overlap,” the government is not “required [to] refrain from implementing reasonable measures to advance legitimate secular goals merely because they would thereby relieve religious groups of costs they would otherwise incur.” Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 10 (plurality opinion). Thus, if Congress believes that there are important secular reasons for granting the exemption in § 107(2), it is free to rewrite the provision in accordance with the principles laid down in Texas Monthly and Walz so that it includes ministers as part of a larger group of beneficiaries. Haller, 728 A.2d at 356 (noting that Texas amended statute at issue in Texas Monthly to grant sales tax exemption to broader range of groups). As it stands now, however, § 107(2) is unconstitutional.

ORDER

IT IS ORDERED that

1. The motion for summary judgment filed by defendants Timothy Geithner and Douglas Schulman (now succeeded by Jacob Lew and Daniel Werfel), dkt. #40, is GRANTED with respect to plaintiffs’ Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc.’s, Annie Laurie Gaylor’s and Dan Barker’s challenge to 26 U.S.C. § 107(1). Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED as to that claim for lack of standing.

2. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED as to plaintiffs’ challenge to 26 U.S.C. § 107(2). On the court’s own motion, summary judgment is GRANTED to plaintiffs as to that claim.

3. It is DECLARED that 26 U.S.C. § 107(2) violates the establishment clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.

4. Defendants are ENJOINED from enforcing § 107(2). The injunction shall take effect at the conclusion of any appeals filed by defendants or the expiration of defendants’ deadline for filing an appeal, whichever is later.

5. The clerk of court is directed to enter judgment in favor of plaintiffs and close this case.

ENTERED this 21st day of November, 2013.

By the Court:

Barbara B. Crabb

District Judge

FOOTNOTE

1 Initially, plaintiffs sued Timothy Geithner and Douglas Schulman in their official capacities as Secretary of the Treasury Department and Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d), I have substituted the new Secretary, Jacob Lew, and the Acting Commissioner, Daniel Werfel.

Citations: Freedom From Religion Foundation Inc. et al. v. Jacob Lew et al.; No. 3:11-cv-00626




Treasury, IRS Will Issue Proposed Guidance for Tax-Exempt Social Welfare Organizations.

WASHINGTON — The U.S. Department of the Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service today will issue initial guidance regarding qualification requirements for tax-exemption as a social welfare organization under section 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code. This proposed guidance defines the term “candidate-related political activity,” and would amend current regulations by indicating that the promotion of social welfare does not include this type of activity. The proposed guidance also seeks initial comments on other aspects of the qualification requirements, including what proportion of a 501(c)(4) organization’s activities must promote social welfare.

The proposed guidance is expected to be posted on the Federal Register later today.

There are a number of steps in the regulatory process that must be taken before any final guidance can be issued. Given the significant public interest in these and related issues, Treasury and the IRS expect to receive a large number of comments. Treasury and the IRS are committed to carefully and comprehensively considering all of the comments received before issuing additional proposed guidance or final rules.

“This is part of ongoing efforts within the IRS that are improving our work in the tax-exempt area,” said IRS Acting Commissioner Danny Werfel. “Once final, this proposed guidance will continue moving us forward and provide clarity for this important segment of exempt organizations.”

“This proposed guidance is a first critical step toward creating clear-cut definitions of political activity by tax-exempt social welfare organizations,” said Treasury Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy Mark J. Mazur. “We are committed to getting this right before issuing final guidance that may affect a broad group of organizations. It will take time to work through the regulatory process and carefully consider all public feedback as we strive to ensure that the standards for tax-exemption are clear and can be applied consistently.”

Organizations may apply for tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(4) of the tax code if they operate to promote social welfare. The IRS currently applies a “facts and circumstances” test to determine whether an organization is engaged in political campaign activities that do not promote social welfare. Today’s proposed guidance would reduce the need to conduct fact-intensive inquiries by replacing this test with more definitive rules.

In defining the new term, “candidate-related political activity,” Treasury and the IRS drew upon existing definitions of political activity under federal and state campaign finance laws, other IRS provisions, as well as suggestions made in unsolicited public comments.

Under the proposed guidelines, candidate-related political activity includes:

1. Communications

Communications that expressly advocate for a clearly identified political candidate or candidates of a political party.

Communications that are made within 60 days of a general election (or within 30 days of a primary election) and clearly identify a candidate or political party.

Communications expenditures that must be reported to the Federal Election Commission.

2. Grants and Contributions

Any contribution that is recognized under campaign finance law as a reportable contribution.

Grants to section 527 political organizations and other tax-exempt organizations that conduct candidate-related political activities (note that a grantor can rely on a written certification from a grantee stating that it does not engage in, and will not use grant funds for, candidate-related political activity).

3. Activities Closely Related to Elections or Candidates

Voter registration drives and “get-out-the-vote” drives.

Distribution of any material prepared by or on behalf of a candidate or by a section 527 political organization.

Preparation or distribution of voter guides that refer to candidates (or, in a general election, to political parties).

Holding an event within 60 days of a general election (or within 30 days of a primary election) at which a candidate appears as part of the program.

These proposed rules reduce the need to conduct fact-intensive inquiries, including inquiries into whether activities or communications are neutral and unbiased.

Treasury and the IRS are planning to issue additional guidance that will address other issues relating to the standards for tax exemption under section 501(c)(4). In particular, there has been considerable public focus regarding the proportion of a section 501(c)(4) organization’s activities that must promote social welfare. Due to the importance of this aspect of the regulation, the proposed guidance requests initial comments on this issue.

The proposed guidance also seeks comments regarding whether standards similar to those proposed today should be adopted to define the political activities that do not further the tax-exempt purposes of other tax-exempt organizations and to promote consistent definitions across the tax-exempt sector.




Proposed Regs Define Candidate-Related Political Activities for Social Welfare Groups.

The IRS has issued proposed regulations (REG-134417-13) that provide guidance on political activities related to candidates that don’t promote social welfare for purposes of tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(4). Comments and public hearing requests are due by February 27.

Organizations may apply for tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(4) if they operate to promote social welfare, which under the current rules doesn’t include participation or intervention in political campaigns on behalf of, or in opposition to, any candidate for public office. The preamble to the proposed regs highlights the history of the “political campaign intervention” standard and the facts and circumstances analysis the IRS has applied over the years to determine whether an organization is engaged in that activity.

Treasury and the IRS have determined that more definitive rules on political activities related to candidates — rather than the current, fact-intensive analysis — would be helpful in applying the rules on qualification for tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(4). Accordingly, the proposed regs amend the current rules to provide that the promotion of social welfare does not include “candidate-related political activity,” as defined under the regs.

Under the proposed regs, candidate-related political activity includes communications that expressly advocate for a clearly identified political candidate; communications made within 60 days of a general election, or within 30 days of a primary election, that clearly identify a candidate or political party; and communications expenditures that must be reported to the Federal Election Commission. Candidate-related political activity also includes any contribution that is recognized under campaign finance law as a reportable contribution and grants to section 527 political organizations and other tax-exempt organizations that conduct candidate-related political activities. The regs provide that a grantor may rely on a written certification from a grantee stating that it does not engage in, and will not use grant funds for, candidate-related political activity.

Other candidate-related political activities identified in the proposed regs include voter registration drives and “get out the vote” drives; distribution of material prepared by or on behalf of a candidate or by a section 527 political organization; preparation or distribution of voter guides that refer to candidates or political parties; and events held within 60 days of a general election, or within 30 days of a primary election, at which a candidate appears as part of the program. The regs are proposed to apply on the date that final regs are published in the Federal Register.

Treasury and the IRS have received requests for guidance on the meaning of “primarily” as used in the current rules under section 501(c)(4). Before deciding how to proceed, Treasury and the IRS have requested comments on what portion of an organization’s activities must promote social welfare for an organization to qualify under section 501(c)(4) and whether more limits should be imposed on any or all activities that do not further social welfare. Comments are also requested on how to measure the activities of organizations seeking to qualify as section 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations for these purposes.

The proposed regs don’t address the definition of political campaign intervention under section 501(c)(3), the definition of exempt function activity under section 527, or the application of section 527(f). Comments are requested on whether standards similar to those in the proposed regs should be adopted to define the political activities that do not further the tax-exempt purposes of other tax-exempt organizations and to promote consistent definitions across the tax-exempt sector.

Guidance for Tax-Exempt Social Welfare Organizations on

Candidate-Related Political Activities

[4830-01-p]

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Internal Revenue Service

26 CFR Part 1

[REG-134417-13]

RIN 1545-BL81

AGENCY: Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Treasury.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.

SUMMARY: This document contains proposed regulations that provide guidance to tax-exempt social welfare organizations on political activities related to candidates that will not be considered to promote social welfare. These regulations will affect tax-exempt social welfare organizations and organizations seeking such status. This document requests comments from the public regarding these proposed regulations. This document also requests comments from the public regarding the standard under current regulations that considers a tax-exempt social welfare organization to be operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare if it is “primarily” engaged in activities that promote the common good and general welfare of the people of the community, including how this standard should be measured and whether this standard should be changed.

DATES: Written or electronic comments and requests for a public hearing must be received by February 27, 2014.

ADDRESSES: Send submissions to: CC:PA:LPD:PR (REG-134417-13), Room 5205, Internal Revenue Service, P.O. Box 7604, Ben Franklin Station, Washington, DC 20044. Submissions may be hand-delivered Monday through Friday between the hours of 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. to CC:PA:LPD:PR (REG-134417-13), Courier’s Desk, Internal Revenue Service, 1111 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC, or sent electronically via the Federal eRulemaking Portal at http://www.regulations.gov (IRS REG-134417-13).

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Concerning the proposed regulations, Amy F. Giuliano at (202) 317-5800; concerning submission of comments and requests for a public hearing, Oluwafunmilayo Taylor at (202) 317-6901 (not toll-free numbers).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Paperwork Reduction Act

The collection of information contained in this notice of proposed rulemaking has been submitted to the Office of Management and Budget for review in accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507(d)). Comments on the collection of information should be sent to the Office of Management and Budget, Attn: Desk Officer for the Department of the Treasury, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Washington, DC 20503, with copies to the Internal Revenue Service, Attn: IRS Reports Clearance Officer, SE:W:CAR:MP:T:T:SP, Washington, DC 20224. Comments on the collection of information should be received by January 27, 2014.

Comments are specifically requested concerning:

Whether the proposed collection of information is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the IRS, including whether the information will have practical utility;

The accuracy of the estimated burden associated with the proposed collection of information;

How the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected may be enhanced; and

How the burden of complying with the proposed collection of information may be minimized, including through forms of information technology.

The collection of information in these proposed regulations is in § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(iii)(D), which provides a special rule for contributions by an organization described in section 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) to an organization described in section 501(c). Generally, a contribution by a section 501(c)(4) organization to a section 501(c) organization that engages in candidate-related political activity will be considered candidate-related political activity by the section 501(c)(4) organization. The special rule in § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(iii)(D) provides that a contribution to a section 501(c) organization will not be treated as a contribution to an organization engaged in candidate-related political activity if the contributor organization obtains a written representation from an authorized officer of the recipient organization stating that the recipient organization does not engage in any such activity and the contribution is subject to a written restriction that it not be used for candidate-related political activity. This special provision would not apply if the contributor organization knows or has reason to know that the representation is inaccurate or unreliable. The expected recordkeepers are section 501(c)(4) organizations that choose to contribute to, and to seek a written representation from, a section 501(c) organization.

Estimated number of recordkeepers: 2,000.

Estimated average annual burden hours per recordkeeper: 2 hours.

Estimated total annual recordkeeping burden: 4,000 hours.

A particular section 501(c)(4) organization may require more or less time, depending on the number of contributions for which a representation is sought.

An agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless it displays a valid control number assigned by the Office of Management and Budget.

Books or records relating to a collection of information must be retained as long as their contents may become material in the administration of any internal revenue law. Generally, tax returns and return information are confidential, as required by section 6103.

Background

Section 501(c)(4) of the Code provides a Federal income tax exemption, in part, for “[c]ivic leagues or organizations not organized for profit but operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare.” This exemption dates back to the enactment of the federal income tax in 1913. See Tariff Act of 1913, 38 Stat. 114 (1913). The statutory provision was largely unchanged until 1996, when section 501(c)(4) was amended to prohibit inurement of an organization’s net earnings to private shareholders or individuals.

Prior to 1924, the accompanying Treasury regulations did not elaborate on the meaning of “promotion of social welfare.” See Regulations 33 (Rev.), art. 67 (1918). Treasury regulations promulgated in 1924 explained that civic leagues qualifying for exemption under section 231(8) of the Revenue Act of 1924, the predecessor to section 501(c)(4) of the 1986 Code, are “those not organized for profit but operated exclusively for purposes beneficial to the community as a whole,” and generally include “organizations engaged in promoting the welfare of mankind, other than organizations comprehended within [section 231(6) of the Revenue Act of 1924, the predecessor to section 501(c)(3) of the 1986 Code].” See Regulations 65, art. 519 (1924). The regulations remained substantially the same until 1959.

The current regulations under section 501(c)(4) were proposed and finalized in 1959. They provide that “[a]n organization is operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare if it is primarily engaged in promoting in some way the common good and general welfare of the people of the community.” Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i). An organization “embraced” within section 501(c)(4) is one that is “operated primarily for the purpose of bringing about civic betterments and social improvements.” Id. The regulations further provide that “[t]he promotion of social welfare does not include direct or indirect participation or intervention in political campaigns on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate for public office.” Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii). This language is similar to language that appears in section 501(c)(3) requiring section 501(c)(3) organizations not to “participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office” (“political campaign intervention”). However, unlike the absolute prohibition that applies to charitable organizations described in section 501(c)(3), an organization that primarily engages in activities that promote social welfare will be considered under the current regulations to be operating exclusively for the promotion of social welfare, and may qualify for tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(4), even though it engages in some political campaign intervention.

The section 501(c)(4) regulations have not been amended since 1959, although Congress took steps in the intervening years to address further the relationship of political campaign activities to tax-exempt status. In particular, section 527, which governs the tax treatment of political organizations, was enacted in 1975 and provides generally that amounts received as contributions and other funds raised for political purposes (section 527 exempt function income) are not subject to tax. Section 527(e)(1) defines a “political organization” as “a party, committee, association, fund, or other organization (whether or not incorporated) organized and operated primarily for the purpose of directly or indirectly accepting contributions or making expenditures, or both, for an exempt function.” Section 527(f) also imposes a tax on exempt organizations described in section 501(c), including section 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations, that make an expenditure furthering a section 527 exempt function. The tax is imposed on the lesser of the organization’s net investment income or section 527 exempt function expenditures. Section 527(e)(2) defines “exempt function” as “the function of influencing or attempting to influence the selection, nomination, election, or appointment of any individual to any federal, state, or local public office or office in a political organization, or the election of Presidential or Vice-Presidential electors” (referred to in this document as “section 527 exempt function”).1

Unlike the section 501(c)(3) standard of political campaign intervention, and the similar standard currently applied under section 501(c)(4), both of which focus solely on candidates for elective public office, a section 527 exempt function encompasses activities related to a broader range of officials, including those who are appointed or nominated, such as executive branch officials and certain judges. Thus, while there is currently significant overlap in the activities that constitute political campaign intervention under sections 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) and those that further a section 527 exempt function, the concepts are not synonymous.

Over the years, the IRS has stated that whether an organization is engaged in political campaign intervention depends upon all of the facts and circumstances of each case. See Rev. Rul. 78-248 (1978-1 CB 154) (illustrating application of the facts and circumstances analysis to voter education activities conducted by section 501(c)(3) organizations); Rev. Rul. 80-282 (1980-2 CB 178) (amplifying Rev. Rul. 78-248 regarding the timing and distribution of voter education materials); Rev. Rul. 86-95 (1986-2 CB 73) (holding a public forum for the purpose of educating and informing the voters, which provides fair and impartial treatment of candidates, and which does not promote or advance one candidate over another, does not constitute political campaign intervention under section 501(c)(3)). More recently, the IRS released Rev. Rul. 2007-41 (2007-1 CB 1421), providing 21 examples illustrating facts and circumstances to be considered in determining whether a section 501(c)(3) organization’s activities (including voter education, voter registration, and get-out-the-vote drives; individual activity by organization leaders; candidate appearances; business activities; and Web sites) result in political campaign intervention. The IRS generally applies the same facts and circumstances analysis under section 501(c)(4). See Rev. Rul. 81-95 (1981-1 CB 332) (citing revenue rulings under section 501(c)(3) for examples of what constitutes participation or intervention in political campaigns for purposes of section 501(c)(4)).

Similarly, Rev. Rul. 2004-6 (2004-1 CB 328) provides six examples illustrating facts and circumstances to be considered in determining whether a section 501(c) organization (such as a section 501(c)(4) social welfare organization) that engages in public policy advocacy has expended funds for a section 527 exempt function. The analysis reflected in these revenue rulings for determining whether an organization has engaged in political campaign intervention, or has expended funds for a section 527 exempt function, is fact-intensive.

Recently, increased attention has been focused on potential political campaign intervention by section 501(c)(4) organizations. A recent IRS report relating to IRS review of applications for tax-exempt status states that “[o]ne of the significant challenges with the 501(c)(4) [application] review process has been the lack of a clear and concise definition of ‘political campaign intervention.'” Internal Revenue Service, “Charting a Path Forward at the IRS: Initial Assessment and Plan of Action” at 20 (June 24, 2013). In addition, “[t]he distinction between campaign intervention and social welfare activity, and the measurement of the organization’s social welfare activities relative to its total activities, have created considerable confusion for both the public and the IRS in making appropriate section 501(c)(4) determinations.” Id. at 28. The Treasury Department and the IRS recognize that both the public and the IRS would benefit from clearer definitions of these concepts.

Explanation of Provisions

1. Overview

The Treasury Department and the IRS recognize that more definitive rules with respect to political activities related to candidates — rather than the existing, fact-intensive analysis — would be helpful in applying the rules regarding qualification for tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(4). Although more definitive rules might fail to capture (or might sweep in) activities that would (or would not) be captured under the IRS’ traditional facts and circumstances approach, adopting rules with sharper distinctions in this area would provide greater certainty and reduce the need for detailed factual analysis in determining whether an organization is described in section 501(c)(4). Accordingly, the Treasury Department and the IRS propose to amend Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2) to identify specific political activities that would be considered candidate-related political activities that do not promote social welfare.

To distinguish the proposed rules under section 501(c)(4) from the section 501(c)(3) standard and the similar standard currently applied under section 501(c)(4), the proposed regulations would amend Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii) to delete the current reference to “direct or indirect participation or intervention in political campaigns on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate for public office,” which is similar to language in the section 501(c)(3) statute and regulations. Instead the proposed regulations would revise Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii) to state that “[t]he promotion of social welfare does not include direct or indirect candidate-related political activity.” As explained in more detail in section 2 of this preamble, the proposed rules draw upon existing definitions of political campaign activity, both in the Code and in federal election law, to define candidate-related political activity that would not be considered to promote social welfare. The proposed rules draw in particular from certain statutory provisions of section 527, which specifically deals with political organizations and taxes section 501(c) organizations, including section 501(c)(4) organizations, on certain types of political campaign activities. Recognizing that it may be beneficial to have a more uniform set of rules relating to political campaign activity for tax-exempt organizations, the Treasury Department and the IRS request comments in subparagraphs a through c of this section of the preamble regarding whether the same or a similar approach should be adopted in addressing political campaign activities of other section 501(c) organizations, as well as whether the regulations under section 527 should be revised to adopt the same or a similar approach in defining section 527 exempt function activity.

a. Interaction with section 501(c)(3)

These proposed regulations do not address the definition of political campaign intervention under section 501(c)(3). The Treasury Department and the IRS recognize that, because such intervention is absolutely prohibited under section 501(c)(3), a more nuanced consideration of the totality of facts and circumstances may be appropriate in that context. The Treasury Department and the IRS request comments on the advisability of adopting an approach to defining political campaign intervention under section 501(c)(3) similar to the approach set forth in these regulations, either in lieu of the facts and circumstances approach reflected in Rev. Rul. 2007-41 or in addition to that approach (for example, by creating a clearly defined presumption or safe harbor). The Treasury Department and the IRS also request comments on whether any modifications or exceptions would be needed in the section 501(c)(3) context and, if so, how to ensure that any such modifications or exceptions are clearly defined and administrable. Any such change would be introduced in the form of proposed regulations to allow an additional opportunity for public comment.

b. Interaction with section 527

As noted in the “Background” section of this preamble, a section 501(c)(4) organization is subject to tax under section 527(f) if it makes expenditures for a section 527 exempt function. Consistent with section 527, the proposed regulations provide that “candidate-related political activity” for purposes of section 501(c)(4) includes activities relating to selection, nomination, election, or appointment of individuals to serve as public officials, officers in a political organization, or Presidential or Vice Presidential electors. These proposed regulations do not, however, address the definition of “exempt function” activity under section 527 or the application of section 527(f). The Treasury Department and the IRS request comments on the advisability of adopting rules that are the same as or similar to these proposed regulations for purposes of defining section 527 exempt function activity in lieu of the facts and circumstances approach reflected in Rev. Rul. 2004-6. Any such change would be introduced in the form of proposed regulations to allow an additional opportunity for public comment.

c. Interaction with sections 501(c)(5) and 501(c)(6)

The proposed regulations define candidate-related political activity for social welfare organizations described in section 501(c)(4). The Treasury Department and the IRS are considering whether to amend the current regulations under sections 501(c)(5) and 501(c)(6) to provide that exempt purposes under those regulations (which include “the betterment of the conditions of those engaged in [labor, agricultural, or horticultural] pursuits” in the case of a section 501(c)(5) organization and promoting a “common business interest” in the case of a section 501(c)(6) organization) do not include candidate-related political activity as defined in these proposed regulations. The Treasury Department and the IRS request comments on the advisability of adopting this approach in defining activities that do not further exempt purposes under sections 501(c)(5) and 501(c)(6). Any such change would be introduced in the form of proposed regulations to allow an additional opportunity for public comment.

d. Additional guidance on the meaning of “operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare”

The Treasury Department and the IRS have received requests for guidance on the meaning of “primarily” as used in the current regulations under section 501(c)(4). The current regulations provide, in part, that an organization is operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare within the meaning of section 501(c)(4) if it is “primarily engaged” in promoting in some way the common good and general welfare of the people of the community. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i). As part of the same 1959 Treasury decision promulgating the current section 501(c)(4) regulations, regulations under section 501(c)(3) were adopted containing similar language: “[a]n organization will be regarded as ‘operated exclusively’ for one or more exempt purposes only if it engages primarily in activities which accomplish one or more of such exempt purposes specified in section 501(c)(3).” Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1). Unlike the section 501(c)(4) regulations, however, the section 501(c)(3) regulations also provide that “[a]n organization will not be so regarded if more than an insubstantial part of its activities is not in furtherance of an exempt purpose.” Id.

Some have questioned the use of the “primarily” standard in the section 501(c)(4) regulations and suggested that this standard should be changed. The Treasury Department and the IRS are considering whether the current section 501(c)(4) regulations should be modified in this regard and, if the “primarily” standard is retained, whether the standard should be defined with more precision or revised to mirror the standard under the section 501(c)(3) regulations. Given the potential impact on organizations currently recognized as described in section 501(c)(4) of any change in the “primarily” standard, the Treasury Department and the IRS wish to receive comments from a broad range of organizations before deciding how to proceed. Accordingly, the Treasury Department and the IRS invite comments from the public on what proportion of an organization’s activities must promote social welfare for an organization to qualify under section 501(c)(4) and whether additional limits should be imposed on any or all activities that do not further social welfare. The Treasury Department and the IRS also request comments on how to measure the activities of organizations seeking to qualify as section 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations for these purposes.

2. Definition of Candidate-Related Political Activity

These proposed regulations provide guidance on which activities will be considered candidate-related political activity for purposes of the regulations under section 501(c)(4). These proposed regulations would replace the language in the existing final regulation under section 501(c)(4) — “participation or intervention in political campaigns on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate for public office” — with a new term — “candidate-related political activity” — to differentiate the proposed section 501(c)(4) rule from the standard employed under section 501(c)(3) (and currently employed under section 501(c)(4)). The proposed rule is intended to help organizations and the IRS more readily identify activities that constitute candidate-related political activity and, therefore, do not promote social welfare within the meaning of section 501(c)(4). These proposed regulations do not otherwise define the promotion of social welfare under section 501(c)(4). The Treasury Department and the IRS note that the fact that an activity is not candidate-related political activity under these proposed regulations does not mean that the activity promotes social welfare. Whether such an activity promotes social welfare is an independent determination.

In defining candidate-related political activity for purposes of section 501(c)(4), these proposed regulations draw key concepts from the federal election campaign laws, with appropriate modifications reflecting the purpose of these regulations to define which organizations may receive the benefits of section 501(c)(4) tax-exempt status and to promote tax compliance (as opposed to campaign finance regulation). In addition, the concepts drawn from the federal election campaign laws have been modified to reflect that section 501(c)(4) organizations may be involved in activities related to local or state elections (in addition to federal elections), as well as the broader scope of the proposed definition of candidate (which is not limited to candidates for federal elective office).

The proposed regulations provide that candidate-related political activity includes activities that the IRS has traditionally considered to be political campaign activity per se, such as contributions to candidates and communications that expressly advocate for the election or defeat of a candidate. The proposed regulations also would treat as candidate-related political activity certain activities that, because they occur close in time to an election or are election-related, have a greater potential to affect the outcome of an election. Currently, such activities are subject to a facts and circumstances analysis before a determination can be made as to whether the activity furthers social welfare within the meaning of section 501(c)(4). Under the approach in these proposed regulations, such activities instead would be subject to a more definitive rule. In addition, consistent with the goal of providing greater clarity, the proposed regulations would identify certain specific activities as candidate-related political activity. The Treasury Department and the IRS acknowledge that the approach taken in these proposed regulations, while clearer, may be both more restrictive and more permissive than the current approach, but believe the proposed approach is justified by the need to provide greater certainty to section 501(c)(4) organizations regarding their activities and reduce the need for fact-intensive determinations.

The Treasury Department and the IRS note that a particular activity may fit within one or more categories of candidate-related political activity described in subsections b through e of this section 2 of the preamble; the categories are not mutually exclusive. For example, the category of express advocacy communications may overlap with the category of certain communications close in time to an election.

a. Definition of “candidate”

These proposed regulations provide that, consistent with the scope of section 527, “candidate” means an individual who identifies himself or is proposed by another for selection, nomination, election, or appointment to any public office or office in a political organization, or to be a Presidential or Vice-Presidential elector, whether or not the individual is ultimately selected, nominated, elected, or appointed. In addition, the proposed regulations clarify that for these purposes the term “candidate” also includes any officeholder who is the subject of a recall election. The Treasury Department and the IRS note that defining “candidate-related political activity” in these proposed regulations to include activities related to candidates for a broader range of offices (such as activities relating to the appointment or confirmation of executive branch officials and judicial nominees) is a change from the historical application in the section 501(c)(4) context of the section 501(c)(3) standard of political campaign intervention, which focuses on candidates for elective public office only. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(iii). These proposed regulations instead would apply a definition that reflects the broader scope of section 527 and that is already applied to a section 501(c)(4) organization engaged in section 527 exempt function activity through section 527(f).

b. Express advocacy communications

These proposed regulations provide that candidate-related political activity includes communications that expressly advocate for or against a candidate. These proposed regulations draw from Federal Election Commission rules in defining “expressly advocate,” but expand the concept to include communications expressing a view on the selection, nomination, or appointment of individuals, or on the election or defeat of one or more candidates or of candidates of a political party. These proposed regulations make clear that all communications — including written, printed, electronic (including Internet), video, and oral communications — that express a view, whether for or against, on a clearly identified candidate (or on candidates of a political party) would constitute candidate-related political activity. A candidate can be “clearly identified” in a communication by name, photograph, or reference (such as “the incumbent” or a reference to a particular issue or characteristic distinguishing the candidate from others). The proposed regulations also provide that candidate-related political activity includes any express advocacy communication the expenditures for which an organization reports to the Federal Election Commission under the Federal Election Campaign Act as an independent expenditure.

c. Public communications close in time to an election

Under current guidance, the timing of a communication about a candidate that is made shortly before an election is a factor tending to indicate a greater risk of political campaign intervention or section 527 exempt function activity. In the interest of greater clarity, these proposed regulations would move away from the facts and circumstances approach that the IRS has traditionally applied in analyzing certain activities conducted close in time to an election. These proposed regulations draw from provisions of federal election campaign laws that treat certain communications that are close in time to an election and that refer to a clearly identified candidate as electioneering communications, but make certain modifications. The proposed regulations expand the types of candidates and communications that are covered to reflect the types of activities an organization might conduct related to local and state, as well as federal, contests, including any election or ballot measure to recall an individual who holds state or local elective public office. In addition, the expansion of the types of communications covered in the proposed regulations reflects the fact that an organization’s tax exempt status is determined based on all of its activities, even low cost and volunteer activities, not just its large expenditures.

Under the proposed definition, any public communication that is made within 60 days before a general election or 30 days before a primary election and that clearly identifies a candidate for public office (or, in the case of a general election, refers to a political party represented in that election) would be considered candidate-related political activity. These timeframes are the same as those appearing in the Federal Election Campaign Act definition of electioneering communications. The definition of “election,” including what would be treated as a primary or a general election, is consistent with section 527(j) and the federal election campaign laws.

A communication is “public” if it is made using certain mass media (specifically, by broadcast, in a newspaper, or on the Internet), constitutes paid advertising, or reaches or is intended to reach at least 500 people (including mass mailings or telephone banks). The Treasury Department and the IRS intend that content previously posted by an organization on its Web site that clearly identifies a candidate and remains on the Web site during the specified pre-election period would be treated as candidate-related political activity.

The proposed regulations also provide that candidate-related political activity includes any communication the expenditures for which an organization reports to the Federal Election Commission under the Federal Election Campaign Act, including electioneering communications.

The approach taken in the proposed definition of candidate-related political activity would avoid the need to consider potential mitigating or aggravating circumstances in particular cases (such as whether an issue-oriented communication is “neutral” or “biased” with respect to a candidate). Thus, this definition would apply without regard to whether a public communication is intended to influence the election or some other, non-electoral action (such as a vote on pending legislation) and without regard to whether such communication was part of a series of similar communications. Moreover, a public communication made outside the 60-day or 30-day period would not be candidate-related political activity if it does not fall within the ambit of express advocacy communications or another specific provision of the definition. The Treasury Department and the IRS request comments on whether the length of the period should be longer (or shorter) and whether there are particular communications that (regardless of timing) should be excluded from the definition because they can be presumed to neither influence nor constitute an attempt to influence the outcome of an election. Any comments should specifically address how the proposed exclusion is consistent with the goal of providing clear rules that avoid fact-intensive determinations.

The Treasury Department and the IRS also note that this rule regarding public communications close in time to an election would not apply to public communications identifying a candidate for a state or federal appointive office that are made within a specified number of days before a scheduled appointment, confirmation hearing or vote, or other selection event. The Treasury Department and the IRS request comments on whether a similar rule should apply with respect to communications within a specified period of time before such a scheduled appointment, confirmation hearing or vote, or other selection event.

d. Contributions to a candidate, political organization, or any section 501(c) entity engaged in candidate-related political activity

The proposed definition of candidate-related political activity would include contributions of money or anything of value to or the solicitation of contributions on behalf of (1) any person if such contribution is recognized under applicable federal, state, or local campaign finance law as a reportable contribution; (2) any political party, political committee, or other section 527 organization; or (3) any organization described in section 501(c) that engages in candidate-related political activity within the meaning of this proposed rule. This definition of contribution is similar to the definition of contribution that applies for purposes of section 527. The Treasury Department and the IRS intend that the term “anything of value” would include both in-kind donations and other support (for example, volunteer hours and free or discounted rentals of facilities or mailing lists). The Treasury Department and the IRS request comments on whether other transfers, such as indirect contributions described in section 276 to political parties or political candidates, should be treated as candidate-related political activity.

The Treasury Department and the IRS recognize that a section 501(c)(4) organization making a contribution may not know whether a recipient section 501(c) organization engages in candidate-related political activity. The proposed regulations provide that, for purposes of this definition, a recipient organization would not be treated as a section 501(c) organization engaged in candidate-related political activity if the contributor organization obtains a written representation from an authorized officer of the recipient organization stating that the recipient organization does not engage in any such activity and the contribution is subject to a written restriction that it not be used for candidate-related political activity. This special provision would apply only if the contributor organization does not know or have reason to know that the representation is inaccurate or unreliable.

e. Election-related activities

The proposed definition of candidate-related political activity would include certain specified election-related activities, including the conduct of voter registration and get-out-the-vote drives, distribution of material prepared by or on behalf of a candidate or section 527 organization, and preparation or distribution of a voter guide and accompanying material that refers to a candidate or a political party. In addition, an organization that hosts an event on its premises or conducts an event off-site within 30 days of a primary election or 60 days of a general election at which one or more candidates in such election appear as part of the program (whether or not such appearance was previously scheduled) would be engaged in candidate-related political activity under the proposed definition.

The Treasury Department and the IRS acknowledge that under the facts and circumstances analysis currently used for section 501(c)(4) organizations as well as for section 501(c)(3) organizations, these election-related activities may not be considered political campaign intervention if conducted in a non-partisan and unbiased manner. However, these determinations are highly fact-intensive. The Treasury Department and the IRS request comments on whether any particular activities conducted by section 501(c)(4) organizations should be excepted from the definition of candidate-related political activity as voter education activity and, if so, a description of how the proposed exception will both ensure that excepted activities are conducted in a non-partisan and unbiased manner and avoid a fact-intensive analysis.

f. Attribution to a section 501(c)(4) organization of certain activities and communications

These proposed regulations provide that activities conducted by an organization include, but are not limited to, (1) activities paid for by the organization or conducted by the organization’s officers, directors, or employees acting in that capacity, or by volunteers acting under the organization’s direction or supervision; (2) communications made (whether or not such communications were previously scheduled) as part of the program at an official function of the organization or in an official publication of the organization; and (3) other communications (such as television advertisements) the creation or distribution of which is paid for by the organization. These proposed regulations also provide that an organization’s Web site is an official publication of the organization, so that material posted by the organization on its Web site may constitute candidate-related political activity. The proposed regulations do not specifically address material posted by third parties on an organization’s Web site. The Treasury Department and the IRS request comments on whether, and under what circumstances, material posted by a third party on an interactive part of the organization’s Web site should be attributed to the organization for purposes of this rule. In addition, the Treasury Department and the IRS have stated in guidance under section 501(c)(3) regarding political campaign intervention that when a charitable organization chooses to establish a link to another Web site, the organization is responsible for the consequences of establishing and maintaining that link, even if it does not have control over the content of the linked site. See Rev. Rul. 2007-41. The Treasury Department and the IRS request comments on whether the consequences of establishing and maintaining a link to another Web site should be the same or different for purposes of the proposed definition of candidate-related political activity.

Proposed Effective/Applicability Date

These regulations are proposed to be effective the date of publication of the Treasury decision adopting these rules as final regulations in the Federal Register. For proposed date of applicability, see § 1.501(c)(4)-1(c).

Statement of Availability for IRS Documents

For copies of recently issued Revenue Procedures, Revenue Rulings, Notices, and other guidance published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin or Cumulative Bulletin, please visit the IRS Web site at http://www.irs.gov or the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402.

Special Analyses

It has been determined that this notice of proposed rulemaking is not a significant regulatory action as defined in Executive Order 12866, as supplemented by Executive Order 13563. Therefore, a regulatory assessment is not required. It also has been determined that section 553(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. chapter 5) does not apply to these regulations. It is hereby certified that this rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. This certification is based on the fact that only a minimal burden would be imposed by the rule, if adopted. Under the proposal, if a section 501(c)(4) organization chooses to contribute to a section 501(c) organization and wants assurance that the contribution will not be treated as candidate-related political activity, it may seek a written representation that the recipient does not engage in candidate-related political activity within the meaning of these regulations. Therefore, a regulatory flexibility analysis under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. chapter 6) is not required. Pursuant to section 7805(f) of the Code, this notice of proposed rulemaking has been submitted to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration for comment on its impact on small business.

Comments and Requests for Public Hearing

Before these proposed regulations are adopted as final regulations, consideration will be given to any written comments (a signed original and eight (8) copies) or electronic comments that are submitted timely to the IRS. The Treasury Department and the IRS generally request comments on all aspects of the proposed rules. In particular, the Treasury Department and the IRS request comments on whether there are other specific activities that should be included in, or excepted from, the definition of candidate-related political activity for purposes of section 501(c)(4). Such comments should address how the proposed addition or exception is consistent with the goals of providing more definitive rules and reducing the need for fact-intensive analysis of the activity. All comments submitted by the public will be made available for public inspection and copying at www.regulations.gov or upon request.

A public hearing will be scheduled if requested in writing by any person who timely submits written comments. If a public hearing is scheduled, notice of the date, time, and place for the public hearing will be published in the Federal Register.

Drafting Information

The principal author of these regulations is Amy F. Giuliano, Office of Associate Chief Counsel (Tax Exempt and Government Entities). However, other personnel from the IRS and Treasury Department participated in their development.

List of Subjects in 26 CFR Part 1

Income taxes, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

Proposed Amendments to the Regulations

Accordingly, 26 CFR part 1 is proposed to be amended as follows:

PART 1 — INCOME TAXES

Paragraph 1. The authority citation for part 1 continues to read in part as follows:

Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805 * * *

Par. 2. Section 1.501(c)(4)-1 is proposed to be amended by revising the first sentence of paragraph (a)(2)(ii) and adding paragraphs (a)(2)(iii) and (c) to read as follows:

§ 1.501(c)(4)-1 Civic organizations and local associations of employees.

(a) * * *

(2) * * *

(ii) * * * The promotion of social welfare does not include direct or indirect candidate-related political activity, as defined in paragraph (a)(2)(iii) of this section. * * *

(iii) Definition of candidate-related political activity — (A) In general. For purposes of this section, candidate-related political activity means:

(1) Any communication (as defined in paragraph (a)(2)(iii)(B)(3) of this section) expressing a view on, whether for or against, the selection, nomination, election, or appointment of one or more clearly identified candidates or of candidates of a political party that —

(i) Contains words that expressly advocate, such as “vote,” “oppose,” “support,” “elect,” “defeat,” or “reject;” or

(ii) Is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than a call for or against the selection, nomination, election, or appointment of one or more candidates or of candidates of a political party;

(2) Any public communication (defined in paragraph (a)(2)(iii)(B)(5) of this section) within 30 days of a primary election or 60 days of a general election that refers to one or more clearly identified candidates in that election or, in the case of a general election, refers to one or more political parties represented in that election;

(3) Any communication the expenditures for which are reported to the Federal Election Commission, including independent expenditures and electioneering communications;

(4) A contribution (including a gift, grant, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit) of money or anything of value to or the solicitation of contributions on behalf of —

(i) Any person, if the transfer is recognized under applicable federal, state, or local campaign finance law as a reportable contribution to a candidate for elective office;

(ii) Any section 527 organization; or

(iii) Any organization described in section 501(c) that engages in candidate-related political activity within the meaning of this paragraph (a)(2)(iii) (see special rule in paragraph (a)(2)(iii)(D) of this section);

(5) Conduct of a voter registration drive or “get-out-the-vote” drive;

(6) Distribution of any material prepared by or on behalf of a candidate or by a section 527 organization including, without limitation, written materials, and audio and video recordings;

(7) Preparation or distribution of a voter guide that refers to one or more clearly identified candidates or, in the case of a general election, to one or more political parties (including material accompanying the voter guide); or

(8) Hosting or conducting an event within 30 days of a primary election or 60 days of a general election at which one or more candidates in such election appear as part of the program.

(B) Related definitions. The following terms are defined for purposes of this paragraph (a)(2)(iii) only:

(1) “Candidate” means an individual who publicly offers himself, or is proposed by another, for selection, nomination, election, or appointment to any federal, state, or local public office or office in a political organization, or to be a Presidential or Vice-Presidential elector, whether or not such individual is ultimately selected, nominated, elected, or appointed. Any officeholder who is the subject of a recall election shall be treated as a candidate in the recall election.

(2) “Clearly identified” means the name of the candidate involved appears, a photograph or drawing of the candidate appears, or the identity of the candidate is apparent by reference, such as by use of the candidate’s recorded voice or of terms such as “the Mayor,” “your Congressman,” “the incumbent,” “the Democratic nominee,” or “the Republican candidate for County Supervisor.” In addition, a candidate may be “clearly identified” by reference to an issue or characteristic used to distinguish the candidate from other candidates.

(3) “Communication” means any communication by whatever means, including written, printed, electronic (including Internet), video, or oral communications.

(4) “Election” means a general, special, primary, or runoff election for federal, state, or local office; a convention or caucus of a political party that has authority to nominate a candidate for federal, state or local office; a primary election held for the selection of delegates to a national nominating convention of a political party; or a primary election held for the expression of a preference for the nomination of individuals for election to the office of President. A special election or a runoff election is treated as a primary election if held to nominate a candidate. A convention or caucus of a political party that has authority to nominate a candidate is also treated as a primary election. A special election or a runoff election is treated as a general election if held to elect a candidate. Any election or ballot measure to recall an individual who holds state or local elective public office is also treated as a general election.

(5) “Public communication” means any communication (as defined in paragraph (a)(2)(iii)(B)(3) of this section) —

(i) By broadcast, cable, or satellite;

(ii) On an Internet Web site;

(iii) In a newspaper, magazine, or other periodical;

(iv) In the form of paid advertising; or

(v) That otherwise reaches, or is intended to reach, more than 500 persons.

(6) “Section 527 organization” means an organization described in section 527(e)(1) (including a separate segregated fund described in section 527(f)(3)), whether or not the organization has filed notice under section 527(i).

(C) Attribution. For purposes of this section, activities conducted by an organization include activities paid for by the organization or conducted by an officer, director, or employee acting in that capacity or by volunteers acting under the organization’s direction or supervision. Communications made by an organization include communications the creation or distribution of which is paid for by the organization or that are made in an official publication of the organization (including statements or material posted by the organization on its Web site), as part of the program at an official function of the organization, by an officer or director acting in that capacity, or by an employee, volunteer, or other representative authorized to communicate on behalf of the organization and acting in that capacity.

(D) Special rule regarding contributions to section 501(c) organizations. For purposes of paragraph (a)(2)(iii)(A)(4) of this section, a contribution to an organization described in section 501(c) will not be treated as a contribution to an organization engaged in candidate-related political activity if —

(1) The contributor organization obtains a written representation from an authorized officer of the recipient organization stating that the recipient organization does not engage in such activity (and the contributor organization does not know or have reason to know that the representation is inaccurate or unreliable); and

(2) The contribution is subject to a written restriction that it not be used for candidate-related political activity within the meaning of this paragraph (a)(2)(iii).

(c) Effective/applicability date. Paragraphs (a)(2)(ii) and (iii) of this section apply on and after the date of publication of the Treasury decision adopting these rules as final regulations in the Federal Register.

John Dalrymple

Deputy Commissioner for Services

and Enforcement.

FOOTNOTE

1 In 2000 and 2002, section 527 was amended to require political organizations (with some exceptions) to file a notice with the IRS when first organized and to periodically disclose publicly certain information regarding their expenditures and contributions. See sections 527(i) and 527(j).

Citations: REG-134417-13




Moody's Industry Outlook: 2014 Outlook – US Not-for-Profit Hospitals.

Description Comprehensive analysis and data on the current and expected economic conditions and ratings drivers for a given sector in the coming 12-18 months.

Purchase the report at:

https://www.moodys.com/MdcAccessDeniedCh.aspx?lang=en&cy=global&Source=https%3a%2f%2fwww.moodys.com%2fresearchdocumentcontentpage.aspx%3fdocid%3dPBM_PBM160569




Final Exempt Hospital Regs May Result in Extensive Reporting Changes.

Substantial changes to Form 990 Schedule H, “Hospitals,” are possible once the section 501(r) charitable hospital regulations are finalized, an IRS official said November 22.

Substantial changes to Form 990 Schedule H, “Hospitals,” are possible once the section 501(r) charitable hospital regulations are finalized, an IRS official said November 22.

Stephen Clarke, tax law specialist (rulings and agreements), IRS Tax-Exempt and Government Entities Division, outlined changes made to Form 990, “Return of Organization Exempt From Income Tax,” for tax year 2013, including the creation of a new part V, section C of Schedule H, which provides for narrative responses to check-box questions in part V, section B, on such things as community health needs assessments and discounted care.

Speaking during a breakout session at the Western Conference on Tax-Exempt Organizations in Los Angeles organized by Loyola Law School, Clarke said the Schedule H changes for tax year 2013 are similar in scope to those made for 2012.

“Once the 501(r) regulations are finalized, we’ll make more extensive changes to reflect those regulations,” he told Tax Analysts.

Because the guidance has been proposed and is not final, the IRS has held off on making some changes until those regulations are finalized, he said.

The hospital schedule isn’t the only one that will likely see regulation-driven changes, Clarke said. Schedule A, which section 501(c)(3) organizations use to indicate they are public charities and not private foundations, clarifies the requirements for functionally integrated and nonfunctionally integrated Type III supporting organizations, including transition rules for how those organizations meet the integral part test for the 2013 tax year, he said.

Temporary and proposed regs (REG-155929-06; 2013-11 IRB 650 ) released last year that interpreted the 2006 Pension Protection Act’s Type III supporting organization provisions provide guidance on how these organizations meet the integral part test for tax year 2014 and later years, he said.

“So you can expect to see on our 2014 Schedule A some significant revisions which we’re working hard on to reflect the implementing regs for the 2006 Pension Protection Act,” he said.

According to a February TE/GE memo  regarding determination letters to Type III supporting organizations and general requirements, organizations seeking classification as a Type III supporting organization must satisfy the integral part test for either a functionally or nonfunctionally integrated supporting organization. There are three ways to satisfy the test, including being the parent of each supported organization, the memo says.

All forms, schedules, and instructions for Forms 990, and a list of changes to them, for the 2013 tax year should be posted online by early next year, Clarke said. Some are available online now, he said.

Donor-Advised Funds

Practitioners shouldn’t expect new regulations on donor-advised funds anytime soon, Ruth Madrigal, attorney-adviser, Treasury Office of Tax Legislative Counsel, said during an afternoon session November 21. The project isn’t one that can be simply fitted in between section 501(r) hospital regulations and supporting organization regulations or other large projects, she said.

“This is going to be a big project,” she said. “It’s a complicated project.”

“We are finally to a point where I can think about beginning to sit down and talk about donor-advised fund guidance with the IRS,” she added. “But it’s still going to be a ways off.”

Madrigal reminded conference attendees that donor-advised funds were only defined in the code in 2006. Speaking on her own behalf, she said there are good things about donor-advised funds generally. However, she said a few large sponsoring organizations with a lot at risk might be more compliant than a lot of little organizations, which in many cases are run by the donors themselves.

“I worry about small private foundations that have very low balances and don’t want to spend the little that they have on administrative expenses, which is what lawyers and accountants are,” she said.

by David van den Berg




Camp Says His Reform Bill Will Not Change Estate and Gift Taxes.

House Ways and Means Committee Chair Dave Camp, R-Mich., told reporters November 20 that he is not planning to make changes to estate and gift tax law in the comprehensive tax reform bill he is drafting.

Asked why not, Camp said, “I don’t think that policy needs the reform that the rest of the code does, and we are doing international [reform], which ’86 didn’t do,” referring to the Tax Reform Act of 1986.

Later, Camp added that he believes that the section of the code dealing with estate and gift taxes was settled at the beginning of the year. “It’s not necessary to revisit it,” he said.

Congress made major estate and gift tax provisions permanent as part of the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-240) enacted January 2.

That act set the top rate on taxable estates over $1 million at 40 percent and maintained the inflation-indexed $5.12 million exemption amount and portability provisions that were enacted in the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010.

Camp’s decision not to touch estate tax law may anger some Republicans, many of whom would like to see the estate tax repealed. Several House Republicans have introduced bills that would repeal or otherwise alter the estate tax. Ways and Means member Kevin Brady, R-Texas, introduced a bill (H.R. 2429) this year to repeal the estate tax and modify the gift tax. The bill has 170 cosponsors.

by Lindsey McPherson




Updated 2013-2014 Priority Guidance Plan Adds 5 Projects – Exempt Organizations.

The IRS and Treasury have released the first quarter update to the 2013-2014 priority guidance plan, noting the addition of five guidance projects.

The original 2013-2014 plan, released August 9, 2013, included 324 guidance projects identified as priorities for the July 2013-June 2014 plan year.

EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS

1. Revenue Procedures updating grantor and contributor reliance criteria under §§ 170 and 509.

2. Revenue Procedure to update Revenue Procedure 2011-33 for EO Select Check.

3. Guidance under § 501(c)(4) relating to measurement of an organization’s primary activity and whether it is operated primarily for the promotion of social welfare, including guidance relating to political campaign intervention.

4. Final regulations under §§ 501(r) and 6033 on additional requirements for charitable hospitals as added by § 9007 of the ACA. Proposed regulations were published on June 26, 2012 and April 5, 2013.

5. Additional guidance on § 509(a)(3) supporting organizations (SOs).

6. Guidance under § 4941 regarding a private foundation’s investment in a partnership in which disqualified persons are also partners.

7. Final regulations under § 4944 on program-related investments. Proposed regulations were published on April 19, 2012.

8. Guidance regarding the new excise taxes on donor advised funds and fund management as added by § 1231 of the Pension Protection Act of 2006.

9. Regulations under §§ 6011 and 6071 regarding the return and filing requirements for the § 4959 excise tax for community health needs assessments failures by charitable hospitals as added by § 9007 of the ACA.

PUBLISHED 08/15/13 in FR as TD 9629 (FINAL and TEMP).

10. Guidance under § 6033 on returns of exempt organizations.

11. Final regulations under § 6104(c). Proposed regulations were published on March 15, 2011.

12. Final regulations under § 7611 relating to church tax inquiries and examinations. Proposed regulations were published on August 5, 2009.




Partnership's Deduction for Qualified Conservation Contribution Is Disallowed.

Citations: 61 York Acquisition LLC et al. v. Commissioner; T.C. Memo. 2013-266; No. 22910-12

The Tax Court disallowed a partnership’s claimed charitable contribution deduction for its contribution of an easement to an organization, finding that the contribution failed to meet the exclusivity requirement since the restriction didn’t preserve the entire exterior of the structure.

61 YORK ACQUISITION, LLC,

SIB PARTNERSHIP, LTD., TAX MATTERS PARTNER,

Petitioner

v.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

Respondent

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

Filed November 19, 2013

Kevin M. Flynn and Henry S. Lovejoy, for petitioner.

Michael Dean Wilder and Michael A. Sienkiewicz, for respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

LARO, Judge: In 2006, 61 York Acquisition, LLC (partnership) contributed a historic preservation facade easement in a certified historic structure. In respect thereof, the partnership claimed a charitable contribution deduction of $10,730,000 on its 2006 partnership tax return. Respondent disallowed the [*2] deduction in full. Respondent further determined that the partnership was liable for a 40% accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(h)1 or, alternatively, for a 20% accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a) and (b)(1), (2), or (3).

This case is presently before the Court on respondent’s motion for partial summary judgment. At issue is whether the partnership’s contribution is a “qualified conservation contribution” under section 170(h)(1) entitling the partnership to a charitable contribution deduction. We hold that it is not. Consequently, we will grant respondent’s motion.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are not in dispute.

The partnership owns the entire interest in 332 Property, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, which is treated as a disregarded entity for Federal income tax purposes. 332 Property, LLC, owns a partial interest in a property at 330-332 South Michigan Avenue in Chicago, Illinois (property). The property is in the Historic Michigan Boulevard District and is a Chicago landmark designation. On December 27, 2006, the National Park Service classified the property as a “certified historic structure” for charitable contribution purposes.

[*3] Ownership of the property is divided into two parts: the “Office Property”, which consists of the first 14 floors of the property, and the “Residential Property”, which consists of residential condominium units on the top 6 floors of the property.

On January 3, 2000, the respective owners of the office property and the residential property entered into an “Amended and Restated Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements” (amended declaration) which set forth the ownership rights and responsibilities of the respective owners.

Section 20.16 of the amended declaration provides that the owner of the office property owns the “Facade” and “reserves the right, in its sole and exclusive discretion, to [ ] grant an easement in or dedicate the Facade to or for the benefit of any private, city, county, state or federal historic preservation agency or trust.” Section 1.1 of the amended declaration defines “Facade” as follows:

[t]he exterior wall of the Building facing Michigan Avenue and Van Buren Street from the street level up to the Roof * * * but excluding (i) the glass in the windows, window frames, window systems, joints and seals located in the Building; (ii) the Roof and the Roof structure, membrane, flashings and seals over the cornice; (iii) the window frames, flashings, systems, machinery and equipment and joints and seals located in the Condominium; (iv) the Garage entrance and exit doors and entrance and exit door systems and joints and seals; and (v) the structural support for the exterior wall of the Building. [Emphasis added.]

[*4] Section 5.1(I) of the amended declaration provides that the owner of the office property is responsible for “Maintenance of the Facade and maintenance of other portions of the facade of the Building”. Finally, section 14.1 of the amended declaration provides that an owner who wishes to make an addition, improvement, or alteration that “materially alters the Facade of the Building” must obtain prior written consent of the other owner.

In 2004 the partnership, as the owner of 332 Property, LLC, acquired the office property but did not acquire the residential property. On December 18, 2006, the partnership granted a “Conservation Deed of Easement” (easement) in the property to the National Architectural Trust, Inc. (NAT). The easement terms require the grantor to obtain prior written consent from the NAT before making any change to the “Protected Facades”, which include “the existing facades on the front, sides and rear of the Building and the measured height of the Building.”

In its 2006 return, the partnership claimed a charitable contribution deduction of $10,730,000 with respect to the easement contribution. Attached to the 2006 return was Form 8283, Noncash Charitable Contributions, which included a declaration by an appraiser valuing the easement at $10,730,000.

On June 25, 2012, respondent issued the partnership a notice of final partnership administrative adjustment (FPAA) disallowing the charitable [*5] contribution deduction because the partnership did not establish that the requirements of section 170 (or the regulations thereunder) had been met nor establish that the value of the easement was $10,730,000. Respondent also determined, with respect to the noncash charitable contribution, that the partnership was liable for an accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(h) for a gross valuation misstatement or, in the alternative, that the partnership was liable for an accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a) and (b)(1), (2) or (3) for negligence or disregard of rules or regulations, a substantial understatement of income tax, or a substantial valuation misstatement, respectively. SIB Partnership, Ltd., the tax matters partner, petitioned the Court in response to the FPAA. At the time of the filing of this petition, the partnership’s principal place of business was in New York.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

The Court may grant summary judgment upon all or any part of the legal issues in controversy where the record establishes that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and a decision may be rendered as a matter of law. Rule 121(a) and (b). The moving party bears the burden of proving that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and factual inferences are drawn most [*6] favorably to the party opposing summary judgment. Fielder v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-284, at *13; see also United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962); Dahlstrom v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 812, 821 (1985). In responding to a motion for summary judgment, a nonmoving party such as petitioner must do more than merely allege or deny facts. Rule 121(d). The nonmoving party must “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine dispute for trial.” Id. See generally Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).

Respondent contends that there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the easement at issue is a qualified conservation contribution under section 170(h). While petitioner’s response attempts to place before the Court a factual dispute as to whether the terms of the easement and amended declaration collectively impose enforceable restrictions on the entire exterior of the property, petitioner has not submitted any affidavits, declarations, answers to interrogatories, deposition testimony, or any other acceptable evidence to show that there is a genuine dispute for trial. See Rule 121(d). On the basis of the record at hand, we conclude that this case is ripe for partial summary judgment.

[*7] II. Qualified Conservation Contribution Under Section 170(h)

Section 170(a)(1) generally allows a deduction for any charitable contribution made during the taxable year. In this context, a charitable contribution includes a gift of property to a charitable organization, made with charitable intent and without the receipt or expectation of receipt of adequate consideration. See Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 690 (1989); United States v. Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 116-118 (1986); see also sec. 1.170A-1(h)(1) and (2), Income Tax Regs. While section 170(f)(3) generally does not allow an individual to deduct a charitable contribution for a gift of property consisting of less than his or her entire interest in that property, an exception applies in the case of a “qualified conservation contribution”. See sec. 170(f)(3)(B)(iii). A contribution of real property is a qualified conservation contribution if (1) the real property is a “qualified real property interest”, (2) the contributee is a “qualified organization”, and (3) the contribution is “exclusively for conservation purposes”. Sec. 170(h)(1); see also sec. 1.170A-14(a), Income Tax Regs.

The parties do not dispute that the easement is a “qualified real property interest” under section 170(h)(2), nor do they dispute that the NAT is a “qualified organization” under section 170(h)(3). The parties’ sole point of disagreement is [*8] whether the contribution is “exclusively for conservation purposes” under section 170(h)(4).

A contribution is made exclusively for conservation purposes if it meets the tests of section 170(h)(4) and (5).2 Section 170(h)(4)(A) provides that a contribution is for a conservation purpose if it preserves a historically important land area or a certified historic structure. Section 170(h)(4)(B) provides that a contribution that consists of a restriction with respect to the exterior of a certified historic structure shall not be considered to be exclusively for conservation purposes unless the interest: (1) includes a restriction which preserves the entire exterior of the building (including the front, sides, rear, and height of the building); and (2) prohibits any change in the exterior of the building which is inconsistent with the historical character of the exterior.

To determine whether the conservation easement complies with the requirements for the conservation easement deduction under Federal tax law, we must look to State law to determine the effect of the easement. State law determines the nature of the property rights, and Federal law determines the appropriate tax treatment of those rights. Carpenter v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. [*9] 2012-1, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1001, 1004 (2012); Estate of Lay v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-208, 102 T.C.M. (CCH) 202, 208 (2011). Specifically, we must look to State law to determine whether the partnership granted the NAT a restrictive easement as to the entire exterior of the property.

Respondent argues that the partnership cannot grant a valid easement restricting the entire exterior of the building when the partnership does not own the entire exterior. Petitioner argues that, under Illinois law, ownership of the entire exterior is not required to grant an easement which imposes enforceable restrictions on the entire exterior of the building. Under Illinois State law, a person can grant only a right which he himself possesses. Munroe v. Brower Realty & Mgmt. Co., 565 N.E.2d 32, 36 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); see also Fyffe v. Fyffe, 11 N.E.2d 857, 862 (Ill. App. Ct. 1937). We hold that the partnership did not assign a restrictive easement in the entire exterior of the property, as required by the plain meaning of section 170(h)(4)(B)(1), because the partnership only had rights to the Facade, as defined by the amended declaration.3

[*10] Petitioner argues that the partnership has an assignable right in the entire exterior because the partnership has an obligation under section 5.1(I) of the amended declaration to maintain the entire facade of the building. In essence, petitioner invites the Court to find a right in an obligation, but does not cite any Illinois caselaw in support of its proposition. We decline this invitation.

Petitioner next argues that section 14.1 of the amended declaration, which disallows certain alterations to the property without the prior written consent of the other property owner, gives the partnership an assignable right to the entire exterior of the property. However, the altering owner must obtain prior written consent from the other owner only if the alteration will materially alter the Facade of the property. The partnership does not have the right to restrict alterations to the two sides of the building not covered by the definition of Facade, nor the numerous excluded portions of the other two sides.4 The partnership cannot contribute a right it does not possess.5 Therefore, we hold that the partnership’s [*11] contribution is not a “qualified conservation contribution” under section 170(h)(1) because it is not a restriction that preserves the entire exterior of a certified historic structure.

In reaching our holdings, we have considered all arguments made, and, to the extent not mentioned above, we conclude they are moot, irrelevant, or without merit.

To reflect the foregoing,

An appropriate order will be issued.

FOOTNOTES

1 Unless otherwise indicated, section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the year at issue, and Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

2 Sec. 170(h)(5)(A) generally provides that a contribution of a qualified real property interest may be exclusively for conservation purposes only if it is protected in perpetuity.

3 Because we hold that the partnership did not have a right to the entire exterior of the property, we need not decide whether, under Illinois State law, an ownership right is required to grant a restrictive easement in the entire exterior of a building.

4 Because we hold that the partnership does not possess a right in the entire exterior of the property, we need not decide whether an alteration that is inconsistent with the historic character of the exterior is necessarily a materially alteration.

5 Because we hold that the partnership does not possess the right to restrict alterations to the entire exterior of the building, we need not decide whether this right “runs with the land”.




EO Update: e-news for Charities and Nonprofits.

1.  Looking for the 2012 Forms 990?

Organizations requiring 2012 forms and instructions can find them on the Prior Year Forms & Pubs list or the webpage Current Form 990 Series – Forms and Instructions. As new 2013 forms roll out, they will replace 2012 forms on the Current Forms & Pubs list. Form 990-series returns for calendar year filers with an extension are due Nov. 15.

http://www.irs.gov/uac/Current-Form-990-Series-Forms-and-Instructions

2.  Revenue procedure provides details about inflation-adjusted items for 2014

Revenue Procedure 2013-35, which sets forth inflation-adjusted items for 2014, will be published in Internal Revenue Bulletin 2013-47 on Nov. 18. Items in the revenue procedure that apply to exempt organizations include:

Insubstantial benefit limitations for contributions associated with charitable fund-raising campaigns

– Low cost article. For taxable years beginning in 2014, for purposes of defining the term “unrelated trade or business” for certain exempt organizations under § 513(h)(2), “low cost articles” are articles costing $10.40 or less.

Reporting exception for certain exempt organizations with nondeductible lobbying expenditures

– For taxable years beginning in 2014, the annual per person, family, or entity dues limitation to qualify for the reporting exception under § 6033(e)(3) (and section 5.05 of Rev. Proc. 98-19, 1998-1 C.B. 547), regarding certain exempt organizations with nondeductible lobbying expenditures, is $110 or less.

http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/rp-13-35.pdf

3.  2014 PTIN renewal period underway for tax professionals

The IRS reminds the nation’s almost 690,000 federal tax return preparers to renew their Preparer Tax Identification Numbers (PTINs) for 2014. All current PTINs will expire on Dec. 31, 2013. See news release:

http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/2014-PTIN-Renewal-Period-Underway-for-Tax-Professionals

4.  Register for upcoming EO workshop

Register for this workshop for small and medium-sized 501(c)(3) organizations:

December 10 – New York, NY

Hosted by Baruch College

http://www.irs.gov/Charities-%26-Non-Profits/Upcoming-Workshops-for-Small-and-Medium-Sized-501(c)(3)-Organizations

5.  IRS warns of pervasive telephone scam

The IRS recently warned consumers about a sophisticated phone scam targeting taxpayers, including recent immigrants, throughout the country. See news release:

http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/IRS-Warns-of-Pervasive-Telephone-Scam




Do We Need a New Legal Definition of Charity?

Do we need a new legal definition of charity? In answering this critical question, the history of the federal tax definition of charity and the origins of the law of charity must be considered alongside the current federal and state laws surrounding the tax treatment of charity. The law of charities, based on centuries of historical precedent, is not only relevant in terms of current regulations, but also flexible enough to accommodate the changing needs of society.

Read the full report at:

http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412946-Do-We-Need-a-New-Legal-Definition-of-Charity.pdf

Marion R. Fremont-Smith




Fire Chiefs Group Expresses Concern About Effect of ACA on Volunteer Fire Departments.

William Metcalf of the International Association of Fire Chiefs has urged the IRS to do all it can to avert the disastrous effect of any requirement that would force service agencies providing volunteer fire and emergency services protection to buy health insurance for volunteers under the Affordable Care Act.

[Editor’s Note: The document appearing at this citation is one of many substantially similar letters received but not published by Tax Analysts.]

September 27, 2013

The Honorable Daniel Werfel

Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Internal Revenue Service

1111 Constitution Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20004

Re: Information Reporting by Applicable Large Employers on Health Insurance Coverage Offered Under Employer-Sponsored Plans. Docket Number: REG-136630-12

Dear Acting Commissioner Werfel:

On behalf of the nearly 10,000 fire and emergency services chiefs of the International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC), I am submitting the following comments in reference to Docket Number: REG-136630-12. The IAFC is concerned that the Shared Responsibility Provision presents a serious threat to fire departments relying upon volunteer emergency responders.

While this proposed rule eases reporting requirements for employers, I continue to be concerned about the impact that the Shared Responsibility Provision will have on volunteer fire departments across the United States. As you know, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has classified nominally compensated volunteer firefighters as common-law employees of their fire departments. Unfortunately, the IRS’ interim final rule on the Shared Responsibility Provision makes no clear mention of nominally compensated volunteer firefighters and emergency medical personnel; as a result, many fire departments may be unintentionally forced to comply with the Shared Responsibility Provision — an action which will pose a threat to public safety.

Recent data from the National Fire Protection Association show that approximately 27,595 fire departments, or 92% of all fire departments in the United States, have volunteer firefighters and/or volunteer emergency medical personnel. In many rural and suburban areas, volunteers may work multiple 12- or 24-hour shifts per week, and provide the only fire and emergency medical response. These fire departments, which are often funded by private donations and local taxes, do not have the capacity to offer insurance to their volunteers. If the IRS defines nominally compensated volunteers as “employees” for the purposes of the Shared Responsibility Provision, fire departments may be forced to choose between eliminating volunteer emergency responders or significantly reducing training hours and the number of firefighters and emergency medical personnel who respond to life-threatening emergencies.

As you determine the final regulations for implementing the Shared Responsibility Provision, I urge you to clearly exempt nominally compensated volunteer firefighters and emergency medical personnel from being considered “employees.” Without this clear, common-sense guidance, volunteer fire departments may be forced to take measures which could seriously harm public safety in communities across the nation.

If nominally compensated volunteers are considered employees, I encourage you to count only hours spent on-duty, in training, or responding to emergency incidents. In many volunteer fire departments, volunteers are not assigned to a shift and are permitted to remain at home or work, and only respond to emergencies when alerted. In these cases, volunteers are free to control their own activities when not responding to emergencies and are not required to remain in any geographic location. Hours of service should not be counted when a volunteer merely has their pager or cell phone and are not responding to an emergency.

Both Congress and the Administration have taken strong steps to support fire departments and incentivize increased staffing levels; the IRS should not force the fire service to take a step back by incentivizing reduced training and eliminating firefighters and emergency medical personnel.

Sincerely,

Chief William R. Metcalf,

EFO, MIFireE

International Association of Fire

Chiefs

President and Chairman of the Board

Fairfax, VA




Lawmakers React to Incomplete Disclosure of Charitable Asset Diversions.

Recent reports that some charities are understating the extent of their losses from the unauthorized diversion of their assets have attracted the attention of Congress.

Several members of the congressional taxwriting committees have reacted in recent days to an October 27 article in The Washington Post reporting that, based on the newspaper’s analysis of filings between 2008 and 2012, more than 1,000 nonprofits reported on their IRS information returns a significant diversion of charitable assets due to embezzlement, fraud, theft, and other improper uses of funds. The article also said some charities reporting the diversions on their Form 990, “Return of Organization Exempt From Income Tax,” routinely left out details about the losses, with about half the filers not disclosing the total amounts lost.

House Ways and Means Committee Chair Dave Camp, R-Mich., said in a statement provided to Tax Analysts, “It is vital that nonprofits account for, and accurately report, how their funds are used, even when the worst happens and funds are misused. Misrepresenting the loss of charitable donations due to mismanagement, fraud or embezzlement diminishes the trust we put in nonprofit organizations.”

Senate Finance Committee member Chuck Grassley, R-Iowa, said the public should know when charitable dollars are diverted to non-charitable activities. “Without this kind of disclosure, law enforcement and charitable donors might never learn of diversion,” he said in a statement.

Grassley on November 1 also sent a letter  to the American Legacy Foundation, which, according to the Post, lost $3.4 million through embezzlement by a former employee but told the IRS simply that the amount of the loss was more than $250,000. The foundation told the Post it did not report the total amount lost because a Justice Department investigation was underway at the time, an explanation Grassley found troubling. He posed 30 questions about the foundation’s actions and asked for a response by November 15.

Inadequate Enforcement?

The Post quoted charity specialists as saying there is no established penalty for organizations that fail to disclose the full extent of the improper diversion of their assets.

But charity specialists contacted by Tax Analysts following the Post article’s publication said penalties are available but for various reasons are not enforced. Jack Siegel of Charity Governance Consulting LLC, who also spoke with the Post, said that if the code is parsed, penalties for making false statements can be found. However, he added that penalties for perjury are limited because failure to fully disclose is not necessarily perjury.

“There’s only so far these folks can go,” Siegel said of the IRS.

Siegel said that with any rule that requires a written disclosure of facts, there will be discretion in how much one will be required to disclose. “I think charities take advantage of that fact, and as a practical matter there’s only so much the IRS can do,” he said.

Another limitation, Siegel said, is that the exempt organizations function in the IRS Tax-Exempt and Government Entities Division is not really a revenue-producing operation. Rather, it is tasked with ensuring that organizations comply with the tax laws. “And so there is, from an enforcement standpoint, [a question of] how many resources do you want to put into going after people,” Siegel said.

Gary Snyder, publisher of the newsletter Nonprofit Imperative, who also was quoted in the Post, said the IRS does not have enough staff to enforce the disclosure requirement. Another problem, he said, is that the IRS has assured organizations that the section of the information return that asks about their governance practices will be used only for data collection and not enforcement.

“The IRS just does not care or does not have the resources to care,” Snyder said, adding that the IRS audits less than 1 percent of all exempt organization returns.

Snyder said Congress has done little about the problem and that state attorneys general lack the resources to address it.

Elaine Waterhouse Wilson of the West Virginia University College of Law agreed that many state attorney general offices are poorly equipped to address incomplete reporting of diversions. Although some states — Illinois, Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania, for example — are active in charity oversight, for many others it isn’t a priority, she said.

“From a resource allocation point of view, they just don’t have the wherewithal to go after that, unless they saw the underreporting as kind of part and parcel — almost like a conspiracy with the embezzler,” Wilson said. She added that some states have no one dedicated to charity oversight and that other states do not believe in regulating charities.

A possible solution, Wilson said, would be for information returns to ask more straightforward, unambiguous questions about the misuse of charitable assets that would not allow for vague or misleading answers.

In a November 1 follow-up story published on washingtonpost.com that discussed congressional and state reaction to the original article, the Post reported that officials from several state charity regulators said they would act on the newspaper’s findings.

‘Embarrassment’

Snyder attributed the tendency of some charities to downplay the extent of diversions to embarrassment. “We have a situation where nobody wants to deal with the problem at hand . . . because they’re embarrassed,” he said. “It’s a huge problem that nobody wants to deal with, including those that are sending in their IRS forms.”

Siegel said charities that fail to tell the whole story are worried about how their donors will react and, in some cases, how grant-makers and government agencies that fund them will respond. He added that charities are sometimes reluctant to give too much detail because they fear the possibility of defamation, particularly if there has not been a final criminal adjudication.

According to Snyder, the problem needs more attention from the press. “Unless it becomes a public issue where the media have gotten involved, nothing happens,” he said.

Siegel said the press and public should pay more attention to charities’ information returns. “To the extent donors take the time and look at a [Form] 990 . . . it puts a donor on notice, and certainly they have the right to call up and say, ‘Before I write my check out, tell me what happened,'” he said.

The IRS did not respond to a request from Tax Analysts for comment.

by Fred Stokeld




IRS LTR: High School Athletic Organization Loses Exemption.

The IRS revoked the tax-exempt status of an organization established to host high school sporting events, finding that a substantial amount of the organization’s assets inured to the private benefit of its founder.

Person to Contact: * * *

Release Date: 10/25/13

UIL: 501.03-19

Date: July 20, 2013

Tax Period(s) Ended: * * *

LEGEND:

A = * * *

B = * * *

C = * * *

D = * * *

Dear * * *

This is a final adverse determination regarding your exempt status under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”). It is determined that you do not qualify as exempt from Federal income tax under section 501(c)(3) of the Code effective January 1, 2008.

The revocation of your exempt status was made for the following reason(s):

A substantial amount of your organization’s assets inured to the private benefit of your founder. Because a substantial amount of your charitable assets were used for private purposes, the organization is not operated exclusively for exempt purposes described in section 501(c)(3) of the Code.

Contributions to your organization are not deductible under section 170 of the Code.

You are required to file Federal income tax returns on Forms 1120 for the tax periods stated in the heading of this letter and for all tax years thereafter. File your return with the appropriate Internal Revenue Service Center per the instructions of the return. For further instructions, forms, and information please visit www.irs.gov.

If you were a private foundation as of the effective date of revocation, you are considered to be taxable private foundation until you terminate your private foundation status under section 507 of the Code. In addition to your income tax return, you must also continue to file Form 990-PF by the 15th Day of the fifth month after the end of your annual accounting period.

You have waived your right to contest this determination under declaratory judgment provisions of section 7428 of the Internal Revenue Code.

You also have the right to contact the office of the Taxpayer Advocate. Taxpayer Advocate assistance is not a substitute for established IRS procedures, such as the formal appeals process. The Taxpayer Advocate cannot reverse a legally correct tax determination, or extend the time fixed by law that you have to file a petition in a United States Court. The Taxpayer Advocate can however, see that a tax matters that may not have been resolved through normal channels get prompt and proper handling. If you want Taxpayer Advocate assistance, please contact the Taxpayer Advocate for the IRS office that issued this letter. You may call toll-free, 1-877-777-4778, for the Taxpayer Advocate or visit www.irs.gov/advocate for more information.

If you have any questions, please contact the person whose name and telephone number are shown in the heading of this letter.

Sincerely Yours,

[signature omitted]

Appeals Team Manager

Enclosure:

Publication 892

* * * * *

Person to Contact/ID Number: * * *

Contact Numbers:

Telephone: * * *

Fax: * * *

Date: April 12, 2012

Taxpayer Identification Number: * * *

Form: * * *

Tax Year(s) Ended: * * *

LEGEND:

ORG = * * *

ADDRESS = * * *

Dear * * *

We have enclosed a copy of our report of examination explaining why we believe revocation of your exempt status under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) is necessary.

If you accept our findings, take no further action. We will issue a final revocation letter.

If you do not agree with our proposed revocation, you must submit to us a written request for Appeals Office consideration within 30 days from the date of this letter to protest our decision. Your protest should include a statement of the facts, the applicable law, and arguments in support of your position.

An Appeals officer will review your case. The Appeals office is independent of the Director, EO Examinations. The Appeals Office resolves most disputes informally and promptly. The enclosed Publication 3498, The Examination Process, and Publication 892, Exempt Organizations Appeal Procedures for Unagreed Issues, explain how to appeal an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) decision. Publication 3498 also includes information on your rights as a taxpayer and the IRS collection process.

You may also request that we refer this matter for technical advice as explained in Publication 892. If we issue a determination letter to you based on technical advice, no further administrative appeal is available to you within the IRS regarding the issue that was the subject of the technical advice.

If we do not hear from you within 30 days from the date of this letter, we will process your case based on the recommendations shown in the report of examination. If you do not protest this proposed determination within 30 days from the date of this letter, the IRS will consider it to be a failure to exhaust your available administrative remedies. Section 7428(b)(2) of the Code provides, in part: “A declaratory judgment or decree under this section shall not be issued in any proceeding unless the Tax Court, the Claims Court, or the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia determines that the organization involved has exhausted its administrative remedies within the Internal Revenue Service.” We will then issue a final revocation letter. We will also notify the appropriate state officials of the revocation in accordance with section 6104(c) of the Code.

You have the right to contact the office of the Taxpayer Advocate. Taxpayer Advocate assistance is not a substitute for established IRS procedures, such as the formal appeals process. The Taxpayer Advocate cannot reverse a legally correct tax determination, or extend the time fixed by law that you have to file a petition in a United States court. The Taxpayer Advocate can, however, see that a tax matter that may not have been resolved through normal channels gets prompt and proper handling. You may call toll-free 1-877-777-4778 and ask for Taxpayer Advocate Assistance. If you prefer, you may contact your local Taxpayer Advocate at:

* * *

If you have any questions, please call the contact person at the telephone number shown in the heading of this letter. If you write, please provide a telephone number and the most convenient time to call if we need to contact you.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

Nanette M. Downing

Director, EO Examinations

Enclosures:

Publication 892

Publication 3498

Report of Examination

* * * * *

LEGEND:

ORG = Organization name

EIN = ein

XX = Date

City = city

State = state

BM-1 & BM-2 = 1st & 2nd BM

CO-1 through Co-5 =- 1st through 5th COMPANIES

ISSUE

Whether ORG, operates exclusively for exempt purposes.

FACTS

ORG, (ORG) was incorporated in the state of State as a Non-profit (Non-Stock) — Domestic Corporation on July 22, 19XX. ORG was recognized as tax-exempt by the Service as an organization described in Code section 501(c)(3) in a determination letter dated February 14, 20XX. ORG was also determined to be a publicly supported organization during its advanced ruling period.

The following activities are listed on the Form 1023, Application for Recognition of Exemption under Internal Revenue Code Section 501(c)(3), Part II, #1, Activities and Operational Information:

The organization is formed to host high school sporting events around the country. Formed at the request of participating school principals, athletic directors, and coaches, participation in these events and open to high schools of any size, type, strength, or geographic location. Currently contests in football, boys and girl’s soccer, boys and girl’s basketball, girl’s field hockey, and girl’s volleyball are occurring. All events are known and sanctioned by the local and state high school organizing bodies of each team that participates and the National Federation of High School Associations. The contests take place in several cities across the country. Additional sports and cities will be added as resources allow as to make these athletic and scholarship opportunities available to more students.”

The purpose of the events is the purpose of the organization. It is to provide high school athletic programs of all sizes and competition levels with an opportunity to further develop and demonstrate the educational aspects of sports through the competition of interstate interscholastic athletic competitions; exposure to world-class competition facilities; experience in team travel and travel participations; the responsibility of representing their organization through sportsmanship and citizenship; and the opportunity to provide exposure to themselves, their team, their school, and their community; and to accomplish these objectives while providing continuing education scholarships to participating student-athletics.

All of the organizations’ time is spent either: 1) marketing to and preparing participating teams to travel; 2) organizing and producing the event and 3) securing funding to cover the event cost and the scholarships given to each participating team. This work is preformed primarily by the Executive Director with great leadership and volunteer assistance from the Board of Directors. Actual Events employ the use of Event Volunteers.

ORG hosts high school sporting event competitions at the professional sports facilities located in CO-1 in City, State, for high schools located in 46 of 50 states of the United States of America. The 5-day events are for both male and female sports activities; the sports hosted are: Baseball, Basketball, Lacrosse, Softball, Football, Filed Hockey, Track and Field, Volleyball, Wrestling, and Cheerleading. During the 5 day stay, the teams participate in around 1 to 3 games, depending on the sport. The teams stay at CO-1 and are able to take in all the entertainment it offers, while not participating in the ORG sporting events. If the sporting event were not hosted by a charitable organization, none of the 46 State Athletic Association would allow their high school sports teams to participate in the experience.

CO-2 (CO-2), a for-profit corporation, conducts business from the same location as ORG and shares two of three common board members: husband and wife, BM-1 and BM-2. CO-2 performs the marketing for ORG. An interested team submits a ORG application, along with a minimum deposit, to CO-2. CO-2 then invoices the team for the remaining amount due and deposits the check into its checking account.

At this point, ORG invoices CO-2 for a tournament entry fee of $$ to $$, tournament related costs, and the amounts that were being charged by CO-1 for meals, hotels, park passes, special events, and the facility where the tournament takes place, plus an additional 3 percent to pay ORG employee salaries.

A participating team typically holds fundraising events to cover expenses and submits partial payments to CO-2 until the invoice is paid in full. CO-2 records the expenses of the airfare and land transportation on its books and records; no part of these expenses are recorded on ORG’S books and records. CO-2 pays ORG for tournament costs on an allocated basis per payment received and uses the remaining moneys not sent to ORG for travel expenses recorded on CO-2 books and records; CO-2 keeps any residual dollars submitted by each team.

The following descriptions of both organizations’ activities were submitted by ORG:

Marketing

CO-2 Enterprises markets to High Schools via Email and Faxes. Primary marketing is from hosting State Dinners which are organized by our Steering Committee Coaches. We found over the years that majority of our new Schools were being referred by other teams that had participated. By hosting these dinners we are creating a relationship with these coaches that is ensuring a more memorable experience.”

Team Booking

A Coach will either request information over the phone, website or at one of our dinners. CO-2 will then make a travel proposal for the school which includes meals, hotels, park, passes, special events, and the tournament they will be participating in. There are many other inclusions but those are the primary ones. The packages are bundled and is [sic] not an Ala Carte option for them. Once a team decides they are going to attend they complete a Team Application which is a ORG * * * Document and submit it typically with a team deposit. At that time a team is invoiced from CO-2 and a [sic] invoice is made from ORG * * * to CO-2 for booking the team into the tournament.

Receivables

Majority of teams are fundraising to participate in this event so they are set up on payment plans. Teams will typically make 4 to 5 payments throughout the process. Payments will be sent into CO-2 on behalf of the schools for a tentative number of participants. As invoices adjust in CO-2 they will be adjusted in ORG * * * as well.

Payments

As payments are required to suppliers CO-2 will pay its bills to ORG * * *. All event items are paid through ORG * * *. Facility rental, officials, hotels, park passes, etc. CO-2 pays for travel related items such as buses and airlines.

Expenses

Primarily all expenses are recorded in CO-2 Enterprises except for a few salaries in ORG * * *. ORG * * * charges a tournament entry fee of $$* * * – $$* * *, plus * * *% to cover the salaries.

Travel Experience

From the time the team gets on the plane back home until the time they are on their way back we handle all the details for them. When a team arrives at the airport we will meet them at baggage claim and load them on buses to the hotel. When a team arrives at a hotel we have a check in area that is special just for our participants. Coaches won’t even need to go to the front desk and check in their team. We are creating a “College Like” road trip feel for the team and the coach where all the coach needs to worry about is Coaching. During their stay they will typically play 1 to 3 games a day and also attend some type of attraction. Attractions range from CO-1, CO-3, CO-4, CO-5, and so on.

Scholarship Awards

At the end of the school year ORG * * * sends out notifications to all our participating coaches for that school year. Each coach is responsible to nominate one graduating senior to be awarded a $$* * * to $$* * * Book Scholarship.

Ultimately it is up to the coach who is awarded this but we do have a list of criteria that we would like them to follow. The entire experience is much more then [sic] who the best athlete is. It is more about who is a team leader, involvement in the community, overcoming adversity, improving grades and so on and so on. Once the school has their Book Scholarship winner that same student athlete is then eligible to enter our Essay Competition. The topic is different each year and is chosen by our Steering Committee Coaches. These same coaches are also the ones that will read all the essays and determine the winner. Each of our sports will receive a Essay Scholarship winner. Volleyball, Field Hockey, Football, Boys and Girls Basketball, Wrestling, Baseball, Softball and Boys and Girls Lacrosse. Scholarship amounts are determined on the size of the tournaments participation. Scholarships typically range from $$* * * to $$* * * per sport. The payments are made out to the College that the winner will be attending and can be used for any college related expenses.”

CO-2, a for-profit entity, receives benefits from making the travel arrangements for all travel related to a ORG event. ORG stated that approximately * * * percent of CO-2’s business is derived from ORG events.

Since CO-2 deposits all receipts associated with an athletic competition hosted by ORG on its books and records and pays ORG the cost plus * * * percent for tournament related costs (mostly payments to CO-1), the income innures to CO-2, the for-profit entity operated by the officers of ORG.

The total amount of scholarships given by ORG. are small compared to the revenues reported. ORG reported on its Form 990 for 20XX scholarships in the amount $$* * * and gross receipts of $$* * *. For the 20XX, ORG reported scholarships in the amount of $$* * * and gross receipts of $$* * *.

ORG stated that in order for a high school team to be allowed to participate in an amateur sporting event, that event must be hosted by a non-profit organization pursuant to the guidelines of the State Athletic Associations.. In the past, CO-2 asked Rotary Clubs to “host the amateur sporting activities;” though “hosted” by the Rotary Club, all financial transactions were reported on CO-2’s books and records. An officer of CO-2 researched other organizations that conduct music competition events in a similar manner and decided to establish an exempt organization to host the sporting events, making the whole process much easer for CO-2 to manage. The organizations on which ORG stated that it modeled its operations were * * * and * * *

LAW

Organizations that are exempt from federal income tax under Internal Revenue Code section 501(c)(3) are described as follows:

Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation (except as otherwise provided in subsection (h)), and which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.

An organization is not organized or operated exclusively for one or more [exempt] purposes . . . unless it serves a public rather than a private interest. Thus, to meet the requirements of this subdivision, it is necessary for an organization to establish that it is not organized or operated for the benefit of private interests such as designated individuals, the creator or his family, shareholders of the organization, or persons controlled, directly or indirectly, by such private interests. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii).

Prohibited private interests include those of unrelated third parties as well as insiders. Christian Stewardship Assistance, Inc. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 1037 (1978); American Campaign Academy v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 1053 (1989). Private benefits include an “advantage; profit; privilege; gain; [or] interest.” Retired Teachers Legal Fund v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 280, 286 (1982).

An organization formed to educate people in Hawaii in the theory and practice of “est” was determined by the Tax Court to be a part of a “franchise system which is operated for private benefit;, therefore, the Tax Court determined that it should not be recognized as exempt under section 501(c)(3) of the Code. est of Hawaii v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 1067, 1080 (1979). Although the organization was not formally controlled by the same individuals who controlled the for-profit entity that owned the license to the “est” body of knowledge, publications, and methods, the for-profit entity exerted considerable control over the applicant’s activities by setting pricing, the number and frequency of different kinds of seminars and training, and providing the trainers and management personnel who are responsible to it in addition to setting price for the training. The court stated that the fact that the organization’s rights were dependent upon its tax-exempt status showed the likelihood that the for-profit entities were trading on that status. The question for the court was not whether the payments made to the for-profit were excessive, but whether the for-profit entity benefited substantially from the operation of the organization. The court determined that there was a substantial private benefit because the organization “was simply the instrument to subsidize the for-profit corporations and not vice versa and had no life independent of those corporations.”

The Tax Court in Wayne Baseball, Inc., v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 199-304, held that an adult amateur baseball league could not be described in section 501(c)(3) because a substantial part of the league’s activities furthered the social and recreational interests of its members. The Tax Court determined that the sponsoring of an adult amateur baseball team furthered the team members’ social and recreational interests to a more than insubstantial extent; accordingly, the Tax Court determined that the organization did not operate exclusively as a section 501(c)(3) organization. Id.

GOVERNMENT POSITION

It appears that ORG is organized and operated primarily to benefit CO-2, a for-profit organization, rather than to achieve a tax exempt purpose such that it is similar to the organization described in est of Hawaii, 71 T.C. 1067. In addition, ORG operates to promote the social and recreational interests of the team members who participate in its events with such activities as visits to CO-1 as part of the event packages, making it similar to the organization in Wayne Baseball, T.C. Memo. 19XX-304.

CO-2 receives a benefit from being the only for-profit organization used to book travel arrangements for ORG events. ORG has not established that “it is not organized or operated for the benefit of private interests, such as designated individuals, the creator or his family, shareholders of the organization, or persons controlled, directly or indirectly, by such private interests.” Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii). Rather, ORG was created to meet each State Athletic Association’s requirement that an event must be hosted by a charitable organization in order for a high school team in that state to participate in a sporting event and to provide a stream of business opportunity for CO-2. Like the organization in est of Hawaii, 71 T.C. 1067, the organization appears to have been established for the benefit of CO-2, a for-profit entity, in order to provide the main stream of revenue for it and appears to have no life independent of CO-2.

TAXPAYER’S POSITION

We believe that the facts reflect that the organization is fulfilling its exempt purpose as originally requested on Form 1023, Application for Recognition of Exemption. Internal Revenue Services in a determination letter to the taxpayer in response to form 1023 approved their application for recognition of exemption.

In reviewing your letter dated April 12, 20XX in which you propose revocation of the taxpayer’s exemption, it appears that the primary issue which leads you to your determination that the taxpayer’s exempt status should be revoked is that ORG (ORG) utilizes the services of an entity known as CO-2 We stipulate that the facts reflect the owners and officers of CO-2 are also officers and directors of ORG. We further stipulate that a substantial portion of CO-2’s revenues arise from services preformed for ORG. However, we believe that the facts reflect that there is no private enurement to CO-2 from these activities. In fact, CO-2 has in recent years reflected operating loses and, other than reasonable salaries paid to employees and the officers of CO-2 for their services, no amounts have enured to their benefit.

In addition, we provided you with evidence to show that this type of relationship between a for-profit entity and a not-for-profit entity in this industry (that being provision of travel services and the hosting of youth sports events) is very typical.

Further, you make a reference in your report to various cases supporting the government’s position that ORG is essentially no more that a glorified travel agent, we have reviewed these cases and do not believe they are on point.

We believe that the IRS has not appropriately considered all of the evidence provided; importantly, but not limited to, the mischaracterization of ORG as an organization formed to promote the social and recreational interest of team members. Rather, we believe it is apparent from all of the evidence available to the field agent that ORG is fulfilling its exempt purpose as reflected on Form 1023 and as approved by the IRS determination letter.

We respectfully request that this information be reviewed by an appeals officer along with testimony that we provided.

ORG has entered into contracts to provide events for various youth groups through December 20XX. As an alternative to appealing the revocation, if the IRS would agree to allow ORG to cease operation and liquidate as of December 31, 20XX, we would agree to that.

CONCLUSION

ORG is not operated exclusively for one or more exempt purposes, and it provides private benefit to shareholders or individuals associated with CO-2, a for-profit entity.. Accordingly, the exempt status of ORG is revoked as of January 1, 20XX.

Citations: LTR 201343028




IRS LTR: Proposed Bequest to Camp Would Constitute an "Unusual Grant."

The IRS ruled that a proposed bequest to an organization that operates a camp for seriously ill children constitutes an unusual grant within the meaning of reg. section 1.170A-9(f)(6)(ii) because the size of the grant is not only unusual and unexpected but would also adversely affect the group’s publicly supported status.

LEGEND:

C = Name of Founder

D = State

E = Date

G = Name of Foundation

T = Trust

f = $ Amount of Unusual Grant

Dear * * *:

We have considered your March 22, 2012 request for recognition of an unusual grant under Treasury Regulations section 1.170A-9(f)(6)(ii) and related provisions.

Based on the information provided, we have concluded that the proposed grant constitutes an unusual grant under section 1.170A-9(f)(6)(ii) and related provisions of the regulations. The basis for our conclusion is set forth below.

FACTS

You were incorporated in the State of D on E. You were recognized as exempt from federal income tax under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (“the Code”). You operate a camp for seriously ill children. We have further determined that you are not a private foundation within the meaning of section 509(a) of the Code because you are an organization of the type described in section 509(a)(1) and 170(b)(1)(A)(vi) of the Code.

The camp is funded by donations. You have received funding from individuals, businesses, corporations, foundations, civic groups and other organizations. Your public support has continued to grow. You anticipate that this trend will continue. You have a representative governing body made up of individuals with previous experience with organizations similar to yours.

You are requesting recognition of a proposed grant of $f from T as an unusual grant under sections 1.170A-9(f)(6)(ii) and related provisions of the regulations. The grant is in the form of a charitable bequest to you upon the passing of C. No restrictions were placed on the bequest.

The proceeds from this grant are to be used to pay off tax exempt bonds issued by you to fund the construction of your facilities for which C had provided a personal guarantee. Any remaining funds will be used to partially fund your operations for up to one (1) year and/or to establish an endowment in the name of C.

C was your founder. A review of your previously filed Form 990 filings indicates that you previously received contributions from C during Fiscal year ended 20* * * and 20* * *. You have also received contributions from G in previous years.

C was not an employee, board member, or person in position to exercise control over you. You met the facts and circumstances test in each of the years from 20* * * – 20* * *. Subject to the treatment of the bequest as an unusual grant your public support percentage would be * * *%

LAW

Treasury Regulations sections 1.170A-9(f)(6)(ii) and 1.509(a)-3(c)(4) set forth the criteria for an unusual grant:

Treasury Regulations section 1.170A-9(f)(6)(ii) states that, for purposes of applying the 2-percent limitation described in paragraph (f)(6)(i) of this section to determine whether the 33 1/3 percent support test or the 10 percent support limitation in paragraph (f)(3)(i) of this section is satisfied, one or more contributions may be excluded from both the numerator and the denominator of the applicable support fraction if such contributions meet the requirements of paragraph (f)(6)(iii) of this section. The exclusion is generally intended to apply to substantial contributions or bequests from disinterested parties which:

are attracted by reason of the publicly supported nature of the organization;

are unusual or unexpected with respect to the amount thereof; and

would, by reason of their size, adversely affect the status of the organization as normally being publicly supported.

Treasury Regulations section 1.509(a)-3(c)(4) states that all pertinent facts and circumstances will be taken into consideration to determine whether a particular contribution may be excluded. No single factor will necessarily be determinative. Such factors may include:

Whether the contribution was made by a person who:

a. created the organization

b. previously contributed a substantial part of its support or endowment

c. stood in a position of authority with respect to the organization, such as a foundation manager within the meaning of section 4946(b)

d. directly or indirectly exercised control over the organization, or

e. was in a relationship described in Internal Revenue Code section 4946(a)(1)(C) through 4946(a)(1)(G) with someone listed in bullets a, b, c, or d above.

A contribution made by a person described in a. – e. is ordinarily given less favorable consideration than a contribution made by others not described above.

Whether the contribution was a bequest or an inter vivos transfer. A bequest will ordinarily be given more favorable consideration than an inter vivos transfer.

Whether the contribution was in the form of cash, readily marketable securities, or assets which further the exempt purposes of the organization, such as a gift of a painting to a museum.

Whether (except in the case of a new organization) prior to the receipt of the particular contribution, the organization (a) has carried on an actual program of public solicitation and exempt activities and (b) has been able to attract a significant amount of public support.

Whether the organization may reasonably be expected to attract a significant amount of public support after the particular contribution. Continued reliance on unusual grants to fund an organization’s current operating expenses (as opposed to providing new endowment funds) may be evidence that the organization cannot reasonably be expected to attract future public support.

Whether, prior to the year in which the particular contribution was received, the organization met the one-third support test described in section 1.509(a)-3(a)(2) without the benefit of any exclusions of unusual grants pursuant to section 1.509-3(c)(3);

Whether the organization has a representative governing body as described in Treasury Regulations section 1.509(a)-3(d)(3)(i); and

Whether material restrictions or conditions within the meaning of Treasury Regulations section 1.507-2(a)(7) have been imposed by the transferor upon the transferee in connection with such transfer.

Treasury Regulations section 1.509(a)-3(c)(6), Example 5 read in conjunction with Example 4 provides an example of a bequest received by an organization from an individual not in control of the governing body, in cash, with no restrictions as to its use, which contribution could be excluded as an unusual grant for the purpose of determining the one-third support test.

APPLICATION OF LAW

The proposed bequest constitutes an unusual grant within the meaning of Section 1.170A-9(f)(6)(ii) and related provisions of the regulations for exclusion as an unusual grant. It is unusual and unexpected with respect to the amount and you received it due to your publicly supported nature. Additionally it would by reason of its size adversely affect your publicly supported status.

After reviewing the factors detailed in section 1.509(a)-3(c)(4) of the regulations we have determined that the proposed contribution constitutes an unusual grant. Although made by the founder, the proposed contribution is in the form of a bequest, was made in cash and has no restrictions as to its use. The founder had no authority with respect to you as an officer or board member. Further, you have carried on a program of exempt activities and have attracted public support since inception of your organization. You have met the public support tests yearly under facts and circumstances and will meet the one-third public support test if the proposed bequest is treated as an unusual grant. You are similar to the organization in Treasury Regulations section 1.509(a)-3(c)(6), Example 5.

We’ll make our determination letter available for public inspection under Internal Revenue Code section 6110 after deleting certain identifying information. Please read the enclosed Notice 437, Notice of Intention to Disclose, and review the two attached letters that show our proposed deletions. If you disagree with our proposed deletions, you should follow the instructions in Notice 437. If you agree with our deletions, you don’t need to take any further action.

If you have any questions, please contact the person listed in the heading of this letter.

Sincerely,

Kenneth Corbin

Acting Director,

Exempt Organizations

Citations: LTR 201342011




AICPA Comments on EO Information Return.

Jeffrey Porter of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants has submitted comments on Form 990, “Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax,” and instructions, suggesting changes to the 2014 form and instructions.

October 25, 2013

Mr. Ken Corbin

Acting Director, Exempt Organizations

Internal Revenue Service

1111 Constitution Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20224

RE: Comments on Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax, and Instructions

Dear Mr. Corbin:

The American Institute of CPAs (AICPA) is pleased to provide comments on Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax, and instructions. Our matrix includes comments and recommendations for the 2014 forms and instructions, while indicating the importance and urgency of each recommendation.

The comments were developed by the AICPA Exempt Organizations Taxation Technical Resource Panel (TRP) and approved by the AICPA Tax Executive Committee. The Exempt Organizations TRP is comprised of practitioners who serve tax-exempt organizations and are experienced with both the nuances of the form and the challenges that arise for taxpayers in trying to complete it.

The AICPA is the world’s largest member association representing the accounting profession, with more than 394,000 members in 128 countries and a 125-year heritage of serving the public interest. Our members advise clients on federal, state and international tax matters and prepare income and other tax returns for millions of Americans. Our members provide services to individuals, not-for-profit organizations, small and medium-sized businesses, as well as America’s largest businesses.

We appreciate your consideration of our comments, and look forward to working with you in the future on this matter. We are available to meet with you to discuss and explain our comments further. If you have any questions, please contact Jeanne Schuster, Chair, AICPA Exempt Organizations Taxation Technical Resource Panel, at (617) 585-0373, or [email protected]; or Amy Wang, AICPA Technical Manager, at (202) 434-9264, or [email protected].

Sincerely,

Jeffrey A. Porter, CPA

Chair, Tax Executive Committee

American Institute of CPAs

Washington, DC

* * * * *

General Instructions

Section of the Form

Instructions, Foreign Filings & Public Disclosure

Importance/Urgency

Low

Comment

If a foreign form (Form 926, 5471, etc.) is attached to Form 990 instead of Form 990-T, the instructions do not address whether it is open to public disclosure. Currently, GuideStar does not appear to publish these forms when they are filed with a Form 990. The instructions make it clear that if the foreign forms are filed with Form 990-T, they are then removed for public disclosure purposes.

Recommendation

Please clarify that foreign forms are removed from the public disclosure copy of the Form 990.

Section of the Form

Instructions, Section E, When to File

Importance/Urgency

Low

Comment

It is understood that an organization that has an application for exemption pending must file Forms 990-EZ, 990-PF, or 990 while its application for exemption is in pending status. Currently, it is unclear whether and when an organization that has an application for exemption pending must file a Form 990-N. In addition, if the organization is not yet in the IRS system and cannot file a Form 990-N, the instructions do not address whether or not the organization must file a paper extension until it can get into the IRS system and file a Form 990-N.

Recommendation

Clarify in the instructions whether an organization must file an extension for a Form 990-N. Because the extension period might expire before exemption is granted, allow organizations whose exemption is pending and if granted on a retroactive basis to qualify to file a Form 990-N. An exemption pending box can be added to the form. In the alternative, provide guidance regarding the Form 990-N extension process.

Section of the Form

Instructions, Section H, Failure to File

Importance/Urgency

Low

Comment

If Forms 990, 990-EZ, 990-PF, or 990-N has been filed late, but within a three-year period, the instructions do not address whether this occurrence counts as a filing within three consecutive years for purposes of the automatic revocation provisions.

Recommendation

Clarify in the instructions that one return filed within three consecutive years qualifies as a filed return, even if late, except if the late return is for the third year and no return was filed for the previous two years.

Section of the Form

Instructions, Who Must File, Subcategory, Form 990-N

Importance/Urgency

Low

Comment

Small organizations need to maintain proper donor records in order to know when they have reached the filing threshold for a Form 990-EZ or full Form 990.

Recommendation

The instructions should note that all small organizations should keep track of their charitable contributions by donor. Once the filing thresholds have been reached for filing a Form 990-EZ, the organizations will have the appropriate documentation in order to file the Form 990-EZ and related Schedule A.

Heading, Part I and II

Section of the Form

Part I, Line 16a, Glossary

Importance/Urgency

Medium

Comment

This line requires organizations to report any “professional fundraising” paid to officers, directors, trustees, key employees or disqualified persons from Lines 5 and 6 of Part IX. These amounts are then excluded from Part I, Line 15.

Recommendation

The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) should clarify the definition of professional fundraisers as it relates to IRS appointed officers who are really employees (CEO, CFO, etc.). The definition for professional fundraising should include details for such individuals since employees are excluded from this definition.

Part III

Section of the Form

Part III, Line 4e

Importance/Urgency

Low

Comment

Currently, taxpayers have to manually calculate the total grants and program revenue for Lines 4a-4d to make sure the total amounts match with Parts VIII and IX of the return.

Recommendation

In addition to having the total program service expenses on line 4e, please add the total grants and program service revenue.

Part IV

Section of the Form

Part IV, Line 25a and Schedule L, Part I Header

Importance/Urgency

High

Comment

The excess benefit rules apply to section 501(c)(29) organizations. The updated form and instructions need to include these organizations.

Recommendation

Add section 501(c)(29) to the list of affected organizations on the face of the form at Part IV, Line 25a. The section 501(c)(29) organizations were appropriately added to the instructions.

Section of the Form

Part IV, Questions 12a and 12b

Importance/Urgency

High

Comment

The language in the instructions continues to confuse taxpayers and paid preparers. The source of the confusion comes from the definition in the Glossary for generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). The definition as stated in the Glossary appears narrower than intended. There are audited financial statements with formal opinion letters for financial statements that are not prepared according to U.S. GAAP (e.g., cash-basis accounting, International Finance Accounting Standards (IFRS), hybrid accounting, etc.). Exempt organization taxpayers would like to answer “yes” to this question because an answer of “no” confuses their stakeholders.

Recommendation

One option is to remove the reference to GAAP from both the instructions to Line 12 and the Glossary (but keep audited financial statements). A second option is to re-write the definition of GAAP in the Glossary to allow for other methods of accounting, including but not limited to cash-basis, modified cash-basis and IFRS.

Section of the Form

Part IV, Line 29

Importance/Urgency

High

Comment

The question posed is whether the organization received more than $25,000 in non-cash contributions. If the answer is “yes,” Schedule M needs completion. The instructions also provide that contributions of services or use of facilities are not included. Line 33 of Schedule M asks to include a description in Part II if the organization did not report an amount in Column (c) for a type of property for which Column (a) is checked. The instructions ask for an explanation of why the organization did not report revenue for the item. Since in many instances, it is likely that organizations will not take into account contributions where no revenue has been recorded, the answer to Line 29 may be “no” and result in Line 33 of Schedule M having no response.

Recommendation

To make certain that Line 33 of Schedule M contains a response where relevant, Line 29 presentation on the form, as well as the instructions, need revising to make clear that the $25,000 threshold is regardless of whether amounts were included in the financial statements or in financial statement revenue. The question can include a parenthetical to allow the form to read: “Did the organization receive more than $25,000 in non-cash contributions (whether or not included in revenue)?”

Part V

Section of the Form

Part V, Line 2a

Importance/Urgency

Medium

Comment

Please clarify whether the number of employees paid by a related exempt organization must be indicated at this line if the related organization files the W-2s and W-3s while the employee works for the filing organization. If the employee is included on the filing organization, the instructions should indicate whether he/she is also included on the related organization because it was the related organization that issued the W-2. If the answer is yes, double reporting will presumably occur as both organizations will include the employee on this line of the Form 990.

Recommendation

Clarify whether or not to report an employee more than once. In addition, clarify whether the number on this line has any correlation to the salary expense reported on Part IX. For example:

Organization P is the parent and common paymaster for Organizations S and T. Therefore, all payroll related activities run through Organization P. Employee X is an employee of Organization P. However, he/she spends 20% of his/her time with Organization S, 30% of his time with Organization T and the remaining 50% with Organization P. While Organization P pays for all of Employee X’s salary and related payroll expenses, Organizations S and T reimburse P for the amount of time Employee X spends at their organization. Therefore, Organizations S, T, and P each report 20%, 30% and 50% respectively of Employee X’s salary on their Part IX.

Please clarify whether the procedure should be: 1) Organizations S, T, and P report Employee X on their Part V, Line 2a because Employee X works for all three organizations, or 2) Only Organization P report Employee X on Part V, Line 2a because Organization P is the one the issued the W-2 to Employee X.

Section of the Form

Part V, Line 2a

Importance/Urgency

Low

Comment

The face of the form indicates an organization should report the number of employees on its Form W-3 for the year. However, the instruction for this line indicates this number is the organization’s number of employees.

Recommendation

Please change the language on either the core form or the instructions in order for the two questions to ask for the same number.

Part VI

Section of the Form

Part VI, Line 15

Importance/Urgency

Medium

Comment

The last paragraph of the instructions for Line 15 indicates that if the filing organization did not compensate its CEO, executive director, other officers, or key employees, it should answer “no” to Lines 15a and 15b. However, the instructions do not address what the answer is if the filing organization itself did not compensate those employees but a related organization or common paymaster did. Some organizations take this question literally and answer “no” because they themselves do not compensate the employees despite having these types of individuals’ compensation reported in Part VII, Column (D).

Recommendation

Clarify that an organization should only answer “no” if no compensation was paid to these individuals whether by the filing or related organization.

Section of the Form

Part VI, Line 15

Importance/Urgency

Medium

Comment

The instructions to Line 15 state that an organization should answer “yes” if the organization used a process for determining compensation of those individuals listed in Part VII. What if the filing organization relied on its parent or related organization to determine the compensation and the filing organization itself does not have a process? The instructions do not clearly explain whether the filing organization must have its own process or whether it can rely on a related organization’s process.

Recommendation

Clarify whether filing organizations must have their own processes to determine compensation or whether they can rely on a related organization’s process to determine the filing organization’s compensation and still check “yes.” Also, include an additional subpart below Line 15 to have a box checked if: “Process was performed by a related organization.”

Section of the Form

Part VI, Line 1a

Importance/Urgency

Low

Comment

The form indicates a disclosure is required if the organization delegates broad authority to an executive committee. However, “broad authority” is not defined. Almost all organizations delegate some powers to the executive committee.

Recommendation

Please provide examples of decisions that qualify and do not qualify under “broad authority.” For example, it is our opinion that the authority to approve compensation of executives is not considered broad authority, but hiring/firing executives is considered broad authority.

Part VII

Section of the Form

Part VII, Section B

Importance/Urgency

High

Comment

The instructions add disclosures for organizations using management companies such as contract CFO services. However, the instructions lack specificity as to what is disclosed regarding compensation. It is common for individuals to work for a company that provides contract CFO services to organizations. Those individuals are assigned to perform work for multiple organizations throughout the year. Their compensation from the management company may not be allocated to the individual clients easily. Also, those individuals may not want to disclose how much they are compensated by their employer, especially if it is not solely related to services provided to the reporting exempt organizations.

Recommendation

Expand the instructions to specify that the compensation is for the calendar year ending with, or within, the calendar year to match other similar disclosures on the Form 990. The instructions should permit the disclosure of an allocated amount rather than the full amount paid by the management company to the individual and also, allow for a reasonable estimate if actual amounts are not available.

Section of the Form

Part VII, Section B

Importance/Urgency

Medium

Comment

Suppose a parent organization pays a vendor on behalf of a related subsidiary organization, and the subsidiary reimburses the parent for the expenses. Instructions are needed to explain which organization (parent or subsidiary) should report the expense if the vendor is paid greater than $100,000.

Recommendation

When one organization is paying expenses on behalf of another organization, please clarify which organization should report the payment on Part VII, Section B.

Part VIII, IX, X and XI

Section of the Form

Part VIII, Line 8b (and Schedule G, Part II, Direct vs. Indirect Expenses)

Importance/Urgency

Medium

Comment

There is confusion surrounding what is classified as a “direct expense” versus “indirect expense” for special events. Postage, invitation costs, and securing sponsorships all occur before the day of the event but directly relate to the event. However, many taxpayers work under the logic that “direct expenses” really mean “day of event” and “indirect expenses” really mean “pre-day of event.” In addition, for most taxpayers, there is significant administrative burden in separating out the expenses of an event into those two categories.

Recommendation

Please specify the appropriate indirect expenses to list in Part IX of Form 990.

Section of the Form

Part XI, Line 6, Instructions

Importance/Urgency

High

Comment

The instructions are incorrect. This line is for donated services and use of facilities. However, the instructions indicate it is the sum of Lines 3, 4, and 5.

Recommendation

Two recommendations:

1) The instructions should explain that this line is an item that requires an entry and it is not the sum of the lines above. For better transparency, require detail of the income and expenses for donated services and use of faculties on Schedule O, or

2) The second option is to separate Line 6 into Line 6a) Revenue from donated services and use of facilities, and Line 6b) expenses from donated services and use of faculties. Separating revenue and expenses can provide greater transparency. Sometimes, these amounts will equal, and in that case, the number nets to zero.

Schedule B

Section of the Form

Schedule B, Page 1, Special Rules

Importance/Urgency

Medium

Comment

Per Treas. Reg. 1.6033-2(a)(2)(iii)(a), an organization described in section 501(c)(3) which meets the 33 1/3% of support test of the regulations under section 170(b)(1)(A)(vi) (without regard to whether such organization otherwise qualifies as an organization described in section 170(b)(1)(A)) is required to provide the name and address of a person who contributed, bequeathed, or devised $5,000 or more during the year only if this amount exceeds 2% of the total contributions, bequests and devises received by the organization during the year.

Recommendation

Please clarify if an organization that meets the section 509(a)(1) test and the section 170(b)(1)(A)(vi) test but is not granted exempt status under section 170(b)(1)(A)(vi), such as a school or hospital, the organization is still able to use the special rule for Schedule B.

Schedule C

Section of the Form

Schedule C, Part II, Page 1, Instructions, Column 2

Importance/Urgency

High

Comment

The instructions state: “for which the election was valid and in effect for its tax year beginning in the year 2011.” This language is only correct for fiscal year organizations. For calendar year organizations, the tax year will begin January 1, 2013 and an election made in that year is valid and effective for 2013.

Recommendation

Please correct the instructions to use the appropriate date in future forms.

Schedule D

Section of the Form

Schedule D, Part I, Other Funds

Importance/Urgency

Medium

Comment

Some taxpayers are not including scholarship funds in Column (b) as “funds or other accounts.”

Recommendation

Please add an example or clarification to the instructions regarding whether scholarship funds meet the definition of “funds or other accounts.” Also, add language to clarify that Part I should report “funds or other accounts,” which are part of the endowments (reported in Part V).

Section of the Form

Schedule D, Part V, Endowments, Lines 1 and 4

Importance/Urgency

Low

Comment

Consider changing the instructions to only reflect endowments for the filing organization rather than those endowments held by a related organization. It is duplicate reporting by the parent organization when the related organization holds the endowments. Additionally, it can cause confusion to the tax preparer if an endowment is reported in Part V of Schedule D but no investment assets appear on the filing organization’s balance sheet.

Recommendation

Change instructions to only require Line 1 reporting of endowment funds when held by the organization. Change Line 4 to say, “Describe in Part XIII the intended uses of the organization’s endowment fund. Also, if `yes’ to Lines 3(a)(i) or 3(a)(ii), name the organization(s) in Part XIII.”

Schedule F

Section of the Form

Schedule F, Part I

Importance/Urgency

Medium

Comment

Due to the amount of ownership in a program related investment (PRI), activities of the PRI can consolidate on the exempt organization’s financial statements. In this case, the assets, liabilities, and equity of the PRI are reported on the exempt organization’s return.

Recommendation

Please clarify whether the amount reported on Schedule F, Part I, Line 3(f) is the total assets of the PRI or total equity balance of the PRI. The instructions indicate the ending book value is reported. It is not clear if this value is the net equity balance or total asset balance.

Section of the Form

Schedule F, Part IV, Question 1

Importance/Urgency

Medium

Comment

Schedule F, Part IV, Question 1 states: “Was the organization a U.S. transferor of property to a foreign corporation during the tax year? If ‘Yes,’ the organization may need to file Form 926, Return by a U.S. Transferor of Property to a Foreign Corporation (see Instructions for Form 926).” Based on conversations with the IRS, the answer to this question is “Yes” if the organization made grants to foreign organizations that are corporations. We believe that this question is answered “Yes” when the organization has made grants to foreign corporations.

Recommendation

The IRS should make it clear in the instructions that the “transfer of property” to a U.S. corporation for these purposes does not include grants. Grants are already disclosed on Schedule F, Part II, and a grant is not the type of transfer that triggers a Form 926 filing. Therefore, this question is redundant for grants. Responding “Yes” for grants will also make it difficult for the IRS to determine whether the organization may have a Form 926 filing requirement.

Schedule G

Section of the Form

Schedule G, Part II, Direct vs. Indirect Expenses (and Part VIII, Line 8b)

Importance/Urgency

Low

Comment

There is confusion surrounding what is classified as a “direct expense” versus “indirect expense” for special events. Postage, invitation costs, and securing sponsorships all occur before the day of the event but directly relate to the event. However, many taxpayers work under the logic that “direct expenses” really mean “day of event” and “indirect expenses” really mean “pre-day of event.” In addition, for most taxpayers, there is significant administrative burden in separating out the expenses of an event into those two categories.

Recommendation

Please specify the appropriate indirect expenses to list in Part IX of Form 990.

Schedule I

Section of the Form

Schedule I, Parts II and III

Importance/Urgency

Medium

Comment

Taxpayers continue to have confusion about what qualifies as cash vs. non-cash. The instructions provide examples of tangible non-cash items such as equipment and supplies. However, there are many other types of grants being made where the recipient receives a financial benefit but never has access to cash. For example, gift cards are generally considered cash equivalents. However, organizations may receive the benefits from gift cards but never have access to cash.

Recommendation

Please add the following as examples of non-cash contributions for Schedule I purposes: 1) Financial aid and scholarships that are applied against a student’s tuition account 2) Gift cards to individuals for necessities such as groceries, household items, etc. 3) Payments to a third party vendor on behalf of an individual (e.g. paying the utility company for a family in need).

Schedule J

Section of the Form

Schedule J, Part I, Line 4a

Importance/Urgency

High

Comment

The question asks whether a person listed in Part VII, Section A, Line 1a with respect to the filing or related organization has received a severance or change-of-control payment. The instructions provide that “a severance payment is a payment made if the right to the payment is contingent solely upon the person’s severance from service in specified circumstances, such as upon an involuntary separation from service.” The utilization of the phrase “such as upon involuntary separation” is reasonably interpreted as illustrative, and not exclusive. The language that is used causes uncertainty as to whether voluntary separations are also within the purview of the instructions.

Recommendation

In order to eliminate any uncertainty as to the types of separation payments disclosed, please clarify whether separation pay includes voluntary separation payments.

Section of the Form

Schedule J, Part VII, Listing of Trustees and Officers on Part VII and on Schedule J

Importance/Urgency

High

Comment

Neither the form nor the instructions forbid listing the same person on more than one line.

Recommendation

To avoid confusion to the reader with the use of multiple lines for one individual, the form and instructions should state that all compensation to one individual should be listed only once and not broken into multiple individual listings.

Section of the Form

Schedule J, Header Above Line 5

Importance/Urgency

Medium

Comment

The header and instructions indicate that the following questions only apply to organizations exempt under section 501(c)(3) and (4). Instructions are needed to explain if section 501(c)(29) organizations are added to this list.

Recommendation

Consider adding section 501(c)(29) organizations to the list of organizations required to complete this part of Schedule J.

Schedule K

Section of the Form

Schedule K, Part III, Line 7, Instructions

Importance/Urgency

High

Comment

The new question on the 2013 Schedule K asks about the private security or payment test of section 141(b)(2) but provides no additional definitions.

Recommendation

Please add a definition for “private security test” and “private payment test” to the Schedule K instructions and glossary.

Schedule L

Section of the Form

Schedule L, Part I, Header

Importance/Urgency

High

Comment

Section 501(c)(29) organizations are also subject to excess benefit transaction rules. This information is missing from the header.

Recommendation

Modify the header to include section 501(c)(29) organizations.

Section of the Form

Schedule L, Part IV

Importance/Urgency

High

Comment

For purposes of Part IV, the list of interested persons includes an entity other than a section 501(c)(3) organization, a section 501(c) organization of the same subsection as the filing organization, or an entity more than 35% controlled by one or more current directors. Consider the following example: Organization A (501(c)(3)) owns 100% of Corporation B. The officers of B consist entirely of directors from A. B has business transactions with A in excess of $100,000. As the instructions are currently written, the transactions are reported on Part IV, and all directors of B are treated as not independent with respect to A. Since A owns/controls B, A can do what it wants with B (e.g., liquidate, merge, etc.). It does not make sense that those board members are deemed to lack independence with respect to A.

Recommendation

Add the following to the list of exceptions: Business transactions with an organization controlled by the filing organization.

Schedule M

Section of the Form

Schedule M, Column C

Importance/Urgency

Low

Comment

A “total” line is needed to sum up the amounts in Column C in order for the Schedule M contribution detail to easily agree back to Part VIII, Line 1g of the Form 990.

Recommendation

Please add a “total” line to sum up the amounts in Column C.

Schedule N

Section of the Form

Schedule N, Part II

Importance/Urgency

Medium

Comment

The instructions need greater clarification regarding what types of transactions are excluded. It is logical that a sale of investment assets for fair market value consideration in order to pay down debt is not the kind of transaction that would require a Schedule N disclosure. However, the instructions appear to require this disclosure.

Recommendation

Add to the examples of situations that are not reporting requirements: “Sale of investment assets such as securities for full fair market value consideration for any purpose.”

Schedule R

Section of the Form

Schedule R, Instructions

Importance/Urgency

Medium

Comment

The definition of control of a nonprofit (as defined in the Glossary to the Form 990) includes the following statement: “Also, a (parent) organization controls a (subsidiary) nonprofit organization if a majority of the subsidiary’s directors or trustees are trustees, directors, officers, employees, or agents of the parent.” This definition of control includes situations where there is coincidental overlap (i.e., there is no right or ability of one organization to appoint or remove board members of the other). While the organizations may be related, there lacks a sense of an element of control in these situations.

Recommendation

At conferences and in conversations with the IRS, IRS personnel have indicated that there is coincidental overlap when each organization is the controlled and controlling entity. With coincidental overlap, there is no control. This presentation on the Form 990 may confuse readers from understanding the true nature of the organizations’ relationship. The IRS should modify the instructions to state that in cases where there is coincidental overlap of board members, each organization should report the other entity as “related” using Schedule R. However, neither organization is a controlled or controlling entity.

Section of the Form

Schedule R, Definitions

Importance/Urgency

High

Comment

It is a challenge to determine “brother/sister” organizations in large organizations with complex structures and multiple layers of organizations. Additional examples of the extent/reach of Schedule R reporting are helpful. The following examples and questions illustrate the issue. Example: A and B (brother/sister organizations) are commonly controlled by C (the parent). D is a supporting organization of A. B owns 100% of E, a for-profit C corporation. Should D report on B’s Schedule R? Should E report on A’s Schedule R? Should E report on D’s Schedule R? A and B have separate boards, but all board member are appointed by C. No board members of B are on D’s board. None of the officers of E are part of A or D’s boards. However, C directly or indirectly controls all of the organizations. This issue becomes more pronounced when dealing with a Catholic hospital system or state university system. It is quite burdensome to locate every controlled for-profit subsidiary and/or partnership. Reasonable efforts should apply.

Recommendation

Please provide an example in the instructions with similar facts as this AICPA provided comment. Please also allow for reasonable efforts.

Section of the Form

Part IV

Importance/Urgency

Medium

Comment

The definition of control for trusts is ownership of more than 50% of the beneficial interest in the trust. More clarity is required with regards to split interest trusts. It appears that many split interest trusts will need reporting (if the beneficial interest is more than 50%) even though the filing organization has no actual control over the assets or distributions of income.

Recommendation

Exclude the reporting requirement for trusts for which there is an outside unrelated trustee and a trust document that gives the beneficiary no control.

Section of the Form

Part V, Line 2

Importance/Urgency

High

Comment

It is extremely burdensome for organizations to gather this information and ensure consistency amongst related organizations. Not all members of related groups utilize the same tax preparers.

Recommendation

Eliminate the detailed reporting on Line 2 or limit the request to just a few specific transactions such as: controlled group interest, annuities, royalties, and rent.




State AG Office Expresses Support for Required E-Filing of EO Information Returns.

 

Connecticut Assistant Attorney General Karen Gano has expressed support for President Obama’s fiscal 2014 budget proposal to phase in the required electronic filing of Form 990, stressing that its adoption is needed for the effective oversight of charities.

M. Ruth M. Madrigal

Advisor, Office of Tax Policy

Department of the Treasury

1500 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Room 3120

Washington, DC 20220

Re: Budget Initiative for E-Filing of IRS Form 990s and Machine-Readable Data

Dear Attorney Madrigal:

We met last February at the Columbia Law School Charities Policy conference on “Future of State Charities Regulation.” In your remarks at the conference, you acknowledged the need for universal e-filing of IRS Forms 990 to enable accessibility of machine-readable data concerning tax-exempt organizations. After your remarks, we spoke briefly about the possibility and feasibility of initiating mandatory e-filing of 990s. I was delighted to see recently that President Obama’s FY 2014 budget proposes to phase in required electronic filing of the Form 990 and have the IRS release the data in a computable format in a timely manner. The proposal, coming soon after The Aspen Institute’s report on “Liberating Nonprofit Sector Data for Impact,” supports the findings and challenges addressed in that report.

Connecticut is leading the multistate project that, in effect, constitutes the corresponding liberation of the wealth of additional valuable data about nonprofit organizations — in addition to data collected on the Forms 990 — that is collected by the states through state charities registrations. Forty states require nonprofits and their professional fundraisers to register with the state under disparate state-specific and mostly paper-based systems. Most of that data is not available in electronic and searchable format. Even when it is, it can be accessed only through state-specific websites. Missouri Assistant Attorney General Bob Carlson and I are chairing a pilot project with twelve states to develop and launch a single, unified electronic state charities registration website that will make all states’ charities registration data universally available and computable.

We anticipate that the unified state charities registration system will be interfaced with the IRS’s electronic 990 filing system for maximum efficiency, in a manner similar to Hawaii’s current electronic state registration system. Our plan is to launch the website in 2014-2015 and we anticipate that all forty registration states will enable registration on the unified website within five to ten years of launch. All state attorneys general, and also seventeen secretaries of state or heads of other state charities registration agencies, have a direct interest in unified electronic state charities registration and required e-filing of IRS Forms 990 as part of their oversight responsibilities for protecting charitable assets and charitable solicitations in their respective states.

I have discussed President Obama’s budget proposal to phase in mandatory e-filing of Forms 990, and your comments from our conversation in February about the importance of such an initiative, with our Deputy Attorney General, Nora Dannehy. She agrees that the budget proposal for e-filing of 990s is a critical and necessary step for effective oversight and policy ability of the states to effectively carry out our charities oversight responsibilities. In addition, the correspondence of required e-filing for 990s with the initiation of unified electronic state charities registration will render significant efficiencies and cost savings for nonprofits in complying with state and federal regulatory requirements.

If our Office can provide additional information or facilitate the efforts to initiate required e-filing of 990s, please contact us.

Yours truly,

Karen Gano

Assistant Attorney General

State of Connecticut

Hartford, CT




EO Update: e-news for Charities and Nonprofits - October 25, 2013.

1.  Use Form 8822-B to notify IRS of a change of address or responsible party

Effective January 1, taxpayers must use Form 8822-B to notify the IRS of a change of address or the identity of a responsible party. Form 8822-B must be filed within 60 days of the change. An updated Form 8822-B is available on IRS.gov. There is a box on the form that exempt organizations must check.  The updated form is available at: http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f8822b.pdf

2.  Delayed Start for PTIN Renewal Season.

Due to the lapse in government funding, the 2014 PTIN renewal season is delayed. An email or letter will be sent to all current PTIN holders notifying them when the 2014 renewal season opens. The online PTIN system is still available for users to log in and view or change information or to secure a PTIN for 2013 at: http://www.irs.gov/Tax-Professionals/PTIN-Requirements-for-Tax-Return-Preparers

3.  Reminder: Don’t Include Social Security Numbers on Publicly Disclosed Forms.

Because the IRS is required to disclose approved exemption applications and information returns, tax-exempt organizations should not include personal information, such as Social Security numbers, on these forms.

4.  Work Opportunity Tax Credit Expires Soon.

Employers, don’t forget to claim the Work Opportunity Tax Credit for all of the targeted group employee categories, including veterans, listed on Form 5884, if they were hired on or after Jan. 1, 2011, or before Jan.1, 2014.

Information on the Work Opportunity Tax Credit is available at:

http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/Work-Opportunity-Tax-Credit-1

Form 5884 is available at:

http://www.irs.gov/uac/Form-5884,-Work-Opportunity-Credit-1

5.  Register for EO Workshops.

Register for upcoming workshops for small and medium-sized 501(c)(3) organizations:

November 6-7 – Augusta, GA

Hosted by Augusta Technical College

December 10 – New York, NY

Hosted by Baruch College

Register at: http://www.irs.gov/Charities-%26-Non-Profits/Upcoming-Workshops-for-Small-and-Medium-Sized-501(c)(3)-Organizations

6.  IRS Provides Tax Relief to Victims of Colorado Storms.

The IRS is providing tax relief to individual and business taxpayers impacted by severe storms, flooding, landslides and mudslides in Colorado.

Information is available at: http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/IRS-Provides-Tax-Relief-to-Victims-of-Colorado-Storms




MSRB Provides New Resource for EMMA Users Interested in 529 College Savings Plan Information.

The Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) has enhanced its MyEMMA service to allow users to sign up for alerts about 529 college savings plans. The alerts notify users when new information about a 529 plan becomes available on EMMA, such as the posting of a new plan disclosure document. The MSRB provides information on EMMA about the essential terms of 529 plans, including investment options, fees and expenses, and any state tax benefits.

Explore 529 college savings plan information on EMMA: http://emma.msrb.org/Search/Plan529.aspx




Project Management Agency Requests Guidance on Low-Income Housing Tax Credit.

John Lamey Jr. of the Atlantic County Improvement Authority has written to the IRS and Treasury to express support for guidance that would clarify what happens when an existing low-income housing tax credit property that was previously allocated 9 percent credits is rehabilitated following a natural disaster or casualty loss.

September 19, 2013

Ms. Lee A. Kelley

Deputy Tax Legislative Counsel

Department of the U.S. Treasury

1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20220

[email protected]

Mr. Paul F. Handleman

Branch Chief, 5 (CC:PSI:5)

Internal Revenue Service

Room 5111

1111 Constitution Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20224

[email protected]

RE: Guidance to preserve 9% LIHTC buildings damaged by disasters or casualties

Dear Ms. Kelley and Mr. Handleman,

The Atlantic County Improvement Authority is a body corporate and politic of the State of New Jersey authorized to issue to sell private activity tax-exempt revenue bonds under Internal Revenue Code Section 142 allocated from the State of New Jersey’s volume cap. We are enabled under New Jersey law to lend the proceeds of such bond issues to qualified low- and moderate income rental housing projects in conjunction with allocations of 4% LIHTCs equity financing, both for new construction and rehabilitation.

We understand Treasury is considering guidance clarifying what happens in situations where an existing LIHTC property previously allocated 9% credits is rehabilitated following a natural disaster or casualty loss. The rules will clarify that the existing property retains the 9% credit and the rehabilitation can qualify as “New Property” under Internal Revenue Code section 42(e) and be eligible for allocations of tax exempt volume cap bond financing and the 4% credit.

We strongly support the publication of this guidance. It is common sense tax administrative guidance that will be an important tool for state housing agencies, state housing bond issuers, owners and investors in applicable circumstances for maintaining and rehabilitating the stock of low income rental housing in New Jersey and throughout the United States.

The Authority respectfully urges the immediate publication of the requested guidance, which is badly needed now because many months have passed since the impacts of Hurricane Sandy have dealt a serious setback to New Jersey’s affordable housing stock, a significant portion of which continues to need restoration. There are projects that could be rehabilitated now by bond and credit financings structured pursuant to the policy and technical parameters of the proposed guidance.

Sincerely.

John C. Lamey, Jr.

Executive Director

Atlantic County Improvement

Authority

Mays Landing, NJ

Mark J. Mazur,

Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy),

U.S. Treasury

Representative Frank LoBiondo,

Congressman

2nd District of New Jersey




IRS LTR: Change in Accounting Method Won't Jeopardize Cooperative's Exemption.

The IRS ruled a rural electric cooperative can retire former members’ capital credit accounts by offsetting the amounts of their accounts against outstanding debt owed for electric services without adversely impacting its tax-exempt status.

UIL: 501.12-03

Release Date: 10/4/2013

Date: May 30, 2013

Dear * * *

We have considered your ruling request regarding the tax consequences relating to the proposed change of methodology for the retiring all, or portion, of your former members’ capital credit accounts, described below.

You were created on Date as a cooperative under the laws of State and have qualified as a cooperative electric company under I.R.C. § 501(c)(12) since that time. Your members elect the board of directors on a one member, one vote basis.

Pursuant to Article VII, Section 2 of your bylaws, you are obligated to account on a patronage basis to all your members for all amounts received and receivable from electric services in excess of operating costs and expenses properly chargeable against the furnishing of such services. Such excess of revenue over expenses is allocated each year to each member in an equity ownership account which you call a capital credit account in proportion to the amount of the member’s electrical usage. The amounts allocated to the capital credit accounts are paid out to the members when the Board determines that you are financially able and in retirement of the capital credit accounts to the extent a payment is made. Payments are only made when it is possible to do so and not violate the requirements of your bylaws to keep reserves for operations and maintenance, debt repayment requirements, working capital, and other specified requirements.

A large number of your former members have outstanding balances due on their accounts for electric services. At this time, and pursuant to Article VII, Section 2 of your bylaws, you offset any outstanding balance with the amount of the former member’s capital credit account that is scheduled to be retired in that year. In addition, pursuant to Board policy, a former member’s capital credit account is fully retired by offset against any outstanding balance due for non-payment for electric services or by payout (or both) after the member has been a former member for seven years.

You would like to change your current policies so that you do not wait for seven years to fully retire a former member’s capital account balance if that former member has an outstanding balance from non-payment for electric services. You would like to use the outstanding balance in the former member’s capital credit account to offset any outstanding account balance for non-payment for electric services at the end of fiscal year Year and periodically thereafter.

After the offset occurs, you would retire the former member’s capital credit account in accordance with its normal retirement schedule if there is a residual balance in the capital credit account. In addition, you would cease all collection activities with respect to the former member’s debt to you. If the former member later pays you amounts in excess of any debt remaining in their account, you will return that payment to the former member. The offset to the former member’s outstanding bill would be made at the full amount of the capital credit amount retired. No discount will apply.

You request the following ruling:

The revised method for retiring former members’ capital credit accounts by offsetting the amounts of their capital credit accounts against outstanding debt they owe to you for provision of electric services on an accelerated basis will not adversely affect your tax-exempt status as a rural electric cooperative under I.R.C. § 501(c)(12).

LAW

Section 501(c)(12)(A) of the Code provides for the exemption from federal income tax of benevolent life insurance associations of a purely local character, mutual ditch or irrigation companies, mutual or cooperative telephone companies, or like organizations, but only if 85 percent or more of the income consists of amounts collected from members for the sole purpose of meeting losses and expenses.

Rev. Rul. 72-36, 1972-1 C.B. 151, describes certain basic characteristics an organization must have in order to be a cooperative organization described in § 501(c)(12)(A) of the Code. These characteristics include the following: A cooperative must keep adequate records of each member’s rights and interest in the assets of the organization. A cooperative must not retain more funds than it needs to meet current losses and expenses. The rights and interests of members in the organization’s savings must be determined in proportion to their business with the organization. A member’s rights and interests may not be forfeited upon the withdrawal or termination of membership. Upon dissolution, gains from the liquidation of assets should be distributed to all current and former members in proportion to the value or quantity of business that each did with the cooperative over the years.

The ruling also addresses a situation involving forfeiture of a former member’s rights and interests where the bylaws provide for such action upon withdrawal from the cooperative or termination. It states that even if forfeiture is permitted by the bylaws, the organization has not operated on a cooperative basis and should not be recognized as tax-exempt.

In Puget Sound Plywood, Inc. v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 305 (1965), acq. 1966-1 C.B. 3, the court stated that an organization must meet certain common law requirements in order to be a cooperative. These common law requirements include: democratic control of the organization by members, the organization operates at cost for the benefit of members, and the contributors of capital to the organization do not control or receive most of the pecuniary benefits of the organization’s operations (i.e. subordination of capital).

DISCUSSION

Section 501(c)(12) of the Code provides for the federal tax exemption of cooperative telephone companies or like organizations, including other cooperative organizations not relevant here. While the term “cooperative” is not defined in I.R.C. § 501(c)(12) or the regulations thereunder, a cooperative has been traditionally and historically defined as a voluntary, membership business organization that is organized in response to the economic needs of and to perform services for its members, and not to realize monetary gains as a separate legal entity. A cooperative is organized and operated for the benefit of and is democratically controlled by its members. See Puget Sound Plywood v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 305 (1965), acq. 1966-1 C.B. 3. Hence, to qualify for exemption under I.R.C. § 501(c)(12), an organization must be a cooperative and organize and operate as such. Puget Sound Plywood v. Commissioner describes the principles that are fundamental to the organization and operation of cooperatives. They are: (1) democratic control by the members, (2) operation at cost, and (3) subordination of capital. These principles apply to organizations described in I.R.C. § 501(c)(12).

Democratic control requires that the cooperative be governed by members and on a one-member, one-vote basis. Each member has a single vote regardless of the amount of business he or she does with the organization. The issue of democratic control is a question of fact.

Operation at cost requires that the cooperative’s net earnings or savings derived from furnishing services in excess of costs and expenses be returned to its members in proportion to the amount of business conducted with them. This principle ensures that a cooperative’s net savings from members are returned to members in proportion to the amount of business each transacts with the cooperative. A cooperative satisfies this requirement by making annual allocations of patronage to members.

Subordination of capital has two requirements. First, control of the cooperative and ownership of the pecuniary benefits arising from the cooperative’s business remains in the hands of the members rather than with non-patron equity investors. Second, the returns on equity investments must be limited. Hence, the net savings that accrue to the cooperative from the business activities it transacts with its members will largely inure to the benefit of those members rather than to its equity investors. The rationale for these limitations is to ensure that the cooperative remains faithful to its purpose — providing services at the lowest possible prices (or highest possible prices for a marketing cooperative) to its members and not to realize profits for capital. If it were otherwise, the emphasis then would likely be on protection of returns of equity capital rather than services to members, and this would destroy the basic purpose of cooperatives. See Puget Sound Plywood v. Commissioner, Inc., 44T.C. 305 (1965), acq. 1966-1 C.B. 3.

Rev. Rul. 72-36, supra, describes additional fundamental requirements for operation of cooperatives described in IRC. § 501(c)(12). It requires that a member’s rights and interest in the assets of a cooperative cannot be forfeited upon termination of membership. It also requires that upon dissolution, a cooperative must distribute any gains from the sales of its assets to those who were members during the period that the assets were owned.

A fundamental tenet of cooperative operation is that the earnings of a cooperative are allocated and ultimately distributed to its members based on the amount of business (patronage) done with those members. The amount a cooperative member pays for the cooperative’s services less the cost of providing such services is allocated to the member. Thus, the presumption is that the cooperative’s services are provided at cost to the members. But it is impractical for such a cooperative to return immediately all the amounts or earnings to its members because the cooperative needs to have reserves in order to operate, meet unexpected expenses, or to expand. These amounts or earnings are held by the cooperative for a certain period of time as prescribed by cooperative bylaws and are allocated as capital credits to accounts kept for each member. These capital credits are returned to the members or former members when the cooperative redeems them (i.e., sends a check for the amount of the capital credits) at the end of the prescribed time.

The primary issue raised by the change in method for retirement of capital account credits for certain former members is whether it violates any of the cooperative requirements described Puget Sound Plywood, Inc. v. Commissioner, Inc., 44 T.C. 305 (1965), acq. 1966-1 C.B. 3, and Rev. Rul. 72-36. The cooperative principle of democratic control by members is satisfied because the redemption of capital credit accounts of former members by offsetting the amounts in their capital credit accounts against any outstanding balance they owe the cooperative for provision of electric services will not affect member voting rights or governing rights. We also note that the cooperative (and its board of directors and management) has fiduciary duties to former members, and the former members can enforce their rights in the courts. See Lamesa Cooperative Gin v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 894 (1982). The cooperative principle of operating at cost is satisfied because the members’ right to receive the excess (i.e. capital credits) over the cost of electricity service is also not adversely affected since they will receive full credit against a debt owed by them to the cooperative in return for the retirement of the amount in their capital credit account. The debt will be fully extinguished. If they later try to pay the former debt, that money will be returned to them. No collection against the extinguished amount will be attempted once the offset has taken place.

The cooperative principle of subordination of capital is satisfied because the proposed redemption program does not adversely affect the members’ control and ownership of the cooperative assets. The cooperative requirement that there is no forfeiture of former members’ rights to assets of the cooperative is not violated since the new policy does not impact this aspect of the cooperative’s operations.

Accordingly, based on the foregoing facts and circumstances, we rule as follows:

1. The revised method for retiring former members’ capital credit accounts by offsetting the amounts of their capital credit accounts against outstanding debt they owe to you for provision of electric services will not adversely affect your tax-exempt status as a rural electric cooperative under I.R.C. § 501(c)(12).

This ruling is conditioned on the understanding that there will be no material changes in the facts upon which it based. Also, we express no opinion as to the tax consequences of the transactions under other provisions of the Code or state laws.

This ruling will be made available for public inspection under I.R.C. § 6110 of the Code after certain deletions of identifying information are made. For details, see enclosed Notice 437, Notice of Intention to Disclose. A copy of this ruling with deletions that we intend to make available for public inspection is attached to Notice 437. If you disagree with our proposed deletions you should follow the instructions in Notice 437.

Pursuant to a Power of Attorney on file in this office, a copy of this letter is being sent to your authorized representative. A copy of this letter should be kept in your permanent records.

This ruling is directed only to the organization that requested it. I.R.C. § 6110(k)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that it may not be used or cited by others as precedent.

If you have any questions about this ruling, please contact the person whose name and telephone number are shown in the heading of this letter. You should keep a copy for your permanent records.

Sincerely,

Stephen M. Clarke

Acting Manager,

Exempt Organizations

Guidance Group 1

Citations: LTR 201340017




IRS Explains Valuation Process for Charitable Contributions of Property Other Than Money.

The IRS explained that, for charitable contributions made in property other than money, the amount of the contribution is the fair market value of the property at the time of the contribution, reduced by a set amount; in some cases, taxpayers may claim a higher deduction by using the so-called enhanced deduction.

UIL: 170.00-00

Release Date: 9/27/2013

Date: September 10, 2013

Refer Reply To: CONEX-137437-13

The Honorable Bill Huizenga

Member, U.S. House of Representatives

4555 Wilson Avenue SW, Suite 3

Grandville, MI 49418

Attention: * * *

Dear Congressman Huizenga:

I am responding to your letter dated July 3, 2013, on the behalf of your constituent, * * *, * * *. He requested an exemption from the provisions of section 170(e)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (the Code) that currently prohibits charging the recipient of the donated food for the food or the cost of its distribution.

A taxpayer may deduct any charitable contribution that is paid within the taxable year under section 170(a) of the Code. For a charitable contribution made in property other than money, the amount of the contribution is the fair market value of the property at the time of the contribution, reduced by an amount as stated in the Code and accompanying Income Tax Regulations (section 1.170A-1(c)(1)). In general, the deduction is limited to the lesser of the fair market value or the taxpayer’s basis in the contributed property.

There is an exception to this general rule: taxpayers can claim a higher deduction amount if they meet certain requirements, including that the donee cannot transfer contributed property in exchange for money, other property, or services (often called the “enhanced deduction,” section 170(e)(3)(A) of the Code). Therefore, according to the tax law, the enhanced deduction only applies if the recipient does not transfer the donated food to its clients in exchange for money, other property, or services.

We administer the tax law as enacted. Any change in the law would require legislative action by the Congress.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any questions, please contact * * *, Identification Number * * *, at * * *.

Sincerely,

Norma C. Rotunno

Acting Branch Chief, Branch 2,

Office of Associate Chief Counsel

(Income Tax and Accounting)




Graev: Conditional Facade Easement.

Wendy C. Gerzog discusses Graev v. Commissioner, in which the Tax Court decided whether the taxpayer’s donations of a facade easement and cash contributions were conditional gifts and therefore disallowable as charitable deductions.

In Graev v. Commissioner, the Tax Court decided whether the taxpayers’ donations of a facade easement and cash contributions were conditional gifts and therefore disallowable as charitable deductions under the requirements of the regulations.

* * * * *

The Tax Court decided Graev v. Commissioner1 under fully stipulated facts. In 1999, the taxpayers, residents of New York City, purchased property listed in the National Register of Historic Places for $4.3 million, subject to a mortgage.

Pre-2004 case law is replete with disallowed facade easements either for overvaluation or unenforceability issues.2 Under Notice 2004-41,3 the government advised that it would be scrutinizing the substance of transactions involving real property purchases, charitable organizations, and conservation easements. One example mentioned in the notice described a charitable organization that bought property, placed a conservation easement on the property, and sold the property at a substantially reduced price to a buyer who made a cash “charitable donation” to the organization to reimburse the charity for its financial loss. In that instance, the notice stated that the government may treat the cash donation as part of the buyer’s purchase price instead of as a charitable gift.

Later, the National Architectural Trust (NAT), a charitable organization with a mission “to preserve historic architecture in metropolitan areas across the United States,”4 approached Mr. Graev to make a facade easement gift. Having qualms about the latest government ruling, Graev, an attorney, sought the advice of his accountant. Graev then e-mailed NAT with his concerns after the accountants urged caution and Graev asked for NAT’s “thoughts especially as it relates to the side letter.”5

The side letter was NAT’s letter to Graev explaining that it was NAT’s standard policy to refund the applicable portion of Graev’s donation if he couldn’t get the promised favorable charitable deduction. Specifically, the letter promised “to join with Graev to immediately remove the façade easement from the property’s title.”6 Referencing the assurance made by NAT both to Graev and to his neighbor, Graev executed the facade easement agreement on September 20, 2004.

A firm appraised the value of the facade easement at $990,000. At or near the end of 2004, Graev executed a deed that granted a facade easement to NAT and the deed was recorded on February 17, 2005. The conservation deed provided that the easement grant would facilitate preservation, in perpetuity, of the historic structure and of the public open space, but it also stated that the provisions of the deed were not intended to limit the grantee’s right “to abandon some or all of its rights hereunder.”7 The mortgagee joined in the easement agreement and agreed to subordinate its rights to the enforcement of the conservation easement; however, the mortgagee declared to have claims, superior to the grantee, to all insurance or condemnation proceeds.

In 2004 Graev made a total of $99,000 in cash contributions to NAT, as requested by the trust to subsidize NAT’s operating and future monitoring and administrative expenses. In 2005 NAT sent Graev a written acknowledgement of his easement and cash donations, together with the applicable tax forms to submit with his return. Also in 2005, NAT sent two letters to Graev: the first, apprising him of upcoming reforms, including penalties and fines, applicable to taxpayers, promoters, and appraisers involved in “significantly overvalued” facade easement donations; and the second, informing him that the refund offer “may adversely affect the deductibility of the cash contribution as a charitable gift.”8 Graev did not ask NAT to remove the refund feature of his donation.

After those NAT letters, the Graevs filed their income tax returns for 2004 and 2005, taking deductions for both the easement and the cash contribution to NAT.9 In its September 22, 2008, notice of deficiency, the government disallowed the taxpayers’ charitable deductions because the donations were made “subject to subsequent events.” The taxpayers contended that the side letter agreement was unenforceable under New York law and a nullity under federal tax law.

The court reviewed the facts to determine whether the gifts were conditional donations or whether the condition was allowed under the regulations10 because it was “so remote as to be negligible.” Moreover, as the court stated, “Section 170 and the corresponding regulations provide instruction and limitations that, at least in part, ensure that the donor will be able to deduct only what the donee organization actually receives.”11 The court reviewed the background of the applicable regulation’s language (“so remote as to be negligible”) and the identical language in an older estate tax regulation.12

The Supreme Court interpreted the estate tax regulation in Sternberger.13 Concerned that the donation must match what the charity actually received, the court stated that deductible gifts must be unconditional “unless the possibility that the charity will not take is ‘negligible’ or ‘highly improbable.'”14 Applying that standard, the Tax Court held that the deduction was only allowable if the possibility that NAT would lose its easement and cash was so remote that it was a negligible risk.

The legislative history of charitable split interests accords with that emphasis. Section 170(f)(3) was enacted in 1969 and denied a deduction for most partial interests in property, including conservation easements, but also allowed a donation of an open space easement in gross that was donated to a charity in perpetuity. It wasn’t until the 1976 Tax Reform Act that Congress amended section 170(f)(3) to create a deduction for a conservation easement. That provision was later revised and expanded in 1980 to include subsection (h), which defines a qualified conservation contribution. The regulations define the perpetuities requirement as ensuring that the potential for the divestment of the easement be so remote as to be negligible.

The court held that at the time of the easement and cash donations, the potential for the IRS to disallow those deductions and for NAT to remove the easement and return the cash to Graev was not so remote as to be negligible. Although Graev argued that case law at the time of the donation allowed for a donation of between 10 and 15 percent of the value of the property, and that he had deducted a value constituting 11 percent of the property’s appraised value, the court emphasized that at that date, the potential for IRS disallowance was not negligible and that valuation was a separate issue. Indeed, the court stated that Graev acted (for example, filing returns with the deductions and failing to remove the refund feature) in response both to the IRS notice indicating additional scrutiny applicable to overvalued facade easements and to NAT’s second letter warning of the government’s disallowance of a deduction for facade easement donations coupled with refund provisions.

Responding to the Graevs’ argument that the one example provided in Notice 2004-41 did not apply to their specific transaction, the court found that the notice advised more generally that donations relating to conservation easements would involve greater scrutiny, and that Graev was well aware of this intensified IRS examination, as indicated in his correspondence with his accountants. NAT agreed to return Graev’s contributions if the government disallowed deductions for them. Thus the court held that the risk of the government’s disallowing the deduction was “well above ‘negligible.'”15 According to the court, Graev required NAT’s letter with the refund feature before making his contribution. Also, NAT understood that an IRS disallowance was more than a remote possibility and that was why NAT would routinely issue comfort letters to potential donors.

The court explained that Graev misinterpreted the court’s ruling in O’Brien v. Commissioner,16 in which the taxpayers created a charitable remainder trust in 1964, appointing themselves trustees with broad management powers. The issue in the case was whether the donors had retained control sufficient to cause the gift to be incomplete. The return of their contributions was solely in the government’s act of disallowance regardless of the correctness of its action, placing “the contingency ‘within the control of the Commissioner.'”17 In O’Brien, the court held that the taxpayers had the right to first litigate their position so that the return contingency was not applicable unless the taxpayers lost. The court held that O’Brien did not even address the issue of a tax contingency under the section 170 regulations and “did not hold that a tax-treatment contingency can never be a subsequent event that will defeat a contribution and a deduction.”18

The court also rejected Graev’s argument that there was no possibility that NAT would return the property. The court analyzed New York’s conservation easement law and held that while NAT’s letter alone would not satisfy the state’s extinguishment requirements, the recorded deed sufficiently reserved NAT’s power to abandon the easement in compliance with New York law. Therefore, the court found that this possibility was “more than negligible.”19

Likewise, the court was unmoved by Graev’s contention that the doctrine of merger extinguished NAT’s refund letter. The court cited, as an exception to that principle, a clear intention by the parties to have a particular provision of a contract survive the deed. Graev required NAT’s letter before making his donation and thus the letter clearly qualified as an inducement for him to make the contribution. Even when NAT offered to rescind the letter, Graev declined that offer. Therefore, the court found that the parties intended the letter to survive the deed and that the doctrine of merger did not apply.

Finally, Graev argued that the letter was a nullity under Commissioner v. Procter.20 In Procter, a trust provided that a noncharitable gift would revert to the donor if a court later determined that the transfer would be subject to gift tax. The court held that the trust provision was void as contrary to public policy because it (1) discourages the government’s tax collection by nullifying the audit of returns; (2) renders the court’s decision moot by canceling the gift the court has adjudged; and (3) disturbs a final judgment.

The taxpayer in Procter had asserted that under the terms of the trust, the gift was not to become effective if a court found the transfer to be subject to the gift tax. However, the circuit court held that such a clause in the trust could not prevent the imposition of the gift tax because the clause would discourage the government’s tax collection and the gift tax should not be so easily avoided. Furthermore, the court refused to allow that kind of “trifling with the judicial process.”

The Tax Court in Graev held that Procter was inapplicable because recognizing that the refund feature in NAT’s letter would not prevent Graev from being taxed on his contribution would not undo a judicial decision, would not discourage tax collection, would not render the case moot, and would not undo the judgment in the case. The court concluded that at the time of the donation, the possibility that the IRS would disallow Graev’s deduction and that NAT would thereby return both the easement and cash contributions to Graev was not “so remote as to be negligible” in contravention of the regulations. Therefore, the court disallowed both donation deductions.

Analysis and Conclusion

It is ironic that the taxpayers in Graev cited to Procter to sustain their position. If anything, the facts in Graev reflect the very behavior so repugnant to the Procter court.

When a charitable donation is conditional on receiving a tax deduction, it is difficult to accept that the primary goal of the taxpayer is to make a gift to a charity. In United States v. American Bar Endowment,21 donative intent was central to allowing a charitable deduction. That is, while the charitable deduction is often an incentive for making or increasing a charitable gift, no one may contract with a charity to make a donation dependent on getting a tax benefit. If all charitable gifts were conditional on receiving a tax deduction, that limitation would place a heavy burden on charities. They would not know if they were receiving funds and could not rely on using those “donations” until several years in the future. Yet, of course, most donors actually want the charity to be able to apply their funds to the charity’s exempt purpose.

It is also difficult to value a conditional gift at its fair market value, because a transfer of property with a refund feature must surely be heavily discounted. Alternatively, if the gift is viewed as a precondition, the completed gift and deduction should not occur until the statute of limitations has run.

As a general policy matter, extending that notion would add extreme complexity to tax administration. What if, for example, payments of expenses were refundable on the condition of a deduction disallowance? What possible positive policy goal would that serve?

This case and others suggest reasons to eliminate the facade easement deduction. The reduction in value because of the easement is often more hypothetical than real. Adding a refund “guarantee” based on the tax benefits to the donor makes the transfer more a commercial transaction than a charitable gift.

FOOTNOTES

1 140 T.C. No. 17 (2013) .

2 Id., slip op. at 6-7, 8-9, n.5.

3 2004-28 IRB 31.

4 Graev, at 5.

5 Id. at 8. The side letter is also referred to as NAT’s comfort letter.

6 Id. at 11.

7 Id. at 13.

8 Id. at 15.

9 Their 2004 return was filed on October 10, 2005, wherein they deducted the full $99,000 cash contribution and $544,449 for the easement deduction, as limited by section 170(b)(1)(C). They deducted the remaining $445,551 on their 2005 return. Id. at 16-17.

10 Reg. section 1.170A-1(e), -7(a)(3), and -14(g)(3).

11 Id. at 19.

12 Reg. section 20.2055-2(b).

13 Commissioner v. Estate of Sternberger, 348 U.S. 187, 194 (1955).

14 Id. at 22.

15 Id. at 33.

16 46 T.C. 583 (1966), acq. 1968-1 C.B. 2.

17 Graev, op. at 37, citing O’Brien, at 591 (quoting Surface Combustion Corp. v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 631, 655 (1947), aff’d, 181 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1950)).

18 Id. at 38.

19 Id. at 45.

20 142 F.2d 824 (4th Cir. 1944).

21 477 U.S. 105, 117-118 (1986) (“The sine qua non of a charitable contribution is a transfer of money or property without adequate consideration. The taxpayer, therefore, must at a minimum demonstrate that he purposely contributed money or property in excess of the value of any benefit he received in return.” Id.).

Copyright 2013 Wendy C. Gerzog.

All rights reserved.

Wendy C. Gerzog is a professor at the University of Baltimore School of Law.

 




Treasury Responds to Senators' Concerns About Health Plan Fee for Tax-Exempt, Nonprofit Hospitals.

Treasury Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs Alastair Fitzpayne has explained to Sen. Sherrod Brown, D-Ohio, and other Democratic senators that proposed rules (REG-118315-12) on the annual health insurer fee under the Affordable Care Act require nonprofit, tax-exempt hospitals to take into account only a portion of their net premiums when calculating the fee.

September 12, 2013

The Honorable Elizabeth Warren

United States Senate

Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Warren:

Thank you for your follow up letter regarding the annual health insurer fee under section 9010 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. We received several comment letters on the proposed regulations, which were issued on March 1, 2013, from stakeholders regarding the issue raised in your letter. We are carefully considering these comments as we work to finalize the regulations.

As I mentioned in my response to your previous letter on this topic, proposed regulations on the annual health insurer fee reiterate the rule provided in the statute. Under the statute, the fee does not apply to the first $25 million of net premiums written, and it only applies to 50 percent of the net premiums written for amounts between $25 million and $50 million. After application of this rule and in accordance with the statute, the proposed regulations provide that a covered entity exempt from tax under section 501(a) and described in section 501(c)(3) (generally, a charity), 501(c)(4) (generally, a social welfare organization), section 501(c)(26) (generally, a high-risk health insurance pool), or section 501(c)(29) (a consumer operated and oriented plan health insurance issuer) will be required to take into account only 50 percent of its remaining net premiums written that are attributable to its exempt activities.

We appreciate the concerns expressed in your letter regarding the way the fee will be applied, and we look forward to working with you and your staff on these and other important ACA implementation issues.

Sincerely,

Alastair M. Fitzpayne

Assistant Secretary for Legislative




Tax Court Finds Facade Easement Appraisal Was Qualified After Reconsideration.

The Tax Court, in light of a change in law, held that the appraisal of development rights and a facade easement donated by a couple was a qualified appraisal under reg. section 1.170A-13(c)(3), allowing the court to decide later whether the couple was entitled to the charitable contribution deduction for the facade easement donation.

Citations: Barry S. Friedberg et ux. v. Commissioner; T.C. Memo. 2013-224; No. 9530-09

BARRY S. FRIEDBERG AND CHARLOTTE MOSS,

Petitioners

v.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

Respondent*

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

Filed September 23, 2013

Kathleen M. Pakenham, for petitioners.

Robert W. Mopsick, for respondent.

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM OPINION

WELLS, Judge: Respondent determined a deficiency of $1,321,250 and a penalty pursuant to section 6662(h)1 of $528,500 with respect to petitioners’ 2003 [*2] tax year. In a prior opinion filed September 3, 2011, Friedberg v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-238, 2011 WL 4550136 (prior opinion), we granted partial summary judgment on the issue of whether the appraisal report prepared by Michael Ehrmann of Jefferson & Lee Appraisals, Inc., and attached to petitioners’ 2003 joint Federal income tax return (Ehrmann appraisal) was a qualified appraisal as defined in section 1.170A-13(c)(3), Income Tax Regs. We held that the Ehrmann appraisal was not a qualified appraisal as it related to petitioners’ facade easement. We further held that there remained issues of material fact regarding whether the Ehrmann appraisal was a qualified appraisal as it related to petitioners’ transfer of development rights. Petitioners move the Court, pursuant to Rule 161, to reconsider our prior opinion.

BACKGROUND

Many of the underlying facts are set out in detail in our prior opinion and are incorporated herein by reference. We summarize the factual and procedural background briefly here and make additional findings as required for our ruling on petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. The facts are based upon examination of [*3] the pleadings, moving papers, responses, and attachments, including numerous affidavits supplied by petitioners. Petitioners are husband and wife who resided in New York at the time they filed their petition.

During 2002, Mr. Friedberg purchased a residential townhouse in New York City on East 71st Street between Park Avenue and Lexington Avenue (subject property) for $9,400,000, and then paid approximately an additional $4 million for extensive renovations. The subject property is in Manhattan’s Upper East Side Historic District. On October 15, 2003, the National Park Service determined that the subject property “contributes to the significance of the * * *[Upper East Side Historic District] and is a ‘certified historic structure’ for a charitable contribution for conservation purposes in accordance with the Tax Treatment Extension Act of 1980.”

During 2003, the National Architectural Trust (NAT) contacted Mr. Friedberg to ask him to donate an easement on the subject property. Mr. Friedberg met with Sean Zalka, a representative from NAT, to discuss donating a facade easement and development rights related to the subject property. Mr. Zalka then sent Mr. Friedberg a spreadsheet that provided an estimate of the tax savings available to Mr. Friedberg should he decide to donate to NAT the facade easement [*4] and development rights for the subject property. Mr. Zalka’s spreadsheet read as follows:

THE NATIONAL ARCHITECTURAL TRUST

Profile of Estimated Tax Benefit1

134 East 71st Street (Development Rights Extinguished)

_____________________________________________________________________

 

Estimated Fair Market Value                              $13,000,000

Conservation Easement Value (11% of FMV)2                $ 1,430,000

Estimated Development Rights Value                       $ 2,070,000

(See Development Rights Analysis Worksheet)

Total Estimated Gross Tax Deduction                      $ 3,500,000

Tax-Deductible Cash Donations                            $   350,000

(10% of Gross Tax Deduction)

Appraisal                                                $    16,000

Lender Subordination Fee (if applicable)

Total Estimated Tax-Deductible Costs                     $   366,000

Total Estimated Charitable Contribution                  $ 3,866,000

Tax Deduction

Total Estimated Federal, State and City                  $ 1,643,050

Income Tax Savings (42.5% Tax Bracket)

Total Estimated Cash Savings                             $ 1,277,050

___________________________________________________________________

FOOTNOTES TO TABLE

1 For illustrative purposes only. Please consult your

tax advisor.

2 Actual figure determined by appraisal, typically 11%

of FMV for comparable properties.

END OF FOOTNOTES TO TABLE

[*5] After reviewing NAT’s materials, Mr. Friedberg decided to donate to NAT a facade easement and all of the development rights associated with the subject property.

Mr. Friedberg followed NAT’s recommendation and engaged Michael Ehrmann of Jefferson & Lee Appraisals, Inc., based in Pittsburgh, to appraise the subject property. Mr. Ehrmann visited the subject property and conducted an inspection during November 2003 and subsequently prepared the Ehrmann appraisal, which states that it “has been prepared for tax purposes, in order to determine the loss of value due to a facade easement to be donated on the subject property.” The Ehrmann appraisal includes a number of pages of background on the economic, social, cultural, environmental, and political forces that influence property values in New York City.

On the basis of the lot’s location in an R9X zoning district, permitting a “floor area ratio”2 (FAR) of 9.0 for residential property, Mr. Ehrmann calculated [*6] that the lot had a maximum development potential of 20,786.94 square feet, approximately 13,731 square feet of which was unused.3 Mr. Ehrmann wrote:

Although the underlying zoning would permit expansion of the subject property up to the maximum development potential, I believe that the New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission, which has authority over the Upper East Side Historical [sic] District, would block such an expansion. However, the subject owner clearly has the right to transfer/see [sic] these development rights for use on neighboring blocks within the Historical District. Furthermore, I believe that developments utilizing Transferable Development Rights (TDR) would [be] feasible in this area, particularly along Lexington Avenue.

New York statutes define transfer of development rights (TDR) as “the process by which development rights are transferred from one lot, parcel, or area of land in a sending district to another lot, parcel, or area of land in one or more receiving districts.” * * *

In many TDR programs, the zoning provisions applicable to the sending district are amended to reduce the density at which land can be developed. While losing their right to develop their properties at the formerly permitted densities, property owners in the sending district are awarded development rights. These development rights are regarded as severable from the land ownership and transferable by their owners. * * *

[*7] The Ehrmann appraisal then describes different aspects of transferable development rights programs in general, without any reference to the particular program implemented in New York City.

Mr. Ehrmann found that the “sales comparison approach” was the most appropriate valuation method for estimating the market value of the subject property before and after the donation. He wrote: “In the following sections of this report, I have estimated the market value of the subject property both before and after donation of the proposed easement utilizing the Sales Comparison Approach to value.” Mr. Ehrmann used the following sales to estimate the before value of the subject property:

Price                Histo-

per                  ric

Square     square    Adjusted   dis-

Date         Address       Sale price   feet       foot      $/sq ft    trict?

______________________________________________________________________________

 

4/15/03  36 East 67th St   $9,750,000   16,235   $1,216.51   $1,655.80   Yes

3/26/03  631 Park Ave       9,650,000    5,143    1,876.34    1,778.20   Yes

1/17/03  151 East 72d St    8,187,500    5,885    1,391.25    1,701.13   No

1/15/03  123 East 73d St   10,250,000    8,625    1,188.41    1,775.24   Yes

8/26/02  54 East 92d St     9,000,000    4,320    2,083.33    2,595.79   No

6/17/02  10 East 87th St    8,200,000    8,791      932.77    1,609.16   No

5/6/02   46 East 69th St   10,250,000    8,500    1,205.88    1,755.77   Yes

2/16/02  20 East 73d St    17,000,000    9,345    1,819.15    2,281.21   Yes

2/14/02  10 East 75th St    8,250,000    8,930      923.85    1,527.13   Yes

Mr. Ehrmann adjusted those sale prices to take into account differences between those properties and the subject property due to the following factors: time of [*8] sale; location; condition of the property; size; and whether the property included a finished basement. Although the properties were subject to different zoning, Mr. Ehrmann did not make any adjustments on that basis because, he wrote: “I do not believe that the varying zones have an impact on subject value.” After making all of his adjustments, Mr. Ehrmann averaged the adjusted prices and arrived at $1,853.27 per square foot, which he rounded to $1,855 and used as his estimate for the value of the subject property as of the appraisal date. On the basis of the subject property’s gross floor area of 7,056 square feet, Mr. Ehrmann estimated that the subject property’s total value was $13,090,000.

In addition to estimating the subject property’s fair market value, Mr. Ehrmann sought to appraise the development rights that “could be transferred to a nearby property s [sic] as TDRs.” To do so, he identified five transfers involving development rights on the east side of Manhattan. Three of the five transfers involved the sale of development rights by themselves; the other two each involved the sale of an entire tract that included development rights previously acquired. Mr. Ehrmann calculated the price per FAR foot for each of the sales and then averaged those figures to reach an average of $154 per FAR foot. He then considered some general categories of adjustments, including time, location, size, zoning, and historic restrictions. With regard to historic restrictions, he wrote:

[*9] The subject is part of the Upper East Side Historic District, with significant historic restrictions. None of the previous improvements on the comparable sites had a similar status. Furthermore, there do not appear to be historically protected properties in the immediate vicinities of the TDR comparables. As discussed previously, the subject TDRs can only be utilized in a limited geographic area near the site. However, the TDRs transferred to the comparable properties do not appear to have had the same restriction.

I believe that the restrictions on the subject TDRs make these development rights somewhat less valuable than the apparently unrestricted rights purchased in the comparable transactions.

Mr. Ehrmann’s comments reflect the fact that none of the other properties he considered was in a historic district. The average price per FAR foot of the comparable properties Mr. Ehrmann reported on was $154. However, Mr. Ehrmann estimated that the value of the unused development rights on the subject property was $170 per FAR foot. He explained his reasoning as follows:

I have identified five adjustment factors applicable to the TDR comparables. Three of the factors — time, location, and size of the TDR — support upward adjustments of a number of the comparable unit prices. The two other factors — zoning and landmark limitations — support downward adjustments of all of the comparable unit prices.

TDR transactions are complex. I have not made specific adjustments of each comparable for each adjustment factor discussed above. However, based on the overall adjustments, I estimate that the value of the TDRs on the subject property as of $170.00 per FAR foot.

[*10] Mr. Ehrmann calculated that the total value of the unused development rights associated with the subject property was $2,335,000. He then added that value to his before estimate of the value of the subject property to arrive at a total value for the subject property of $15,425,000.

The second half of the Ehrmann appraisal provides an estimate of the value of the subject property after the facade easement. In an introduction, Mr. Ehrmann explained that there are several reasons property values are negatively affected by facade easements. One of the factors he listed was “the loss of the right to develop the property up to the maximum density allowed under the subject zone.” Other factors included potentially increased maintenance costs, loss of flexibility in changing exterior design, and the inability of future owners to use the tax advantages from an easement contribution. Mr. Ehrmann noted:

The best measure of the impact of these elements on property values is the market place [sic]. I have been able to identify a number of examples of the impact of easements on properties in both New Orleans and Washington, two cities where facade easements have been most actively used.

Mr. Ehrmann provided six examples of sales of eased properties in Washington, D.C., during the mid-1980s and two examples of transactions involving eased properties in New Orleans during the mid-1990s. Mr. Ehrmann constructed the [*11] following table to summarize his research on sales of comparable properties involving facade easements:

Property #                         Easement loss

_____________________________________________________________________

 

1                                  27.9%

2                                  18.3%

3                                   8.9%

4                                  18.6%

5                                  22.5%

6                                     8%

7                  30-40% increase in renovation costs

8                                   11+%

The average facade “easement loss” of the six sales of eased properties (i.e., properties 1 through 6, the Washington, D.C., sales) was 17.4%. However, Mr. Ehrmann estimated that the facade easement on the subject property decreased its value by 11%. He provided the following analysis to explain his reasoning:

The comparable data shows estimated losses ranging from 8% to 27.9%. The residential properties had losses ranging from 8% to 22.5%. Most of the examples that I have identified took place during the 1980s, when the facade easement programs in both Washington and New Orleans were relatively new. Comparables #7 and #8 are based on recent market developments.

The subject property is a residential dwelling in excellent condition and degree of finish. Based on the comparable data, with particular emphasis on Eased Property #8, I estimate that [the] facade easement will result in a loss of value of 11% of the value of the actual subject improvement before donation of the easement.

[*12] On the basis of his estimate of 11%, Mr. Ehrmann calculated that the facade easement would reduce the value of the subject property by $1,439,000, which he rounded to $1,440,000. He stated that after the easement the unused development rights would have no value. He therefore estimated that the “after” value of the subject property was $11,650,000. Mr. Ehrmann concluded that the loss in value due to the facade easement was $3,775,000.4

Petitioners timely filed their joint 2003 Federal income tax return. They deducted $3,775,000 for the donation of the facade easement and development rights on the subject property. Petitioners appended Form 8283, Noncash Charitable Contributions, signed by Mr. Ehrmann and by the president of NAT. Petitioners also attached to their tax return a copy of the Ehrmann appraisal. On or about January 23, 2009, respondent mailed to petitioners’ last known address a statutory notice of deficiency. Petitioners timely filed their petition with this Court on April 20, 2009.

During December 2010, each party filed a motion for partial summary judgment. Petitioners moved that, inter alia, the Court grant summary judgment that the Ehrmann appraisal of the value of the easement was a “qualified [*13] appraisal” within the meaning of section 1.170A-13(c)(3), Income Tax Regs. Respondent moved that the Court grant summary judgment that petitioners are not entitled to a charitable contribution deduction related to their 2003 donation of the facade easement and development rights because, inter alia, “petitioners failed to substantiate their deduction * * * as required by section 155(a) of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-369, 98 Stat. 691, (“DEFRA”) and Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13(c).” Specifically, we were asked to determine whether the Ehrmann appraisal included the “method of valuation” and the “specific basis for the valuation” pursuant to section 1.170A-13(c)(3)(ii)(J) and (K), Income Tax Regs.

On October 3, 2011, we issued our prior opinion addressing the parties’ cross-motions for partial summary judgment. Relying in part on Scheidelman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-151, 2010 WL 2788205 (Scheidelman I), vacated and remanded, 682 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2012), we held that petitioners were not entitled to a deduction for the donation of the facade easement because the Ehrmann appraisal was not a “qualified appraisal” pursuant to section 1.170A-13(c)(3), Income Tax Regs., with respect to its valuation of the facade easement. Accordingly, we granted respondent’s motion for partial summary judgment with respect to that issue. However, with respect to the valuation of the development rights, we concluded that disputed issues of material fact remained as [*14] to whether the Ehrmann appraisal was a qualified appraisal. Accordingly, we denied both parties’ motions for partial summary judgment with respect to that issue.

On June 15, 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated our decision in Scheidelman I and remanded the case. Scheidelman v. Commissioner, 682 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2012) (Scheidelman II). On July 17, 2012, respondent deposed Mr. Ehrmann in the presence of petitioners’ counsel. During the deposition Mr. Ehrmann stated that he had never appraised other transferrable development rights before issuing the Ehrmann appraisal and that Mr. Friedberg knew of this fact.

On August 1, 2012, petitioners moved the Court to reconsider our prior opinion because of the change in law governing the issues noted above. On September 7, 2012, respondent filed a response to petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

DISCUSSION

Reconsideration under Rule 161 is intended to correct substantial errors of fact or law and allow the introduction of newly discovered evidence that the moving party could not have introduced, by the exercise of due diligence, in the [*15] prior proceeding. See Knudsen v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 185 (2008); Estate of Quick v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 440, 441-442 (1998). We have broad discretion as to whether to grant a motion for reconsideration, but will not do so unless the moving party can point to unusual circumstances or substantial error. Estate of Quick v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. at 441-442; see also Vaughn v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 164, 166-167 (1986). “Reconsideration is not the appropriate forum for rehashing previously rejected legal arguments or tendering new legal theories to reach the end result desired by the moving party.” Estate of Quick v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. at 441-442.

However, an intervening change of controlling law may warrant our exercising that discretion. See Doe v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 709 F.2d 782, 789 (2d Cir. 1983); see also Alioto v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-185, 2008 WL 2945349, at *8. We based our prior opinion in part on a similar legal analysis as that contained in Scheidelman I. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated and remanded Scheidelman I, see Scheidelman II, 682 F.3d 189, and, absent stipulation to the contrary, this case is appealable to that court. In accordance with Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742, 757 (1970), aff’d, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971), we conclude that the decision by the Court of Appeals [*16] in Scheidelman II specifically alters the underlying law and, therefore, requires that we reconsider our prior opinion.

Petitioners ask us to reconsider whether the Ehrmann appraisal met the requirements of a “qualified appraisal” pursuant to section 1.170A-13(c)(3)(ii)(J) and (K), Income Tax Regs., with respect to both the facade easement and the development rights. We address each issue in turn.

I. Facade Easement

In our prior opinion we determined that Mr. Ehrmann’s approach to valuing the subject property after the facade easement donation diverged significantly from the accepted comparable sales method, which was the method Mr. Ehrmann claimed to apply. We determined that Mr. Ehrmann instead used sale and nonsale transactions of eased properties in locations other than New York City, which is the site of the subject property, to estimate a percentage diminution in value associated with a facade easement. Mr. Ehrmann then multiplied the before value of the subject property, the calculation of which respondent did not contest, by the percentage diminution that he purported to derive from the transactions noted above to estimate the loss in value on account of the facade easement.5 In [*17] Scheidelman I, we held that the mechanical application of a percentage diminution to the fair market value before donation of a facade easement does not constitute a method of valuation as contemplated under section 1.170A-13(c)(3), Income Tax Regs. Scheidelman I, 2010 WL 2788205, at *9. Accordingly, our prior opinion in this case held, consistent with our decision in Scheidelman I, that the Ehrmann appraisal was not a qualified appraisal with respect to the facade easement because it lacked a method and specific basis for the determined value.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated this Court’s decision in Scheidelman I and remanded the case. See Scheidelman II, 682 F.3d 189. Concerning whether an appraisal includes the method of valuation as required by section 1.170A-13(c)(3)(ii)(J), Income Tax Regs., the Court of Appeals in Scheidelman II stated:

For the purpose of gauging compliance with the reporting requirement, it is irrelevant that the * * * [Commissioner] believes the method employed was sloppy or inaccurate, or haphazardly applied * * *. The regulation requires only that the appraiser identify the valuation method “used”; it does not require that the method adopted be reliable. * * * By providing the information required by the regulation, * * * [the appraiser] enabled the * * * [Commissioner] to evaluate his methodology.

[*18] Id. at 196-197 (fn. ref. omitted). The Court of Appeals held that “the Commissioner’s interpretation, that an unreliable method is no method at all, goes beyond the wording of the regulation, which imposes only a reporting requirement.” Id. n.6. Concerning whether an appraisal includes the specific basis for the valuation as required by section 1.170A-13(c)(3)(ii)(K), Income Tax Regs., the Court of Appeals stated that the purpose of that reporting regulation was to provide the Commissioner with “sufficient information to evaluate the claimed deduction and ‘deal more effectively with the prevalent use of overvaluations.'” Id. at 198 (quoting Hewitt v. Commissioner, 109 T.C. 258, 265 (1997), aff’d, 166 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 1998)). The Court of Appeals held that the requirement of section 1.170A-13(c)(3)(ii)(K), Income Tax Regs., is fulfilled if the appraiser’s analysis is present, even if the Commissioner deems it to be unconvincing. Scheidelman II, 682 F.3d at 198.

In their motion for reconsideration, petitioners contend that the Ehrmann appraisal included a method of valuation because it supplied enough information to enable the Commissioner to evaluate his methodology and showed how he applied the method. Petitioners acknowledge that we previously concluded that Mr. Ehrmann’s stated method was improperly applied and unreliable but contend that reliability is not a factor for purposes of determining whether the Ehrmann [*19] appraisal is a qualified appraisal. Respondent opposes petitioners’ motion for reconsideration with respect to the facade easement and contends that (1) petitioners misstate the proper standard articulated by the Court of Appeals in Scheidelman II, (2) the Ehrmann appraisal is not a qualified appraisal even if we apply the standard that petitioners advocate, and (3) the Ehrmann appraisal fails to include a specific basis for valuation.6 We disagree with all three of respondent’s contentions.

Respondent first contends that petitioners misstate the standard that the Court should apply and that the proper standard is to determine whether the method of valuation stated in the appraisal is the method actually used by the [*20] appraiser. We disagree. In Scheidelman II, 682 F.3d at 197, the Court of Appeals stated that the relevant question is whether the information provided “enabled the * * * [Commissioner] to evaluate * * * [the appraiser’s] methodology”. See also Rothman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-218, 2012 WL 3101513, at *4. Moreover, the Court of Appeals clarified that “it is irrelevant that the * * * [Commissioner] believes the method employed was sloppy or inaccurate, or haphazardly applied”. Scheidelman II, 682 F.3d at 197 (emphasis added). Scheidelman II is clear; the regulations are a reporting requirement. Id. at 197 & n.6. Thus, pursuant to Scheidelman II, any evaluation of accuracy is irrelevant for purposes of deciding whether the appraisal is qualified pursuant to section 1.170A-13(c)(3)(ii)(J), Income Tax Regs.

Respondent also contends that the Ehrmann appraisal fails to enable respondent to evaluate Mr. Ehrmann’s methodology. Respondent argues that the Ehrmann appraisal “merely set forth certain disconnected and meaningless steps that Mr. Ehrmann took” and that “the 11% value was arrived at in spite of his research.” While we note that we previously determined that “[n]othing in Mr. Ehrmann’s report supports his conclusion about the after value of the subject property”, Friedberg v. Commissioner, 2011 WL 4550136, at *15, we concede that reaching that determination first required us to evaluate Mr. Ehrmann’s [*21] methodology. Although we continue to question whether the Ehrmann appraisal is reliable or properly applied methodology to reach its conclusions, we conclude that it provides sufficient information to enable respondent to evaluate Mr. Ehrmann’s underlying methodology. Accordingly, we conclude that the Ehrmann appraisal includes a method of valuation as required by section 1.170A-13(c)(3)(ii)(J), Income Tax Regs., with respect to the facade easement.

Regarding the requirements of section 1.170A-13(c)(3)(ii)(K), Income Tax Regs., respondent contends that the Ehrmann appraisal did not provide a specific basis for the valuation because it lacked reasoned analysis and arrived at the value of the facade easement in spite of Mr. Ehrmann’s research, not because of it. The Court of Appeals held that there is a specific basis for the valuation if the appraiser’s analysis is present, even if the Commissioner deems it unconvincing. Scheidelman II, 682 F.3d at 198 (“The Commissioner may deem * * * [the appraiser’s] ‘reasoned analysis’ unconvincing, but it is incontestably there.”). As we stated in our prior opinion, the Ehrmann appraisal compared eight different properties with facade easements, for which Mr. Ehrmann allegedly considered, inter alia, each property’s location, size, local government laws and regulations, use, date of easement, appreciation of value, and improvements. Although we criticized and disagreed with Mr. Ehrmann’s analysis, it was “incontestably there”. [*22] See id. Indeed, respondent’s own argument concedes that the Ehrmann appraisal contained some research and analysis because respondent concludes that value was determined in spite of that research. Accordingly, we conclude that the Ehrmann appraisal includes a specific basis for Mr. Ehrmann’s valuation as required by section 1.170A-13(c)(3)(ii)(K), Income Tax Regs., with respect to the facade easement.

Consequently, pursuant to Scheidelman II, we conclude that the Ehrmann appraisal is a qualified appraisal pursuant to section 1.170A-13(c)(3)(ii), Income Tax Regs., with respect to petitioners’ facade easement. However, we specifically do not opine on the reliability and accuracy of the methodology and specific basis of valuation in the Ehrmann appraisal, a matter we leave to be decided at trial.

II. Development Rights

In our prior opinion we determined that Mr. Ehrmann’s method of using five comparable transactions involving development rights to estimate the value of the subject property’s unused development rights was inconsistent and contained mathematical errors and erroneous assumptions. Although we determined that Mr. Ehrmann claimed to be applying the comparable sales method to calculate a price per square foot of the development rights, we were not convinced that the comparable sales transactions were truly comparable. Instead of comparing the [*23] purchase prices per square foot for additional development rights, Mr. Ehrmann compared prices per square foot of properties that included no additional development rights or averaged prices per square foot for both development rights attached to the property and additional development rights. However, we determined that the Ehrmann appraisal nonetheless explained the method and specific basis of valuation with respect to the development rights. Because we questioned the Ehrmann appraisal’s accuracy and reliability and whether it adequately evaluated the market demand for and transferability of development rights, we held that issues of material fact remained regarding whether the Ehrmann appraisal was a qualified appraisal with respect to the development rights.7

In their motion for reconsideration, petitioners contend that our prior opinion concludes that the Ehrmann appraisal included the method of valuation and specific basis for the valuation of the development rights. Petitioners contend that remaining issues of material fact, which caused us to deny petitioners’ motion for summary judgment with respect to this issue in our prior opinion, are relevant [*24] only to determining the value of the development rights and not to determining whether the Ehrmann appraisal is qualified under the Scheidelman II analysis. We agree with petitioners. Under Scheidelman II, section 1.170A-13(c)(3)(ii)(J) and (K), Income Tax Regs., “imposes only a reporting requirement” and the taxpayer only needs to include sufficient information to allow the Commissioner to evaluate the methodology and specific basis for valuation. Scheidelman II, 692 F.3d at 196-198, n.6. In our prior opinion, we stated that, despite errors, the Ehrmann appraisal “explained the method of valuation and the specific basis for the valuation” of the development rights. Friedberg v. Commissioner, 2011 WL 4550136, at *22. The remaining issues of material fact (e.g., the effect of the market demand, the transferability of the development rights, and the accuracy and reliability of the Ehrmann appraisal) are relevant to our analysis of valuation but are irrelevant as to whether the Ehrmann appraisal is [*25] qualified pursuant to section 1.170A-13(c)(3), Income Tax Regs.8 See Scheidelman II, 692 F.3d at 196-198.

Respondent does not object to petitioners’ motion for reconsideration with respect to whether the Ehrmann appraisal is a qualified appraisal of development rights but contends that we should consider additional factual developments that have arisen since our prior opinion and, in result, grant summary judgment to respondent. Specifically, respondent contends that, at a deposition after our prior opinion, Mr. Ehrmann confirmed that he had never appraised other transferrable development rights before issuing the Ehrmann appraisal and that Mr. Friedberg knew of this fact. Consequently, respondent contends that Mr. Ehrmann was not a qualified appraiser of transferable development rights pursuant to section 1.170A-13(c)(5), [*26] Income Tax Reg., and therefore, the Ehrmann appraisal was not a qualified appraisal.9 We disagree.

Pursuant to section 1.170A-13(c)(5), Income Tax Regs.,10 a qualified appraiser is an individual who includes on the appraisal summary11 a declaration that: (1) the individual either holds himself or herself out to the public as an appraiser or performs appraisals regularly; (2) the appraiser is qualified to make appraisals of the type of property being valued;12 (3) the appraiser is not excluded [*27] from qualifying under section 1.170A-13(c)(5)(iv), Income Tax Regs.;13 and (4) the appraiser understands that an intentionally false or fraudulent overstatement of the value of the property described in the qualified appraisal or appraisal summary may subject the appraiser to a civil penalty under section 6701 for aiding and abetting an understatement of tax liability. According to the plain language of the regulation, an appraiser is a qualified appraiser if he or she makes the requisite declaration that he or she is qualified to appraise the value of the contributed property; the regulation does not direct the Commissioner to analyze the appraiser’s qualifications to determine whether he or she has sufficient education, experience, or other characteristics. We conclude that the analysis of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Scheidelman II regarding the method and specific basis of valuation of a qualified appraisal applies equally to the appraiser’s qualification for purposes of section 1.170A-13(c)(5)(i)(B), Income [*28] Tax Regs. Accordingly we conclude that section 1.170A-13(c)(5)(i)(B), Income Tax Regs., is a reporting requirement, i.e., an appraiser is qualified if the declaration is present, regardless of whether it is “unconvincing”. See Scheidelman II, 682 F.3d at 198. Accordingly, respondent’s contention that Mr. Ehrmann is not a qualified appraiser is without merit.

Respondent has conceded that Mr. Ehrmann signed the appraisal summary that contains the necessary declaration. Consequently, Mr. Ehrmann is a qualified appraiser pursuant to section 1.170A-13(c)(5), Income Tax Regs., and the Ehrmann appraisal is a qualified appraisal of the value of the development rights petitioners contributed.14

III. Conclusion

Upon due consideration of the foregoing, we hold that petitioners are entitled to summary judgment on the issue of whether the Ehrmann appraisal is a qualified appraisal pursuant to section 1.170A-13(c)(3), Income Tax Regs., with respect to both the facade easement and the development rights. Consequently, we reconsider our holding in our prior case that petitioners are not entitled to a [*29] charitable contribution deduction with respect to the facade easement. However, the other holdings of our prior opinion remain.

We have considered all arguments made, and to the extent not specifically addressed herein, conclude they have been previously addressed in our prior opinion in this case or are irrelevant, moot, or without merit.

To reflect the foregoing,

An appropriate order will be issued.

FOOTNOTES

* This opinion supplements Friedberg v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-238.

1 Unless otherwise indicated, section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (Code) and in effect at all relevant times, and Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. We round all monetary amounts to the nearest dollar.

2 New York, N.Y. Zoning Resolution sec. 12-10 (2011) provides the following definition for “floor area ratio”:

“Floor area ratio” is the total floor area on a zoning lot, divided by the lot area of that zoning lot. If two or more buildings are located on the same zoning lot, the floor area ratio is the sum of their floor areas divided by the lot area. (For example, a zoning lot of 10,000 square feet with a building containing 20,000 square feet of floor area has a floor area ratio of 2.0, and a zoning lot of 20,000 square feet with two buildings containing a total of 40,000 square feet of floor area also has a floor area ratio of 2.0).

3 Respondent accepts those numbers as accurate for purposes of the parties’ cross motions for partial summary judgment addressed in our prior opinion.

4 That figure reflects the value of both the facade easement and the development rights, but Mr. Ehrmann stated that it represented “the estimated market value of the loss due to the easement.”

5 As we noted in our prior opinion in this case, it appears that Mr. Ehrmann arrived at 11%, the percentage of fair market value that NAT had told Mr. Friedberg was typical for facade easements, in spite of his research on comparable sales and not because of it.

6 Respondent also contends that we did not rest our prior opinion entirely on the legal analysis contained in Scheidelman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-151, 2010 WL 2788205 (Scheidelman I), vacated and remanded, 682 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2012) (Scheidelman II), pointing to our scarce citations of that case and that we instead relied on Friedman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-45, 2010 WL 845949, and Jacobson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-401, 1999 WL 1127811, which the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit approved. Respondent’s contention is without merit. The Court of Appeals’ opinion in Scheidelman II vacated this Court’s decision in Scheidelman I with respect to the same analysis we used in this case in our prior opinion and distinguished both Friedman and Jacobson. See Scheidelman II, 682 F.3d at 197-198 (stating that the appraisals in those cases “failed altogether to ‘even indicate the valuation method used or the basis for the appraised values'” (quoting Friedman v. Commissioner, 2010 WL 845949, at *4) and “‘provided no methodology or rationale'” (quoting Jacobson v. Commissioner, 1999 WL 1127811, at *2). Pursuant to Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. at 757, the Court of Appeals’ opinion controls our analysis in the instant case.

7 This Court did not discuss qualified appraisals of development rights in Scheidelman I. However, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s analysis of sec. 1.170A-13(c)(3)(ii)(J) and (K), Income Tax Regs., applies as much to a valuation of development rights as it does to a valuation of a facade easement. We do not deem it necessary to restate that analysis, which we discussed above.

8 Respondent contends that the Ehrmann appraisal is not qualified because it assumed a highest and best use for the development rights without adequately assessing the market demand for those rights with a market study. We disagree. We have previously held that, when using the comparable sales method, the before value “is arrived at by first determining the highest and best use of the property in its current condition unrestricted by the easement.” Hilborn v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 677, 689 (1985). However, valuation is not a precise science, and the fair market value of property on a given date is a question of fact to be resolved on the basis of the entire record. Kiva Dunes Conservation, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-145, 2009 WL 1748862, at *3. Like the other questions of fact noted above, respondent’s contentions as to the defects of the Ehrmann appraisal are irrelevant as to whether the Ehrmann appraisal is a qualified appraisal pursuant to sec. 1.170A-13(c)(3), Income Tax Regs.

9 Pursuant to sec. 1.170A-13(c)(3)(i)(B), Income Tax Regs., a qualified appraisal must be “prepared, signed, and dated by a qualified appraiser (within the meaning of paragraph (c)(5) of * * * [that] section).”

10 While we recognize that “qualified appraiser” is now defined in sec. 170(f)(11)(E)(ii), that section was not in effect at the time petitioners filed the return for their 2003 tax year. See Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, sec. 1219(c)(1), 120 Stat. at 1084 (effective for appraisals prepared with respect to returns filed after August 17, 2006).

11 Pursuant to sec. 1.170A-13(c)(2)(i)(B), Income Tax Regs., a fully completed appraisal summary must be attached to the tax return on which the deduction for contribution is first claimed. The appraisal summary, which differs from a qualified appraisal, must comply with the requirements set forth in sec. 1.170A-13(c)(4), Income Tax Regs.

12 Pursuant to sec. 1.170A-13(c)(3)(ii)(F), Income Tax Regs., the qualified appraisal should include “[t]he qualifications of the qualified appraiser who signs the appraisal, including the appraiser’s background, experience, education, and membership, if any, in professional appraisal associations”. Respondent makes no claim regarding whether Mr. Ehrmann failed to report his qualifications pursuant to sec. 1.170A-13(c)(3)(ii)(F), Income Tax Regs., so we do not further address that issue.

13 Pursuant to sec. 1.170A-13(c)(5)(iv), Income Tax Regs., an individual is not a qualified appraiser if the individual is, inter alia, the donor, the donee, any person employed by the donor or donee, or an appraiser who is regularly used by the donor or donee and who does not perform most of his or her appraisals for other persons. Respondent makes no claim regarding whether Mr. Ehrmann is excluded from qualifying as a qualified appraiser pursuant to sec. 1.170A-13(c)(5)(iv), Income Tax Regs., so we do not further address that issue.

14 However, we note that we do not at this time opine on whether Mr. Ehrmann’s qualifications are sufficient to qualify as an expert witness to testify in this Court regarding the value of the development rights in this case or whether the Ehrmann appraisal may be admitted as an expert report pursuant to Rule 143(g) for that purpose.




Law Professor Questions Costs of Tax-Exempt Hospitals.

Tax-exempt hospitals raise prices for consumers and contribute little in charity despite the requirements of their exempt status, Barak D. Richman of Duke University said at a September 19 hearing on healthcare reform held by the House Judiciary Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law Subcommittee.

http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/113th/09192013_2/Prof%20Richman%20Testimony%20[9-19-13].pdf




IRS Releases Publication Containing Guidance on Applying for Tax-Exempt Status.

The IRS has released Publication 4220 (rev. Aug. 2013), Applying for 501(c)(3) Tax-Exempt Status, which provides general guidelines for organizations that seek exemption from federal income tax under section 501(c)(3).

http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p4220.pdf




IRS Releases Publication for Public Charity Compliance.

The IRS has released Publication 4221-PC (rev. Aug. 2013), Compliance Guide for 501(c)(3) Public Charities, which identifies activities that could jeopardize a public charity’s tax-exempt status and addresses general compliance requirements on record keeping, reporting, and disclosure for exempt organizations.

http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p4221pc.pdf




IRS Releases Publication on Charitable Contributions.

The IRS has released Publication 1771 (rev. Jul. 2013), Charitable Contributions — Substantiation and Disclosure Requirements, which explains general rules and specifications for documenting charitable deductions and explains new guidelines that allow charities to electronically mail documentation to donors.

http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1771.pdf




IRS Releases Publication Containing Guidance for Charitable Donations of Vehicles.

The IRS has released Publication 4303 (rev. Aug. 2013), A Donor’s Guide to Vehicle Donations, which provides general guidelines for individuals who donate their vehicles to a charity

http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p4303.pdf




IRS Previewing Interactive Exemption Application.

The IRS is previewing an interactive version of Form 1023, “Application for Recognition of Exemption Under Section 501(c)(3),” online and is seeking comments.

The interactive application was posted September 6 and is available until September 20 at www.stayexempt.irs.gov, the IRS announced in an electronic newsletter.

Users cannot now print or submit the interactive version of the application, according to the newsletter. However, when testing is finished later this year, users will be able to print and mail the form and its attachments.

The interactive form should allow users to submit a more complete application and help the agency speed up processing times and provide faster determinations, the newsletter says.

The IRS developed the interactive application from recommendations made in the Advisory Committee on Tax-Exempt and Government Entities report , the newsletter says. The application was also listed in the agency’s fiscal 2013 exempt organizations workplan .

The IRS requests that comments on the interactive application be sent to [email protected].




EO Update: e-news for Charities and Nonprofits - September 6, 2013.

1.  New interactive Form 1023 available for review

In an effort to make applying for tax exemption easier, the IRS Exempt Organizations (EO) office is in the development stage of an alternate version of Form 1023, Application for Recognition of Exemption. The new application is available for preview until September 20, 2013.

The Interactive Form 1023 (i1023) features pop-up information boxes for most lines of the form. These boxes contain explanations and links to related information on IRS.gov and StayExempt.irs.gov, EO’s educational website. When final testing is completed later this year, you’ll print and mail the form and its attachments just like the standard Form 1023.

Although viewers are unable to print or submit this “review” version of i1023, EO encourages the public to click through its new features and promote the i1023 to colleagues and business associates. After reviewing the i1023, please send your comments to [email protected].

Anticipated i1023 benefits:

Interactive Form 1023 is available at: http://www.stayexempt.irs.gov/StartingOut.aspx

2.  Register for EO workshops

Register for upcoming workshops for small and medium-sized 501(c)(3) organizations:

Sept. 9  – St. Paul, MN

Hosted by Hamline University

Sept. 10 – Minneapolis, MN

Hosted by University of St. Thomas

Sept. 27 – Albuquerque, NM

Hosted by University of New Mexico

Oct. 16-17 – Lakeland, FL

Hosted by Florida Southern College

Register at: http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Upcoming-Workshops-for-Small-and-Medium-Sized-501(c)(3)-Organizations

3.  Sign up for upcoming phone forums

Exempt Organizations and Employment Taxes (Sept. 10, 2 p.m., EDT)

Even organizations that don’t use paid workers on a regular basis should be aware of employment tax issues. http://ems.intellor.com/index.cgi?p=204698&t=71&do=register&s=&rID=417&edID=305

Stay Exempt: A guide for charitable organizations with changing leadership (Sept. 18, 2 p.m. EDT)

Helps organizations stay tax-exempt – organized and operated exclusively for exempt purposes.

http://ems.intellor.com/index.cgi?p=204707&t=71&do=register&s=&rID=417&edID=305




IRS Publishes Final, Temporary Regs on Excise Tax Return Requirement for Charitable Hospitals.

The IRS has published final and temporary regulations (T.D. 9629) requiring charitable hospital organizations that are liable for an excise tax for failing to meet the community health needs assessment (CHNA) requirements for any tax year to file Form 4720, “Return of Certain Excise Taxes Under Chapters 41 and 42 of the Internal Revenue Code.”

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act enacted sections 501(r) and 4959. A hospital organization seeking to obtain or maintain tax-exempt status as a charitable organization must comply with the requirements of section 501(r), including the requirement to conduct a CHNA under section 501(r)(3). Section 4959 imposes a $50,000 excise tax if a hospital organization to which section 501(r) applies fails to meet the requirements of section 501(r)(3) for any tax year.

In April 2013 the IRS issued proposed regs (REG-106499-12) that provided guidance to charitable hospital organizations on CHNA requirements and related excise tax and reporting obligations. Those regs, however, didn’t include amendments to the rules under sections 6011 and 6071 on the return required to accompany a section 4959 excise tax payment and when to file the return.

Accordingly, the temporary regs provide that a charitable hospital organization that is liable for the section 4959 excise tax must file a return on Form 4720 by the 15th day of the fifth month after the end of the organization’s tax year during which the liability under section 4959 was incurred. The text of the temporary regs also serves as the text of concurrently issued proposed regs (REG-115300-13). The regs are effective August 15, 2013.




IRS Publishes Proposed Regs on Excise Tax Return Requirement for Charitable Hospitals.

The IRS has published proposed regulations (REG-115300-13) requiring charitable hospital organizations that are liable for an excise tax for failing to meet the community health needs assessment requirements for any tax year to file Form 4720, “Return of Certain Excise Taxes Under Chapters 41 and 42 of the Internal Revenue Code.”

The text of simultaneously issued temporary regs (T.D. 9629) also serves as the text of the proposed regs. Comments and public hearing requests are due by November 13.

Requirement of a Section 4959 Excise Tax Return

and Time for Filing the Return

[4830-01-p]

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

26 CFR Part 53

[REG-115300-13]

RIN 1545-BL57

AGENCY: Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Treasury.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking by cross-reference to temporary regulations.

SUMMARY: In the Rules and Regulations section of this issue of the Federal Register, the IRS is issuing regulations requiring hospital organizations liable for the excise tax for failure to meet the community health needs assessment requirements for any taxable year to file Form 4720, “Return of Certain Excise Taxes Under Chapters 41 and 42 of the Internal Revenue Code.” The regulations also specify the due date for such returns. The text of those temporary regulations also serves as the text of these proposed regulations. DATES: Written or electronic comments and requests for a public hearing must be received by November 13, 2013.

ADDRESSES: Send submissions to: CC:PA:LPD:PR (REG-115300-13), room 5203, Internal Revenue Service, PO Box 7604, Ben Franklin Station, Washington, DC 20044. Submissions may be hand-delivered Monday through Friday between the hours of 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. to CC:PA:LPD:PR (REG-115300-13), Courier’s Desk, Internal Revenue Service, 1111 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC, or sent electronically via the Federal eRulemaking Portal at http://www.regulations.gov (IRS REG-115300-13).

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Concerning the proposed regulations, Amy F. Giuliano at (202) 622-6070; concerning submission of comments and request for hearing, Oluwafunmilayo Taylor at (202) 622-7180 (not toll-free numbers).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background and Explanation of Provisions

Temporary regulations in the Rules and Regulations section of this issue of the Federal Register amend the existing regulations under sections 6011 and 6071 to (1) specify the form that must be used to accompany payment of the excise tax imposed by section 4959 for failure to meet the community health needs assessment requirements of section 501(r)(3), and (2) provide the due date for filing the form. Section 501(r) and section 4959 were enacted by section 9007 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Public Law 111-148 (124 Stat. 119 (2010)).

The text of those temporary regulations also serves as the text of these proposed regulations. The preamble to the temporary regulations explains the amendments.

Special Analyses

It has been determined that this notice of proposed rulemaking is not a significant regulatory action as defined in Executive Order 12866, as supplemented by Executive Order 13563. Therefore, a regulatory assessment is not required. It also has been determined that section 553(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. chapter 5) does not apply to these regulations. It is hereby certified that this rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. This certification is based on the fact that this rule merely provides guidance as to the timing and filing of Form 4720 for charitable hospital organizations liable for the section 4959 excise tax, and completing the applicable portion (Schedule M) of the Form 4720 for this purpose imposes little incremental burden in time or expense. The liability for the section 4959 excise tax is imposed by statute, and not these regulations. In addition, a charitable hospital organization may already be required to file the Form 4720 under the existing final regulations in sections 53.6011-1 and 53.6071-1 if it is liable for another Chapter 41 or 42 excise tax. Therefore, a Regulatory Flexibility Analysis under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. Chapter 6) is not required. Pursuant to section 7805(f) of the Code, these proposed regulations were submitted to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration for comment on their impact on small business, and no comments were received.

Comments and Requests for Public Hearing

Before these proposed regulations are adopted as final regulations, consideration will be given to any comments that are submitted timely to the IRS as prescribed in this preamble under the “Addresses” heading. The Treasury Department and the IRS request comments on all aspects of the proposed rules. All comments will be available at www.regulations.gov or upon request.

A public hearing will be scheduled if requested in writing by any person that timely submits written comments. If a public hearing is scheduled, notice of the date, time, and place for the public hearing will be published in the Federal Register.

Drafting Information

The principal author of these regulations is Amy F. Giuliano, Office of Associate Chief Counsel (Tax Exempt and Government Entities). However, other personnel from the IRS and Treasury Department participated in their development.

List of Subjects in 26 CFR Part 53

Excise taxes, Foundations, Investments, Lobbying, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

Proposed Amendments to the Regulations

Accordingly, 26 CFR part 53 is proposed to be amended as follows:

PART 53 — FOUNDATION AND SIMILAR EXCISE TAXES

Paragraph 1. The authority citation for part 53 continues to read in part as follows:

Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805 * * *

Par. 2. Section 53.6011-1 is amended by:

1. Redesignating paragraphs (c) through (e) as (d) through (f).

2. Adding new paragraphs (c) and (g).

The addition reads as follows:

§ 53.6011-1 General requirement of return, statement or list.

(c) [The text of paragraph (c) of this section is the same as the text of § 53.6011-1T(c) published elsewhere in this issue of the Federal Register ].

(g) [The text of paragraph (g) of this section is the same as the text of § 53.6011-1T(g) published elsewhere in this issue of the Federal Register ].

Par. 3. Section 53.6071-1 is amended by:

1. Revising paragraph (h).

2. Adding paragraph (i).

The revision and addition read as follows:

§ 53.6071-1 Time for filing returns.

[The text of paragraphs (h) and (i) of this section is the same as the text of §§ 53.6071-1T(h) and (i)(1) and (2) published elsewhere in this issue of the Federal Register ].

Heather C. Maloy

Acting Deputy Commissioner for

Services and Enforcement.




FASB Looks to Improve Nonprofit Reporting of Net Assets.

The Financial Accounting Standards Board on September 4 tentatively decided that it should revise the existing requirements for the presentation, classification, and disclosure of information about the funding and resources of nonprofit organizations.

The Financial Accounting Standards Board on September 4 tentatively decided that it should revise the existing requirements for the presentation, classification, and disclosure of information about the funding and resources of nonprofit organizations.

At a meeting in Norwalk, Conn., FASB members unanimously supported the staff recommendation to replace existing rules that require a nonprofit to present on the face of its statement of financial position the totals for three classes of net assets that are used to fund the entity’s operations. Current requirements also dictate that an entity present the changes in each of the classes on the face of its statement of activities.

Based on the staff’s recommendation, the board will pursue guidance that instead requires totals for two classes of net assets to be presented on the face of the financial statements: those with donor-imposed restrictions and those without donor-imposed restrictions.

FASB also agreed to replace the definitions of two donor-restricted classes of net assets — temporarily restricted net assets and permanently restricted net assets — with a single definition for net assets with donor-imposed restrictions. The board will retain the substance of the definition of unrestricted net assets but will change its label to “net assets without donor-imposed restrictions.”

To further improve disclosures about net asset restrictions, the board tentatively decided that it will require nonprofit entities to provide information in the financial statement footnotes about the composition of net assets at the balance sheet date.

According to FASB, the guidance will require an entity to describe how and when its resources can be used and provide information on the net assets without donor-imposed restrictions that have been “board-designated or otherwise authorized by the board for particular uses.”

Ronald Bossio, a senior project manager at FASB, said the net asset composition can be an important part of nonprofit financial reporting if an entity’s communications about its liquidity are perceived to be less than adequate. For some financial statement users, such as creditors, the net asset disclosure is a backdoor way of understanding the liquidity of a nonprofit organization, he added.

According to Bossio, the staff recommendations on improving the information that nonprofit entities provide on their liquidity and cash flow will be presented to the board in October.

FASB’s latest decisions were made as part of its project on reexamining the standards for nonprofit financial statement presentation. The board previously decided on how intermediate operating measures should be defined in the financial statements of nonprofit entities. (Prior coverage .)

Share-Based Payments

The board also unanimously voted against adding to its technical agenda a new project on how to determine the grant date of share-based payments when the conditions of those awards contain discretionary provisions and clawback arrangements.

Lauren Mottley, a FASB practice fellow, said the request for additional guidance was brought to the board’s attention because the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act includes a provision that requires public companies to have a clawback policy on the restatement of their financial statements.

According to Mottley, the staff recommended that the board not pursue a project on the topic because they believed that sufficient guidance was provided in Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) Topic 718, “Compensation — Stock Compensation,” and that additional guidance might not be able to resolve the diversity in practice.

FASB member Thomas Linsmeier supported the staff recommendation, adding that the board’s guidance on stock-based compensation is converged with the related international financial reporting standards. “I don’t see a reason at this point to diverge,” he said.

Linsmeier said the board will have another opportunity to reconsider the topic after a post-implementation review of FASB Statement No. 123(R), “Share-Based Payment,” is completed by the Financial Accounting Foundation.

by Thomas Jaworski




IRS EO Update - e-news for Charities & Nonprofits - August 30, 2013.

1.  IRS describes Code Section 4959 excise tax reporting for charitable hospitals

The IRS has issued temporary and proposed regulations under sections 6011 and 6071 for charitable hospital organizations on how to report any Code Sec.4959 excise tax for failing to meet the community health needs assessment (CHNA) requirements described in Code Sec. 501(r)(3).

The temporary regulations state that a charitable hospital organization liable for the Code Sec. 4959 excise tax must file a return on Form 4720, Return of Certain Excise Taxes Under Chapters 41 and 42 of the Internal Revenue Code. The form must be filed by the 15th day of the fifth month after the end of the charitable hospital organization’s tax year during which the liability under Code Sec. 4959 was incurred.

The proposed regulations provide that written or electronic comments and requests for a public hearing must be received by November 13, 2013.

The temporary regulations are available at:

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-08-15/pdf/2013-19931.pdf

The proposed regulations are available at:

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-08-15/pdf/2013-19930.pdf

Form 4720 is available at:

http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f4720.pdf

2.  EO’s latest changes to implement the TIGTA recommendations

Check out the status of improvements at:

http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/IRS-Charts-a-Path-Forward-with-Immediate-Actions

3.  IRS offers alternative solution for political organizations filings made July/August

While Exempt Organizations’ political organizations disclosure search and download applications are temporarily unavailable, the IRS has an alternative solution for filings made in July and August 2013.

http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Political-Organizations/Political-Organization-Filing-and-Disclosure

These filings include copies of Forms 8871, 8872 and 990 filed by 527s. We anticipate the IRS will re-launch its database this fall, at a date to be determined.

The IRS regrets any inconvenience as it continues to work through this complex situation to ensure the public disclosure of these documents while appropriately protecting important personal information.

4.  Sign up for upcoming IRS Exempt Organizations phone forums

Exempt Organizations and Employment Taxes (Sept. 10, 2 p.m., EDT)

Even organizations that don’t use paid workers on a regular basis should be aware of employment tax issues.

http://ems.intellor.com/index.cgi?p=204698&t=71&do=register&s=&rID=417&edID=305

Stay Exempt: A guide for charitable organizations with changing leadership (Sept. 18, 2 p.m. EDT)

Tax-exempt organizations must be organized and operated exclusively for exempt purposes.

http://ems.intellor.com/index.cgi?p=204707&t=71&do=register&s=&rID=417&edID=305

5.  Review the 2013–2014 Priority Guidance Plan

The 2013–2014 Priority Guidance Plan contains 324 projects that are IRS priorities through June 2014, including:

http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/2013-2014_pgp.pdf

6.  Register for EO workshops

Register for upcoming workshops for small and medium-sized 501(c)(3) organizations:

Sept. 9  – St. Paul, MN

Hosted by Hamline University

Sept. 10 – Minneapolis, MN

Hosted by University of St. Thomas

Sept. 27 – Albuquerque, NM

Hosted by University of New Mexico

October 16-17 – Lakeland, FL

Hosted by Florida Southern College

http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Upcoming-Workshops-for-Small-and-Medium-Sized-501(c)(3)-Organizations




IRS Releases Publication on Tax Status of Veterans Organizations.

The IRS has released Publication 3386 (rev. Aug. 2013), Tax Guide — Veterans’ Organizations, to explain tax exemptions available to veterans organizations that qualify for tax-exempt status under section 501(c).

http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p3386.pdf




IRS EO Update: e-news for Charities and Nonprofits.

1.  IRS website explains tax provisions of the health care law; provides guide to online resources

The IRS has launched a new Affordable Care Act Tax Provisions website at IRS.gov/aca to educate individuals and businesses on how the health care law may affect them. The new home page has three sections, which explain the tax benefits and responsibilities for individuals and families, employers, and other organizations, with links and information for each group. The site provides information about tax provisions that are in effect now and those that will go into effect in 2014 and beyond.

http://www.irs.gov/uac/Affordable-Care-Act-Tax-Provisions-Home

2.  Disclosure of return information

On Aug. 13, 2013, the Department of the Treasury and the IRS issued final regulations with rules for disclosure of return information to the Department of Health and Human Services that will be used to carry out eligibility determinations for advance payments of the premium tax credit, Medicaid and other health insurance affordability programs. For additional information on the final regulations, see questions and answers.

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-08-14/pdf/2013-19728.pdf

http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/IRC-Section-6103(l)(21)-Questions-and-Answers

3.  IRS web pages provide information on group exemptions and group returns

These pages explain how to obtain and maintain group exemptions and file group returns.

Group exemptions: http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Group-Exemption-Resources

Group returns: http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Returns-Filed-by-Organizations-in-Group-Rulings-Resources

4.  Register for EO workshops

Register for upcoming workshops for small and medium-sized 501(c)(3) organizations:

August 20-21 – San Francisco, CA

Hosted by Golden Gate University

August 28-29 – Anaheim, CA

Hosted by Trinity Law School

http://www.irs.gov/Charities-%26-Non-Profits/Upcoming-Workshops-for-Small-and-Medium-Sized-501(c)(3)-Organizations

5.  IRS open Aug. 30 as cost cutting continues; will reevaluate need for furlough day in September

Read news release: http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/IRS-Open-Aug.-30-as-Cost-Cutting-Continues;-Will-Reevaluate-Need-for-Furlough-Day-in-September

6.  Six good reasons to become a tax volunteer

If you’re looking for a way to help your community, consider becoming a tax volunteer. The IRS is looking for volunteers now who will provide free tax help next year. Read tax tip: http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/Six-Good-Reasons-Why-You-Should-Become-a-Tax-Volunteer

7.  Ten cool reasons to visit IRS.gov in Espanol this summer

Tax information can be difficult to understand in any language. It can be even more difficult if English is not your first language. The IRS provides a wide range of free products and services on its Spanish language web pages. Visit IRS.gov/espanol to get federal tax help in Spanish. Read all about it: http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/Ten-Cool-Reasons-to-Visit-IRS.gov-in-Espanol-This-Summer




Nonprofit Housing Organization Requests Guidance on Low-Income Housing Tax Credit.

B. Susan Wilson of Enterprise, responding to a request (Notice 2013-22) for items to include on the 2013-2014 priority guidance list, has asked the IRS to address issues relating to the low-income housing tax credit, including bond issuance costs, casualty losses, over-income tenants, and the applicability of the economic substance doctrine.

Internal Revenue Service

Attn: CC:PA:LPD:PR (Notice 2013-22)

Room 5203

P.O. Box 7604

Ben Franklin Station

Washington, D.C. 20044

Re: Notice 2013-22 Recommendations for 2013-2014 Guidance Priority List

Ladies and Gentlemen:

We are writing in response to Notice 2013-22, in which the Service invited public comment on items that should be included on the 2013-2014 Guidance Priority List.

Enterprise is a national nonprofit organization that creates opportunity for low- and moderate-income people through affordable housing in diverse, thriving communities. For more than 30 years, Enterprise has introduced neighborhood solutions through public-private partnerships with financial institutions, governments, community organizations and others that share our vision. Enterprise has raised and invested more than $13.9 billion in equity, grants and loans to help build or preserve 300,000 affordable rental and for-sale homes to create vital communities. As a key part of our affordable housing finance work, Enterprise is a leading national syndicator of Low-Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC).

Below, we have outlined five guidance issues that we believe impact many transactions and propose solutions that we believe would result in the credit working more efficiently and being more effective. Please note that these are the same items that we submitted last year, but we believe that these issues continue to be important and should be considered in the plan.

Inclusion of Bond Issuance Costs in Eligible Basis: We would like the Internal Revenue Service to reconsider the rule that bond issuance costs, including those associated with construction period bonds, cannot be included in basis.

TAM 200043015, issued on October 27, 2000, concludes that Bond Issuance Costs cannot be capitalized and included in eligible basis since they are not subject to depreciation, but are amortizable costs. However, while these costs are amortizable, a portion of the amortization would then be capitalized and depreciable under Internal Revenue Code Section 168. Therefore, to the extent these costs would ultimately be depreciable, they would also be includible in eligible basis.

In many cases, owners use tax-exempt bonds to fund the construction or rehabilitation of the project. In some cases, the bonds are completely paid off at or soon after completion of the project and in other cases, a portion of the bonds are paid off at or near completion of the project, with the balance remaining outstanding for a longer period of time.

Internal Revenue Code Section 42(d)(1) provides that the eligible basis of a building is its adjusted basis at the close of the first taxable year of the credit period.

Generally, costs incurred in obtaining a loan are capitalized and amortized over the life of the loan. Internal Revenue Code Section 263A provides that indirect costs allocable to the production of real or tangible property are to be capitalized into the basis of the produced property.

Such allocable costs would include points and other financing costs associated with a loan used entirely or in part for construction or rehabilitation of the project, as well as interest incurred during the construction or rehabilitation of the project.

To the extent that these costs are amortizable, the amortization associated with the construction or rehabilitation period would be capitalized under Internal Revenue Code Section 263A.

In those cases where the bond is a source of construction financing, the points and other costs of the bonds should be treated as an allocable cost and the portion relating to the construction and rehabilitation of the project should be capitalized into the basis of the building, pursuant to Internal Revenue Code Section 263A.

Loss of Low Income Housing Tax Credits upon a Casualty Loss: We would like the Internal Revenue Service to reconsider its position that credits are not allowed for a year to the extent that the building or units are not available for occupancy on December 31st of that year, due to a casualty loss that is not part of a presidentially declared disaster area, even though the owner is in the process of a timely restoration of the damaged units or building.

Internal Revenue Code Section 42(j)(4) states that there should be no tax credit recapture resulting from a reduction in qualified basis by reason of a casualty loss to the extent that such loss is restored by reconstruction or replacement within a reasonable period established by the Secretary.

In Revenue Procedure 2007-54, which superseded Revenue Procedure 95-28, the IRS stated that the owner of a building that is beyond the first year of the credit period has suffered a reduction in qualified basis that would cause it to be subject to a recapture or loss of credit will not be subject to recapture or loss of credit if the building’s qualified basis is restored within a reasonable period. However, the Revenue Procedure addressed this relief to casualties that resulted from a disaster that caused the President to issue a major disaster declaration since that was the general topic of the Revenue Procedure and it did not address casualty losses that did not result from such disasters.

In CCA 200134006 and CCA 200913012, the Chief Counsel to the Internal Revenue Service stated that the ability of the owner to claim credits on units while out of service is limited to those casualties resulting from a presidential declared disaster and is not appropriate for a casualty that resulted form some other cause, such as a fire experienced by a specific project, stating that the exception in Revenue Procedure 95-28 was limited to that.

In the latter case, while recapture does not result if the building or units are restored within a reasonable period of time, if not restored by the end of the year, pursuant to CCA 200134006, no credits are allowed for that year. Although credits would resume for the year in which the project is returned to service, these are credits that the owner would have been entitled to had the casualty not occurred. Credits would be lost for any year in which the units are not returned to service by the end of the year, regardless of when the casualty occurred, and these credits are not made up later, as in the 11th year, so it is a permanent loss of credits. This result is somewhat punitive to an owner who suffered a loss through no fault of its own, despite acting prudently to restore the unit or building in a reasonable period.

The distinction provided in CCA 200134006 was based on Revenue Procedure 95-28, which only provided relief in the form of the ability to claim credits during the replacement period if the property was in a location being designated as a major disaster area. However, that distinction is inappropriate. The Revenue Procedure was only dealing with such disaster areas, which is why relief was only given to such an area. In addition, in CCA200134006, it states that “Such an event is quite distinct from the general casualty loss situation confronting property owners.” While being in a disaster area can make replacements and restoration more challenging, an owner suffering a casualty loss of any sort has similar challenges.

We request that the Service consider revising its policy and provide the same treatment for casualty losses that are not located in a presidentially-declared disaster area. In general, tax law provides a time period for replacements to be completed for casualties, even if not located in a disaster area. If restored within that time period, there should be no loss of tax credit, even if the building is not restored until after the end of the year. This was the treatment accorded to casualty losses that occurred in a disaster area. There is no reason why the rule should be different in a disaster area than outside of it. The rules for casualty losses are the same.

Application of the Economic Substance Doctrine: We would like the Internal Revenue Service to issue official guidance that the Economic Substance Doctrine does not apply to tax credit transactions, including the low income housing credit, new markets credit, rehabilitation credit, and the energy credit.

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and the Health Care and Education Affordability Reconciliation Act codified the common law economic substance doctrine under which federal income tax benefits of a transaction are disallowed if the transaction does not have economic substance or lacks a business purpose, and imposes significant penalties on taxpayers that enter into transactions that lack economic substance.

The Joint Committee on Taxation description of the economic substance doctrine provides that the doctrine is not intended to disallow tax benefits if the realization of those tax benefits is consistent with the Congressional purpose or plan that the tax benefits are designed to effectuate, such as low income housing, new markets, rehabilitation and energy credit transactions.

The Joint Committee on Taxation’s description is an interpretation and is not part of the Statute. Without formal guidance of the inapplicability of this statute to the programs named above, potential investors will perceive this to be a risk, which can interfere with the effectiveness of the programs.

We request that the Internal Revenue provide formal guidance that states that the economic substance doctrine provided by The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and the Health Care and Education Affordability Reconciliation Act not apply to low income housing, new markets, rehabilitation and energy credit transactions.

Continued qualification of over-income tenants covered by an extended use agreement after a transfer of project: We would like the Internal Revenue Service to issue formal guidance that would state that any household determined to be income qualified at the time of move-in for purpose of the extended use agreement is a qualified household for any subsequent allocation of Internal Revenue Code Section 42 or allowable through the issuance of tax-exempt bonds pursuant to Internal Revenue Code Section 42(h)(4).

In the Guide for Completing Form 8823 Low-Income Housing Credit Agencies Report of Noncompliance or Building Disposition (Revised October 2009), (“The Guide”) the Internal Revenue states that “any household determined to be income qualified at the time of move-in for purposes of the extended use agreement is a qualified low-income household for any subsequent allocation of IRC § 42.” (p. 4-27)

This is a reasonable position since these tenants may not be evicted without cause and relocation of the tenants will be very costly and inefficient.

Rev. Proc. 2003-82 provides a safe harbor that will allow an owner to treat a unit occupied by a tenant whose income exceeds the maximum qualified income as qualified if “The unit has been a low-income unit under § 42(i)(3)(B), (C), (D), and (E) from either the date the existing building was acquired by the taxpayer or the date the individuals started occupying the unit, whichever is later, to the beginning of the first taxable year of the building’s credit period. Further, the safe harbor provided by the Revenue Procedure provides that in order for the unit to be qualified, “The individuals occupying the units have incomes that are at or below the applicable income limitation under 42(d)(4)(B)(i) on either the date the existing building was acquired by the taxpayer or the date the individuals started occupying the unit, whichever is later.”

The Revenue Procedure does not state that there would be a different result if an extended use agreement were in effect at the time of the transfer. However, since the purpose of the Rev. Proc. was to provide a safe harbor that would allow tenants to qualify in some situations, it presumably was not intended to cover all situations.

Although The Guide does not have the standing of official guidance from the Office of the Chief Counsel, state agencies and developers rely on it. However, because it is not official guidance, investors and their counsel are reluctant to rely upon it and, in some cases, it forces the owner to relocate tenants that, according to the Service (as stated in The Guide) may not be necessary. This results in additional costs to the owner and displacement of the tenants.

We request that the Internal Revenue Service issue formal guidance that would be consistent with The Guide.

Definition of federally- or state-assisted building for purposes of qualification for exception from ten year rule requirements for the acquisition credit: We would like the Internal Revenue to issue formal guidance on the minimum requirements that a project would need to meet in order to be deemed “a federally- or state-assisted building, which would allow the building to be exempt from the requirement that there be a period of at least ten years between the date the building is being acquired by the taxpayer and the date the building was last placed in service by the previous owner.

The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (“HERA”) expanded the exceptions from the ten year rule to include federally- or State-Assisted Buildings. HERA defined a federally-assisted building to be “any building which is substantially assisted, financed, or operated under section 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1937, section 221(d)(3), 221(d)(4), or 236 of the National Housing Act, section 515 of the Housing Act of 1949, or any other housing program administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development or by the Rural Housing Service of the Department of Agriculture.” HERA defined a state-assisted building as a building “which is substantially assisted, financed, or operated under any State law similar in purpose to any of the laws” described under the federal definition.

While HERA provided a broad list of the programs that qualified a building for the exception, they did not define “substantially assisted”.

Without a definition or guidance of “substantially assisted”, taxpayers are unsure whether a buiding qualifies and investors are reluctant to invest in these credits due to the uncertainty.

We request that the Internal Revenue Service provide guidance as to what would be deemed substantially federally subsidized. Without such guidance, the purpose of creating this exception to the ten year rule will not be achieved.

We appreciate the opportunity to present our recommendations on items that should be included in the 2012-2013 Priority Guidance Plan. We believe that these changes will improve the use of the tax credits to provide affordable housing that is needed in this country. Thank you in advance for your consideration of these suggestions. If you have any questions about any of the items described above, please feel free to contact Susan Wilson at 410-772-2539 or [email protected] or Peter Lawrence at 202-649-3915 or [email protected].

Very truly yours,

B. Susan Wilson

Vice-President

Enterprise Community Investment,

Inc.

Washington, DC




Affordable Housing Association Requests Guidance on Low-Income Housing Tax Credit.

Kris Cook of the National Affordable Housing Management Association, responding to a request (Notice 2013-22) for items to include on the 2013-2014 priority guidance list, has asked the IRS to address issues relating to the low-income housing tax credit, including the utility allowance submetering rule and the treatment of casualty losses.

May 1, 2013

Internal Revenue Service

Attn: CC:PA:LPD:PR

(Notice 2013-22)

Room 5203

P.O. Box 7604

Ben Franklin Station

Washington, D.C. 20044

Re: Notice 2013-22 Recommendations for 2013-2014 Guidance Priority List

Thank you for this opportunity to submit recommendations for the 2013-2014 Guidance Priority List on behalf of the National Affordable Housing Management Association (NAHMA). NAHMA members manage and provide quality affordable housing to more than two million Americans with very low to moderate incomes. Presidents and executives of property management companies, owners of affordable rental housing, public agencies and national organizations involved in affordable housing, and providers of supplies and services to the affordable housing industry make up the membership of NAHMA. In addition, NAHMA serves as the national voice in Washington for 19 regional, state and local affordable housing management associations (AHMAs) nationwide. NAHMA’s comments will focus on two important matters related to the Section 42 Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program, namely the utility allowance submetering rule and treatment of casualty losses.

Utility Allowances (UA) Submetering

On August 7, 2012, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) — Treasury Department issued the “Utility Allowances Submetering Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Public Hearing” [REG-136491-09], RIN 1545-BI91. NAHMA respectfully requests that IRS-Treasury add finalization of this rule, with certain changes, to its 2013-2014 Guidance Priority List.

Before releasing the final rule, NAHMA strongly urges IRS-Treasury to revise its interpretation of State housing agencies’ authority to disapprove UA estimation methods permitted under current policies. Under the section, “Summary of Comments on Notice 2009-44 and Explanation of Provisions,” the August 7 Notice states:

“A commentator asked whether State housing agencies are allowed to disapprove of certain methods for determining utility allowances listed in § 1.42-10(b)(4)(ii). Existing rules address the role of the State housing agencies in determining utility allowances. Thus, depending on the particular method under § 1.42-10(b)(4)(ii), State housing agencies may require certain information before a method can be used, or they may disapprove of a method.”

NAHMA stands by the position articulated by nine national organizations which represent property owners and managers, developers and lenders who participate in the LIHTC program. The joint industry comments, submitted on October 4, 2012, stated:

“We disagree with the general implication of this language that State housing agencies may arbitrarily choose to disapprove any method described in the regulation. . . .”

“As written, the language in the August 7, 2012, proposed rule would give State housing agencies authority to ignore the intent of the existing regulation, which is to recognize accurate estimates that encourage energy efficiency and are based on reliable methods that are easily verifiable. We are concerned that agencies may impose less accurate methods for calculating utility allowances on an arbitrary basis. We recommend that the IRS direct State housing agencies to review the data and information provided by project sponsors and make a determination based on the facts of the individual project submission. Applicants for LIHTC credits should be encouraged to engage with the State housing agency to determine what, if any, issues or concerns the approving agency may have.”

NAHMA urges IRS-Treasury to issue a final rule that reaffirms LIHTC property owners’ options for selecting an appropriate UA estimation method available under current IRS policies.

Section 42 Low Income Housing Tax Credit Buildings Damaged by Casualty Events

NAHMA respectfully requests that IRS-Treasury include harmonization of casualty loss policies for LIHTC properties on its 2013-2014 Guidance Priority List.

Under current policies, casualties are treated differently depending on whether they are the result of a presidentially declared disaster. As described in Revenue Procedure 2007-54, a taxpayer can continue to claim the credits for casualty events in presidentially declared disaster areas. Low Income Housing Tax Credits will not be subject to recapture or loss of credit if the building’s qualified basis is restored within a reasonable restoration period — which may not exceed 24 months after the end of the calendar year in which the president issued a major disaster declaration for the area where the building is located. However, properties that suffer casualty losses outside of these declared disaster areas operate under different terms. Internal Revenue Code 42(j)(4)(E) provides relief from recapture of previously earned credits if the building is restored by reconstruction or replacement within a reasonable time.

However, it does not provide authority for claiming the credit during the time that the building is being restored.

As stated by the IRS, the credit is determined at the close of the taxable year under IRC § 42(c)(1). Credit is determined on a monthly basis only for the first year of the credit period under IRC § 42(f)(2)(A), and for additions to qualified basis under IRC § 42(f)(3)(B). Otherwise, there is no authority to disallowing credits on a monthly basis. Owners of buildings in presidentially declared disaster areas will not lose credits if the building is not placed back in service by the end of the year. However, owners of buildings not in a declared disaster area will lose credits for the year if their units are not back online by December 31. This means an owner could have a unit that was in compliance for the entire year, but have a fire in December that is not restored by December 31, and the owner would not be eligible to take credits for the entire year. If this is not done on December 31, then credits cannot be claimed for the entire year, no matter if the units were in compliance every other day of the calendar year.

NAHMA urges IRS-Treasury to apply the same casualty loss policies across the board. Properties should be able to continue to take the credits during the restoration period, regardless of whether or not the property is in a presidentially declared disaster area. It is reasonable, however, for IRS to establish criteria for owners to demonstrate they took prompt action to begin the restoration process following the casualty event when the loss occurs outside of a presidentially declared disaster area.

Thank you again for the opportunity to offer these recommendations for the Guidance Priority List.

Sincerely,

Kris Cook, CAE

Executive Director

National Affordable Housing

Management Association

Washington, DC




IRS Issues Final, Temporary Regs on Excise Tax Return Requirement for Charitable Hospitals.

The IRS has issued final and temporary regulations requiring charitable hospital organizations that are liable for an excise tax for failing to meet the community health needs assessment requirements for any tax year to file Form 4720, “Return of Certain Excise Taxes Under Chapters 41 and 42 of the Internal Revenue Code.” (T.D. 9629)




Treasury Will Consider Request on Health Plan Fee for Tax-Exempt, Nonprofit Hospitals.

Treasury Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs Alastair Fitzpayne has assured Rep. Tim Walberg, R-Mich., that Treasury will take into consideration his request to classify health plans owned by nonprofit, tax-exempt hospitals or hospital systems in the same category as other nonprofit, tax-exempt health plans.

July 31, 2013

The Honorable Tim Walberg

U.S. House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515

Dear Representative Walberg:

Thank you for your letter regarding the annual health insurer fee under section 9010 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.

Proposed regulations on the annual health insurer fee were released through the Federal Register on March 1, 2013. Under the statute, the fee does not apply to the first $25 million of net premiums written, and it only applies to 50 percent of the net premiums written for amounts between $25 million and $50 million. After application of this rule and in accordance with the statute, the proposed regulations provide that a covered entity exempt from tax under section 501(a) and described in section 501(c)(3) (generally, a charity), 501(c)(4) (generally, a social welfare organization), section 501(c)(26) (generally, a high-risk health insurance pool), or section 501(c)(29) (a consumer operated and oriented plan health insurance issuer), will be required to take into account only 50 percent of its remaining net premiums written that are attributable to its exempt activities.

We appreciate the concerns expressed in your letter regarding the way the fee will be applied. We will carefully consider all comments we receive on the proposed regulations, and we intend to continue to work with health insurance providers as the fee is implemented.

If you have any further questions, please contact Sandra Salstrom, Office of Legislative Affairs, at (202) 622-1900.

Sincerely,

Alastair M. Fitzpayne

Assistant Secretary for

Legislative Affairs




Firm Requests Guidance on Recognizing Nonprofit News Organizations as Exempt From Tax.

Celia Roady of Morgan, Lewis, and Bockius LLP, in response to a request for items to be placed on the IRS 2013-2014 priority guidance plan (Notice 2013-22), has asked for guidance on the standards for recognizing nonprofit news organizations as exempt from tax under section 501(c)(3).

April 29, 2013

Internal Revenue Service

Attn: CC:PA:LPD:PR (Notice 2013-22)

1111 Constitution Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20224

Re: 2013-2014 Treasury/IRS Guidance Priority List

Dear Sir or Madam:

The purpose of this letter is to propose guidance for inclusion on the 2013-2014 Treasury/IRS Guidance Priority List. We recommend that the list include guidance about the standards for recognizing organizations engaged in the publication of information that is useful to the individual and beneficial to the community, including general news, as exempt under Section 501(c)(3). In this letter, we refer to such organizations as “nonprofit news organizations.”

As background, in 2011 the Federal Communications Commission (the “FCC”) issued a report, The Information Needs of Communities: The Changing Media Landscape in a Broadband Age, which documents the substantial decrease in accountability reporting by commercial news organizations. For example, the FCC report points to a study conducted by the Pew Center for Excellence in Journalism which found that in 2009 the Baltimore Sun produced 32 percent fewer investigative stories than it did in 1999 and 73 percent fewer stories than in 1991.1 It explains that financial pressures are forcing commercial news organizations to reduce coverage of investigative pieces involving lengthy documents and records searches or stories requiring a reporter to develop comprehensive knowledge of a particular subject matter. This cut-back affects coverage of issues that Americans care about — such as schools, health care, the environment, and local public affairs — and that offer substantial public benefit and civic value. The FCC report also describes the serious consequences that result from communities losing information that can improve government responsiveness and accountability. It explains that nonprofit news organizations can help to fill the gap in coverage and notes that uncertainty about the standards required for nonprofit news organizations to obtain tax exemption under Section 501(c)(3) is a significant barrier to this evolution.

The FCC report recommended that tax and journalism experts study the tax exemption requirements for nonprofit news organizations more carefully, and the Council on Foundations convened a working group of such experts. The group released its findings in a report issued earlier this year, The IRS and Nonprofit Media: Toward Creating a More Informed Public. The report is available online at http://www.cof.org/files/Bamboo/home/documents/Nonprofit-Media-Full-Report-03Q42013.pdf.

The working group report confirms that many nonprofit news organizations have experienced lengthy delays and even rejections of their applications for exemption. It concludes that the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) approach for evaluating whether an organization primarily engaged in publishing qualifies for tax exemption under Section 501(c)(3), namely Revenue Ruling 67-4,2 needs to be modernized. The working group report notes that Revenue Ruling 67-4 was issued decades before the advent of the digital era. That ruling establishes four criteria for analyzing the tax-exempt status of nonprofit news organizations, whether; (1) the content of the publication is educational, (2) the preparation of material follows methods generally accepted as “educational” in character, (3) the distribution of the materials is necessary or valuable in achieving the organization’s educational and scientific purposes, and (4) the manner in which the distribution is accomplished is distinguishable from ordinary commercial practices. The fourth criterion, in particular, does not reflect dramatic changes in the manner of dissemination of information by all news organizations, nonprofit and for-profit alike.

This request for guidance is consistent with the recommendations of the working group report, and the discussion below explains how such guidance meets the factors that Treasury/IRS considers in choosing to add an item to the priority list.

1. The guidance will resolve significant issues relevant to many taxpayers.

The Section 501(c)(3) status of nonprofit news organizations is of great importance to the millions of Americans who seek information about the events shaping their lives. According to the FCC report, “communities and citizens are seriously harmed — including financially — if there is not a critical mass of full-time professional journalists watching over the key institutions — such as state and local government, local schools, state and local courts, police, environmental planning, land use, transportation, and public health.”3 Nonprofit news organizations offer an additional source of information on these topics just as the for-profit news sector is cutting back. These stories help Americans gain useful and beneficial information that allows them to make more-informed decisions.

Moreover, investigative reporting benefits residents of communities whether or not they are readers of a particular paper. For example, the working group report points to an in-depth series in the Raleigh News & Observer on the quality of the city’s parole system that helped take criminals off the streets in the Raleigh-Durham area, thereby improving safety for all residents, regardless of whether they were readers of the paper.4 Nonprofit news organizations, often with philanthropic support from foundations, are the hope of the future for this type of reporting.

Section 501(c)(3) status is critical for nonprofit news organizations, in part because their ability to provide or expand accountability coverage on subjects such as local government, schools, and healthcare often hinges on philanthropic support from funders that require such exemption as a prerequisite for providing support. These organizations also want to structure their activities in a manner consistent with the requirements for Section 501(c)(3), but lack guidance about how to do so. In this regard, the working group report notes that the operator of the Oshkosh Community News Network, a Section 501(c)(3) nonprofit news organization, shut down the organization in part because of uncertainty regarding the tax laws.5 Updated guidance will help these organizations gain important information about how to structure their activities in order to ensure continued qualification as a Section 501(c)(3) organization.

Finally, private foundations are investing in nonprofit news organizations, with one report estimating contributions of nearly $128 million to news and information projects since 2005.6 The guidance will facilitate and streamline the grant-making programs of these foundations and help ensure their investments are advancing charitable and educational purposes.

2. The guidance will promote sound tax administration.

As noted above and in the working group report, nonprofit news organizations have experienced substantial delays associated with the processing of their applications for exemption under Section 501(c)(3). Recently, the IRS centralized a group of applications submitted by nonprofit news organizations as it attempted to understand, analyze, and apply the rules for exemption to these organizations and needed to ensure consistent treatment. Providing updated guidance about how nonprofit news organizations advance Section 501(c)(3) purposes will facilitate the IRS’s processing of applications for exemption, as well as nonprofit news organizations’ compliance with the law.

3. The guidance can be drafted in a manner that will enable taxpayers to easily understand and apply the guidance.

The guidance can be drafted in a form such as a revenue procedure that provides background on the rules for evaluating the Section 501(c)(3) status of nonprofit news organizations, outlines the various factors the IRS will consider in evaluating whether a nonprofit news organization is advancing charitable and educational purposes, and identifies the factors that are not relevant in such a determination. The IRS has issued similar types of revenue procedures in the past to help give guidance about how a particular sector or industry advances tax-exempt purposes. For example, Revenue Procedure 96-32 provides a safe harbor for organizations providing low-income housing to qualify as Section 501(c)(3) organizations, and this has proved to be an invaluable tool for low-income housing organizations seeking to apply for exemption, and for IRS agents processing such applications.

4. The guidance involves regulations that are outmoded, ineffective, insufficient, or excessively burdensome and that should be modified, streamlined, expanded, or repealed.

As noted above and in the working group report, the IRS is relying on outdated standards for evaluating whether nonprofit news organizations are furthering charitable and educational purposes. For example, Revenue Ruling 67-4 evaluates whether an organization’s manner of distribution of a publication is distinguishable from ordinary commercial publishing practices. However, since the publication of Revenue Ruling 67-4, advances in the development of technology and devices that facilitate the low-cost dissemination of information have made the distribution of free or low-cost content to the public an ordinary practice by Section 501(c)(3) organizations and commercial publishers alike.

5. The Service can administer the guidance on a uniform basis.

The IRS has faced challenges with applying the rules for tax exemption under Section 501(c)(3) on a uniform basis to nonprofit news organizations, in part because the current outdated guidance does not reflect changes in the manner of dissemination of useful and beneficial public information. Updated guidance will enable the IRS to administer the tax laws on a more uniform basis.

6. The guidance will reduce controversy and lessen the burden on taxpayers and the Service.

As noted above, the guidance will have a substantial positive impact on the American public, nonprofit news organizations, private foundations, and the IRS. It will enable new nonprofit news organizations to move forward to meet the information and accountability needs of their communities. It will provide certainty to philanthropy funders. It will provide clear standards for the IRS to apply. And it will avoid litigation that will inevitably result if the IRS does not address the need for updated guidance in this area.

We appreciate your consideration of this request. We believe the time is right and the time is now for the IRS to issue updated guidance. Every month more commercial newspapers close their doors or reduce new coverage to the detriment of their communities. Nonprofit news organizations can and will emerge to help address this problem, but they need Section 501(c)(3) status to do so. Updated guidance is essential to allow that to happen.

Sincerely,

Celia Roady

Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP

Washington, DC

cc:

The Honorable Mark Mazur

Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy

Department of the Treasury

The Honorable William J. Wilkins

Chief Counsel

Internal Revenue Service

FOOTNOTES

1 S. Waldman and the Working Group on Information Needs of Communities, The Information Needs of Communities: the Changing Media Landscape in a Broadband Age, 123 (July 2011).

2 Revenue Ruling 67-4, 1967-1 CB 121.

3 S. Waldman and the Working Group on Information Needs of Communities, The Information Needs of Communities: the Changing Media Landscape in a Broadband Age, 263 (July 2011).

4 See S. Waldman and the Working Group on Information Needs of Communities, The Information Needs of Communities: the Changing Media Landscape in a Broadband Age, 18 (July 2011).

5 Council on Foundations, The IRS and Nonprofit Media: Toward Creating a More Informed Public, 12 (2013).

6 J. Schaffer, New Media Makers: A Toolkit for Innovators in Community Media and Grantmaking 2 (2009).




Nonprofit Association Requests Guidance on Program-Related Investments.

Robert Collier of the Council of Michigan Foundations, in response to a request for items to be placed on the IRS 2013-2014 priority guidance plan (Notice 2013-22), has asked for guidance on program-related investments.

April 30, 2013

Internal Revenue Service

Attn: CC:PA:LPD:PR (Notice 2013-22)

Room 5203

P.O. Box 7604

Ben Franklin Station

Washington, DC 20044

Re: 2013-2014 Guidance Priority List

Sir/Madam:

This letter is in response to Notice 2013-22 and the Department of Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service’s invitation for public comment on recommendations for items that should be included on the 2013-2014 Guidance Priority List. We appreciate the opportunity to provide input to formulate a guidance plan that focuses on guidance items that are important to taxpayers and tax administration.

As a Section 501(c)(3) membership association encompassing more than 350 grantmaking organizations, The Council of Michigan Foundations (“CMF”) strongly urges the Department and Service to include in its Guidance Priority List guidance relating to program-related investments (“PRI” or “PRIs”). PRIs are an important, yet underutilized vehicle by which grantmakers may accomplish their charitable purposes. PRIs are underutilized, however, due to minimal guidance regarding qualifying investments and lack of a timely process for approving PRIs.

In 2012, the IRS issued proposed amendments to 26 C.F.R. § 53.4944-3 concerning PRIs. We expressed our comments to the amendments in a letter dated July 16, 2012, a copy of which is attached. We request that the Department and Service consider our letter and recommended course of action for improving the guidance relating to PRIs as part of the 2013-2014 Guidance Priority List.

Additionally, we recommend that further guidance be provided with respect to jeopardizing investments under Section 4944 of the Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”), and offer one other suggestion to allow private foundations to share rulings related to PRIs.

First, we request that the Service issue guidance that a mission-related investment (“MRI”) made primarily for charitable purposes is not a jeopardizing investment under Section 4944 of the Code. A “mission-related investment” is a commonly used term among grantmakers and refers to an investment made by a charitable organization to further one or more social objectives. Often, mission-related investments are made primarily for charitable purposes, and as such, are similar to PRIs in that the primary purpose of the investment is to accomplish one or more of the purposes described in Section 170(c)(2)(B). However, MRIs differ from program related investment in that the decision to make the investment is treated primarily as an investment decision rather than a programmatic decision by the foundation. Also, an MRI, whether or not made primarily for charitable reasons, is not treated as a qualifying distribution under Section 4942 of the Code.

Section 4944 of the Code and the regulations thereunder impose taxes on investments made by private foundations which jeopardize charitable purposes. 26 C.F.R. § 53.4944-1 contains care and prudence standards for making a determination as to whether an investment is a jeopardizing one. Guidance is requested to clarify that a mission-related investment made primarily for charitable purposes, or more broadly, any investment, the primary purpose of which is to accomplish one or more of the purposes described in Section 170(c)(2)(B), is not a jeopardizing investment under Section 4944 of the Code.

Finally, as described in the attached letter, we previously requested that the Service amend the regulations to allow rulings relating to PRIs to be relied upon by other parties. While we still urge the Service to give consideration to this suggestion, we offer one other recommendation regarding reliance on PRI rulings.

As you know, currently the Code and revenue procedures indicate that a taxpayer may not rely on a letter ruling issued to another taxpayer or use another taxpayer’s written determination as precedent. At least with respect to PRIs, this prohibition on reliance is especially frustrating. Often with economic development projects where a project cannot be financed on traditional commercial terms, multiple foundations may make substantially identical PRIs in the same project. We ask that the Service consider a procedure which would allow a ruling or determination issued to one foundation to be shared among, and relied upon by, foundations investing in the same project so long as the investments are made on substantially similar terms.

For example, assume XYZ Foundation applies for a private letter ruling that its investment in an urban investment fund will qualify as a PRI. The fund will make loans to growth-oriented businesses in target urban core areas. The target businesses face obstacles to traditional financing by being above the credit risk threshold for commercial bank loans and below the size and return threshold for other mezzanine financing. The fund’s principal purpose in making the loans is charitable, and more specifically, is intended to promote economic development, relieve the underprivileged, eliminate prejudice and discrimination and combat community deterioration. The loans significantly further the accomplishment of XYZ Foundation’s exempt activities and would not have been made but for such relationship between the loans and XYZ Foundation’s exempt activities. The urban investment fund is organized as a limited partnership and governed by a limited partnership agreement. Each private foundation investor will execute the limited partnership agreement of the fund and participate in the investment on substantially identical terms.

Assume that the Service makes a determination that XYZ Foundation’s investment in the urban investment fund constitutes a PRI. We request that this ruling be shared and relied upon by other private foundations that invest in the urban investment fund pursuant to the limited partnership agreement. Alternatively, each private foundation may make a loan to the urban investment fund utilizing template loan documents. Assuming that the Service makes a determination that XYZ Foundation’s loan to the urban investment fund constitutes a PRI, we request that this ruling be shared and relied upon by other private foundations that loan to the urban investment fund utilizing the template loan documents.

On behalf of CMF, and our 350 member foundations, we thank you for the opportunity to provide recommendations for guidance on PRIs for inclusion on the 2013-2014 Guidance Priority List. We welcome future dialogue regarding our comments and suggested guidance for PRIs. If we can be of additional assistance, please let me know.

Sincerely,

Robert Collier

President and CEO

Council of Michigan Foundations

Grand Haven, MI




IRS Phone Forum: 501(c)(7) Social and Recreational Organizations – How to Stay Tax-Exempt, August 21, 2013 2-3 p.m. ET

Fraternities, country clubs, hobby clubs and sports clubs all are examples of groups organized for social, recreational and similar nonprofit purposes that are tax exempt under Section 501(c)(7) of the Internal Revenue Code.

This instructive phone forum will discuss:

The phone forum is eligible for CPE credits for Enrolled Agents.

Register at:

http://ems.intellor.com/index.cgi?p=204754&t=71&do=register&s=&rID=417&edID=305




IRS EO Update.

1.  IRS Pub. 5093 provides a list of online ACA health care resources

This electronic flyer provides a list of online Affordable Care Act resources provided by various federal agencies.

http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p5093.pdf

2.  Upcoming IRS phone forums cover important topics

Learn about upcoming forums including:

http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Phone-Forums-Exempt-Organizations

3.  Register for EO workshops

Register for upcoming workshops for small and medium-sized 501(c)(3) organizations:

August 13 – Highland Heights, KY

Hosted by University of Kentucky

August 15 – Lexington, KY

Hosted by University of Kentucky

August 20-21 – San Francisco, CA

Hosted by Golden Gate University

August 28-29 – Anaheim, CA

Hosted by Trinity Law School

September 9 – St. Paul, MN

Hosted by Hamline University

September 10 – Minneapolis, MN

Hosted by University of St. Thomas

http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Upcoming-Workshops-for-Small-and-Medium-Sized-501(c)(3)-Organizations




Mortgage, Credit Card, and Utility Payments Were Income to Minister.

The Tax Court, stating that an accuracy-related penalty may apply, held that mortgage, credit card, and utility payments a minister received for services were unreported self-employment income, finding that he failed to show that the mortgage payments were excluded under section 107 or that he was exempt from self-employment income tax.

Citations: Donald L. Rogers et ux. v. Commissioner; T.C. Memo. 2013-177; No. 13138-11

 

DONALD L. ROGERS AND VYON M. ROGERS,

Petitioners

v.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

Respondent

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

Filed August 1, 2013

Scott W. Gross, for petitioners.

Frederic J. Fernandez and Mark J. Miller, for respondent.

MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION

PARIS, Judge: On March 7, 2011, respondent issued to petitioners a notice of deficiency for tax year 2007 determining a deficiency in Federal income tax of [*2] $29,479 and an accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a)1 of $5,895.80. Petitioners seek redetermination of the deficiency and the penalty.

On November 5, 2012, the parties submitted a joint stipulation of settled issues reflecting the resolution of a number of issues with respect to petitioners’ 2007 tax year. The remaining issues for decision are:

(1) whether petitioners failed to report income of $43,2002 related to Mr. Rogers’ services as a pastor for tax year 2007; and

(2) whether petitioners are liable for the accuracy-related penalty imposed under section 6662(a) for tax year 2007.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. The proposed stipulations deemed admitted under Rule 91(f) on October 26, 2012, the stipulation of facts filed and supplemented on November 6, 2012, and the associated exhibits received in evidence are incorporated herein by this reference. Petitioners resided in Wisconsin when the petition was filed.

[*3] Petitioner Donald Rogers is a pastor at the Pentecostals of Wisconsin (PoW). He was formerly employed in the fields of sales and marketing but has been involved in ministry for over 30 years. Mr. Rogers’ duties as a pastor include free home Bible studies, new life classes, men’s and women’s ministries, marriage outreach, youth outreach, and children’s outreach. In return for these services, PoW pays petitioners’ personal credit card bills, utility bills, and home mortgage payments.3

Mr. Rogers registered PoW in 1995 as a nonstock corporation in the State of Wisconsin, for which Mr. Rogers was listed as a registered agent. PoW operated in this fashion until 2005, when Mr. Rogers and other members of PoW sought dissolution of the entity in favor of setting up a corporation sole. Mr. Rogers and the other members sought out SACM Management (SACM) to help facilitate the steps necessary to complete the conversion to a corporation sole.

On February 1, 2005, Mr. Rogers signed a document entitled “Vow of Poverty, Statement of Faith” detailing that any donation/honorarium, and/or and endowment given to Mr. Rogers personally will be considered the property of [*4] PoW, and that PoW will in turn provide for Mr. Rogers’ needs. The document further states that

[Mr. Rogers] further understands that any honorarium, donation, and/or endowment received by * * * [him] when performing ministerial duties among any other membership of the ecclesiastical church body or among the public that is required by the church is not mine personally, but is actually that of * * * [PoW] and will be turned over to same. * * * Even though * * * [Mr. Rogers] has taken this vow of poverty, * * * [he] further understands that any income/wages * * * [he] would received outside of * * * [PoW] that is not done on behalf of, or is not required by church ministry, is considered a third party and will be considered income to * * * [him] and is taxable.

On February 22, 2005, an entity registered as “The Office of Presding [sic] Pastor Donald L. Rogers and his successors, a Corporation Sole” was created in the State of Nevada. On April 14, 2005, PoW filed articles of dissolution in the State of Wisconsin. Despite the corporation sole’s having been set up as a Nevada entity with a Nevada address, PoW continued to operate in the Milwaukee, Wisconsin, area.

In tax year 2007 various amounts were paid on petitioners’ behalf by PoW in return for Mr. Rogers’ ministerial services. PoW made $30,612 of home mortgage payments, $8,268 in personal credit card payments, and $4,320 of utility payments on petitioners’ behalf for a total of $43,200. Petitioners timely filed a joint Federal income tax return for tax year 2007 by April 15, 2008. On their [*5] return, petitioners reported wage income from Victory Christian Academy of $53,770. Petitioners also reported itemized deductions for home mortgage interest and charitable contributions of $17,965 and $10,820, respectively. Petitioners did not report any income from amounts PoW paid on their behalf, nor did they file a timely certificate of exemption from self-employment tax in accordance with section 1402(e).

On March 7, 2011, respondent issued to petitioners a notice of deficiency for tax year 2007, determining a deficiency of $29,479 and an accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a) of $5,895.80. This determination reflected, in part, respondent’s finding that petitioners failed to report $43,200 of taxable income4 for amounts PoW paid on their behalf for tax year 2007.5 On June 3, 2011, petitioners timely filed a petition in this Court for redetermination.

[*6] OPINION

I. Unreported Income

Section 61(a) defines gross income as “all income from whatever source derived”, including compensation for services. This definition includes all accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).

Section 1401 imposes a tax on an individual’s self-employment income, which is defined as the “net earnings from self-employment” derived by an individual during a taxable year. Sec. 1402(b). “Net earnings from self-employment” is the gross income derived by an individual from any trade or business carried on by that individual less the deductions attributable to that trade or business. Sec. 1402(a). Pursuant to section 1402(c)(4), a “duly ordained, commissioned, or licensed minister of a church in the exercise of his ministry” is engaged in carrying on a trade or business unless the minister is exempt from self-employment tax pursuant to section 1402(e). Unless an exemption certificate is timely filed, the minister is liable for self-employment tax on income derived from the ministry.6 Sec. 1402(e)(3). The time limitation imposed by section 1402(e)(3) [*7] is mandatory and is to be complied with strictly. Wingo v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 922, 930 (1987); Bennett v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-355; sec. 1.1402(e)-3A, Income Tax Regs. Petitioners did not file a timely application for exemption from self-employment tax for tax year 2007. Petitioners therefore do not qualify for an exemption from self-employment tax for amounts PoW paid on their behalf.

Section 107 provides that gross income does not include, in the case of a minister of the gospel, “the rental allowance paid to him as part of his compensation, to the extent used by him to rent or provide a home”. In order for a minister to be eligible for this exclusion, the following requirements must be met: (1) the home or rental allowance must be provided as remuneration for services which are ordinarily the duties of a minister of the gospel; (2) before the payment of this rental allowance, the employing church or other qualified organization must designate the rental allowance pursuant to official action, which may be evidenced in an employment contract or by any other appropriate instrument; and (3) the designation must be sufficient in that it clearly identifies the portion of the minister’s salary that is the rental allowance. Sec. 1.107-1(a) and (b), Income Tax Regs.

[*8] There is no evidence that a rental allowance was designated in an official action between PoW and petitioners. In fact, Mr. Rogers testified at trial that PoW never considered the mortgage payments made on petitioners’ behalf to be parsonage allowances. Accordingly, petitioners are not entitled to exclude mortgage payments PoW made on their behalf as a parsonage allowance under section 107.

Petitioners failed to avail themselves of either the exemption from self-employment tax under section 1402(e) or the exclusion for rental allowance under section 107. Instead, petitioners’ primary contention at this point is that Mr. Rogers’ vow of poverty insulated them from being taxed on the compensation they received for Mr. Rogers’ services to PoW.

Petitioners point to several cases and a revenue ruling issued by the Commissioner to illustrate that while members of religious orders who have taken a vow of poverty are subject to tax for income received in their individual capacities, they are not subject to tax on income received by them merely as agents of the orders of which they are members. See Schuster v. Commissioner, 800 F.2d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 1986), aff’g 84 T.C. 764 (1985); Fogarty v. United States, 780 F.2d 1005, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 1986); McEneany v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1986413; Rev. Rul. 77-290, 1977-2 C.B. 26. However, petitioners’ reliance on these [*9] authorities is misguided. In each of these cases, the taxpayer was paid a salary by a third party and remitted this salary to the religious order by assignment in accordance with the vow of poverty.

Here, petitioners did not receive a salary from a third party and did not remit any income to PoW by assignment. Mr. Rogers provided services to PoW and received compensation for those services in the form of payments PoW made on petitioners’ behalf. The critical difference is that, in this case, there was no income transferred to PoW from petitioners pursuant to their vow of poverty. The mortgage payments PoW made were applied toward a house owned solely by petitioners and titled in petitioners’ names. Similarly, the credit card payments and utility payments PoW made on behalf of petitioners served only to benefit petitioners in meeting their basic living expenses. It would be a mischaracterization of the facts to state that petitioners were paid a “salary” as agents of PoW and that this salary was assigned for the benefit of PoW when, in fact, no such salary was paid and all income issued to petitioners was used solely for their benefit. Accordingly, the authorities cited by petitioners are inapplicable in this particular case.

PoW paid $43,200 on petitioners’ behalf for tax year 2007, consisting of $30,612 in home mortgage payments, $8,268 in credit card payments, and $4,320 [*10] in utility payments. Petitioners failed to show that they were entitled to an exemption from self-employment tax for these amounts under section 1402(e). Petitioners likewise failed to show that they were entitled to exclude mortgage payments PoW made on their behalf as a parsonage allowance under section 107. Accordingly, respondent’s determination that petitioners received $43,200 of unreported self-employment income for tax year 2007 is sustained.

II. Section 6662(a) Accuracy-Related Penalty

Section 6662(a) and (b)(2) imposes an accuracy-related penalty equal to 20% of an underpayment attributable to any substantial understatement of income tax. Under section 7491(c), the Commissioner has the burden of production to show that the imposition of a penalty under section 6662(a) is appropriate. However, this does not mean the Commissioner bears the burden of proof with regard to penalties, only that the Commissioner “must come forward with sufficient evidence indicating that it is appropriate to impose the relevant penalty.” Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 446-447 (2001). Further, the Commissioner does not have the burden to introduce evidence regarding reasonable cause or substantial authority. Id.

Section 6662(d) defines a “substantial understatement” of income tax as one which exceeds the greater of: (1) 10% of the amount of tax required to be shown [*11] on the return; or (2) $5,000. In a case such as this where the return shows a zero tax liability, the understatement and the amount of tax required to be shown on the return are the same. Accordingly, the understatement of income tax will be “substantial” only if the amount of tax required to be shown on the return exceeds $5,000.

No penalty will be imposed under section 6662(a) if the taxpayer establishes that he acted with reasonable cause and in good faith. Sec. 6664(c)(1). Circumstances that indicate reasonable cause and good faith include reliance on the advice of a tax professional or an honest misunderstanding of the law that is reasonable in light of all the facts and circumstances. Sec. 1.6664-4(b), Income Tax Regs. The taxpayer has the burden of proving that he acted with reasonable cause and in good faith. Rule 142(a); Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. at 446-447. Regulations promulgated under section 6664(c) further provide that the determination of reasonable cause and good faith “is made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account all pertinent facts and circumstances.” Sec. 1.6664-4(b)(1), Income Tax Regs.

It may be argued that petitioners acted with reasonable cause and in good faith when they relied on advice from SACM to set up a corporation sole structure for PoW. However, Mr. Rogers testified at trial that he and the members of PoW [*12] had done the research over a number of years and decided to convert PoW to the corporation sole structure. He further testified that they sought SACM’s advice merely to effect the organization of PoW as a corporation sole. It is clear that the members of PoW chose to convert PoW into a corporation sole and that any reliance on SACM was in the execution of that decision. Accordingly, petitioners did not rely on a tax professional such that the reliance would constitute reasonable cause under section 6664(c)(1).

Alternatively, it may be argued that petitioners made a reasonable and honest mistake of law that using the corporation sole structure in conjunction with their vow of poverty would exempt them from tax on amounts PoW paid on their behalf. In actuality, restructuring PoW as a corporation sole on its own did nothing to shield petitioners from tax on the amounts paid on their behalf. Petitioners’ understanding of the pertinent law seems to be that the vow of poverty protects them from income tax in all circumstances, particularly when the religious entity is set up as a corporation sole. Petitioners mistook the body of law surrounding the vow of poverty to apply to their circumstances. As explained above, it does not. Petitioners’ failure to avail themselves of the established exemption under section 1402(e) in favor of the tenuous corporation sole theory [*13] they espoused was not a reasonable mistake of law given all the facts and circumstances.

Petitioners have failed to present a colorable argument that they acted with reasonable cause and in good faith in filing a tax return reflecting zero income tax due for tax year 2007. Accordingly, if the final computations under Rule 155 reflect an understatement of income tax exceeding $5,000 for tax year 2007, petitioners will be liable for the accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a).

Respondent alternatively asserts that if the understatement of income tax for tax year 2007 does not exceed $5,000, petitioners should still be liable for the accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(b)(1) because they acted with negligence or disregard of rules or regulations. Negligence is defined as a lack of due care or failure to do what a reasonable and ordinarily prudent person would do under the circumstances. Neely v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 934, 947 (1985); sec. 1.6662-3(b)(1), Income Tax Regs. While the Court finds that petitioners’ mistake of law in this instance was not reasonable for the purposes of establishing reasonable cause, the Court will not go so far as to say that petitioners acted with negligence or disregard of rules and regulations in the preparation of their 2007 return. Accordingly, if petitioners’ understatement of income tax for tax year 2007 does not exceed $5,000 (i.e., it is not a “substantial” understatement), [*14] petitioners will not be liable for the accuracy-related penalty for an underpayment of tax attributable to negligence under section 6662(b)(1).

The Court has considered all of the arguments made by the parties and, to the extent they are not addressed herein, they are considered unnecessary, moot, irrelevant, or without merit.

To reflect the foregoing,

Decision will be entered under Rule 155.

FOOTNOTES

1 Unless otherwise indicated, section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the year in issue, and Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

2 This amount consists of $30,612 in home mortgage payments, $8,268 in credit card payments, and $4,320 in utility payments made on behalf of petitioners.

3 The mortgage payments made by PoW on petitioners’ behalf were for a house solely owned by petitioners and titled in their names. The house was originally transferred to PoW in 1995 but was transferred back to petitioners in 1997.

4 The notice further determined that this income should be reported as profit or loss from a business and that petitioners were liable for self-employment tax on that income.

5 The remainder of respondent’s determinations have been resolved through the stipulation of settled issues lodged by the parties on November 5, 2012, as referenced above.

6 The operative document used to apply for this exemption is Form 4361, Application for Exemption From Self-Employment Tax for Use by Ministers, Members of Religious Orders and Christian Science Practitioners.




Comments Requested on Notice for Exempt Organizations.

The IRS has requested comments on Form 990-N, “Electronic Notice (e-Postcard) for Tax-Exempt Organizations Not Required to File Form 990 or Form 990-EZ”; comments are due by September 30, 2013.




ABA Members Request Additional Guidance on Accountable Care Organizations.

Rudolph Ramelli of the American Bar Association Section of Taxation and David Douglass of the ABA Health Law Section have responded to a request for comments (Notice 2011-20) on tax-exempt hospitals or other tax-exempt healthcare organizations participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) through an accountable care organization (ACO).

The tax section and health law section are grateful for the guidance in Notice 2011-20 explaining that a tax-exempt organization that participates in the MSSP through an ACO will not jeopardize its tax-exempt status, will not violate the private inurement or private benefit doctrines, and will not be subject to the unrelated business income tax. However, section members ask that the guidance be formalized in a revenue ruling and have provided an example on which that ruling can be based.

Section members note that Notice 2011-20 focuses primarily on the exempt purpose of lessening the burdens of government, while leaving open the question of whether the promotion of health would qualify as an exempt purpose to support an ACO’s tax-exempt status. Members recommend that in general, the promotion of health should be recognized as an exempt purpose for MSSP ACOs as well as non-MSSP ACOs.

Section members also address whether non-MSSP activities will result in private inurement or impermissible private benefit and provide examples of guidelines that can be used to make the determination. Another example is used to illustrate that a tax-exempt organization should not be subject to UBIT when it participates in non-MSSP activities through an ACO joint venture.

Members request guidance confirming that an ACO would qualify for section 501(c)(3) status if it is organized as a nonprofit subsidiary of a tax-exempt organization and is subject to the same safeguards that the IRS has approved for integrated healthcare systems and in other contexts in which ultimate control of an entity resides in the parent’s community-controlled board of directors. Lastly, members recommend that a tax-exempt organization that provides services to an ACO in which it participates or which it controls, including project management, actuarial, population management, and clinical care design services, should not be subject to UBIT on payments it receives from the ACO for those services.




EO Update: e-news for Charities and Nonprofits - July 19, 2013.

Inside This Issue:

1.  Upcoming IRS phone forums cover important topics

For a list of upcoming phone forums, go to the phone forums section of the Calendar of Events page. http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Phone-Forums-Exempt-Organizations

“Charities and their Volunteers” – July 24

Go to the registration link to sign up for this encore session.

http://ems.intellor.com/index.cgi?p=204749&t=71&do=register&s=&rID=417&edID=305

“Veterans Organizations – Complying with IRS Rules” — July 30

This phone forum provides information to help veterans organizations stay tax exempt.

Topics include:

Click here to register for this event.

http://ems.intellor.com/index.cgi?p=204705&t=71&do=register&s=&rID=417&edID=305

“What’s Special about Schedule K (Form 990)?” – July 31

Topics covered include:

Helpful resources for completion of Schedule K

Detailed discussion of Schedule K information requirements

Helpful compliance monitoring procedures

Space is limited so register quickly.

2.  Register for EO workshops

Register for upcoming workshops for small and medium-sized 501(c)(3) organizations:

August 13 – Highland Heights, KY

Hosted by University of Kentucky

August 15 – Lexington, KY

Hosted by University of Kentucky

August 20-21 – San Francisco, CA

Hosted by Golden Gate University

August 28-29 – Anaheim, CA

Hosted by Trinity Law School

September 9 – St. Paul, MN

Hosted by Hamline University

September 10 – Minneapolis, MN

Hosted by University of St. Thomas

http://www.irs.gov/Charities-%26-Non-Profits/Upcoming-Workshops-for-Small-and-Medium-Sized-501(c)(3)-Organizations

3.  Reminder: Tax credit extension for hiring veterans ends December 31

Review the following links regarding the Work Opportunity Tax Credit and its extension:

Work Opportunity Tax Credit

http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/Work-Opportunity-Tax-Credit-1

Work Opportunity Tax Credit Extended

http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/Expanded-Work-Opportunity-Tax-Credit-Available-for-Hiring-Qualified-Veterans

Work Opportunity Tax Credit – frequently asked questions and answers

http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/Expanded-Work-Opportunity-Tax-Credit-Available-for-Hiring-Qualified-Veterans

4.  Tips for taxpayers who travel for charity work

Do you plan to travel while doing charity work this summer? Some travel expenses may help lower your taxes if you itemize deductions when you file next year. Here are five tax tips the IRS wants you to know about travel while serving a charity.

http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/Tips-for-Taxpayers-Who-Travel-for-Charity-Work




IRS Releases FAQ on Governance Section of Exempt Organizations' Annual Return.

The IRS has released a list of frequently asked questions on Part VI of the exempt organization return, which focuses on who is responsible for governing the organization, noting in part that the IRS will use the information to assess noncompliance and the risk of noncompliance for individual organizations and across the broader exempt sector.

Form 990, Part VI — Governance, Management, and Disclosure

Frequently Asked Questions

1. Are all organizations required to complete Part VI and answer all of its questions regarding an organization’s governance structure, policies and practices?

Yes, all organizations that file Form 990 are required to answer all of the questions in Part VI. However, refer to Appendix E of the instructions to the Form 990 for instructions regarding how to complete Part VI in the case of a group return.

2. Are all the policies and practices described in Part VI required by the Internal Revenue Code? If not, what happens if an organization reports that it does not have such policies in place?

In general, the policies and practices described in Part VI are not required by the Internal Revenue Code. However, organizations are required by the Code to make publicly available some of the items described in Question 18 of Part VI. This includes the Forms 990 of all organizations for their three most recent tax years; the Form 1023 or 1024 of all organizations that filed such forms on or after July 15, 1987, or had a copy on such date; and the Forms 990-T of a section 501(c) (3) organization for its three most recent tax years, if such forms were filed after August 17, 2006. The IRS will use the information reported in Part VI, along with other information reported on the form, to assess noncompliance and the risk of noncompliance with federal tax law for individual organizations and across the broader exempt sector.

3. If an organization adopted a policy or practice after the close of its tax year but before it filed the Form 990 for such year, may it report that it had such policy or practice in place for purposes of answering Part VI?

In most instances, the instructions to the Part VI questions state the specific time or period to be used to answer a particular question. For example, Question 12a asks whether as of the end of the organizations tax year it had a written conflict of interest policy. An organization that did not have a written conflict of interest policy in place on such date must answer no. If that same organization adopted a written policy after the close of the tax year but before it filed its return, it may describe doing so in Schedule O. If the instructions to a particular question do not provide a specific time or period to be used to answer the question, the organization may take into account practices undertaken after the close of the tax year in its response to that question (e.g., Question 12b regarding whether certain persons are required to disclose potential conflicts). Question 10 regarding whether the organization provided a copy of the Form 990 to its governing body before filing the form, and the process (if any) used by the organization to review the form, necessarily involves activity conducted after the close of the tax year.

4. Can our organization answer yes to a question about having a policy if a committee of the board, rather than the board itself, adopted the policy, and was authorized to do so?

Yes. The organization may answer Yes to any question in Section B of Part VI, Form 990, that asks whether the organization has a particular policy if the organization’s governing body (or a committee of the board, if the board delegated authority to that committee to adopt the policy) adopted the policy by the end of its tax year.

5. Part VI asks for information regarding an organization’s members, if any, and any local chapters, branches or affiliates. Why is the IRS concerned about an organization’s members and local units?

Much of Part VI focuses on who is responsible for governing the organization. In most organizations this includes a governing body, such as a board of directors, or trustees. Many organizations, however, also have members, who may be vested with certain governance or financial rights with regard to the organization. Part VI, Questions 6 and 7, ask whether an organization has members, and if so what their governance rights are, in order to provide a more complete and accurate picture about where governance authority is vested and about the organization’s legal structure. Part VI, Question 9 asks about local chapters, branches and affiliates to obtain information about whether and how the organization exercises supervision and control over its chapters, branches, and affiliates to ensure that their activities are consistent with those of the organization. This question is designed to obtain information about the extent to which the filing organization’s policies and practices extend to all of its parts or to affiliated entities.

6. Is an organization required by federal tax law to provide a copy of Form 990 to its board or governing body, or have its board or governing body review the form, before it is filed with the IRS?

No. Nonetheless, it is required to answer Question 10 regarding these matters.

7. Question 1b asks for the number of independent voting members of the governing body. May an organization use its own definition of independence to answer this question?

No, the organization must use the three-part definition contained in the instructions to this question to determine whether a particular voting member of its governing body is independent for purposes of Form 990 reporting. Note that this definition will vary from other meanings of the term independent that may apply to the organization, such as for state law or internal conflict of interest policy purposes.

8. How hard do we have to look for the information requested in Questions 1 and 2 of Form 990, Part VI regarding independent directors and business and family relationships among Board members, officers, and key employees? What if we are unable to obtain and report all the reportable information?

As described in the instructions, the organization need not engage in more than a reasonable effort to obtain the necessary information to answer these questions. An example of a reasonable effort would be for the Form 990 preparer or an officer eligible to sign the Form 990 to distribute a questionnaire annually to each of the organization’s officers, directors, trustees and key employees asking for the information that needs to be reported in response to Questions 1 and 2. The questionnaire could include the name, title, date and signature of the person reporting information, and contain the Form 990 Glossary definitions of independent voting member of governing body, family relationship, business relationship and key employee. The organization may rely on information it obtains in response to such a questionnaire in answering Questions 1 and 2.

9. Does the IRS intend to provide model or sample policies (e.g., joint venture policy) that organizations could adopt in order to answer yes to the questions in Part VI regarding such policies or practices?

The IRS does not plan to provide model or sample policies to be used for this purpose. Whether an organization adopts a policy of the type referred to in Part VI of Form 990 is a decision to be made by each individual organization. If an organization decides to adopt such a policy, it should consider its own particular facts and circumstances, including its size, culture, type and structure, in designing and implementing the policy.

10. Must the filing organization provide governance information regarding its related organizations?

In general, no. Part VI is to be completed with respect to the facts and circumstances of the filing organization. Thus, an organization is not required to provide information regarding the composition of the governing body or policies or practices of a related organization, such as a joint venture, for-profit subsidiary, parent, or brother-sister exempt organization.

However, Appendix E provides information regarding how Part VI is to be completed in the case of a group return, Question 1b asks about compensation from transactions with related organizations for purposes of determining a governing board member’s independence, and Question 9 asks whether the organization’s policies and practices extend to local affiliates.

11. If the filing organization is controlled by an organization with a conflicts of interest policy, whistleblower policy, and document retention and destruction policy, should the filing organization answer yes or no to Part VI, Questions 12a, 13 and 14?

Because these questions ask whether the filing organization has these policies, answer yes only if the filing organization’s governing body has adopted the policies of the controlling organization or other such policies. Otherwise, answer no. The filing organization can explain in Schedule O how it is governed or otherwise affected by the policies of its parent.

12. What are the governance reporting requirements for organizations that file Form 990-EZ?

Form 990-EZ was not revised to include a governance section. However, Question 34 (regarding changes to organizing documents), which was included in the 2007 Form 990-EZ, has been retained.




IRS Releases FAQ on Compensation Section of Exempt Organizations' Annual Return.

The IRS has released a list of frequently asked questions on sections of the exempt organization return that focus on the compensation of officers, directors, trustees, key employees, and independent contractors.

Exempt Organizations Annual Reporting Requirements — Form 990,

Part VII and Schedule J — Compensation Information

The questions below relate to Schedule J (Compensation Information) and Part VII (Compensation of Officers, Directors, Trustees, Key Employees, Highest Compensated Employees, and Independent Contractors), Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt From Income Tax.

A. Questions for All Filers

1. Which persons must be listed as officers, directors, trustees, key employees and five highest compensated employees on Part VII of Form 990?

The organization must list all of its current officers, directors and trustees, as those terms are defined in the Glossary in the instructions, regardless of whether any compensation was paid to such individuals. The organization must also list up to 20 current employees who satisfy the definition of key employee (persons with certain responsibilities and reportable compensation greater than $150,000 from the organization and related organizations), and its five current highest compensated employees with reportable compensation greater than $100,000 from the organization and related organizations who are not officers, directors, trustees or key employees of the organization.

Special filing amounts and requirements apply for a former–a person who was an officer, director, trustee, key employee or one of the organization’s five highest compensated employees, in one of the five prior reporting years.

TIP: All filing organizations (not just section 501(c)(3) organizations) must list and report compensation paid to the organization’s five highest compensated employees with reportable compensation greater than $100,000 from the organization and related organizations, as well as to its five highest compensated independent contractors to which the organization paid more than $100,000 for services. See Part VII and related instructions.

2. Form 990 reporting requirements refer to reportable compensation and other compensation. How does an organization know which types and amounts of compensation are included in each, and where to report these types and amounts on the form?

Reportable compensation generally means compensation reported in Box 5 of the employee’s Form W-2, or in Box 7 of a non-employee’s Form 1099-MISC. Special rules apply if an employee does not have any amount reported in Box 5 of Form W-2. Other compensation generally means compensation that is not reportable compensation. The instructions to Part VII explain these terms, and also provide a table listing various types of compensation and where to report them in Part VII or in Schedule J. A specific type of other compensation that is less than $10,000 for a given person does not need to be reported in Part VII, except tax-deferred contributions by the employer to a defined contribution retirement plan, the annual increase in the actuarial value of a defined benefit plan, and the value of health benefits not includible in reportable compensation. This $10,000 exception only applies to reporting in Part VII of Form 990; it does not apply to Schedule J.

TIP: As stated above, the $10,000 exclusions for reporting related organization compensation (described in Reporting Compensation Paid by Related Organizations ) and certain types of other compensation (described in this Q&A) apply only to Part VII reporting, and are not available for Schedule J reporting. Accordingly, the compensation amounts required to be reported on Schedule J may exceed the amounts required to be reported on Part VII for the same person. Organizations are not required to use the available reporting exclusions for Part VII. Organizations that prefer to report the same total reportable compensation and other compensation amounts in both Part VII and Schedule J for a person listed in Schedule J may do so by reporting otherwise excludible amounts in Part VII.

3. Schedule J, Part VII, contains questions about an organization’s executive compensation practices and policies. Are these questions to be answered for all of the persons listed in Form 990, Part VII, or only those persons listed in Schedule J, Part II?

Question 3 of Schedule J, Part I, must be answered with respect to the organization’s top management official (e.g., CEO/Executive Director). All other Part I questions are to be answered for all persons listed in the core form Part VII, not just those also required to be listed in Schedule J.

4. The organization uses a fiscal year as its tax year for completing Form 990. May it report executive compensation in Part VII based on its fiscal year, rather than the calendar year amounts reported on Form W-2 or Form 1099?

No. A fiscal year filing organization must report amounts in Form 990, Part VII, as well as any amounts reported in Schedule J, on the calendar year ending with or within the organization’s fiscal year. This is the same requirement for organizations filing a Form 990 on a calendar year basis.

TIP: In contrast to the calendar year reporting required in Part VII, an organization filing Form 990 for a fiscal year must report compensation expense amounts in its Statement of Expenses (Part IX of Form 990) based on its fiscal year.

5. How should an organization list in Part VII, Form 990, a person who is a current officer or director for part of the year and a former officer or director for the rest of the year — as a current, former or both? What about persons who are key employees or highest compensated employees for only part of the year?

The filer should list in Part VII, Section A, Form 990, any person who was a current officer or director at any time during the tax year, even if the person is not an officer or director at the end of the year. All of that person’s compensation from the organization should be listed in Part VII, Section A, whether received as a current officer or director, a former officer or director or in another capacity (e.g., independent contractor). A current key employee or highest compensated employee is a person who was a key employee or highest compensated employee for the calendar year ending with or within the organization’s tax year, even if he or she is not an employee of the organization at the end of that year. A former officer, director, trustee, key employee or highest compensated employee should be listed in Part VII, Section A, only if such person is not listed in Part VII, Section A, in any other capacity.

6. Under what circumstances must compensation paid by a related organization be reported on Form 990?

For purposes of Form 990, related organization generally means a parent, subsidiary, brother or sister organization under common control, a sponsoring organization of or contributing employer to a voluntary employee beneficiary association (VEBA), or a section 509(a)(3) supporting or supported organization of the filing organization. An organization need not list individuals who are officers, directors, trustees, key employees or the five highest compensated employees of a related organization unless that person also serves in one or more of these capacities with the filing organization. Once a person is required to be listed in Part VII, Section A, however, compensation paid by a related organization to such person generally must be reported in Part VII if it equals or exceeds $10,000 from that organization. The $10,000 exception for amounts paid by a related organization only applies to reporting in Part VII of the core form; it does not apply to Schedule J.

7. The reporting requirements refer to reportable compensation and other compensation. Which types and amounts of compensation are included in each, and where should we report these types and amounts on Form 990?

Reportable compensation generally means compensation reported in Box 5 of the employee’s Form W-2, or in Box 7 of a non-employee’s Form 1099-MISC. Special rules apply if an employee does not have any amount reported in Box 7 of Form W-2. Other compensation generally means compensation that is not reported on Forms W-2 or 1099. A specific type of other compensation that is less than $10,000 for a given person does not need to be reported in Part VII, except tax-deferred contributions by the employer to a defined contribution retirement plan, the annual increase in the actuarial value of a defined benefit plan, and the value of health benefits not includable in reportable compensation. This $10,000 exception only applies to reporting in Part VII of Form 990; it does not apply to Schedule J.

The instructions to Part VII explain these terms, and also provide a table listing various types of compensation and where to report them in Part VII and in Schedule J.

TIP: As stated above, the $10,000 exclusions for related organization compensation and certain types of other compensation (described above) apply only to Part VII reporting, and are not available for Schedule J reporting. Accordingly, compensation amounts required to be reported on Schedule J may exceed amounts required to be reported on Part VII for the same person. Organizations are not required to use the available reporting exclusions for Part VII. Organizations that prefer to report the same total reportable compensation and other compensation amounts in both Part VII and Schedule J for a person listed in Schedule J may do so by reporting otherwise excludable amounts in Part VII.

8. Form 990, Part VII, Section A instructions say to list persons in a particular order, beginning with trustees or directors, followed by officers, then key employees, then highest compensated employees, then former such persons. Why should these persons be listed in this order?

If a person is a director, trustee or officer of the organization, he or she cannot be listed as a key employee of that organization in Part VII of Form 990. Accordingly, officers, directors or trustees should be listed in Part VII before the organization determines which key employees to list. Likewise, in determining its five highest compensated employees who received more than $100,000 of reportable compensation, the organization is not to consider persons who are already listed in Part VII as officers, directors, trustees or key employees of the organization.

9. Because some of our managers report to the CEO or other executives, they don’t have ultimate authority over the organization, so we don’t need to report them as key employees on Form 990, right?

The answer depends on whether those employees manage a discrete segment or activity of the organization that represents 10 percent or more of the organization’s assets, income, activities or expenses, or whether they have authority to control or determine 10 percent or more of the organization’s capital expenditures, operating budget or employee compensation. If so, and if their reportable compensation from the organization and related organizations during the tax year exceeds $150,000, then they must be reported as key employees. If the organization has over 20 employees who meet these tests, then it would only report the top 20 most highly compensated as key employees.

Additional information:

Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt From Income Tax

Form 990 instructions

10. Are all organizations that list individuals in Form 990, Part VII also required to complete Schedule J?

No. An organization is required to complete Schedule J only if it satisfied at least one of three separate requirements:

1. It is required to list any former officer, director, trustee, key employee or highest compensated employee in Part VII, Form 990;

2. The sum of reportable compensation and other compensation paid to any individual listed in Part VII by the filing organization and related organizations exceeds $150,000, or

3. It participated in an arrangement in which compensation was paid by an unrelated organization to at least one of its officers, directors, trustees, key employees or five highest compensated employees for services provided to the filing organization.

The thresholds for completing Schedule J are contained in Questions 3-5 of Part VII, Section A.

TIP: Organizations required to complete Schedule J are not required to list and report compensation for all individuals listed and reported in core form Part VII. They only must list and report in Schedule J, Part II, those individuals who receive compensation for the tax year that exceeds the applicable reporting thresholds described in Questions 3-5 of Part VII, Section A (e.g., $150,000 for current officers, directors, trustees and key employees).

11. Some amounts reported on Form 990 as current year compensation may have also been reported in a prior year’s Form 990 or 990-EZ. This could overstate the cumulative compensation reported as paid to the individual. May the organization back out this duplicate amount on the current year’s form?

Part VII core form reporting does not permit amounts to be backed out if they were reported in a prior filing of Form 990; such double reporting may be explained in Schedule O. However, for persons listed in Schedule J, column (F) of that schedule allows for a backing out of duplicate amounts that were included in the current year’s reportable compensation amount as well as in a prior year’s Form 990 filing. This may occur for compensation deferred in a prior year but paid in the current year. This allows the organization to depict more accurately the cumulative compensation paid to individuals listed on Schedule J.

12. May an organization report base pay at full amount on Form 990, Schedule J, including deferrals to 401(k) and 403(b) plans, rather than separating deferrals from other base pay and reporting them in Schedule J as other reportable compensation?

A table in the core Form 990 Part VII instructions indicates that employee deferrals to 401(k) and 403(b) plans should be reported in other reportable compensation on Schedule J, column (B)(iii). The sum of the amounts reported by the organization for an individual in Schedule J columns (B)(i)-(iii) must equal the total reportable compensation amount (generally the Form W-2 Box 5 amount) for that person. The organization may report the 401(k) or 403(b) employee deferral in either column (B)(i) as base pay, or in column (B)(iii) as other reportable compensation. For instance, if an employee has Box 5 compensation of $200,000, including $5,000 of 401(k) employee deferrals, the organization may report $200,000 in base pay, or $195,000 in base pay and $5,000 in other reportable compensation in Schedule J, column (B).

TIP: Certain pre-tax deductions from Box 5 compensation raise reporting issues not expressly addressed by the instructions. These include pre-tax deductions for certain health insurance premiums, the value of which is not included in Box 5. For example, an employee with base pay of $200,000 before a pre-tax deduction of $5,000 for health insurance premiums might have $195,000 reported in Box 5 of the Form W-2. The organization should report $195,000 in column (B)(i) of Schedule J, and $5,000 in column (D).

13. How do we know whether the compensation we’re paying to our officers and key employees is reasonable?

Reasonable compensation is the value that would ordinarily be paid for like services by like enterprises under like circumstances. Reasonableness is determined based on all the facts and circumstances. For more information on reasonable compensation, see Form 990 instructions, Appendix G, Section 4958 Excess Benefit Transactions, and Form 990-EZ instructions, Appendix E, Section 4958 Excess Benefit Transactions.

B. Questions for Political Organizations

1. What does a political organization report in Part VII of Form 990?

Internal Revenue Code section 527 does not require political organizations to be organized with boards of directors, officers and trustees, but if the political organization is organized in this way, it must provide the names, addresses, title, average hours worked and compensation of those officers, directors and trustees, key employees, highest compensated employees and independent contractors.

2. What is a related organization for purposes of reporting compensation paid by related organizations on Form 990?

A related organization is any organization that meets one of the following tests:

Fifty percent or more of the political organization’s officers, directors, trustees or key employees are also officers, directors, trustees or key employees of the other organization.

The political organization appoints fifty percent or more of the other organization’s officers, directors, trustees or key employees.

Fifty percent or more of the political organization’s officers, directors, trustees or key employees are appointed by the other organization.




AICPA Seeks Guidance Limiting Required Disclosure of Exempt Org Returns.

Jeffrey Porter of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants has suggested that Treasury issue guidance clarifying that the public inspection requirements only apply to items required to be filed under sections 6033 and 6011 to protect sensitive tax information of taxpayers and related parties from tax identity theft and tax fraud.

July 12, 2013

Ms. Emily McMahon

Deputy Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy)

Department of the Treasury

1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

3112 MT

Washington, D.C. 20220

Re: Clarification of Public Disclosure Requirements for Exempt Organization Returns

Dear Ms. McMahon:

The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) appreciates the opportunity to provide comments regarding clarification of the public disclosure requirements for returns filed by exempt organizations. These comments were developed by the AICPA Exempt Organizations Taxation Technical Resource Panel, and approved by the AICPA Tax Executive Committee.

The AICPA is the world’s largest membership association representing the accounting profession, with nearly 386,000 members in 128 countries and a 125-year heritage of serving the public interest. Our members advise clients on federal, state and international tax matters and prepare income and other tax returns for millions of Americans. Our members provide services to individuals, not-for-profit organizations, small and medium-sized businesses, as well as America’s largest businesses.

We commend the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the Department of Treasury (“Treasury”) for annually updating forms and instructions of exempt organization returns. However, the AICPA recommends that the IRS and Treasury modify the requirements and add additional instruction guidance for information to be publicly disclosed on exempt organization returns. Implementation of this recommendation would protect sensitive tax information of the taxpayer and related parties from tax identity theft and tax fraud.

Background

Under Internal Revenue Code (IRC) section 6104(d),1 exempt organizations are required to publicly disclose tax returns filed under sections 6033 and 6011 (in the case of IRC section 501(c)(3) organizations). Section 6033 requires exempt organizations to file the Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax, Form 990EZ, Short Form Return of Organization Exempt From Income Tax, Form 990-N, e-Postcard, or the Form 990PF, Return of Private Foundation or Section 4947(a)(1) Nonexempt Charitable Trust Treated as a Private Foundation. The Form 990-T, Exempt Organization Business Income Tax Return (and proxy tax under section 6033(e)), is required to be filed under section 6011 for certain qualifying exempt organizations. Certain exceptions from public disclosure are provided in section 6104(d)(3), such as the identity of donors.

Exempt organizations are frequently required to file additional tax returns and forms not required by sections 6033 and 6011, and these filings are often transmitted to the IRS when attached to a Form 990 series return or Form 990-T. Examples include the Form 5471, Information Return of U.S. Persons with Respect to Certain Foreign Corporations (required under IRC section 6038) and Form 8865, Information Return of U.S. Persons with Respect to Certain Partnerships (required under section 6038B). These additional forms and returns often have sensitive information that is not intended to be included in the public disclosure of the exempt organization tax return filings.

Congress, Treasury, the IRS, and the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration have increased their focus on the potential concern for tax identity theft. However, requiring exempt organizations to publicly disclose sensitive information in their additional tax return attachments (e.g., Form 5471 and Form 8865), that are not required by sections 6033 and 6011, creates the potential for tax identity theft and tax fraud as well as potentially placing the employees, officers, and volunteers of an exempt organization at physical risk. We have recommendations, discussed below, to mitigate this risk.

Recommendations

The AICPA recommends that Treasury issue guidance in the form of a Notice or Regulation clarifying the public inspection requirements applicable to Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax, Form 990-PF, Return of Private Foundation or Section 4947(a)(1) Nonexempt Charitable Trust Treated as a Private Foundation, and Form 990-T, Exempt Organization Business Income Tax Return (and proxy tax under section 6033(e)). Specifically, guidance should be issued clarifying that the public inspection requirements only apply to items required to be filed under Sections 6033 and 6011. This change would reduce the likelihood of incidental release of sensitive information that is included on other additional forms and returns and is not intended to be viewed by the public or potentially abused and misused by third parties.

Additionally, a list of forms that are excluded from the public inspection requirement can be included as part of the instructions to the Form 990 series of returns and Form 990-T. However, merely listing the forms in the instructions (without the Notice or Regulation) is not our preference. We believe the issue is of great importance and a list in the instructions may not be timely updated.

Schedules, attachments, and supporting documents filed with the Form 990-T that are not associated with unrelated business taxable income (UBTI) should not be available for public inspection. The provisions of Notice 2008-49 — Public Inspection of Form 990-T, Exempt Organization Business Income Tax Return — should be retained, e.g., the requirement to publicly disclose Form 990-T and include any schedules, attachments, and supporting documents that relate to the imposition of tax on the UBTI of the charitable organization.

Both of these recommendations would remediate the risk of tax identity theft, tax fraud, and physical risk to the employees, officers, and volunteers of exempt organizations and other parties, by limiting the disclosure of sensitive information not intended to be publicly disclosed.

Conclusion

We appreciate your consideration of our comments. The AICPA believes that the above recommended revisions limit the disclosure of forms not intended for the public and reduce the risk of misusing sensitive tax information of taxpayers and related parties. If you have any questions regarding this submission, please feel free to contact me at (304) 522-2553 or [email protected]; Jeffrey D. Frank, Chair, AICPA Exempt Organizations Taxation Technical Resource Panel, at (317) 656-6921, or [email protected]; or Amy Wang, AICPA Technical Manager — Taxation, at (202) 434-9264, or [email protected].

Respectfully submitted,

Jeffrey A. Porter, CPA

Chair, AICPA Tax Executive

Committee

American Institute of CPAs

Washington, DC




IRS LTR: IRS Denies Tax Exemption to Shareholder Organization.

Citations: LTR 201329024

The IRS denied tax-exempt status to an organization formed to promote shareholders’ interests in publicly traded companies, finding that its activities don’t improve business conditions along one or more lines of business or of a certain area but rather are services for member convenience.

Person to Contact: * * *

UIL: 501.06-00, 501.36-00

Release Date: 7/19/2013

Date: April 26, 2013

Taxpayer Identification Number: * * *

Tax Period(s) Ended: * * *

Dear * * *:

We considered your appeal of the adverse action proposed by the Director, Exempt Organizations, Rulings and Agreements. This is our final determination that you do not qualify for exemption from Federal income tax under Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”) section 501(a) as an organization described in section 501(c)(6) of the Code.

Our adverse determination was made for the following reason(s):

You are not described within the purview of section 501(c)(6) of the Code because your purpose, as stated in the Restated Articles of Incorporation, is to restore and then maintain appropriate and effective control of shareholders over the US corporations they own.

Your membership consists of individual investors of equity investment firms who wish to preserve and strengthen their shareholder rights.

You are required to file Federal income tax returns on Forms 1120 for the tax periods stated in the heading of this letter and for all tax years thereafter. File your return with the appropriate Internal Revenue Service Center per the instructions of the return. For further instructions, forms, and information please visit www.irs.gov.

Please show your employer identification number on all returns you file and in all correspondence with Internal Revenue Service.

You also have the right to contact the office of the Taxpayer Advocate. Taxpayer Advocate assistance is not a substitute for established IRS procedures, such as the formal appeals process. The Taxpayer Advocate cannot reverse a legally correct tax determination, or extend the time fixed by law that you have to file a petition in a United States Court. The Taxpayer Advocate can however, see that a tax matters that may not have been resolved through normal channels get prompt and proper handling. If you want Taxpayer Advocate assistance, please contact the Taxpayer Advocate for the IRS office that issued this letter. You may call toll-free, 1-877-777-4778, for the Taxpayer Advocate or visit www.irs.gov/advocate for more information.

If you have any questions about this letter, please contact the person whose name and telephone number are shown in the heading of this letter.

Sincerely Yours,

Karen A. Skinder

Appeals Team Manager

* * * * *

Contact Person: * * *

Identification Number: * * *

Contact Number: * * *

FAX Number: * * *

UIL 501.06-00, 501.36-00

Date: August 2, 2012

Employer Identification Number: * * *

LEGEND:

C = individual

J = business

P = state

u = date

y = year

w = dollar amount

x = dollar amount

y = dollar amount

Dear * * *:

We have considered your application for recognition of exemption from federal income tax under Internal Revenue Code (“Code”) section 501(a). Based on the information provided, we have concluded that you do not qualify for exemption under Code section 501(c)(6). The basis for our conclusion is set forth below.

This letter supersedes our letter dated September 20, 2011

ISSUE

Do you qualify for exemption under section 501(c)(6) of the Code? No, for the reasons stated below.

FACTS

You are a corporation formed on u, and operate pursuant to the laws of the State of P. Your Articles of Incorporation state that your purpose is to restore and then maintain appropriate and effective control of shareholders over the US corporations they own. Your Articles of Incorporation also state that you shall not carry on any activities not permitted to be carried on by a corporation exempt from federal income tax under section 501(c)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code, or the corresponding section of any future federal tax code.

You initially applied for exemption under IRC 501(c)(3), then re-applied under IRC 501(c)(6). You state that you are a chamber of commerce with shareholders of various unrelated corporations as members that seek to improve business conditions for publicly traded US corporations by enhancing the effectiveness with which shareholders contribute to running those corporations. To accomplish this goal, you conduct the following activities:

You organize collective action by shareholders on matters pertinent to effectively running the corporation they own through virtual shareholder meetings, where the organized shareholders pressure public corporations to use remote communications technology in shareholder meetings such as online forums. This work is conducted by your membership — perhaps with leadership by your board or officers — primarily out of their homes. It will consume about * * *% of your time.

You advocate for effective legislation and regulation. Examples of this work include the letters you sent to the SEC in v to comment on proposed regulations on behalf of shareholders. These letters were primarily written by your executive director working out of his office, but many shareholders contributed to and co-signed the letters. This will consume about * * *% of your time.

You organize conferences, media events, rallies or other events that draw attention to critical issues affecting shareholders’ ability to effectively run the corporations they own. This work is conducted by your membership — perhaps with leadership by your board or officers — primarily out of their homes. It will consume about * * *% of your time.

You improve shareholders ability to effectively run the corporations they own by helping shareholders engage qualified proxies, agents or board members to represent their interests. While you have facilitated a number of grants of proxies in the past, these efforts will be advanced through implementing social networking software. You have a team of volunteer information technology professionals who will implement that technology. The general membership will also be engaged, with direction from your officers. Work is conducted primarily from members’ homes. It will consume about * * *% of your time.

You improve shareholders ability to effectively run the corporations they own by mitigating the risk of frivolous corporate lawsuits against shareholders who exercise their rights or responsibilities as owners of corporations. This work entails securing legal advice for shareholders who are sued by corporations. You have, for example, been assisting shareholder C who was sued by J over a shareholder resolution he submitted for inclusion in that corporation’s 2010 proxy materials. You will also form a legal defense trust for shareholders who are victimized by such lawsuits. This work is conducted by your membership — perhaps with leadership by your board or officers — primarily out of their homes. It will consume about * * *% of your time.

Your members are owners of various unrelated publicly traded US corporations who share a common business interest of improving the effectiveness with which the corporations they own are managed. Currently, your members consist solely of your board members. Your membership requirements, duties, and privileges are as follows:

You distinguish members who have not yet reached the age of majority.

You grant full voting rights only to members who have demonstrated commitment to your cause.

You separate classes of membership for shareholders who are natural persons and shareholders that are institutions.

You grant honorary — non-voting — memberships to certain parties, such as academics or service providers who are not shareholders but have knowledge or expertise that could be useful to your organization.

You grant non-honorary membership only to shareholders. Individuals are considered shareholders if they satisfy either the first or both the second and third of the following criteria:

Currently owns at least $* * * in publicly traded US equities, either directly or indirectly, through a mutual fund or other pooled investment vehicle.

Has owned at least $* * * in publicly traded US equities in the past, either directly or indirectly, through a mutual fund or other pooled investment vehicle.

Will very likely own at least $* * * in publicly traded US equities within the next three years, either directly or indirectly, through a mutual fund or other pooled investment vehicle.

An institution is considered a shareholder if it is an institutional investor that routinely invests * * *% or more of its portfolio in publicly traded US equities, either directly or indirectly, through mutual funds or other pooled investment vehicles.

You have nine classes of members that include:

Nominal individual — an individual of any age who is not a shareholder. This honorary membership provides member benefits but no voting rights.

Junior individual — an individual who is a shareholder but has not yet reached his 18th birthday. This membership provides member benefits but no voting rights.

Associate individual — an adult shareholder who has not been promoted to general member. This membership provides member benefits but limited voting rights on policy issues, as permitted by the board.

General institutional — an associate institutional member can be promoted to general institutional member in recognition of service and commitment to the organization. Provides for full voting rights.

Nominal charitable — Essentially nominal institutional membership but for a 501(c)(3). Membership dues are lower.

Associate charitable — Essentially associate institutional membership but for a 501(c)(3). Membership dues are lower.

General charitable — Essentially general institutional membership but for a 501(c)(3). Membership dues are lower.

Membership dues are:

w dollars a month for all individual memberships

x dollars annually for institutional memberships

y dollars annually for charitable memberships

You have estimated membership to be the following:

Year 1: approximately 20 individual, 2 institutional, 2 charitable

Year 2: approximately 30 individual, 4 institutional, 4 charitable

Year 3: approximately 40 individual, 6 institutional, 6 charitable

LAW

Section 501(c)(6) of the Code provides exemption from federal income tax for “business leagues, chambers of commerce, real-estate boards, boards of trade, or professional football leagues (whether or not administering a pension fund for football players), not organized for profit and no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.”

Section 1.501(c)(6)-1 of the Income Tax Regulations states, “A business league is an association of persons having some common business interest, the purpose of which is to promote such common interest and not to engage in a regular business of the kind ordinarily carried on for profit. It is an organization of the same general class as a chamber of commerce or board of trade. Thus, its activities should be directed to the improvement of business conditions of one or more lines of business as distinguished from the performance of particular services for individual persons. An organization whose purpose is to engage in a regular business of a kind ordinarily carried on for profit, even though the business is conducted on a cooperative basis or produces only sufficient income to be self-sustaining, is not a business league.”

In Revenue Ruling. 59-391, 1959-2 C.B. 151, exemption under 501(c)(6) was denied to an organization composed of individuals, firms, associations, and corporations, each representing a different trade, business, occupation, or profession. The organization was created for exchanging information on business prospects and has no common business interest other than a desire to increase sales of members. The revenue ruling found that the members of the instant organization had no common business interest other than a mutual desire to increase their individual sales. It stated that the organization’s activities were not directed to the improvement of business conditions of one or more lines of business, but rather to the promotion of the private interests of its members.

In Revenue Ruling 67-176, 1967-1, CB 140, the organization was formed to advance a given profession, contribute to the welfare and education of students preparing for that profession, to furnish financial aid to that profession in the form of grants and loans and to do other things for the benefit, welfare and security of its members. The ruling found that the emergency loan plan, among other activities served primarily as a convenience and for the economy of the members in providing financial aid, which is found to be the performance of particular services to members as opposed to improving a line of business. Thus, exemption under section 501(c)(6) was not afforded to the organization.

In Revenue Ruling 76-38, 1976-1 C.B. 157, the organization in question was formed to maintain the goodwill and reputation of the credit unions in a particular state. To achieve this goal, they maintained a fund for assistance to credit unions having financial difficulty to keep them solvent so that their members would not lose deposits upon liquidation. They allowed member credit unions to take interest free loans from the fund. The loans were to be repaid only if the borrowers were financially able to do so. The ruling found that the loan activities were not solely calculated to accomplish the objective of improving the industry’s image by protecting depositors. Further, the favorable terms of the loans to members was done in a manner that would provide little or no additional security to depositors and is clearly for the convenience (and economy) of the members in their business and does not constitute an exempt activity under section 501(c)(6).

In MIB, Inc. v. Commissioner, 734 F.2d 71 (1986), an organization whose membership consisted of insurance companies was denied exemption as a business league under section 501(c)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code. The principal activity carried on by MIB was the maintenance and operation of a computerized system for compiling, storing and distributing information about applicants for life insurance. MIB argued that its activities created a deterrent to fraud, which created benefits to the industry through reduced investigation expenses and reduced losses due to misclassification of applicants. The Court held MIB’s activities by their nature consisted of rendering particular services for individual member companies and served to benefit the individual members’ businesses. The Court also stated that even though the services produced various indirect and intangible benefits for the industry as a whole, the fact remained that the rendered services were in form and substance particular services for individual member companies. According to the Court in this case, the ultimate inquiry is whether the association’s activities advance the members’ interests generally, by virtue of their membership in the industry, or whether they assist members in the pursuit of their individual businesses.

APPLICATION OF THE LAW

You are not described within section 501(c)(6) of the Code as you are not a business league, chamber of commerce, real-estate board, board of trade, or professional football league. You are instead an entity that promotes shareholders’ interests in publicly traded corporations.

You are not operated as described in section 1.501(c)(6)-1 of the regulations because your activities are not directed to the improvement of business conditions of one or more lines of business. Rather, your activities provide particular services for individual persons. Additionally, because of the nature of your activities, you do not have a line of business to improve. Your members are individuals and institutions who are in various occupations and business. The only common interest is protecting and improving stockholders’ rights. All of your activities consist of promoting the exercise of the rights of shareholders of publicly traded corporations and offering members legal advice. Such programs constitute a particular service to individuals because you vote on behalf of the individuals who delegate their rights to you and provide legal advice to the shareholder who are in litigation with publicly traded corporations.

You state that you are improving the common interest of your member organizations that consist of economic and community development; thus, you qualify for exemption under section 501(c)(6) of the Code. However, there is no common interest since your members own shares of various publicly traded corporations that conduct all kinds of business. There is also no defined geographic area for the improvement of business conditions for a certain area because your members and the stock corporations are all over the world. Like Revenue Ruing 59-391, you are an organization composed of individuals, firms, associations, and corporations, each representing a different trade or business, having no common business interest other than to advocate for shareholder rights. For these reasons you do not meet the qualifications for a 501(c)(6) entity.

The organizations in Revenue Rulings 67-176 and 76-38, above, ran a fund for their members. The rulings conclude that it is the performance of particular services to members as opposed to improving a line of business since it is for the convenience and economy of the members. You are providing a specific service to your members through your programs. You provide direct services to your members for their convenience and economy because your purpose is to maximize members’ voice as a shareholder for the company in which the member owns stocks.

In MIB, Inc. v. Commissioner the Court found that even though services produced various indirect and intangible benefits for the industry as a whole, the fact remained that the rendered services were in form and substance particular services for individual member companies. Even if your programs bring some general benefits to the industry under which the companies perform, or benefits to various companies themselves operating under a common line of business, it still holds that programs and services are performed first to benefit your members. In advocating for shareholder rights you are benefitting members specifically, not generally, in pursuing their own interests. Because of this any indirect benefit to the industry does not overcome your main purpose of providing individualized service to members.

PROTEST FROM APPLICANT

You protested our initial adverse ruling in that first, certain facts were not accurate and second, you disagreed with the application of relevant law.

Regarding bullet point five, above, Facts section, you have indicated that you have not and will not provide legal services. Rather, you have petitioned for and prepared amicus curiae briefings, in this instance, regarding the case against C. You were not representing C, but were instead submitting protest to a position you felt could harm you or any U.S. shareholders. Any benefit received on the part of C was incidental and not intentional. You have filed no other briefs, but will do so in the future if the need arises. You have also canceled any attempt at forming any form of legal defense fund.

Regarding our positions stated in the Application of Law section, you disagree with the statement that you do not improve any line of business. The line of business you improve is that of equity finance of corporations and for investment by equity shareholders. You have cited the case of Associated Industries of Cleveland v. Commissioner, 7 TC 1449 (1946) in arguing your members share a common business interest. Petitioner in this case was an association of persons, firms and corporations with offices in Cleveland, OH, meeting to consider labor problems and difficulties confronting industry in that city following the first World War. Petitioner was a business league; members cooperated to employ labor under circumstances deemed advantageous.

You disagree with the position that your activities are not improving business conditions but are instead providing particular services to members. Your efforts are devoted towards communication among shareholders, and facilitating this communication is not a service to members but improves business conditions.

You disagree with the position that you have no defined geographic area in improving business. You focus exclusively on improving business conditions for equity investment in U.S. corporations.

You cited three other entities, all of which are exempt under 501(c)(6), and indicated similar goals and agendas, missions and operations.

SERVICE RESPONSE TO PROTEST FROM APPLICANT

Removing the activity of securing legal advice for shareholders does not change the primary reason for which you are formed, as this made up only * * *% of your total activities. The submission of briefs, which may serve to benefit your position or that of other shareholders, still serves no common business interest nor improves any particular line of business. The changing of this initial fact does not alter the position on our ruling.

You are different from the organization in Associated Industries in that you are advocating for all shareholders across the U.S, rather than employers in a particular city, and your members are individuals who hold stock in any company whereas the members of the organization in Associated Industries were workers and owners of businesses in one geographic area.

While you are improving communication among shareholders, this in and of itself improves no particular business conditions. It serves as a service to your members allowing them to share responsibility in serving proxies, when needed, and acting in place when they are unable to be personally present to protect or represent their interests.

The particular geographic area is not determinate in this particular case. Instead, it is the fact you are composed of individuals, firms, association and corporations, each representing a different trade or business, having no common interest other than to advocate for shareholder rights.

Regarding the entities you referenced currently exempt under 501(c)(6). The qualification of another entity is not a basis for a similar ruling as each application for exemption is determined on its own merits.

CONCLUSION

Based on the information submitted, your primary purpose is to promote shareholders’ interests in publicly traded corporations and provide legal advice to your members. Such activities do not improve business conditions along one or more lines of business or of a certain area but instead are services for the convenience of your members. Therefore, you do not qualify for exemption under IRC 501(c)(6).

You have the right to file a protest if you believe this determination is incorrect. To protest, you must submit a statement of your views and fully explain your reasoning. You must submit the statement, signed by one of your officers, within 30 days from the date of this letter.

We will consider your statement and decide if that information affects our determination. If your statement does not provide a basis to reconsider our determination, we will forward your case to our Appeals Office. You can find more information about the role of the Appeals Office in Publication 892, Exempt Organization Appeal Procedures for Unagreed Issues.

Types of information that should be included in your appeal can be found on page 2 of Publication 892, under the heading “Regional Office Appeal”. The statement of facts (item 4) must be declared true under penalties of perjury. This may be done by adding to the appeal the following signed declaration:

“Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have examined the statement of facts presented in this appeal and in any accompanying schedules and statements and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, they are true, correct, and complete.”

Your appeal will be considered incomplete without this statement.

If an organization’s representative submits the appeal, a substitute declaration must be included stating that the representative prepared the appeal and accompanying documents; and whether the representative knows personally that the statements of facts contained in the appeal and accompanying documents are true and correct.

An attorney, certified public accountant, or an individual enrolled to practice before the Internal Revenue Service may represent you during the appeal process. To be represented during the appeal process, you must file a proper power of attorney, Form 2848, Power of Attorney and Declaration of Representative, if you have not already done so. For more information about representation, see Publication 947, Practice Before the IRS and Power of Attorney. All forms and publications mentioned in this letter can be found at www.irs.gov, Forms and Publications.

If you do not intend to protest this determination, you do not need to take any further action. If we do not hear from you within 30 days, we will issue a final adverse determination letter to you. That letter will provide information about filing tax returns and other matters.

Please send your protest statement, Form 2848 and any supporting documents to the applicable address:

Mail to:

Internal Revenue Service

EO Determinations Quality Assurance

Room 7-008

P.O. Box 2508

Cincinnati, OH 45201

Deliver to:

Internal Revenue Service

EO Determinations Quality Assurance

550 Main Street, Room 7-008

Cincinnati, OH 45202

You may also fax your statement using the fax number shown in the heading of this letter. If you fax your statement, please call the person identified in the heading of this letter to confirm that he or she received your fax.

If you have any questions, please contact the person whose name and telephone number are shown in the heading of this letter.

Sincerely,

Holly O. Paz

Director, Exempt Organizations

Rulings and Agreements




IRS LTR: IRS Revokes Exempt Status of Real Estate Trade Group.

Citations: LTR 201329023

The IRS revoked the tax-exempt status of a trade group that supports the real estate industry, saying it primarily engages in nonexempt activities and performs particular services for members.

Person to Contact/ID Number: * * *

Contact Numbers:

Voice: * * *

Fax: * * *

501-06.00

Release Date: 7/19/2013

Date: January 27, 2012

Taxpayer Identification Number: * * *

Form: * * *

Tax Years Ended: * * *

LEGEND:

ORG = Organization name

XX = Date

Address = address

Dear * * *:

In a determination letter dating from October 19XX, you were held to be exempt from Federal income tax under section 501(c)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code (the Code).

Based on recent information received, we have determined you have not operated in accordance with the provisions of section 501(c)(6) of the Code. Accordingly, your exemption from Federal income tax is revoked effective January 1, 20XX. This is a final adverse determination letter with regard to your status under section 501(c)(6) of the Code.

We previously provided you a report of examination explaining why we believe revocation of your exempt status is necessary. At that time, we informed you of your right to contact the Taxpayer Advocate, as well as your appeal rights. On September 23, 20XX, you signed Form 6018-A, Consent to Proposed Action, agreeing to the revocation of your exempt status under section 501(c)(6) of the Code.

You are required to file Federal income tax returns for the tax periods shown above. If you have not yet filed these returns, please file them with the Ogden Service Center within 60 days from the date of this letter, unless a request for an extension of time is granted, or unless an examiner’s report for income tax liability was issued to you with other instructions. File returns for later tax years with the appropriate service center indicated in the instructions for those returns.

You have the right to contact the Office of the Taxpayer Advocate. Taxpayer Advocate assistance is not a substitute for established IRS procedures, such as the formal Appeals process. The Taxpayer Advocate cannot reverse a legally correct tax determination, or extend the time fixed by law that you have to file a petition in a United States court. The Taxpayer Advocate can, however, see that a tax matter that may not have been resolved through normal channels gets prompt and proper handling. You may call toll-free, 1-877-777-4778, and ask for Taxpayer Advocate Assistance. If you prefer, you may contact your local Taxpayer Advocate at:

* * *

If you have any questions, please contact the person whose name and telephone number are shown at the beginning of this letter.

Sincerely,

Nanette M. Downing

Director, EO Examinations

* * * * *

Person to Contact/ID Number: * * *

Contact Numbers:

Telephone: * * *

Fax: * * *

501-06.00

Date: November 1, 2011

Employer Identification Number: * * *

LEGEND:

ORG = Organization name

XX = Date

Address = address

Dear * * *:

In a determination letter dated March 28, 19XX, you were held to be exempt from Federal income tax under section 501(c)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code (the Code).

Based on recent information received, we have determined you have not operated in accordance with the provisions of section 501(c)(6) of the Code. Accordingly, your exemption from Federal income tax is revoked effective January 1, 20XX. This is a final adverse determination letter with regard to your status under section 501(c)(6) of the Code.

We previously provided you a report of examination explaining why we believe revocation of your exempt status is necessary. At that time, we informed you of your right to contact the Taxpayer Advocate, as well as your appeal rights. On September 23, 20XX, you signed Form 6018-A, Consent to Proposed Action, agreeing to the revocation of your exempt status under section 501(c)(6) of the Code.

You are therefore required to file Form[s] 1120, U.S. Corporation Tax Return, for the year[s] ended December 31, 20XX, 20XX, and 20XX with the Ogden Service Center. For future periods, you are required to file Form 1120 with the appropriate service center indicated in the instructions for the return.

You have the right to contact the Office of the Taxpayer Advocate. Taxpayer Advocate assistance is not a substitute for established IRS procedures, such as the formal Appeals process. The Taxpayer Advocate cannot reverse a legally correct tax determination, or extend the time fixed by law that you have to file a petition in a United States court. The Taxpayer Advocate can, however, see that a tax matter that may not have been resolved through normal channels gets prompt and proper handling. You may call toll-free, 1-877-777-4778, and ask for Taxpayer Advocate Assistance. If you prefer, you may contact your local Taxpayer Advocate at:

* * *

If you have any questions, please contact the person whose name and telephone number are shown at the beginning of this letter.

Sincerely,

Nanette M. Downing

Director, EO Examinations

* * * * *

LEGEND:

ORG = Organization name

EIN = ein

XX = Date

State = state

CO-1, CO-2 & CO-3 = 1st, 2nd & 3rd COMPANIES

ISSUES

Whether this exempt organization’s (EO) activities permit it to continue to be exempt under § 501(c)(6).

FACTS

ORG (hereinafter, “ORG”) was formed with the filing of Articles of Incorporation with the State Corporation Commission on March 28, 19XX.

ORG is a subsidiary of the CO-1 and received its letter of exemption under § 501(c)(6) with an effective date of March 28, 19XX.

The purpose of the organization stated in the original Articles of Incorporation are:

(a) To unite those engaged in the recognized branches of the real estate profession in this community for the purpose of exerting the beneficial influence upon the profession and related interests.

(b) To promote and maintain high standards of conduct in the real estate profession as expressed in the code of Ethics of the CO-2.

(c) To provide a unified medium for real estate owners and those engaged in the real estate profession whereby they may be safe guarded and advanced.

(d) To further the interest of home and other real property ownership.

(e) To unite those engaged in the real estate profession in this community with a CO-1 and the CO-2, thereby furthering their own objectives throughout the state and nation, and obtaining the benefits and privileges of membership therein.

(f) To designate, for the benefit of the public, those individuals within its jurisdiction authorized to use the term Realtor and Realtor Associates as licensed, prescribed, and controlled by the CO-2.

ORG Articles of incorporation also contains the following:

Article XVIII — Multiple Listing

The CO-3® shall maintain for the use of it Members a Multiple Listing Service which shall be a lawful corporation of the state of STATE, all the stock of which shall be owned by the CO-3®.

Section 2. Purpose. A Multiple Listing Service is a means by which authorized Participants make blanket unilateral offers of compensation to other Participants (acting as subagents, buyer agents, or in other agency or nonagency capacities defined by law); by which disseminated to enable authorized Participants to prepare appraisals, analyses, and other valuations of real property for bona fide clients and customers; by which Participants engaging in real estate appraisal contribute to common databases; and is a facility for the orderly correlation and dissemination of listing information so participants may better serve their clients and the public. Entitlement to compensation is determined by the cooperating broker’s performance as a procuring cause of the sale (or lease). Amended 11/XX)

The activity pertinent to this discussion is the level of activities devoted to the multiple listing services (hereinafter, MLS) provided to the members of the Association.

There are six classes of members. Only licensed real estate agents, brokers and realtors can list property for sale on the MLS and see sold information within the database.

ORG maintains a committee on its board that is dedicated to the MLS program. The organization generated more income from the MLS than from it membership dues.

A prior examination of the ORG books and records by the Internal Revenue Service Tax Exempt & Government Entities: Exempt Organization Division in calendar year 20XX resulted in the organization being issued an Advisory Letter. The advisory issued cautioned the organization on the impact of its exempt status with regard to the level of non-exempt activities.

The organization prepared and filed Form 990-T for the tax year ending December 31, 20XX to report all unrelated business income.

The 20XX Form 990-EZ states that the organization’s primary purpose is “ORG”.

Information from the “EO” 20XX Form 990-EZ:

LAW

In Section 501(c)(6) of the Code, it defines business leagues, chambers of commerce, real-estate boards, boards of trade, or professional football leagues (whether or not administering a pension fund for football players), not organized for profit and no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.

In Section 1.501(c)(6)-1 of the regulations, it provides that a business league is an association of persons having some common business interest the purpose of which is to promote such common interest and not to engage in a regular business of a kind ordinarily carried on for profit. It is an organization of the same general class as a chamber of commerce or board of trade. Thus, its activities should be directed to the improvement of business conditions of one or more lines of business as distinguished from the performance of particular services for individual persons. An organization, whose purpose is to engage in a regular business of a kind ordinarily carried on for profit, even though the business is conducted on a cooperative basis or produces only sufficient income to be self sustaining, is not a business league.

Section 1.513-1(b) of the regulations provides that the term “trade or business” for purposes of section 513 of the Code has the same meaning it has in section 162 and generally includes any activity carried on for the production of income from the sale of goods or services.

In section 1.513-1(d)(2) of the regulations, in defining unrelated trade or business provides that where the production or distribution of the goods or the performance of the services does not contribute importantly to the accomplishment of the exempt purposes of an organization, the income from the sale of the goods or the performance of the services does not derive from the conduct of related trade or business.

In Rev. Rul. 56-65, it states that a local organization whose principle activity consists of furnishing particular information and specialized individual services to its individual members through publications and other means is performing particular services for individual persons. Such an EO is therefore not entitled to exemption under § 501(c)(6).

Rev. Rul. 68-264 defines a particular service for the purposes of section 501(c)(6) of the Code as an activity that serves as a convenience or economy to the members of the organization in the operation of their own businesses.

In Rev. Rul. 59-234 it states, the purpose of a multiple listing service is:

(a) to assist members of the board in rendering better services to the public by creating a broader and more active market for real estate;

(b) to stimulate and facilitate the transaction of business between members of the board through cooperation and exchange of exclusive listings;

(c) to provide a medium through which real estate may be merchandised more efficiently and expeditiously to the advantage of both buyer and seller and

(d) to encourage realtors to uphold high standards of business practice and to further educate them in adhering to the principles of Realtor’s code of Ethics.

Rev Rul. 73-411 states, Trade associations or business leagues under section 501(c)(6) are similar to chambers of commerce, except that they serve only the common business interests of the members of a single line of business or of the members of closely related lines of business within a single industry.

Rev. Rul. 81-175 defines the term “particular services” for the purposes of section 501(c)(6) of the Code, as acting in a manner which provides an economy or a convenience for members in the operation of their own businesses.

In Retailers Credit Ass’n of Alameda County v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue 90 F.2d 47, C.A.9 1937. May 10, 1937, Exemption from petitioner from taxation must be denied on the ground that the purpose to engage in a business of a kind ordinarily carried on for profit is not incidental to a main or principal purpose, but is in fact a principal or main purpose.

In Southern Hardwood Traffic Ass’n v. U.S. 283 F.Supp. 1013 D.C.Tenn. 1968. March 13, 1968, the District Court, Bailey Brown, Chief Judge, held that unincorporated association engaged in regular business of providing, as one of its two main purposes and as substantial part of its total activity, majority of its members with individual services of kind ordinarily carried on for profit was not a ‘business league’ entitled to tax exempt status.

In Associated Master Barbers and Beauticians of America, Inc., 69 T.C. 53 (1977), the court held that an organization did not qualify as a tax-exempt business league because it both engaged in a regular business of a kind ordinarily carried on for profit and its activities were directed to the performance of particular services for individual members.

In Carolinas Farm & Power Equipment Dealers Ass’n, Inc. v. U.S. 699 F.2d 167, C.A.N.C., 1983. January 24, 1983, we must conclude that the Association’s insurance service primarily advances the interests of participating members, and so it is not related to its charitable purpose.

The presence of a single substantial nonexempt purpose can destroy the exemption regardless of the number of exempt purposes. Better Bus. Bureau v. United States, 326 U. S. 279. 283, 90 L. Ed. 67, 66 S. Ct. 112 (1945); Am. Campaign Acad. v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 1056, 1065 (19XX).

TAXPAYER’S POSITION

ORG agrees that it is not entitled to exemption under section 501(c)(6) because its primary purpose is the daily operations of the Multiple Listing Services (MLS) in which * * *% of the organization’s activities are devoted too.

GOVERNMENT’S POSITION

ORG provides professional development, research, and exchange of information among its members.

ORG’s book and records demonstrates the Multiple Listing Services primarily advances the interests of participating members, and so it is not related to its exempt purpose.

In order to qualify for exemption as a business league under Reg. § 1.501(c)(6)-1, an exempt organization must meet all of 6 tests:

(1) Persons having a common business interest

(2) Whose purpose is to promote the common business interest

(3) Not organized for profit

(4) That does not engage in a business ordinarily conducted for profit

(5) Whose activities are directed at improvement of one or more lines of business as distinguished from the performance of particular services

(6) Of the same general class as a chamber of commerce or a board of trade

A review of the ORG books and records indicates the Association fail test 1, 4 and 5 under Reg. § 1.501(c)(6)-1.

ORG fails test (1) — Persons having a common business interest. Rev. Rul. 81-175 defines the term “particular services” for the purposes of section 501(c)(6) of the Code, as acting in a manner which provides an economy or a convenience for members in the operation of their own businesses. A review of the ORG books and record indicates its primary activity is operating a multiple listing service for its members, which is not a common business interest, but rather providing a convenience to members in the operation of their own businesses and thus performing particular services for members.

ORG fails test (4) — Not being engaged in a business ordinarily carried on for profit. The MLS is a database of homes for sale. Real Estate Agents use the MLS to find homes for buyers that they represent. Listing a home on the MLS notifies all local brokers that the home is for sale. If an agent other than the listing agent sees a listing and brings a buyer, the listing agent must pay the buyer’s agent a commission if the buyer accepts the offer. The commission is negotiated on an agent by agent basis. Services to members are an activity ordinarily conducted for profit. These services are of the same character of services provided by Real Estate firms. The membership dues may be construed as being of the same character as that of a professional charging a retainer fee against which future services are applied.

ORG fails test (5) Whose activities are directed at improvement of one or more lines of business as distinguished from the performance of particular services Rev. Rul. 81-175 defines the term “particular services” for the purposes of section 501(c)(6) of the Code, as acting in a manner which provides an economy or a convenience for members in the operation of their own businesses. ORG’s primary activity is providing member with a medium through which real estate may be merchandised more efficiently and expeditiously to the advantage of both buyer and seller. Operation of the MLS provides a convenience to members in the operation of their own businesses and thus is performing particular services for the members.

In Better Bus. Bureau v. United States, 326 U. S. 279. 283, 90 L. Ed. 67, 66 S. Ct. 112 (1945) and Am. Campaign Acad. v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 1056, 1065 (19XX), it is stated that the presence of a single substantial nonexempt purpose can destroy the exemption regardless of the number of exempt purposes. In Associated Master Barbers and Beauticians of America, Inc., 69 T.C. 53 (1977), the court held that an organization did not qualify as a tax-exempt business league because it both engaged in a regular business of a kind ordinarily carried on for profit and its activities were directed to the performance of particular services for individual members.

The primary activity of providing a multiple listing services to members is an activity ordinarily carried on for profit and therefore is nonexempt. The EO’s primary activity is one involving providing particular services to individual members in providing member with a medium through which real estate may be merchandised more efficiently and expeditiously to the advantage of both buyer and seller which conflicts with the EO’s tax-exempt status.

Rev. Rul. 56-65 states that a local organization whose principle activity consists of furnishing particular information and specialized individual services to its individual members through publications and other means is performing particular services for individual persons. Such an EO is therefore not entitled to exemption under section 501(c)(6). The subject EO’s principle activity consists of furnishing particular and specialized individual services to its individual members through response to individual requests for human resource information specific to the individual member; the EO is therefore performing particular services for individual persons.

This organization fails three of the six tests under section 1.501(c)(6)-1 and as a result, is not entitled to remain exempt. The organization engages in primary nonexempt activities involving activities normally conducted for profit and performs particular services for members.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing reasons, ORG does not qualify for exemption under section 501(c)(6) and its tax exempt status should be revoked effective January 1, 20XX.




IRS LTR: Homeowners Association Loses Exemption.

Citations: LTR 201329022

The IRS revoked the tax-exempt status of a homeowners association because its communal property isn’t made available to the general public, but the IRS determined that the organization may make an election to be treated as a taxable homeowners association under section 528.

Person to Contact/ID Number: * * *

Contact Numbers:

Phone: * * *

Fax: * * *

501-04.00

Date: July 7, 2012

Taxpayer Identification Number: * * *

Form: * * *

Tax Period(s) Ended: * * *

LEGEND:

ORG = Organization name

XX = Date

Address = address

Dear * * *,

In a determination letter dated June, 19XX, you were held to be exempt from Federal income tax under section 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code (the Code).

Based on recent information received, we have determined you have not operated in accordance with the provisions of section 501(c)(4) of the Code. Accordingly, your exemption from Federal income tax is revoked effective May 1, 20XX. This is a final letter with regard to your exempt status.

We previously provided you a report of examination explaining why we believe revocation of your exempt status was necessary. At that time, we informed you of your right to contact the Taxpayer Advocate, as well as your appeal rights. On [date] you signed Form 6018-A, Consent to Proposed Action, agreeing to the revocation of your exempt status under section 501(c)(4) of the Code.

You are required to file Federal income tax returns for the tax period(s) shown above. If you have not yet filed these returns, please file them with the Ogden Service Center within 60 days from the date of this letter, unless a request for an extension of time is granted. File returns for later tax years with the appropriate service center indicated in the instructions for those returns.

You have the right to contact the office of the Taxpayer Advocate. Taxpayer Advocate assistance is not a substitute for established IRS procedures, such as the formal appeals process. The Taxpayer Advocate cannot reverse a legally correct tax determination, or extend the time fixed by law that you have to file a petition in a United States court. The Taxpayer Advocate can, however, see that a tax matter that may not have been resolved through normal channels gets prompt and proper handling. You may call toll-free, 1-877-777-4778, and ask for Taxpayer Advocate Assistance. If you prefer, you may contact your local Taxpayer Advocate at:

* * *

If you have any questions, please contact the person whose name and telephone number are shown at the beginning of this letter.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

Nanette M. Downing

Director, EO Examinations

* * * * *

Person to Contact/ID Number: * * *

Contact Numbers:

Telephone: * * *

Fax: * * *

Date: November 15, 2011

Taxpayer Identification Number: * * *

Form: * * *

Tax Period(s) Ended: * * *

LEGEND:

ORG = * * *

ADDRESS = * * *

Dear * * *,

We have enclosed a copy of the preliminary findings of our examination, explaining why we believe revocation of your exempt status under section 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) is necessary. Your organization may instead make an election to be treated as a taxable homeowner’s association under IRC § 528.

If you accept our findings, please sign and return the enclosed Form 6018-A, Consent to Proposed Action, to the individual listed above. We will then send you a final letter revoking your exempt status. Please also file Federal income tax return Form 1120-H for the tax year ending April 30, 20XX, with the individual listed above.

If you disagree with our findings, please provide in writing any additional information you believe may alter the findings. Your reply should include a statement of the facts, the applicable law, and arguments that support your position. Please also include any corrections to the facts that have been stated, if in dispute.

Upon receipt of your response, we will evaluate any additional information you have provided prior to issuing any final report of examination.

Please respond within 30 days from the date of this letter.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

Anne Jewell

Revenue Agent

Enclosure:

Form 886-A, Explanation of Items

Form 6018-A, Consent to Proposed Action

* * * * *

LEGEND:

ORG = Organization name

XX = Date

EIN = ein

State = state

County = county

POA = poa

Treasurer = treasurer

RA-1 = 1st RA

CO-1, CO-2, CO-3, CO-4 & CO-5 = 1ST, 2ND,

3RD, 4TH & 5TH COMPANIES

ISSUES

1. Does ORG (ORG) qualify as a tax exempt homeowners association under § 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC)?

2. Does ORG qualify as a for-profit homeowners association under IRC § 528?

3. What are the exempt and non-exempt function income and expenses as defined in IRC § 528?

4. If so, what are the tax implications of the revocation and reclassification of the organization under IRC § 528?

An alternative position based on if the organization continued to qualify as an organization exempt under IRC § 501(c)(4) is included at the end of the primary position.

FACTS

ORG, * * * (ORG) is currently classified as a tax-exempt organization under § 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). Per the Articles of Incorporation (“Articles”), the organization was originally organized in State on October 3, 19XX. These Articles were later amended on October 3, 20XX to expand the stated purpose. The organization was created to “acquire, maintain and conduct building and property and activities for a community life and center at the ORG as above described, to engage in educational and recreational facilities for members; to acquire other property and construct buildings for such proposes; to foster and promote good citizenship among is members; to promote and foster educational, recreational; physical and social activities of its members and their friends; to engage in such activities as shall raise the standards of civic morality and community welfare.” The 19XX Articles were expanded with the following language during the 20XX revision, “ORG’s primary purpose is to own, repair, maintain, and improve the roads within the ORG, and to collect and disperse road maintenance fees related to the private roads within the plats of the Assessor’s Plat of ORG in Volume 16 of Plats, records of County, State, or in Volumes 17, 18, and 19 of said records, or any additions thereto as platted.”

The bylaws were also amended at this time. The current bylaws provide the following definition of a member:

“. . . any Property Owner who chooses to pay an annual membership fee established by the Board of Directors to ORG for the rights to enjoy ORG Member Properties and the secondary purposes of ORG as outlined in the Amended Articles of Incorporation.”

On October 22, 20XX, a Form 2848, Power of Attorney and Declaration of Representative, was received by the Internal Revenue Service allowing POA authority to discuss income tax for the tax periods ending April 30, 20XX through April 30, 20XX.

On September 20, 20XX, a Letter 3611 and Publication 1, Your Rights as a Taxpayer, and a Form 4564, Information Document Request (‘IDR”), were issued to notify the organization of an examination of the Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax, for the year ended April 30, 20XX. The initial appointment was held November 5, 20XX, at POA’s office. Treasurer, the Treasurer, and POA, POA, were present on behalf of the organization. The following is a summary of the relevant points of the initial interview (questions asked in bold and response in italics).

To get a full understanding of your organization, please describe the history of your organization and all of its activities.

The organization was started in 19XX as a group of owners who purchased property from the RA-1. The original plan had 1100 lots which were completely undeveloped and were mostly for tents. The mission is to manage and maintain the roads of ORG. The roads were later deeded to ORG. The organization has changed several times over the years based on who has had power over the board of directors. The organization has been involved in 2 major law suits. The first in 20XX was based around additional assessments made to replace a bridge, the organization won the right to make assessments against the owners based on a formula but the formula was not specified. According to the organization, this suit also stated that the organization was not a homeowners association under state law. The formula determined was based on how many of the main and side roads were used when accessing the properties. The second law suit was a class action suit against the owners of the organization who were not paying assessments. This suit validated the formula used before with minor changes to make it more fair. The new formula was * * *% the old formula and * * *% the assessed value of the property. The suit also allowed the organization to place liens or even foreclose on properties. The organization currently has 95 owners in collections. This case also allowed them to collect for administrative and legal costs.

The organization had a road budget of $$* * * and an Admin budget of $* * * ~ $* * * (used for bookkeeping and lawyers as the organization has no employees). The organization is also in the process of selling some of their properties (some gained through foreclosure and some were road accesses). The properties owned by the organization include two beach access points and a stretch of river beach.

What are the rules for non-owners being on the property?

The road is not open to the public except in limited ways. The CO-1 road to the first arch is public access and the organization has an easement across the land from the first arch to the second arch (~1.5 miles). ORG owns the roads while the CO-1 has an easement. Per the CO-1, the only people who should be on the roads after the first gate are owners or those on official CO-1 business. The remainder of the road is marked as being for property owners and guests only. There are signs on both arches which state that the road is private.

The organization requires stickers to be present on cars that enter the property. If the sticker is not present on the car, the organization will place a note on the car. When asked, the treasurer stated that usually if a person is on the property, they are instructed to carry out their business, leave the premises and that they are not to return.

Does the organization have a gate or security guard shack?

The organization does have a guard shack but it has not been used in years.

How commonly does the organization receive income from logging?

This happens once every 100 years or so and was not for the sale of lumber but instead was compensation for use of the roads. The organization was paid $$.00. The lumber company was required to pay repair costs for any damage done to the roads. Per the treasurer, the money was used to pay for flood damage and the class action lawsuit.

For what reason was the organization property logged?

The logging was occurring on the land on the other side of the property and the logging company had an easement across the organization in order to reach their property.

What access is given to the general public to view the waterfalls and the river?

The public are not given access to view the waterfalls and river. The waterfalls are located beyond the area with the CO-1 easement.

What benefit do you provide to the general public?

No benefit is provided to the public.

What are the requirements for being a property owner?

They must own property within the organization’s serviced area.

What classes of members or property owners are there and are there any differences in voting rights?

There are no classes of property owners and in order to vote you must be in good standing (have paid all assessments).

What are the dues & initiation fees for the various classes of members?

Assessments are between $$* * * and $$* * * a year based on the formula.

Does the organization own, lease or sublease any real property? If so, is the property encumbered by debt?

The organization owns roads and other properties. None are encumbered by debt.

Per the transcript of the class action law suit posted on the organization’s website, the organization is not primarily a membership based organization. The determination was made that the organization may solicit voluntary membership and dues for all purposes besides the maintenance of the roads.

The law suit establishes the validity of the agreement between ORG and the CO-1. This agreement establishes a basis for dues assessments to the ORG members to maintain the .6 of a mile that is owned by the CO-1.

The law suit finds that the administrative costs of the organization, including legal fees from this lawsuit, may be assessed against the owners.

The Class Action finds that the correct assessment formula would be * * *% of the implied easement formula (IE) and * * *% the assessed value of the property. The determination of commercial use of the property is also important as commercial activity increases traffic on the roads. The determination was made that a surcharge of $* * * per lot may be assessed for commercial use.

The minutes for the board meeting held March 7, 20XX, state that there was an issue with guests being on the property and being told that they were not allowed to have access to the property. The organization requires that owners display a sticker on their car to show that they are allowed to park on the property. Guests would receive a hanging tag. These plans were finalized January 9, 20XX with each owner receiving two guest tags with the option to purchase more for $* * * a pair. The minutes for June 6, 20XX state that a sign should be posted at CO-2 to notify non-residents that only residents and their guests may park on CO-3. Money was allocated for this activity.

During the tour of the facility, several posted signs were observed. The signs stated that the roads are private roads for owners only. Signs were observed on both the first and second arches.

The following are the income and expenses as reported by the organization.

Income Statement

Per further discussion, it was noted that the logging company owned property within the organization’s boundaries. The logging company paid a total of $$* * * as a “special assessment” for the use of the roads by the logging trucks. The logged area was located behind the land owned by the organization. The logging activity was in process from October 20XX through April 20XX, a total of 26 weeks.

Per the ORG response to an IDR dated January 4, 20XX, the organization noted two expenses which could be directly related to the existence of logging trucks on the roads. These expenses as shown below are for lumber and repairs on a bridge within the organization’s boundaries. The expenses were incurred in the next fiscal year, ten months after the end of the logging activity.

Per an ORG IDR response, there are a total of 405 property owners in the organization. Of these, 160 are permanent residents who are likely to drive on the roads an average of twice a day, once as they leave and once when they return.

The remaining 245 property owners are non-residents and more likely to use the roads on a more intermittent basis. On average, they may drive the roads twice per time in residence. Per the ORG IDR response, it is likely that the non-residents used the facility an average of 7 times during the six months that the logging company was using the roads.

Per the ORG IDR response, “A large logging truck does much more damage to a road than a passenger car or pickup truck. For purposes of this analysis, it is assumed that a logging truck does twice as much damage as a passenger car or pickup truck.”

ORG spent a total of $$* * * on road maintenance during the year ended April 30, 20XX.

LAW

IRC § 501(c)(4)

IRC § 501(c)(4)(A) holds that civic leagues or organizations not organized for profit but operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare, or local associations of employees, the membership of which is limited to the employees of a designated person or persons in a particular municipality, and the net earnings of which are devoted exclusively to charitable, educational, or recreational purposes.

It also requires that no part of the net earnings of such entity inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.

Revenue Ruling 74-99, 1974-1 C.B. 131, modifies Rev. Rul. 72-102, to make clear that a homeowners’ association, oft the kind described in Rev. Rul. 72-102 must, in addition to otherwise qualifying for exemption under section 501(c)(4) of the Code, satisfy the following requirements: (1) It must engage in activities that confer benefit on a community comprising a geographical unit which bears a reasonably recognizable relationship to an area ordinarily identified as a governmental subdivision or a unit or district thereof; (2) It must not conduct activities directed to the exterior maintenance of private residences; and (3) It owns and maintains only common areas or facilities such as roadways and parklands, sidewalks and street lights, access to, or the use and enjoyment of which is extended to members of the general public and is not restricted to members of the homeowners’ association.

Flat Top Lake Ass’n, Inc v. US holds that an organization will not qualify for tax exempt status under IRC § 501(c)(4) if it restricts its facility and activities only to members. It sites Rev Rul 74-99 which states that a homeowner’s association must serve a “community” which bears a reasonably, recognizable relationship to an area ordinarily identified as a governmental subdivision or unit. Second it must not conduct activities directed to the exterior maintenance of any private residence, Third common areas or facilities that the homeowners’ association owns and maintains must be for the use and enjoyment of the general public.

IRC § 528

IRC § 528(a) holds that a homeowners association (as defined in subsection (c)) shall be subject to taxation under this subtitle only to the extent provided in this section. A homeowners association shall be considered an organization exempt from income taxes for the purpose of any law which refers to organizations exempt from income taxes. A tax is imposed for each taxable year on the homeowners’ association taxable income of every homeowners association. Such tax shall be equal to 30 percent of the homeowners’ association taxable income.

IRC § 528(c) defines a homeowners association as an organization which is a condominium management association, a residential real estate management association, or a timeshare association if such organization is organized and operated to provide for the acquisition, construction, management, maintenance, and care of association property, 60 percent or more of the gross income of such organization for the taxable year consists solely of amounts received as membership dues, fees, or assessment’s from owners of residences or residential lots in the case of a residential real estate management association, or 90 percent or more of the expenditures of the organization for the taxable year are expenditures for the acquisition, construction, management, maintenance, and care of association property and, in the case of a timeshare association, for activities provided to or on behalf of members of the association, no part of the net earnings of such organization inures (other than by acquiring, constructing, or providing management, maintenance, and care of association property, and other than by a rebate of excess membership dues, fees, or assessments) to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, and such organization elects (at such time and in such manner as the Secretary by regulations prescribes) to have this section apply for the taxable year.

IRC § 528(c)(3) defines the term “residential real estate management association” as any organization meeting the requirements of subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1) with respect to a subdivision, development, or similar area substantially all the lots or buildings of which may only be used by individuals for residences.

IRC § 528(c)(5) defines “association property” as property held by the organization, property commonly held by the members of the organization, property within the organization privately held by the members of the organization, and property owned by a governmental unit and used for the benefit of residents of such unit.

IRC § 528(d) For purposes of this section, defines homeowners association taxable income as an amount equal to the excess (if any) of the gross income for the taxable year (excluding any exempt function income), over the deductions allowed by this chapter which are directly connected with the production of the gross income (excluding exempt function income). The section also allows for the following modifications, there shall be allowed a specific deduction of $100, no net operating loss deduction shall be allowed under Link section 172, and no deduction shall be allowed under part VIII of subchapter B (relating to special deductions for corporations).

IRC § 528(d)(3) defines “exempt function income” as any amount received as membership dues, fees, or assessments from owners of real property in the case of a residential real estate management association.

Federal Tax Regulations (Regulations) § 1.528-1., Homeowners associations

(c) Residential real estate management association. — Residential real estate management associations are normally composed of owners of single-family residential units located in a subdivision, development, or similar area. However, they may also include as members owners of multiple-family dwelling units located in such area. They are commonly formed to administer and enforce covenants relating to the architecture and appearance of the real estate development as well as to perform certain maintenance duties relating to common areas.

TAXPAYER’S POSITION

The taxpayer’s position is being solicited at this time.

GOVERNMENT’S POSITION

Issue #1

Does ORG (ORG) qualify as a tax exempt homeowners association under § 501(c)(4) of the IRC?

ORG does not qualify as a tax exempt homeowners association. Per the findings of Revenue Ruling 74-99 and Flat Top Lake Ass’n Inc v. U.S., there are three requirements for a homeowners association to be considered tax exempt under IRC § 501(c)(4). One, the organization must engage in activities that confer benefit on a community comprising a geographical unit which bears a reasonably recognizable relationship to an area ordinarily identified as a governmental subdivision or a unit or district thereof. Two, it must not conduct activities directed to the exterior maintenance of private residences. Finally, it must own and maintain only common areas or facilities such as roadways and parklands, sidewalks and street lights, access to, or the use and enjoyment of which is extended to members of the general public and is not restricted to members of the homeowners’ association.

The organization satisfies the first and second requirements for exemption but does not satisfy the third requirement The organization, as stated during the initial interview and seen during the tour of the road, does not allow members of the general public access to their road or the common areas maintained by the organization. As noted in the facts above, ORG will ask persons who do not have a parking decal or hanging tag not enter their property again. The organization also posted signs in several locations along the road which state that only members and their guests are allowed access to the road. As such, the communal property of ORG is not made available to the general public and the organization can not qualify under IRC § 501(c)(4).

Issue #2

Does ORG qualify as a for-profit homeowners association under IRC § 528?

Per their bylaws, ORG is organized as a for-profit homeowners association under IRC § 528, as a residential real-estate management association.

IRC § 528 defines a homeowners association as an organization which is organized and operated to provide for the acquisition, construction, management, maintenance, and care of association property. A residential real-estate management association is any organization meeting the requirements of a subdivision, development, or similar area substantially all the lots or buildings of which may only be used by individuals for residences.

Given the conclusion reached in Issue #1, ORG is operated to manage and maintain the roads of CO-3. Per the current articles of incorporation, the organizations primary purpose “is to own, repair, maintain, and improve the roads within the ORG, and to collect and disperse road maintenance fees related to the private roads within the plats of the Assessor’s Plat of ORG in Volume 16 of Plats, records of County, State, or in Volumes 17, 18, and 19 of said records, or any additions thereto as platted.” This furthers the argument that the organization is organized in such a way as to qualify for exemption under IRC § 528.

Issue #3

What are the exempt and non-exempt function income and expenses as defined in IRC § 528?

Per IRC § 528(d), the taxable income of a homeowners association is the gross income for the taxable year less any exempt function income and any deductions that are directly connected with the production of the gross income. IRC § 528(d)(3) further defines “exempt function income” as any amount received as membership dues, fees, or assessments from owners of real property in the case of a residential real estate management association.

As noted in the initial interview and the books and records of the organization, the organization receives the majority of their money from assessments made for road and administrative fees. These amounts would be considered “exempt function income” to an IRC § 528 organization. The organization’s purpose is to conduct activities which support the community as a whole rather than provide a specific benefit. To support this purpose the organization may impose annual or special assessments for road maintenance.

As noted in the initial interview, the organization also received $$* * * from a logging company for use of the road. This income was classified as a “special assessment.” The fundamental difference between a special assessment for road maintenance and the “special assessment” made against the logging company is in the purpose for which it is assessed. A valid special assessment would be assessed against the entire property owner community or a distinct portion of such community in order to pay for an unusual repair, such as the replacement of a culvert or to fix the damage from a flood. In comparison, the “special assessment” made against the logging company was not made in response to the need for an unusual repair, nor was it an assessment that was paid by any distinct portion of the community. The assessment was instead a payment for use of the road by an outside party to alleviate some of the cost of maintaining the road as well as paying for any additional costs associated with increased traffic. As such, this income would not be considered “exempt function income.”

The total exempt function income is $* * * in the year ended April 30, 20XX and $* * * in the year ended April 30, 20XX. The non-exempt function income includes all investment and other income that is not related to the exempt purpose of an IRC § 528 organization. This is income is as follows.

Non-Exempt Function Income

The Non-exempt function expenses are those expenses which are directly connected to the production of the non-exempt income. In this instance, while the organization may not deduct any portion of expenses from the interest income as it has not directly related expenses, it may deduct any expenses which are directly related to the income from the logging company. These expenditures have been allocated using the method below:

Per IRC § 528(d), the organization may deduct only those expenses which are directly related to the production of the non-exempt function income.

The organization identified the following transactions as directly related to damage caused by the logging trucks.

While these transactions are directly related to the unrelated business activity, they may not be deducted in the year ended April 30, 20XX as they were not incurred until the following year. However, these costs are fully deductable in the following year as valid road maintenance expenses.

The organization may deduct an allocated portion of the years total road maintenance expenses to the unrelated business activity. Using a slightly modified version of the allocation method provided by ORG, the road maintenance costs may be allocated using the estimated road use by logging trucks shown below.

Estimated Road use by Logging Trucks

The estimated number of trips made by logging trucks was calculated using the following calculation method provided by ORG.

Estimated number of Trips by Logging Trucks

The explanation for the damage severity factor per ORG is as follows, “A large logging truck does much more damage to a road than a passenger car or pickup truck. For purposes of this analysis, it is assumed that a logging truck does twice as much damage as a passenger car or pickup truck.” The organization used a damage severity factor of 3 to represent this increased damage.

The estimated number of trips by property owners was calculated using the following calculation method provided by ORG.

Estimated number of Trips by Property Owners

In addition to the allocation factor shown above, the agent also allocated the portion of road maintenance expenses that would have been incurred during the logging assuming that the maintenance expense was incurred evenly over the course of the year. This calculation has been shown below.

Allocated Total Maintenance Expenses

This maintenance cost figure is then multiplied by the estimated use by logging trucks to calculation the total maintenance expense allocable to the logging activity as shown below.

Given the above calculation the organization may deduct a total of $* * * from the income received from the logging trucks using the roads.

As such the total net non-exempt function income is shown in the following table.

Net Non-Exempt Function Income

Issue #4

If so, what are the tax implications of the revocation and reclassification of the organization under IRC § 528?

Given the conclusions reached in Issues #1 through 3, the organization can possibly qualify as an organization exempt under IRC § 528. However, this Code section requires that in any given year the organization have either 60% of the total income of the organization consist of membership dues, fees, or assessments from owners of residences or residential lots, or 90% or more of the expenditures of the organization are for the acquisition, construction, management, and care of association property.

ORG, given the income statement shown above, has the following percentages of income from membership dues, fees and assessments.

Percentage of Exempt Function Income

As noted in the figures above, the organization meets the 60% exempt function income test in only the year ended April 30, 20XX. The year ended April 30, 20XX, did not qualify due to the non-exempt function income received from the logging company.

ORG, given the income statement above, has the following percentages of expenditures made for the acquisition, construction, management, maintenance, and care of association property. This figure includes all expenditures made including those made as a result of the logging trucks using the road.

Percentage of Exempt Function Expenditures

The organization also does not qualify for this Code section under the expenditure test as in nether year do they meet the 90% requirement. As such, the organization may not make the election to be treated as a homeowners association under IRC § 528 for the year ended April 30, 20XX but may for the year ended April 30, 20XX.

IRC § 528(d) defines a homeowners association taxable income as the amount equal to the excess (if any) of the gross income, less the exempt function income, for the taxable year, less any deductions which are directly connected with the production of those non-exempt activities. Exempt function income is defined as any membership dues, fees, or assessments from owners of real property.

The calculation of taxable income for the year ended April 31, 20XX has been shown in the first table below and includes investment income and any additional income that is received by the organization in a given year.

Form 1120-H

U.S. Income Tax Return for Homeowners Associations

For Year Ended April 31, 20XX

The second table calculates the taxable income for the year ended April 31, 20XX as that year does not qualify for the IRC § 528 election. This has been calculated using the corporate tax rate.

Form 1120

U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return

For Year Ended April 31, 20XX

CONCLUSION

As noted in the above analysis, the organization does not qualify for exemption under § 501(c)(4) of the IRC but does qualify under IRC § 528 as a taxable homeowners association for the year ended April 30, 20XX. As such, the organization may make an election in the year ended April 30, 20XX and all subsequent years when filing the Form 1120, to instead file the Form 1120-H if they continue to qualify. In the year ended April 30, 20XX, the organization would be assessed $* * * in income tax.

In the year ended April 30, 20XX, the organization does not qualify for exemption under either IRC § 501(c)(4) or § 528. As such, they must file Form 1120 for the year in question. The tax to be assessed in the prior year would be $* * *.

Treatment under IRC § 528 is an election made every year upon the filing of the tax return. An organization may qualify for exemption in one year but not the next due to unusual income. As such, the total tax to be assessed against the organization is $* * *.

ALTERNATIVE POSITION

In the alternative, if the organization continues to qualify for exemption under IRC § 501(c)(4), should the income from logging truck using the road received by the organization in the year ended April 30, 20XX be considered unrelated businesses income under IRC § 511.

ISSUES

1. Is the revenue received from the logging company related to the exempt purpose of the organization?

2. If not, what expenses may be allocated to the unrelated business income?

3. What is the total unrelated business income tax due?

FACTS

On September 20, 20XX, a Letter 3611 and Publication 1, Your Rights as a Taxpayer; and a Form 4564, Information Document Request (IDR) were issued to notify the organization of an examination of the Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt From Income Tax, for the year ended April 31, 20XX. The initial appointment was held November 5, 20XX at the Power of Attorney’s Office. Treasurer, the Treasurer, and POA, POA, were present on behalf of the organization. The following is a summary of the relevant points of the initial interview in relation to the income from the Logging activity.

How commonly does the organization receive income from logging?

This happens once every 100 years or so and was not for the sale of lumber but instead was compensation for use of the roads. The organization was paid $* * * as well as the lumber company fixing any damage done to the roads. Per the treasurer, the money was used to pay for flood damage and the class action lawsuit.

For what reason was the organization property logged?

The logging was happening on the land on the other side of the property and the logging company had an easement across the organization in order to reach their property.

Per further discussion, it was noted that the logging company owned property within the organization and paid a total of $$* * * as a “special assessment” for the use of the roads by the logging trucks. The area being logged is behind the area owned by the organization. The logging activity was in process from October 20XX through April 20XX, a total of 26 weeks.

Per the Information Document Request (IDR) response dated January 4, 20XX, the organization noted two expenses which could be directly related to the existence of logging trucks on the roads. These expenses as shown below are for lumber and repairs on a bridge within the organization. The expenses were incurred in the next fiscal year, ten months after the end of the logging activity.

Per IDR response, there are a total of 405 property owners in the organization. Of these 160 are permanent residents who are likely to drive the roads an average of twice a day, once as they leave and once when they return.

The remaining 245 property owners are non residents and more likely to use the roads on a more intermittent basis. On average, they may drive the roads twice per time in residence. Per the ORG, it is likely that the non-residents used the facility an average of 7 times during the six months that the logging company was using the roads.

Per ORG, “A large logging truck does much more damage to a road than a passenger car or pickup truck. For purposes of this analysis, it is assumed that a logging truck does twice as much damage as a passenger car or pickup truck.”

ORG spent a total of $$* * * on road maintenance during the year ended April 30, 20XX. ORG did not file a Form 990-T for the period in question.

LAW

IRC § 512(a)(1) provides that the term “unrelated business taxable income” means the gross income derived by any organization from any unrelated trade or business regularly carried on by it, less the deductions which are directly connected with the carrying on of such trade or business.

Treasury Regulations (Regulations) § 1.512(a)-1(a) defines “unrelated business taxable income” as the gross income derived from any unrelated trade or business regularly carried on, less those deductions allowed by chapter 1 of the Code which are directly connected with the carrying on of such trade or business, subject to certain modifications referred to in § 1.512(b)-1. To be deductible in computing unrelated business taxable income, therefore, expenses, depreciation, and similar items not only must qualify as deductions allowed by chapter 1 of the Code, but also must be directly connected with the carrying on of unrelated trade or business. Except as provided in paragraph (d)(2) of this section, to be “directly connected with” the conduct of unrelated business for purposes of section 512, an item of deduction must have proximate and primary relationship to the carrying on of that business. In the case of an organization which derives gross income from the regular conduct of two or more unrelated business activities, unrelated business taxable income is the aggregate of gross income from all such unrelated business activities less the aggregate of the deductions allowed with respect to all such unrelated business activities. For the treatment of amounts of income or loss of common trust funds, see § 1.584-2(c)(3).

Regulations § 1.512(a)-1(b) defines expenses, depreciation, and other similar items that are attributable solely to the conduct of unrelated business activities as those which are proximately and primarily related to that business activity. Such expenses qualify for deduction to the extent that they meet the requirements of IRC § 162, IRC § 167, or other relevant section of the Internal Revenue Code. Thus, the wages of personnel employed full-time in carrying on unrelated business activates are directly connected with the conduct of said activity and are deductable in computing unrelated business taxable income if they otherwise qualify under the requirements of IRC § 162.

Regulations § 1.512(a)-1(c) provides that when facilities or personnel are used for both exempt activities and the conduct of an unrelated trade or business, expenses, depreciation, and similar items shall be allocated between the two activities on a reasonable basis. The portion of any such item so allocated to the unrelated trade or business is proximately and primarily related to that business activity and shall be allowable as a deduction in computing unrelated business taxable income to the extent provided by IRC § 162, IRC § 167, or other relevant Code section.

TAXPAYER’S POSITION

The taxpayer’s position is unknown at this time.

GOVERNMENT’S POSITION

ISSUE # 1

Is the revenue received from the logging company related to the exempt purpose of the organization?

The income received from the logging company is not related to the exempt purpose of the organization.

Per the Bylaws of the organization, the organization is organized “acquire, maintain and conduct building and property and activities for a community life and center at the ORG as above described, to engage in educational and recreational facilities for members; to acquire other property and construct buildings fur such proposes; to foster and promote good citizenship among is members; to promote and foster educational, recreational; physical and social activities of its members and their friends; to engage in such activities as shall fraise the standards of civic morality and community welfare.” As such, the organizations purpose is to conduct activities which support the community as a whole rather than provide a specific benefit. To support this purpose the organization may impose annual or special assessments for road maintenance.

The fundamental difference between a special assessment for road maintenance and the “special assessment” made against the logging company is in the purpose for which it is assessed. A valid special assessment would be assessed against the entire property owner community or a distinct portion of such community in order to pay for an unusual repair, such as the replacement of a culvert or to fix the damage from a flood. In comparison, the “special assessment” made against the logging company was not made in response to the need for an unusual repair, nor was it an assessment that was paid by any distinct portion of the community. The assessment was instead a payment for use of the road by an outside party to alleviate some of the cost of maintaining the road as well as paying for any additional costs associated with increased traffic.

As such, the $$* * * paid by the logging company was a payment for use rather than a valid assessment and is therefore unrelated to the exempt purpose of a IRC § 501(c)(4) homeowner’s organization.

ISSUE #2

If not, what expenses may be allocated to the unrelated business income?

Per IRC § 512(a)(1), the organization may deduct only those expenses which are directly related to the production of the unrelated business income.

The organization identified the following transactions as directly related to damage caused by the logging trucks.

While these transactions are directly related to the unrelated business activity, they may not bee deducted in the year ended April 30, 20XX as they were not incurred until the following year. However, these costs are fully deductable in the following year as valid road maintenance expenses.

The organization may take deduction of a portion of the years total road maintenance expenses as allocated to the unrelated business activity. Using a slightly modified version of the allocation method provided by ORG, the road maintenance costs may be allocated using the estimated road use by logging trucks shown below.

Estimated Road use by Logging Trucks

The estimated number of trips made by logging trucks was calculated using the following calculation method provided by ORG.

Estimated number of Trips by Logging Trucks

The explanation for the damage severity factor per ORG is as follows, “A large logging truck does much more damage to a road than a passenger car or pickup truck. For purposes of this analysis, it is assumed that a logging truck does twice as much damage as a passenger car or pickup truck.” The organization used a damage severity factor of 3 to represent this increased damage. The agent disagrees with the damage factor used by the organization as it would represent three times as much damage rather than twice as much damage. As such, the agent has used 2 as the damage factor.

The estimated number of trips by property owners was calculated using the following calculation method provided by ORG.

Estimated number of Trips by Property Owners

In addition to the allocation factor shown above, the agent also allocated the portion of road maintenance expenses that would have been incurred during the logging assuming that the maintenance expense was incurred evenly over the course of the year. This calculation has been shown below.

Allocated Total Maintenance Expenses

This maintenance cost figure is then multiplied by the estimated use by logging trucks to calculation the total maintenance expense allocable to the logging activity as shown below.

Given the above calculation the organization may deduct a total of $* * * from the income received from the logging trucks using the roads.

ISSUE # 3

What is the total unrelated business income tax due?

Per the calculations shown in Issue #1 and 2, the organization owes $* * * in unrelated business income tax. This figure has been calculated as follows: Unrelated business income tax is a * * *% tax on the unrelated income less any directly related expenses.

Allocation of Income and Expenses from the Logging Company

Unrelated Business Income Tax

CONCLUSION

ORG allowed a logging company to use their roads for a fee. As this transaction is not typical of organizations defined under IRC § 501(c)(4) it is considered to be unrelated to the exempt purpose of the organization and is therefore subject to Unrelated Business Income Tax In this case the total tax due was calculated at $* * * for the transaction in question.




IRS LTR: University's Tax-Exempt Status Is Revoked.

Citations: LTR 201329020

The IRS revoked the tax-exempt status of an online university, concluding that the university’s net earnings routinely and continuously inured to its president, vice president, and secretary.

Person to Contact: * * *

Employee Identification Number: * * *

Employee Telephone Number:

(Phone): * * *

(Fax): * * *

501-03.00

Release Date: 7/19/2013

Date: January 7, 2013

Taxpayer Identification Number: * * *

LEGEND:

ORG = organization name

xx = Date

Address = address

Officer — 1-3 = 1st, 2nd & 3rd Officer

Dear * * *:

This is a final adverse determination regarding your exempt status under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Our favorable determination letter to you dated February 3, 20XX is hereby revoked and you are no longer exempt under section 501(a) of the Code effective January 1, 20XX.

The revocation of your exempt status was made for the following reason(s):

Organizations described in IRC 501(c)(3) and exempt under section 501(a) must be both organized and operated exclusively for exempt purposes. You must establish that you are operated exclusively for exempt purposes and that no part of your net earnings inures to the benefit of private shareholders or individuals.

Your earnings have inured to the benefit of three of your officers, Officer-1, Officer-2, and Officer-3. This inurement totaled $* * * during the years 20XX, 20XX, and 20XX. This is a substantial amount of inurement, and violates section 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2) of the Treasury Regs. Given the routine and continuous nature of the inurement, this warrants revocation of your 501(c)(3) status effective January 1, 20XX.

Contributions to your organization are no longer deductible under IRC § 170 after January 1, 20XX.

You are required to file income tax returns on Form 1120. These returns should be filed with the appropriate Service Center for the tax year ending December 31, 20XX, and for all tax years thereafter in accordance with the instructions of the return.

Processing of income tax returns and assessments of any taxes due will not be delayed should a petition for declaratory judgment be filed under section 7428 of the Internal Revenue Code.

If you decide to contest this determination under the declaratory judgment provisions of section 7428 of the Code, a petition to the United States Tax Court, the United States Claims Court, or the district court of the United States for the District of Columbia must be filed before the 91st Day after the date this determination was mailed to you. Please contact the clerk of the appropriate court for rules regarding filing petitions for declaratory judgments by referring to the enclosed Publication 892. You may write to the United States Tax Court at the following address:

* * *

You also have the right to contact the Office of the Taxpayer Advocate. Taxpayer Advocate assistance is not a substitute for established IRS procedures, such as the formal Appeals process. The Taxpayer Advocate cannot reverse a legally correct tax determination, or extend the time fixed by law that you have to file a petition in a United States court. The Taxpayer Advocate can, however, see that a tax matter that may not have been resolved through normal channels gets prompt and proper handling. You may call toll-free, 1-877-777-4778, and ask for Taxpayer Advocate Assistance. If you prefer, you may contact your local Taxpayer Advocate at:

* * *

If you have any questions, please contact the person whose name and telephone number are shown in the heading of this letter.

Sincerely,

Nanette M. Downing

Director, EO Examinations

* * * * *

Person to contact/ID number: * * *

Contact numbers: * * *

Manager’s name/ID number: * * *

Manager’s contact number: * * *

Response due date: * * *

Date: July 24, 2012

Taxpayer Identification Number: * * *

Form: * * *

Tax year(s) ended: * * *

LEGEND:

ORG = * * *

ADDRESS = * * *

Dear * * *:

WHY YOU ARE RECEIVING THIS LETTER

We propose to revoke your status as an organization described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (Code). Enclosed is our report of examination explaining the proposed action.

WHAT YOU NEED TO DO IF YOU AGREE

If you agree with our proposal, please sign the enclosed Form 6018, Consent to Proposed Action — Section 7428, and return it to the contact person at the address listed above (unless you have already provided us a signed Form 6018). We’ll issue a final revocation letter determining that you aren’t an organization described in section 501(c)(3).

After we issue the final revocation letter, we’ll announce that your organization is no longer eligible for contributions deductible under section 170 of the Code.

IF WE DON’T HEAR FROM YOU

If you don’t respond to this proposal within 30 calendar days from the date of this letter, we’ll issue a final revocation letter. Failing to respond to this proposal will adversely impact your legal standing to seek a declaratory judgment because you failed to exhaust your administrative remedies.

EFFECT OF REVOCATION STATUS

If you receive a final revocation letter, you’ll be required to file federal income tax returns for the tax year(s) shown above as well as for subsequent tax years.

WHAT YOU NEED TO DO IF YOU DISAGREE WITH THE PROPOSED REVOCATION

If you disagree with our proposed revocation, you may request a meeting or telephone conference with the supervisor of the IRS contact identified in the heading of this letter. You also may file a protest with the IRS Appeals office by submitting a written request to the contact person at the address listed above within 30 calendar days from the date of this letter. The Appeals office is independent of the Exempt Organizations division and resolves most disputes informally.

For your protest to be valid, it must contain certain specific information including a statement of the facts, the applicable law, and arguments in support of your position. For specific information needed for a valid protest, please refer to page one of the enclosed Publication 892, How to Appeal an IRS Decision on Tax-Exempt Status, and page six of the enclosed Publication 3498, The Examination Process. Publication 3498 also includes information on your rights as a taxpayer and the IRS collection process. Please note that Fast Track Mediation referred to in Publication 3498 generally doesn’t apply after we issue this letter.

You also may request that we refer this matter for technical advice as explained in Publication 892. Please contact the individual identified on the first page of this letter if you are considering requesting technical advice. If we issue a determination letter to you based on a technical advice memorandum issued by the Exempt Organizations Rulings and Agreements office, no further IRS administrative appeal will be available to you.

CONTACTING THE TAXPAYER ADVOCATE OFFICE IS A TAXPAYER RIGHT

You have the right to contact the office of the Taxpayer Advocate. Their assistance isn’t a substitute for established IRS procedures, such as the formal appeals process. The Taxpayer Advocate can’t reverse a legally correct tax determination or extend the time you have (fixed by law) to file a petition in a United States court. They can, however, see that a tax matter that hasn’t been resolved through normal channels gets prompt and proper handling. You may call toll-free 1-877-777-4778 and ask for Taxpayer Advocate assistance. If you prefer, you may contact your local Taxpayer Advocate at:

Internal Revenue Service

Office of the Taxpayer Advocate

* * *

FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

If you have any questions, please call the contact person at the telephone number shown in the heading of this letter. If you write, please provide a telephone number and the most convenient time to call if we need to contact you.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

Nanette M. Downing

Director, EO Examinations

Enclosures:

Report of Examination

Form 6018

Publication 892

Publication 3498

* * * * *

LEGEND:

ORG = Organization name

XX = Date

Address = address

City = city

State = state

President = president

Vice-President = vice president

Secretary = secretary

CPA = CPA

Founder = founder

RA-1 = 1st RA

CO-1 through CO-11 = 1st through 11th COMPANIES

ISSUE

Should ORG’S 501(c)(3) status be revoked on the grounds that its net earnings inured to the benefit of its president, vice-president, and secretary?

FACTS

ORG, formerly known as CO-1 (“ORG”), is an online university. Its corporate office is located at Address, City, State. It offers degrees in * * * and * * *. Its enrollment was approximately 200 students during the years under examination. ORG also conducts live training seminars approximately 30 times throughout each school year. These seminars are held in locations throughout the United States and Canada.

During the years under examination, ORG’s president and vice-president were President and Vice-President (husband and wife), respectively. ORG’s board secretary was Secretary.

ORG filed with the IRS a Form 1023, Application for Recognition of Exemption Under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, on May 13, 20XX. On February 3, 20XX, the IRS issued a ruling letter to ORG, recognizing it as a tax-exempt public charity under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (“Code”), effective April 26, 20XX.

On April 28, 20XX, ORG filed a Plan of Conversion with the State of State to convert back to for-profit status as of June 1, 20XX. The State of State certified this conversion. According to a valuation prepared by CO-2 ORG’s value was appraised to be zero. This was primarily due to ORG’s outstanding debt of $$* * * to CO-3 (“CO-3”). President owns * * *% of CO-3’s stock. At conversion, the debt was extinguished in exchange for ORG’s stock. ORG formally changed its name from CO-1 to ORG on December 13, 20XX.

The examining IRS agent contacted ORG president President on December 8, 20XX and advised him of the audit of ORG’s year 20XX Form 990. The agent mailed the audit letter to ORG on December 10, 20XX. The agent conducted the field audit at the City office of ORG’s representative, CPA, CPA on January 10, 20XX. CPA was replaced as representative by CPA, CPA, on March 2, 20XX.

BACKGROUND OF ORG

ORG operated as a for-profit corporation from 19XX until 20XX. ORG was incorporated in City, State on December 13, 19XX. It was a correspondence school organized to train individuals in various self-improvement techniques developed by its founder, Founder. Founder is the father of President.

CO-3 was ORG’s predecessor. It was incorporated November 12, 19XX as a for-profit State corporation. All of the rights, title and interest in programs, training, books, recordings and videos were held either by CO-3 or Founder, personally. Ownership of CO-3 passed from Founder to President in 20XX.

According to ORG’s meeting minutes dated September 18, 20XX, ORG’s board voted unanimously to remove Founder from his position as president of the board of ORG. President was voted to take the position as president.

Following Founder’ termination, he demanded that ORG and CO-3 cease using his registered marks, name and likeness. ORG and CO-3, however, continued to use his marks, name and likeness in their print advertisements and on their web sites. As a result, President brought suit against ORG, CO-3, President, and Vice-President. Founder was granted a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order on March 6, 20XX.

Forms 990 and Payments to Officers

ORG’s Forms 990 for the years under examination reported as follows:

Figure 1: Forms 990

Among the disbursements ORG made during the years under examination were the following:

Figure 2 — Payments 20XX

Figure 3 — Payments 20XX

Figure 4 — Payments 20XX

Secretary’ City Apartment

The payments to CO-4, in 20XX and 20XX, were for ORG board secretary Secretary’ apartment at Address in City, State. ORG did not report these payments as compensation to Secretary on its own Forms 990, or on Secretary’ Forms W2.

The revenue agent asked ORG, in Information Document Request (“IDR”) #3, issued March 16, 20XX, the following question regarding these payments:

Question: What was the reason for not including the value of the City apartment in the W2 of Secretary as a fringe benefit?

ORG’s response to IDR #3, received May 16, 20XX, included the following answer to the above question:

Answer: We did not include the value of the City apartment in the W2 of Secretary due to an oversight. We would be issuing a 1099 for this.

On December 13, 20XX, Secretary sent the agent an email regarding the $$* * * in apartment payments in the year 20XX, which stated as follows:

Unfortunately, I was unable to locate the email correspondence via my old laptop as the PC was non-functional. I had hoped to find the email stating that I was accepting the position with the information included that housing was a condition of employment. As such, for now, I have paid the $$* * * to ORG and have attached evidence of this.

Attached to the email was a scanned check written by Secretary to ORG for $$* * *, and a scanned letter from ORG, signed by President, acknowledging receipt of the check.

On February 8, 20XX, Secretary sent the agent an email regarding the $$* * * in apartment payments in the year 20XX, which stated as follows:

ORG did not report the payment to me of the apartment I resided in as compensation. As I stated in my earlier correspondence with you, as well as, via telephone, provision of housing was offered by the university as part of my original offer of employment. I also indicated to you previously, that the correspondence which references this is unavailable.

There is no discussion in ORG’s Board Meeting minutes of paying for Secretary’ apartment as part of her compensation or as a condition of her working for ORG.

Payments to President and Vice-President

The agent requested source documents (e.g. invoices or receipts) to support the payments made to President and Vice-President in 20XX via IDRs #2 and #3. ORG did not initially provide any source documents.

With respect to check #* * * for $* * * ORG stated that $* * * of this went to President “for his 20th anniversary gift in 20XX, to be included in his 20XX payroll”. ORG stated that the other $* * * went to Vice-President “for her 10th anniversary gift in 20XX, included in her 20XX payroll”.

Regarding the $* * * payment to CO-5, ORG’s explanation was as follows:

The payment to CO-5 was classified as consulting fee due to the styling, makeup and other tips they were giving us during the big public relations push to increase marketing. Once we understood the styling tips there were (sic) no need for their services anymore. Their services include hair maintenance and make up services. These were for the benefit of President, President and Lead Trainer.

With respect to check #* * * for $* * *, ORG stated that $* * * of it went to two employees’ payroll, and the other $* * * went to Vice-President for “personal” purposes. ORG stated that this amount was “to be included in her 20XX payroll”.

On October 11, 20XX, the agent sent reports to President and Vice-President, proposing excise taxes on excess benefit transactions (“EBTs”), as described in Code section 4958, for the year 20XX disbursements shown in Figure 2, above.

On January 17, 20XX, CPA responded to the reports on behalf of the President and Vice-President1. The response had attached to it five “employee expense reports”, none of which are legible. It also had attached about 30 receipts, many of which are also not legible. The response included the following statements:

Taxpayers will agree to reimburse the Company for $* * * for the watch that was purchased for Vice-President.

Taxpayers will agree to reimburse the Company for the $$* * * 20th Anniversary gift to President.

The response argued that the $$* * * payment to CO-5 was justified because, at the time, President was having to make TV appearances to talk about RA-1 (a former ORG student) and the deaths at his State sweat lodge, in an effort to save ORG’s public image. The examining agent later viewed footage of President’ TV appearances, including one on the CO-6 show.

The response argued that the $$* * * of the $$* * * from check ##* * * that went to Vice-President was included in her reported 20XX compensation prior to the examining agent’s January 10, 20XX initial audit appointment, and that it should therefore not be included in EBTs.

Finally, the response went on to state that the President and Vice-President could only produce $$* * * of the requested receipts2. It argued, however, that all of the remaining disbursements to the President and Vice-President were for reimbursements of travel expenses related to conducting ORG’s exempt activities, and that the per diem for the dates and locations of this travel amounts to $$* * * for President and $$* * * for Vice-President. The response argues that these per diem amounts, when added to the receipts, comes to $$* * * ($$* * * + $$* * * + $$* * *) and that, compared to this amount, the disbursements made to the President and Vice-President in the year 20XX were reasonable.

On March 26, 20XX, the agent requested source documents to support the disbursements to the President and Vice-President in 20XX and 20XX (in Figures 3 and 4) via IDRs #6 and #7. On May 10, 20XX, ORG responded by providing a CD with a number of receipts and invoices. Many of these receipts are either illegible or bear no relationship to carrying out ORG’s exempt activities. For example, ORG submitted, in support of checks #* * * and #* * *, two receipts from CO-7, a luxury watch dealer in City, State and City, State. The receipts reflect the purchase of four Rolex watches; two “Oyster” models” one “Yachtmaster”, and one “Submariner”, totaling $$* * *. For check #* * *, ORG submitted $$* * * in receipts from CO-8, CO-9, and the CO-10 boutique in City. In support of check #* * *, ORG produced a receipt for a $$* * * CO-11 men’s bag.

The agent reviewed all legible receipts that could conceivably be related to ORG’s exempt activities, and subtracted them from the corresponding disbursements in Figures 3 and 4. The detailed analysis of valid and invalid receipts is attached as Exhibit A. The results are as follows:

Figure 5 — Unsubstantiated Payments 20XX

Figure 6 — Unsubstantiated Payments 20XX

Figure 7 — Unsubstantiated Payments 20XX

LAW

Internal Revenue Code

Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code provides for exemption from Income Tax for corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition, or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.

Section 4958(c) defines the term “excess benefit transaction” as any transaction in which an economic benefit is provided by an applicable tax-exempt organization directly or indirectly to or for the use of any disqualified person if the value of the economic benefit provided exceeds the value of the consideration (including the performance of services) received for providing such benefit. For purposes of the preceding sentence, an economic benefit shall not be treated as consideration for performance of services unless such organization clearly indicated its intent to so treat such benefit.\

Section 4958(e) defines “applicable tax-exempt organization” as an organization described in either section 501(c)(3) or 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code or an organization which was so described at any time during the five-year period ending on the date of the excess benefit transaction.

Section 4958(f)(1) defines a “disqualified person” as (A) any person who was, at any time during the five-year period ending on the date of such transaction, in a position to exercise substantial influence over the affairs of the organization, (B) a member of the family of a disqualified person, and (C) a 35% controlled entity.

Section 4958(f)(6) of the Code defines “correction”, with respect to any excess benefit transaction, as the undoing of the excess benefit to the extent possible, and taking any additional measures necessary to place the organization in a financial position not worse than that in which it would be if the disqualified person were dealing under the highest fiduciary standards.

Treasury Regulations

Section 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)(1) of the Treasury Regulations (“Regs”) provides that, in order to be exempt as an organization described in Section 501(c)(3), an organization must be both organized and operated exclusively for one or more of the purposes specified in such section. If an organization fails to meet either the organizational test or the operational test, it is not exempt.

Section 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2) of the Regs provides that an organization is not operated exclusively for one or more exempt purposes if its net earnings inure in whole or in part to the benefit of private shareholders or individuals.

Section 1.501(c)(3)-1(f)(2)(ii) of the Regs provides that, in determining whether to continue to recognize the tax-exempt status of an applicable tax-exempt organization described in section 501(c)(3) that engages in one or more excess benefit transactions that violate the prohibition on inurement under section 501(c)(3), the Commissioner will consider all relevant facts and circumstances, including, but not limited to, the following:

(A) The size and scope of the organization’s regular and ongoing activities that further exempt purposes before and after the excess benefit transaction or transactions occurred;

(B) The size and scope of the excess benefit transaction or transactions (collectively, if more than one) in relation to the size and scope of the organization’s regular and ongoing activities that further exempt purposes;

(C) Whether the organization has been involved in multiple excess benefit transactions with one or more persons;

(D) Whether the organization has implemented safeguards that are reasonably calculated to prevent excess benefit transactions; and

(E) Whether the excess benefit transaction has been corrected (within the meaning of section 4958(f)(6) and section 53.4958-7), or the organization has made good faith efforts to seek correction from the disqualified person(s) who benefited from the excess benefit transaction.

Section 53.4958-3(c)(2) of the Regs describes individuals having “substantial influence over the affairs of the organization” (per Code section 4958(f)(1)) as including presidents, chief executive officers, chief operating officers, or any person who, regardless of title, has ultimate responsibility for implementing the decisions of the governing body or for supervising the management, administration, or operation of the organization. A person who serves as president, chief executive officer, or chief operating officer has this ultimate responsibility unless the person demonstrates otherwise. If this ultimate responsibility resides with two or more individuals (e.g., co-presidents), who may exercise such responsibility in concert or individually, then each individual is in a position to exercise substantial influence over the affairs of the organization.

Section 53.4958-4(a)(4) provides that certain economic benefits are disregarded for purposes of section 4958, including (i) Nontaxable fringe benefits. An economic benefit that is excluded from income under section 132, except any liability insurance premium, payment, or reimbursement that must be taken into account under paragraph (b)(1)(ii)(B)(2) of this section, and (ii) Expense reimbursement payments pursuant to accountable plans. Amounts paid under reimbursement arrangements that meet the requirements of section 1.62-2(c) of this chapter.

Section 53.4958-4(c)(1) provides that an economic benefit is not treated as consideration for the performance of services unless the organization providing the benefit clearly indicates the intent to treat the benefit as compensation when the benefit is paid. An applicable tax exempt organization is treated as clearly indicating its intent to provide an economic benefit as compensation for services only if the organization provided written substantiation that is contemporaneous with the transfer of the economic benefit at issue. If an organization fails to provide this contemporaneous substantiation, any services provided by the disqualified person will not be treated as provided in consideration for the economic benefit for purposes of determining the reasonableness of the transaction. In no event shall an economic benefit that a disqualified person obtains by theft or fraud be treated as consideration for the performance of services.

Section 53.4958-4(c)(3)(i)(A) provides that an organization’s reporting constitutes contemporaneous substantiation to treat a benefit as compensation if the organization reports the benefit as compensation on an original Federal tax information return with respect to the payment (e.g., Form W-2 or 1099); or the recipient disqualified person reports the benefit as income on the person’s original Federal tax return (e.g., Form 1040); or there is an approved written employment contract executed on or before the date of the transfer indicating the benefit is compensation; or there is documentation by the organization’s authorized body approving the transfer as compensation for services on or before the date of the transfer; or there was written evidence in existence before the due date of the applicable Federal tax return indicating a reasonable belief by the organization that the benefit was a nontaxable benefit as described in Regs section 53.4958-4(c)(2).

Section 53.4958-7(e) provides that when the applicable tax-exempt organization is no longer described in section 501(c)(3), the disqualified person must make correction to another organization described in sections 501(c)(3) and 170(b)(1)(A) (other than sections 170(b)(1)(A)(vii) or (viii)) which has been so described for at least 60 months ending on the date of correction. It further provides that the disqualified person must not be a disqualified person with respect to the organization which receives the correction, and that the organization receiving the correction amount must not allow the disqualified person to make or recommend any grants or distributions by the organization.

Section 1.62-2(b) provides that for purposes of determining “adjusted gross income,” section 62(a)(2)(A) allows an employee a deduction for expenses paid by the employee, in connection with the performance of services as an employee of the employer, under a reimbursement or other expense allowance arrangement with a payor. Section 62(c) provides that an arrangement will not be treated as a reimbursement or other expense allowance arrangement for purposes of section 62(a)(2)(A) if —

(1) Such arrangement does not require the employee to substantiate the expenses covered by the arrangement to the payor, or

(2) Such arrangement provides the employee the right to retain any amount in excess of the substantiated expenses covered under the arrangement.

(c) Reimbursement or other expense allowance arrangement — (1) Defined. For purposes of sections 1.62-1, 1.62-1T, and 1.62-2, the phrase “reimbursement or other expense allowance arrangement” means an arrangement that meets the requirements of paragraphs (d) (business connection), (e) (substantiation), and (f) (returning amounts in excess of expenses) of this section.

(2) Accountable plans — (i) In general. Except as provided in paragraph (c)(2)(ii), if an arrangement meets the requirements of paragraphs (d), (e), and (f) of this section, all amounts paid under the arrangement are treated as paid under an “accountable plan.”

(ii) Special rule for failure to return excess. If an arrangement meets the requirements of paragraphs (d), (e), and (f) of this section, but the employee fails to return, within a reasonable period of time, any amount in excess of the amount of the expenses substantiated in accordance with paragraph (e) of this section, only the amounts paid under the arrangement that are not in excess of the substantiated expenses are treated as paid under an accountable plan.

(3) Nonaccountable plans — (i) In general. If an arrangement does not satisfy one or more of the requirements of paragraphs (d), (e), or (f) of this section, all amounts paid under the arrangement are treated as paid under a “nonaccountable plan.” If a payor provides a nonaccountable plan, an employee who receives payments under the plan cannot compel the payor to treat the payments as paid under an accountable plan by voluntarily substantiating the expenses and returning any excess to the payor.

(ii) Special rule for failure to return excess. If an arrangement meets the requirements of paragraphs (d), (e), and (f) of this section, but the employee fails to return, within a reasonable period of time, any amount in excess of the amount of the expenses substantiated in accordance with paragraph (e) of this section, the amounts paid under the arrangement that are in excess of the substantiated expenses are treated as paid under a nonaccountable plan.

(4) Treatment of payments under accountable plans. Amounts treated as paid under an accountable plan are excluded from the employee’s gross income, are not reported as wages or other compensation on the employee’s Form W-2, and are exempt from the withholding and payment of employment taxes.

(5) Treatment of payments under nonaccountable plans. Amounts treated as paid under a nonaccountable plan are included in the employee’s gross income, must be reported — as wages or other compensation on the employee’s Form W-2, and are subject to withholding and payment of employment taxes (FICA, FUTA, RRTA, RURT, and income tax). See paragraph (h) of this section. Expenses attributable to amounts included in the employee’s gross income may be deducted, provided the employee can substantiate the full amount of his or her expenses (i.e., the amount of the expenses, if any, the reimbursement for which is treated as paid under an accountable plan as well as those for which the employee is claiming the deduction) in accordance with sections 1.274-5T and 1.274(d)-1 or section § 1.162-17, but only as a miscellaneous itemized deduction subject to the limitations applicable to such expenses (e.g., the 80-percent limitation on meal and entertainment expenses provided in section 274(n) and the 2-percent floor provided in section 67).

(d) Business connection — (1) In general. Except as provided in paragraphs (d)(2) and (d)(3) of this section, an arrangement meets the requirements of this paragraph (d) if it provides advances, allowances (including per diem allowances, allowances only for meals and incidental expenses, and mileage allowances), or reimbursements only for business expenses that are allowable as deductions by part VI (section 161 and the following), subchapter B, chapter 1 of the Code, and that are paid or incurred by the employee in connection with the performance of services as an employee of the employer. The payment may be actually received from the employer, its agent, or a third party for whom the employee performs a service as an employee of the employer, and may include amounts charged directly or indirectly to the payor through credit card systems or otherwise. In addition, if both wages and the reimbursement or other expense allowance are combined in a single payment, the reimbursement or other expense allowance must be identified either by making a separate payment or by specifically identifying the amount of the reimbursement or other expense allowance.

(3) Reimbursement requirement — (i) In general. If a payor arranges to pay an amount to an employee regardless of whether the employee incurs (or is reasonably expected to incur) business expenses of a type described in paragraph (d)(1) or (d)(2) of this section, the arrangement does not satisfy this paragraph (d) and all amounts paid under the arrangement are treated as paid under a nonaccountable plan. See paragraphs (c)(5) and (h) of this section.

(ii) Per diem allowances. An arrangement providing a per diem allowance for travel expenses of a type described in paragraph (d)(1) or (d)(2) of this section that is computed on a basis similar to that used in computing the employee’s wages or other compensation (e.g., the number of hours worked, miles traveled, or pieces produced) meets the requirements of this paragraph (d) only if, on December 12, 1989, the per diem allowance was identified by the payor either by making a separate payment or by specifically identifying the amount of the per diem allowance, or a per diem allowance computed on that basis was commonly used in the industry in which the employee is employed. See section 274(d) and section 1.274(d)-1. A per diem allowance described in this paragraph (d)(3)(ii) may be adjusted in a manner that reasonably reflects actual increases in employee business expenses occurring after December 12, 1989.

(e) Substantiation — (1) In general. An arrangement meets the requirements of this paragraph (e) if it requires each business expense to be substantiated to the payor in accordance with paragraph (e)(2) or (e)(3) of this section, whichever is applicable, within a reasonable period of time. See section 1.274-5T or section 1.162-17.

(2) Expenses governed by section 274(d). An arrangement that reimburses travel, entertainment, use of a passenger automobile or other listed property, or other business expenses governed by section 274(d) meets the requirements of this paragraph (e)(2) if information sufficient to satisfy the substantiation requirements of section 274(d) and the Regs thereunder is submitted to the payor. See section 1.274-5. Under section 274(d), information sufficient to substantiate the requisite elements of each expenditure or use must be submitted to the payor. For example, with respect to travel away from home, section 1.274-5(b)(2) requires that information sufficient to substantiate the amount, time, place, and business purpose of the expense must be submitted to the payor. Similarly, with respect to use of a passenger automobile or other listed property, section 1.274-5(b)(6) requires that information sufficient to substantiate the amount, time, use, and business purpose of the expense must be submitted to the payor. See section 1.274-5(g) and (j), which grant the Commissioner the authority to establish optional methods of substantiating certain expenses. Substantiation of the amount of a business expense in accordance with rules prescribed pursuant to the authority granted by section 1.274-5(g) or (j) will be treated as substantiation of the amount of such expense for purposes of this section.

(3) Expenses not governed by section 274(d). An arrangement that reimburses business expenses not governed by section 274(d) meets the requirements of this paragraph (e)(3) if information is submitted to the payor sufficient to enable the payor to identify the specific nature of each expense and to conclude that the expense is attributable to the payor’s business activities. Therefore, each of the elements of an expenditure or use must be substantiated to the payor. It is not sufficient if an employee merely aggregates expenses into broad categories (such as “travel”) or reports individual expenses through the use of vague, nondescriptive terms (such as “miscellaneous business expenses”). See section 1.162-17(b).

(f) Returning amounts in excess of expenses — (1) In general. Except as provided in paragraph (f)(2) of this section, an arrangement meets the requirements of this paragraph (f) if it requires the employee to return to the payor within a reasonable period of time the amount paid under the arrangement in excess of the expenses substantiated in accordance with paragraph (e) of this section. The determination of whether an arrangement requires an employee to return amounts in excess of substantiated expenses will depend on the facts and circumstances. An arrangement whereby money is advanced to an employee to defray expenses will be treated as satisfying the requirements of this paragraph (f) only if the amount of money advanced is reasonably calculated not to exceed the amount of anticipated expenditures, the advance of money is made on a day within a reasonable period of the day that the anticipated expenditures are paid or incurred, and any amounts in excess of the expenses substantiated in accordance with paragraph (e) of this section are required to be returned to the payor within a reasonable period of time after the advance is received.

GOVERNMENT’S POSITION

ORG’s 501(c)(3) status should be revoked, effective January 1, 20XX, based on the substantial inurement evidenced by the payments shown in Figures 5, 6, and 7 above. The examining agent has requested documentation and explanations for the above payments. ORG, the President and Vice-President, and Secretary have provided what documentation and explanations they could. The payments to or for these individuals that have either been acknowledged as benefiting them, or that still remain unsubstantiated total $* * * for 20XX, $* * * for 20XX, and $* * * for 20XX. This inurement violates section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code and section 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2) of the Treasury Regulations.

The payments for Secretary’ City apartment constitute inurement and EBTs. They benefited her through the provision of free housing. There was no contemporaneous substantiation that it was ORG’S intent to treat these payments as compensation for services.

The $$* * * from check ##* * * constitutes inurement and an EBT to President. It was not reported as compensation to President on any Form W2 issued to him, nor on any of ORG’s Forms 990s filed prior to the December 20XX commencement of the IRS examination. This payment should have been included in President’ year 20XX Form W2, issued in January of 20XX. The President and Vice-President acknowledged in the January 17th response that this $$* * * “gift” should be reimbursed.

The $* * * from check #* * * constitutes inurement and an EBT to Vice-President. The January 17th response acknowledged that this was for the purchase of a watch for Vice-President, and that it should be reimbursed.

The $$* * * from check ##* * * constitutes inurement and an EBT to Vice-President. It was not reported as compensation to Vice-President on any Form W2 issued to her, nor on any of ORG’s Forms 990s filed prior to the December 20XX commencement of the IRS examination. This payment should have been included in Vice-President’ year 20XX Form W2, issued in January of 20XX. In any event, ORG’s issuing of Vice-President’ 20XX W2 in January 20XX came after the commencement of the IRS examination. It therefore does not meet the contemporaneous substantiation requirement of Regs section 53.4958-4(c)(3)(i)(A). ORG’s inclusion of this amount on President and Vice-President compensation for the year 20XX is not a mitigating factor.

The rest of the unsubstantiated payments to President and Vice-President, shown in Figures 5, 6, and 7 also constitute inurement and EBTs. They benefited the President and Vice-President in the form of outright cash payments, mostly in $* * * denominations. These payments were not part of an accountable plan. They failed, variously, sections (d), (e), and (f) of Regs section 1.62-2. The shopping at CO-11 and other boutiques, and purchases of multiple Rolex watches fail the section 1.62-2(d) business connection requirement. And the rest of the unexplained excess reimbursements fail both the section 1.62-2(e) and (f) substantiation and return of excess requirements.

The argument in the January 17th response to the Code section 4958 reports that the total of receipts should be added to the total of per diem is not logical. Reimbursement arrangements are either “actual” or “per diem”. To the extent that ORG had a particular reimbursement arrangement in place, it is clear, from the fact that it used “employee expense reports”, that it was not based on per diem. It should be noted that this report only cites the excess of reimbursements over what has been substantiated as having a business connection. An employee would never be entitled to “reimbursement” of both actual and per diem, as was suggested in the response. The unsubstantiated payments in Figures 5, 6, and 7 thus constitute inurement and EBTs.

With respect to section 1.501(c)(3)-1(f)(2)(ii) of the Treasury Regs, the analysis of the five factors set forth therein is as follows:

(A) The size and scope of the organization’s regular and ongoing activities that further exempt purposes before and after the excess benefit transaction or transactions

No evidence was gathered during the examination to suggest that there was any fluctuation in ORG’s activities. Furthermore, due to the frequency of the payments at issue, being evenly spread throughout each year, no distinction can be made between ORG’s activities “before and after” these payments. The qualification of ORG’s activities for 501(c)(3) status are not being challenged in this report. Thus, this factor weighs neither in favor of, nor against, revocation.

(B) The size and scope of the excess benefit transaction or transactions in relation to the size and scope of the organization’s regular and ongoing exempt activities

ORG does not have any “ongoing” exempt activities. It voluntarily became a for-profit entity on June 1, 20XX. Inasmuch as ORG’s revenues reflect its exempt activities, its revenues during the years under examination, while it was still exempt, was $* * *. The inurement and EBTs cited above total $* * *, or about * * *%. This is a significant amount of inurement and EBTs, and weighs in favor of revocation.

(C) Whether the organization has been involved in multiple excess benefit transactions with one or more persons

ORG engaged in over sixty EBTs during the years under examination. These transactions involved three different officers; President, Vice-President, and Secretary. This weighs in favor of revocation.

(D) Whether the organization has implemented safeguards that are reasonably calculated to prevent excess benefit transactions

ORG forfeited its own 501(c)(3) exemption June 1, 20XX. At issue, then, is whether its exemption should also be revoked for the period of January 1, 20XX to May 31, 20XX. It is evident that no safeguards were put in place to prevent EBTs from 20XX to 20XX, or from 20XX to 20XX. On the contrary, President has even more unfettered control over ORG’s assets, now that ORG is owned by his wholly-owned company, CO-3. This factor weighs in favor of revocation.

(E) Whether the excess benefit transaction has been corrected (within the meaning of section 4958(f)(6)), or the organization has made good faith efforts to seek correction from those who benefited from the excess benefit transaction

As of the date of this report, ORG is no longer described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Repayments to ORG would not qualify as “correction” within the meaning of section 4958(f)(6). Therefore, per Regs section 53.4958-7(e), any correction to be made by the President and Vice-President or Secretary would have to go to a different 501(c)(3) organization. As of the date of this report, no correction has been made to such a 501(c)(3) organization. Therefore, applying this factor would weigh in favor of revocation.

TAXPAYER’S POSITION

ORG has not yet taken a position with respect to this report.

CONCLUSION

ORG’s earnings have inured to the benefit of three of its officers, President, Vice-President, and Secretary. This inurement totaled $* * * during the years 20XX, 20XX, and 20XX. This is a substantial amount of inurement, and violates section 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2) of the Treasury Regs. Given the routine and continuous nature of the inurement, this warrants revocation of ORG’s 501(c)(3) status effective January 1, 20XX. ORG should file Form 1120, U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return, for the years 20XX and 20XX, and for the period ended May 31, 20XX. If the proposed revocation becomes final, appropriate State officials will be notified in accordance with Code section 6104(c).

FOOTNOTES

1 CPA also represented the President and Vice-President in their Code section 4958 examinations until March 20XX, when they appointed CPA as their representative.

2 The agent found that the legible receipts only totaled $$* * * which included $$* * * in hotel receipts. The $$* * * CO-5 invoice was discussed separately and so presumably was not included in the $$* * *.




Comments Requested on Regs on Remedial Actions for QZABs.

The IRS has requested comments on regulations (T.D. 9339) on the maximum term and permissible use of proceeds of qualified zone academy bonds and on specified remedial actions for curing some violations of the rules for those bonds; comments are due by September 6, 2013.

http://services.taxanalysts.com/taxbase/eps_pdf2013.nsf/DocNoLookup/16360/$FILE/2013-16360-1.pdf




IRS LTR: Supporting Organization's Ownership Interest in For-Profit Won't Jeopardize Exemption.

The IRS ruled a supporting organization’s ownership interest in a newly formed holding company resulting from a restructuring transaction won’t adversely affect its tax-exempt status.

Employer Identification Number: * * *

LEGEND:

Center = * * *

Group = * * *

Network = * * *

Health = * * *

Dear * * *:

This is in reply to your letter of June 30, 2011, in which you request a ruling on the effect to your tax-exempt status of your proposed ownership (through a wholly-owned disregarded entity) in a for-profit Subchapter S corporation.

FACTS

You are tax-exempt under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), and a § 509(a) supporting organization of the Center and its School of Medicine. The Center is part of a state-chartered university system. You are a faculty group practice that assists the Center in carrying out its mission, particularly as it relates to the Center’s clinical practice function. You consist of the faculty of the clinical departments of the Center. Through you, the Center’s faculty is able to enter into contractual relationships with health plans, community providers, and businesses to provide health care services and thereby operate a health care delivery system. The health care delivery system, which you facilitate, promotes the charitable, educational, and research programs of the Center by providing it with the clinical programs and patient populations with which to educate its students and conduct research, while also providing healthcare services to the public regardless of ability to pay.

You are the sole member of the Group, a wholly owned subsidiary that is treated as a disregarded entity for federal tax purposes. The Group provides professional medical services as a participating independent physician association (“IPA”) in the Network. The Network is organized as a for-profit corporation, and serves as a third party administrator providing medical necessity review organization services to its clients under state licenses. The Group owns * * * percent of the issued and outstanding common shares of the Network. The Network has six additional IPA shareholders that are unrelated to the Group. The Network is currently a C corporation for federal income tax purposes. These six additional IPA shareholders comprise for-profit corporations and a partnership.

The Network has four wholly owned subsidiaries. Three of the subsidiaries are limited liability companies that are disregarded as separate entities for federal income tax purposes. The fourth subsidiary, Health, is a C corporation and insurance company for federal income tax purposes. All four wholly owned subsidiaries are involved in healthcare or healthcare related services.

In addition to being a participant IPA in, and shareholder of, the Network, the Group has an exclusive management agreement with the Network under which the Network provides certain administrative and contract services to the Group. These services include collecting revenue, paying claims, contracting with healthcare providers, and performing other administrative functions necessary to manage the Group. For its services, the Network collects * * *% of all collected revenues. At the year-end, the Network reconciles its actual management costs incurred on behalf of the Group and remits any overpayments to the Group. The Group remits to you the overpayments it receives from the Network.

Proposed Restructuring Transaction

In order to achieve an ownership structure that is eligible for S corporation status, the following restructuring transaction is proposed:

A new entity, the “Holding Company,” will be established, and will make an “S” election as of the date of formation.

The Group and the other shareholders of the Network will contribute their shares of the Network to the capital of the Holding Company, thus making the Network a wholly owned subsidiary of the Holding Company.

The Holding Company will make a qualified subchapter “S” subsidiary (“QSSS”) election for the Network.

The Network will distribute its membership interests in its three subsidiaries that are disregarded entities for federal tax purposes to the Holding Company. The Network will continue to own all of the issued and outstanding common shares of Health.

Once the proposed transaction is completed, the Group will hold * * *% of the Holding Company. The remaining * * * % will be owned by the 54 individuals that currently own the six other shareholders of the Network. All of the entities involved in the proposed transaction will continue to operate for the same business purposes as they did prior to the transaction.

The Holding Company will have a board or directors consisting of seven members. The Group will have the right to elect one board member and the other unrelated shareholders will elect the remaining six board members. The Network will have a board of directors consisting of 14 members. The Group will have the right to elect two board members and the other unrelated shareholders will elect the remaining 12 board members.

Health will have a board of directors consisting of six members. Three of the members will be selected by the Network’s board of directors from among its members, and the other three members will be selected from the Network’s senior management team. The three subsidiaries of the Holding Company that are disregarded entities for federal income tax purposes will be managed by a non-shareholder manager selected by the Holding Company.

The Holding Company and its subsidiaries will each develop, maintain, and manage its own financial systems independent of you and the Group. The Holding Company and its subsidiaries will each by operated by a professional staff with expertise in the relevant business areas, which are independent and unrelated to you. Neither you nor the Group will be involved in the day-to-day management of the Holding Company or any of its subsidiaries.

RULING REQUESTED

You have requested the following ruling:

Your ownership, through your wholly-owned disregarded entity, Group, in a for-profit Subchapter “S” corporation, together with the flow-through allocation of “S” tax items subject to the unrelated business income tax, has no effect on the your tax exempt status.

LAW

I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) provides for the exemption from federal income tax of organizations that are organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, or educational purposes, provided no part of the net earnings inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.

Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)(1) provides that, in order to qualify as an organization described in § 501(c)(3), an organization must be both organized and operated exclusively for one or more of the purposes specified in such section. If an organization fails to meet either the organizational test or the operational test, it does not qualify for exemption.

Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) provides that an organization will be regarded as “operated exclusively” for one or more exempt purposes only if it is engaged primarily in activities which accomplish one or more of such exempt purposes specified in § 501(c)(3). An organization will not be so regarded if more than an insubstantial part of its activities is not in furtherance of an exempt purpose.

I.R.C. § 511(a) imposes a tax on the unrelated business taxable income of organizations exempt from federal income tax under I.R.C. § 501(c).

I.R.C. § 512(e) provides that if an organization described in § 1361(c)(6) holds stock in a S corporation — (A) such interest shall be treated as an interest in an unrelated trade or business; and, (B) notwithstanding any other provisions of this part — (i) all items of income, loss, or deduction taken into account under § 1366(a), and (ii) any gain or loss on the disposition of the stock in the S corporation shall be taken into account in computing the unrelated business taxable income of such organization.

I.R.C. § 1361(c)(6) provides that, for purposes of subsection (b)(1)(B) (which defines the term “small business corporation”), an organization which is (A) described in § 401(a) or 501(c)(3), and (B) exempt from taxation under § 501(a), may be a shareholder in an S corporation.

In Moline Properties, Inc. v. Comm’r, 319 U.S. 436, 438-39 (1943), the Supreme Court said that “[t]he doctrine of corporate entity fills a useful purpose in business life. Whether the purpose be to gain an advantage under the law of the state of incorporation or to avoid or to comply with the demands of creditors or to serve the creator’s personal or undisclosed convenience, so long as that purpose is the equivalent of business activity or is followed by the carrying on of business by the corporation, the corporation remains a separate taxable entity. . . . In general, in matters relating to the revenue, the corporate form maybe disregarded where it is a sham or unreal. In such situations the form is a bald and mischievous fiction.” In response to the argument that a corporation is a mere agent of its sole stockholder, the court said that “the mere fact of the existence of a corporation with one or several stockholders, regardless of the corporation’s business activities, does not make the corporation the agent of its stockholders. Id. at 440.

In National Carbide Corp. v. Comm’r, 336 U.S. 422, 437 (1949), the Supreme Court said that a finding of a “true agency” relationship turns on several factors. “Whether the corporation operates in the name and for the account of the principal, binds the principal by its actions, transmits money received to the principal, and whether receipt of income is attributable to the services of employees of the principal and to assets belonging to the principal are some of the relevant considerations in determining whether a true agency exists. If the corporation is a true agent, its relations with the principal must not be dependent upon the fact that it is owned by the principal, if such is the case. Its business purposes must be the carrying on of the normal duties of an agent.”

In National Investors Corp. v. Hoey, 144 F.2d 466, 468 (2nd Cir. 1944), the court said that “to be a separate jural person for purposes of taxation, a corporation must engage in some industrial, commercial, or other activity besides avoiding taxation; in other words, that the term ‘corporation’ will be interpreted to mean a corporation which does some ‘business’ in the ordinary meaning; and that escaping taxation is not ‘business’ in the ordinary meaning.”

In Britt v. U.S., 431 F.2d 227, 237 (5th Cir. 1970), the court said that “business activity is required for recognition of the corporation as a separate taxable entity; the activity may be minimal.”

In Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. Nat’l Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098, 1106 (5th Cir. 1973), the Court said that “the control required for liability under the ‘instrumentality’ rule amounts to total domination of the subservient corporation, to the extent that the subservient corporation manifests no separate corporate interests of its own and functions solely to achieve the purposes of the dominant corporation.”

ANALYSIS

For taxable years beginning before January 1, 1998, tax exempt organizations described in § 501(c)(3) could not be shareholders in an S corporation. In 1996, Congress enacted the Small Business Job Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1755, authorizing the ownership of S corporation stock by tax-exempt organizations described in § 501(c)(3). The Joint Committee on Taxation’s General Explanation of Tax Legislation Enacted in the 104th Congress (JCS-12-96), December 18, 1996, Sec. 1316, p. 130, describes the reason for the change in law as follows —

The Congress believed that the present-law prohibition of certain tax-exempt organizations being S corporation shareholders may have inhibited employee ownership of closely-held businesses, frustrated estate planning, discouraged charitable giving, and restricted sources of capital for closely-held businesses. The Congress sought to lift these barriers by allowing certain tax-exempt organizations to be shareholders in S corporations. However, the provisions of subchapter S were enacted in 1958 and substantially modified in 1982 on the premise that all income of the S corporation (including all gains on the sale of the stock) would be subject to a shareholder-level income tax. This underlying premise allows the rules governing S corporations to be relatively simple . . . because of the lack of concern about “transferring” income to non-taxpaying persons. Consistent with this underlying premise of subchapter S, the provision treats all the income flowing through to a tax-exempt shareholder, and gains and losses from the disposition of the stock, as unrelated business taxable income.

As a result of the legislation, tax-exempt organizations described in § 501(c)(3) are allowed to be shareholders in an S corporation under § 1361(c)(6). Furthermore, under § 512(e), items of income or loss of an S corporation will flow through to tax-exempt shareholders as unrelated business taxable income regardless of the source or nature of such income. In addition, gain or loss on the sale or other disposition of stock of an S corporation will be treated as unrelated business taxable income. These provisions, however, do not cause the for-profit activities of the S corporation to be attributed to the tax-exempt shareholder. See Moline Properties, Inc., 319 U.S. at 440. In determining whether the activities of a for-profit S corporation subsidiary is attributable to its tax-exempt parent, the separate identity principles annunciated in Moline Properties, Inc. v. Comm’r should apply lest the intent of Congress to remove barriers for investment in S corporations by tax-exempt entities be frustrated.

For federal income tax purposes, a parent corporation and its subsidiaries are treated as separate and distinct taxable corporate entities as long as each entity has a valid business purpose and engages in at least a minimal amount of business activity. See Moline Properties, Inc., 319 U.S. at 438; National Investors Corp., 144 F.2d at 468; Britt, 431 F.2d at 234. However, where the parent corporation so controls the affairs of the subsidiary that it is merely an instrumentality of the parent, the corporate identity of the subsidiary may be disregarded. See, Krivo, 483 F.2d at 1106.

Hence, the activities of a for-profit subsidiary will not be attributed to its tax-exempt parent unless (1) the subsidiary lacks a business purpose, or (2) the subsidiary is an arm or agent of the parent.

In your case, your relationship with the Holding Company does not fail the first prong, i.e., that the subsidiary have a business purpose and conduct some amount of business activity. The Holding Company and its four subsidiaries have been, or will be, organized to perform bona fide and substantial business functions. The Holding Company and all of its subsidiaries maintain activities that are separate, distinct, and independent from you. Therefore, their existence may not be disregarded for tax purposes.

Additionally, your relationship with the Holding Company does not fail the second prong, i.e., that the parent not control the day-to-day operations of the subsidiary. The Holding Company has its own corporate identity and interests, and its own independent board of seven directors, only one of which is chosen by you. The other six directors are chosen by unrelated shareholders. Furthermore, each of the Holding Company’s subsidiaries has its own management and employees independent of you. Furthermore, neither your investment in the Holding Company nor your management agreement with the Network exhibits any of the attributes of a “true agency” relationship identified in National Carbide Corp., 336 U.S. at 437. Therefore, neither the Holding Company nor its subsidiaries can be considered a sham or under your “total domination.” Consequently, the activities of the Holding Company and its subsidiaries would not be attributable to you.

CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, we rule as follows:

Your ownership interest in the Holding Company, a for-profit subchapter S corporation, through Group, together with the flow-through allocation of the Holding Company’s “S” tax items subject to the unrelated business income tax, would have no effect on your tax-exempt status as an organization described in § 501(c)(3).

This ruling will be made available for public inspection under section 6110 of the Code after certain deletions of identifying information are made. For details, see enclosed Notice 437, Notice of Intention to Disclose. A copy of this ruling with deletions that we intend to make available for public inspection is attached to Notice 437. If you disagree with our proposed deletions, you should follow the instructions in Notice 437.

This ruling is directed only to the organization that requested it. Section 6110(k)(3) of the Code provides that it may not be used or cited by others as precedent.

This ruling is based on the facts as they were presented and on the understanding that there will be no material changes in these facts. This ruling does not address the applicability of any section of the Code or regulations to the facts submitted other than with respect to the sections described. Because it could help resolved questions concerning your federal income tax status, this ruling should be kept in your permanent records.

If you have any questions about this ruling, please contact the person whose name and telephone number are shown in the heading of this letter.

In accordance with the Power of Attorney currently on file with the Internal Revenue Service, we are sending a copy of this letter to your authorized representative.

Sincerely,

Peter A. Holiat

Acting Manager,

Exempt Organizations

Technical Group 1

Citations: LTR 201328035




IRS LTR: Foundation Granted More Time to Dispose of Stock.

The IRS granted a private foundation an additional five years to dispose of excess holdings of corporate stock after concluding the foundation made diligent efforts to dispose of the shares but was unable to do so except at a price substantially below the fair market value.

Employer Identification Number: * * *

LEGEND:

Corporation = * * *

Founder = * * *

Brand = * * *

Date 1 = * * *

Date 2 = * * *

Dear * * *:

This is in response to your ruling request dated November 28, 2012, requesting an extension for an additional five years under I.R.C. § 4943(c)(7) for disposing of certain excess business holdings.

FACTS

You are a private foundation organized as a nonprofit corporation to further the charitable interests of your Founder. You have been recognized as an organization exempt under § 501(c)(3) and are classified as a private foundation within the meaning of § 509(a). You state that you operate exclusively for charitable and educational purposes through the making of grants and contributions to charities. You acquired * * * percent of Corporation stock as a donation from your Founder after his death. You have excess business holdings in Corporation under § 4943(c)(1). Your initial five-year period for disposing of these excess business holdings will end on Date 1.

During the initial five-year period for disposing of excess business holdings under § 4943(c)(6), you have created a more formal management and governance structure for Corporation, and taken steps to unify the Brand with respect to * * *. Your managers have consulted with advisors, valuation specialist and legal counsel to discuss the various disposition options available to you.

You represent that, because of the size, value, nature, and complexity of this business holding, you have, despite your best efforts, been unable to complete the sale of Corporation stock within the prescribed five-year period except at a price substantially below fair market value. You represent that you will be better able to determine and realize the full fair market value of your interest in Corporation after the expiration of the initial five-year period.

Your directors have established a plan of disposition that includes either selling your Corporation stock to an unaffiliated third party or donating Corporation shares to one or more charitable organizations. Your directors expect that they can dispose of the Corporation stock no later than Date 2. You submitted the plan to your appropriate state Attorney General and are waiting for a response. If and when a response is received from the Attorney General, a copy will be submitted to the Secretary in accordance with § 4943(c)(7)(B)(ii).

Prior to the end of the initial five-year period for disposing of excess business holdings under § 4943(c)(6), you submitted a request to the Internal Revenue Service for an extension of five years to complete the required disposition.

RULING REQUESTED

You requested a ruling extending the five-year period of time for disposing of excess business holdings for an additional five years under § 4943(c)(7).

LAW

I.R.C § 4943(a)(1) imposes excise taxes on the excess business holdings of any private foundation in a business enterprise.

I.R.C. § 4943(c)(1) provides that the term “excess business holdings” means, with respect to the holdings of any private foundation in any business enterprise, the amount of stock or other interest in the enterprise which the foundation would have to dispose of to a person other than a disqualified person in order for the remaining holdings of the foundation in such enterprise to be permitted holdings.

I.R.C. § 4943(c)(2) provides in part that the permitted holdings of any private foundation in an incorporated business enterprise are 20 percent of the voting stock, reduced by the percentage of the voting stock owned by all disqualified persons.

I.R.C. § 4943(c)(6)(A) provides that, if there is a change in the holdings in a business enterprise (other than by purchase by the private foundation or by a disqualified person) which causes the private foundation to have excess business holdings in such enterprise, the interest of the foundation in such enterprise (immediately after such change) shall (while held by the foundation) be treated as held by a disqualified person (rather than by the foundation) during the 5-year period beginning on the date of such change in holdings.

I.R.C. § 4943(c)(7) provides that the Internal Revenue Service may extend for an additional five years the initial five-year period for disposing of excess business holdings in the case of an unusually large gift or bequest of diverse business holdings or holdings with complex corporate structures if:

(A) The foundation establishes that: (i) it made diligent efforts to dispose of such holdings during the initial five-year period, and (ii) disposition within the initial five-year period has not been possible (except at a price substantially below fair market value) by reason of such size and complexity or diversity of holdings;

(B) Before the close of the initial five-year period: (i) the private foundation submits to the Internal Revenue Service a plan for disposing of all of the excess business holdings involved in the extension, and (ii) the private foundation submits the plan to the Attorney General (or other appropriate State official) having administrative or supervisory authority or responsibility with respect to the foundation’s disposition of the excess business holdings involved and submits to the Internal Revenue Service any response the private foundation received during the five-year period; and

(C) The Internal Revenue Service determines that such plan can reasonably be expected to be carried out before the close of the extension period.

ANALYSIS

You are subject to § 4943, which imposes a tax on the excess business holdings of private foundations. Generally, under § 4943(c)(2)(A), a private foundation and its disqualified persons are permitted to hold twenty percent of the voting stock in a business enterprise, with any excess constituting excess business holdings. However, if a private foundation acquires holdings in a business enterprise other than by purchase (e.g., by gift) which causes the foundation to have excess business holdings, then the interest of the foundation in such business enterprise shall be treated as held by a disqualified person (rather than the foundation) for a five-year period beginning on the date such holdings were acquired by the foundation, under § 4943(c)(6)(A).

Under § 4943(c)(7), the Internal Revenue Service may extend the initial five-year period for disposing of excess business holdings for an additional five years if a foundation establishes that: (i) it made diligent efforts to dispose of such holdings during the initial five-year period, and disposition within the initial five-year period has not been possible (except at a price substantially below fair market value) by reason of the size and complexity or diversity of holdings, (ii) before the close of the initial five-year period it submits to the Internal Revenue Service, and to the Attorney General (or other appropriate State official) having administrative or supervisory authority or responsibility with respect to the foundation’s disposition of the excess business holdings, a plan for disposing of all of the excess business holdings involved during the extension and (iii) the Internal Revenue Service determines that such plan can reasonably be expected to be carried out before the close of the extension period.

You received a donation of * * *% of the Corporation stock from Founder, a disqualified person under § 4946. You have stated that you consequently have excess business holdings in Corporation under § 4943(c)(1). Therefore, you are required under § 4943(c)(6) to dispose of these holdings during the initial five-year period that will end on Date 1. You have established that during the initial five-year period you have made diligent efforts to dispose of the Corporation stock, but disposition within this period has not been possible (except at a price substantially below fair market value) because of the size and complexity or diversity of your holdings. Before the end of the initial five-year period, you submitted a request to the Internal Revenue Service under § 4943(c)(7) for an additional five-year period within which to dispose of your excess business holdings in Corporation and you described your plan for disposing of these holdings. You also submitted the plan to the Attorney General of your state, who is expected to approve the plan. Based on the information submitted, we have determined that your plan to dispose of your excess business holdings in Corporation within an additional five-year period can reasonably be expected to be carried out. Therefore, we conclude that you do meet the requirements under § 4943(c)(7) for an extension of five years to dispose of your excess business holdings in Corporation.

RULING

Under § 4943(c)(7), the period during which you may dispose of your excess business holdings in Corporation is extended for an additional five years, until Date 2.

We are not ruling on whether your interest in Corporation constitutes excess business holdings.

This ruling will be made available for public inspection under § 6110 after certain deletions of identifying information are made. For details, see enclosed Notice 437, Notice of Intention to Disclose. A copy of this ruling with deletions that we intend to make available for public inspection is attached to Notice 437. If you disagree with our proposed deletions, you should follow the instructions in Notice 437.

This ruling is directed only to the organization that requested it. Section 6110(k)(3) provides that it may not be used or cited by others as precedent.

This ruling is based on the facts as they were presented and on the understanding that there will be no material changes in these facts. This ruling does not address the applicability of any section of the Code or regulations to the facts submitted other than with respect to the sections described. Because it could help resolve questions concerning your federal income tax status, this ruling should be kept in your permanent records.

If you have any questions about this ruling, please contact the person whose name and telephone number are shown in the heading of this letter.

In accordance with the Power of Attorney currently on file with the Internal Revenue Service, we are sending a copy of this letter to your authorized representative.

Sincerely,

Ronald Shoemaker

Manager, Exempt Organizations

Technical Group 2

Citations: LTR 201328034




IRS: Exempt Organization Update.

 

  1. IRS announces Optional Expedited Process for certain 501(c)(4) Exemption Applications
  2. IRS Nationwide Tax Forums begin next week
  3. Check out this summer’s IRS phone forums
  4. Register for EO workshops
  5. Section 509(a)(3) Supporting Organizations pages updated
  6. IRS accepting applications for Low Income Taxpayer Clinic grants
  7. IRS Electronic Tax Administration Advisory Committee delivers report to Congress

 

1.  IRS announces Optional Expedited Process for certain 501(c)(4) Exemption Applications

The IRS announced an optional expedited process for certain Section 501(c)(4) applications. To qualify, organizations must have applied for 501(c)(4) exempt status, their application must be pending for more than 120 days as of May 28, 2013, and their cases must involve possible political campaign intervention or issue advocacy.

http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/New-Review-Process-and-Expedited-Self-Certification-Option

2.  IRS Nationwide Tax Forums begin next week

The IRS Nationwide Tax Forums, which begin next week in Orlando, Fla., offer three full days of seminars with the latest word from IRS leadership and experts in the fields of tax law, compliance and ethics.

Attendees can:

http://www.irs.gov/Tax-Professionals/IRS-Nationwide-Tax-Forum-Information

3.  Check out this summer’s IRS phone forums

For a list of upcoming phone forums, go to the phone forums section of the Calendar of Events page.

“Charities and their Volunteers” – July 24

We’ve scheduled an encore session! The registration link on our phone forums page will be live soon.

“Veterans Organizations – Complying with IRS Rules” — July 30

Veterans organizations occupy a special place in the world of exempt organizations. Not only are most veterans organizations exempt from tax, but contributions to them may be deductible, and some are permitted to set aside amounts that are used to provide insurance benefits to members.

This combination — tax-exempt status, deductibility of contributions and the ability to pay benefits to members — is relatively rare and is evidence of Congress’s intent to provide special tax treatment for veterans organizations. This phone forum provides information to help them stay tax exempt.

Topics include:

“What’s Special about Schedule K (Form 990)?” – July 31

Topics covered include:

http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Phone-Forums-Exempt-Organizations

4.  Register for EO workshops

Register for upcoming workshops for small and medium-sized 501(c)(3) organizations:

August 13 – Highland Heights, KY

Hosted by University of Kentucky

August 15 – Lexington, KY

Hosted by University of Kentucky

August 20-21 – San Francisco, CA

Hosted by Golden Gate University

August 28-29 – Anaheim, CA

Hosted by Trinity Law School

September 9 – St. Paul, MN

Hosted by Hamline University

September 10 – Minneapolis, MN

Hosted by University of St. Thomas

http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Upcoming-Workshops-for-Small-and-Medium-Sized-501(c)(3)-Organizations

5.  Section 509(a)(3) Supporting Organizations pages updated

These updated pages illustrate the new rules for certain organizations that carry out their exempt purposes by supporting other public charities. This classification is important because it is one means by which a charity can avoid classification as a private foundation, a status that is subject to a more restrictive regulatory regime.

http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Section-509(a)(3)-Supporting-Organizations

6.  IRS accepting applications for Low Income Taxpayer Clinic grants

The IRS recently announced the opening of the 2014 Low Income Taxpayer Clinic grant application process. Read news release.

http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/IRS-Accepting-Applications-for-Low-Income-Taxpayer-Clinic-Grants-2013

7.  IRS Electronic Tax Administration Advisory Committee delivers report to Congress

The Electronic Tax Administration Advisory Committee recently presented its 2013 Annual Report to Congress. The report discusses five groups of recommendations on issues in electronic tax administration.

http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p3415.pdf




ACA Provisions: What You Need to Know Phone Forum Recording Now Available.

If you want to listen to the April 30th ACA Provisions: What you need to know! Phone Forum, click the link below. The 60 minute presentation covers:

What is included in the cost of coverage (i.e. health, dental/vision, FSA benefits).

Additional Medicare Tax: application, calculation, and reporting.

http://www.irsvideos.gov/Governments/Employers/ACAProvisionsWhatYouNeedtoKnow




McDermott Calls on IRS to Update Safe Harbor Guidelines for Health Care Facilities to Better Implement Affordable Care Act.

In a letter to Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy Mark Mazur, Congressman Jim McDermott (D-WA) today called on the IRS to review outdated “safe harbor” provisions that inhibit the ability of certain new payment models, such as accountable care organizations, to flourish. Updated provisions would help clear obstacles to many of the innovative and more efficient payment models outlined by the Affordable Care Act (ACA), and improve efforts to coordinate care between hospitals and health care professionals.

IRS Revenue Procedure 97-13, which creates safe harbors that protect the tax-exempt status of certain bonds issued by health care facilities, was issued in 1997. Since then, new compensation models, such as bundled payments, have shown promising results for improving care and reducing costs. Updates to the safe harbors will give providers and bondholders certainty that new payment models are protected under the IRS guidance.

“Stakeholders generally structure arrangements to fit squarely within a safe harbor with respect to their compensation arrangements, as they are aware that the IRS is closely scrutinizing these issues,” wrote McDermott. “As a result, hospitals have some anxiety with entering into new and innovative arrangements encouraged by the ACA.”

As the ACA ramps up to full implementation, any revisions to the relevant tax guidance should be made in time to provide certainty so that the new models can be quickly adopted. “It is imperative that the IRS begin to consider such modifications immediately, since under the Affordable Care Act, models that emerge as successful from [Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation] can be rapidly expanded throughout the country,” urged McDermott.

* * * * *

July 1, 2013

Mr. Mark Mazur

Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy

Department of Treasury

1500 Pennsylvania Ave N.W.

Washington, DC 20220

Re: Potential Updates to Rev. Proc. 97-13

Dear Mr. Mazur:

As Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Health of the Committee on Ways and Means, I am deeply interested in initiatives that advance better coordinated care among hospitals, physicians, and other health care professionals. Such coordinated care is not only good for the patient, it is also good for the economy since coordinated care results in a decrease in the number of duplicative tests performed on patients, and can decrease the potential for medical errors that lead to readmissions and other negative consequences.

Many of the reforms in the Affordable Care Act are intended to promote better care coordination. In fact, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (“CMMI”) was tasked with developing new, replicable models where health care professionals and hospitals provide high quality care at a lower cost on a population-wide basis. CMMI is now in the process of testing various permutations of accountable care organizations, as well as various bundled payment initiatives. It is my hope that these programs result in savings to the Medicare program and that patients see demonstrable, measurable improvements in the quality of care that they are provided.

However, I am aware that stakeholders are concerned about the implications that participating in such innovative programs may have on tax-exempt bond financed facilities. As you know, facilities that are financed with tax-exempt bonds attempt to structure their contractual arrangements to fit within the safe harbors of Rev. Proc. 97-13. The safe harbors are narrow and limit the terms of such arrangements. Also, the safe harbors limit the types of permissible compensation arrangements and may not address innovative payment methods such as payment bundles. Because of the limited nature of the safe harbors, some of the newly emerging innovative methods by which a hospital may want to compensate a physician do not fit squarely within the existing safe harbors. Of course, this does not automatically make the bonds that finance the health care facility taxable. However, stakeholders generally structure arrangements to fit squarely within a safe harbor with respect to their compensation arrangements, as they are aware that the IRS is closely scrutinizing these issues, particularly since it is easier to do so given the Form 990 redesign. As a result, stakeholders may have some anxiety with entering into new and innovative arrangements encouraged by the Affordable Care Act.

While I understand and fully support the intended purpose behind Rev. Proc. 97-13 and believe it should be retained, I believe it should be updated to recognize the newly emerging compensation models between hospitals and physicians. It is imperative that the IRS begin to consider such modifications immediately, since under the Affordable Care Act, models that emerge as successful from CMMI can be rapidly expanded throughout the country. Thus, it is important to update the guidance and allow providers time to gain an understanding of how they can fit squarely within a safe harbor before such programs are expanded on a nationwide basis.

Thank you for your consideration of this important matter. Should you wish to discuss this matter further, please do not hesitate to contact Tiana Korley on my staff at (202) 225-3106 or at [email protected].

Regards,

Hon. Jim McDermott

Member of Congress




Conditional Donation of Conservation Easement and Cash Precludes Charitable Contribution Deduction.

The Tax Court held that a couple wasn’t entitled to charitable contribution deductions for their gift of cash and a conservation easement to an architectural trust, finding that the donation was improperly conditioned on whether the IRS would allow their claimed deductions.

Lawrence Graev agreed to contribute a façade conservation easement on his property to the National Architectural Trust (NAT), a qualified charitable organization. Before the donation, Graev’s accountants advised him of Notice 2004-41 and the IRS’s increased scrutiny of deductions for conservation easement donations. Graev sought assurances from NAT regarding his donation and his ability to claim deductions. NAT issued Graev a letter in which it agreed to refund any disallowed cash contributions and remove the easement from the property title if the deduction was disallowed.

Graev contributed the easement and made a cash contribution to NAT in 2004. On his 2004 and 2005 joint returns with his wife, Graev claimed charitable contribution deductions for his easement contribution and accompanying cash contribution to NAT. The IRS disallowed the deductions as conditional gifts and imposed accuracy-related penalties against the couple.

The Tax Court, in an opinion by Judge David Gustafson, considered whether the promises made in NAT’s letter to Graev made the gift conditional and whether the chance that the condition would occur was so remote as to be negligible under reg. section 1.170A-1(e). Gustafson wrote that “what is determinative under the section 170 ‘remote’ regulations is the possibility, after considering all the facts and circumstances, that NAT’s reception and retention of the easement and cash would be defeated.”

The court concluded that the IRS’s disallowance of the deductions and NAT’s return of the cash and removal of the easement was not so remote as to be negligible at the time of the contribution. The court found that there was a substantial risk of disallowance based on the IRS’s announcement of increased scrutiny and that the risk was evident based on Graev’s request for assurances from NAT. That NAT had issued “comfort letters” to other donors was further evidence of a non-negligible risk that the IRS would disallow the deduction.

Gustafson rejected the Graevs’ argument that the letter from NAT was not enforceable under state law, finding that NAT could abandon the easement under the deed. The court also held that NAT intended to honor its promise if the deduction was disallowed. The court rejected the couple’s argument that the doctrine of merger extinguished the terms of the letter once the deed for the easement was recorded. Gustafson wrote, “We find that NAT’s promises in the side letter to return to the easement and cash were enforceable because we find a clear intent evidenced by the parties that the side letter would survive the deed.”

The Tax Court concluded that there was substantial risk that the IRS would challenge the deductions, that enforcement of the letter wasn’t precluded by state or federal law, and that NAT would act as promised in the letter. As a result, the gifts were conditional and the charitable contribution deductions should be disallowed, the court said.

LAWRENCE G. GRAEV AND LORNA GRAEV,

Petitioners

v.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

Respondent

Citations: Lawrence G. Graev et ux. v. Commissioner; 140 T.C. No. 17; No. 30638-08

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

Filed June 24, 2013

Petitioner husband (“P-H”) contributed cash and a conservation easement to N, a charitable organization. Before the contribution, N at P-H’s request issued to P-H a side letter which promised that, in the event R disallows Ps’ charitable contribution deductions, N “will promptly refund your entire cash endowment contribution and join with you to immediately remove the facade conservation easement from the property’s title”. Ps claimed charitable contribution deductions for the cash and easement donations. R contends the side letter made those contributions conditional gifts that are not deductible under I.R.C. sec. 170, since the likelihood that N would be divested of the cash and easement was not negligible.

Held: Ps’ charitable contribution deductions are not allowed because at the time of P-H’s contributions, the possibility that the deductions would be disallowed and, as a result, that N would return the contributions was not “so remote as to be negligible”, under 26 C.F.R. secs. 1.170A-1(e), 1.170A-7(a)(3), and 1.170A-14(g)(3), Income Tax Regs.

Frank Agostino, Eduardo S. Chung, Jeremy M. Klausner, and Reuben G. Miller, for petitioners.

Shawna A. Early, for respondent.

CONTENTS

FINDINGS OF FACT

NAT

The property

Increased IRS scrutiny of easement contributions

NAT’s solicitation

The side letter

Appraisal

Noncash contribution to NAT

Cash contribution to NAT

Subsequent communications from NAT

2004 and 2005 Federal income tax returns

Notice of deficiency

OPINION

I. Charitable contributions

A. Generally

B. Conditional gifts

C. Partial interests in general

D. Conservation easements

E. Construing “so remote as to be negligible”

II. Analysis

A. The possibility of disallowance by the IRS

1. The possibility of disallowance as a matter of fact

a. Increased IRS scrutiny

b. The side letter

2. Disallowance as a subsequent event

B. The possibility of return of the contributions

1. Conservation easements under New York law

2. Merger doctrine

3. Nullity

4. Voluntary removal of the easement

III. Conclusion.

GUSTAFSON, Judge: Pursuant to section 6212(a),1 the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) determined deficiencies in tax for petitioners, Lawrence and Lorna Graev, in the amounts of $237,481 for 2004 and $412,620 for 2005, resulting from the disallowance of charitable contribution deductions the Graevs claimed for those years. The IRS also determined that Mr. and Mrs. Graev are liable for accuracy-related penalties under section 6662(h) and alternatively under section 6662(a) for 2004 and 2005. Mr. and Mrs. Graev petitioned this Court, pursuant to section 6213(a), for redetermination of these deficiencies and penalties. The issue for decision at present is whether the deductions that the Graevs claimed for charitable contributions of cash and a conservation easement they donated to the National Architectural Trust (“NAT”) should be disallowed because they were conditional gifts.2 We hold that the Graevs’ contributions were conditional, non-deductible gifts.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The parties submitted this issue fully stipulated pursuant to Rule 122, reflecting their agreement that the relevant facts could be presented without a trial.3 The stipulated facts are incorporated herein by this reference. Mr. and Mrs. Graev resided in the State of New York when they filed the petition.

NAT

The parties have stipulated that, “[f]or purposes of the Court’s decision regarding” the conditional gift issue, NAT is a “qualified organization” under section 170(h)(3), to which a charitable contribution can be made that is deductible for tax purposes. NAT’s stated mission is to preserve historic architecture in metropolitan areas across the United States. NAT solicits the contribution of facade conservation easements by owners of property with historic significance as determined by the National Park Service. When NAT solicits potential donors, it features the potential charitable deductions that owners may receive by contributing a facade conservation easement and a corresponding cash endowment to NAT. In addition, NAT considered it “standard Trust policy”, regarding donors of easements and cash, to return a cash contribution to the extent the IRS disallowed a deduction therefor. In numerous instances NAT issued “comfort letters” assuring donors of this policy.

The property

In 1999 Mr. Graev purchased property in a historic preservation district in New York, New York, for $4.3 million. The property is listed on the National Register of Historic Places. During the years at issue Mr. Graev was the sole fee simple owner of the property, and he held the property subject to a mortgage.

Increased IRS scrutiny of easement contributions

On June 30, 2004, the IRS released IRS Notice 2004-41, 2004-2 C.B. 31, which addressed charitable contributions and conservation easements and stated in part:

The Internal Revenue Service is aware that taxpayers who (1) transfer an easement on real property to a charitable organization, or (2) make payments to a charitable organization in connection with a purchase of real property from the charitable organization, may be improperly claiming charitable contribution deductions under § 170 of the Internal Revenue Code. The purpose of this notice is to advise participants in these transactions that, in appropriate cases, the Service intends to disallow such deductions and may impose penalties and excise taxes. * * *

* * * * * * *

Some taxpayers are claiming inappropriate charitable contribution deductions under § 170 for cash payments or easement transfers to charitable organizations in connection with the taxpayers’ purchases of real property.

In some of these questionable cases, the charitable organization purchases the property and places a conservation easement on the property. Then, the charitable organization sells the property subject to the easement to a buyer for a price that is substantially less than the price paid by the charitable organization for the property. As part of the sale, the buyer makes a second payment, designated as a “charitable contribution,” to the charitable organization. The total of the payments from the buyer to the charitable organization fully reimburses the charitable organization for the cost of the property.

In appropriate cases, the Service will treat these transactions in accordance with their substance, rather than their form. Thus, the Service may treat the total of the buyer’s payments to the charitable organization as the purchase price paid by the buyer for the property.

Thus, the IRS publicly announced its awareness of abuses related to easement contribution deductions, putting potential donors and donees on notice that easement contribution deductions might be examined and challenged. We find that there was at least a non-negligible possibility that the IRS would challenge an easement contribution deduction thereafter claimed by Mr. Graev.

NAT’s solicitation

In the summer of 2004, a representative from NAT contacted Mr. Graev regarding a potential easement donation to NAT. Mr. Graev became aware that he had a “neighbor across the street” who had contributed a facade easement to NAT and who had received from NAT a side letter that promised return of contributions if deductions were disallowed. Mr. Graev evidently expressed to NAT an interest in making an easement contribution like his neighbor’s, but on September 15, 2004, he sent an email to NAT explaining a concern that had arisen:

My accountants have referred me to Notice 2004-41 * * * issued by the IRS on June 30, 2004, in which the IRS has indicated that it will, in “appropriate cases”, disallow charitable deductions to organizations that promote conservation easements and may impose penalties and excise taxes on the taxpayer. They have not advised me to abandon this idea, but they have advised me to be very cautious. What are your thoughts especially as it relates to the side letter, etc.

(The “side letter” to which Mr. Graev referred was NAT’s comfort letter assuring that it would refund a contribution in the event that the favorable tax results anticipated from a contribution were not achieved.) Mr. Graev indicated that he had consulted his accountants, and in 2004 those accountants would surely have been aware of published court decisions issued over the past decade that disallowed deductions claimed for the contribution of facade easements.4 On his tax returns Mr. Graev listed his occupation as “attorney”, and we infer that he is an individual of above-average sophistication who, with the help of his accountants, was capable of identifying tax risks. We find that Mr. Graev did in fact identify non-negligible risks regarding the deductibility of facade easements, as evidenced by his September 15 email and subsequent dealings with NAT.

In a response to Mr. Graev’s concerns, NAT sent him an email dated September 16, 2004, that stated:

The IRS notices to which you refer were prompted by recently exposed improprieties at the Nature Conservancy, the nation’s largest land conservation easement holding organization. The practice the IRS is concerned with here is when a non-profit acquires property, puts an easement on it and sells it for a reduced price plus a tax-deductible contribution. * * *

It is important to distinguish between these activities, which certainly warrant scrutiny, and those engaged in by the National Architectural Trust. * * * We have been in contact with the IRS since the notices were issued and, based upon our discussion with them, have no reasons to expect that we or any of the donations we have received (easement or cash) will be reviewed.

Thus far not a single donation made to the Trust has been disallowed by the IRS (400+ in New York City alone). * * *

With regard to side letters in particular, NAT wrote:

[W]e don’t believe they compromise the tax-deductibility of cash donations in the present tax year, as they are simply a confirmation of standard Trust policy. However, we do not believe this would be the case with a legal agreement that explicitly made the cash donation contingent on the survival of the deduction. In such a case, we would recommend that the cash donation be treated as tax-deductible once the contingency period has expired. * * *

That is, it was “standard Trust policy” to refund a cash contribution to the extent the IRS disallowed the donor’s deduction for the related easement.

Evidently reassured, Mr. Graev executed a facade conservation easement application to NAT on September 20, 2004. In a cover letter to NAT transmitting the application, Mr. Graev stated: “I will also be looking for the NAT to issue the ‘side’ letter we discussed (similar to the one being issued to my neighbor across the street).”

The side letter

On September 24, 2004 NAT sent the side letter to Mr. Graev. The side letter read in pertinent part:

1. In the event the IRS challenges the appraisal of your facade conservation easement and the tax deductions derived therefrom are reduced as a result, we will make a proportionate reduction to your cash endowment contribution and promptly refund the difference to you.

2. In the event the IRS disallows the tax deductions in their entirety, we will promptly refund your entire cash endowment contribution and join with you to immediately remove the facade conservation easement from the property’s title.

Neither the side letter nor any other evidence in our record suggests that, in the event the IRS disallowed his contribution, Mr. Graev would have to sue NAT in order to induce it to “remove” the easement. Rather, NAT promised upon disallowance to “join with [him] * * * to immediately remove the facade conservation easement from the property’s title”. Mr. Graev took NAT at its word, and so do we. That is, we find that there was at least a non-negligible possibility, if the IRS successfully disallowed Mr. Graev’s easement contribution deduction, that NAT would do what it said it would do.

Appraisal

Mr. Graev retained the firm of Miller Samuel, Inc. (“MSI”), to prepare an appraisal of the facade easement. In October 2004, MSI issued its appraisal report to Mr. Graev appraising the property at $9 million and concluding that the easement would reduce the value by 11% (or $990,000). Thus, the report appraised the easement at $990,000.

Noncash contribution to NAT

In late 20045 Mr. Graev executed a conservation deed granting a facade easement on the property to NAT. The deed in pertinent part provides:

The Property constitutes an important element in the architectural ensemble of the Treadwell Farms Historic District, and the grant of the Easement as set forth in this instrument will, inter alia, assist in preserving this certified historic structure and in preserving open space for the scenic enjoyment of the general public.

* * * * * * *

The Grantor does hereby grant and convey to the Grantee, TO HAVE AND TO HOLD, an Easement in gross, in perpetuity, in, on and to the Property, the Building and the Facade, being an Open Space and Architectural Facade Conversation Easement on the Property * * *

* * * * * * *

A. * * * This Easement shall survive any termination of Grantor’s or the Grantee’s existence. The rights of the Grantee under this instrument shall run for the benefit of an may be exercised by its successor and assigns, or by its designees duly authorized in a deed of Easement.

B. Grantee covenants and agrees that it will not transfer, assign or otherwise convey its rights under this Easement except to another “qualified organization” described in Section 170(h)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and controlling Treasury regulations, and Grantee further agrees that it will not transfer this Easement unless the transferee first agrees to continue to carry out the conservation purposes for which this Easement was created, provided, however, that nothing herein contained shall be constructed to limit the Grantee’s right to give its consent (e.g., to changes in a Protected Facade(s)) or to abandon some or all of its rights hereunder. [Emphasis added.]

C. In the event this Easement is ever extinguished through a judicial decree, Grantor agrees on behalf of itself, its heirs, successors and assigns, that Grantee, or its successors and assigns, will be entitled to receive upon the subsequent sale, exchange or involuntary conversion of the Property, a portion of the proceeds from such sale, exchange or conversion equal to the same proportion that the value of the initial Easement donation bore to the entire value of the property at the time of donation * * *. Grantee agrees to use any proceeds so realized in a manner consistent with the conservation purposes of the original contribution.

* * * * * * *

Citimortgage Inc. (“Mortgagee/Lender”) hereby joins in the execution of this CONSERVATION DEED OF EASEMENT for the sole and limited purpose of subordinating its rights in the Property to the right of the Grantee, its successors or assigns, to enforce the conservation purposes of this Easement in perpetuity under the following conditions and stipulations:

(a) The Mortgagee/Lender and its assignees shall have a prior claim to all insurance proceeds * * * and all proceeds from condemnation, and shall be entitled to same in preference to Grantee until the Mortgage/the Deed of Trust is paid off and discharged, notwithstanding that the Mortgage/the Deed of Trust is subordinate in priority to the Easement.

The deed did not expressly refer to the side letter or incorporate its terms. The City of New York recorded the deed on February 17, 2005.

Cash contribution to NAT

In conjunction with an easement donation, NAT asks a donor to make a cash contribution to NAT equal to 10% of the appraised easement value, in order to pay for NAT’s current operating costs and to fund its long-term monitoring and administration needs. In compliance with NAT’s request, Mr. Graev made an initial deposit of $1,000 to NAT on September 15, 2004. On December 17, 2004, the same day he delivered the signed deed to NAT, Mr. Graev made a $98,000 cash contribution to NAT, bringing his cash contributions to NAT to a total of $99,000. On January 25, 2005, NAT gave Mr. Graev written acknowledgment of his 2004 cash and non-cash contributions. That correspondence also included a copy of Form 8283, executed by the appraiser, MSI, and NAT.

Subsequent communications from NAT

Also on January 25, 2005, NAT sent a letter to Mr. Graev informing him that the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance had announced in a press release their “intent to implement reforms to the tax laws governing facade easements that will increase and create additional fines and penalties on promoters, taxpayers and appraisers who participate, aid or assist in the donation of facade easements that are found to be significantly overvalued.” Several months later, in August 2005, NAT sent Mr. Graev another letter which read:

The purpose of this letter is to bring to your attention a development that may be relevant to the tax deductibility of the cash contributions that you made to the National Architectural Trust * * *

In connection with your donation of a facade conservation easement and cash contribution and per your request, we sent you a letter dated September 24, 2004, stating, among other things, that the cash contribution would be refunded in whole or in part if your tax deduction for the easement were reduced or disallowed by the Internal Revenue Service. It has recently been brought to our attention by our attorney that this offer of a refund may adversely affect the deductibility of the cash contribution as a charitable gift. * * *

We urge you to contact your professional tax advisor to determine the actual impact of the refund offer. Of course, if you determine that you would prefer that we withdraw the refund offer, which according to our attorney should restore the deductibility of your cash contribution, the Trust will promptly do so. * * *

Mr. Graev did not ask NAT to withdraw the refund offer. We find that NAT’s formal offer to withdraw the refund offer — made after NAT consulted with its attorney — further indicates that NAT intended to honor its promises in the side letter (even if the promises may not have been legally enforceable), unless Mr. Graev directed otherwise.

2004 and 2005 Federal income tax returns

Mr. and Mrs. Graev filed joint Forms 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, for taxable years 2004 and 2005. On their 2004 return, which they filed on or around October 10, 2005 (i.e., after the January and August 2005 letters from NAT, discussed above), Mr. and Mrs. Graev reported a charitable contribution of $990,000 for the facade easement contribution and $99,000 for the cash contribution to NAT. Mr. and Mrs. Graev claimed a deduction for the entire cash contribution in 2004, but because of the limitations on charitable contribution deductions in section 170(b)(1)(C), they claimed a charitable contribution deduction with respect to the facade easement of only $544,449 on their 2004 return.

On their 2005 return, filed on or around October 6, 2006, Mr. and Mrs. Graev claimed a carryover charitable contribution deduction of $445,551 relating to the facade easement contribution in 2004.

Notice of deficiency

By a statutory notice of deficiency dated September 22, 2008, the IRS disallowed Mr. and Mrs. Graev’s cash and non-cash charitable contribution deductions relating to their contributions to NAT and determined deficiencies in tax for both 2004 and 2005. In the notice of deficiency the IRS stated: “[T]he noncash charitable contribution of a qualified conservation contribution is disallowed because it was made subject to subsequent event(s)”. The notice disallowed the Graevs’ cash charitable contribution deduction for the same reason. The IRS also determined that Mr. and Mrs. Graev are liable for accuracy-related penalties under section 6662 for 2004 and 2005.

OPINION

The question now before the Court is whether deductions for Mr. Graev’s contributions of cash and the easement to NAT should be disallowed because they were conditional gifts. The answer depends on whether NAT’s promises in the side letter made the gifts conditional and whether the chance that the condition would occur was “so remote as to be negligible”. See 26 C.F.R. secs. 1.170A-1(e), 1.170A-7(a)(3), 1.170A-14(g)(3), Income Tax Regs.

The Graevs argue that under New York law the agreement in the side letter is unenforceable because conditions in the side letter were not included in the recorded deed and that under Federal tax law the side letter was a nullity. We conclude that NAT’s promises in the side letter were not a nullity and were not extinguished and that NAT could and would honor its promises both as to the easement and as to the cash contribution.

I. Charitable contributions

A. Generally

Section 170(a)(1) generally allows a deduction for any “charitable contribution” made during the taxable year. Section 170(c)(2) defines a “charitable contribution” for this purpose to include “a contribution or gift to or for the use of” a trust organized and operated exclusively for charitable or educational purposes. The parties agree for purposes of the conditional gift issue that NAT is such an organization.

Application of the general rule in section 170(a)(1) may be complicated — especially with regard to the amount and timing of a charitable contribution deduction — if a donor contributes a property interest to a charity but, at the time of the contribution, there is uncertainty about the amount of property that will actually reach the charity — e.g., when a donor contributes a remainder interest in property to a charity, or (as in this case) the donor contributes property subject to a condition. Section 170 and the corresponding regulations provide instruction and limitations that, at least in part, ensure that the donor will be able to deduct only what the donee organization actually receives. See, e.g., sec. 170(f)(2), (3), (11). Three such limitations are pertinent in this case: (1) 26 C.F.R. section 1.170A-1(e), which limits deductions for conditional gifts; (2) section 170(f)(3)(A) and the corresponding regulations, which limit deductions for contributions of partial interests in property; and (3) section 170(f)(3)(B)(iii) and corresponding regulations, which provide special rules for conservation easements.

B. Conditional gifts

The general rule of section 170(a)(1) allows a deduction for a charitable contribution only when “payment * * * is made within the taxable year.” (Emphasis added.) Regulations corresponding to section 170(a) clarify this rule with a limitation particularly relevant in this case:

If an interest in property passes to, or is vested in, charity on the date of the gift and the interest would be defeated by the subsequent performance of some act or the happening of some event, the possibility of occurrence of which appears on the date of the gift to be so remote as to be negligible, the deduction is allowable. [26 C.F.R. sec. 170A-1(e).]

That is, the deduction may be considered “made” notwithstanding a possibility that the contribution will be defeated by a subsequent event, but only if that possibility is “so remote as to be negligible”. Although the parties agree that the side letter recited conditions on Mr. Graev’s contributions, the parties disagree about whether this regulation disallows deductions for those contributions.

A brief discussion of the history of 26 C.F.R. section 1.170A-1(e) is helpful in understanding the regulation’s application in this case. The Secretary promulgated the first version of this regulation in1959 to correspond to section 170(a) of the 1954 Code.6 The operative language in that 1959 regulation was identical to an older regulation that had limited deductions for estate tax purposes for certain conditional charitable bequests. See 26 C.F.R. sec. 81.46(a), Estate Tax Regs. (1949).7 Given this similarity, we consider interpretations of 26 C.F.R. section 20.2055-2(b), Estate Tax Regs., and its history instructive in construing 26 C.F.R. section 170A-1(e). See Briggs v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 646, 657 (1979), aff’d without published opinion, 665 F.2d 1051 (9th Cir. 1981).

The Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Estate of Sternberger, 348 U.S. 187, 194 (1955), discussed the estate tax regulations at length, stating:

The predecessor of [26 C.F.R.] s[ec.] 81.46 confined charitable deductions to outright, unconditional bequests to charity. It expressly excluded deductions for charitable bequests that were subject to conditions, either precedent or subsequent. While it encouraged assured bequests to charity, it offered no deductions for bequests that might never reach charity. Subsequent amendments have clarified and not changed that principle. Section 81.46(a) today yields to no condition unless the possibility that charity will not take is “negligible” or “highly improbable.” * * *

Similarly, a fundamental principle underlying the charitable contribution deduction is that the charity actually receive and keep the contribution. 26 C.F.R. section 1.170A-1(e) clarifies that principle: no deduction for a charitable contribution that is subject to a condition (regardless of what the condition might be) is allowable, unless on the date of the contribution the possibility that a charity’s interest in the contribution “would be defeated” is “negligible”.

Accordingly, under section 1.170A-1(e) of the regulations (construing the statutory requirement of section 170(a)(1) that a gift actually “is made”), the Graevs’ deductions are not allowable unless the possibility that NAT’s interests in the easement and cash would be defeated was “so remote as to be negligible”.

C. Partial interests in general

Logically related to but distinct from the disallowance of deductions for conditional gifts is the limitation in section 170(f)(3) on deductions for contributions of partial interests in property. One is generally allowed a deduction only for the contribution of one’s entire interest in property. Congress enacted what is now section 170(f)(3)(A) as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, sec. 201, 83 Stat. at 549. Section 170(f)(3)(A) allows a deduction for a charitable contribution “of an interest in property [not made in trust] which consists of less than the taxpayer’s entire interest in such property” only to the extent it would be allowable under section 170 “if such interest had been transferred in trust”. This is a narrow allowance, since the rules that allow charitable contribution deductions for partial interests transferred in trust allow deductions only for interests that can be valued using prescribed methods (e.g., actuarial tables promulgated in the regulations) and that have assurances that the charity will receive payments from the trust. See, e.g., sec. 170(e)(2); 26 C.F.R. sec. 1.170A-6, Income Tax Regs.

In this case, since Mr. Graev reserved the right to have NAT return the easement and the cash if certain events occurred, the contributions of both the easement and the cash were less than Mr. Graev’s entire interest in the contributed property. Accordingly, Mr. Graev’s contributions appear subject to the limitation in section 170(f)(3). However, 26 C.F.R. section 1.170A-7(a)(3) provides the following mitigation of this limitation:

A deduction shall not be disallowed under section 170(f)(3)(A) * * * merely because the interest which passes to, or is vested in, the charity may be defeated by the performance of some act or the happening of some event, if on the date of the gift it appears that the possibility that such act or event will occur is so remote as to be negligible. * * *

Thus, under this regulation, even though the contributions did not consist of Mr. Graev’s entire interest in the cash and the easement, the Graevs’ deductions for contributions would not be disallowed under section 170(f)(3)(A) if the likelihood that NAT’s interests in the cash and the easement would be defeated was “so remote as to be negligible”.

D. Conservation easements

An easement is “[a]n interest in land owned by another person, consisting in the right to use or control the land, or an area above or below it, for a specific limited purpose”. Black’s Law Dictionary 585-586 (9th ed. 2009). Consequently, an easement — whether or not it is subject to any condition — is by definition a partial interest in property, and it would therefore be non-deductible under section 170(f)(3)(A), apart from any further statutory provision. However, further provision is made in subsections (f)(3)(B)(iii) and (h) of section 170, the history of which we briefly survey:

The disallowance of a deduction for partial interests was added to the Code as section 170(f)(3) by the Tax Reform Act of 1969. In that provision’s original form, the only exceptions to disallowance of a deduction for contributions of partial interests were for contributions of “a remainder interest in a personal residence or farm” and “an undivided portion of the taxpayer’s entire interest in property”. That is, no exception was made for a qualified conservation contribution. However, the Staff of Joint Committee on Taxation opined in its General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, at 80 (J. Comm. Print 1970), that “a gift of an open space easement in gross is to be considered a gift of an undivided interest in property where the easement is in perpetuity.”

Congress made explicit an exception for (i.e., permitted a deduction for) certain easements in the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, sec. 2124(e), 90 Stat. at 1919, which amended section 170(f)(3)(B) to provide in clause (iii) that a donor may claim a deduction for the contribution of an “easement with respect to real property of not less than 30 years’ duration granted to * * * [a charitable organization] exclusively for conservation purposes”. The following year Congress revised that exception, eliminating the “30 years’ duration” provision and limiting deductibility to an “easement with respect to real property granted in perpetuity”. (Emphasis added.) Tax Reduction and Simplification Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-30, sec. 309(a), 91 Stat. at 154. In the Tax Treatment Extension Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-541, sec. 6(a), 94 Stat. at 3206, Congress amended section 170(f)(3) and added subsection (h), which have remained in effect since then and work in tandem to keep the perpetuity requirement for conservation easement donations.

Section 170(f)(3)(B)(iii) exempts, from the general disallowance of deductions for contributions of partial interests, contributions of “a qualified conservation contribution” — a term defined in section 170(h)(1) as a contribution of a “qualified real property interest,” to a “qualified organization”, “exclusively for conservation purposes.” A “qualified real property interest” must have “a restriction (granted in perpetuity) on the use which may be made of the real property.” Sec. 170(h)(2)(C) (emphasis added).8 Regulations describing the perpetuity requirement provide:

A deduction shall not be disallowed under section 170(f)(3)(B)(iii) * * * merely because the interest which passes to, or is vested in, the donee organization may be defeated by the performance of some act or the happening of some event, if on the date of the gift it appears that the possibility that such act or event will occur is so remote as to be negligible. * * * [26 C.F.R. sec. 1.170A-14(g)(3).]

(The “so remote as to be negligible” phrase is the familiar term first used in the 1949 estate tax regulations cited above.) Accordingly, a conservation easement fails to be “in perpetuity” — and is therefore not excepted from the general rule of section 170(f)(3)(A) disallowing deductions for contributions of partial interests — if, on the date of the donation, the possibility that the charity may be divested of its interest in the easement is not so remote as to be negligible.

E. Construing “so remote as to be negligible”

Each of the issues discussed above — i.e., whether a charitable contribution was effectively “made”, whether it consisted of an “entire interest”, and whether it was a “qualified conservation contribution” — essentially turns on the same question: At the time of Mr. Graev’s contributions, was the possibility that NAT’s interest in the cash and the easement would be defeated “so remote as to be negligible”? In prior cases, we have defined “so remote as to be negligible” as “‘a chance which persons generally would disregard as so highly improbable that it might be ignored with reasonable safety in undertaking a serious business transaction.'” 885 Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. 156, 161 (1990) (quoting United States v. Dean, 224 F.2d 26, 29 (1st Cir. 1955)). Stated differently, it is “a chance which every dictate of reason would justify an intelligent person in disregarding as so highly improbable and remote as to be lacking in reason and substance.” Briggs v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. at 657. What is determinative under the section 170 “remote” regulations is the possibility, after considering all the facts and circumstances, that NAT’s reception and retention of the easement and cash would be defeated.

II. Analysis

The side letter provides that the occurrence that would defeat NAT’s interest in the easement and cash is the IRS’s successful disallowance of the Graevs’ charitable contribution deductions and NAT’s consequent promised “removal” of the easement and return of the cash. We hold that at the date of the contribution the possibility that the IRS would disallow the deductions and that NAT would return the cash to Mr. Graev and “remove” the easement was not “so remote as to be negligible”.

A. The possibility of disallowance by the IRS

1. The possibility of disallowance as a matter of fact

The Graevs argue that as of December 2004, the caselaw supported an easement valuation of 10% to 15% of Mr. Graev’s property and that it was therefore reasonable to conclude that Mr. Graev’s easement donation had a value of $990,000 (i.e., 11% of the appraised value of the property). They assert that the possibility the IRS would disallow their deductions was so remote as to be negligible. However, on the undisputed facts of this case, it is self-evident that the risk of IRS disallowance was not negligible.9 A substantial risk obviously arose from the IRS’s then-announced intention to scrutinize charitable contribution deductions for facade easement contributions, and that risk is evident from Mr. Graevs’ insistence on NAT’s issuing the side letter. We need not wonder how a donor or donee would have responded to this risk if he had foreseen it; we know how Mr. Graev did respond when he did foresee it: He did not “disregard” or “ignore[ ]” it, see 885 Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. at 161; Briggs v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. at 657, but rather went out of his way to address it and hedge against it.

a. Increased IRS scrutiny

The Graevs note that at the time of their contribution in December 2004, no charitable contribution deduction arising from a contribution to NAT had been disallowed (to their knowledge). However, the enforcement landscape regarding deductions for facade easement donations was visibly changing at the time of his contribution. As is discussed above, the IRS released Notice 2004-41, supra, on June 30, 2004. In that notice the IRS stated:

The Internal Revenue Service is aware that taxpayers who (1) transfer an easement on real property to a charitable organization, or (2) make payments to a charitable organization in connection with a purchase of real property from the charitable organization, may be improperly claiming charitable contribution deductions under § 170 of the Internal Revenue Code. The purpose of this notice is to advise participants in these transactions that, in appropriate cases, the Service intends to disallow such deductions and may impose penalties and excise taxes. * * *

Notice 2004-41 goes on to give a specific example of the second instance, i.e., a taxpayer makes a cash contribution to a charitable organization in addition to purchasing (at a discount) from the same organization real property that was subject to a conservation easement, where the total amount of contribution and purchase price equals the charity’s initial cost of the real property. The Graevs argue that since Notice 2004-41 specifically described a transaction that did not apply in their case, the notice was not applicable to them.

We disagree. While Notice 2004-41 did list one specific transaction that the Commissioner had determined was inappropriate, the Commissioner’s general warning against “improperly claiming charitable contribution deductions” connected with transfers of conservation easements to charities was still very much applicable to the Graevs. Notice 2004-41 made clear before Mr. Graev’s transfer that his transaction with NAT would be subject to heightened scrutiny and that if any of the Graevs’ positions were susceptible to challenge, the Commissioner would likely enforce a contrary position. Mr. Graev’s September 15, 2004, email to NAT reflects his understanding of this possibility, stating that in light of Notice 2004-41 his accountants “have advised [him] to be very cautious.”

The Graevs argue that their valuation of the contributed easement was reasonable. Since the valuation issue will be resolved by the parties’ stipulation to be bound by the outcome of another case that is still pending, see note 2 above, we do not decide valuation now but assume that the Graevs’ valuation was reasonable. However, the fact that a valuation is reasonable does not mean that it is correct; a reasonable but incorrect valuation may be challenged and disallowed; consequently, someone who assigns a reasonable value to his donation may nonetheless face a non-negligible risk of disallowance.

Moreover, valuation is not the only potential issue faced by a taxpayer claiming a deduction for a contributed easement, and it was not the only issue as to which NAT promised to return Mr. Graev’s contributions. The first numbered paragraph of the side letter did address valuation (“In the event the IRS challenges the appraisal”), but the second numbered paragraph made the distinct promise to return the contributions “[i]n the event the IRS disallows the tax deductions in their entirety”. There are multiple requirements in section 170 and the corresponding regulations that, if not followed, may lead to disallowance — and valuation is only one of them. For example, an easement contribution may be disallowed where —

The donee fails to be a “qualified organization” described in section 170(h)(3).

The property subject to the easement fails to be of a “historically important land area” or a “certified historic structure.” Sec. 170(h)(4)(iv); see Turner v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 299, 316 (2006).

The taxpayer fails to contribute a “qualified real property interest”. Sec. 170(a)(2); see Belk v. Commissioner, 140 T.C. __ (Jan. 28, 2013).

The easement fails to preserve conservation purposes “in perpetuity”. Sec. 170(h)(5); see Carpenter v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-1; Herman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-205.

The parties fail to subordinate the rights of a mortgagee in the property “to the right of the qualified organization to enforce the conservation purposes of the gift in perpetuity.” 26 C.F.R. sec. 1.170A-14(g)(2); see Mitchell v. Commissioner, 138 T.C. 324, 331-332 (2012).

The taxpayer fails to “[a]ttach a fully complete appraisal summary * * * to the tax return”. 26 C.F.R sec. 1.170A-13(c)(2)(B). But see Kaufman v. Shulman, 687 F.3d 21, 28-30 (1st Cir. 2012), aff’g in part, vacating in part, and remanding in part Kaufman v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 294 (2011), and 134 T.C. 182 (2010).

The appraisal fails to be a “qualified appraisal”. 26 C.F.R. sec. 1.170A-13(c)(3); see Friedberg v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-238.

The appraiser fails to be a “qualified appraiser”. 26 C.F.R. sec. 1.170A-13(c)(5); see Rothman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-218 (reserving the question on whether an appraiser was “qualified”).

The parties fail to record the easement or otherwise fail to effect “legally enforceable restrictions”. 26 C.F.R. sec. 1.170A-14(g)(1); see Satullo v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-614, aff’d without published opinion, 67 F.3d 314 (11th Cir 1995).

The taxpayer fails to “[m]aintain records” necessary to substantiate the charitable contribution. 26 C.F.R. sec. 1.170A-13(c)(2)(C), Income Tax Regs.

Mr. Graev’s September 15, 2004, correspondence with NAT reflects his clear understanding that charitable contribution deductions for contributions “to organizations that promote conservation easements” were going to be the subject of IRS scrutiny and could be disallowed for failing to satisfy any one of the requirements in section 170. Mr. Graev’s accountants advised him “to be very cautious” with such transactions. Clearly, the risk that the IRS might disallow a deduction for the contribution of an easement was well above “negligible”.

b. The side letter

Informed by his accountants’ warning, Mr. Graev initially asked NAT about the possibility of a side letter from NAT that promised the return of contributions if deductions were disallowed. NAT eventually gave Mr. Graev such a letter on September 24, 2004. The mere fact that he required the side letter is strong evidence that, at the time of Mr. Graev’s contribution, the risk that his corresponding deductions might be disallowed could not be (and was not) “ignored with reasonable safety in undertaking a serious business transaction.” 885 Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. at 161.

Mr. Graev was not alone in his assessment of the risk of disallowance. NAT considered it “standard Trust policy” to return a cash contribution to the extent a deduction therefor was disallowed by the IRS. In numerous instances NAT issued “comfort letters” assuring donors of this policy. The very essence of a comfort letter implies a non-negligible risk; and the author uses the letter to induce the recipient to enter into a transaction. In this case the risk was either partial or complete disallowance of Mr. Graev’s claimed charitable contribution deductions. NAT’s course of dealing confirms that the possibility that the IRS might disallow Mr. Graev’s deductions was not “so remote as to be negligible”. See 26 C.F.R. secs. 1.170A-1(e), 1.170A-7(a)(3), 1.170A-14(g)(3).

3. Disallowance as a subsequent event

The Graevs argue:

Forty-four years ago, this Court ruled that the [subsequent] events referred to by Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(e) do not include contingencies created by Respondent’s examination or contingencies within Respondent’s control. O’Brien v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 583, 592 (1966), acq., 1968-1 C.B. 2.[ 10 ]

O’Brien v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 583 (1966), did involve a charitable contribution that was contingent on subsequent favorable tax treatment; but the Graevs’ characterization of our ruling in O’Brien is flatly incorrect, and their reliance on it is therefore mistaken.

O’Brien addressed two issues — a charitable remainder trust issue (which we describe here first) and a related but distinct tax-treatment contingency issue. The taxpayers created a charitable remainder trust in June 1964 — of which they made themselves trustees with broad powers to manage the trust — and then made contributions to the trust in December 1964. Id. at 584. The Commissioner argued that the taxpayers were not entitled to charitable contribution deductions derived from the taxpayers’ contributions to the trust because the complete management power given to the donor-trustees enabled them to defeat the remainder interests and therefore prevented the deduction. Id. at 591. We rejected that argument and concluded —

that it is highly improbable that the petitioners in their fiduciary capacity will ever perform an act which will defeat the charitable remainders they have created in the trust. All of the conditions and circumstances surrounding the transfers of property interests to the trust persuade us that the named charities, or other qualified ones, will eventually receive the beneficial enjoyment thereof. * * * [ Id. at 596; emphasis added.]

We thus decided this remainder trust issue under “[t]he guidelines * * * set forth in section 1.170-1(e), Income Tax Regs.”11 Id. at 594.

The Commissioner’s tax contingency argument (discussed first in O’Brien) was based on paragraph 16 of the trust instrument, under which contributions to the trust were “subject to the condition that such contribution shall be repaid to the contributor by the Trustees * * * only in the event and to the extent that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue does not allow [it] as a deduction”. Id. at 588. In the notice of deficiency issued in September 1965, the Commissioner had disallowed the charitable contribution deductions (for the sole reason that the donor-trustees had power over the trust). We “disposed of [the contingency issue] summarily”, id. at 591, so it is not entirely clear what the Commissioner had argued; but it appears that the Commissioner’s contention was simply that “the literal meaning of paragraph 16”, id., called for return of the contributions upon the mere act of disallowance by the Commissioner, whether or not the Commissioner’s position was valid or was upheld. This position would have put the contingency “‘within the control * * * of the Commissioner'”, O’Brien v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. at 591(quoting Surface Combustion Corp. v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 631, 655 (1947), aff’d, 181 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1950)),12 without regard to the merits of the Commissioner’s decision. We held, to the contrary, that despite “the narrow wording of the trust instrument”, “[t]he petitioners have a right to litigate respondent’s determination”, so that the contributions would not be subject to return “unless the petitioners are unsuccessful in this litigation.” Id. at 592.

That is, in O’Brien the Commissioner evidently argued that the charitable contribution deductions were improper simply because, under the trust instrument, the charitable contributions were defeated by the IRS’s mere disallowance (whether or not that disallowance was upheld in litigation). We held, however, that if the taxpayers successfully challenged that disallowance, then the contributions were not defeated (and the contribution deductions could therefore be allowed). We thus held that a contingency expressed in terms of “disallowance” of a deduction actually looked to the merits of the deduction. Contrary to the Graevs’ argument, our O’Brien Opinion did not analyze the tax contingency issue under the section 170 regulations,13 and we did not hold that a tax-treatment contingency can never be a subsequent event that will defeat a contribution and a deduction. We simply did not address that issue.

This case, unlike O’Brien, clearly presents the issue of whether the promised return of a charitable contribution upon the disallowance of the charitable contribution deduction can constitute a subsequent event the possibility of which, if not negligible, renders the deduction not allowable. O’Brien sheds no light on that question.

B. The possibility of return of the contributions

If the risk of IRS disallowance was non-negligible, then so was the prospect that NAT would be called on to honor its side letter and “promptly refund * * * [Mr. Graev’s] entire cash endowment contribution and join with * * * [Mr. Graev] to immediately remove the facade conservation easement from the property’s title”. Given that non-negligible risk, Mr. Graev’s contributions fell afoul of the section 170 regulations implementing the statutory requirements that a gift be effectively “made”, that it consist of an “entire interest”, and that it be a “qualified conservation contribution”. The Graevs argue, however, that as a matter of law NAT could not be held to the promises it made in its side letter, so that there was in fact no possibility that the property would be returned.

The Graevs contend that NAT could not be divested of its interest in the easement because the side letter is not enforceable under New York law and that, as a result, the contributions were not really conditional.14 In particular, the Graevs argue that New York’s environmental conservation statutes, N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law secs. 49-0301 to 49-0311 (McKinney 2008 & Supp. 2013), would prevent the side letter from being enforced, and alternatively, that the common law doctrine of merger extinguished the side letter upon NAT’s recording the easement deed. They also contend that under principles of tax law the promises in the side were a nullity. We disagree.

1. Conservation easements under New York law

In general, property interests are determined by State law. United States v. Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 722 (1985). In 1983 New York enacted the New York Conservation Easement Statute. See N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law secs. 49-0301 to 49-0311. For purposes of these statutes a “conservation easement” is defined as:

an easement, covenant, restriction or other interest in real property, created under and subject to the provisions of this title which limits or restricts development, management or use of such real property for the purpose of preserving or maintaining the scenic, open, historic, archaeological, architectural, or natural condition, character, significance or amenities of the real property * * * [ Id. sec. 49-0303(1).]

Under these New York statutes, a conservation easement is enforceable even though “[i]t is not appurtenant to an interest in real property” and even though “[i]t can be or has been assigned to another holder”.15 N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law sec. 49-0305(5). Since an easement with these characteristics would not have been enforceable under New York common law, see Gross v. Cizauskas, 385 N.Y.S.2d 832 (App. Div. 1976), a conservation easement in New York is authorized only by statute and thus is subject to several statutory restrictions. We assume the easement in this case is enforceable only under New York’s Environmental Conservation Law and (as the Graevs contend) is subject to the restrictions therein, especially restrictions on how an easement can be extinguished.

The manner and circumstances in which parties can modify or extinguish a conservation easement under New York’s Environmental Conservation statutes are clear:

A conservation easement shall be modified or extinguished only pursuant to the provisions of section 49-0307 of this title. Any such modification or extinguishment shall be set forth in an instrument which complies with the requirements of section 5-703 of the general obligations law or in an instrument filed in a manner prescribed for recording a conveyance of real property pursuant to section two hundred ninety-one of the real property law. [N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law sec. 49-0305(2).]

The Graevs argue that NAT’s promise in the side letter to “remove the facade conservation easement from the property’s title” purports to retain for Mr. Graev a right to extinguish the easement that does not comply with the provisions of N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law section 49-0307, and as a result, any attempt to remove the easement pursuant to the promise in the side letter would be unlawful.

Pursuant to N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law section 49-0307, cross-referenced in the statute quoted above, a conservation easement held by a “not-for-profit conservation organization”16 may be modified or extinguished only: (1) “as provided in the instrument creating the easement”; (2) “in a proceeding pursuant to section nineteen hundred fifty-one of the real property actions and proceedings law”; or (3) “upon the exercise of the power of eminent domain.” NAT’s promise in the side letter to remove the easement, standing alone, does not appear to comply with any of the three permissible modification or extinguishment methods provided in N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law section 49-0307.

The Commissioner argues that the side letter should be considered part of “the instrument creating the easement”. That argument fails because the side letter was not “subscribed by the person * * * granting [the deed]”, N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law sec. 5-703 (McKinney 2012), nor was it recorded, which are both required under N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law section 49-0305 (cross-referencing N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law sec. 5-703) in order for a document to be considered an “instrument creating the easement”.

However, we hold that NAT had the ability to honor its promises in the side letter because the subscribed and recorded deed — which clearly is “the instrument creating the easement” — reserved for NAT the power to do so. Paragraph IV.B. of the duly recorded deed granting the easement explicitly gives NAT the right to “abandon” the easement, and that deed does comply with one of the three permissible methods — i.e., the first (allowing modification or extinguishment “as provided in the instrument creating the easement”). The recorded deed provides:

Grantee further agrees that it will not transfer this Easement unless the transferee first agrees to continue to carry out the conservation purposes for which this Easement was created, provided, however, that nothing herein contained shall be constructed to limit the Grantee’s right to give its consent (e.g., to changes in a Protected Facade(s)) or to abandon some or all of its rights hereunder. [Emphasis added.]

We have found that at the time Mr. Graev made the contribution, NAT intended to honor its promise to “join with * * * [Mr. Graev] to immediately remove the facade conservation easement from the property’s title”, and we hold that NAT had the ability to honor this promise by exercising its right to abandon the easement as set forth in paragraph IV.B. of the recorded deed.17

Accordingly, we find that the Commissioner has shown that the possibility that NAT would actually abandon its rights was more than negligible.

2. Merger doctrine

Alternatively, the Graevs argue that the entire side letter was extinguished under the common law doctrine of merger. This argument is also without merit. While the doctrine of merger generally extinguishes terms of preliminary contracts or negotiations upon the recording of a deed, so that only the terms in the recorded deed remain, there are exceptions to this general rule. 91 N.Y. Jur. 2d Real Property Sales and Exchanges, sec. 140 (2011). Assuming the doctrine of merger applies to the side letter, the provisions in the side letter would fall within one of these exceptions and survive the deed.

The merger rule does not apply where there is a clear intent evidenced by the parties that a particular provision of the contract shall survive the deed. See Novelty Crystal Corp. v. PSA Institutional Partners, L.P., 850 N.Y.S.2d 497, 500 (App. Div. 2008). “Intention of the parties may be derived from the instruments alone or from the instruments and the surrounding circumstances”. Goldsmith v. Knapp, 637 N.Y.S.2d 434, 436 (App. Div. 1996). In Seibros Fin. Corp. v. Kirman, 249 N.Y.S. 497, 499 (App. Div. 1931), a New York court held that because an agreement giving the purchaser a right to reconvey property that was claimed to be the “inducing cause which persuaded the plaintiff to purchase the property * * * [, t]he contract clearly shows that there was no intention on the part of the parties to merge the contract in the deed. A contract for the sale of real estate is merged in the deed only when the latter is intended to be accepted in full performance of the former.”

Likewise, we find that the side letter was an inducing cause that persuaded Mr. Grave to contribute the conservation easement and cash to NAT. Before he even filled out his application to NAT, Mr. Graev emailed NAT asking for its thoughts on the side letter; and after receiving NAT’s assurances that the side letter would not affect the deductibility of his contribution, he specifically requested the side letter. Moreover, after the donation, when NAT recognized that the side letter might be detrimental to Mr. Graev’s tax deductions, NAT offered to rescind the side letter and Mr. Graev did not accept NAT’s offer, indicating that the parties understood the side letter had survived the deed. Accordingly, we find that NAT’s promises in the side letter to return to the easement and cash were enforceable because we find a clear intent evidenced by the parties that the side letter would survive the deed.

3. Nullity

The Graevs appear to argue that NAT’s side letter is a nullity and should be disregarded for tax purposes because it provides for the donor’s potential recovery of the contributions in the event of unwanted tax consequences. In support of this argument the Graevs rely primarily on Commissioner v. Procter, 142 F.2d 824, 827-828 (4th Cir. 1944), rev’g a Memorandum Opinion of this Court. The holding of the Court of Appeals in Procter, however, is inapposite to this case.

In Procter the donors assigned to their children gifts of remainder interests in two trusts, subject to the following clause:

[I]n the event it should be determined by final judgment or order of a competent federal court of last resort that any part of the transfer in trust hereunder is subject to gift tax, it is agreed by all the parties hereto that in that event the excess property hereby transferred which is decreed by such court to be subject to gift tax, shall automatically be deemed not to be included in the conveyance in trust hereunder and shall remain the sole property of * * * [the taxpayer] * * *. [ Id. at 827.]

Under that clause, if the gifts were held by the courts to be taxable, then the gifts would be undone, and the donors would then be not liable for the tax for which the courts had held them liable. The clause purported not only to undo the gifts but also to undo the judicial decision.

The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the clause in Procter was “clearly a condition subsequent and void because contrary to public policy”, id., for three reasons:

(1) Such a clause “has a tendency to discourage the collection of the tax by the public officials charged with its collection”, thereby discouraging efforts to collect the tax. Id.

(2) “[T]he effect of the condition would be to obstruct the administration of justice by requiring the courts to pass upon a moot case”. Id.

(3) “[T]he condition is to the effect that the final judgment of a court is to be held for naught because of the provision of an indenture necessarily before the court when the judgment is rendered.” Id. That is, a final judgment would cause the condition to be operative, but the condition should not be allowed to operate to undo the judgment, since the instrument containing the condition was before the court, and all matters pertaining thereto merged in the judgment. Id. at 827-828.

None of these three reasons would apply to nullify NAT’s side letter:

First, the conditions in NAT’s side letter would not discourage the collection of tax. This Opinion decides that the Graevs are not entitled to charitable contribution deductions (and that there are therefore deficiencies in their income tax), and the return of the contributions to the Graevs would not at all undo or contradict that holding but would instead be consistent with that holding. In order for the condition in the side letter to be triggered, the deductions must be disallowed, and income tax will thereafter be owing whether or not the contribution is returned.

Second, the possibility of the subsequent return of the contributions does not render this case moot. The Graevs claimed deductions; the IRS disallowed them and determined deficiencies of tax; the Graevs challenged that determination, and we must decide the matter. If we had upheld the deductions, the condition in the side letter would never have been met, the gift would be complete, the contribution would be deductible (assuming other qualifications are met), and we would enter decision in favor of the Graevs to overturn the IRS’s deficiency determination. Because instead we disallow the deductions and enter decision in the IRS’s favor, upholding the deficiency determination, the condition in the side letter is triggered and the gift presumably reverts to the donor. However, in this case, unlike Procter, the reversion to the donor would not be inconsistent with the court’s holding — i.e., the tax collector in our case, unlike Proctor, would collect the tax consistent with the judgment even if the condition become operative and the gift were returned to the donor.

Third, although the final judgment in the IRS’s favor would cause the side letter to be operative, the return of the contribution pursuant to the side letter would not operate to undo the judgment, as was the case in Procter. The return would have no effect on the Graevs’ tax liabilities.

Other cases have similarly distinguished Procter and have held that certain tax contingency provisions are not void as against public policy. See Estate of Christiansen v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. 1, 8 n.7, 17-18 (2008) (a clause that “increases the amount donated to charity should the value of the estate be increased”, “would not make us opine on a moot issue [i.e., the value of the estate], and wouldn’t in any way upset the finality of our decision in this case”), aff’d, 586 F.3d 1061 (8th Cir. 2009); Estate of Dickinson v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 771, 777 (1975) (stating that the “agreement makes no attempt to nullify * * * [the Court’s] determination” (citing Surface Combustion Corp. v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 631, and O’Brien v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 583)); Estate of Petter v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-280 (“a judgment adjusting the value of each unit will actually trigger a reallocation of the number of units between the trusts and the foundation under the formula clause. So we are not issuing a merely declaratory judgment”), aff’d, 653 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2011).

4. Voluntary removal of the easement

The event that might defeat the contribution to NAT is the “removal” of the easement and the return of the cash pursuant to NAT’s side letter. Even if, as a matter of law, the side letter was not enforceable for any of the reasons the Graevs advance, the question would remain whether, as a matter of fact, in December 2004 there was a non-negligible possibility that the IRS would disallow the Graevs’ contribution deduction and NAT would voluntarily remove the easement. We have found that there was. Mr. Graev evidently concluded that NAT’s promise should be believed; he took deliberate steps to obtain its promise; and his conclusion is evidence of what was likely. NAT made such promises to Mr. Graev and others precisely because it was soliciting contributions from within a community of potential donors, and the ability of such an organization to obtain solicitations might well be undermined if it got a reputation for failing to keep its promises. To decide that there was no non-negligible possibility that NAT would voluntarily extinguish the easement and return the cash would require us to find that, in order to induce Mr. Graev to make his contribution, NAT made cynical promises that it fully intended to break. Our record will not support such a finding; the stipulated evidence simply shows a non-profit organization going about accomplishing its purpose. If we speculate (without evidence) that NAT might have reneged on its promise, or even if we assume that NAT probably would have reneged on its promise, that still leaves us with at least a non-negligible possibility that NAT would have done what it said it would do. That possibility is fatal to the Graevs’ contribution deductions.

III. Conclusion

Thus, on the evidence before us, we find that there was a substantial possibility that the IRS would challenge the Graevs’ easement contribution deductions. We hold that neither State nor Federal law would prevent enforcement of the side letter. And we find that apart from any legal enforceability of the side letter, it reflected what NAT was likely to do in the event of IRS disallowance.

For these reasons, we conclude that at the time of Mr. Graev’s contributions to NAT, the possibility that the IRS would disallow the Graevs’ deductions for the contributions and, as a result, that NAT would “promptly refund * * * [Mr. Grave’s] entire cash endowment contribution and join with * * * [Mr. Graev] to immediately remove the facade conservation easement from the property’s title” (as it promised) was not “so remote as to be negligible”. Accordingly, under 26 C.F.R. sections 1.170A-1(e) and 1.170A-7(a)(3) the deduction relating to the cash contributions is disallowed. Likewise, under 26 C.F.R. sections 1.170A-1(e), 1.170A-7(a)(3), and 1.170A-14(g)(3), the easement contribution deductions are disallowed.

To reflect the foregoing,

An appropriate order will be issued.

FOOTNOTES

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C.; “the Code”), as amended, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

2 In January 2010 the parties entered into a stipulation to be bound, by which they agreed that if in this case the Court decides the conditional gift issue in the Graevs’ favor, the outcome of some the other issues in this case (chiefly, the valuation of the contributed easement) will follow the outcome of a then-pending case. That case was decided in favor of respondent in July 2010, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, vacated and remanded, and decided again in favor of respondent in January 2013. See Scheidelman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-151, vacated and remanded, 682 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2012), remanded to T.C. Memo. 2013-18. Decision in that case was entered April 12, 2013, and the time to appeal has not yet expired; but we are able to resolve the issue addressed herein without awaiting the resolution of the Scheidelman issues. We do not resolve here the issue of the Graevs’ liability for the penalties, which will be a subject of future proceedings.

3 The burden of proof is generally on the taxpayer, see Rule 142(a)(1), and the submission of a case under Rule 122 does not alter that burden, see Borchers v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. 82, 91 (1990), aff’d, 943 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1991). However, the burden of proof can be shifted when the Commissioner’s position implicates “new matter” not in the notice of deficiency, see note 8 below, addressing the Graevs’ contention about supposed “new matter” in this case.

4 For pre-2004 cases involving facade easements, see Richmond v. United States, 699 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. La. 1988) (upholding partial disallowance of contribution deduction where the taxpayer’s valuation of facade easement was found excessive); Satullo v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-614 (upholding disallowance of contribution deduction where the facade easement was unenforceable in the year at issue because it had not been recorded, and where a mortgage had not been subordinated to the donee’s interest), aff’d without published opinion, 67 F.3d 314 (11th Cir. 1995); Dorsey v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1990-242 (upholding partial disallowance of contribution deduction where the taxpayer’s valuation of facade easement was found excessive); Griffin v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1989-130 (same), aff’d, 911 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1990); Losch v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1988-230 (same); and Hilborn v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 677 (1985) (same). For pre-2004 cases involving conservation easements generally, see Strasburg v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-94 (upholding partial disallowance of contribution deductions where the deductions claimed exceeded the taxpayer’s pro rata basis in the property and valuation of the easement was found excessive); Fannon v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1986-572 (upholding partial disallowance of contribution deductions where the taxpayer’s valuation of scenic easement was found excessive); Akers v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1984-490, aff’d, 799 F.2d 243 (6th Cir. 1986) (same); and Great N. Nekoosa Corp. v. United States, 38 Fed. Cl. 645, 654 (1997) (holding that conservation easements were not exclusively for conservation purposes when the plaintiffs retained the right to extract sand and gravel).

5 The deed recites that it was executed October 11, 2004, but Mr. Graev’s signature on the deed was notarized on December 16, 2004, and he delivered it to NAT one day later. NAT’s then president, James Kearns, signed the deed on NAT’s behalf on December 28, 2004.

6 26 C.F.R. section 1.170-1(e), Income Tax Regs. (1959), provided:

If as of the date of a gift a transfer for charitable purposes is dependent upon the performance of some act or the happening of a precedent event in order that it might become effective, no deduction is allowable unless the possibility that the charitable transfer will not become effective is so remote as to be negligible. If an interest passes to or is vested in charity on the date of the gift and the interest would be defeated by the performance of some act or the happening of some event, the occurrence of which appeared to have been highly improbable on the date of the gift, the deduction is allowable. The deduction is not allowed in the case of a transfer in trust conveying a present interest in income if by reason of all the conditions and circumstances surrounding the transfer it appears that the charity may not receive the beneficial enjoyment of the interest. * * *

7 26 C.F.R. sec. 81.46(a), Estate Tax Regs. (1949), provided:

If as of the date of decedent’s death the transfer to charity is dependent upon the performance of some act or the happening of a precedent event in order that it might become effective, no deduction is allowable unless the possibility that charity will not take is so remote as to be negligible. If an estate or interest has passed to or is vested in charity at the time of decedent’s death and such right or interest would be defeated by the performance of some act or the happening of some event which appeared to have been highly improbable at the time of decedent’s death, the deduction is allowable.

The current version of this regulation is in 26 C.F.R. sec. 20.2055-2(b)(1), Estate Tax Regs.

8 In his reply brief, Mr. Graev complains that an IRS argument invoking the perpetuity requirement is “new matter” as to which the IRS should bear the burden of proof under Rule 142(a)(1). We do not believe that the burden of proof affects the resolution of this issue, since the material facts are not actually in dispute, and the outcome is the same no matter which party has the burden. See Dagres v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 263, 279 (2011). More important, however, the argument that the gifts were subject to a subsequent event — an issue plainly stated in the notice of deficiency — is by its nature an argument that the gifts failed to be perpetual. One reason a conservation easement may fail to be a perpetual gift to the donee, and may thus fail to be deductible, is that it is subject to a condition that creates a non-remote possibility that the easement may revert to the donor. See 26 C.F.R. sec. 1.170A-14(g)(3), Income Tax Regs. The issue of perpetuity is not new matter in this case.

9 We do not address the circumstance in which a hyper-cautious donor conditions his gift on non-disallowance where there is no non-negligible possibility of disallowance.

10 The Graevs also cite an IRS private letter ruling. We decline to consider it, in light of section 6110(k)(3), which provides: “(3) Precedential status. — Unless the Secretary otherwise establishes by regulations, a written determination may not be used or cited as precedent.” See Abdel-Fattah v. Commissioner, 134 T.C. 190, 202 (2010); Vons Cos., Inc. v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 1, 12 (2001).

11 For the remainder trust issue we cited 26 C.F.R. section 1.170-1(e) (1961) (see note 6 above for the 1959 version which was identical to the 1961 regulation); but the limitations now set forth in 26 C.F.R. sections 1.170A-1(e), 1.170A-7(a)(3), and 1.170A-14(g)(3), Income Tax Regs., are equivalent.

12 In Surface Combustion Corp. v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 631 (1947), aff’d, 181 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1950), we held that a provision in an employee trust allowing an employer to reclaim his contributions to the trust if the contributions were determined to be nondeductible did not prevent the employer from deducting his contributions to the trust since the contingency was in the control of the Commissioner. Surface Combustion did not involve charitable contributions, section 170, nor any regulations with a “so remote as to be negligible” standard.

13 Our Opinion in O’Brien v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 583, 592 (1966), indicates that the Commissioner also cited — but we distinguished — Jones v. United States, 252 F. Supp. 256 (N.D. Ohio 1966), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 395 F.2d 938 (6th Cir. 1968), a case not involving a tax-treatment-contingent contribution, in which (as we noted) the District Court held that the possibility that a contribution at issue there would be defeated “was not ‘so remote as to be negligible’ under section 1.170-1(e), Income Tax Regs.” This description of Jones includes our only mention of that regulation in our discussion of this issue in the O’Brien Opinion, and our discussion does not address any relation between the regulation and the tax-treatment-contingent deduction at issue in O’Brien.

14 In this argument the Graevs do not distinguish between the contribution of the easement (which was subject to the statutes that the Graevs cite) and the contribution of the cash (which was not). Reliance on New York real estate principles to argue that the side letter is not enforceable as to the cash contribution is misplaced. Even if the side letter were not enforceable as to the easement, for the reasons the Graevs advance, so that they could not require NAT to “remove” it, the Graevs show no reason that the side letter would not be enforceable so as to require the return of the cash.

15 The legislative history of these provisions suggests that they were included in the statutes so that the conservation easements would satisfy the perpetuity requirement of 26 C.F.R. sec. 170A-14(g). See John C. Partigan, “New York’s Conservation Easement Statute: The Property Interest and Its Real Property and Federal Income Tax Consequences”, 49 Albany L. Rev. 430, 452 n.87 (1985).

16 The Commissioner does not dispute that NAT is a “not-for-profit conservation organization” for purposes of New York’s Environmental Conservation Law.

17 Our holding here is distinguishable from Commissioner v. Simmons, 646 F.3d 6, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2011), aff’g T.C. Memo. 2009-208, which looked at similar abandonment language in an easement deed and concluded “deductions cannot be disallowed based upon the remote possibility * * * [the charity] will abandon the easements.” See also Kaufman v. Shulman, 687 F.3d 21, 28 (1st Cir. 2012), aff’g in part, vacating in part, and remanding in part Kaufman v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 294 (2011), and 134 T.C. 182 (2010). In Commissioner v. Simmons, 646 F.3d at 10, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit stated that “the Commissioner has not shown the possibility * * * [the charity] will actually abandon its rights is more than negligible. [The charity] * * * has been holding and monitoring easements in the District of Columbia since 1978, yet the Commissioner points to not a single instance of its having abandoned its right to enforce.” In the instant case, however, NAT gave Mr. Graev an explicit, written promise that it would abandon its rights in the easement if certain events occurred. We find nothing to indicate that NAT did not intend to comply with its written promises.




Report Outlines Changes for IRS To Ensure Accountability, Chart a Path Forward; Immediate Actions, Next Steps Outlined.

WASHINGTON ― Internal Revenue Service Principal Deputy Commissioner Danny Werfel today issued a report outlining new actions and next steps to fix problems uncovered with the IRS’ review of tax-exempt applications and improve the wider processes and operations in place at the IRS.

The three-part report covers a wide range of areas Werfel and his leadership team examined during the past month. The report cites actions to hold management accountable and identifies immediate steps to help put the process for approving tax-exempt applications back on track. Werfel also outlines actions needed to protect and improve wider IRS operations, ranging from compliance areas to taxpayer service.

“It is critical that the IRS takes steps to ensure accountability, address the problems uncovered in recent weeks and improve the operations of the IRS to continue to carry out our critical mission on behalf of the public,” Werfel said. “We have made a number of changes already, more are in the works and even more will develop as we move forward.”

Importantly, the initial IRS review shows no signs of intentional wrongdoing by IRS personnel or involvement by parties outside the IRS in the activities described in the recent TIGTA  report.  However, the report notes that investigations are ongoing, and that the IRS is committed to a full fact-finding effort to provide the public answers to these and other important questions.

“The IRS is committed to correcting its mistakes, holding people accountable, and establishing control elements that will help us mitigate the risks we face,” Werfel said. “This report is a critical first step in the process of restoring trust in this critical institution. We have more work in front of us, but we believe we are on the right track to move forward.”

Werfel’s report, titled “Charting a Path Forward at the IRS: Initial Assessment and Plan of Action,” covers three primary areas:

Accountability. This covers the steps being taken to ensure accountability for the mismanagement described in last month’s Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) report:

• The report finds that significant management and judgment failures occurred, as outlined in the TIGTA report. These contributed to the inappropriate treatment of taxpayers applying for tax- exempt status.

• To address this, new leadership has been installed across all five executive management levels involved in the chain of command connected to these matters. In addition, the IRS has empaneled an Accountability Review Board to provide recommendations within 60 days (and later as needed) on any additional personnel actions that should be taken.

Fixing the Problems with the Review of Applications for Tax-Exempt Status. This part covers several process improvements underway to ensure that taxpayers are treated appropriately and effectively in the review of applications for tax-exempt status:

The report outlines a new voluntary process to help certain applicants gain fast-track approval to operate as a 501(c)(4) tax-exempt entity if they are being reviewed for advocacy questions and  have been in our application backlog for more than 120 days. This self-certification process allows them a streamlined path to tax-exempt status if they certify they will operate within specified limits and thresholds of political and social welfare activities. In addition, the IRS has added new technical and program staff to assist with reviewing 501(c)(4) applications.

The IRS also suspended the use of any “be-on-the-lookout,” or BOLO lists in the application process for tax-exempt status.

Review of IRS Operations and Risks. The report identifies a series of actions to ensure taxpayers that selection criteria across the IRS are appropriate and that taxpayers are aware of how they can seek assistance if they have concerns about the IRS. The report further outlines steps underway to ensure that critical program or operational risks within the IRS are identified early, raised to the right decision-makers and shared timely with key stakeholders.

The report calls for establishing an Enterprise Risk Management Program to provide a common framework for capturing, reporting and addressing risk areas across the IRS.  This will improve timeliness in bringing information to the attention of the IRS Commissioner and other IRS leaders as well as key stakeholders to help prevent future instances of inappropriate treatment or mismanagement.

Although there is no current evidence that selection criteria in other IRS organizations is inappropriate, the nature of the problems identified in the tax-exempt application process warrants a review of certain process controls within the IRS.  The IRS will initiate a comprehensive, agency-wide review of compliance selection criteria.  Results will be shared with the Department of the Treasury, the IRS Oversight Board, and the Chairpersons of the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee.

The IRS will initiate additional internal and external education and outreach about the role of the National Taxpayer Advocate in assisting taxpayers in resolving problems they encounter with the IRS.

In addition to posting the report on IRS.gov, the IRS will regularly update the progress made on the TIGTA report’s recommendations and provide other developments related to this effort.




S. 952 Would Clarify Treatment of Church Pension Plans.

S. 952, the Church Plan Clarification Act of 2013, introduced by Senate Finance Committee member Benjamin L. Cardin, D-Md., would provide various clarifications regarding the treatment of church plans, including application of controlled group rules, contribution limits, automatic enrollment, transfers and mergers, and investments.

113TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION

S. 952

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to clarify the

treatment of church pension plans, and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MAY 14, 2013

Mr. CARDIN (for himself and Mr. PORTMAN) introduced the following

bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance

A BILL

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to clarify the treatment of church pension plans, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “Church Plan Clarification Act of 2013”.

SEC. 2. CHURCH PLAN CLARIFICATION.

(a) APPLICATION OF CONTROLLED GROUP RULES TO CHURCH PLANS. —

(1) IN GENERAL. — Section 414(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended —

(A) by striking “For purposes” and inserting the following:

“(1) IN GENERAL. — For purposes”, and

(B) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

“(2) CHURCH PLANS. —

“(A) GENERAL RULE. — Except as provided in subparagraphs (B) and (C), for purposes of this subsection and subsection (m), an organization that is otherwise eligible to participate in a church plan as defined in subsection (e) shall not be aggregated with another such organization and treated as a single employer with such other organization unless —

“(i) one such organization provides directly or indirectly at least 80 percent of the operating funds for the other organization during the preceding tax year of the recipient organization, and

“(ii) there is a degree of common management or supervision between the organizations.

For purposes of this subparagraph, a degree of common management or supervision exists only if the organization providing the operating funds is directly involved in the day-to-day operations of the other organization.

“(B) NONQUALIFIED CHURCH-CONTROLLED ORGANIZATIONS. — Notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraph (A), for purposes of this subsection and subsection (m), an organization that is a nonqualified church-controlled organization shall be aggregated with one or more other nonqualified church-controlled organizations, or with an organization that is not exempt from tax under section 501, and treated as a single employer with such other organizations, if at least 80 percent of the directors or trustees of such organizations are either representatives of, or directly or indirectly controlled by, the first organization. For purposes of this subparagraph, a ‘nonqualified church controlled organization’ shall mean a church-controlled organization described in section 501(c)(3) that is not a qualified church-controlled organization described in section 3121(w)(3)(B).

“(C) PERMISSIVE AGGREGATION AMONG CHURCH-RELATED ORGANIZATIONS. — Organizations described in subparagraph (A) may elect to be treated as under common control for purposes of this subsection. Such election shall be made by the church or convention or association of churches with which such organizations are associated within the meaning of subsection (e)(3)(D), or by an organization determined by such church or convention or association of churches to be the appropriate organization for making such election.

“(D) PERMISSIVE DISAGGREGATION OF CHURCH-RELATED ORGANIZATIONS. — For purposes of subparagraph (A), in the case of a church plan (as defined in subsection (e)), any employer may permissively disaggregate those entities that are not churches (as defined in section 403(b)(12)(B)) separately from those entities that are churches, even if such entities maintain separate church plans.

“(E) ANTI-ABUSE RULE. — For purposes of subparagraphs (A) and (B), the anti-abuse rule in Treasury Regulation section 1.414(c)-5(f) shall apply.”.

(2) EFFECTIVE DATE. — The amendments made by this subsection shall apply to taxable years beginning before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(b) APPLICATION OF CONTRIBUTION AND FUNDING LIMITATIONS TO 403(b) GRANDFATHERED DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS. —

(1) IN GENERAL. — Section 251(e)(5) of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (Public Law 97-248), is amended —

(A) by striking “403(b)(2)” and inserting “403(b)”, and

(B) by inserting before the period at the end the following: “, and shall be subject to the applicable limitations of section 415(b) of such Code as if it were a defined benefit plan under section 401(a) of such Code and not the limitations of section 415(c) of such Code (relating to limitation for defined contribution plans).”.

(2) EFFECTIVE DATE. — The amendments made by this subsection shall apply as if included in the enactment of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982.

(c) AUTOMATIC ENROLLMENT BY CHURCH PLANS. —

(1) IN GENERAL. — This subsection shall supersede any law of a State that relates to wage, salary, or payroll payment, collection, deduction, garnishment, assignment, or withholding which would directly or indirectly prohibit or restrict the inclusion in any church plan (as defined in this subsection) of an automatic contribution arrangement.

(2) DEFINITION OF AUTOMATIC CONTRIBUTION ARRANGEMENT. — For purposes of this subsection, the term “automatic contribution arrangement” means an arrangement —

(A) under which a participant may elect to have the plan sponsor make payments as contributions under the plan on behalf of the participant, or to the participant directly in cash, and

(B) under which a participant is treated as having elected to have the plan sponsor make such contributions in an amount equal to a uniform percentage of compensation provided under the plan until the participant specifically elects not to have such contributions made (or specifically elects to have such contributions made at a different percentage).

(3) NOTICE REQUIREMENTS. —

(A) IN GENERAL. — The plan administrator of an automatic contribution arrangement shall, within a reasonable period before such plan year, provide to each participant to whom the arrangement applies for such plan year notice of the participant’s rights and obligations under the arrangement which —

(i) is sufficiently accurate and comprehensive to apprise the participant of such rights and obligations, and

(ii) is written in a manner calculated to be understood by the average participant to whom the arrangement applies.

(B) ELECTION REQUIREMENTS. — A notice shall not be treated as meeting the requirements of subparagraph (A) with respect to a participant unless —

(i) the notice includes an explanation of the participant’s right under the arrangement not to have elective contributions made on the participant’s behalf (or to elect to have such contributions made at a different percentage),

(ii) the participant has a reasonable period of time, after receipt of the notice described in clause (i) and before the first elective contribution is made, to make such election, and

(iii) the notice explains how contributions made under the arrangement will be invested in the absence of any investment election by the participant.

(4) EFFECTIVE DATE. — This subsection shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.

(d) ALLOW CERTAIN PLAN TRANSFERS AND MERGERS. —

(1) IN GENERAL. — Section 414 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

“(y) CERTAIN PLAN TRANSFERS AND MERGERS. —

“(1) IN GENERAL. — Under rules prescribed by the Secretary, except as provided in paragraph (2), no amount shall be includible in gross income by reason of —

“(A) a transfer of all or a portion of the account balance of a participant or beneficiary, whether or not vested, from a plan described in section 401(a) or an annuity contract described in section 403(b), which is a church plan described in subsection (e) to an annuity contract described in section 403(b), if such plan and annuity contract are both maintained by the same church or convention or association of churches,

“(B) a transfer of all or a portion of the account balance of a participant or beneficiary, whether or not vested, from an annuity contract described in section 403(b) to a plan described in section 401(a) or an annuity contract described in section 403(b), which is a church plan described in subsection (e), if such plan and annuity contract are both maintained by the same church or convention or association of churches, or

“(C) a merger of a plan described in section 401(a), or an annuity contract described in section 403(b), which is a church plan described in subsection (e) with an annuity contract described in section 403(b), if such plan and annuity contract are both maintained by the same church or convention or association of churches.

“(2) LIMITATION. — Paragraph (1) shall not apply to a transfer or merger unless the participant’s or beneficiary’s benefit immediately after the transfer or merger is equal to or greater than the participant’s or beneficiary’s benefit immediately before the transfer or merger.

“(3) QUALIFICATION. — A plan or annuity contract shall not fail to be considered to be described in sections 401(a) or 403(b) merely because such plan or account engages in a transfer or merger described in this subsection.

“(4) DEFINITIONS. — For purposes of this subsection:

“(A) CHURCH. — The term ‘church’ includes an organization described in subparagraph (A) or (B)(ii) of subsection (e)(3).

“(B) ANNUITY CONTRACT. — The term ‘annuity contract’ includes a custodial account described in section 403(b)(7) and a retirement income account described in section 403(b)(9).”.

(2) EFFECTIVE DATE. — The amendment made by this subsection shall apply to transfers or mergers occurring after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(e) INVESTMENTS BY CHURCH PLANS IN COLLECTIVE TRUSTS. —

(1) IN GENERAL. — In the case of —

(A) a church plan (as defined in section 414(e) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986), including a plan described in section 401(a) of such Code and a retirement income account described in section 403(b)(9) of such Code, and

(B) an organization described in section 414(e)(3)(A) of such Code the principal purpose or function of which is the administration of such a plan or account,

the assets of such plan, account, or organization (including any assets otherwise permitted to be commingled for investment purposes with the assets of such a plan, account, or organization) may be invested in a group trust otherwise described in Internal Revenue Service Revenue Ruling 81-100 (as modified by Internal Revenue Service Revenue Rulings 2004-67 and 2011-1), or any subsequent revenue ruling that supersedes or modifies such revenue ruling, without adversely affecting the tax status of the group trust, such plan, account, or organization, or any other plan or trust that invests in the group trust.

(2) EFFECTIVE DATE. — This subsection shall apply to investments made after the date of the enactment of this Act.




LTR: IRS Denies Exempt Status to Jewish Orthodox Synagogue.

The IRS denied tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3) to a Jewish Orthodox synagogue because it failed to establish that it was organized and operated exclusively for exempt purposes and not for the private benefit of its creators, and because it lacked control and discretion of its funds.

Citations: LTR 201325017

Contact Person: * * *

Identification Number: * * *

Contact Number: * * *

UIL Code: 501.00-00, 501.03-00, 501.03-20, 503.00-00

Release Date: 6/21/2013

Date: March 28, 2013

Employer Identification Number: * * *

Form Required To Be Filed: * * *

Tax Years: * * *

Dear * * *:

This is our final determination that you do not qualify for exemption from federal income tax as an organization described in Internal Revenue Code section 501(c)(3). Recently, we sent you a letter in response to your application that proposed an adverse determination. The letter explained the facts, law and rationale, and gave you 30 days to file a protest. Since we did not receive a protest within the requisite 30 days, the proposed adverse determination is now final.

Since you do not qualify for exemption as an organization described in Code section 501(c)(3), donors may not deduct contributions to you under Code section 170. You must file federal income tax returns on the form and for the years listed above within 30 days of this letter, unless you request an extension of time to file.

We will make this letter and our proposed adverse determination letter available for public inspection under Code section 6110, after deleting certain identifying information. Please read the enclosed Notice 437, Notice of Intention to Disclose, and review the two attached letters that show our proposed deletions. If you disagree with our proposed deletions, you should follow the instructions in Notice 437. If you agree with our deletions, you do not need to take any further action.

In accordance with Code section 6104(c), we will notify the appropriate State officials of our determination by sending them a copy of this final letter and the proposed adverse letter. You should contact your State officials if you have any questions about how this determination may affect your State responsibilities and requirements.

If you have any questions about this letter, please contact the person whose name and telephone number are shown in the heading of this letter. If you have any questions about your federal income tax status and responsibilities, please contact IRS Customer Service at 1-800-829-1040 or the IRS Customer Service number for businesses, 1-800-829-4933. The IRS Customer Service number for people with hearing impairments is 1-800-829-4059.

Sincerely,

Holly O. Paz

Director, Exempt Organizations

Rulings and Agreements

Enclosure

Notice 437

Redacted Proposed Adverse Determination Letter

Redacted Final Adverse Determination Letter

* * * * *

Contact Person: * * *

Identification Number: * * *

Contact Number: * * *

FAX Number: * * *

UIL Numbers: 501.00-00, 501.03-00, 501.03-20, 503.00-00

Date: January 25, 2013

Employer Identification Number: * * *

LEGEND:

B = individual

C = individual

D = individual

E = couple

F = individual

G = organization

H = business

J = individual

k = dollar amount

L = individual

W = state

X = date

Dear * * *:

We have considered your application for recognition of exemption from federal income tax under Internal Revenue Code section 501(a). Based on the information provided, we have concluded that you do not qualify for exemption under Code section 501(c)(3). The basis for our conclusion is set forth below. This letter supersedes our letter dated July 9, 2012.

ISSUES

1. Do the available facts show you have failed to pass the operational test, therefore disqualifying you from exemption under Section 501(c)(3) of the IRC? Yes, for the reasons described below.

2. Does the fact that you allow a non-board member to have signatory authority on your checking account demonstrate a lack of control and discretion of your funds, causing you to fail the operational test, therefore disqualifying you from exemption under Section 501(c)(3) of the Code? Yes, for the reasons described below.

3. Have your transactions resulted in private benefit, therefore precluding you from exemption under Section 501(c)(3) of the Code? Yes, for the reasons described below.

4. Do the capital improvements you made constitute a substantial non-exempt purpose, therefore disqualifying you from exemption under Section 501(c)(3) of the Code? Yes, for the reasons described below.

FACTS

You were formed by Articles of Incorporation on X by Trustees B, C and D. Article seven of your Articles states you were formed, in part:

To establish, maintain and conduct services for divine worship and religious observances in accordance with the customs and traditions of the Orthodox Jewish Religion; to establish, maintain and conduct synagogue for religious worship and prayer in accordance with the customs and traditions of the Orthodox Jewish Religion; to establish, maintain and conduct classes in Talmud and religious education; to purchase and lease such property as may be necessary for or incidental to the conduct and welfare of the corporation and the fulfillment of its religious objectives and purposes; and to solicit contributions form the general public in order to sustain said religious corporation.

Your Bylaws state you were formed to maintain a synagogue to conduct religious worship and services in accordance with the tenants of Jewish Orthodox faith. Article eight of your Bylaws states the following:

The Treasurer shall have the care and custodies of the monies belonging to the Organization and shall be responsible for such monies and securities of the Organization. He shall cause to be deposited in a regular business bank or trust company all sums of the Organization. He or one of the other offices [sic] must be one of the persons who shall sign checks or drafts of the organization. No special fund may be set aside that shall make it unnecessary for the Treasurer to sign the checks issued upon it.

You state in your attachments to Form 1023 that “our organization (you) is controlled by the board of directors. They make all decisions about the organizations (your) activities, and decide how funds are to be spent.”

You submitted a Conflict of Interest Policy, which has a purpose of protecting your interest when contemplating entering into a transaction, or arrangement that might benefit the private interest of an officer or director of the organization or might result in a possible excess benefit transaction. However, no one had signed the Conflict of Interest Policy.

You describe your activities as that of a congregation, with services held each weekday morning in accordance with Jewish tradition, as “described in prayer books available at any bookstore.” Per your application, you have * * * members. However, you submitted a list of your members of which there were only * * *. Only one of your Trustees was included in your membership listing. You attract new members through “word of mouth, we have no website.”

When we asked how you came into existence you said “adherents and former students of B decided to form a congregation to foster community feeling [sic] among former students and appreciative community members.”

Your rabbi is B. You said, “We have no written contract with the rabbi. The rabbi does not receive a salary from the congregation. He is otherwise employed.” G, a school located within your facility, employs B. B works at least 25 hours per week for them. He works at least 10 hours per week for you, and does not conduct services for any other organization. D and C are the father and father-in-law of B, respectively. You said volunteers conduct all activities. You later revised your board, adding L with B resigning.

You said your schedule is as follows:

Sunday thru Thursday,

9:00AM – 1:00PM — tractate Brachot (blessings)

3:00PM – 6:00PM — tractate Shabbos, and

8:00PM – 9:15PM — code of Jewish law

Friday, 9:30AM – 11:30PM — Brachot (Blessings)

The following is the schedule for G’s shared use of your facility:

Sunday thru Thursday, 8:00AM – 9:30PM

Friday, 8:00AM – 1:00PM

Despite your statement that services are held “every day,” it is noted, per your schedule, you do not offer services on the Sabbath (Saturday).

Regarding your membership, you stated you were a membership organization, “a Sabbath-observing Jew who pays dues may become a member of congregation.” Members have the right to vote at annual membership meetings and to elect directors. You further asserted “a member may belong to another Orthodox Jewish congregation.”

We asked for a list of the governing body members of G and you responded by saying “unavailable we do not maintain the records of the” school. However, B is an employee of G. We asked again for this information and you said “most business entities limit the information allowed to employees to the extent necessary to carry out their functions. Accordingly teaching employees are not usually privy to broader organization information since it does not impact on their pedagogical function.”

You are distinguishable from G as “they are a religious school for the religious instruction of young teens. We are a congregation for young and old alike.” The students of the school are not your congregants. You share physical space with the school. Specifically, you share the synagogue space. Although B is a teacher at the school, when we asked approximately how many students attend G, which operates in your physical space, you said “we are not the party to properly address the . . .” school’s enrollment. You conduct religious classes. The instructors for these classes are four men, one of which is B. The other three instructors are Rabbis for other congregations.

You provided a list of your donors. When asked for the Employer Identification Number (EIN) for those donors that were not individuals, you responded, “It is very difficult in our identity theft conscious society to collect specific personal identifying information. This is information not readily shared and just inquiries arouse suspicion and may jeopardize collection efforts especially for a not-for-profit.”

You submitted budgets which showed revenue in the form of gifts, grants and contributions of approximately $* * * annually, with membership fees accounting for approximately $* * * annually, for a three year period. Your expenses consisted of occupancy, professional fees, and other — with other being the majority.

We asked if you had a bank account. You responded you did not yet have a bank account. However, several days after we received correspondence indicating you did not yet have a bank account, you mailed us copies of your bank statements. Regarding this discrepancy you said:

It was erroneously understood to refer to an operating account which we do not have. The Congregation had at one point an active account solely set aside for the purpose of making renovations to the site for use as a congregation. Once the congregation realized their error of their own volition they set the records straight by submitting the statements.

The bank account showed that you had already had tens of thousands of dollars flow through your account before you even submitted your application for exemption, in contradiction to the proposed budgets you provided. B, C, D and F all have signatory authority on your checking account. As evidenced by canceled checks you submitted, F had, in fact, signed checks on your behalf. We asked why F, who is not one of your board members, has signatory authority on your account. You said “in the event board members are not available, and to offer an element of oversight.” However, we asked if F was related to any of the board members and you responded that she is the daughter of C, daughter-in-law of D and wife of B. You later stated, when asked about payment of expenses from your accounts, that various members pay for out of pocket expenses keeping you afloat.

You occupy a two story, 40 by 100 sq. ft. building. You indicated, “The first floor is a synagogue, furnished with tables, chairs, bookcases, a stand for reading the Torah scroll, an ark for storage of the Torah scroll and prayer books.” On the second floor, “there are classrooms, a dining room and offices for the congregation.” You “occupy the space free of rent” and you “have no lease.” Per our request, as you did not have a lease agreement, you submitted a statement signed by the individuals who own the facility where you conduct your activities. The statement is as follows:

I acknowledge the use of the building at address H by the congregation. I allow it to be used indefinitely (although not contractual) provided the congregation maintains the cleanliness of the building and agrees not to exceed fire department allowable maximum occupancy.

We asked if you had made any improvements to the facility and you responded simply “yes.” We further inquired and you said the “improvements were basically to retrofit the building from a business commercial use to a congregation house of worship use. This involved plastering and installing sheetrock for the walls and installing a drop ceiling, as well as tiles covering a cement floor. It also involved setting up walls to define rooms.” We asked for you to provide the total cost of the project, which you omitted. We again asked and you said the total cost was k dollars. We asked how you are ensured continued use of the facility you have improved, as you have no lease agreement. You responded as follows:

We are assured in a number of ways. Firstly, we have a very good relationship with the owner who is excited about our future growth. Secondly, if our stay is terminated abruptly we would be made whole by the landlord being that at that point he would be the beneficial recipient of the improvements. The cost would be collectable both in a legal proceeding as we’ll [sic] as in a rabbinical tribunal.

G did not pay for any of the renovations. The name of the contractor for the renovation projects is H. We asked for a copy of the contract with the contractor, how the terms were negotiated, the name of the owner of the company, and a description of the renovations planned. To these inquires you responded:

The work was done on a step-by-step project-by-project basis. Each project was priced with various contractors and craftsmen. Work was awarded by project to the one we felt best suited to fill our needs. As we gained confidence in H we felt we are best off using him exclusively. We cannot vouch for ownership, but our contact at H is J. No more renovations planned.”

Regarding our request for copies of the written contracts, you said there is “no overall contract, as construction [sic] done per project basis as opposed to master construction project.” We asked for copies of all of the bids you received for your projects. Rather than provide same, you simply provided a sheet that contained the total of all of the bids received.

You later provided a list of the actual construction costs totaling k dollars and including skeleton and sheet rocking, security, plumbing, air conditioning, electric, carding, furniture and fixtures, floors, ceiling, professional and misc.

You submitted internal and external photographs of your facility. The internal photographs showed two large rooms with numerous desks. One of the rooms had windows at the top of the walls near the ceiling. The other interior photographs include rooms with very large windows. The windows in both rooms were different in location and size than the windows shown in the exterior photographs of the facility. You said “the room (you use) is not in the basement but on the first floor and the windows are at the top of the walls. It seems that in the older commercial buildings that’s how the architecture was that windows were placed on top of the room. The other pictures are from the interior of the second floor. The exterior pictures are the entrances of the front side of the building and these rooms face the back of the building.” You provided no other photographs to confirm your assertions.

We sent you an internet article which stated F is the director of a religious camp, which has a very similar name to you and to the school with whom you share a facility. We asked if the camp was one of your proposed activities and you said “no.”

We sent you a print from the internet which shows an organization with your exact same name operating a high school out of a different street address, but the same city, as you. You said they are an “unrelated entity which just coincidently has the same name.”

You submitted minutes from your board meetings for each of the three annual meetings you held, and two additional meetings after those. Each indicates a meeting of the trustees was held. The minutes each state that one of your Trustees acted as chairman of the meeting and each year he “. . . nominated three Trustees . . .” and each year he nominated himself and the other two governing body members as Trustees, who are all related (B, C and D). Each year the meeting minutes also document the appointment of B, C and D as Officers. In comparison, the most recent two meetings for which you provided documentation indicate a meeting of the membership was held, not of the trustees, although the same people were present.

LAW

Section 501(c)(3) of the Code describes corporations organized and operated exclusively for charitable purposes no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.

Section 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)(1) of the regulations states that, in order to be exempt as an organization described in section 501(c)(3) of the Code, an organization must be both organized and operated exclusively for one or more of the purposes specified in such section. If an organization fails to meet either the organizational test or the operational test, it is not exempt.

Section 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) of the regulations states that an organization is not organized or operated exclusively for exempt purposes unless it serves a public rather than a private interest.

Rev. Proc. 2012-9, superseding Rev. Proc. 90-27, 1990-1 C.B. 514, Section 4.01, provides the Internal Revenue Service will recognize the tax-exempt status of an organization only if its application and supporting documents establish that it meets the particular requirements of the section under which exemption from federal income tax is claimed. Section 4.02 states that a determination letter or ruling on exempt status is issued based solely upon the facts and representations contained in the administrative record. It further states:

(1) The applicant is responsible for the accuracy of any factual representations contained in the application.

(2) Any oral representation of additional facts or modification of facts as represented or alleged in the application must be reduced to writing over the signature of an officer or director of the taxpayer under a penalties of perjury statement.

(3) The failure to disclose a material fact or misrepresentation of a material fact on the application may adversely affect the reliance that would otherwise be obtained through issuance by the Service of a favorable determination letter or ruling.

Section 4.03 states that the organization must fully describe all of the activities in which it expects to engage, including the standards, criteria, procedures or other means adopted or planned for carrying out the activities, the anticipated sources of receipts, and the nature of contemplated expenditures.

In United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, 485 U.S. 351, 108 S. Ct. 1179, 99 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1900), the Supreme Court held that an organization must prove unambiguously that it qualifies for a tax exemption.

In American Guidance Foundation v. U.S., 490 F. Supp. 304 (D.D.C. 1980), the court said that, at a minimum, a church must include a body of believers that assemble regularly in order to worship. It must also be reasonably available to the public in the conduct of worship, in its educational instruction, and in its promulgation of doctrine. In addition, it was held that when the assets of an organization are used to pay for the living expenses of an individual(s) denial of exemption is appropriate. Generally, there are fourteen criteria used in determining whether or not an organization qualifies as a church. These criteria are as follows:

a. A distinct legal existence

b. A recognized creed and form of worship

c. A definite and distinct ecclesiastical government

d. A formal code of doctrine and discipline

e. A distinct religious history

f. A membership not associated with any other church or denomination

g. Ordained ministers ministering to its congregation

h. Ordained ministers selected after completing prescribed studies

i. Literature of its own

j. Established place of worship

k. Regular congregation

I. Regular religious services

m. Sunday schools for religious instruction of the young

n. Schools for the preparation of ministers

The court stated that courts in cases where church status has been litigated have more heavily weighted certain criteria. It considered the following factors to be especially important:

A membership not associated with any other church or Denomination

Established places of worship

Regular religious services.

In Bubbling Well Church of Universal Love, Inc. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 531 (1980), in an action for declaratory judgment pursuant to section 7428(a), the Tax Court considered an adverse ruling by the IRS on an application for exempt status as a church. The applicant had declined to furnish some information, and made answers to other inquiries that were vague and uninformative. On the basis of the record, the Court held that the applicant had not shown that no part of its net earnings inure to the benefit of the family or that petitioner was not operated for the private benefit.

In Western Catholic Church v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 196 (1980), the petitioner’s only activities were some individual counseling and distribution of a few grants to needy individuals. The petitioner’s failure to keep adequate records and its manner of operation made it impossible to trace the money completely, but the court found it clear that money passed back and forth between petitioner and its director and his for-profit businesses. The Court Held that petitioner had not shown it was operated exclusively for exempt purposes or the no part of its earnings inured to the benefit of its officer.

In Basic Unit Ministry of Alma Karl Schurig v. Commissioner, 511 F. Supp. 166 (D.D.C. 1981), aff’d, 670 F.2d 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1982), the court upheld IRS’s denial of exempt status as a religious organization in a declaratory judgment action. The court held that in factual situations where there is evident potential for abuse of the exemption provision, a petitioner must openly disclose all facts bearing on the operation and finances of its organization. Here Plaintiff did not proffer sufficiently detailed evidence of its charitable disbursements, or the extent of its support of its members. Rather, plaintiff continually responded that it had already provided the data, or could not furnish anything further. Therefore, the court found that the applicant did not meet its burden to positively demonstrate that it qualifies for the exemption. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in affirming that the organization had not met its burden of establishing that no part of its net earnings inured to any private individual, observed:

“taxpayer confuses a criminal prosecution, in which the government carries the burden of establishing the defendant’s guilt, with a suit seeking a declaratory judgment that plaintiff is entitled to tax-exempt status, in which the taxpayer, whether a church or an enterprise of another character, bears the burden of establishing that it qualifies for exemption.”

In National Association of American Churches v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 18 (1984), the court denied a petition for declaratory judgment that the organization qualified for exempt status as a church. In addition to evidence of a pattern of tax-avoidance in its operations, the court noted that the organization had failed to respond completely and candidly to IRS during administrative processing of its application for exemption. An organization may not declare what information or questions are relevant in a determination process. It cited a number of declaratory relief actions that upheld adverse rulings by the Service because of the failure of the applicants to provide full and complete information on which the Service could make an informed decision.

In Peoples Prize v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2004-12 (2004), the court upheld the Service’s determination that an organization failed to establish exemption when the organization failed to provide requested information. The court stated “[Applicant] has, for the most part, provided only generalizations in response to repeated requests by [the Service] for more detail on prospective activities. . . . Such generalizations do not satisfy us that [applicant] qualifies for the exemption.”

In New Dynamics Foundation v. United States, 70 Fed. Cl. 782 (2006), the petitioner brought to challenge the denial of its application for exempt status. The court found that the administrative record supported the Service’s denial on the basis that the organization operated for the private benefit of its founder, who had a history of promoting dubious schemes. The organization’s petition claimed that the founder had resigned and it had changed. However, there was little evidence of change other than replacement of the founder with an acquaintance who had no apparent qualifications. The court resolved these questions against the petitioner, who had the burden of establishing it was qualified for exemption. If the petitioner had evidence that contradicted these findings, it should have submitted it as part of the administrative process. “It is well-accepted that, in initial qualification cases such as this, gaps in the administrative record are resolved against the applicant”.

APPLICATION OF LAW

Section 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code provides for exemption for organizations operated exclusively for religious, charitable, and educational purposes. Section 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)(1) of the regulations states that if an organization fails to meet either the organizational test or the operational test, it is not exempt. We cannot determine and you are unable to substantiate that your programs are furthering exclusively 501(c)(3) purposes; therefore you are not described in section 501(c)(3) of the Code. Because you are not described in section 501(c)(3) you fail the operational test and are not exempt.

To be exempt an organization must serve public rather than private interests, as described in 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) of the regulations. Despite having one board member resign, two of the three are still related. Further, the trustee that resigned is still employed in a position of power as your rabbi. You also allow a non-board member, who is related to the other board members, to write checks. You have executed capital improvements on a facility that is privately owned. You have been unable to fully substantiate these improvements, as there was no contract for the work, no documentation on a bid process nor any documentation on your selection process for the contractor. You have only provided that no one on your governing body is related to the contractor. You have been unable to substantiate that the owner of the facility will not benefit from your improvements, as there is no documentation on what would occur in the event you had to vacate the facility, nor is there any documented agreement on the terms of your use of the facility. You have expended most of your revenue for capital improvements for a facility you do not own, and for which do not have a lease agreement. Further, you have provided little details regarding the school, G, that is also sharing this facility. It is unclear if this is a privately owned school, who might own it, or who from that school is benefitting from the improvements you have made to the facility. As you have been unable to document the public benefit of the improvements done to this facility, you have not proven your assets will not inure to insiders or be used to privately benefit certain individuals.

As required by Rev. Proc. 2011-9 you have not established that you are organized and operated exclusively for exempt purposes and not for the private benefit of your creators. Section 4.02(3) of this Rev. Proc. states that the failure to disclose a material fact or misrepresentation of a material fact on the application may adversely affect the reliance that would otherwise be obtained through issuance by the Service of a favorable determination letter or ruling. You indicate control by your board of directors, and that they make all decisions about your activities and how funds are spent. Yet you have stated in correspondence that members are paying expenses out of pocket to keep you afloat, while also stating that members are appraised of issues regarding your finances. It is unclear who has financial control of your operations. We initially asked about bank accounts, to which you replied you had none, only to submit months worth of bank statements indicating much larger actual income than you had submitted as projected budgets. You have a non board member with signatory authority on you account, which was not disclosed, and was discovered only on submission of cancelled checks. Given the information provided regarding your financial data, it is unclear what your sources of income and expenses will be, or how you intend on maintaining control over your accounts. As a result, we cannot consider the administrative record complete and subsequently your failure to disclose material facts does not demonstrate that your operations further exempt purposes.

As in the above-cited cases of Basic Unit Ministry of Alma Karl Schurig and Peoples Prize, you have the burden of showing you come squarely within the terms of the law conferring the benefit sought, and whether you have satisfied the operational test is a question of fact. You did not respond openly or candidly to our questions as evidenced by the repeat requests for documentation of your facility. In fact, we asked the same questions multiple times and continually received little or no details regarding your operations, or responses contradicted information previously given. You did not provide details regarding your donors or the school with which you share a facility. You were also unable to produce copies of bids for the renovations you performed. An applicant seeking exempt status must provide sufficient information for the Service to make an informed decision, as indicated in National Association of American Churches. You must respond completely and candidly. You have given answers to our inquires that were vague and occasionally contradictory. You have not proven unambiguously that you qualify for a tax exemption, as in United States v. Wells Fargo Bank.

As in the case of Western Catholic Church v. Commissioner, your lack of sufficient records and lack of control over an funds fails to establish an exempt purpose consistent with Section 1.501(c)(3) of the regulations. You permit a non board member, F, to write checks on your behalf, which is in direct contrast with Article Eight of your Bylaws. You delegated your authority, responsibility, and operations to individuals outside of your internal operating control. You allow an unauthorized individual access to your bank account. This, together with your statement that members are paying expenses out of pocket, demonstrates a lack of financial control. Given the contradictory responses provided regarding your financial data it is unclear who may or may not benefit from transactions, what your sources of income and expenses will be, or how you intend on maintaining control over your accounts. Because we cannot determine how you will use or control income or what you may expense we cannot conclude who benefits from these transactions. As it is unclear who will benefit you have not proven your assets will not inure to insiders or be used to privately benefit certain individuals.

As in Bubbling Well Church of Universal Love, you are in a position to perpetuate control of the organization’s operations indefinitely, prepare its budget, have complete control of the organization’s finances and make all decisions on how the funds were spent. The close control held by a few individuals, without a system for public oversight, creates an environment for potential abuse and insider benefit as there are no defined roles or responsibilities for your board or policies setting forth their duties and the handling of your finances. Despite your statements that you are a membership entity, your board meeting minutes confirm the tightly held control of the organization. Therefore, the undue control of the organization by a related board causes the organization to serve private interests and thus fail the operational test.

American Guidance Foundation provides, at a minimum, a church must include a body of believers that assemble regularly in order to worship in an established location, must be reasonably available to the public in the conduct of worship, in its educational instruction, and in its promulgation of doctrine:

It is unclear from your responses if you are conducting regular religious services. While you provided a daily schedule of activities, despite your statement that you act in accordance with traditions, you hold no Sabbath services. G operates from the same facility and you do not conduct service on the Sabbath, although you require your members to observe the Sabbath.

We are unable to conclude you have an established facility for religious services. You are sharing both space and at least one employee with G. You were unable or unwilling to provide any information regarding G. As a result, there is a lack of clarity regarding where you are operating inside of the facility. While you have stated you use the first floor of the building, the pictures you have submitted lend one to think otherwise. The descriptions given in combination with the pictures provided call into question your presence and use of the facility, your establishment in the facility, and your regular use of the facility. It is also unclear how many students G has, making it impossible for us to determine how much space they would occupy in your facility, or to what extent they are using your facility. We are unable to determine who has access to your facility, or when. You have no materials or literature advertising your services to the public, relying instead on word of mouth. It is unclear from your responses that you have an established, regular location for religious services reasonably available to the general public.

We are unable to conclude you have an established congregation that regularly assembles for worship services. You initially stated you have 50 members, but later said you only have 25 members. Only one of your trustees is a congregant. You have provided varied numbers of attendees and have had no increase in attendance in over three years, which calls into question whether you have an established body of believers. Further, it would seem that if you require your congregants to be Sabbath-observing, they must attend services at a different location on the Sabbath as you do not offer services that day. Based on these facts it is unclear that you have an established and regular body of worshipers.

While you meet some of the 14 points as listed in American Guidance, your lack of, or inconsistency of, information has not conclusively demonstrated the existence of the basic tenets required for obtaining status as a church — regular worship services conducted at a regular location with a regular congregation.

An organization that is unable to demonstrate they have now or will have in the future sufficient records to show operations exclusively further exempt purposes will not be found to meet the operational test under Section 501(c)(3) of the Code. You were unable to provide a copy of the contract, or bids, for the construction work on your facility. You have been unable to provide financial data, citing members handling your expenses, despite a grant that was proposed by B. As in the above-cited case of New Dynamics Foundation v. United States, you have not demonstrated that your operations exclusively further exempt purposes and it is your burden to revolve gaps in the administrative record.

APPLICANT’S POSITION

You said it is standard business practice in your state to engage in leasehold improvements, and most properties have to be retro fitted to the specifics of the entity using the property. Leasehold improvements are treated as an asset and depreciate over the life of the asset. It is not considered a benefit to the landlord since the asset is owned and depreciated by the lease holder. You further asserted that the “sum of the total renovations was less than $* * * which is considered a modest sum” by State W standards for construction cost. “Although the written bids were not located the entity maintained the bid tally sheet” which in State W the government agencies consider it sufficient documentation of bids.

Regarding your allowance of a non-board member to write checks, you stated the IRS doesn’t mandate any specific management policy. You further stated:

The fact that a small organization which affords the board with tight oversight of fiscal transactions suffices to exercise control of funds. A board is generally not intended to be involved in detail micro managing of daily operations. Accordingly check signing which is typical of daily management is delegated to persons more readily available outside of the board. This is standard practice in State W to the extent that banks in State W have sample board resolutions designating persons outside the board as signatories.”

You also cited some laws from State W as well as a trade manual for non-profits discussing internal controls. These indicate delegating is an effective means of management and supervision is a control activity.

You indicated you are willing to adopt policies we suggest in order to satisfy the operational test. In fact, you submitted board meeting minutes from a recent meeting whereby you nominated an additional, unrelated member of the board. You said the new board member’s credential of business acumen and being an unrelated party establishes a well-rounded, totally unrelated board. You said this should aid the approval process. You further asserted the unrelated board mitigates and minimizes the possibility of conflict of interest at the governance level. You said this has public benefit as well as a compliance enhancement and logically should expedite the tax-exempt application process.

Most recently you have requested expedite status of your application for exemption. Your expedite request indicates that an individual with the same surname of B and D (you did not provide the first name) has “. . . committed to our congregation a grant . . .” of a specific amount for the purpose of purchasing a Torah scroll to memorialize his ancestry.” This is conditional on our being approved as a 501(c)(3) organization by . . .” a certain date, in time for a specific Jewish holiday. You further stated, “Loss of the grant would severely impact our operations as a Torah Scroll is a necessity.”

SERVICE’S RESPONSE TO APPLICANT’S POSITION

You indicated you spent over $* * * for renovations. Based on your documented income, this was * * *% of your revenue to provide renovations to a building not owed by you and for which you do not have a lease. In fact, you said you had a bank account “solely set aside for the purpose of making renovations to the site for use as a congregation.” You said the building is an asset owned and depreciated by the leaseholder; however, you do not have a lease. You are operated for the substantial non-exempt purpose of providing renovations to a building, thus providing substantial private benefit to the owner.

Although you state you qualify for exemption under Section 501(c)(3) of the Code as a church under Sections 509(a)(1) and 170(b)(1)(A)(i), you are operating in a manner which contradicts your Bylaws. We are unable to conclude which operational procedures you adhere to and which ones you disregard. You suggest you are willing to adopt policies and procedures in order to satisfy the operational test; however, your written policies and procedures (Bylaws) already in place do not appear to have been followed. Therefore, the adoption of policies to which you may not adhere is insufficient to establish exemption

Your addition of a fourth, unrelated board member does not eliminate the control of the board by the majority-related board. Likewise, the commitment of a grant from a related party does not sufficiently establish qualification of exempt status.

PROTEST

You submitted additional photographs of your facility. You also submitted a lease agreement prepared by the landlord’s attorney. Rent was calculated by evenly dividing the amount of capital improvements done to the facility, k dollars, by the lease term, 60 months. You said this satisfies the private benefit issue. The lease you submitted is back-dated four years and permits your occupancy rent free for one more year. After that time you will have to pay rent.

 

SERVICE’S RESPONSE TO APPLICANT’S PROTEST

Although you now have a retroactive lease agreement, you did not substantiate how the rent amount was determined and whether it is reasonable. You simply divided the amount of money spent on the renovations over a five year period with you receiving a credit against the amount due. You have not indicated what happens after the five year period expires. The lease also does not alleviate the benefit derived to the other tenants of the building. Although your new lease agreement may reduce some concern over the private benefit to the owners of the facility regarding the renovations you performed, you still have not substantiated the actual improvements made, the process by which they were done and their public benefit.

CONCLUSION

Based on the above facts and law, we conclude that you do not qualify for exemption under section 501(c)(3) of the IRC. More specifically you fail the operational test and lack control and discretion of your funds. Each of these non-exempt purposes causes you to be disqualified from exemption under Section 501(c)(3) of the Code.

You have the right to file a protest if you believe this determination is incorrect. To protest, you must submit a statement of your views and fully explain your reasoning. You must submit the statement, signed by one of your officers, within 30 days from the date of this letter. We will consider your statement and decide if the information affects our determination. If your statement does not provide a basis to reconsider our determination, we will forward your case to our Appeals Office. You can find more information about the role of the Appeals Office in Publication 892, Exempt Organization Appeal Procedures for Unagreed Issues.

An attorney, certified public accountant, or an individual enrolled to practice before the Internal Revenue Service may represent you during the appeal process. If you want representation during the appeal process, you must file a proper power of attorney, Form 2848, Power of Attorney and Declaration of Representative, if you have not already done so. You can find more information about representation in Publication 947, Practice Before the IRS and Power of Attorney. All forms and publications mentioned in this letter can be found at www.irs.gov, Forms and Publications.

If you do not file a protest within 30 days, you will not be able to file a suit for declaratory judgment in court because the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) will consider the failure to appeal as a failure to exhaust available administrative remedies. Code section 7428(b)(2) provides, in part, that a declaratory judgment or decree shall not be issued in any proceeding unless the Tax Court, the United States Court of Federal Claims, or the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia determines that the organization involved has exhausted all of the administrative remedies available to it within the IRS.

If you do not intend to protest this determination, you do not need to take any further action. If we do not hear from you within 30 days, we will issue a final adverse determination letter. That letter will provide information about filing tax returns and other matters.

Please send your protest statement, Form 2848, and any supporting documents to the applicable address:

Mail to:

Internal Revenue Service

EO Determinations Quality Assurance

Room 7-008

P.O. Box 2508

Cincinnati, OH 45201

Deliver to:

Internal Revenue Service

EO Determinations Quality Assurance

550 Main Street, Room 7-008

Cincinnati, OH 45202

You may fax your statement using the fax number shown in the heading of this letter. If you fax your statement, please call the person identified in the heading of this letter to confirm that he or she received your fax.

If you have any questions, please contact the person whose name and telephone number are shown in the heading of this letter.

Sincerely,

Holly O. Paz

Director, Exempt Organizations

Rulings and Agreements

Enclosure:

Publication 892




IRS Phone Forum: "Charities and their Volunteers" – July 17

Many charities use all-volunteer labor to accomplish their work. Even those fortunate enough to have paid staff often rely heavily on volunteers to enhance their efforts.

This phone forum will help charity leaders and tax practitioners understand the tax rules that can come into play with volunteers. We’ll discuss what charities and their volunteers need to do to avoid any unintended tax consequences for the organization or the volunteer.

Topics include:

Click here to register for this event:

http://ems.intellor.com/index.cgi?p=204706&t=71&do=register&s=&rID=417&edID=305




IRS Phone Forum: "Veterans Organizations – Complying with IRS Rules" — July 30.

Veterans organizations occupy a special place in the world of exempt organizations. Not only are most veterans organizations exempt from tax, but contributions to them may be deductible, and some are permitted to set aside amounts that are used to provide insurance benefits to members.

This combination — tax-exempt status, deductibility of contributions and the ability to pay benefits to members — is relatively rare and is evidence of Congress’s intent to provide special tax treatment for veterans organizations. This phone forum provides information to help them stay tax exempt.

Topics include:

Click here to register for this event:

http://ems.intellor.com/index.cgi?p=204705&t=71&do=register&s=&rID=417&edID=305




Lawmaker Seeks Discounted Health Plan Fee for Tax-Exempt, Nonprofit Hospitals.

Rep. Tim Walberg, R-Mich., has urged Treasury to classify health plans owned by nonprofit, tax-exempt hospitals or hospital systems in the same category as other nonprofit, tax-exempt health plans, which would give the hospital plans a 50 percent discount on the insurance plan fee required under the Affordable Care Act.

May 22, 2013

The Honorable Jacob Lew

Secretary of the Treasury

United States Department of the Treasury

1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Room 3330

Washington, DC 20220

RE: REG-118315-12: Health Insurance Providers Fee

Dear Secretary Lew:

I write on a matter of concern to a number of federally taxable regional health insurance plans owned by tax-exempt hospitals and health care systems. These hospital-owned health plans (HHPs) are unique because they are entirely owned and controlled by parents that are tax-exempt under section 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) and are further described in section 501(c). Despite paying taxes under the IRC, HHPs function more similarly to nonprofit entities because they must reinvest whatever marginal profits they produce each year into the hospital parent’s charitable mission. HHPs were originally created as taxable entities due to the prevailing physician ownership model at the time of their founding. However, as the ownership model moved away from physician ownership, HHPs found it nearly impossible to convert to nonprofit status due to the evolving interpretation of section 501(m) of the IRC. As a result, HHPs will be assessed at unsustainable levels under REG-118315-12: Health Insurance Providers Fee (“the insurer fee”) and will likely be forced to significantly limit services or exit the market altogether. Either outcome will negatively affect the communities that HHPs serve by impacting the charitable activities of their parent hospitals.

The recently released rules implementing Section 9010 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) failed to curtail the implementation of the insurer fee on this specific group of health plans. In § 57.4(a)(4)(iii) of the insurer fee, the ACA is interpreted as granting partial reductions for certain exempt activities to health insurers that are exempt from Federal income tax and meet section 501(c) requirements. I believe HHPs should be included in this category of health plans that receive partial reductions because, like other nonprofit health plans, HHP premiums are attributable to the exempt activities of their parent nonprofit, tax-exempt hospitals and health systems. I urge you to provide relief to these plans from the insurer fee, consistent with the treatment of other tax exempt providers.

I am concerned that these taxable health plans owned entirely by nonprofit, tax-exempt hospitals or health systems appear to be included in a group of health plans that receive no exemptions from the insurer fee, while other nonprofit insurance providers receive either a partial or full exemption. I believe HHPs should receive a 50 percent exemption from the insurer fee because they are an essential part of the communities they serve.

HHPs operate differently than traditional for-profit health plans and should be treated accordingly. The parent hospitals and health systems, exempt under Internal Revenue Code Section 501(c)(3) and Section 501(c)(4), are required to hold and use all of their assets and earnings for tax-exempt, charitable purposes. This requirement extends to the equity and earnings of wholly owned/controlled taxable subsidiaries, such as HHPs. Therefore, the cost of the insurer fee that a HHP will be required to pay under the proposed regulation will ultimately reduce the resources of the parent hospital or health system to fulfill their charitable missions. The imposition of the fee on these hospitals and health systems will detract from the organization’s mission and the vital community services they provide. To impose the insurer fee on these community-based providers is not sustainable and will have a damaging effect on the communities that these plans serve.

I believe that if no relief is granted to these hospital-owned health plans in the final regulations, these types of health plans will be assessed approximately $200 million in fees in 2014 under the insurer fee. This will make it impossible for these plans to continue to offer quality, locally-based compassionate health care. The imposition of the full insurer fee on these providers may drive HHPs from the marketplace, thus limiting the choices available in these areas.

Classifying these 28 health plans with other non-profit tax-exempt health insurers appears to be in alignment with the federal government’s tax exempt policies. These plans share the same charitable mission-driven agendas of their parent nonprofit health systems and should be treated in the same manner as other tax-exempt entities. Adding these plans to the 50 percent tax exempt category would increase the fees of the health plans remaining in the non-exempt category by only about 1.8 percent, resulting in a de minimis impact on the health insurance marketplace.

I greatly appreciate your willingness to continue refining your approach and hope you will grant these hospital-owned health plans a 50 percent exemption from the Health Insurance Providers Fee.

Sincerely,

Tim Walberg

Member of Congress




IRS LTR: Multi-Employer Plan With One Non-Church Member Can't Qualify as Church Plan.

Citations: LTR 201323042

The IRS ruled that a multi-employer plan that included at least one employer that was not a tax-exempt church cannot qualify as a church plan under section 414(e) nor can a subsequent plan, as a continuation of the original plan, qualify as a church plan.

U.I.L 414.08-00

Date: March 12, 2013

Refer Reply To: T:EP:RA:T3

LEGEND:

Organization A = * * *

Church B = * * *

Constitution C = * * *

Board D = * * *

Organization E = * * *

Committee F = * * *

Committee G = * * *

Plan X = * * *

Plan Y = * * *

State S = * * *

Dear * * *:

This is in response to correspondence dated March 11, 2005, as supplemented by correspondence dated October 24, 2005, November 23, 2011, February 3, 2012, February 15, 2012, April 24, 2012, May 11, 2012, and May 24, 2012, submitted by you on behalf of Organization A, concerning whether Plan X qualifies as a church plan under section 414(e) of the Internal Revenue Code (“Code”).

The following facts and representations have been submitted under penalty of perjury in support of the rulings requested:

Organization A is a tax-exempt entity under section 501(c)(3) of the Code. Its principal offices are located in State S. Church B is a church for purposes of determining church plan status. Constitution C mandates that Organization A meet Church B’s requirements for its affiliate organizations.

Board D consists solely of individuals ratified by State S synods of Church B. Board D has the power to adopt resolutions, appoint and remove Organization A’s president, approve Organization A’s budget, and designate committees to act on behalf of the board.

Constitution C declares Organization A’s affiliation with Church B. Church B plays a significant role in governance of Organization A. In addition to Church B’s role in the selection of Board D, Organization A’s executive committee includes the bishop of the three State S synods of Church B. These synods of Church B provide financial support to Organization A. Organization A is included in a directory of Church B’s ministries. Services provided by Organization A are provided as part of the social ministry of Church B.

Organization A has been recognized as an affiliated organization of Church B by annual filings with the Internal Revenue Service (“Service”) and is covered under a group ruling issued to Church B.

Organization A adopted Plan X for the benefit of its eligible employees on January 1, 1966. Plan X is a tax-qualified plan under section 401(a) of the Code. It is represented that Plan X does not benefit any Organization A employees engaged in unrelated trade or businesses. Plan X allows various tax-exempt organizations to sponsor Plan X for the benefit of their employees.

The Preamble of Plan X states that Plan X is for the exclusive benefit of the employees (and their beneficiaries) of the plan sponsor and participating agencies, originally effective as of July 1, 1970.

Section 1.1 of Plan X is the definitions section of Plan X. Section 1.1(r) of Plan X states that an “Employer” means the Lead Sponsor and any health or welfare agency that is exempt from taxation under Section 501(c)(3) or 501(c)(4) of the Code which has adopted the Plan as may be provided under Article XV. Section 1.1(kk) defines the “Lead Sponsor” as Organization E and any successor thereto.

Section 15.1 of Plan X states that any health or welfare agency that is exempt from taxation under section 501(c)(3) or 501(c)(4) of the Code that is not an Employer may, with the consent of the Lead Sponsor, adopt and sponsor the Plan for the benefit of its Employees and become an Employer hereunder by causing an appropriate written instrument evidencing such adoption to be executed in accordance with the requirements of its organizational authority.

Section 16.1 of Plan X states that the Lead Sponsor reserves the right at any time and from time to time, by means of a written instrument executed in the name of the Lead Sponsor by its duly authorized representatives, to amend or modify the Plan and, to the extent provided therein, to amend or modify the funding agreement.

Section 16.2 of Plan X states that if an Employer should disagree with any general amendment made to the Plan by the Lead Sponsor, the Employer shall have 60 days following such amendment in which to notify the Lead Sponsor of its disagreement and its intention either to terminate the Plan with respect to its Employees, as provided in section 16.4, or to withdraw from the Plan and set up its own plan with its own funding arrangement, as provided in section 16.13.

Section 16.3 of Plan X states that the Lead Sponsor reserves the right, by means of a written instrument executed in the name of the Lead Sponsor by its duly authorized representatives, at any time to terminate the Plan. In the event that Lead Sponsor terminates the Plan, each Employer under the Plan must elect either to terminate the Plan with respect to its Employees and proceed as provided in Section 16.4 or to set up its own plan with its own funding arrangement.

Section 16.4 of Plan X states that each employer may, by action of its board of directors or other governing body, elect to terminate the Plan solely with respect to its own Employees and Participants. Except as otherwise provided in section 16.2 or 16.3, such termination may be effectuated only on January 1, or July 1 of any year, and only after the Employer has given the Lead Sponsor at least three months advance notice of its intent to terminate.

On May 11, 2012, your representative sent a letter that included the most recent determination letter for Plan X, the Eighteenth Amendment to the prior plan document, and the current plan document. The Eighteenth Amendment is effective January 1, 1997, and states in relevant part that Plan X is a collection of single employer plans maintained for the exclusive benefit of eligible employers of health or welfare agencies exempt from taxation under section 501(c)(3) or 501(c)(4) of the Code that, with the consent of the Lead Sponsor, adopt and sponsor Plan X for the benefit of their respective employees and their beneficiaries. These employers are set forth on the Schedule of Adopting Employers that immediately precedes Appendix A of Plan X.

The Eighteenth Amendment goes on to state that each adopting employer: (1) maintains a separate single employer plan only with respect to its own respective employees; (2) makes contributions to fund the benefits only of its own employees, which assets are separately accounted for in Pension Fund sub-accounts segregated from any and all other adopting employers’ contributions; and (3) has received a separate favorable determination from the Service on the tax-qualified status of its plan.

Prior to March 15, 2005, Board D appointed Committee F to handle functions of Plan X. Committee F consists of members appointed by Board D. Committee F was charged with various tasks related to the funding and administration of Plan X. However, the administration or funding of Plan X was not the principal purpose or function of Committee F.

Effective March 15, 2005, pursuant to a resolution adopted on March 15, 2005 by Board D, Board D appointed Committee G. Committee G consists of three Board D members and two vice-presidents of Organization A. Board D members constitute the majority of Committee G. The principal purpose and function of Committee G is the administration and funding of Plan X. Committee G is responsible for determining which benefits are offered to employees of Organization A, determining how to best provide such benefits, determining the level of benefits provided to the employees of Organization A and establishing funding policies for Plan X.

Effective January 1, 2010, Plan X, as adopted by Organization A, was restated and renamed Plan Y.

On January 12, 2012, Plan Y filed a statement as part of its amended 2007 Form 5500 filing, electing ERISA coverage pursuant to section 410(d) of the Code, effective January 1, 2007.

In accordance with Revenue Procedure 2011-44, Notice to Employees with reference to Plan X was provided on November 22, 2011. This notice adequately explained to participants of Plan X the consequences of church plan status.

Based on the above facts and representations, you request a ruling that Plan X is a church plan within the meaning of section 414(e) of the Code effective March 15, 2005, and for all prior years of the Plan’s operation.

Section 414(e) was added to the Code by section 1015 of ERISA. Section 1017(e) of ERISA provided that section 414(e) applied as of the date of ERISA’s enactment. However, section 414(e) was subsequently amended by section 407(b) of the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. Law 96-364, to provide that section 414(e) was effective as of January 1, 1974.

Section 414(e)(1) of the Code generally defines a church plan as a plan established and maintained for its employees (or their beneficiaries) by a church or a convention or association of churches which is exempt from taxation under section 501 of the Code.

Section 414(e)(2) of the Code provides, in part, that the term “church plan” does not include a plan that is established and maintained primarily for the benefit of employees (or their beneficiaries) of such church or convention or association of churches who are employed in connection with one or more unrelated trades or businesses (within the meaning of section 513 of the Code); or if less than substantially all of the individuals included in the plan are individuals described in section 414(e)(1) of the Code or section 414(e)(3)(B) of the Code (or their beneficiaries).

Section 414(e)(3)(A) of the Code provides that a plan established and maintained for its employees (or their beneficiaries) by a church or a convention or association of churches includes a plan maintained by an organization, whether a civil law corporation or otherwise, the principal purpose or function of which is the administration or funding of a plan or program for the provision of retirement benefits or welfare benefits, or both, for the employees of a church or a convention or association churches, if such organization is controlled by or associated with a church or a convention or association of churches.

Section 414(e)(3)(B) of the Code generally defines “employee” of a church or a convention or association of churches to include a duly ordained, commissioned, or licensed minister of a church in the exercise of his or her ministry, regardless of the source of his or her compensation, and an employee of an organization, whether a civil law corporation or otherwise, which is exempt from tax under section 501 of the Code, and which is controlled by or associated with a church or a convention or association of churches.

Section 414(e)(3)(C) of the Code provides that a church or a convention or association of churches which is exempt from tax under section 501 of the Code shall be deemed the employer of any individual included as an employee under subparagraph (B).

Section 414(e)(3)(D) of the Code provides that an organization, whether a civil law corporation or otherwise, is associated with a church or a convention or association of churches if it shares common religious bonds and convictions with that church or convention or association of churches.

Section 1.414(e)-1(c) of the Federal Income Tax Regulations (“Regulations”) states that the term church plan does not include a plan which, during the plan year, is maintained by two or more employers unless each of the employers is a church that is exempt from tax under section 501(a) of the Code. The Regulations also state that the employees of each employer must not be employed by an unrelated trade or business.

Based on the language of Plan X described above, Plan X was a multiple employer plan when it was established and was a multiple employer plan until January 1, 1997, when the Eighteenth Amendment to Plan X provided that Plan X is a collection of single employer plans. Thus, effective January 1, 1997, Plan X is no longer a multiple employer plan, but it cannot become a church plan, because it was not established as a church plan. In addition the Plan, in its current form, Plan Y, cannot be a church plan, because it is merely a continuation of Plan X.

Since Plan X was a multiple employer plan, not all of whose participating employers were church plans when established, it failed to satisfy section 1.414(e)-1(c) of the Regulations which states that the term church plan does not include a plan which, during the plan year, is maintained by two or more employers unless each of the employers is a church that is exempt from tax under section 501(a).

There is at least one employer that had employees that participated in Plan X that was not a church that is exempt from tax under section 501(a). Therefore, we find that neither Plan X nor Plan Y, as a continuation of Plan X, is or can become a church plan.

This letter expresses no opinion as to whether Plan X satisfies the requirements of section 401(a) of the Code.

No opinion is expressed as to the tax treatment of the transaction described herein under the provisions of any other section of either the Code or regulations which may be applicable thereto.

This letter is directed only to the taxpayer who requested it. Section 6110(k)(3) of the Code provides that it may not be used or cited as precedent.

A copy of this letter has been sent to your authorized representative in accordance with a power of attorney on file in this office.

If you have any questions regarding this letter, please contact * * *. Please address all correspondence to SE:T:EP:RA:T3.

Sincerely yours,

Laura B. Warshawsky, Manager

Employee Plans Technical Group 3

Enclosures:

Deleted copy of ruling letter

Notice of Intention to Disclose




IRS LTR: IRS Rules on Status of Church Plan, Grantor Trust.

Citations: LTR 201323043

The IRS determined that a plan providing employees and former employees health and life insurance benefits is a church plan, that the trust funding the insurance premium payments is a grantor trust and is not a welfare benefit fund, and that contributions to or premiums paid by the trust are not includable in participants’ gross income.

U.I.L: 414.08-00

Date: March 15, 2013

Refer Reply To: T:EP:RA:T2

LEGEND:

Convention B = * * *

Association C = * * *

State A = * * *

Board R = * * *

Denomination D = * * *

Local Denomination D Associations = * * *

Denomination D Associations = * * *

Union W = * * *

Brotherhood P = * * *

Policy J = * * *

Convention G = * * *

Committee O = * * *

Committee N = * * *

Board D = * * *

Plan X = * * *

Resolution H = * * *

Committee U = * * *

Trust T = * * *

Foundation F = * * *

Dear * * *:

This letter is in response to your letter dated December 11, 2003, as supplemented by correspondence dated December 13, 2004, July 8, 2005, August 2, 2005, September 27, 2005, December 1, 2005, November 29, 2006, December 18, 2006, March 1, 2007, and February 23, 2012, submitted on your behalf by your authorized representative regarding the church plan status of Plan X within the meaning of section 414(e) of the Internal Revenue Code (Code). In addition, you have requested rulings under sections 79, 83, 106, 402(b), 419, and 671 of the Code and section 301.7701-4(a) of the Procedure and Administration Regulations (P&A Regulations).

The following facts and representations have been submitted on your behalf:

Convention B was originally incorporated pursuant to State A statutes under the name of Association C in 1852. Association C’s name was changed to Convention B on December 20, 19* * * Article I of Convention B’s Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation provides that Convention B constitutes a body corporate and shall have the full power to institute, pursue, adopt, and carry into effect such measures as to them may be thought best for the promotion of morality, benevolence, and religion, not inconsistent with the laws of State A. Convention B is comprised of and offers services to Denomination D churches across State A. The Local Denomination D Associations are comprised of and offer services to most of the same Denomination D churches but in a regional area of State A. Denomination D member churches of Convention B are also typically members of their Local Denomination D Associations.

Both Convention B and the Local Denomination D Associations have the general purpose of assisting Denomination D member churches in carrying out their mission of evangelism, missions, and ministries and work closely together to promote those ends. The Local Denomination D Associations receive grants and missionary assistance funding from Convention B. Convention B and the Local Denomination D Associations maintain collaborative efforts in training and participation in evangelism/missions and ministries/church development and leadership development and the promotion of the unity and fellowship among and between Denomination D member churches.

Convention B staff often serves as consultants with the local Denomination D associations in helping them with their needs and to develop strategies to meet their perceived needs. As a result of such planning, specific training events are planned and implemented locally, regionally and statewide in which the staff of Convention B and Local Denomination D Associations participate. The consulting work is done on-site, per e-mail, letters or phone calls as needed. The Local Denomination D Association leadership in collaboration with the staff of Convention B negotiate dates, resources, personalities, locations, funding, promotion and other logistics, needed to make such training effective and efficient for mutually desired outcomes in evangelism, missions, ministries and church and leadership development.

Article II of Convention B’s Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation provide that it shall be a medium through which the Denomination D churches, in their sovereign capacity, can work together in promoting all denominational enterprises which they deem necessary in carrying out the Great Commission. Article II further provides that Convention B shall not carry on any activities not permitted to be carried on by a corporation exempt from federal income tax under section 501(c)(3) of the Code.

Convention B receives its funding from the various Denomination D churches throughout State A which are affiliated with and/or working in cooperation with Convention B. It is represented that Denomination D churches that comprise the membership of Convention B are churches as defined in section 414(e)(1) of the Code and are treated as organizations described in section 501(c)(3) of the Code. It is also represented that the Local Denomination D Associations are organizations described in section 501(c)(3) of the Code.

Article III of Convention B’s Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation provides, in general, that Convention B shall have full power to admit, elect, or appoint its members and officers, to select such times and places for its meetings, and the transaction of its business, and to make such bylaws, rules, and ordinances for its own government. Article III further provides that Convention B shall elect a board of directors to be known as the Executive Board (now called Board R), which shall have charge of the work of Convention B between the meetings, and which shall appoint all officers and agencies that may be required in its work.

Article IV of Convention B’s Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation provides that upon dissolution of Convention B, Board R shall, after paying or making provision for the payment of all liabilities of Convention B, dispose of all of the assets of Convention B exclusively for one or more exempt purposes consistent with the purposes of Convention B.

Convention B’s Constitution provides that the membership of Convention B shall consist of messengers from cooperating affiliated Denomination D churches.

Article IV of Convention B’s Constitution provides that on the occasion of the annual meeting, the messengers of cooperating Denomination D churches of Convention B shall elect by ballot, a president, a first and second vice president, a secretary and one assistant secretary. The President and the Vice President and Secretaries of Convention B shall be the officers of Board R. Board R members must be members of a Denomination D church for at least one year prior to nomination or appointment.

Article VII of Convention B’s Constitution provides, in general, that Board R shall consist of members from each cooperating Denomination D District Association, plus eight at-large members from the geographical regions of State A.

The eight at-large members shall be elected from any cooperating affiliated Denomination D church. These members shall be nominated by Committee O of Convention B. Committee O is one of the governing committees of Convention B.

Members of Board R are elected by Convention B. Any vacancies on Board R not filled at the annual meeting of Convention B or which occur during the year shall be filled by Board R upon recommendation of Committee O. The retiring President of Convention B shall be an at-large member of Board R for one year immediately following his term of office. The president of Union W and the president of Brotherhood P shall serve as ex-officio members of Board R.

Article VIII of Convention B’s Constitution provides that Board R shall have charge of the work of Convention B between its sessions, and shall appoint all officers and agencies that may be required in its work.

Article IX provides, in part, that no person shall be eligible for election or appointment until he has been a member of a State A Denomination D church for at least one year prior to nomination or appointment.

The messengers from the cooperating Denomination D churches approve the membership on the various governing committees of Convention B.

On May 6, 20* * * Board R approved an employment policy, Policy J, which sets forth a preferential hiring policy for hiring members of Denomination D churches. Policy J provides that it is the policy and intent of Convention B from the effective date of this policy to hire and retain for all full-time and professional contract positions, where possible, persons who are members in good standing of Denomination D churches which are affiliated with and/or working in cooperation with Convention B and Convention G. Convention G is described as a cooperative ministry agency serving Denomination D churches on a world-wide basis. Policy J also states that it is the policy of Convention B to expect all of its employees to conduct themselves in a Christ-like manner both on and off the job so that their lives reflect Christian values, and to assist Denomination D members and State A Denomination D churches in their ministry. Policy J further provides that failure to adhere to this conduct standard may result in disciplinary action up to and including termination of employment.

Plan X was established in 19* * * by Board R to provide health and life insurance coverage to Convention B’s retired employees and has always been maintained by Convention B for such employees. All former employees (i.e., retirees) who meet the applicable eligibility criteria established by Convention B can participate in Plan X and are eligible to receive benefits under Plan X. Currently, as premiums become due, Convention B pays all applicable health and life insurance premiums to Board D of Convention G for retirees (including the missionary/pastor employees whose employment was transferred to the Local Denomination D Associations) from its general assets. Retirees may be required to pay a portion of premiums in the future. Convention G is a vehicle through which its affiliated member conventions can purchase insurance coverage such as the coverage provide for under Plan X.

With respect to Plan X membership, it is represented that the majority of the participants are either employees or former employees (i.e., retirees) of Convention B. It is further represented that there is a group of missionary/pastor employees most of whom, if not all, were employed by Convention B in the 19* * *s. In 19* * * the employment of these missionary/pastor employees was transferred to various Local Denomination D Associations in State A, which share common religious bonds and convictions with Convention B. You state that this group of employees has been grandfathered into Plan X and is a finite group that has not and will not increase in size. There are no other participants in Plan X other than the above described two groups.

You also represent that none of the Plan X participants engage in unrelated trades or businesses within the meaning of section 513 of the Code.

Plan X provides retiree health and life insurance coverage for employees who retire after meeting certain age and service conditions.

Plan X has been historically administered by an informal committee of several employees and officers of Convention B. However, on December * * * 20* * * Board R approved Resolution H that provides that Convention B resolved to amend Plan X to provide that a benefits committee, Committee U shall act as the administrator to maintain and administer Plan X. Committee U shall have the authority to address all administrative issues relating to Plan X including interpreting Plan X provisions. Committee U is comprised of four members who are appointed by Board R and such members may be removed and new members added at any time in the discretion of Board R. All members of Committee U shall share common religious bonds and convictions with Convention B and its related churches. Committee U shall have no activities other than the administration of Plan X and shall meet as often as necessary to administer Plan X.

In connection with Plan X, Convention B has been authorized to establish and fund Trust T. Convention B intends to make a substantial contribution to Trust T to fund future retiree health and life insurance premium payments pursuant to Plan X. Convention B may make future contributions, from time to time, to fund premium costs of Plan X. Convention B, a tax-exempt entity, will not take a deduction for contributions to Trust T. No employee contributions, if made under Plan X, will be held in Trust T. As retiree health and life insurance premiums become due on a monthly basis, Convention B intends to direct the trustee of Trust T to pay the applicable health and life insurance premiums directly to Board D.

Trust T is intended to be a grantor Trust under section 671 of the Code. Trust T will be revocable. However, Trust T may only be revoked on termination of Plan X or dissolution of Convention B. If Trust T is revoked because of termination of Plan X or dissolution of Convention B, the remaining trust assets may be returned to Convention B provided all obligations under Plan X have been satisfied. Convention B may terminate Plan X at any time.

Participants and their dependents have no preferred claim on, or any beneficial ownership interest in, any Trust T assets, and all rights created under Plan X in Trust T are unsecured contractual rights against Convention B. No benefits or assets under Trust T may be assigned, anticipated, or alienated by participants.

Trust T provides that the principal and income of Trust T are subject to the claims of Convention B’s general creditors in the event of insolvency. If Convention B becomes insolvent, the trustee will immediately cease distributions and hold Trust T assets for the benefit of Convention B’s creditors.

Foundation F will serve as the trustee of Trust T.

Specifically, Trust T contains the following provisions:

Paragraph 1(b) of Trust T’s governing document provides that Trust T shall be revocable by Convention B. However, Convention B may only revoke Trust T upon the termination of Plan X or dissolution of Convention B.

Paragraph 1(c) provides that Trust T is intended to be a grantor trust, of which Convention B is the grantor, within the meaning of subpart E, part I, subchapter J, chapter 1, subtitle A of the Code and shall be construed accordingly.

Paragraph 1(d) provides that the principal of Trust T and any earnings thereon, shall be held separate and apart from other funds of Convention B and shall be used exclusively for the uses and purposes of Plan X participants and general creditors as provided in Trust T’s governing document. Plan X participants and their beneficiaries shall have no preferred claim on, or any beneficial ownership interest in, any assets of Trust T. Any rights created under Plan X and Trust T’s governing documents shall be mere unsecured contractual rights of the Plan X participants against Convention B.

Paragraph 1(d) also provides that any assets held by Trust T will be subject to the claims of Convention B’s general creditors under federal and state law in the event of insolvency of Convention B.

Paragraph 3(a) provides that Convention B will be considered “Insolvent” if (i) Convention B is unable to pay its debts as they become due, or (ii) Convention B is subject to a pending proceeding as a debtor under the United States Bankruptcy Code. This paragraph also provides that the Trustee shall cease payment of insurance benefits on behalf of Plan X participants and their beneficiaries or dependents if Convention B is insolvent.

Paragraph 3(b)(3) provides that if at any time the Trustee has determined that Convention B is insolvent, the Trustee shall discontinue payments under Plan X and shall hold Trust T assets for the benefit of Convention B’s general creditors.

Paragraph 4 provides that if Trust T is revoked because of the termination of Plan X or dissolution of Convention B, the remaining Trust T assets may be returned to Convention B provided all of Convention B’s obligations under Plan X as of such date have been satisfied.

In its submission for rulings, Convention B has indicated that it plans to request a ruling from the Department of Labor that Plan X is a church plan for purposes of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). Pursuant to ERISA section 4(b)(2), the ERISA Title 1 provisions do not apply to an employee benefit plan that is a church plan with respect to which no election has been made under section 410(d) of the Code.

In a facsimile dated February * * * 20* * * it is represented that the notice required by Revenue Procedure 2011-44 was not issued to participants because Revenue Procedure 2011-44 applies to qualified retirement plans and not to retiree health insurance plans. Plan X is a retiree health and life insurance plan.

Based on the foregoing facts you request the following rulings:

1. That Trust T will be classified as a Trust under section 301.7701-4(a) of the P&A Regulations;

2. That Trust T is a Grantor Trust under section 671 of the Code;

3. That Trust T is not a welfare benefit fund under section 419(e)(1) of the Code;

4. That the contributions to Trust T will not be includible in the Participants’ gross income under either section 83 of the Code or section 402(b) of the Code;

5. That the premiums paid under Plan X from Trust T will be excluded from gross income of retirees under sections 106(a) and 79 of the Code to the same extent as if paid directly by Convention B; and

6. That Plan X as described herein is a church plan under section 414(e) of the Code.

With respect to ruling request number one, section 301.7701-4(a) of the P&A Regulations provides that, generally, an arrangement will be treated as a trust if it can be shown that the purpose of the arrangement is to vest in trustees responsibility for the protection and conservation of property for beneficiaries who cannot share in the discharge of the responsibility and, therefore, are not associates in a joint enterprise for the conduct of business for profit.

Section 671 of the Code provides that if the grantor or another person is treated as the owner of any portion of a trust, there shall then be included in computing the taxable income and credits of the grantor or the other person those items of income, deductions, and credits against tax of the trust which are attributable to that portion of the trust to the extent that such items would be taken into account in computing the taxable income or credits against the tax of an individual.

Sections 673 through 677 of the Code specify the circumstances that cause a grantor to be treated as the owner of any portion of a trust.

Section 677(a)(2) of the Code provides that the grantor is treated as the owner of any portion of a trust whose income without the approval or consent of an adverse party is, or in the discretion of the grantor or a non-adverse party, or both, may be distributed or accumulated for future distribution to the grantor.

Section 1.677(a)-1(d) of the Income Tax Regulations (I.T. Regulations) provides that under section 677 of the Code a grantor is treated as the owner of a portion of a trust whose income is, or in the discretion of the grantor or a non-adverse party or both, may be applied in the discharge of the legal obligation of the grantor.

Section 1.671-2(e)(1) of the I.T Regulations provides that for purposes of subchapter J, a grantor includes any person to the extent such person either creates a trust, or directly or indirectly makes a gratuitous transfer of property to a trust.

In this case, Convention B will transfer assets to Foundation F, the trustee, who will have responsibility for the management, protection, conservation, and investment of the assets. Neither the Plan X participants nor their beneficiaries share in this responsibility. Accordingly, with respect to ruling request number one, we conclude that Trust T will be classified as a trust for federal tax purposes under section 301.7701-4(a) of the P&A Regulations.

With respect to ruling request number two, the purpose of Trust T is to provide benefits to Plan X participants and their beneficiaries. However, if Convention B becomes insolvent, Foundation F has an obligation to cease payments from Trust T and hold Trust T’s assets for the benefit of Convention B’s creditors. Convention B is the grantor of Trust T because it creates and funds Trust T. As determined in ruling request number three below, and based solely on the facts described herein, Trust T is not a “welfare benefit fund” within the meaning of section 419(e)(1) of the Code. Accordingly, because the principal and income of Trust T can be applied to discharge legal obligations of Convention B, Convention B will be treated as the owner of Trust T under section 671 of the Code and section 1.677(a)-1(d) of the I.T. Regulations.

With respect to ruling request number three, section 419(a) of the Code provides that employer contributions to a welfare benefit plan are not deductible under Chapter 1 of the Code, but if they would otherwise be deductible, then they are deductible (subject to the limitation of section 419(b) of the Code) under section 419 of the Code for the taxable year in which paid.

Section 419(e) of the Code defines “welfare benefit fund” to include any fund that is part of a plan of an employer and through which the employer provides welfare benefits to employees. Section 419(e)(2) of the Code defines “welfare benefit” as any benefit other than a benefit with respect to which section 83(h) of the Code applies, section 404 of the Code applies (determined without regard to section 404(b)(2) of the Code), or section 404A of the Code applies. Section 419(e)(3)(A) of the Code provides that the term “fund” includes any organization described in section 501(c)(9) of the Code. Pursuant to section 419(e)(3)(B) of the Code, the term “fund” also includes any trusts not exempt from tax.

In the present case, Trust T is not exempt from tax. Trust T is subject to claims of Convention B’s general creditors in the event of the insolvency of Convention B, and so its assets are not irrevocably set aside, apart from the claims of Convention B’s creditors, for the provision of welfare benefits under Plan X. Accordingly, we conclude that Trust T is not a welfare benefit fund within the meaning of section 419(e)(1) of the Code. This conclusion is based on the assumption that Plan X is not subject to the provisions of title 1 of ERISA.

With respect to ruling request number four, section 83 of the Code provides, if, in connection with the performance of services, property is transferred to any person other than the service recipient, the excess of the fair market value of the property, on the first day that the rights to property are either transferable or not subject to substantial risk of forfeiture, over the amount paid for the property is included in the service provider’s gross income for the first taxable year in which the rights to the property are either transferable or not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture.

Section 1.83-3(e) of the I.T. Regulations states that the term “property” includes real and personal property, other than money or an unfunded and unsecured promise to pay money or property in the future. Thus, a promise to pay money or property in the future is “property” if it is either funded or secured. The term “property” also includes a beneficial interest in assets (including money) that are transferred or set aside from the claims of creditors of the transferor, such as in a trust or escrow account. In the case of a transfer of a life insurance contract, or other contract providing life insurance protection, only cash surrender value of the contract is considered to be property.

Section 1.83-3(a)(1) of the I.T. Regulations states that a “transfer” of property occurs when a person acquires a beneficial interest in the property, disregarding any lapse restriction as defined in section 1.83-3(i) of the I.T. Regulations.

Section 83(c)(1) of the Code states that the rights of a person in property are subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture if the person’s rights to full enjoyment of the property are conditioned on the future performance of services by any individual. Section 1.83-3(c)(1) of the I.T. Regulations further states that whether a risk of forfeiture is substantial or not depends on the facts and circumstances. A substantial risk of forfeiture exists where rights in property that are transferred are conditioned, directly or indirectly, on the future performance (or refraining from performance) of substantial services by any person, or the occurrence of a condition related to the purpose of the transfer, and the possibility of forfeiture is substantial if the condition is not satisfied.

Section 402(b) of the Code generally provides that contributions to an employees’ trust that is not exempt under section 501(a) of the Code are included in the gross income of the employee in accordance with section 83 of the Code except that the value of the employee’s interest in the trust is substituted for the fair market value of the property for purposes of section 83 of the Code.

In this case, Convention B is providing life and health insurance benefits for participants in Plan X and Trust T contains employer contributions for these benefits. However, Trust T is subject to the claims of the general creditors of Convention B. Further, participants in Plan X have no preferred claim on, or any beneficial ownership interest in, Trust T’s assets. Plan X participants may not anticipate, assign, or alienate any of Trust T’s assets. Accordingly, the amounts set aside on behalf of participants in Plan X for life and health benefits are not “property” and there is no “transfer of property” to the participants within the meaning of section 83(a) of the Code.

Based solely on the facts presented, we conclude, with respect to your ruling request number four that the contributions to Trust T will not be includible in the Plan X participants’ gross income under either section 83 of the Code or section 402(b) of the Code.

As to ruling request number five, section 106(a) of the Code provides that the gross income of an employee does not include employer-provided coverage under an accident or health plan.

Section 1.106-1 of the I.T. Regulations states that the gross income of an employee does not include contributions which his employer makes to an accident or health plan for compensation (through insurance or otherwise) to the employee for personal injuries or sickness incurred by the employee, the employee’s spouse, or the employee’s dependents as defined in section 152 of the Code. The employer may contribute to an accident or health plan either by paying the premium on a policy of accident or health insurance covering one or more of the employees or by contributing to a separate trust or fund which provides accident or health benefits directly or through insurance to one or more employees. However, if the insurance policy, trust or fund provides other benefits in addition to accident or health, section 106 of the Code applies only to the portion of the contributions allocable to accident or health benefits.

Revenue Ruling 62-199, 1962-2 C.B. 38, provides that the exclusion under section 106 of the Code for employer-provided accident or health plan coverage applies to retired employees as well as active employees.

Section 79(a) of the Code generally provides that an employee must include in gross income an amount equal to the cost of group-term life insurance on the life of the employee under a policy (or policies) carried directly or indirectly by his or her employer, but only to the extent that the cost exceeds: (1) the sum of the cost of $50,000 of insurance; and, (2) the amount, if any, paid by the employee toward the purchase of the insurance.

For purposes of section 79 of the Code, section 79(e) of the Code provides that the term “employee” includes a former employee.

Section 1.79-0 of the I.T. Regulations provides, in part, that a policy of life insurance is “carried directly or indirectly” by an employer if the employer pays any cost of the life insurance directly or through another person.

In this case, Convention B will make contributions to Trust T that will be used by Trust T, in connection with Plan X, to pay premiums for health insurance and life insurance on the lives of Convention B’s retired employees. Retirees are employees for purposes of sections 106 and 79 of the Code. Pursuant to section 1.106-1 of the I.T. Regulations, the health insurance coverage will be provided by the employer since Convention B is paying the cost of health insurance through a separate trust. Pursuant to section 1.79-0 of the I.T. Regulations, the life insurance coverage will be carried directly or indirectly by the employer since Convention B is paying the cost of insurance through Trust T. Thus, the fact that the premiums for retiree health insurance and life insurance are paid to the insurance company by Trust T rather than Convention B does not change the taxation to the retirees under sections 106 and 79 of the Code.

Therefore, based solely on the facts presented, we conclude, with regard to ruling request number five, that the cost of health insurance coverage provided to retired employees of Convention B as a result of premiums paid under Plan X from Trust T will be excluded from gross income of retirees under section 106 of the Code to the same extent as if paid directly by Convention B; and the cost of group term life insurance coverage provided to retired employees of Convention B as a result of premiums paid under Plan X from Trust T will be excluded from the gross income of retirees under section 79 of the Code to the same extent as if paid directly by Convention B.

As to ruling request number six, section 414(e) was added to the Code by section 1015 of ERISA. Section 1017(e) of ERISA provided that section 414(e) of the Code applied as of the date of ERISA’s enactment. However, section 414(e) of the Code was subsequently amended by section 407(b) of the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendment Act of 1980, Pub. Law 96-364, to provide that section 414(e) of the Code was effective as of January 1, 1974.

Section 414(e)(1) of the Code generally defines a church plan as a plan established and maintained for its employees (or their beneficiaries) by a church or by a convention or association of churches which Is exempt from taxation under section 501 of the Code.

Section 414(e)(2) of the Code provides, in part, that the term “church plan” does not include a plan that is established and maintained primarily for the benefit of employees (or their beneficiaries) of such church or convention or association of churches who are employed in connection with one or more unrelated trades or businesses (within the meaning of section 513 of the Code); or if less than substantially all of the individuals included in the plan are individuals described in section 414(e)(1) of the Code or section 414(e)(3)(B) of the Code (or their beneficiaries).

Section 414(e)(3)(A) of the Code provides that a plan established and maintained for its employees (or their beneficiaries) by a church or by a convention or association of churches includes a plan maintained by an organization, whether a civil law corporation or otherwise, the principal purpose or function of which is the administration or funding of a plan or program for the provision of retirement benefits or welfare benefits, or both, for the employees of a church or a convention or association of churches, if such organization is controlled by or associated with a church or a convention or association of churches.

Section 414(e)(3)(B) of the Code defines “employee” of a church or a convention or association of churches to include a duly ordained, commissioned, or licensed minister of a church in the exercise of his or her ministry, regardless of the source of his or her compensation, and an employee of an organization, whether a civil law corporation or otherwise, which is exempt from tax under section 501 of the Code, and which is controlled by or associated with a church or a convention or association of churches.

Section 414(e)(3)(C) of the Code provides that a church or a convention or association of churches which is exempt from tax under section 501 of the Code shall be deemed the employer of any individual included as an employee under subparagraph (B).

Section 414(e)(3)(D) of the Code provides that an organization, whether a civil law corporation or otherwise, is associated with a church or a convention or association of churches if the organization shares common religious bonds and convictions with that church or convention or association of churches.

Section 414(e)(3)(E) of the Code provides, in general, that if an employee who is included in a church plan separates from the service of a church or a convention or association of churches or an organization described in clause (ii) of paragraph(3)(B), the church plan shall not fail to meet the requirements of this subsection merely because the plan (i) retains the employee’s accrued benefit or account for the payment of benefits to the employee or his beneficiaries pursuant to the terms of the plan, or (ii) receives contributions on the employee’s behalf after the employee’s separation from service but only for a period of 5 years after such separation, unless the employee is disabled (within the meaning of the disability provisions of the church plan or, if there are no such provisions in the church plan, within the meaning of section 72(m)(7) of the Code) at the time of such separation from service.

In this case, Convention B qualifies as a church or association of churches for purposes of the church plan rules. Additionally, all of the employees that participant in Plan X share the same common bonds and convictions of Denomination D churches, and Convention B is a nonprofit organization described under section 501(c)(3) of the Code which is exempt from tax under section 501(a) of the Code.

Convention B was created to institute, pursue, adopt and carry into effect such measures for the promotion of morality, benevolence and religion consistent with the laws of State A. Convention B receives its funding from various Denomination D churches throughout State A which are affiliated with and/or working in cooperation with Convention B.

To the extent that some participants in Plan X are not employees of Convention B but are employed by Local Denomination D Associations, and in view of the fact that there are common religious bonds between Local Denomination D Associations and Convention B, and that Convention B receives its funding from various Denomination D churches, we conclude that the Local Denomination D Associations are associated with a church or a convention or association of churches within the meaning of section 414(e)(3)(D) of the Code, that the employees of the Local Denomination D Associations meet the definition of employee under section 414(e)(3)(B) of the Code and that they are deemed to be employees of a church or a convention or association of churches by virtue of being employees of an organization which is exempt from tax under section 501 of the Code and which is controlled by or associated with a church or a convention or association of churches.

In addition, the fact that Convention B may make contributions to Trust T and Trust T will then pay premiums directly under Plan X on behalf of retired employees who may have been retired for over five years does not take away the Plan’s status as a church plan because benefits under Plan X fully accrued while the retiree was an active employee and no contributions are made with respect to any periods after the employee’s separation from service.

Based on the foregoing facts and representations, with respect to ruling request number six, we conclude that Plan X is a church plan within the meaning of section 414(e) of the Code.

No opinion is expressed as to the tax treatment of the transaction described herein under the provisions of any other section of either the Code or regulations, which may be applicable thereto.

This ruling is directed only to the Taxpayer who requested it. Section 6110(k)(3) of the Code provides that it may not be used or cited by others as precedent.

A copy of this letter ruling is being sent to your authorized representative pursuant to a Power of Attorney on file in this office.

If you have any questions regarding this letter, please contact * * *, I.D. Number * * *, at * * *. Please address all correspondence to SE:T:EP:RA:T3.

Sincerely yours,

Laura B. Warshawsky, Manager

Employee Plans Technical Group 3




IRS LTR: Prep School's Defined Benefit Plan Is Church Plan.

Citations: LTR 201322051

The IRS ruled that a tax-exempt college preparatory school’s defined benefit plan is a church plan within the meaning of section 414(e) and has been a church plan since January 1, 1974.

U.I.L 414.08-00

Date: March 8, 2013

Refer Reply To: T:EP:RA:T3

LEGEND:

School S = * * *

State A = * * *

City P = * * *

Society J = * * *

Year B = * * *

Religion C = * * *

Directory C = * * *

Conference C = * * *

Plan X = * * *

Dear * * *

This is in response to your letters dated, December 11, 2007, November 1, 2011, and January 8, 2013, submitted on your behalf by your authorized representative, in which you request a ruling that Plan X is a church plan described in Section 414(e) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the “Code”).

The following facts and representations have been submitted under penalty of perjury in support of the ruling requested.

School S is a private non-profit college preparatory school formed under the non-profit corporation law of State A. School S was founded in Year B in City P as a Society J secondary school for young men. The governing body of School S is a Board of Trustees which consists of no fewer than 18 or more than 25 members of which no less than one-third plus one shall be members of Society J, which is a religious order of men. The Bylaws of School S provide that the Board of Trustees has the power and authority to (1) appoint or remove the President of School S; (2) approve diplomas, certificates and awards; (3) approve and adopt all major changes or renovations in the educational programs of School S; (4) review and take appropriate action as to the Budget, which shall be submitted to it upon recommendation of the President; (5) institute and promote major fund raising efforts of School S; and (6) authorize any changes in tuition and fees within School S.

The Bylaws of School S provide that the Board of Trustees has the authority to elect the President of School S by a two-thirds majority of the Board of Trustees and by a majority of the members of Society J then on the Board of Trustees, subject to the approval by the Provincial of the Society J Province in which School S is located.

The Bylaws require a vote of a two-thirds majority of the Board of Trustees and a vote of a majority of the members of the Society J then on the Board to approve any action effecting a change in the essential character of School S as a Religion C Society J secondary school.

School S is listed in Directory C and, consequently, is exempt from federal income taxes under section 501 of the Code, pursuant to group rulings issued to Conference C by the Internal Revenue Service (the “IRS”).

School S has maintained Plan X, a defined benefit pension plan, since September 15, 19* * *. Plan X covers all employees of School S after their completion of one year of service. None of the eligible participants in Plan X are or can be considered employed in connection with one or more unrelated trades or businesses with the meaning of section 513 of the Code. All the eligible participants are employed by School S. Plan X does not include any employees of for-profit entities.

Prior to May 15, 20* * *, Plan X was administered by School S. By resolutions adopted on May 15, 20* * *, the Board of Trustees of School S established a benefits committee (the “Committee”), the sole purpose of which is to have the exclusive authority to control and manage the operation and administration of Plan X as well as any successor retirement plan that the Board may hereafter establish. The resolutions provide that the Board of Trustees shall appoint the members of the Committee, subject to the requirement that at all times the Committee must consist of not less than three members, the majority of whom must be vowed members of Society J. The resolutions further provide that the members of the Committee will serve at the pleasure of and are subject to removal by the Board of Trustees at any time with or without cause.

In accordance with Revenue Procedure 2011-44, Notice to Employees with reference to Plan X was provided on October * * *, 20* * *. This notice explained to participants of Plan X the consequences of church plan status.

You represent that School S has not made an election under Code Section 410(d) to be subject to the provisions of the Code relating to vesting, funding, participation and other standards applicable to other retirement plans.

Based on your submission and the above facts and representations, you request a ruling that Plan X is a church plan, within the meaning of Section 414(e) of the Code, retroactively effective for all prior years that the Plan has been in effect.

Section 414(e) was added to the Code by section 1015 of ERISA. Section 1017(e) of ERISA provided that section 414(e) applied as of the date of ERISA’s enactment. However, section 414(e) was subsequently amended by section 407(b) of the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. Law 96-364, to provide that section 414(e) was effective as of January 1, 1974.

Section 414(e)(1) of the Code generally defines a church plan as a plan established and maintained for its employees (or their beneficiaries) by a church or by a convention or association of churches which is exempt from taxation under section 501 of the Code.

Section 414(e)(2) of the Code provides, in part, that the term “church plan” does not include a plan that is established and maintained primarily for the benefit of employees (or their beneficiaries) of such church or convention or association of churches who are employed in connection with one or more unrelated trades or businesses (within the meaning of section 513 of the Code); or if less than substantially all of the individuals included in the plan are individuals described in section 414(e)(1) of the Code or section 414(e)(3)(B) of the Code (or their beneficiaries).

Section 414(e)(3)(A) of the Code provides that a plan established and maintained for its employees (or their beneficiaries) by a church or by a convention or association of churches includes a plan maintained by an organization, whether a civil law corporation or otherwise, the principal purpose or function of which is the administration or funding of a plan or program for the provision of retirement benefits or welfare benefits, or both, for the employees of a church or a convention or association of churches, if such organization is controlled by or associated with a church or a convention or association of churches.

Section 414(e)(3)(B) of the Code defines “employee” of a church or a convention or association of churches to include a duly ordained, commissioned, or licensed minister of a church in the exercise of his or her ministry, regardless of the source of his or her compensation, and an employee of an organization, whether a civil law corporation or otherwise, which is exempt from tax under section 501 of the Code, and which is controlled by or associated with a church or a convention or association of churches.

Section 414(e)(3)(C) of the Code provides that a church or a convention or association of churches which is exempt from tax under section 501 of the Code shall be deemed the employer of any individual included as an employee under subparagraph (B).

Section 414(e)(3)(D) of the Code provides that an organization, whether a civil law corporation or otherwise, is associated with a church or a convention or association of churches if the organization shares common religious bonds and convictions with that church or convention or association of churches.

Revenue Procedure 2011-44, 2011-39 I.R.B. 446, supplements the procedures for requesting a letter ruling under section 414(e) of the Code relating to church plans. The revenue procedure: (1) requires that plan participants and other interested persons receive a notice in connection with a letter ruling request under section 414(e) of the Code for a qualified plan; (2) requires that a copy of the notice be submitted to the IRS as part of the ruling request; and (3) provides procedures for the IRS to receive and consider comments relating to the ruling request from interested persons.

In order for an organization that is not itself a church or a convention or association of churches to have a qualified church plan, it must establish that its employees are employees or deemed employees of a church or convention or association of churches under section 414(e)(3)(B) of the Code by virtue of the organization’s control by or affiliation with a church or convention or association of churches. Employees of any organization maintaining a plan are considered to be church employees if the organization: (1) is exempt from tax under section 501 of the Code; and (2) is controlled by or associated with a church or convention or association of churches. In addition in order to be a church plan, the administration or funding (or both) of the plan must be by an organization described in section 414(e)(3)(A) of the Code. To be described in section 414(e)(3)(A) of the Code, an organization must have as its principal purpose the administration or funding of the plan and must also be controlled by or associated with a church or convention or association of churches.

In view of the common religious bonds between School S and Society J, the inclusion of School S in Directory C, and the indirect control of School S by Society J through the Board of Trustees, we conclude that School S is associated with a church or convention or association of churches within the meaning of section 414(e)(3)(D) of the Code, that the employees of School S meet the definition of employee under section 414(e)(3)(B) of the Code, and that they are deemed to be employees of a church or a convention or association of churches by virtue of being employees of an organization which is exempt from tax under section 501 of the Code and which is controlled by or associated with a church or a convention or association of churches.

The administrative control of Plan X is vested in the Committee. The Committee is controlled by and shares common religious bonds with Society J through its control by the Board of Trustees and the common religious bonds of the members of the Committee with Society J. The sole purpose of the Committee is to have exclusive authority to control and manage the operation and administration of Plan X as well as any successor retirement plan that the Board of Trustees may hereafter establish. Thus, the administration of Plan X satisfies the requirements regarding church plan administration under section 414(e)(3)(A) of the Code.

Accordingly, in regard to your ruling request, we conclude that Plan X is a church plan as defined in section 414(e) of the Code and has been a church plan since January 1, 1974.

This letter expresses no opinion as to whether Plan X, satisfies the requirements for qualification under section 401(a) of Code.

This ruling is directed only to the taxpayer who requested it. Section 6110(k)(3) of the Code provides that it may not be used or cited by others as precedent.

No opinion is expressed as to the tax treatment of the transaction described herein under the provisions of any other section of either the Code or regulations which may be applicable thereto.

Pursuant to a power of attorney on file with this office, a copy of this letter ruling is being sent to your authorized representative.

If you have any questions regarding this letter, please contact * * *. Please address all correspondence to SE:T:EP:RA:T3.

Sincerely yours,

Laura B. Warshawsky, Manager

Employee Plans Technical Group 3

Enclosures:

Deleted Copy of Ruling Letter

Notice of Intention to Disclose




FASB Seeks to Improve Reporting of Nonprofit Operations.

The Financial Accounting Standards Board on May 29 took steps to bring more clarity to the ways in which nonprofit entities communicate information about their operations and financial performance.

At a meeting in Norwalk, Conn., Lee Klumpp, a practice fellow at FASB, told the board that the presentation of an intermediate measure of operations could improve a nonprofit entity’s ability to “tell its story and promote further comparability among nonprofits.” He added that an intermediate operating measure that is based on a “current operating classification scheme” could provide more meaningful information for users of nonprofit financial statements.

The board tentatively decided to define an intermediate operating measure on the basis of a nonprofit entity’s mission, which would be based on whether resources are used to carry out an entity’s purpose for existence.

Klumpp said the mission of a nonprofit entity is central to how the organization is created, managed, and governed, and how the organization obtains and retains its tax-exempt status with the IRS.

FASB members also agreed that the operating measure should be defined by an availability concept that involves the resources available for the current activities of the nonprofit entity.

Regarding presentation, the board tentatively decided that a nonprofit entity should present in its statement of activities all revenues that are available to support the entity’s mission. A board majority favored presenting those revenues on a gross basis before specific amounts are designated for future period operations.

FASB member Lawrence Smith said that presenting operating measures on a gross basis would help to characterize the decisions made by a nonprofit entity’s governing board regarding the funding of future operations. “Those decisions are very important to portray on the face of the financial statements,” he added.

According to FASB, the proposed presentation approach would report the amounts of previously unavailable funding resources that an entity’s governing board would designate for use in the current reporting period.




IRS Corrects Errors in Proposed Regs on Community Health Needs Assessment Requirements.

The IRS has corrected errors in the preamble to and in the text of proposed regulations (REG-106499-12) that provide guidance to charitable hospital organizations on the community health needs assessment requirements and related excise tax and reporting obligations.

Community Health Needs Assessments for

Charitable Hospitals; Correction

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Internal Revenue Service

26 CFR Parts 1 and 53

[REG-106499-12]

RIN 1545-BL30

AGENCY: Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Treasury.

ACTION: Correction to a notice of proposed rulemaking.

SUMMARY: This document contains corrections to a notice of proposed rulemaking that was published in the Federal Register on Friday, April 5, 2013. The proposed regulations provide guidance to charitable hospital organizations on the community health needs assessment requirements, and related excise tax and reporting obligations, enacted as part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010. These proposed regulations also clarify the consequences for failing to meet these and other requirements for charitable hospital organizations.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Amy F. Giuliano at (202) 622-6070 (not a toll free number).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

The notice of proposed rulemaking (REG-106499-12) that is the subject of these corrections provides guidance to charitable hospital organizations under sections 501(r), 4959, 6012, and 6033 of the Internal Revenue Code.

Need for Correction

As published April 5, 2013 (78 FR 20523), the notice of proposed rulemaking (REG-106499-12) contains errors that may prove to be misleading and are in need of clarification.

Correction of Publication

Accordingly, the notice of proposed rulemaking (REG-106499-12), that was the subject of FR Doc. 2013-07959, is corrected as follows:

1. On page 20523, in the preamble, column 3, under the paragraph heading “Paperwork Reduction Act”, line 3 from the top of the paragraph, the language “Return of Organization Exempt from” is corrected to read “Return of Organization Exempt From”

2. On page 20526, in the preamble, column 2, under the paragraph heading “e. Activities Unrelated to the Operation of a Hospital Facility”, lines 11 and 12 of the first full paragraph, the language “organization operates. Similarly, section 1.501(r)-2 of these proposed regulations” is corrected to read “organization operates. Similarly, § 1.501(r)-2 of these proposed regulations”.

3. On page 20537, in the preamble, column 3, under the paragraph heading “Special Analyses”, line 9 from the top of the page, the language “§ 1.501(r)-3 and § 1.6033-2(a)(2)(ii)(l) of” is corrected to read “Effective/Applicability Dates”, line 9 from the top of the page, the language “§ 1.501(r)-3 and § 1.6033-2(a)(2)(ii)(l) of”.

4. On page 20537, in the preamble, column 3, under the paragraph heading “Special Analyses”, line 3 of the second full paragraph, the language “2(a)(2)(ii)(l) of the regulations requires” is corrected to read “2(a)(2)(ii)(l) of the regulations requires”

§ 1.501(r)-1 [Corrected]

5. On Page 20539, column 1, paragraph (c)(3), the last sentence of the paragraph, the language “In addition, a partnership agreement includes provisions of Federal, state, or local law, as in effect before March 23, 2010, that govern the affairs of the partnership or are considered under such law to be part of the agreement.” is corrected to read “In addition, a partnership agreement includes provisions of federal, state, or local law, as in effect before March 23, 2010, that govern the affairs of the partnership or are considered under such law to be part of the agreement.”

§ 1.6012-3 [Corrected]

6. On page 20543, column 3, paragraph (a)(10) in the heading, the language “Hospital organizations organized as trust with noncompliant hospital facilities.” is corrected to read “Hospital organizations organized as trusts with noncompliant hospital facilities.”.

Alvin Hall

Assistant Director

Legal Processing Division

Associate Chief Counsel

(Procedure and Administration)




Corporation Owned by Indian Tribe Not Exempt From Taxes, Tax Court Holds.

Citations: Uniband Inc. v. Commissioner; 140 T.C. No. 13; No. 4718-06

The Tax Court held that a state-chartered corporation owned by an Indian tribe wasn’t exempt from corporate income tax, that consolidated returns it filed with another corporation the tribe owned were invalid, and that the corporation had to reduce its wage and employee expense deductions by the amount of the Indian employment credits it was entitled to claim.

Uniband Inc., a Delaware corporation, was wholly owned by the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians for the years at issue. Uniband filed consolidated returns with another corporation, TMMC, which was also owned by the tribe for the 1995-1998 tax years. The consolidated returns offset Uniband’s income with TMMC’s losses. The IRS found that the consolidated returns were invalid and that Uniband’s tax liability should be calculated separately from TMMC’s. The IRS also found that Uniband was entitled to the Indian employment credit under section 45A, which it hadn’t claimed. The IRS applied the credit and reduced Uniband’s deductions for wages by the amount of the credit. The adjustments resulted in Uniband’s liability for tax deficiencies, which it challenged in the Tax Court.

Tax Court Judge David Gustafson rejected Uniband’s argument that it was exempt from income tax as an integral part of an Indian tribe. While agreeing that the tribe itself was exempt from income tax, the court found that Uniband was a separate taxable entity. Gustafson explained that the tribe’s immunity from tax didn’t extend to Uniband, nor was the tribe or Uniband exempt from tax under any treaty, as Uniband had attempted to argue. The court also held that Uniband wasn’t entitled to tribal sovereign immunity.

The Tax Court also rejected Uniband’s claim that it was entitled to tax exemption based on its similarity to corporations established under section 17 of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. The court found that Uniband differed in several ways from section 17 corporations, which are exempt from tax. Gustafson explained that as a state-chartered corporation, Uniband lacked the special relation to the tribe that exists with a section 17 corporation.

The court also found that Uniband wasn’t entitled to file a consolidated return with its sister corporation, TMMC, noting that the tribe that owned both corporations was not itself a corporation. The returns were also invalid because the tribe did not file them, consent to them, or report its items on the purported consolidated returns.

The Tax Court agreed with the IRS that Uniband wasn’t entitled to deduct all of its wage and employee business expenses under section 162. The court concluded that Uniband’s deductions were reduced according to the amount of the section 45A credit it was entitled to claim. The court noted that section 280C(a) disallows a deduction for wages or salaries paid or incurred for the tax year that equal the sum of the credits determined for that year under section 45A. The court declined to interpret section 280C as limiting the deductions to the extent the credits are currently allowed after applying the general business credit limitation under section 38(c)(1).




LTR: IRS Approves Organization's Set-Aside Program.

Citations: LTR 201321028

The IRS approved an organization’s set-aside funding program for restoration of a historic building that will be dedicated entirely to the organization’s exempt purposes when the work is finished, saying the project can better be accomplished using a set-aside than by making an immediate payment.

Contact Person – ID Number: * * *

Contact Telephone Number: * * *

UIL LIST: 4942.03-07

Release Date: 5/24/2013

Date: December 27, 2012

Employer Identification Number: * * *

LEGEND:

Q = Name of Facility

R = City, State

u = $ Cost of Project

v = $ Amount of Set Aside

w = $ Set-Aside Year 1

x = $ Set-Aside Year 2

y = $ Set-Aside Year 3

z = $ Set-Aside Year 4

Dear * * *

WHY YOU ARE RECEIVING THIS LETTER

This is our response to your September 18, 2012, and your subsequent amendment thereto, requesting approval of a set-aside under Internal Revenue Code section 4942(g)(2). You’ve been recognized as tax-exempt under section 501(c)(3) of the Code and have been determined to be a private operating foundation under sections 509(a) and 4942(j)(3).

OUR DETERMINATION

Based on the information furnished, your set-aside program is approved under Internal Revenue Code section 4942(g)(2). As required under section 4942(g)(2), the set aside amount must be paid within the 60-month period after the date of the first set-aside.

DESCRIPTION OF SET-ASIDE REQUEST

You previously acquired a historic property, Q, located in R. You propose to restore Q at an estimated total cost of $u. When you acquired Q, a portion of it was leased out to commercial tenants and the remaining part was vacant. After restoration the building Q, will be dedicated in its entirety to your exempt purposes.

The first floor will be used for orientation space, exhibition space, a gift shop and public space. The second floor will provide office space for various existing functions of your organization, and an exhibition space in the rear. The upper floor will contain exhibition spaces and spaces for organ recitals and receptions. A second exit from Q will also be built to meet a Fire Code requirement.

The project can better be accomplished using a set-aside than by making an immediate payment, because long-term expenditures must be made requiring more than one year’s income to assure their continuity. You intend to restore Q using no outside financing. This is a major project demanding the accumulation of funds in earlier years for expenditure in later years. The predesign and design phases of the project will occupy the initial two years of the set-aside period . The final, construction phase of the project will be carried out in the third, fourth and fifth years of the set-aside period. You have requested an initial set-aside of $w for the fiscal year ending March 31, 20* * *, with additions of $x, $y, and $z, for the fiscal years March 31, 20* * *, March 31, 20* * * and March 31, 20* * *, respectively, the total set-aside requested being $v. The set aside requested for each year is expected to be sufficient to ensure that you qualify that year as a private operating foundation under section 4942(j)(3).

You expect that the project will be completed by December 31, 20* * *, and you have affirmed that all the amounts to be set aside will actually be paid within 60 months of the date of the first set-aside.

BASIS FOR OUR DETERMINATION

Internal Revenue Code section 4942(g)(2)(A) states that an amount set aside for a specific project, which includes one or more purposes described in section 170(c)(2)(B), may be treated as a qualifying distribution if it meets the requirements of section 4942(g)(2)(B).

Section 4942(g)(2)(B) of the Code states that an amount set aside for a specific project will meet the requirements of this subparagraph if, at the time of the set-aside, the foundation establishes that the amount will be paid within five years and either clause (i) or (ii) are satisfied.

Section 4942(g)(2)(B)(i) of the Code is satisfied if, at the time of the set-aside, the private foundation establishes that the project can better be accomplished using the set-aside than by making an immediate payment.

Section 4942(j)(3) of the Code requires that private operating foundations must spend at least 85% of its adjusted net income or its minimum investment return, whichever is less, directly for the active conduct of its exempt activities (the income test) in order to remain a private operating foundation.

Section 53.4942(a)-3(b)(1) of the Foundations and Similar Excise Taxes Regulations provides that a private foundation may establish a project as better accomplished by a set-aside than by immediate payment if the set-aside satisfies the suitability test described in section 53.4942(a)-3(b)(2).

Section 53.4942(a)-3(b)(2) of the Foundations and Similar Excise Taxes Regulations provides that specific projects better accomplished using a set-aside include, but are not limited to, projects where relatively long-term expenditures must be made requiring more than one year’s income to assure their continuity.

In Revenue Ruling 74-450, 1974-2 C.B. 388, an operating foundation converted a portion of newly acquired land into a public park under a four-year construction contract. The construction contract payments were to be made mainly during the final two years. This constituted a “specific project.” The foundation’s set-aside of all its excess earnings for four years was treated as a qualifying distribution under Internal Revenue Code section 4942(g)(2).

WHAT YOU MUST DO

Your approved set-aside(s) will be documented on your records as pledges or obligations to be paid by the date specified. The amounts set aside will be taken into account to determine your minimum investment return under Internal Revenue Code section 4942(e)(1)(A), and the income attributable to your set aside(s) will also be taken into account in computing your adjusted net income under section 4942(f) of the Code.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

This determination is directed only to the organization that requested it. Internal Revenue Code section 6110(k)(3) provides that it may not be used or cited as a precedent.

Please keep a copy of this letter in your records.

If you have any questions, please contact the person listed in the heading of this letter.

Sincerely,

Holly O. Paz

Director, Exempt Organizations

Rulings and Agreements




LTR: IRS Rules on Transfer of Assets Between Foundations.

Citations: LTR 201321025

The IRS ruled that the transfer of assets from one private foundation to another will not affect either foundation’s tax-exempt status, will not give rise to termination taxes or net investment income taxes, will not be an act of self-dealing, and will not constitute a jeopardizing investment

Contact Person: * * *

Identification Number: * * *

Telephone Number: * * *

Uniform Issues List Numbers: 501.03-00, 507.00-00, 507.05-00,

507.06-00, 507.09-00, 512.00-00, 4940.00-00, 4941.04-00, 4942.03-05,

4942.05-00, 4944.00-00, 4945.04-00

Release Date: 5/24/2013

Date: February 27, 2013

Employer Identification Number: * * *

LEGEND:

B = * * *

C = * * *

D = * * *

M = * * *

Dear * * *:

This responds to your letter dated May 31, 2012, in which you requested rulings on the application of Parts I and II of Subchapter F of Chapter 1, I.R.C. §§ 501-509, and Subchapter A of Chapter 42, Subtitle D, §§ 4940-4948, to the transaction described below.

FACTS

M is a trust organized exclusively for charitable purposes, and has been recognized exempt from federal income taxation as an organization described in § 501(c)(3). M is classified as a private non-operating foundation within the meaning of § 509(a). M was created by, and originally funded with a contribution from, B. B and her husband, C, (jointly, the “Founders”), are M’s sole trustees. You stipulate that B is a substantial contributor to M within the meaning of § 507(d)(2)(A), that C is a substantial contributor to M within the meaning of § 507(d)(2)(B)(iii), that B and C are M’s foundation managers within the meaning of § 4946(b), and, consequently, that B and C are disqualified persons with respect to M within the meaning of § 4946(a)(1)(A) and (B).

You are organized as a not-for-profit corporation under state law. You have been recognized exempt from federal income taxation as an organization described in § 501(c)(3), and are classified as a private operating foundation described in § 4942(j)(3). M and you do not share the same tax year. Your officers and directors are B, C, and D. D is an unrelated person who has provided legal services to you, B, C, and M. You stipulate that B is a substantial contributor to you within the meaning of § 507(d)(2)(A), that C is a substantial contributor to you within the meaning of § 507(d)(2)(B)(iii), that B, C, and D are foundation managers with respect to you within the meaning of § 4946(b), that B and C are disqualified persons with respect to you within the meaning of § 4946(a)(1)(A) and (B), and that D is a disqualified person with respect to you within the meaning of § 4946(a)(1)(B).

You represent that the Founders, as M’s sole Trustees and as two of your three directors, effectively control both M and you (collectively, “the Foundations”) within the meaning of §§ 1.482-1(a)(3) and 1.507-3(a)(9)(i).

You represent that both of the Foundations have made timely tax filings on their respective Returns of Organizations Exempt from Income Tax, Forms 990-PF, for all applicable years, and that both have complied with all applicable state filing obligations throughout their respective terms of existence. Neither of the Foundations has undertaken any activities that would be inconsistent with tax-exempt status as a § 501(c)(3) organization, nor made any changes to their respective governing documents since the filing of their Applications for Tax-Exempt Status, Form 1023. There have been no willful repeated acts (or failures to act), nor any willful and flagrant act (or failure to act), within the meaning of § 507(a)(2)(A), with respect to either of the Foundations that would give rise to liability for tax under Chapter 42 of the Code, and neither Foundation has received a notification from the Secretary of the Treasury described in § 507(a)(2)(B). Neither Foundation has previously terminated its status as a private foundation. M has made qualifying distributions in sufficient amount to avoid imposition of excise tax under § 4942. You have made qualifying distributions in connection with the conduct of your exempt mission to qualify as a private operating foundation under § 4942(j)(3).

You represent that all grants made, or to be made, by M prior to the transfer of its remaining assets to you, as described below, have been grants to public charities. You have not made grants to other organizations. Neither Foundation has incurred any “taxable expenditure” within the meaning of § 4945(d), and neither Foundation has previously made any grant or other disposition of funds that would require the exercise of expenditure responsibility within the meaning of § 4945(d)(4)(B).

Under the Declaration of Trust that serves as M’s governing instrument, M’s trustees are empowered to make distributions in their discretion from Trust income and principal to “Qualified Charitable Recipients” (“QCRs”). QCRs are defined as organizations described in § 170(c)(1) or (2) which are exempt from tax under § 501(c)(3). The Trust instrument makes reference to suggested types of QCR donees, but the Trustees are empowered to make distributions to any charitable organization qualifying as a QCR, without regard to its mission or purposes. You, as an organization described in §§ 170(c)(2) and 501(c)(3), are a QCR within the meaning of M’s Trust instrument, and, as such, are eligible under the Trust instrument to receive grants from M. Prior to, and except for, the transfer of its remaining assets to you as described below, all of M’s grants have been made or will have been made to unrelated grantees that are treated as public charities under the Code.

Your corporate purposes are described in your Articles of Organization as including “the provision of educational, vocational, social, psychological, and financial assistance to homeless individuals and families,” as well as making distributions to other § 501(c)(3) organizations. Since you were first organized, you have provided education and practical job-skills training to disadvantaged persons and those who have suffered displacement from recent economic upheavals with the objective of equipping them to survive in the current economy, to enter or re-enter the work-force, and to lead productive and satisfying lives. You have provided free career development services to unemployed and underemployed individuals, and have offered such individuals skill assessment, career planning, computer training, interview and resume help, financial planning, job search planning, and other assistance.

Over the past several years, the Founders have concluded that the services you provide have been increasingly needed, in part because of the large number of people displaced by recent economic upheaval and recession. The population in need of such services has been underserved by other organizations and the need and demand for the services you provide have increased. At the same time, economic circumstances have made fundraising from third parties more difficult. The Founders have determined that the exempt purposes of both Foundations will be best served by concentrating their efforts and charitable resources on your work and mission, and by eliminating the duplication and administrative burden of operating two separate private foundations.

M’s only activities have consisted of grants made to unrelated QCRs, the missions of most of which are unrelated to your mission. The Trustees have determined that the best use of M’s remaining charitable funds, in furtherance of its exempt purpose, would be to provide assistance to you in carrying out the activities which form the basis of your exempt purposes. Therefore, the Founders, as Trustees of M and as your Directors, with the concurrence of your third director, have determined that it is in the best interests of both Foundations to contribute all of M’s remaining net funds to you, to discontinue any of M’s further activities or grants, and to continue to operate you in furtherance of your exempt purposes.

After making some final grants to unrelated public charities, M will transfer all of its remaining assets to you. M’s Trustees will reserve a final amount for estimated debts and expenses, including taxes due, if any, under § 4940, and, thereafter, transfer the balance of M’s remaining net assets to you (the “Transfer”). The Transfer will involve substantially all of M’s net assets, including all accumulated income and undistributed trust principal. Any amounts remaining after the final payment of taxes, expenses, and fees, will also be transferred to you. Following these transfers, M will retain no assets and will cease to operate.

M will file a Form 990-PF for the year of the disposition of its assets. No sooner than at least one day after the Transfer, M’s Trustees will provide notice pursuant to § 507(a)(1) to the Manager, Exempt Organizations Determinations, TE/GE, of M’s intent to terminate its private foundation status, in the form and manner prescribed by § 1.507-1(b) and other applicable regulations.

Following the Transfer, you will continue to operate as a private operating foundation engaged in the active conduct of activities in furtherance of your exempt purposes. You expect to use the transferred funds as well as your other assets exclusively in furtherance of your exempt purposes. The Founders expect that your qualifying distributions, substantially all in the form of expenditures incurred in carrying out your exempt activities, will continue to exceed your net income and minimum investment returns. You will also take responsibility for all liabilities, if any, under Chapter 42 that may be imposed or in effect with respect to either M or you after the Transfer date.

While you will continue to provide services free of charge, your management has determined that your exempt purposes can be further served by expanding your services to include fee-based training and certification programs in widely-used computer programs. These services have been identified as particularly valuable to your core mission, which is helping displaced and disadvantaged persons acquire the skills needed to obtain meaningful and lasting employment. The fees paid for such services will help you recover the costs of those programs as well as provide a source of revenue to support your ongoing operations and pro bono services.

The legal services with respect to the Transfer will be provided by a law firm in which D is a partner with a profits interest of less than 35%. D, as one of your directors, is a disqualified person with respect to you. You represent that the law firm will charge reasonable fees for the legal services provided in connection with the Transfer, the termination of M and its status as a private foundation, and the application for a private letter ruling. The services provided by the law firm will be limited solely to such services as are reasonably necessary to carrying out the exempt purposes of the Foundations, and shall not be excessive.

RULINGS REQUESTED

You have requested the following rulings:

1. The transfer of substantially all of M’s net assets to you (the “Transfer”) will not adversely affect the status of M or you as tax-exempt organizations described in § 501(c)(3).

2. The Transfer will be a transfer described in § 507(b)(2).

3. The Transfer will not terminate M’s private foundation status and will not cause M to incur any liability for the § 507(c) termination tax.

4. Following the Transfer, M will be eligible to terminate its private foundation status through the “voluntary termination” procedures of § 507(a)(1).

5. Pursuant to § 1.507-7(b)(1), the date for determining the value of M’s assets, for purposes of calculating the termination tax under § 507(c), shall be the date proper notification is given, in the manner prescribed in the regulations, of M’s intention voluntarily to terminate its private foundations status (hereinafter, “Notice”).

6. Provided that such Notice is given at least one day after the Transfer, and at a time when M’s net remaining assets are valued at zero dollars ($0.00), then the amount of termination tax due under § 507(c)(2) upon the termination of M’s status as a private foundation shall be zero dollars ($0.00).

7. Pursuant to § 507(b)(2), you will not be treated as a newly created organization as a result of the Transfer.

8. You, as transferee of substantially all of M’s net assets, shall be treated as possessing those attributes and characteristics of M described in subparagraphs (2), (3), and (4) of § 1.507-3(a).

9. The Founders, as the only Trustees of M, and as two of your three Directors, and as foundation managers and substantial contributors of both Foundations, effectively control both Foundations within the meaning of §§ 1.482-1(a)(3) and 1.507-3(a)(9), Accordingly, for purposes of Chapter 42, you, the transferee Foundation, will be treated as though you were M, the transferor Foundation.

10. The Transfer will not be a realization event for M, and will not give rise to any gross investment income or capital gain net income, within the meaning of § 4940, with respect to either M or you.

11. You, as transferee, may use any excess § 4940 tax paid by M, the transferor, to offset your § 4940 tax liability.

12. The Transfer will not constitute self-dealing and will not subject either of the Foundations, or any of their respective officers, directors, or Trustees, as the case may be, to tax under § 4941.

13. The providing of reasonable and necessary legal services with respect to the Transfer by a law firm in which D is a partner, and the payment of reasonable compensation for such services by the Foundations, will not be an act of self-dealing within the meaning of § 4941(d), notwithstanding the status of D as a disqualified person with respect to you.

14. M will not be required to meet the qualifying distribution requirements of § 4942 for the taxable year of the Transfer provided that your distributable amount for the year of the Transfer is increased by M’s distributable amount for the year of the Transfer, and M’s qualifying distributions made during the taxable year of the Transfer, if any, will be carried over to you, and may be used by you to meet your minimum distribution requirements under § 4942 for the year.

15. The Transfer will not constitute a jeopardizing investment within the meaning of § 4944.

16. The Transfer will not be a taxable expenditure within the meaning of § 4945(d), and there will be no expenditure responsibility requirements that must be exercised under § 4945(d)(4) or (h) with respect to the Transfer.

17. The payment of reasonable legal fees to the attorneys for M and you for services with respect to the Transfer, and the IRS fee for this Private Letter Ruling will not be treated as taxable expenditures within the meaning of § 4945(d)(5).

18. Your operation of state licensed postsecondary career training programs for a fee will not adversely affect your tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3) or your status as a private operating foundation under § 4942(j)(3).

19. The fees you receive from payments by users for your certification classes will not be considered gross income derived from an unrelated trade or business for purposes of § 512(a)(1).

20. From and after the effective date of the Transfer, you will continue to exist as an organization that is exempt from taxation under § 501(c)(3) and which will qualify as a private operating foundation under § 4942(j)(3).

LAW

I.R.C. § 501(a) exempts from federal income taxation organizations described in § 501(c).

I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) describes organizations organized and operated exclusively for charitable, educational, and other designated exempt purposes.

Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(i) provides that the term “educational,” as used in § 501(c)(3), includes the instruction and training of the individual for the purpose of improving or developing his capabilities.

I.R.C. § 509(a) provides that an organization described in § 501(c)(3) is a private foundation unless it is described in § 509(a)(1), (2), (3), or (4).

I.R.C. § 507(a) provides that, except as provided in subsection (b), the status of any organization as a private foundation shall be terminated only if (1) it notifies the Secretary of its intent to accomplish such termination, or (2) with respect to such organization, there have been either willful repeated acts (or failures to act), or a willful and flagrant act (or failure to act), giving rise to liability for tax under Chapter 42, and the Secretary notifies such organization that it is liable for the tax imposed by subsection (c), and either such organization pays the tax (or any portion not abated under subsection (g)) or the entire amount of such tax is abated under subsection (g).

Treas. Reg. § 1.507-1(b)(1) provides that in order for a private foundation to terminate its private foundation status under § 507(a)(1), an organization must submit a statement to the Internal Revenue Service (“Service”) of its intent to terminate its private foundation status under § 507(a)(1). Such statement must set forth in detail the computation and amount of tax imposed under § 507(c). Unless the organization requests abatement of such tax pursuant to § 507(g), full payment of such tax must be made at the time the statement is filed under § 507(a)(1).

I.R.C. § 507(c) imposes an excise tax on each terminating private foundation equal to the lower of the aggregate tax benefit resulting from the § 501(c)(3) status of such foundation, or the value of the net assets of such foundation.

I.R.C. § 507(e) and Treas. Reg. § 1.507-7(a) provide that, for purposes of § 507(c), the value of the net assets shall be determined at whichever time such value is higher: (1) the first day on which action is taken by the organization which culminates in its ceasing to be a private foundation, or (2) the date on which it ceases to be a private foundation.

Treas. Reg. § 1.507-7(b)(1) provides that, in the case of a termination under § 507(a)(1), the date for determining the value of the foundation’s assets for purposes of calculating the termination tax under § 507(c) shall be the date on which the foundation gives the notification described in § 507(a)(1).

I.R.C. § 507(b)(2) provides that, in the case of a transfer of assets of a private foundation to another private foundation pursuant to any liquidation, merger, redemption, recapitalization, or other adjustment, organization, or reorganization, the transferee foundation shall not be treated as a newly created organization.

Treas. Reg. § 1.507-3(c)(1) provides that, for purposes of § 507(b)(2), the terms “other adjustment, organization, or reorganization” shall include any partial liquidation or any other significant disposition of assets to one or more private foundations, other than transfers for full and adequate consideration or distributions out of current income.

Treas. Reg. § 1.507-3(c)(2) provides that the term “significant disposition of assets to one or more private foundations” includes any disposition (or series of related dispositions) by a private foundation to one or more private foundations of 25 percent or more of the fair market value of the net assets of the transferor foundation at the beginning of the taxable year in which the transfers occur.

Treas. Reg. § 1.507-1(b)(6) provides that when a foundation transfers all or part of its assets to one or more other private foundations pursuant to a transfer described in § 507(b)(2) and § 1.507-3(c), such transferor foundation will not have terminated its private foundation status under § 507(a)(1).

Treas. Reg. § 1.507-1(b)(7) provides that neither a transfer of all the assets of a private foundation nor a significant disposition of assets by a private foundation shall be deemed to result in a termination of the transferor private foundation under § 507(a) unless the transferor private foundation elects to terminate pursuant to § 507(a)(1) or § 507(a)(2) is applicable.

Treas. Reg. § 1.507-3(d) provides that unless a private foundation voluntarily gives notice pursuant to § 507(a)(1), a transfer of assets described in § 507(b)(2) will not constitute a termination of the transferor’s private foundation status under § 507(a)(1).

Treas. Reg. § 1.507-4(b) provides that private foundations which make transfers described in § 507(b)(2) are not subject to the tax imposed under § 507(c) with respect to such transfers unless the provisions of § 507(a) become applicable.

Treas. Reg. § 1.507-3(a)(1) provides that, in the case of a transfer of assets of a private foundation to another private foundation pursuant to any liquidation, merger, redemption, recapitalization, or other adjustment, organization, or reorganization, including a significant disposition of assets to one or more private foundations within the meaning of § 1.507-3(c), the transferee organization shall not be treated as a newly created organization. Rather, the transferee organization shall be treated as possessing those attributes and characteristics of the transferor organization which are described in subparagraphs (2), (3), and (4) of this paragraph.

Treas. Reg. § 1.507-3(a)(2)(i) provides that a transferee organization to which this § 1.507-3(a) applies shall succeed to the aggregate tax benefit of the transferor organization in an amount equal to the amount of such aggregate tax benefit multiplied by a fraction the numerator of which is the fair market vale of the assets (less encumbrances) transferred to such transferee and the denominator of which is the fair market value of the assets of the transferor (less encumbrances) immediately before the transfer. Fair market value shall be determined at the time of the transfer.

Treas. Reg. § 1.507-3(a)(3) provides that, for purposes of § 507(d)(2), in the event of a transfer of assets described in § 507(b)(2), any person who is a “substantial contributor” (within the meaning of § 507(d)(2)) with respect to the transferor foundation shall be treated as a “substantial contributor” with respect to the transferee foundation, regardless of whether such person meets the $5,000-two percent test with respect to the transferee organization at any time.

Treas. Reg. § 1.507-3(a)(4) provides that if a private foundation incurs liability for one or more of the taxes imposed under Chapter 42 (or any penalty resulting therefrom) prior to, or as a result of, making a transfer of assets described in § 507(b)(2) to one or more private foundations, in any case where transferee liability applies each transferee foundation shall be treated as receiving the transferred assets subject to such liability to the extent that the transferor foundation does not satisfy such liability.

Treas. Reg. § 1.507-3(a)(5) provides that, except as provided in subparagraph (9) of this paragraph, a private foundation is required to meet the distribution requirements of § 4942 for any taxable year in which it makes a § 507(b)(2) transfer of all or part of its net assets to another private foundation. Such transfer shall itself be counted toward satisfaction of such requirements to the extent the amount transferred meets the requirements of § 4942(g). However, where the transferor has disposed of all of its assets, the recordkeeping requirements of § 4942(g)(3)(B) shall not apply during any period it which it has no assets. Such requirements are applicable for any taxable year other than a taxable year during which the transferor has no assets.

Treas. Reg. § 1.507-3(a)(9)(i) provides that if a private foundation transfers all of its net assets to one or more private foundations which are effectively controlled (within the meaning of § 1.482-1A(a)(3)), directly or indirectly, by the same person or persons who effectively control the transferor private foundation, for purposes of Chapter 42 (§ 4940 et seq.) and part II of Subchapter F of Chapter 1 of the Code (§§ 507 through 509), such a transferee private foundation shall be treated as if it were the transferor.

I.R.C. § 511(a)(1) imposes a tax for each taxable year on the unrelated business taxable income (as defined in § 512) of organizations described in § 501(c).

I.R.C. § 512(a)(1) provides that the term “unrelated business taxable income” means the gross income derived by any organization from any unrelated trade or business (as defined in § 513) regularly carried on by it less certain deductions and subject to certain modifications.

I.R.C. § 513(a) provides that the term “unrelated trade or business” means, in the case of an organization subject to the tax imposed by § 511, any trade or business the conduct of which is not substantially related (aside from the need of such organization for income or funds or the use it makes of the profits derived) to the exercise or performance by such organization of its charitable, educational, or other purpose or functions constituting the basis for its exemption under § 501.

Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(2) provides that a trade or business is “related” to exempt purposes, in the relevant sense only where the conduct of the business activities bears a causal relationship to the achievement of exempt purposes (other than through the production of income); and the trade or business is “substantially related,” for purposes of § 513, only if the causal relationship is a substantial one. Thus, for the conduct of a trade or business from which a particular amount of gross income is derived to be substantially related to purposes for which exemption is granted, the production or distribution of the goods or the performance of the services from which the gross income is derived must contribute importantly to the accomplishment of those purposes. Whether activities productive of gross income contribute importantly to the accomplishment of any purpose for which an organization is granted exemption depends in each case upon the facts and circumstances involved.

I.R.C. § 4940(a) imposes on each private foundation which is exempt from taxation under § 501(a) for the taxable year a tax equal to 2 percent of the net investment income of such foundation for the taxable year.

Rev. Rul. 2002-28, 2002-1 C.B. 941, holds that when a private foundation transfers all of its assets to one or more private foundations in a transfer described in § 507(b)(2) the transfers do not give rise to net investment income and are not subject to tax under § 4940(a). The transferee foundations may use their proportionate share of any excess § 4940 tax paid by the transferor to offset their own § 4940 tax liability.

I.R.C. § 4941(a)(1) imposes a tax on each act of self-dealing between a disqualified person and a private foundation.

I.R.C. § 4946(a)(1) provides that the term “disqualified person,” with respect to a private foundation, includes a person who is —

(A) a substantial contributor to the foundation,

(B) a foundation manager (within the meaning of subsection (b)(1)),

(C) an owner of more than 20 percent of —

(i) the total combined voting power of a corporation,

(ii) the profits interest of a partnership, or

(iii) the beneficial interest of a trust or unincorporated enterprise, which is a substantial contributor to the foundation,

(D) a member of the family of any individual described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C),

(E) a corporation of which persons described in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (D) own more than 35 percent of the combined voting power,

(F) a partnership in which persons described in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (D) own more than 35 percent of the profits interest, and

(G) a trust or estate in which persons described in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (D) hold more than 35 percent of the beneficial interest.

Treas. Reg. § 53.4946-1(a)(8) provides that, for purposes of § 4941, the term “disqualified person” shall not include any organization described in § 501(c)(3) other than an organization described in § 509(a)(4).

Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(d)-1(b)(4) provides that a transaction between a private foundation and an organization which is not controlled by the foundation (within the meaning of subparagraph (5) of this paragraph) and which is not described in § 4946(a)(1)(E), (F), or (G) because persons described in § 4946(a)(1)(A), (B), (C), or (D) own no more than 35 percent of the total combined voting power or profits or beneficial interest of such organization, shall not be treated as an indirect act of self-dealing between the foundation and such disqualified person solely because of the ownership interest of such persons in such organization.

I.R.C. § 4941(d)(1)(E) provides that the term “self-dealing” includes any direct or indirect payment of compensation (or payment or reimbursement of expenses) by a private foundation to a disqualified person.

I.R.C. § 4941(d)(2)(E) and Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(d)-3(c)(1) provide that the payment of compensation (and the payment or reimbursement of expenses) by a private foundation to a disqualified person for personal services which are reasonable and necessary to carrying out the exempt purpose of the private foundation shall not be an act of self-dealing if the compensation (or payment or reimbursement) is not excessive.

Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(d)-3(c)(2) provides examples illustrating the provisions of § 4941(d)(2)(E). In Example (1), M, a partnership, is a firm of 10 lawyers engaged in the practice of law. A and B, partners in M, serve as trustees to private foundation W and, therefore, are disqualified persons. In addition, A and B own more than 35 percent of the profits interest in M, thereby making M a disqualified person. M performs various legal services for W from time to time as such services are requested. It is concluded that the payment of compensation by W to M shall not constitute an act of self-dealing if the services performed are reasonable and necessary for the carrying out of W’s exempt purposes and the amount paid by W for such services is not excessive.

I.R.C. § 4942(a) imposes a tax on the undistributed income of a private foundation (other than an operating foundation under § 4942(j)(3)) for any taxable year which has not been distributed before the first day of the second (or any succeeding) taxable year following such taxable year.

I.R.C. § 4942(c) defines “undistributed income” for any taxable year as the amount by which the distributable amount for such taxable year exceeds the qualifying distributions made out of such distributable amount for such taxable year.

I.R.C. § 4942(d) defines “distributable amount” as the amount equal to the sum of the minimum investment return, plus certain other amounts, reduced by the sum of the taxes imposed on such private foundation for the taxable year under subtitle A and § 4940.

I.R.C. § 4942(g)(1)(A) provides that the term “qualifying distribution” means any amount (including that portion of reasonable and necessary administrative expenses) paid to accomplish one or more purposes described in § 170(c)(2)(B), other than a contribution to (i) an organization controlled directly or indirectly by the foundation or by one or more disqualified persons with respect to the foundation, except as provided in paragraph (3), or (ii) a private foundation which is not an operating foundation under § 4942(j)(3), except as provided in paragraph (3).

I.R.C. § 4942(g)(3) provides that the term “qualifying distribution” includes a contribution to a § 501(c)(3) organization described in paragraph (1)(A)(i) or (ii) if —

(A) not later than the close of the first taxable year after its taxable year in which such contribution is received, such organization makes a distribution equal to the amount of such contribution and such distribution is a qualifying distribution (within the meaning of paragraph (1) or (2), without regard to this paragraph) which is treated under subsection (h) as a distribution out of corpus (or would be so treated if such § 501(c)(3) organization were a private foundation which is not an operating foundation), and

(B) the private foundation making the contribution obtains adequate records or other sufficient evidence from such organization showing that the qualifying distribution described in subparagraph (A) has been made by such organization.

 

I.R.C. § 4942(i) and Treas. Reg. § 53.4942(a)-3(e) provide for a carry-over of the amount by which qualifying distributions during the five preceding taxable years (other than amounts required to be distributed out of corpus under § 4942(g)(3)) have exceeded the distributable amounts for such years.

I.R.C. § 4942(j)(3) provides that, for purposes of § 4942, the term “operating foundation” means any organization —

A. which makes qualifying distributions (within the meaning of paragraph (1) and (2) of subsection (g)) directly for the active conduct of the activities constituting the purpose or function for which it is organized and operated equal to substantially all of the lesser of —

i. its adjusted net income (as defined in subsection (f), or

ii. its minimum investment return; (the “income test”) and

B.

i. substantially more than half of the assets of which are devoted directly to such activities or to functionally related businesses (as defined in paragraph (4)), or to both, or are stock of a corporation which is controlled by the foundation and substantially all of the assets of which are so devoted (the “assets test”),

ii. which normally makes qualifying distributions (within the meaning of paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (g)) directly for the active conduct of the activities constituting the purpose or function for which it is organized and operated in an amount not less than two-thirds of its minimum investment return (as defined in subsection (e)) (the “endowment test”), or

iii. substantially all of the support (other than gross investment income as defined in § 509(e)) of which is normally received from the general public and from 5 or more exempt organizations which are not described in § 4946(a)(1)(H) with respect to each other or the recipient foundation, not more than 25 percent of the support (other than gross investment income) of which is normally received from any one such exempt organization and not more than half of the support of which is normally received from gross investment income (the “support test”).

Notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraph (A), if the qualifying distributions (within the meaning of paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (g)) of an organization for the taxable year exceed the minimum investment return for the taxable year, clause (ii) of subparagraph (A) shall not apply unless substantially all of such qualifying distributions are made directly for the active conduct of the activities constituting the purpose or function for which it is organized and operated.

Treas. Reg. § 53.4942(b)-1(b)(1) provides, generally, that qualifying distributions are not made by a foundation “directly for the active conduct of activities constituting its charitable, educational, or other similar exempt purpose” unless such qualifying distributions are used by the foundation itself, rather than by or through one or more grantee organizations which receive such qualifying distributions directly or indirectly from such foundation. However, administrative expenses (such as staff salaries and traveling expenses) and other operating costs necessary to conduct the foundation’s exempt activities (regardless of whether they are “directly for the active conduct” of such activities) shall be treated as qualifying distributions expended directly for the active conduct of such exempt activities if such expenses and costs are reasonable in amount. Conversely, administrative expenses and operating costs which are not attributable to exempt activities, such as expenses in connection with the production of investment income, are not treated as qualifying distributions. Expenses attributable to both exempt and nonexempt activities shall be allocated to each such activity on a reasonable and consistently applied basis.

Treas. Reg. § 53.4942(a)-2(d)(4)(i) provides, in part, that where the deductions with respect to property used for a charitable, educational, or other similar exempt purpose exceed the income derived from such property, such excess shall not be allowed as a deduction, but may be treated as a qualifying distribution.

I.R.C. § 4942(j)(4)(A) provides that the term “functionally related business” includes a trade or business which is not an unrelated trade or business (as defined in § 513).

Rev. Rul. 2002-28, 2002-1 C.B. 941, provides that, when a private foundation transfers all of its assets to one or more private foundations in a transfer described in § 507(b)(2), the transfers do not constitute qualifying distributions for the transferor foundation under § 4942. The transferee foundations assume their proportionate share of the transferor foundation’s undistributed income under § 4942 and reduce their own distributable amount for purposes of § 4942 by their proportion share of the transferor’s excess qualifying distributions under § 4942(i).

I.R.C. § 4944(a)(1) imposes a tax on any amount invested by a private foundation in a manner that jeopardizes the carrying out of any of the foundation’s exempt purposes.

Rev. Rul. 2002-28, 2002-1 C.B. 941, holds that, when a private foundation transfers all of its assets to one or more private foundations in a transfer described in § 507(b)(2), the transfers do not constitute investments jeopardizing the transferor foundation’s exempt purposes and are not subject to tax under § 4944(a)(1).

I.R.C. § 4945(a)(1) imposes a tax on any “taxable expenditure” made by a private foundation.

I.R.C. § 4945(d)(4) provides that the term “taxable expenditure” includes any amount paid or incurred as a grant to a private non-operating foundation unless the grantor foundation exercises expenditure responsibility with respect to such grant in accordance with § 4945(h).

I.R.C. § 4945(d)(5) provides that the term “taxable expenditure” includes any amount paid or incurred by a private foundation for any purpose other than one specified in § 170(c)(2)(B).

I.R.C. § 4945(h) provides that the expenditure responsibility referred to in § 4945(d)(4) means that a private foundation is responsible to exert all reasonable efforts and to establish adequate procedures: (1) to see that the grant is spent solely for the purpose for which it was made; (2) to obtain full and complete reports from the grantee on how the funds are spent; and (3) to make full and detailed reports with respect to such expenditures to the Secretary.

Rev. Rul. 2002-28, 2001-1 C.B. 941, provides that, when a private foundation transfers all of its assets to one or more private foundations effectively controlled by the same persons that effectively control the transferor, the transferee foundation is treated as the transferor foundation rather than as the recipient of an expenditure responsibility grant. Therefore, there are no expenditure responsibility requirements that must be exercised under § 4945(d)(4) or (h) with respect to the transfers to the transferee foundation. The transferor foundation is required to exercise expenditure responsibility over the transferor’s outstanding grants until it disposes of all of its assets. Thereafter, during any period in which the transferor foundation has no assets, the transferor foundation is not required to exercise expenditure responsibility over any outstanding grants. However, the transferor foundation must still meet the § 4945(h) reporting requirements for the outstanding grants for the year in which the transfer was made.

Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-6(b)(1)(v) provides that any payment which constitutes a qualifying distribution under § 4942(g) ordinarily will not be treated as taxable expenditures under § 4945(d)(5).

Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-6(b)(2) provides that any expenditures for unreasonable administrative expenses, including compensation, consultant fees, and other fees for services rendered will ordinarily be taxable expenditures under § 4945(d)(5) unless the foundation can demonstrate that such expenses were paid or incurred in the good faith belief that they were reasonable and that the payment or incurrence of such expenses in such amounts was consistent with ordinary business care and prudence. The determination whether an expenditure is unreasonable shall depend upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case.

ANALYSIS

Issue 1

Whether the transfer of substantially all of M’s net assets to you (the “Transfer”) would adversely affect the status of either M or you as tax-exempt organizations described in § 501(c)(3).

Both M and you are currently recognized by the Service as organizations described in § 501(c)(3). Section 501(c)(3) describes organizations organized and operated exclusively for charitable, educational, and other specified exempt purposes, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation, and which does not participate in, or intervene in, any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.

M’s exempt purposes include the making of grants to QCRs, which M’s trust instrument defines as organizations described in §§ 170(c)(1) and (2) that are entitled to exemption from tax under § 501(c)(3). Furthermore, Articles I.B and VI of M’s trust instrument authorize the Trustees, in their discretion, to distribute up to the entire net income and principal of the Trust to such organizations in furtherance of your exempt purposes. You qualify as an organization described in § 170(c)(2) and are exempt from tax under § 501(c)(3). Therefore, you are a QCR and an eligible recipient of trust distributions under M’s trust instrument, and the Transfer of all of M’s remaining assets to an organization such as you is expressly permitted thereunder.

You are organized for charitable and educational purposes, including the provision of educational, vocational, social, psychological, and financial assistance to homeless individuals and families, and the making of distributions for such or similar purposes to organizations that qualify as exempt organizations under § 501(c)(3). Article IV, paragraph (a)(ii) of your Articles of Organization permits you to “receive contributions from any and all sources.” Therefore, the receipt of the transferred funds from M is a permissible action by you under your governing instrument. You intend to utilize these funds in carrying out the activities which constitute the basis of your exempt purposes. No private inurement will result from the receipt of those funds. The founder, B, serves without compensation, and the only persons who will benefit from your activities will be those persons who fall within the charitable class that you were established to serve. Nor will the funds be used for legislative or political activities or for any other purpose that is not in conformity with your exempt purposes.

Since the Transfer is consistent with M’s exempt purposes, and since the transferred funds will be used by you exclusively in furtherance of your exempt purposes, the Transfer will have no adverse effect on the qualification of either M or you as organizations described in § 501(c)(3).

Issue 2

Whether the Transfer would be a transfer described in § 507(b)(2).

I.R.C. § 507(b)(2) applies to the transfer of the assets of any private foundation to another private foundation pursuant to any liquidation, merger, redemption, recapitalization, or other adjustment, organization, or reorganization. Section 1.507-3(c)(1) provides that the terms “other adjustment, organization, or reorganization” shall include any partial liquidation or any other significant disposition of assets to one or more private foundations, other than transfers for full and adequate consideration. The term “significant disposition of assets to one or more private foundations” is defined by § 1.507-3(c)(2) as any disposition or series of dispositions where the aggregate value transferred is 25 percent or more of the fair market value of the foundation at the beginning of the taxable year.

M will transfer all of its net remaining assets to you after the payment of certain grants to unrelated QCR’s and the payment of final taxes and expenses. After the Transfer is completed, the value of M’s assets would be zero dollars ($0.00). The assets transferred would constitute 100 percent of M’s net assets remaining after the payment of its qualifying distributions, debts, expenses, and taxes, and not less than 93 percent of its total assets as of the beginning of the taxable year. Therefore, the Transfer would constitute a “significant disposition of assets” within the meaning of § 1.507-3(c)(2), and, thus, would qualify as an “other adjustment, organization, or reorganization” within the meaning of § 1.507-3(c)(1). Accordingly, the Transfer would be a transfer described in § 507(b)(2).

Issues 3, 4, 5, and 6

Whether the Transfer would not terminate M’s private foundation status or cause it to incur any liability for the § 507(c) termination tax.

Whether, following the Transfer, M would be eligible to terminate its private foundation status by giving notice to the Service as provided in § 507(a)(1).

Whether, for purposes of calculating the termination tax under § 507(c), the date for determining the value of M’s assets is the date on which it gives the notice described in § 507(a)(1) (“Notice”).

Provided that Notice is given at least one day after the Transfer, and at a time when M’s net remaining assets are valued at Zero Dollars ($0.00), whether the amount of termination tax due under § 507(c)(2) upon termination of M’s status as a private foundation would be Zero Dollars ($0.00).

Section 1.507-1(b)(6) provides that when a foundation transfers all or part of its assets to one or more other private foundations pursuant to a transfer described in § 507(b)(2), such transferor foundation will not have terminated its private foundation status under § 507(a)(1). In addition, § 1.507-1(b)(7) provides that neither a transfer of all the assets of a private foundation nor a significant disposition of assets by a private foundation shall be deemed to result in a termination of the transferor private foundation under § 507(a) unless the transferor private foundation elects to terminate pursuant to § 507(a)(1). Furthermore § 1.507-3(d) provides that unless a private foundation voluntarily gives notice pursuant to § 507(a)(1), a transfer of assets described in § 507(b)(2) will not constitute termination of the transferor’s private foundation status under § 507(a)(1). Finally, § 1.507-4(b) provides that a private foundation that makes a transfer described in § 507(b)(2) is not subject to the tax imposed under § 507(c) with respect to such transfer unless the provisions of § 507(a) become applicable.

As discussed under Issue 2, above, the Transfer will constitute a significant distribution of assets described in § 507(b)(2). Further, you have represented that the Secretary has not notified M of any tax imposed by § 507(c) due to any willful or flagrant acts or failures to act. Consequently, the Transfer would not, of itself, terminate M’s private foundation status or subject it to the tax imposed under § 507(c).

Section 507(a)(1) provides that the status of an organization as a private foundation shall be terminated only if such organization notifies the Secretary of its intent to accomplish such termination and such organization pays the tax imposed by § 507(c). Furthermore, § 1.507-1(b)(1) provides that in order for a private foundation to terminate its private foundation status under § 507(a)(1) it must submit a statement to the Internal Revenue Service of its intent to terminate its private foundation status under § 507(a)(1). In M’s situation where there have been no willful repeated acts or failures to act, and no flagrant act or failure to act, which would give rise to taxes and penalties under Chapter 42, M may elect to terminate its private foundation status by notifying the Manager, Exempt Organizations Determinations (TE/GE), of its intent to accomplish such termination and paying any termination tax deemed to be due under § 507(c).

Section 507(c) imposes a tax on a terminating private foundation equal to the lesser of the aggregate tax benefit resulting from its § 501(c)(3) status and the value of its net assets. Section 507(e) and § 1.507-7(a) provide that, for purposes of § 507(c), the value of the net assets shall be determined at whichever time such value is greater: (1) the first day on which the organization takes action which culminates in its ceasing to be a private foundation, or (2) the date on which it ceases to be a private foundation. Finally, § 1.507-7(b)(1) provides that in the case of a voluntary termination under § 507(a)(1), the date for determining the value of the foundation’s assets for purposes of calculating the termination tax under § 507(c) shall be the date on which the foundation gives the notification described in § 507(a)(1). The date for determining the value of M’s assets for purposes of calculating its termination tax is the date it gives Notice. If M gives Notice after the Transfer, the value of its assets on the date of the Notice would be Zero Dollars ($0.00), and, thus, the amount of the § 507(c) termination tax imposed on M would be Zero Dollars ($0.00).

Issues 7, 8, and 9

Whether, for purposes of §§ 507 through 509, you would be treated as a newly created organization as a result of the Transfer, pursuant to § 507(b)(2).

Whether you, as transferee of substantially all of M’s net assets, would be treated as possessing those attributes and characteristics of M, the transferor, described in § 1.507-3(a)(2), (3), and (4).

Since M and you are both effectively controlled by the same persons within the meaning of §§ 1.482-1(a)(3) and 1.507-3(a)(9), whether, for purposes of Chapter 42 (§ 4940 et seq.) and §§ 507 through 509, you, the transferee, would be treated as though you were M, the transferor.

Section 1.507-3(a)(1) provides that in the case of a significant distribution of assets to one or more private foundations within the meaning of § 1.507-3(c) the transferee organization shall not be treated as a newly created organization. Rather, it shall be treated as possessing those attributes and characteristics of the transferor organization which are described in § 1.507-3(a)(2), (3), and (4). Since, as discussed under Issue 2, above, the Transfer would qualify as a “significant distribution of assets” within the meaning of § 1.507-3(c)(2), you would not be treated as a newly created organization as a result of the Transfer. Rather, you would be treated as possessing M’s attributes and characteristics described in subparagraphs (2), (3), and (4) of § 1.507-3(a).

Treas. Reg. § 1.507-3(a)(9)(i) provides that if a private foundation transfers all of its net assets to one or more private foundations which are effectively controlled by the same persons which effectively controlled the transferor private foundation, for purposes of Chapter 42 (§ 4940 et seq.), the transferee foundation shall be treated as if it were the transferor. Since you have represented that B and C effectively control both M and you, for purposes of Chapter 42, you would be treated as if you were M.

Issues 10 and 11

Whether the Transfer would give rise to any gross investment income with respect to either M or you or will be subject to tax under § 4940(a).

Whether you, as transferee, may use any excess § 4940 tax paid by M to offset your § 4940 tax liability.

Section 4940(a) imposes an excise tax on a private foundation’s net investment income for the taxable year. Rev. Rul. 2002-28 holds that when a private foundation transfers all of its assets to one or more private foundations in a transfer described in § 507(b)(2), the transfers do constitute investments of the transferor and, therefore, do not give rise to net investment income subject to tax under § 4940(a). Thus, the Transfer would not give rise to net investment income subject to tax under § 4940.

Furthermore, Rev. Rul. 2002-28 holds that if the transferor foundation transfers all of its assets to private foundations effectively controlled by the same persons that effectively control the transferor, any excess § 4940 tax paid by the transferor may be used by the transferee to offset its § 4940 tax liability. As you represent that the Foundations are effectively controlled by the same persons, any excess § 4940 tax paid by M may be used by you to offset your § 4940 tax liability.

Issues 12 and 13

Whether the Transfer would constitute an act of self-dealing within the meaning of § 4941(d), or would subject any disqualified person or foundation manager with respect to M or you to the tax imposed under § 4941(a).

Whether the provision by a law firm of reasonable and necessary legal services with respect to the Transfer, or the payment of reasonable compensation for such services by M or you, would constitute acts of self-dealing within the meaning of § 4941(d), notwithstanding the status of D, a disqualified person with respect to you, as a partner in that law firm.

Section 4941(a) imposes an excise tax on each act of self-dealing between a disqualified person and a private foundation. Section 4941 and § 1.507-3(a) determine whether the proposed Transfer of all of M’s assets to you would constitute an act of self-dealing between a private foundation and its disqualified persons as defined in § 4946. Under § 53.4946-1(a)(8), a “disqualified person” does not include organizations that are exempt under § 501(c)(3). Therefore, the Transfer of M’s assets to you would not be an act of self-dealing because you are recognized by the Service as an organization exempt from tax under § 501(c)(3).

Furthermore, while the payment of compensation, or the payment or reimbursement of expenses by a private foundation to a disqualified person is, generally, an act of self-dealing under § 4941(d)(1)(E), § 4941(d)(2)(E) and § 53.4941(d)-3(c)(1) provide that a payment or reimbursement to a disqualified person for personal services which are reasonable and necessary to carry out the exempt purposes of the private foundation is not an act of self-dealing provided the compensation, payment, or reimbursement is not excessive.

In this case, the law firm is not a disqualified person, so the payment to the law firm for legal services will not be a direct act of self-dealing. Under § 4946(a)(1)(F) a “disqualified person” includes a partnership in which disqualified persons hold more than 35 percent of the profits interests. D is a disqualified person and is a partner of the law firm but holds less than a 35 percent profits interest in the law firm.

The payment will not otherwise be treated as an indirect act of self-dealing benefitting D. Under § 53.4941(d)-1(b)(4) indirect self-dealing will not occur solely as a result of a transaction between a private foundation and an entity in which a disqualified person holds an interest where the entity is not a disqualified person by operation of § 4946(a)(1)(F). Moreover, as Example (1) of § 53.4941(d)-3(c)(2) demonstrates, the payment of compensation by a foundation for legal services does not constitute an act of self-dealing if the services performed are reasonable and necessary for carrying out of the foundation’s exempt purposes and the amount paid for such services is not excessive, and you have represented that these requirements will be met.

Issue 14

Whether the Transfer will be a qualifying distribution by M under § 4942.

Whether you will assume M’s “undistributed income” (if any) or succeed to M’s excess distributions (if any).

Section 4942(a) generally imposes a tax on the undistributed income of a private foundation (other than an operating foundation under § 4942(j)(3)) for any taxable year which has not been distributed before the first day of the second (or any succeeding) taxable year following such taxable year. Section 4942(c) defines “undistributed income” for any taxable year as the amount by which the distributable amount for such taxable year exceeds the qualifying distributions made out of such distributable amount for such taxable year. Section 4942(g)(1)(A) defines “qualifying distribution” generally as any amount (including that portion of reasonable and necessary administrative expenses) paid to accomplish one or more purposes described in § 170(c)(2)(B), but a qualifying distribution does not include a contribution to an organization controlled directly or indirectly by the foundation or by one or more disqualified persons with respect to the foundation

Section 1.507-3(a)(5) provides that, except as provided in section 1.507-3(a)(9), a private foundation making a transfer described in § 507(b)(2) must satisfy its distribution requirements under § 4942 for the taxable year in which the transfer is made. Section 1.507-3(a)(5) further provides that the transfer will count as a distribution in satisfaction of the transferor foundation’s distribution requirement under § 4942 subject to the provisions of § 4942(g). Section 4942(g) provides that a distribution from one private foundation to another private foundation, where both foundations are effectively controlled by the same persons, will not be treated as a qualifying distribution by the transferor foundation for the purposes of § 4942 except to the extent that the transferee foundation makes one or more distributions that would be qualifying distributions under § 4942(g) (other than a distribution to a controlled foundation) prior to the close of the transferee’s first tax year following the tax year in which it received the transfer and the distributions are treated as being made out of corpus (as if the transferee foundation were not an operating foundation).

Rev. Rul. 2002-28 holds that where, by reason of § 1.507-3(a)(9)(i), a transferee private foundation is treated as though it were the transferor for purposes of § 4942, a transfer to the transferee foundation is not treated as a qualifying distribution of the transferor foundation. Rather, the transferee foundation assumes all obligations with respect to the transferor’s “undistributed income” within the meaning of § 4942(c), if any, and reduces its own distributable amount under § 4942 by the transferor foundation’s excess qualifying distributions under § 4942(i). None of the three situations in Rev. Rul. 2002-28, however, involved an operating foundation.

As discussed under Issues 7, 8, and 9, above, by reason of § 1.507-3(a)(9)(i), you would be treated as if you were M for purposes of Chapter 42, including § 4942. Accordingly, the Transfer to you would not be treated as a qualifying distribution of M. Rather, you would assume M’s obligations with respect to its undistributed income within the meaning of § 4942(c), if any (after taking into account any excess qualifying distribution carryovers that M may have), and M would not be required to meet its qualifying distribution requirements under § 4942 for the taxable year of the Transfer prior to the Transfer. M must file a final Form 990-PF return for the short tax year of its termination. If M has undistributed income for such tax year, you will owe § 4942 tax if you fail, by the end of your tax year following the tax year in which you receive the Transfer, to make qualifying distributions of such amount that would be treated as out of corpus if you were a non-operating foundation. You should provide an attachment to your Form 990-PF showing how you have met this requirement.

If M has excess qualifying distributions that carry over to you, they will be forfeited if you are an operating foundation in the year of the Transfer. Section 53.4942(a)-3(e)(4) (Example (3)) explains that excess qualifying distributions carried forward lapse in their entirety in any year that the private foundation is treated as an operating foundation. Accordingly, if M has any unused excess qualifying distributions that it could have carried forward to a taxable year after the Transfer, and if you are an operating foundation in that year, M’s unused excess qualifying distributions will lapse and will not be available for your use in any taxable year after the year of the Transfer if you were to cease to be an operating foundation.

Issue 15

Whether the Transfer would constitute a investment jeopardizing M’s exempt purposes, or would be subject to tax under § 4944(a)(1).

Section 4944 imposes a tax on any investment that jeopardizes an exempt organization’s charitable purposes. Rev. Rul, 2002-28 holds that where a private foundation transfers all of its assets and liabilities to another private foundation, the transfer does not constitute an investment for purposes of § 4944 and, therefore, the transfer does not constitute an investment jeopardizing the transferor foundation’s exempt purposes and is not subject to tax under § 4944(a)(1), Therefore, the Transfer would not constitute a jeopardizing investment or subject M to tax under § 4944(a)(1).

Issues 16 and 17

Whether the Transfer would be a taxable expenditure within the meaning of § 4945(d) or would require the exercise of expenditure responsibility under § 4945(d)(4) or (h).

Whether the payment of the IRS fee for this private letter ruling would be treated as a taxable expenditure within the meaning of § 4945(d), or whether payment of reasonable legal fees to the attorneys for M and you to obtain this private letter ruling with respect to the Transfer would be treated a taxable expenditures within the meaning of § 4945(d)(5).

Section 4945 imposes a tax on any “taxable expenditure” made by a private foundation. Section 4945(d)(4) provides that the term “taxable expenditure” includes any amount paid or incurred as a grant to a private non-operating foundation unless the grantor foundation exercises expenditure responsibility with respect to such grant in accordance with § 4945(h).

Rev. Rul. 2002-28 holds that where, by reason of § 1.507-3(a)(9)(i), a transferee foundation is treated as though it were the transferor foundation for purposes of § 4945, the transferee foundation is not treated as the recipient of an expenditure responsibility grant, and no expenditure responsibility requirements must be exercise under § 4945(d)(4) or (h) with respect to the transfer to the transferee foundation.

As discussed under Issues 7, 8, and 9, above, by reason of § 1.507-3(a)(9)(i), you would be treated as if you were M for purposes of Chapter 42, including § 4945. Consequently, the Transfer would not be considered a taxable expenditure under § 4945, and there would be no expenditure responsibility requirements to be exercised under § 4945(d)(4) or (h) with respect to the Transfer.

Section 53.4945-6(b)(1)(v) provides that any payment which constitutes a qualifying distribution under § 4942(g) will not be treated as a taxable expenditure under § 4945(d)(5). Section 4942(g)(1)(A) and § 53.4942(a)-3(a)(2)(i) provide that a qualifying distribution under § 4942(g) includes reasonable and necessary administrative expenses paid to accomplish one or more purposes described in § 170(c)(1) or (2)(B). Administrative expenses incurred in obtaining a ruling from the Service or for legal fees relating to a foundation’s exempt purposes are qualifying distributions. On the other hand, § 53.4945-6(b)(2) provides that expenditures for unreasonable administrative expenses, including consultant fees and other fees for services rendered, will ordinarily be taxable expenditures under § 4945(d)(5). The payment of legal fees to the attorneys for M or you and the payment of the IRS fee for this private letter ruling are administrative expenses necessary to the accomplishment of the Foundations’ exempt purposes. So long as such payments are reasonable, the legal fees paid to the attorneys for M and you to obtain a private letter ruling with respect to the Transfer, and the IRS fee paid for this private letter ruling, would not be treated as taxable expenditures within the meaning of § 4945(d)(5).

Issues 18 and 19

Whether the operation by you of state licensed postsecondary career training programs for a fee would adversely affect your tax exempt status under § 501(c)(3) or your status as an operating foundation under § 4942(j)(3).

Whether the fees received by you from the operation of the state licensed postsecondary career training programs would be considered gross income derived from an unrelated trade or business for purposes of § 512(a)(1).

Your exempt purposes, as described in your Articles of Organization, include “the provision of educational, vocational, social, psychological, and financial assistance to homeless individuals and families.” From your beginning, you have provided education and practical job-skills training to disadvantaged persons and those who have suffered displacement from economic upheavals so that they may be better equipped to obtain employment and to lead productive and satisfying lives. You now wish to provide training in software programs widely used by the business community to help displaced persons whose existing skills do not correspond to the current needs of the marketplace.

Providing such training is educational within the meaning of § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(a), and contributes importantly to the accomplishment of your exempt purposes of providing educational and vocational assistance to homeless and displaced persons. Thus, such activities amount to a trade or business that is substantially related to the accomplishment of your exempt purposes within the meaning of § 1.513-1(d)(2), and are, therefore, not unrelated trade or business within the meaning of § 513(a). Insofar as the term “functionally related business” under § 4942(j)(4)(A) includes a trade or business which is not an unrelated trade or business, as defined in § 513, the providing of such state-licensed postsecondary career training programs by you would constitute a “functionally related business,” and deductible expenses related thereto in excess of the income from such business would constitute qualifying distributions made directly for the active conduct of activities constituting your exempt function for purposes of qualifying as a private operating foundation under § 4942(j)(3), as provided in § 53.4942(a)-2(d)(4) and § 53.4942(b)-1(b)(1). The operation of state licensed postsecondary career training programs for a fee will not adversely affect your status as an organization described in § 501(c)(3) or your status as a private operating foundation under § 4942(j)(3). Furthermore, since the income derived from such activities would constitute income from a related trade or business, such income would not constitute gross income derived from an unrelated trade or business for purposes of § 512(a)(1).

Issue 20

Whether, following the Transfer, if your qualifying distributions (within the meaning of § 4942(g)(1) or (2)) made directly for the active conduct of the activities constituting your exempt purpose or function were to exceed both your net investment income and your minimum investment return, you will continue to qualify as a private operating foundation within the meaning of § 4942(j)(3).

To qualify as a private operating foundation under § 4942(j)(3), an organization must meet the income test under § 4942(j)(3)(A) and any one of three alternative tests — the assets test under § 4942(j)(3)(B)(i), the endowment test under § 4942(j)(3)(B)(ii), or the support test under § 4942(j)(3)(B)(iii). The income test requires that the organization make qualifying distributions directly for the active conduct of the activities constituting the purpose or function for which it is organized and operated equal to substantially all of the lesser of (i) its adjusted net income or (ii) its minimum investment return. The endowment test requires qualifying direct distributions of at least two-thirds of the foundation’s minimum investment return.

You anticipate, and represent, that, notwithstanding an increase in your assets and income as a result of the Transfer, you will continue to make qualifying direct distributions in excess of both your minimum investment return and your adjusted net income. So long as your qualifying direct distributions continue to exceed both your net investment income and your minimum investment return, you would continue to qualify as a private operating foundation under § 4942(j)(3).

CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, we rule as follows:

1. The transfer of substantially all of M’s net assets to you (the “Transfer”) would not adversely affect the status of either M or you as organizations described in § 501(c)(3).

2. The Transfer would be a transfer described in § 507(b)(2).

3. The Transfer would not terminate M’s private foundation status or cause M to incur any liability for the § 507(c) termination tax.

4. Following the Transfer, M would be eligible to terminate its private foundation status by giving notice to the Service as provided in § 507(a)(1).

5. For purposes of calculating the termination tax under § 507(c), the date for determining the value of M’s assets would be the date on which it gives the notice described in § 507(a)(1) (“Notice”).

6. Provided that Notice is given at least one day after the Transfer, and at a time when M’s net remaining assets are valued at Zero Dollars ($0.00), the amount of termination tax due under § 507(c)(2) upon termination of M’s status as a private foundation would be Zero Dollars ($0.00).

7. For purposes of §§ 507 through 509, you would be treated as a newly created organization as a result of the Transfer, pursuant to § 507(b)(2).

8. You, as transferee of substantially all of M’s net assets, would be treated as possessing those attributes and characteristics of M described in § 1.507-3(a)(2), (3), and (4).

9. Since M and you are both effectively controlled by the same persons within the meaning of §§ 1.482-1(a)(3) and 1.507-3(a)(9), for purposes of Chapter 42 (§ 4940 et seq.) and §§ 507 through 509, you, the transferee, would be treated as though you were M, the transferor.

10. The Transfer would not give rise to net investment income and would not be subject to tax under § 4940(a).

11. You, as transferee, may use any excess § 4940 tax paid by M, the transferor, to offset your § 4940 tax liability.

12. The Transfer would not constitute an act of self-dealing within the meaning of § 4941(d), and would not subject any disqualified person or foundation manager with respect to M or you to the tax imposed under § 4941(a).

13. The provision by a law firm of reasonable and necessary legal services with respect to the Transfer, and the payment of reasonable compensation for such services by M or you, would not constitute acts of self-dealing within the meaning of § 4941(d), notwithstanding the status of D, a disqualified person with respect to you, as a partner in that law firm.

14. The Transfer would not constitute a qualifying distribution by M under § 4942. You would assume M’s undistributed income under § 4942 (if any) and be required to make qualifying distributions of such amount treated as distributed out of corpus by the end of your tax year after the tax year in which you receive the Transfer, but excess distributions by M (if any) will not carry over to you, but will lapse in the first year after the Transfer that you qualify as an operating foundation

15. The Transfer would not constitute an investment jeopardizing M’s exempt purposes, and would not be subject to tax under § 4944(a)(1).

16. The Transfer would not be a taxable expenditure within the meaning of § 4945(d); consequently there would be no expenditure responsibility requirements to be exercised under § 4945(d)(4) or (h).

17. The payment of the IRS fee for this private letter ruling would not be treated as a taxable expenditure within the meaning of § 4945(d), and payments of reasonable legal fees to the attorneys for M and you to obtain this private letter ruling with respect to the Transfer would not be treated as taxable expenditures within the meaning of § 4945(d) so long as such payments were reasonable.

18. The operation by you of state licensed postsecondary career training programs for a fee would not adversely affect your tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3) or your status as an operating foundation under § 4942(j)(3).

19. The fees received by you from the operation of state licensed postsecondary career training programs would not be considered gross income derived from an unrelated trade or business for purposes of § 512(a)(1).

20. Following the Transfer, if your qualifying distributions (within the meaning of § 4942(g)(1) or (2)) made directly for the active conduct of the activities constituting your exempt purpose or function were to exceed both your net investment income and your minimum investment return, you would continue to qualify as a private operating foundation under § 4942(j)(3).

This ruling will be made available for public inspection under § 6110 of the Code after certain deletions of identifying information are made. For details, see enclosed Notice 437, Notice of Intention to Disclose. A copy of this ruling with deletions that we intend to make available for public inspection is attached to Notice 437. If you disagree with our proposed deletions, you should follow the instructions in Notice 437.

This ruling is directed only to the organization that requested it. I.R.C. § 6110(k)(3) of the Code provides that it may not be used or cited by others as precedent.

This ruling is based on the facts as they were presented and on the understanding that there will be no material changes in these facts. This ruling does not address the applicability of any section of the Code or regulations to the facts submitted other than with respect to the sections described. Because it could help resolve questions concerning your federal income tax status, this ruling should be kept in your permanent records.

If you have any questions about this ruling, please contact the person whose name and telephone number are shown in the heading of this letter.

In accordance with the Power of Attorney currently on file with the Internal Revenue Service, we are sending a copy of this letter to your authorized representative.

Sincerely,

Peter A. Holiat

Acting Manager,

Exempt Organizations

Technical Group 1




LTR: Scholarship Awards Won't Be Taxable Expenditures.

Citations: LTR 201321029

The IRS ruled that awards made through a private foundation’s employer-related scholarship program will not constitute taxable expenditures and will be excludable from the gross income of the recipients if the funds are used for qualified tuition and related expenses.

Contact person – ID number: * * *

Contact telephone number: * * *

UIL: 4945.04-04

Release Date: 5/24/2013

Date: February 27, 2013

Employer Identification Number: * * *

LEGEND:

B = Name

C = Company

D = Location

E = Location

F = Location

p = grade level

v = Number

w = Number range

x = Number

$y = Dollar amount

Dear * * *:

You asked for advance approval of your employer-related scholarship grant procedures under Internal Revenue Code section 4945(g). This approval is required because you are a private foundation that is exempt from federal income tax. You requested approval of your scholarship program to fund the education of certain qualifying students.

OUR DETERMINATION

We approved your procedures for awarding employer-related scholarships. Based on the information you submitted, and assuming you will conduct your program as proposed, we determined that your procedures for awarding employer-related scholarships meet the requirements of Code section 4945(g)(1). As a result, expenditures you make under these procedures won’t be taxable.

Also, awards made under these procedures are scholarship or fellowship grants and are not taxable to the recipients if they use them for qualified tuition and related expenses (subject to the limitations provided in Code section 117(b)).

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR REQUEST

Your letter indicates you will operate an employer-related scholarship program called B. The purpose of B is to provide scholarships for post-secondary education of undergraduate studies to students who are interested in obtaining an education focused on health and wellness related fields. Approximately v children will be eligible to apply and roughly w actual applications are to be received. You will award x non-renewable scholarships annually for $y each to children of C employees and their subsidiaries. Scholarships will be offered for full-time study at an accredited college or vocational institution of the student’s choice.

You will advertise your program by posting application information on your intranet and make annual announcements via company newsletters, e-mail, postings in employee cafeterias or on other bulletin boards to inform employees of the program and timing for the annual application process.

To be eligible, applicants must be graduating high school students or existing college students with a minimum GPA of 3.0 on a 4.0 scale, aged 25 and under and a dependent child of eligible full time employees with one year of employment who intends to attend a qualified post-secondary school. Students outside the United States must be in their final year of upper or higher secondary school or be current technical or university level students.

You define dependent children as biological, step, or legally adopted children living in the employee’s household or primarily supported by the employee. Children of a) employees at or above a vice president or p level and above of C or subsidiaries, b) Directors of C, or c) Trustees of your foundation are not eligible to apply.

Interested students must complete the application in English, Spanish or French and mail it along with a copy of current and complete transcripts of grades and any other required documents to the qualified independent third party hired to manage your program. Online transcripts must display the student’s name, school name, grade and credit hours earned for each course, and term in which each course was taken. Applicants will receive acknowledgement of receipt of their application. If an acknowledgement is not received within four weeks, applicants may contact the independent third party to verify that the application has been received.

Non-U.S. applicants currently or previously enrolled in an institute of higher education (university) must include their academic record (transcripts of grades) for all higher education course work completed and secondary school credential/diploma/certificate. Current secondary school students and students who have completed less than one year of higher education (university) must include their academic record (transcript of grades) for all secondary education course work completed during the past three years, and results of college entrance academic examinations.

All applicants are responsible for gathering and submitting all necessary information. Applications will be evaluated on the information supplied; therefore, answer all questions as completely as possible. Incomplete applications will not be evaluated. All information received will be considered confidential and is reviewed only by the independent third party management service hired.

Scholarship recipients are selected on the following basis: academic performance, demonstrated leadership and participation in school and community activities, work experience, a statement of career and educational goals and objectives, unusual school and community activities, work experience, unusual personal and family circumstances that have affected school or work achievements, and the applicant appraisal found on page two of the application. Academic evaluation of global applicants will include review of the grade/mark average based on the grading system used in the applicant’s country and a review of the results of academic examinations.

Financial need is not considered. However, because sources of funding for higher education vary across the globe, you request applicants from countries outside the United States submit school cost and government subsidy information.

Provided there are qualified applicants, recipients will be selected in proportion to the number of employees in three primary C regions — D, E, and F. The goal is to grant at least one award per region.

The selection committee will be chosen from a qualified independent third party. No relatives of the independent selection committee, or children of C employees that are at a senior level position (Vice President, or equivalent, or above) are eligible to participate in the program. No children of C’s board members or your foundation’s trustees or disqualified persons will be eligible to participate. In no instance does any officer or employee of C or your foundation play a part in the selection. All applicants agree to accept the selection decisions as final. Applicants will be notified of selection decisions. Not all applicants to the program will be selected as recipients.

The independent third party will process scholarship payments on your behalf. Checks will be mailed to each recipient’s home address and will be made payable to the student’s school. The award checks will be issued in U.S. currency. If requested, award payments for recipients outside the United States and Canada may be made via wire transfer.

Recipients will have no obligation to you. They are, however, required to notify the independent third party of any changes in address, school enrollment, or other relevant information and to send complete official transcripts when requested. You reserve the right to review the conditions and procedures of this scholarship program and to make a change at any time including termination of the program.

You will (1) arrange to receive and review grantee reports annually and upon completion of the purpose for which the grant was awarded, (2) investigate diversion of funds from their intended purposes, and (3) take all reasonable and appropriate steps to recover the diverted funds, ensure other grant funds held by a grantee are used for their intended purposes, and withhold further payments to grantees until you obtain grantees’ assurances that future diversions will not occur and that grantees will take extraordinary precautions to prevent future diversion from occurring.

You will maintain all records relating to individual grants including information obtained to evaluate grantees, identify a grantee as a disqualified person, establish the amount and purpose of each grant, and establish that you undertook the supervision and investigation of grants described above.

BASIS FOR OUR DETERMINATION

The law imposes certain excise taxes on the taxable expenditures of private foundations (Code section 4945). A taxable expenditure is any amount a private foundation pays as a grant to an individual for travel, study, or other similar purposes. However, a grant that meets all of the following requirements of Code section 4945(g) is not a taxable expenditure.

The foundation awards the grant on an objective and nondiscriminatory basis.

The IRS approves in advance the procedure for awarding the grant.

The grant is a scholarship or fellowship subject to Code section 117(a).

The grant is to be used for study at an educational organization described in Code section 170(b)(1)(A)(ii).

Revenue Procedure 76-47, 1976-2 C.B. 670, provides guidelines to determine whether grants a private foundation makes under an employer-related program to employees or children of employees are scholarship or fellowship grants subject to the provisions of Code section 117(a). If the program satisfies the seven conditions in sections 4.01 through 4.07 of Revenue Procedure 76-47 and meets the applicable percentage tests described in section 4.08 of Revenue Procedure 76-47, we will assume the grants are subject to the provisions of Code section 117(a).

You represented that your grant program will meet the requirements of either the 25 percent or 10 percent percentage test in Revenue Procedure 76-47. These tests require that:

The number of grants awarded to employees’ children in any year won’t exceed 25 percent of the number of employees’ children who were eligible for grants, were applicants for grants, and were considered by the selection committee for grants, or

The number of grants awarded to employees’ children in any year won’t exceed 10 percent of the number of employees’ children who were eligible for grants (whether or not they submitted an application), or

The number of grants awarded to employees in any year won’t exceed 10 percent of the number of employees who were eligible for grants, were applicants for grants, and were considered by the selection committee for grants.

You further represented that you will include only children who meet the eligibility standards described in Revenue Procedure 85-51, 1985-2 C.B. 717, when applying the 10 percent test applicable to employees’ children.

In determining how many employee children are eligible for a scholarship under the 10 percent test, a private foundation may include only those children who submit a written statement or who meet the foundation’s eligibility requirements. They must also satisfy certain enrollment conditions.

You represented that your procedures for awarding grants under this program will meet the requirements of Revenue Procedure 76-47. In particular:

An independent selection committee whose members are separate from you, your creator, and the employer will select individual grant recipients.

You will not use grants to recruit employees nor will you end a grant if the employee leaves the employer.

You will not limit the recipient to a course of study that would particularly benefit you or the employer.

OTHER CONDITIONS THAT APPLY TO THIS DETERMINATION

This determination only covers the grant program described above. This approval will apply to succeeding grant programs only if their standards and procedures don’t differ significantly from those described in your original request.

This determination is in effect as long as your procedures comply with sections 4.01 through 4.07 of Revenue Procedure 76-47 and with either of the percentage tests of section 4.08. If you establish another program covering the same individuals, that program must also meet the percentage test.

This determination applies only to you. It may not be cited as a precedent.

You cannot rely on the conclusions in this letter if the facts you provided have changed substantially. You must report any significant changes to your program to the Cincinnati Office of Exempt Organizations at::

Internal Revenue Service

Exempt Organizations Determinations

P.O. Box 2508

Cincinnati, OH 45201

You cannot award grants to your creators, officers, directors, trustees, foundation managers, or members of selection committees or their relatives.

All funds distributed to individuals must be made on a charitable basis and further the purposes of your organization. You cannot award grants for a purpose that is inconsistent with Code section 170(c)(2)(B).

You should keep adequate records and case histories so that you can substantiate your grant distributions with the IRS if necessary.

Please keep a copy of this letter in your records.

If you have questions, please contact the person listed at the top of this letter.

Sincerely,

Holly O. Paz

Director, Exempt Organizations

Rulings and Agreements




LTR: IRS Rules on Transfer of Assets Between Foundations.

Citations: LTR 201321024

The IRS ruled that the transfer of assets from one private foundation to another will not affect either foundation’s tax-exempt status, will not give rise to termination taxes or net investment income taxes, will not be an act of self-dealing, and will not constitute a jeopardizing investment.

Contact Person: * * *

Identification Number: * * *

Telephone Number: * * *

Uniform Issues List Numbers: 501.03-00, 507.00-00, 507.05-00,

507.06-00, 507.09-00, 512.00-00, 4940.00-00, 4941.04-00, 4942.03-05,

4942.05-00, 4944.00-00, 4945.04-00

Release Date: 5/24/2013

Date: February 27, 2013

Employer Identification Number: * * *

LEGEND:

B = * * *

C = * * *

D = * * *

P = * * *

Dear * * *:

This responds to your letter dated May 31, 2012, in which you requested rulings on the application of Parts I and II of Subchapter F of Chapter 1, I.R.C. §§ 501-509, and Subchapter A of Chapter 42, Subtitle D, §§ 4940-4948, to the transaction described below.

FACTS

You are a trust organized exclusively for charitable purposes, and you have been recognized exempt from federal income taxation as an organization described in § 501(c)(3). You are classified as a private non-operating foundation within the meaning of § 509(a). You were created by, and originally funded with a contribution from, B. B and her husband, C, (jointly, the “Founders”), are your sole trustees. You stipulate that B is a substantial contributor to you within the meaning of § 507(d)(2)(A), that C is a substantial contributor to you within the meaning of § 507(d)(2)(B)(iii), that B and C are your foundation managers within the meaning of § 4946(b), and, consequently, that B and C are disqualified persons with respect to you within the meaning of § 4946(a)(1)(A) and (B).

P is organized as a not-for-profit corporation under state law. P has been recognized exempt from federal income taxation as an organization described in § 501(c)(3), and is classified as a private operating foundation described in § 4942(j)(3). You and P do not share the same tax year. The officers and directors of P are B, C, and D. D is an unrelated person who has provided legal services to you, B, C, and P. You stipulate that B is a substantial contributor to P within the meaning of § 507(d)(2)(A), that C is a substantial contributor to P within the meaning of § 507(d)(2)(B)(iii), that B, C, and D are foundation managers of P within the meaning of § 4946(b), that B and C are disqualified persons with respect to P within the meaning of § 4946(a)(1)(A) and (B), and that D is a disqualified person with respect to P within the meaning of § 4946(a)(1)(B).

You represent that the Founders, as your sole Trustees and as two of the three directors of P, effectively control both you and P (collectively, “the Foundations”) within the meaning of §§ 1.482-1(a)(3) and 1.507-3(a)(9)(i).

You represent that both of the Foundations have made timely tax filings on their respective Returns of Organizations Exempt from Income Tax, Forms 990-PF, for all applicable years, and that both have complied with all applicable state filing obligations throughout their respective terms of existence.

Neither of the Foundations has undertaken any activities that would be inconsistent with tax-exempt status as a § 501(c)(3) organization, nor made any changes to their respective governing documents since the filing of their Applications for Tax-Exempt Status, Form 1023. There have been no willful repeated acts (or failures to act), nor any willful and flagrant act (or failure to act), within the meaning of § 507(a)(2)(A), with respect to either of the Foundations that would give rise to liability for tax under Chapter 42 of the Code, and neither Foundation has received a notification from the Secretary of the Treasury described in § 507(a)(2)(B). Neither Foundation has previously terminated its status as a private foundation. You have made qualifying distributions in sufficient amount to avoid imposition of excise tax under § 4942. P has made qualifying distributions in connection with the conduct of its exempt mission to qualify as a private operating foundation under § 4942(j)(3).

You represent that all grants made, or to be made, by you prior to the transfer of your remaining assets to P, as described below, have been grants to public charities. P has not made grants to other organizations. Neither Foundation has incurred any “taxable expenditure” within the meaning of § 4945(d), and neither Foundation has previously made any grant or other disposition of funds that would require the exercise of expenditure responsibility within the meaning of § 4945(d)(4)(B).

Under the Declaration of Trust that serves as your governing instrument, your trustees are empowered to make distributions in their discretion from Trust income and principal to “Qualified Charitable Recipients” (“QCRs”). QCRs are defined as organizations described in § 170(c)(1) or (2) which are exempt from tax under § 501(c)(3). The Trust instrument makes reference to suggested types of QCR donees, but the Trustees are empowered to make distributions to any charitable organization qualifying as a QCR, without regard to its mission or purposes. P, as an organization described in §§ 170(c)(2) and 501(c)(3), is a QCR within the meaning of the Trust instrument, and, as such, is eligible under the Trust instrument to receive grants from you. Prior to, and except for, the transfer of its remaining assets to P as described below, all of your grants have been made or will have been made to unrelated grantees that are treated as public charities under the Code.

The corporate purposes of P are described in its Articles of Organization as including “the provision of educational, vocational, social, psychological, and financial assistance to homeless individuals and families,” as well as making distributions to other § 501(c)(3) organizations. Since P was first organized, it has provided education and practical job-skills training to disadvantaged persons and those who have suffered displacement from recent economic upheavals with the objective of equipping them to survive in the current economy, to enter or re-enter the work-force, and to lead productive and satisfying lives. P has provided free career development services to unemployed and underemployed individuals, and has offered such individuals skill assessment, career planning, computer training, interview and resume help, financial planning, job search planning, and other assistance.

Over the past several years, the Founders have concluded that the services provided by P have been increasingly needed, in part because of the large number of people displaced by recent economic upheaval and recession. The population in need of such services has been underserved by other organizations and the need and demand for the services provided by P have increased. At the same time, economic circumstances have made fundraising from third parties more difficult. The Founders have determined that the exempt purposes of both Foundations will be best served by concentrating their efforts and charitable resources on the work and mission of P, and by eliminating the duplication and administrative burden of operating two separate private foundations.

Your only activities have consisted of grants made to unrelated QCRs, the missions of most of which are unrelated to P’s mission. The Trustees have determined that the best use of your remaining charitable funds, in furtherance of your exempt purpose, would be to provide assistance to P in carrying out the activities which form the basis of P’s exempt purposes. Therefore, the Founders, as your Trustees and as Directors of P, with the concurrence of P’s third director, have determined that it is in the best interests of both Foundations to contribute all of your remaining net funds to P, to discontinue any of your further activities or grants, and to continue to operate P in furtherance of its exempt purposes.

After making some final grants to unrelated public charities you will transfer all of your remaining assets to P. Your Trustees will reserve a final amount for estimated debts and expenses, including taxes due, if any, under § 4940, and, thereafter, transfer the balance of your remaining net assets to P (the “Transfer”). The Transfer will involve substantially all of your net assets, including all accumulated income and undistributed trust principal. Any amounts remaining after the final payment of taxes, expenses, and fees, will also be transferred to P. Following these transfers, you will retain no assets and will cease to operate.

You will file a Form 990-PF for the year of the disposition of your assets. No sooner than at least one day after the Transfer, your Trustees will provide notice pursuant to § 507(a)(1) to the Manager, Exempt Organizations Determinations, TE/GE, of your intent to terminate your private foundation status, in the form and manner prescribed by § 1.507-1(b) and other applicable regulations.

Following the Transfer, P will continue to operate as a private operating foundation engaged in the active conduct of activities in furtherance of its exempt purposes. It expects to use the transferred funds as well as its other assets exclusively in furtherance of its exempt purposes. The Founders expect that P’s qualifying distributions, substantially all in the form of expenditures incurred in carrying out its exempt activities, will continue to exceed its net income and minimum investment returns. P will also take responsibility for all liabilities, if any, under Chapter 42 that may be imposed or in effect with respect to either you or P after the Transfer date.

While P will continue to provide services free of charge, its management has determined that P’s exempt purposes can be further served by expanding its services to include fee-based training and certification programs in widely-used computer programs. These services have been identified as particularly valuable to the core mission of P, which is helping displaced and disadvantaged persons acquire the skills needed to obtain meaningful and lasting employment. The fees paid for such services will help P recover the costs of those programs as well as provide a source of revenue to support P’s ongoing operations and pro bono services.

The legal services with respect to the Transfer will be provided by a law firm in which D is a partner with a profits interest of less than 35%. D, as a director of P, is a disqualified person with respect to P. You represent that the law firm will charge reasonable fees for the legal services provided in connection with the Transfer, the termination of you and your status as a private foundation, and the application for a private letter ruling. The services provided by the law firm will be limited solely to such services as are reasonably necessary to carrying out the exempt purposes of the Foundations, and shall not be excessive.

RULINGS REQUESTED

You have requested the following rulings:

1. The transfer of substantially all of your net assets to P (the “Transfer”) will not adversely affect the status of you or P as tax-exempt organizations described in § 501(c)(3).

2. The Transfer will be a transfer described in § 507(b)(2).

3. The Transfer will not terminate your private foundation status and will not cause you to incur any liability for the § 507(c) termination tax.

4. Following the Transfer, you will be eligible to terminate your private foundation status through the “voluntary termination” procedures of § 507(a)(1).

5. Pursuant to § 1.507-7(b)(1), the date for determining the value of your assets, for purposes of calculating the termination tax under § 507(c), shall be the date proper notification is given, in the manner prescribed in the regulations, of your intention voluntarily to terminate your private foundations status (hereinafter, “Notice”).

6. Provided that such Notice is given at least one day after the Transfer, and at a time when your net remaining assets are valued at zero dollars ($0.00), then the amount of termination tax due under § 507(c)(2) upon the termination of your status as a private foundation shall be zero dollars ($0.00).

7. Pursuant to § 507(b)(2), P will not be treated as a newly created organization as a result of the Transfer.

8. P, as transferee of substantially all of your net assets, shall be treated as possessing those attributes and characteristics of yours described in subparagraphs (2), (3), and (4) of § 1.507-3(a).

9. The Founders, as the only Trustees of you, and as two of the three Directors of P, and as foundation managers and substantial contributors of both Foundations, effectively control both Foundations within the meaning of §§ 1.482-1(a)(3) and 1.507-3(a)(9), Accordingly, for purposes of Chapter 42, the transferee Foundation, P, will be treated as though it were you, the transferor Foundation.

10. The Transfer will not be a realization event for you, and will not give rise to any gross investment income or capital gain net income, within the meaning of § 4940, with respect to either you or P.

11. P, as transferee, may use any excess § 4940 tax paid by you, the transferor, to offset P’s § 4940 tax liability.

12. The Transfer will not constitute self-dealing and will not subject either of the Foundations, or any of their respective officers, directors, or Trustees, as the case may be, to tax under § 4941.

13. The providing of reasonable and necessary legal services with respect to the Transfer by a law firm in which D is a partner, and the payment of reasonable compensation for such services by the Foundations, will not be an act of self-dealing within the meaning of § 4941(d), notwithstanding the status of D as a disqualified person with respect to P.

14. You will not be required to meet the qualifying distribution requirements of § 4942 for the taxable year of the Transfer provided that P’s distributable amount for the year of the Transfer is increased by your distributable amount for the year of the Transfer, and your qualifying distributions made during the taxable year of the Transfer, if any, will be carried over to P, and may be used by P to meet its minimum distribution requirements under § 4942 for the year.

15. The Transfer will not constitute a jeopardizing investment within the meaning of § 4944.

16. The Transfer will not be a taxable expenditure within the meaning of § 4945(d), and there will be no expenditure responsibility requirements that must be exercised under § 4945(d)(4) or (h) with respect to the Transfer.

17. The payment of reasonable legal fees to the attorneys for you and P for services with respect to the Transfer, and the IRS fee for this Private Letter Ruling will not be treated as taxable expenditures within the meaning of § 4945(d)(5).

18. The operation by P of state licensed postsecondary career training programs for a fee will not adversely affect P’s tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3) or its status as a private operating foundation under § 4942(j)(3).

19. The fees received by P from payments by users for its certification classes will not be considered gross income derived from an unrelated trade or business for purposes of § 512(a)(1).

20. From and after the effective date of the Transfer, P will continue to exist as an organization that is exempt from taxation under § 501(c)(3) and which will qualify as a private operating foundation under § 4942(j)(3).

LAW

I.R.C. § 501(a) exempts from federal income taxation organizations described in § 501(c).

I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) describes organizations organized and operated exclusively for charitable, educational, and other designated exempt purposes.

Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(i) provides that the term “educational,” as used in § 501(c)(3), includes the instruction and training of the individual for the purpose of improving or developing his capabilities.

I.R.C. § 509(a) provides that an organization described in § 501(c)(3) is a private foundation unless it is described in § 509(a)(1), (2), (3), or (4).

I.R.C. § 507(a) provides that, except as provided in subsection (b), the status of any organization as a private foundation shall be terminated only if (1) it notifies the Secretary of its intent to accomplish such termination, or (2) with respect to such organization, there have been either willful repeated acts (or failures to act), or a willful and flagrant act (or failure to act), giving rise to liability for tax under Chapter 42, and the Secretary notifies such organization that it is liable for the tax imposed by subsection (c), and either such organization pays the tax (or any portion not abated under subsection (g)) or the entire amount of such tax is abated under subsection (g).

Treas. Reg. § 1.507-1(b)(1) provides that in order for a private foundation to terminate its private foundation status under § 507(a)(1), an organization must submit a statement to the Internal Revenue Service (“Service”) of its intent to terminate its private foundation status under § 507(a)(1). Such statement must set forth in detail the computation and amount of tax imposed under § 507(c). Unless the organization requests abatement of such tax pursuant to § 507(g), full payment of such tax must be made at the time the statement is filed under § 507(a)(1).

I.R.C. § 507(c) imposes an excise tax on each terminating private foundation equal to the lower of the aggregate tax benefit resulting from the § 501(c)(3) status of such foundation, or the value of the net assets of such foundation.

I.R.C. § 507(e) and Treas. Reg. § 1.507-7(a) provide that, for purposes of § 507(c), the value of the net assets shall be determined at whichever time such value is higher: (1) the first day on which action is taken by the organization which culminates in its ceasing to be a private foundation, or (2) the date on which it ceases to be a private foundation.

Treas. Reg. § 1.507-7(b)(1) provides that, in the case of a termination under § 507(a)(1), the date for determining the value of the foundation’s assets for purposes of calculating the termination tax under § 507(c) shall be the date on which the foundation gives the notification described in § 507(a)(1).

I.R.C. § 507(b)(2) provides that, in the case of a transfer of assets of a private foundation to another private foundation pursuant to any liquidation, merger, redemption, recapitalization, or other adjustment, organization, or reorganization, the transferee foundation shall not be treated as a newly created organization.

Treas. Reg. § 1.507-3(c)(1) provides that, for purposes of § 507(b)(2), the terms “other adjustment, organization, or reorganization” shall include any partial liquidation or any other significant disposition of assets to one or more private foundations, other than transfers for full and adequate consideration or distributions out of current income.

Treas. Reg. § 1.507-3(c)(2) provides that the term “significant disposition of assets to one or more private foundations” includes any disposition (or series of related dispositions) by a private foundation to one or more private foundations of 25 percent or more of the fair market value of the net assets of the transferor foundation at the beginning of the taxable year in which the transfers occur.

Treas. Reg. § 1.507-1(b)(6) provides that when a foundation transfers all or part of its assets to one or more other private foundations pursuant to a transfer described in § 507(b)(2) and § 1.507-3(c), such transferor foundation will not have terminated its private foundation status under § 507(a)(1).

Treas. Reg. § 1.507-1(b)(7) provides that neither a transfer of all the assets of a private foundation nor a significant disposition of assets by a private foundation shall be deemed to result in a termination of the transferor private foundation under § 507(a) unless the transferor private foundation elects to terminate pursuant to § 507(a)(1) or § 507(a)(2) is applicable.

Treas. Reg. § 1.507-3(d) provides that unless a private foundation voluntarily gives notice pursuant to § 507(a)(1), a transfer of assets described in § 507(b)(2) will not constitute a termination of the transferor’s private foundation status under § 507(a)(1).

Treas. Reg. § 1.507-4(b) provides that private foundations which make transfers described in § 507(b)(2) are not subject to the tax imposed under § 507(c) with respect to such transfers unless the provisions of § 507(a) become applicable.

Treas. Reg. § 1.507-3(a)(1) provides that, in the case of a transfer of assets of a private foundation to another private foundation pursuant to any liquidation, merger, redemption, recapitalization, or other adjustment, organization, or reorganization, including a significant disposition of assets to one or more private foundations within the meaning of § 1.507-3(c), the transferee organization shall not be treated as a newly created organization. Rather, the transferee organization shall be treated as possessing those attributes and characteristics of the transferor organization which are described in subparagraphs (2), (3), and (4) of this paragraph.

Treas. Reg. § 1.507-3(a)(2)(i) provides that a transferee organization to which this § 1.507-3(a) applies shall succeed to the aggregate tax benefit of the transferor organization in an amount equal to the amount of such aggregate tax benefit multiplied by a fraction the numerator of which is the fair market vale of the assets (less encumbrances) transferred to such transferee and the denominator of which is the fair market value of the assets of the transferor (less encumbrances) immediately before the transfer. Fair market value shall be determined at the time of the transfer.

Treas. Reg. § 1.507-3(a)(3) provides that, for purposes of § 507(d)(2), in the event of a transfer of assets described in § 507(b)(2), any person who is a “substantial contributor” (within the meaning of § 507(d)(2)) with respect to the transferor foundation shall be treated as a “substantial contributor” with respect to the transferee foundation, regardless of whether such person meets the $5,000-two percent test with respect to the transferee organization at any time.

Treas. Reg. § 1.507-3(a)(4) provides that if a private foundation incurs liability for one or more of the taxes imposed under Chapter 42 (or any penalty resulting therefrom) prior to, or as a result of, making a transfer of assets described in § 507(b)(2) to one or more private foundations, in any case where transferee liability applies each transferee foundation shall be treated as receiving the transferred assets subject to such liability to the extent that the transferor foundation does not satisfy such liability.

Treas. Reg. § 1.507-3(a)(5) provides that, except as provided in subparagraph (9) of this paragraph, a private foundation is required to meet the distribution requirements of § 4942 for any taxable year in which it makes a § 507(b)(2) transfer of all or part of its net assets to another private foundation. Such transfer shall itself be counted toward satisfaction of such requirements to the extent the amount transferred meets the requirements of § 4942(g). However, where the transferor has disposed of all of its assets, the recordkeeping requirements of § 4942(g)(3)(B) shall not apply during any period it which it has no assets. Such requirements are applicable for any taxable year other than a taxable year during which the transferor has no assets.

Treas. Reg. § 1.507-3(a)(9)(i) provides that if a private foundation transfers all of its net assets to one or more private foundations which are effectively controlled (within the meaning of § 1.482-1A(a)(3)), directly or indirectly, by the same person or persons who effectively control the transferor private foundation, for purposes of Chapter 42 (§ 4940 et seq.) and part II of Subchapter F of Chapter 1 of the Code (§§ 507 through 509), such a transferee private foundation shall be treated as if it were the transferor.

I.R.C. § 511(a)(1) imposes a tax for each taxable year on the unrelated business taxable income (as defined in § 512) of organizations described in § 501(c).

I.R.C. § 512(a)(1) provides that the term “unrelated business taxable income” means the gross income derived by any organization from any unrelated trade or business (as defined in § 513) regularly carried on by it less certain deductions and subject to certain modifications.

I.R.C. § 513(a) provides that the term “unrelated trade or business” means, in the case of an organization subject to the tax imposed by § 511, any trade or business the conduct of which is not substantially related (aside from the need of such organization for income or funds or the use it makes of the profits derived) to the exercise or performance by such organization of its charitable, educational, or other purpose or functions constituting the basis for its exemption under § 501.

Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(2) provides that a trade or business is “related” to exempt purposes, in the relevant sense only where the conduct of the business activities bears a causal relationship to the achievement of exempt purposes (other than through the production of income); and the trade or business is “substantially related,” for purposes of § 513, only if the causal relationship is a substantial one. Thus, for the conduct of a trade or business from which a particular amount of gross income is derived to be substantially related to purposes for which exemption is granted, the production or distribution of the goods or the performance of the services from which the gross income is derived must contribute importantly to the accomplishment of those purposes. Whether activities productive of gross income contribute importantly to the accomplishment of any purpose for which an organization is granted exemption depends in each case upon the facts and circumstances involved.

I.R.C. § 4940(a) imposes on each private foundation which is exempt from taxation under § 501(a) for the taxable year a tax equal to 2 percent of the net investment income of such foundation for the taxable year.

Rev. Rul. 2002-28, 2002-1 C.B. 941, holds that when a private foundation transfers all of its assets to one or more private foundations in a transfer described in § 507(b)(2) the transfers do not give rise to net investment income and are not subject to tax under § 4940(a). The transferee foundations may use their proportionate share of any excess § 4940 tax paid by the transferor to offset their own § 4940 tax liability.

I.R.C. § 4941(a)(1) imposes a tax on each act of self-dealing between a disqualified person and a private foundation.

I.R.C. § 4946(a)(1) provides that the term “disqualified person,” with respect to a private foundation, includes a person who is —

(A) a substantial contributor to the foundation,

(B) a foundation manager (within the meaning of subsection (b)(1)),

(C) an owner of more than 20 percent of —

(i) the total combined voting power of a corporation,

(ii) the profits interest of a partnership, or

(iii) the beneficial interest of a trust or unincorporated enterprise, which is a substantial contributor to the foundation,

(D) a member of the family of any individual described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C),

(E) a corporation of which persons described in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (D) own more than 35 percent of the combined voting power,

(F) a partnership in which persons described in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (D) own more than 35 percent of the profits interest, and

(G) a trust or estate in which persons described in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (D) hold more than 35 percent of the beneficial interest.

Treas. Reg. § 53.4946-1(a)(8) provides that, for purposes of § 4941, the term “disqualified person” shall not include any organization described in § 501(c)(3) other than an organization described in § 509(a)(4).

Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(d)-1(b)(4) provides that a transaction between a private foundation and an organization which is not controlled by the foundation (within the meaning of subparagraph (5) of this paragraph) and which is not described in § 4946(a)(1)(E), (F), or (G) because persons described in § 4946(a)(1)(A), (B), (C), or (D) own no more than 35 percent of the total combined voting power or profits or beneficial interest of such organization, shall not be treated as an indirect act of self-dealing between the foundation and such disqualified person solely because of the ownership interest of such persons in such organization.

I.R.C. § 4941(d)(1)(E) provides that the term “self-dealing” includes any direct or indirect payment of compensation (or payment or reimbursement of expenses) by a private foundation to a disqualified person.

I.R.C. § 4941(d)(2)(E) and Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(d)-3(c)(1) provide that the payment of compensation (and the payment or reimbursement of expenses) by a private foundation to a disqualified person for personal services which are reasonable and necessary to carrying out the exempt purpose of the private foundation shall not be an act of self-dealing if the compensation (or payment or reimbursement) is not excessive.

Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(d)-3(c)(2) provides examples illustrating the provisions of § 4941(d)(2)(E). In Example (1), M, a partnership, is a firm of 10 lawyers engaged in the practice of law. A and B, partners in M, serve as trustees to private foundation W and, therefore, are disqualified persons. In addition, A and B own more than 35 percent of the profits interest in M, thereby making M a disqualified person. M performs various legal services for W from time to time as such services are requested. It is concluded that the payment of compensation by W to M shall not constitute an act of self-dealing if the services performed are reasonable and necessary for the carrying out of W’s exempt purposes and the amount paid by W for such services is not excessive.

I.R.C. § 4942(a) imposes a tax on the undistributed income of a private foundation (other than an operating foundation under § 4942(j)(3)) for any taxable year which has not been distributed before the first day of the second (or any succeeding) taxable year following such taxable year.

I.R.C. § 4942(c) defines “undistributed income” for any taxable year as the amount by which the distributable amount for such taxable year exceeds the qualifying distributions made out of such distributable amount for such taxable year.

I.R.C. § 4942(d) defines “distributable amount” as the amount equal to the sum of the minimum investment return, plus certain other amounts, reduced by the sum of the taxes imposed on such private foundation for the taxable year under subtitle A and § 4940.

I.R.C. § 4942(g)(1)(A) provides that the term “qualifying distribution” means any amount (including that portion of reasonable and necessary administrative expenses) paid to accomplish one or more purposes described in § 170(c)(2)(B), other than a contribution to (i) an organization controlled directly or indirectly by the foundation or by one or more disqualified persons with respect to the foundation, except as provided in paragraph (3), or (ii) a private foundation which is not an operating foundation under § 4942(j)(3), except as provided in paragraph (3).

I.R.C. § 4942(g)(3) provides that the term “qualifying distribution” includes a contribution to a § 501(c)(3) organization described in paragraph (1)(A)(i) or (ii) if —

(A) not later than the close of the first taxable year after its taxable year in which such contribution is received, such organization makes a distribution equal to the amount of such contribution and such distribution is a qualifying distribution (within the meaning of paragraph (1) or (2), without regard to this paragraph) which is treated under subsection (h) as a distribution out of corpus (or would be so treated if such § 501(c)(3) organization were a private foundation which is not an operating foundation), and

(B) the private foundation making the contribution obtains adequate records or other sufficient evidence from such organization showing that the qualifying distribution described in subparagraph (A) has been made by such organization.

I.R.C. § 4942(i) and Treas. Reg. § 53.4942(a)-3(e) provide for a carry-over of the amount by which qualifying distributions during the five preceding taxable years (other than amounts required to be distributed out of corpus under § 4942(g)(3)) have exceeded the distributable amounts for such years.

I.R.C. § 4942(j)(3) provides that, for purposes of § 4942, the term “operating foundation” means any organization —

A. which makes qualifying distributions (within the meaning of paragraph (1) and (2) of subsection (g)) directly for the active conduct of the activities constituting the purpose or function for which it is organized and operated equal to substantially all of the lesser of —

i. its adjusted net income (as defined in subsection (f), or

ii. its minimum investment return; (the “income test”) and

B.

i. substantially more than half of the assets of which are devoted directly to such activities or to functionally related businesses (as defined in paragraph (4)), or to both, or are stock of a corporation which is controlled by the foundation and substantially all of the assets of which are so devoted (the “assets test”),

ii. which normally makes qualifying distributions (within the meaning of paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (g)) directly for the active conduct of the activities constituting the purpose or function for which it is organized and operated in an amount not less than two-thirds of its minimum investment return (as defined in subsection (e)) (the “endowment test”), or

iii. substantially all of the support (other than gross investment income as defined in § 509(e)) of which is normally received from the general public and from 5 or more exempt organizations which are not described in § 4946(a)(1)(H) with respect to each other or the recipient foundation, not more than 25 percent of the support (other than gross investment income) of which is normally received from any one such exempt organization and not more than half of the support of which is normally received from gross investment income (the “support test”).

Notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraph (A), if the qualifying distributions (within the meaning of paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (g)) of an organization for the taxable year exceed the minimum investment return for the taxable year, clause (ii) of subparagraph (A) shall not apply unless substantially all of such qualifying distributions are made directly for the active conduct of the activities constituting the purpose or function for which it is organized and operated.

Treas. Reg. § 53.4942(b)-1(b)(1) provides, generally, that qualifying distributions are not made by a foundation “directly for the active conduct of activities constituting its charitable, educational, or other similar exempt purpose” unless such qualifying distributions are used by the foundation itself, rather than by or through one or more grantee organizations which receive such qualifying distributions directly or indirectly from such foundation. However, administrative expenses (such as staff salaries and traveling expenses) and other operating costs necessary to conduct the foundation’s exempt activities (regardless of whether they are “directly for the active conduct” of such activities) shall be treated as qualifying distributions expended directly for the active conduct of such exempt activities if such expenses and costs are reasonable in amount. Conversely, administrative expenses and operating costs which are not attributable to exempt activities, such as expenses in connection with the production of investment income, are not treated as qualifying distributions. Expenses attributable to both exempt and nonexempt activities shall be allocated to each such activity on a reasonable and consistently applied basis.

Treas. Reg. § 53.4942(a)-2(d)(4)(i) provides, in part, that where the deductions with respect to property used for a charitable, educational, or other similar exempt purpose exceed the income derived from such property, such excess shall not be allowed as a deduction, but may be treated as a qualifying distribution.

I.R.C. § 4942(j)(4)(A) provides that the term “functionally related business” includes a trade or business which is not an unrelated trade or business (as defined in § 513).

Rev. Rul. 2002-28, 2002-1 C.B. 941, provides that, when a private foundation transfers all of its assets to one or more private foundations in a transfer described in § 507(b)(2), the transfers do not constitute qualifying distributions for the transferor foundation under § 4942. The transferee foundations assume their proportionate share of the transferor foundation’s undistributed income under § 4942 and reduce their own distributable amount for purposes of § 4942 by their proportion share of the transferor’s excess qualifying distributions under § 4942(i).

I.R.C. § 4944(a)(1) imposes a tax on any amount invested by a private foundation in a manner that jeopardizes the carrying out of any of the foundation’s exempt purposes.

Rev. Rul. 2002-28, 2002-1 C.B. 941, holds that, when a private foundation transfers all of its assets to one or more private foundations in a transfer described in § 507(b)(2), the transfers do not constitute investments jeopardizing the transferor foundation’s exempt purposes and are not subject to tax under § 4944(a)(1).

I.R.C. § 4945(a)(1) imposes a tax on any “taxable expenditure” made by a private foundation.

I.R.C. § 4945(d)(4) provides that the term “taxable expenditure” includes any amount paid or incurred as a grant to a private non-operating foundation unless the grantor foundation exercises expenditure responsibility with respect to such grant in accordance with § 4945(h).

I.R.C. § 4945(d)(5) provides that the term “taxable expenditure” includes any amount paid or incurred by a private foundation for any purpose other than one specified in § 170(c)(2)(B).

I.R.C. § 4945(h) provides that the expenditure responsibility referred to in § 4945(d)(4) means that a private foundation is responsible to exert all reasonable efforts and to establish adequate procedures: (1) to see that the grant is spent solely for the purpose for which it was made; (2) to obtain full and complete reports from the grantee on how the funds are spent; and (3) to make full and detailed reports with respect to such expenditures to the Secretary.

Rev. Rul. 2002-28, 2001-1 C.B. 941, provides that, when a private foundation transfers all of its assets to one or more private foundations effectively controlled by the same persons that effectively control the transferor, the transferee foundation is treated as the transferor foundation rather than as the recipient of an expenditure responsibility grant. Therefore, there are no expenditure responsibility requirements that must be exercised under § 4945(d)(4) or (h) with respect to the transfers to the transferee foundation. The transferor foundation is required to exercise expenditure responsibility over the transferor’s outstanding grants until it disposes of all of its assets. Thereafter, during any period in which the transferor foundation has no assets, the transferor foundation is not required to exercise expenditure responsibility over any outstanding grants. However, the transferor foundation must still meet the § 4945(h) reporting requirements for the outstanding grants for the year in which the transfer was made.

Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-6(b)(1)(v) provides that any payment which constitutes a qualifying distribution under § 4942(g) ordinarily will not be treated as taxable expenditures under § 4945(d)(5).

Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-6(b)(2) provides that any expenditures for unreasonable administrative expenses, including compensation, consultant fees, and other fees for services rendered will ordinarily be taxable expenditures under § 4945(d)(5) unless the foundation can demonstrate that such expenses were paid or incurred in the good faith belief that they were reasonable and that the payment or incurrence of such expenses in such amounts was consistent with ordinary business care and prudence.

The determination whether an expenditure is unreasonable shall depend upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case.

ANALYSIS

Issue 1

Whether the transfer of substantially all of your net assets to P (the “Transfer”) would adversely affect the status of either you or P as tax-exempt organizations described in § 501(c)(3).

Both you and P are currently recognized by the Service as organizations described in § 501(c)(3). Section 501(c)(3) describes organizations organized and operated exclusively for charitable, educational, and other specified exempt purposes, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation, and which does not participate in, or intervene in, any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.

Your exempt purposes include the making of grants to QCRs, which your trust instrument defines as organizations described in §§ 170(c)(1) and (2) that are entitled to exemption from tax under § 501(c)(3). Furthermore, Articles I.B and VI of your trust instrument authorize the Trustees, in their discretion, to distribute up to the entire net income and principal of the Trust to such organizations in furtherance of your exempt purposes. P qualifies as an organization described in § 170(c)(2) and is exempt from tax under § 501(c)(3). Therefore, P is a QCR and an eligible recipient of trust distributions under your trust instrument, and the Transfer of all your remaining assets to such an organization is expressly permitted thereunder.

P is organized for charitable and educational purposes, including the provision of educational, vocational, social, psychological, and financial assistance to homeless individuals and families, and the making of distributions for such or similar purposes to organizations that qualify as exempt organizations under § 501(c)(3). Article IV, paragraph (a)(ii) of P’s Articles of Organization permits P to “receive contributions from any and all sources.” Therefore, the receipt of the transferred funds from you is a permissible action by P under its governing instrument. P’s intention is to utilize these funds in carrying out the activities which constitute the basis of its exempt purposes. No private inurement will result from the receipt of those funds. The founder, B, serves without compensation, and the only persons who will benefit from P’s activities will be those persons who fall within the charitable class that P was established to serve. Nor will the funds be used for legislative or political activities or for any other purpose that is not in conformity with P’s exempt purposes.

Since the Transfer is consistent with your exempt purposes, and since the transferred funds will be used by P exclusively in furtherance of its exempt purposes, the Transfer will have no adverse effect on the qualification of either you or P as organizations described in § 501(c)(3).

Issue 2

Whether the Transfer would be a transfer described in § 507(b)(2).

I.R.C. § 507(b)(2) applies to the transfer of the assets of any private foundation to another private foundation pursuant to any liquidation, merger, redemption, recapitalization, or other adjustment, organization, or reorganization. Section 1.507-3(c)(1) provides that the terms “other adjustment, organization, or reorganization” shall include any partial liquidation or any other significant disposition of assets to one or more private foundations, other than transfers for full and adequate consideration. The term “significant disposition of assets to one or more private foundations” is defined by § 1.507-3(c)(2) as any disposition or series of dispositions where the aggregate value transferred is 25 percent or more of the fair market value of the foundation at the beginning of the taxable year.

You will transfer all of your net remaining assets to P after the payment of certain grants to unrelated QCR’s and the payment of final taxes and expenses. After the Transfer is completed, the value of your assets would be zero dollars ($0.00). The assets transferred would constitute 100 percent of your net assets remaining after the payment of your qualifying distributions, debts, expenses, and taxes, and not less than 93 percent of your total assets as of the beginning of the taxable year. Therefore, the Transfer would constitute a “significant disposition of assets” within the meaning of § 1.507-3(c)(2), and, thus, would qualify as an “other adjustment, organization, or reorganization” within the meaning of § 1.507-3(c)(1). Accordingly, the Transfer would be a transfer described in § 507(b)(2).

Issues 3, 4, 5, and 6

Whether the Transfer would not terminate your private foundation status or cause you to incur any liability for the § 507(c) termination tax.

Whether, following the Transfer, you would be eligible to terminate your private foundation status by giving notice to the Service as provided in § 507(a)(1).

Whether, for purposes of calculating the termination tax under § 507(c), the date for determining the value of your assets is the date on which you give the notice described in § 507(a)(1) (“Notice”).

Provided that Notice is given at least one day after the Transfer, and at a time when your net remaining assets are valued at Zero Dollars ($0.00), whether the amount of termination tax due under § 507(c)(2) upon termination of your status as a private foundation would be Zero Dollars ($0.00).

Section 1.507-1(b)(6) provides that when a foundation transfers all or part of its assets to one or more other private foundations pursuant to a transfer described in § 507(b)(2), such transferor foundation will not have terminated its private foundation status under § 507(a)(1). In addition, § 1.507-1(b)(7) provides that neither a transfer of all the assets of a private foundation nor a significant disposition of assets by a private foundation shall be deemed to result in a termination of the transferor private foundation under § 507(a) unless the transferor private foundation elects to terminate pursuant to § 507(a)(1). Furthermore § 1.507-3(d) provides that unless a private foundation voluntarily gives notice pursuant to § 507(a)(1), a transfer of assets described in § 507(b)(2) will not constitute termination of the transferor’s private foundation status under § 507(a)(1). Finally, § 1.507-4(b) provides that a private foundation that makes a transfer described in § 507(b)(2) is not subject to the tax imposed under § 507(c) with respect to such transfer unless the provisions of § 507(a) become applicable.

As discussed under Issue 2, above, the Transfer will constitute a significant distribution of assets described in § 507(b)(2). Further, you have represented that the Secretary has not notified you of any tax imposed by § 507(c) due to any willful or flagrant acts or failures to act. Consequently, the Transfer would not, of itself, terminate your private foundation status or subject you to the tax imposed under § 507(c).

Section 507(a)(1) provides that the status of an organization as a private foundation shall be terminated only if such organization notifies the Secretary of its intent to accomplish such termination and such organization pays the tax imposed by § 507(c). Furthermore, § 1.507-1(b)(1) provides that in order for a private foundation to terminate its private foundation status under § 507(a)(1) it must submit a statement to the Internal Revenue Service of its intent to terminate its private foundation status under § 507(a)(1). In your situation where there have been no willful repeated acts or failures to act, and no flagrant act or failure to act, which would give rise to taxes and penalties under Chapter 42, you may elect to terminate your private foundation status by notifying the Manager, Exempt Organizations Determinations (TE/GE), of your intent to accomplish such termination and paying any termination tax deemed to be due under § 507(c).

Section 507(c) imposes a tax on a terminating private foundation equal to the lesser of the aggregate tax benefit resulting from its § 501(c)(3) status and the value of its net assets. Section 507(e) and § 1.507-7(a) provide that, for purposes of § 507(c), the value of the net assets shall be determined at whichever time such value is greater: (1) the first day on which the organization takes action which culminates in its ceasing to be a private foundation, or (2) the date on which it ceases to be a private foundation. Finally, § 1.507-7(b)(1) provides that in the case of a voluntary termination under § 507(a)(1), the date for determining the value of the foundation’s assets for purposes of calculating the termination tax under § 507(c) shall be the date on which the foundation gives the notification described in § 507(a)(1). The date for determining the value of your assets for purposes of calculating your termination tax is the date you give Notice. If you give Notice after the Transfer, the value of you assets on the date of the Notice would be Zero Dollars ($0.00), and, thus, the amount of the § 507(c) termination tax imposed on you would be Zero Dollars ($0.00).

Issues 7, 8, and 9

Whether, for purposes of §§ 507 through 509, P would be treated as a newly created organization as a result of the Transfer, pursuant to § 507(b)(2).

Whether P, as transferee of substantially all of your net assets, would be treated as possessing those attributes and characteristics of you, the transferor, described in § 1.507-3(a)(2), (3), and (4).

Since you and P are both effectively controlled by the same persons within the meaning of §§ 1.482-1(a)(3) and 1.507-3(a)(9), whether, for purposes of Chapter 42 (§ 4940 et seq.) and §§ 507 through 509, P, the transferee, would be treated as though it were you, the transferor.

Section 1.507-3(a)(1) provides that in the case of a significant distribution of assets to one or more private foundations within the meaning of § 1.507-3(c) the transferee organization shall not be treated as a newly created organization. Rather, it shall be treated as possessing those attributes and characteristics of the transferor organization which are described in § 1.507-3(a)(2), (3), and (4). Since, as discussed under Issue 2, above, the Transfer would qualify as a “significant distribution of assets” within the meaning of § 1.507-3(c)(2), P would not be treated as a newly created organization as a result of the Transfer. Rather, P would be treated as possessing your attributes and characteristics described in subparagraphs (2), (3), and (4) of § 1.507-3(a).

Treas. Reg. § 1.507-3(a)(9)(i) provides that if a private foundation transfers all of its net assets to one or more private foundations which are effectively controlled by the same persons which effectively controlled the transferor private foundation, for purposes of Chapter 42 (§ 4940 et seq.), the transferee foundation shall be treated as if it were the transferor. Since you have represented that B and C effectively control both you and P, for purposes of Chapter 42, P would be treated as if it were you.

Issues 10 and 11

Whether the Transfer would give rise to any gross investment income with respect to either you or P or will be subject to tax under § 4940(a).

Whether P, as transferee, may use any excess § 4940 tax paid by you to offset P’s § 4940 tax liability.

Section 4940(a) imposes an excise tax on a private foundation’s net investment income for the taxable year. Rev. Rul. 2002-28 holds that when a private foundation transfers all of its assets to one or more private foundations in a transfer described in § 507(b)(2), the transfers do constitute investments of the transferor and, therefore, do not give rise to net investment income subject to tax under § 4940(a). Thus, the Transfer would not give rise to net investment income subject to tax under § 4940.

Furthermore, Rev. Rul. 2002-28 holds that if the transferor foundation transfers all of its assets to private foundations effectively controlled by the same persons that effectively control the transferor, any excess § 4940 tax paid by the transferor may be used by the transferee to offset its § 4940 tax liability. As you represent that the Foundations are effectively controlled by the same persons, any excess § 4940 tax paid by you may be used by P to offset P’s § 4940 tax liability.

Issues 12 and 13

Whether the Transfer would constitute an act of self-dealing within the meaning of § 4941(d), or would subject any disqualified person or foundation manager with respect to you or P to the tax imposed under § 4941(a).

Whether the provision by a law firm of reasonable and necessary legal services with respect to the Transfer, or the payment of reasonable compensation for such services by you or P, would constitute acts of self-dealing within the meaning of § 4941(d), notwithstanding the status of D, a disqualified person with respect to P, as a partner in that law firm.

Section 4941(a) imposes an excise tax on each act of self-dealing between a disqualified person and a private foundation. Section 4941 and § 1.507-3(a) determine whether the proposed Transfer of all of your assets to P would constitute an act of self-dealing between a private foundation and its disqualified persons as defined in § 4946. Under § 53.4946-1(a)(8), a “disqualified person” does not include organizations that are exempt under § 501(c)(3). Therefore, the Transfer of your assets to P would not be an act of self-dealing because P is recognized by the Service as an organization exempt from tax under § 501(c)(3).

Furthermore, while the payment of compensation, or the payment or reimbursement of expenses by a private foundation to a disqualified person is, generally, an act of self-dealing under § 4941(d)(1)(E), § 4941(d)(2)(E) and § 53.4941(d)-3(c)(1) provide that a payment or reimbursement to a disqualified person for personal services which are reasonable and necessary to carry out the exempt purposes of the private foundation is not an act of self-dealing provided the compensation, payment, or reimbursement is not excessive.

In this case, the law firm is not a disqualified person, so the payment to the law firm for legal services will not be a direct act of self-dealing. Under § 4946(a)(1)(F) a “disqualified person” includes a partnership in which disqualified persons hold more than 35 percent of the profits interests. D is a disqualified person and is a partner of the law firm but holds less than a 35 percent profits interest in the law firm.

The payment will not otherwise be treated as an indirect act of self-dealing benefitting D. Under § 53.4941(d)-1(b)(4) indirect self-dealing will not occur solely as a result of a transaction between a private foundation and an entity in which a disqualified person holds an interest where the entity is not a disqualified person by operation of § 4946(a)(1)(F). Moreover, as Example (1) of § 53.4941(d)-3(c)(2) demonstrates, the payment of compensation by a foundation for legal services does not constitute an act of self-dealing if the services performed are reasonable and necessary for carrying out of the foundation’s exempt purposes and the amount paid for such services is not excessive, and you have represented that these requirements will be met.

Issue 14

Whether the Transfer will be a qualifying distribution by you under § 4942.

Whether P will assume your “undistributed income” (if any) or succeed to your excess distributions (if any).

Section 4942(a) generally imposes a tax on the undistributed income of a private foundation (other than an operating foundation under § 4942(j)(3)) for any taxable year which has not been distributed before the first day of the second (or any succeeding) taxable year following such taxable year. Section 4942(c) defines “undistributed income” for any taxable year as the amount by which the distributable amount for such taxable year exceeds the qualifying distributions made out of such distributable amount for such taxable year. Section 4942(g)(1)(A) defines “qualifying distribution” generally as any amount (including that portion of reasonable and necessary administrative expenses) paid to accomplish one or more purposes described in § 170(c)(2)(B), but a qualifying distribution does not include a contribution to an organization controlled directly or indirectly by the foundation or by one or more disqualified persons with respect to the foundation

Section 1.507-3(a)(5) provides that, except as provided in section 1.507-3(a)(9), a private foundation making a transfer described in § 507(b)(2) must satisfy its distribution requirements under § 4942 for the taxable year in which the transfer is made. Section 1.507-3(a)(5) further provides that the transfer will count as a distribution in satisfaction of the transferor foundation’s distribution requirement under § 4942 subject to the provisions of § 4942(g). Section 4942(g) provides that a distribution from one private foundation to another private foundation, where both foundations are effectively controlled by the same persons, will not be treated as a qualifying distribution by the transferor foundation for the purposes of § 4942 except to the extent that the transferee foundation makes one or more distributions that would be qualifying distributions under § 4942(g) (other than a distribution to a controlled foundation) prior to the close of the transferee’s first tax year following the tax year in which it received the transfer and the distributions are treated as being made out of corpus (as if the transferee foundation were not an operating foundation).

 

Rev. Rul. 2002-28 holds that where, by reason of § 1.507-3(a)(9)(i), a transferee private foundation is treated as though it were the transferor for purposes of § 4942, a transfer to the transferee foundation is not treated as a qualifying distribution of the transferor foundation. Rather, the transferee foundation assumes all obligations with respect to the transferor’s “undistributed income” within the meaning of § 4942(c), if any, and reduces its own distributable amount under § 4942 by the transferor foundation’s excess qualifying distributions under § 4942(i). None of the three situations in Rev. Rul. 2002-28, however, involved an operating foundation.

 

As discussed under Issues 7, 8, and 9, above, by reason of § 1.507-3(a)(9)(i), P would be treated as if it were you for purposes of Chapter 42, including § 4942. Accordingly, the Transfer to P would not be treated as a qualifying distribution of yours. Rather, P would assume your obligations with respect to your undistributed income within the meaning of § 4942(c), if any (after taking into account any excess qualifying distribution carryovers that you may have), and you would not be required to meet your qualifying distribution requirements under § 4942 for the taxable year of the Transfer prior to the Transfer. You must file a final Form 990-PF return for the short tax year of your termination. If you have undistributed income for such tax year, P will owe § 4942 tax if P fails, by the end of P’s tax year following the tax year in which P receives the Transfer, to make qualifying distributions of such amount that would be treated as out of corpus if P were a non-operating foundation. P should provide an attachment to its Form 990-PF showing how it has met this requirement.

 

If you have excess qualifying distributions that carry over to P, they will be forfeited if P is an operating foundation in the year of the Transfer. Section 53.4942(a)-3(e)(4) (Example (3)) explains that excess qualifying distributions carried forward lapse in their entirety in any year that the private foundation is treated as an operating foundation. Accordingly, if you have any unused excess qualifying distributions that you could have carried forward to a taxable year after the Transfer, and if P is an operating foundation in that year, your unused excess qualifying distributions will lapse and will not be available for P’s use in any taxable year after the year of the Transfer if P were to cease to be an operating foundation.

 

Issue 15

 

Whether the Transfer would constitute a investment jeopardizing your exempt purposes, or would be subject to tax under § 4944(a)(1).

 

Section 4944 imposes a tax on any investment that jeopardizes an exempt organization’s charitable purposes. Rev. Rul, 2002-28 holds that where a private foundation transfers all of its assets and liabilities to another private foundation, the transfer does not constitute an investment for purposes of § 4944 and, therefore, the transfer does not constitute an investment jeopardizing the transferor foundation’s exempt purposes and is not subject to tax under § 4944(a)(1), Therefore, the Transfer would not constitute a jeopardizing investment or subject you to tax under § 4944(a)(1).

Issues 16 and 17

Whether the Transfer would be a taxable expenditure within the meaning of § 4945(d) or would require the exercise of expenditure responsibility under § 4945(d)(4) or(h).

Whether the payment of the IRS fee for this private letter ruling would be treated as a taxable expenditure within the meaning of § 4945(d), or whether payment of reasonable legal fees to the attorneys for you and P to obtain this private letter ruling with respect to the Transfer would be treated a taxable expenditures within the meaning of § 4945(d)(5).

Section 4945 imposes a tax on any “taxable expenditure” made by a private foundation. Section 4945(d)(4) provides that the term “taxable expenditure” includes any amount paid or incurred as a grant to a private non-operating foundation unless the grantor foundation exercises expenditure responsibility with respect to such grant in accordance with § 4945(h).

Rev. Rul. 2002-28 holds that where, by reason of § 1.507-3(a)(9)(i), a transferee foundation is treated as though it were the transferor foundation for purposes of § 4945, the transferee foundation is not treated as the recipient of an expenditure responsibility grant, and no expenditure responsibility requirements must be exercise under § 4945(d)(4) or (h) with respect to the transfer to the transferee foundation.

As discussed under Issues 7, 8, and 9, above, by reason of § 1.507-3(a)(9)(i), P would be treated as if it were you for purposes of Chapter 42, including § 4945. Consequently, the Transfer would not be considered a taxable expenditure under § 4945, and there would be no expenditure responsibility requirements to be exercised under § 4945(d)(4) or (h) with respect to the Transfer.

Section 53.4945-6(b)(1)(v) provides that any payment which constitutes a qualifying distribution under § 4942(g) will not be treated as a taxable expenditure under § 4945(d)(5). Section 4942(g)(1)(A) and § 53.4942(a)-3(a)(2)(i) provide that a qualifying distribution under § 4942(g) includes reasonable and necessary administrative expenses paid to accomplish one or more purposes described in § 170(c)(1) or (2)(B). Administrative expenses incurred in obtaining a ruling from the Service or for legal fees relating to a foundation’s exempt purposes are qualifying distributions. On the other hand, § 53.4945-6(b)(2) provides that expenditures for unreasonable administrative expenses, including consultant fees and other fees for services rendered, will ordinarily be taxable expenditures under § 4945(d)(5). The payment of legal fees to the attorneys for you or P and the payment of the IRS fee for this private letter ruling are administrative expenses necessary to the accomplishment of the Foundations’ exempt purposes. So long as such payments are reasonable, the legal fees paid to the attorneys for you and P to obtain a private letter ruling with respect to the Transfer, and the IRS fee paid for this private letter ruling, would not be treated as taxable expenditures within the meaning of § 4945(d)(5).

Issues 18 and 19

Whether the operation by P of state licensed postsecondary career training programs for a fee would adversely affect P’s tax exempt status under § 501(c)(3) or its status as an operating foundation under § 4942(j)(3).

Whether the fees received by P from the operation of the state licensed postsecondary career training programs would be considered gross income derived from an unrelated trade or business for purposes of § 512(a)(1).

The exempt purposes of P, as described in its Articles of Organization, include “the provision of educational, vocational, social, psychological, and financial assistance to homeless individuals and families.” From its beginning, P has provided education and practical job-skills training to disadvantaged persons and those who have suffered displacement from economic upheavals so that they may be better equipped to obtain employment and to lead productive and satisfying lives. P now wishes to provide training in software programs widely used by the business community to help displaced persons whose existing skills do not correspond to the current needs of the marketplace.

Providing such training is educational within the meaning of § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(a), and contributes importantly to the accomplishment of P’s exempt purposes of providing educational and vocational assistance to homeless and displaced persons. Thus, such activities amount to a trade or business that is substantially related to the accomplishment of P’s exempt purposes within the meaning of § 1.513-1(d)(2), and are, therefore, not unrelated trade or business within the meaning of § 513(a). Insofar as the term “functionally related business” under § 4942(j)(4)(A) includes a trade or business which is not an unrelated trade or business, as defined in § 513, the providing of such state-licensed postsecondary career training programs by P would constitute a “functionally related business,” and deductible expenses related thereto in excess of the income from such business would constitute qualifying distributions made directly for the active conduct of activities constituting P’s exempt function for purposes of qualifying as a private operating foundation under § 4942(j)(3), as provided in § 53.4942(a)-2(d)(4) and § 53.4942(b)-1(b)(1). The operation of state licensed postsecondary career training programs for a fee will not adversely affect P’s status as an organization described in § 501(c)(3) or its status as a private operating foundation under § 4942(j)(3). Furthermore, since the income derived from such activities would constitute income from a related trade or business, such income would not constitute gross income derived from an unrelated trade or business for purposes of § 512(a)(1).

Issue 20

Whether, following the Transfer, if P’s qualifying distributions (within the meaning of § 4942(g)(1) or (2)) made directly for the active conduct of the activities constituting its exempt purpose or function were to exceed both its net investment income and its minimum investment return, P will continue to qualify as a private operating foundation within the meaning of § 4942(j)(3).

To qualify as a private operating foundation under § 4942(j)(3), an organization must meet the income test under § 4942(j)(3)(A) and any one of three alternative tests — the assets test under § 4942(j)(3)(B)(i), the endowment test under § 4942(j)(3)(B)(ii), or the support test under § 4942(j)(3)(B)(iii). The income test requires that the organization make qualifying distributions directly for the active conduct of the activities constituting the purpose or function for which it is organized and operated equal to substantially all of the lesser of (i) its adjusted net income or (ii) its minimum investment return. The endowment test requires qualifying direct distributions of at least two-thirds of the foundation’s minimum investment return.

P anticipates, and represents, that, notwithstanding an increase in its assets and income as a result of the Transfer, P will continue to make qualifying direct distributions in excess of both its minimum investment return and its adjusted net income. So long as P’s qualifying direct distributions continue to exceed both its net investment income and its minimum investment return, P would continue to qualify as a private operating foundation under § 4942(j)(3).

CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, we rule as follows:

1. The transfer of substantially all of your net assets to P (the “Transfer”) would not adversely affect the status of either you or P as organizations described in § 501(c)(3).

2. The Transfer would be a transfer described in § 507(b)(2).

3. The Transfer would not terminate your private foundation status or cause you to incur any liability for the § 507(c) termination tax.

4. Following the Transfer, you would be eligible to terminate your private foundation status by giving notice to the Service as provided in § 507(a)(1).

5. For purposes of calculating the termination tax under § 507(c), the date for determining the value of your assets would be the date on which you give the notice described in § 507(a)(1) (“Notice”).

6. Provided that Notice is given at least one day after the Transfer, and at a time when your net remaining assets are valued at Zero Dollars ($0.00), the amount of termination tax due under § 507(c)(2) upon termination of your status as a private foundation would be Zero Dollars ($0.00).

7. For purposes of §§ 507 through 509, P would be treated as a newly created organization as a result of the Transfer, pursuant to § 507(b)(2).

8. P, as transferee of substantially all of your net assets, would be treated as possessing those attributes and characteristics of yours described in § 1.507-3(a)(2), (3), and (4).

9. Since you and P are both effectively controlled by the same persons within the meaning of §§ 1.482-1(a)(3) and 1.507-3(a)(9), for purposes of Chapter 42 (§ 4940 et seq.) and §§ 507 through 509, P, the transferee, would be treated as though it were you, the transferor.

10. The Transfer would not give rise to net investment income and would not be subject to tax under § 4940(a).

11. P, as transferee, may use any excess § 4940 tax paid by you, the transferor, to offset P’s § 4940 tax liability.

12. The Transfer would not constitute an act of self-dealing within the meaning of § 4941(d), and would not subject any disqualified person or foundation manager with respect to you or P to the tax imposed under § 4941(a).

13. The provision by a law firm of reasonable and necessary legal services with respect to the Transfer, and the payment of reasonable compensation for such services by you or P, would not constitute acts of self-dealing within the meaning of § 4941(d), notwithstanding the status of D, a disqualified person with respect to P, as a partner in that law firm.

14. The Transfer would not constitute a qualifying distribution by you under § 4942. P would assume your undistributed income under § 4942 (if any) and be required to make qualifying distributions of such amount treated as distributed out of corpus by the end of P’s tax year after the tax year in which P receives the Transfer, but excess distributions by you (if any) will not carry over to P, but will lapse in the first year after the Transfer that P qualifies as an operating foundation

15. The Transfer would not constitute an investment jeopardizing your exempt purposes, and would not be subject to tax under § 4944(a)(1).

16. The Transfer would not be a taxable expenditure within the meaning of § 4945(d); consequently there would be no expenditure responsibility requirements to be exercised under § 4945(d)(4) or (h).

17. The payment of the IRS fee for this private letter ruling would not be treated as a taxable expenditure within the meaning of § 4945(d), and payments of reasonable legal fees to the attorneys for you and P to obtain this private letter ruling with respect to the Transfer would not be treated as taxable expenditures within the meaning of § 4945(d) so long as such payments were reasonable.

18. The operation by P of state licensed postsecondary career training programs for a fee would not adversely affect P’s tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3) or its status as an operating foundation under § 4942(j)(3).

19. The fees received by P from the operation of state licensed postsecondary career training programs would not be considered gross income derived from an unrelated trade or business for purposes of § 512(a)(1).

20. Following the Transfer, if P’s qualifying distributions (within the meaning of § 4942(g)(1) or (2)) made directly for the active conduct of the activities constituting its exempt purpose or function were to exceed both its net investment income and its minimum investment return, P would continue to qualify as a private operating foundation under § 4942(j)(3).

This ruling will be made available for public inspection under § 6110 of the Code after certain deletions of identifying information are made. For details, see enclosed Notice 437, Notice of Intention to Disclose. A copy of this ruling with deletions that we intend to make available for public inspection is attached to Notice 437. If you disagree with our proposed deletions, you should follow the instructions in Notice 437.

This ruling is directed only to the organization that requested it. I.R.C. § 6110(k)(3) of the Code provides that it may not be used or cited by others as precedent.

This ruling is based on the facts as they were presented and on the understanding that there will be no material changes in these facts. This ruling does not address the applicability of any section of the Code or regulations to the facts submitted other than with respect to the sections described. Because it could help resolve questions concerning your federal income tax status, this ruling should be kept in your permanent records.

If you have any questions about this ruling, please contact the person whose name and telephone number are shown in the heading of this letter.

In accordance with the Power of Attorney currently on file with the Internal Revenue Service, we are sending a copy of this letter to your authorized representative.

Sincerely,

Peter A. Holiat

Acting Manager,

Exempt Organizations

Technical Group 1




Insurance Company Seeks Discounted Health Plan Fee for Tax-Exempt, Nonprofit Hospitals.

James Fritz of Bluegrass Family Health has urged Treasury to classify health plans owned by nonprofit, tax-exempt hospitals or hospital systems in the same category as other nonprofit, tax-exempt health plans, which would give the hospital plans a 50 percent discount on the insurance plan fee required under the Affordable Care Act.

May 16, 2013

The Honorable Jacob Lew

Secretary of the Treasury

United States Department of the Treasury

1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Room 3330

Washington, DC 20220

RE: REG-118315-12: Health Insurance Providers Fee

Dear Secretary Lew:

We write on a matter of concern to a number of federally taxable regional health insurance plans owned by tax-exempt hospitals and health care systems. These hospital-owned health plans (HHPs) are unique because they are entirely owned and controlled by parents that are tax-exempt under section 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) and are further described in section 501(c). Despite paying taxes under the IRC, HHPs function more similarly to nonprofit entities because they must reinvest whatever marginal profits they produce each year into the hospital parent’s charitable mission. HHPs were originally created as taxable entities due to the prevailing physician ownership model at the time of their founding. However, as the ownership model moved away from physician ownership, HHPs found it nearly impossible to convert to nonprofit status due to the evolving interpretation of section 501(m) of the IRC. As a result, HHPs will be assessed at unsustainable levels under REG-118315-12: Health Insurance Providers Fee (“the insurer fee”) and will likely be forced to significantly limit services or exit the market altogether. Either outcome will negatively affect the communities that HHPs serve by impacting the charitable activities of their parent hospitals.

The recently released rules implementing Section 9010 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) failed to curtail the implementation of the insurer fee on this specific group of health plans. In § 57.4(a)(4)(iii) of the insurer fee, the ACA is interpreted as granting partial reductions for certain exempt activities to health insurers that are exempt from Federal income tax and meet section 501(c) requirements. We believe HHPs should be included in this category of health plans that receive partial reductions because, like other nonprofit health plans, HHP premiums are attributable to the exempt activities of their parent nonprofit, tax-exempt hospitals and health systems. We urge you to provide relief to these plans from the insurer fee, consistent with the treatment of other tax exempt providers.

We are concerned that these taxable health plans owned entirely by nonprofit, tax-exempt hospitals or health systems appear to be included in a group of health plans that receive no exemptions from the insurer fee, while other nonprofit insurance providers receive either a partial or full exemption. We believe HHPs should receive a 50 percent exemption from the insurer fee because they are an essential part of the communities they serve.

HHPs operate differently than traditional for-profit health plans and should be treated accordingly. The parent hospitals and health systems, exempt under Internal Revenue Code Section 501(c)(3) and Section 501(c)(4), are required to hold and use all of their assets and earnings for tax-exempt, charitable purposes. This requirement extends to the equity and earnings of wholly owned/controlled taxable subsidiaries, such as HHPs. Therefore, the cost of the insurer fee that a HHP will be required to pay under the proposed regulation will ultimately reduce the resources of the parent hospital or health system to fulfill their charitable missions. The imposition of the fee on these hospitals and health systems will detract from the organization’s mission and the vital community services they provide. To impose the insurer fee on these community-based providers is not sustainable and will have a damaging effect on the communities that these plans serve.

We believe that if no relief is granted to these hospital-owned health plans in the final regulations, these types of health plans will be assessed approximately $200 million in fees in 2014 under the insurer fee. This will make it impossible for these plans to continue to offer quality, locally-based compassionate health care. The imposition of the full insurer fee on these providers may drive HHPs from the marketplace, thus limiting the choices available in these areas.

Classifying these 28 health plans with other non-profit tax-exempt health insurers appears to be in alignment with the federal government’s tax exempt policies. These plans share the same charitable mission-driven agendas of their parent nonprofit health systems and should be treated in the same manner as other tax-exempt entities. Adding these plans to the 50 percent tax exempt category would increase the fees of the health plans remaining in the non-exempt category by only about 1.8 percent, resulting in a de minimis impact on the health insurance marketplace.

We greatly appreciate your willingness to continue refining your approach and hope you will grant these hospital-owned health plans a 50 percent exemption from the Health Insurance Providers Fee.

Sincerely,

James S. Fritz

President & CEO

Bluegrass Family Health

Lexington, KY




Minnesota Lawmaker Requests Guidance on Historic Rehabilitation Tax Credit.

Rep. Betty McCollum, D-Minn., has written to Treasury to request guidance on the future of the historic rehabilitation tax credit program, which she says has been disrupted by a recent court ruling and subsequent IRS memorandum that have created uncertainty and effectively halted investment in rehabilitation projects.

May 10th, 2013

The Honorable Jack Lew

Secretary

U.S. Department of the Treasury

1500 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20220

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I recently met with local nonprofit and development leaders in my Congressional District who have participated in many successful projects to rehabilitate historic properties during the past forty years, due in large part to the Historic Rehabilitation Tax Credit program (HTC). These leaders voiced concerns about the result of a recent court ruling and subsequent Internal Revenue Service (IRS) memorandum and uncertainty that has effectively halted investment in these projects, and which they believe could jeopardize the future of the HTC program. Therefore, I respectfully request your assistance in providing clear guidance from the IRS that allows the HTC to be utilized again within the next 60 days.

Nationally and in Minnesota, the HTC enjoys strong bipartisan support. HTC is a critical tool for urban renewal, facilitating the creation of jobs through the rehabilitation of historic buildings. Since its creation in the 1970s, it has helped to create 2.3 million jobs, rehabilitated more than 38,000 buildings, and spurred more than $106 billion in private investment. This record of success and the litany of examples of community revitalization in every state in the nation have made this a popular and effective tool for economic resurgence.

Through my conversations with Minnesota leaders in urban revitalization and historic preservation, I have learned that several recent or current local projects likely would not have been possible or will not be possible without the HTC. The successful redevelopment of the landmark Saint Paul Pioneer and Endicott buildings into mixed use and residential units is helping to spur energy investment in the heart of the city’s downtown, and could not have occurred without the HTC according the project’s developer. More urgently, a nonprofit partnership to save rapidly deteriorating buildings at the former frontier military outpost Fort Snelling and convert them for use as housing for homeless veterans is in jeopardy. Similarly, a project to rehabilitate the former Saint Paul Post Office Building for mixed use and residential development is at risk, due to the current impasse with the HTC.

In communities like mine with a large urban core and many historic and endangered properties, HTC is a catalyst and lynchpin for redevelopment and renewal as our economy recovers from the great recession. This story is similar across the country. By one national estimate, loss of the HTC for a year would mean that 55,000 jobs will not be created, 1,000 structures will not be rehabilitated, and more than $3 billion in private funding will not be invested in strategic historic property rehabilitation. Given the pressing need to have businesses grow and create more jobs in the economy, an immediate resolution of this matter would allow this investment to continue.

It is my understanding that within the last week, senior IRS officials have indicated that more clarity will be provided to the public within the coming days or weeks. This is a welcome development, and I respectfully request your assistance to make sure this commitment is kept.

Residents of my Congressional District are proud of our success at protecting and investing in our historic properties by utilizing the HTC. It would be an honor to host you for a tour of some of these dynamic projects should your schedule allow it in the coming months.

Thank you for your support in finding an expeditious path forward that assures that the HTC is functioning again and the economic benefits it makes available to communities across the nation are once again flowing.

Sincerely,

Betty McCollum

Member of Congress




IRS Publishes Proposed Regs on Community Health Needs Assessment Requirement for Tax-Exempt Hospitals.

The IRS has published proposed regulations (REG-106499-12) that provide guidance to charitable hospital organizations on the community health needs assessment (CHNA) requirements and related excise tax and reporting obligations. The regs also clarify the consequences for failing to meet these and other requirements for charitable hospital organizations.

Comments and requests for a public hearing must be received by July 5. The regs are proposed to be effective for returns filed on or after the date they are published in the Federal Register as final or temporary regulations.

Section 501(r)(1) imposes four additional requirements that organizations described as hospital organizations must satisfy to be tax exempt under section 501(c)(3), one of which is to conduct a CHNA every three years. In July 2011 Treasury and the IRS issued guidance (Notice 2011-52) on the anticipated regulatory provisions.

As a general rule, the proposed regs provide that a hospital organization operates a hospital facility if it is a partner in a joint venture, limited liability company, or other entity treated as a partnership for federal income tax purposes that operates the hospital facility. A hospital organization also operates a hospital facility under the proposed regs if it does so through a wholly owned entity that is disregarded as separate from the hospital organization for federal tax purposes. A hospital organization is not required, however, to meet the requirements of section 501(r) for any activities unrelated to the operation of a hospital facility.

The proposed regs provide that a hospital organization meets the requirements of section 501(r)(3) in any tax year for a hospital facility it operates only if the hospital facility has conducted a CHNA in that tax year or in either of the two immediately preceding tax years. Also, an authorized body of the hospital facility is required to have adopted an implementation strategy to meet the community health needs identified through the CHNA by the end of the tax year in which the hospital facility conducts the CHNA. The regs include extensive rules for conducting a CHNA and developing implementation strategies.

Under the proposed regs, a hospital facility’s omission of required information from a policy or report described in reg. section 1.501(r)-3 or 1.501(r)-4 or error regarding the implementation or operational requirements described in reg. section 1.501(r)-3 through 1.501(r)-6 will not be considered a failure to meet a requirement of section 501(r) if the omission or error was minor, inadvertent, and due to reasonable cause and the hospital facility corrects the omission or error as promptly after discovery as is reasonable given the nature of the omission or error. Also, the IRS will consider for purposes of determining whether revocation of section 501(c)(3) status is warranted the relative size, scope, nature, and significance of any failures to meet the section 501(r) requirements as well as the reasons for the failures and whether the same type of failures have previously occurred. The proposed regs include rules that apply if one hospital facility within a hospital organization fails to meet a section 501(r) requirement during a tax year, even though the hospital organization as a whole continues to be recognized as a section 501(c)(3) organization.

Citations: REG-106499-12; 2013-21 IRB 1111; 78 F.R. 20523-20544




IRS: Fraternal Society's Sale of Insurance Policies to Nonmember Spouses Is Unrelated Trade or Business.

In technical advice, the IRS concluded that an entity’s sale of life insurance policies to nonmember widows of deceased insured members, under which the widow can name as a beneficiary someone other than a dependent of the member, isn’t substantially related to the entity’s exempt fraternal purposes.

The parent entity of a fraternal beneficiary society that operates under the lodge system sells individual life insurance contracts to its members. Membership is limited to men. The parent entity and its subordinate chapters have a group exemption under section 501(c)(8). The parent entity was formed to provide aid and assistance to its members and their families and beneficiaries. Within a year following the death of a member who was insured by the parent entity, the nonmember widow could request insurance coverage under which the widow could name someone other than a dependent of the member as a beneficiary.

The parent entity derives income from frequent and regular sales of insurance contracts to the widows of deceased members. Unless those sales are substantially related to the entity’s performance of its exempt fraternal functions, the revenue derived from those sales is includable in the entity’s unrelated business taxable income. To determine whether the sales constitute an unrelated trade or business, the IRS examined the relationship between the sales and the furtherance of the entity’s fraternal purposes.

The IRS determined that the sale of insurance to a widow is no different than an ordinary contractual relationship between a policyholder and an insurance company: The nonmember spouse is ineligible for membership and, thus, lacks any fraternal relationship or mutuality of interest with the entity’s members; the insurance coverage that is offered to the widow after the member’s death is not a continuation of the member’s policy; the widow may apply for different coverage from that held by the member; and the widow isn’t guaranteed coverage. Further, section 501(c)(8) requires that a fraternal beneficiary society provide benefits to the society’s members and their dependents but a widow may designate a beneficiary other than a dependent of a member.

Thus, the IRS determined that the sale of insurance policies to nonmember widows of deceased insured members doesn’t contribute importantly to the society’s exempt fraternal purpose and, thus, isn’t substantially related to the entity’s exempt fraternal purposes. The IRS concluded that the sale of commercial-type insurance to nonmembers constitutes an unrelated trade or business.

Citations: TAM 201320023




Rules Governing Nonprofits and Political Activity: A Brief Overview.

If you’ve read the news at all this week, you’ve likely read about the escalating controversy regarding the IRS’ seemingly selective scrutiny of certain organizations, including Tea Party organizations. Without delving into the motivations behind the IRS’ actions, the central question they were attempting to answer is whether the groups were operating in a manner consistent with the rules governing the activity of 501(c)(4) nonprofit organizations, the tax status for which they had applied (and were all ultimately granted, to the best of our knowledge). Given the increased attention on the topic, below is a brief overview of the permissible activities and characteristics of nonprofits that engage in political activities.

This is meant to be a basic overview, and there is a tremendous amount of nuance and detail not included here. If you need more detailed information, please see the references at the end and/or consult a specialist in nonprofit or political law. That said, there are three basic types of organizations that engage with the political system:

501(c)(3) Organizations – Public Charities

There are two types of 501(c)(3) organizations: Public Charities and Private Foundations. This section focuses exclusively on Public Charities, which are allowed to participate in the civic sphere in ways that are in line with their charitable mission.

Permitted activities: Voter education, voter registration, policy analysis, issue education, and related nonpartisan activities. Allowed to conduct limited lobbying (defined as “insubstantial”) activities.

Organizations have the option to choose an official test (501H election) that sets a concrete limit on lobbying expenditures.

Advantages: Greater fundraising capacity through charity status. Can accept contributions of any size from individuals, corporations, and other nonprofits. Not required to disclose donors to the public, although the information is shared with the IRS on Forms 990.

Disadvantages: Restrictions on allowable political activities. Cannot directly engage in elections. Cannot be involved in lobbying as a primary organization activity.

Examples: League of Women Voters, The Urban Institute

501(c)(4) – Social Welfare Organizations; 501(c)(5) – Labor Unions; 501(c)(6) – Business Leagues

While many, if not most, 501(c)(4) organizations do not engage heavily in lobbying or political activity, the ones that do are supposed to exist in order to “promote the social welfare.” 501(c)(5) and 501(c)(6) organizations are membership-based associations capturing labor/agricultural entities and business entities, respectively.

Permitted activities: Nonpartisan issue and legislative advocacy, lobbying, endorsement of specific legislation.

Advantages: Not required to disclose donors to the public, although shared with the IRS on Forms 990. Can accept contributions of any size; the Citizens United decision allowed for unlimited corporate contributions. Can engage in nonpartisan election campaign-related activity, but that must not be the primary purpose of organization. Can endorse candidates in communication with members, although not with public.

Disadvantages: Must be nonpartisan. Cannot publicly (outside of membership) endorse or overtly support or oppose political candidates. No contributions to 501(c)(4) organizations for lobbying or political activity are tax-deductible, by individuals or businesses. In 501(c)(6) organizations, the portion of membership dues used for lobbying and political expenditures cannot be claimed by members as a business expense and deducted from tax liability.

Examples: AARP (c4), Crossroads GPS (c4), Tea Party Patriots (c4), SEIU (c5), Chamber of Commerce (c6)

527 Organizations – Political Action Committees

Section 527 of the tax code encompasses all forms of organizations engaged directly in electoral politics, including candidate and political party committees. This section focuses on independent Political Action Committees that are predominantly–though not exclusively–organized under Section 527, both “traditional” PACs and the newer SuperPACs that emerged following the 2010 Citizens United decision. There is another notable type of independent spending committee known informally as the “527” that can raise and spend money on elections in unlimited amounts without endorsing specific candidates, but these organizations are now significantly less prevalent and influential than they were around a decade ago.

Permitted activities: Partisan-oriented activities to influence elections. Explicit support of or opposition to individual candidates.

Advantages: “Traditional” PACs can engage in direct political activity and endorse candidates. SuperPACs can raise money in unlimited amounts from individuals or corporate/organizational donors.

Disadvantages: Required to disclose donors to the public through the Federal Election Commission. “Traditional” PACs have $5000 contribution limits. SuperPACs are not allowed to coordinate with candidate committees. Lobbying activities are not necessarily tax-exempt.

Examples: EMILY’s List (PAC), American Crossroads (SuperPAC)

Each structure serves a specific function within the political sphere, but reviewing applications of all politically oriented organizations to ascertain whether the proposed activities fit into the allowable activities of the organization type they have chosen seems prudent. However, many of the lines between these organizational types are blurry. Of particular relevance to the current controversy, 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations in practice run issue-based attack ads that look a lot like attempts to influence the outcome of an election. With little guidance from Congress, the IRS is left with the unenviable task of sorting out whether organizations engaged in such activities are merely toeing that blurry line or outright crossing it in some objective way.

If you want to learn more, here are some resources:

Chapter 10 of the 2006 book Nonprofits and Government: Collaboration and Conflict, published by Urban Institute Press, is devoted to permissible activities for politically active nonprofits.

The Alliance for Justice offers details about the permissible political activities of 501(c)(4) organizations.

The National Center for Charitable Statistics website has more general information about 501(c)(4), c5, and c6 organizations.

The IRS offered detailed guidance on the “Political Campaign and Lobbying Activities of IRC 501(c)(4), (c)(5), and (c)(6) Organizations” in 2003.

The Congressional Research Service released a more recent study looking at the role of SuperPACs in federal elections and their relation to other types of political organizations.

The IRS 2012 Data Book has details on the number of 501c organizations by type, including those applying for tax exemption and how many were reviewed more closely and ultimately rejected. See the tables on pages 55 and 56.

Author: Jeremy Koulish




Comments Sought on Exempt Organization E-File Form.

The IRS, as part of a paperwork reduction effort, has asked for public comment on Form 8453-EO, “Exempt Organization Declaration and Signature for Electronic Filing”; comments are due by July 15, 2013.




Tea Party Flap Highlights the Road to Exemption.

The uproar surrounding the revelation that the IRS gave extra scrutiny to the exemption applications of conservative groups, resulting in delays in the applications’ processing, may have people wondering how the process is supposed to work.

The uproar surrounding the revelation that the IRS gave extra scrutiny to the exemption applications of conservative groups, resulting in delays in the applications’ processing, may have people wondering how the process is supposed to work.

That possibility may have been on the minds of IRS officials on May 15 when they released a Q&A  explaining the exemption application process, including how the IRS handles applications of organizations that may engage in political or advocacy activities. Detailed information is also available at http://www.irs.gov/eo.

Numerous Tea Party groups and other conservative entities sought to qualify as tax-exempt organizations described in section 501(c)(4). To qualify, an organization must operate primarily to further the common good and general welfare of the people of the community, according to the IRS. Civic leagues, homeowners associations, and volunteer fire companies can qualify as social welfare organizations.

An organization that believes it meets the qualifications for exemption must decide whether to declare itself exempt or apply to the IRS for exemption. Rosemary E. Fei of Adler & Colvin said most of her firm’s clients apply for exemption because they want the IRS to bless their proposed activities in writing and because potential donors may want to see a favorable determination letter. (Contributions to a section 501(c)(4) organization are not deductible, however.) A favorable determination letter also grants the organization advantageous postage rates and exemption from some state taxes.

To apply for exemption under section 501(c)(4), an organization must file a Form 1024, “Application for Recognition of Exemption Under Section 501(a),” which is more than 25 pages and asks about the organization’s activities, revenues and expenses, assets and liabilities, and other issues. Organizations seeking exemption as a charity under section 501(c)(3) instead file a Form 1023, “Application for Recognition of Exemption Under Section 501(c)(3).”

Using Form 1024 requires a user fee of $400 for organizations with annual gross receipts of $10,000 or less during the preceding four years, or of $850 for organizations with annual gross receipts exceeding $10,000 for the preceding four years.

An organization also must have an employer identification number, even if it has no employees. The EIN can be obtained by filing Form SS-4, “Application for Employer Identification Number.”

Exemption applications are sent to the IRS determinations center in Cincinnati. If the application is complete, the IRS will send the organization a letter of acknowledgement; incomplete applications will be returned. If the IRS needs more information to determine whether the organization qualifies for exemption, it will ask the applicant for the information by a specified date.

Applicants will be informed if their applications are forwarded to IRS headquarters for review. In its Q&A, the IRS said the Cincinnati office may consult with tax law specialists in Washington on how the law applies to a particular case.

Fei said that if an application is in a category singled out for special attention, it will be assigned to a dedicated group of agents. In that case, the applicant can expect a significantly longer wait for one of those few agents to become available, she said. The applicant may also be asked questions that do not seem directly relevant to the application or that have already been answered, she added.

The applicant will normally receive a determination letter after the IRS gets all the information it needs, Fei said. An organization whose application is denied will receive a letter explaining why the IRS believes it does not qualify for exempt status, and it has 30 days to protest. If the IRS does not receive a protest within that time frame, the proposed denial becomes final. Organizations seeking exemption under section 501(c)(3) may petition the Tax Court, the Court of Federal Claims, or the D.C. district court for declaratory judgment that they qualify, but the IRS’s determination is final for section 501(c)(4).

The Tea Party controversy may have arisen because the IRS decided to form a dedicated group to handle the applications of social welfare organizations with possible political or advocacy agendas, “since they certainly would present legal issues that would require more knowledge to review than typical applications,” Fei said. The group would have had to identify indications that applications needed specialized review, and it may have occurred to someone in the group that having “Tea Party” in an organization’s name might point to a political focus that warranted careful scrutiny, she said.

“It was stupid because of the appearance of bias, but in terms of efficient use of limited IRS resources, not unreasonable,” Fei said.

by Fred Stokeld




Guidance Planned for Intermediate Violations of Community Needs Assessment Rules.

The IRS is developing guidance on correction and disclosure of section 501(r) violations that are more than minor or inadvertent but less than egregious or willful, a Treasury Department official said May 15.

The guidance is likely to take the form of a revenue procedure and will provide hospitals with more details on remedying failures to comply with section 501(r) requirements, of which community health needs assessments (CHNAs) are one, and a way to keep those details fresh, Ruth Madrigal, attorney-adviser in the Treasury Office of Tax Legislative Counsel, said during a luncheon program sponsored by the District of Columbia Bar Taxation Section’s Exempt Organizations Committee.

The intermediate violations comprise “a large range, but I think we gave the outlines of it in the proposed regs that there would be a mechanism for disclosure and correction,” Madrigal said after the luncheon, referring to REG-106499-12 . “And so I think we need to put some meat on those bones,” she said, adding that officials hope to release the new guidance before the final regs.

The proposed regs say Treasury and the IRS plan to publish guidance to help hospital facilities correct failures to meet CHNA requirements and other rules under section 501(r) and to inform them how to disclose the corrections.

Revocation of a hospital’s exemption is possible but won’t be a knee-jerk response, Madrigal said. The proposed regs lay out several factors the IRS will consider when deciding whether to revoke exempt status, including the size and scope of the failures. Madrigal said she believes the factors would be applied when the failure was known, which would typically be during an audit. But she said hospitals she’s spoken with and those who regularly counsel hospitals are working hard to avoid all failures, so a willful or egregious failure would be rare.

Minor and inadvertent failures won’t be considered failures if corrected reasonably promptly after they’re found, Madrigal said, giving the example of a hospital failing to widely publicize its policy for a few days because its posted financial assistance policy fell under a sofa and the website hosting the policy crashed due to malware.

“The things that are truly minor, foot faults, they don’t need to be discussed,” Madrigal said.

Schedule H

Alexander L. Reid of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP said there are discrepancies between the instructions on Schedule H of the Form 990, “Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax,” and the proposed regs under section 501(r). For example, the definition of a hospital is broader in the instructions than in the proposed regs, raising the question of which should be relied on, Reid said. Typically after a statutory change makes an IRS form obsolete, the IRS has attached a cover sheet with instructions on how to proceed, but that hasn’t happened yet, he said.

“It would be premature to change the form until we do have final regulations in place,” said Amy Giuliano, attorney-adviser in the IRS Office of Associate Chief Counsel (Tax-Exempt and Government Entities). “We’re planning to change [Schedule] H when the regulations are finalized.”

by David van den Berg




Cardin Bill Would Clarify Church Pension Plan Treatment.

The Church Plan Clarification Act of 2013 (S. 952), introduced by Senate Finance Committee member Benjamin L. Cardin, D-Md., would make code changes for religious institution pension plans to provide clarity and to bring them more in line with other qualified plans.

Citations: S. 952; Church Plan Clarification Act of 2013




IRS: Many Tax-Exempt Organizations Must File with IRS By May 15 to Preserve Tax-Exempt Status.

A key deadline of May 15 is facing many tax-exempt organizations that are required by law to file annual reports with the Internal Revenue Service. Organizations will see their federal tax exemptions automatically revoked if they have not filed reports for three consecutive years.

The Pension Protection Act of 2006 mandates that most tax-exempt organizations file annual Form 990-series informational returns or notices with the IRS. Under this law, organizations that fail to file reports for three consecutive years automatically lose their federal tax-exempt status. The law, which went into effect at the beginning of 2007, also imposed a new annual filing requirement on small organizations. Churches and church-related organizations are not required to file annual reports.

Form 990-series information returns and notices are due on the 15th day of the fifth month after an organization’s fiscal year ends. Organizations that need additional time to file may obtain an extension.

Many organizations use the calendar year as their fiscal year, which makes May 15 the deadline for them. Organizations that fail to file annual reports for three consecutive years will see their tax exemptions automatically revoked as of the due date of the third required filing.

Small tax-exempt organizations with average annual receipts of $50,000 or less may file an electronic notice called a Form 990-N (e-Postcard), which asks organizations for a few basic pieces of information. Tax-exempt organizations with average annual receipts above $50,000 must file a Form 990 or 990-EZ, depending on their receipts and assets. Private foundations file a Form 990-PF.

The IRS began to publish the names of organizations identified as having automatically lost their tax-exempt status for failing to file annual reports for three consecutive years. Organizations that have had their exemptions automatically revoked and wish to have that status reinstated must file an application for exemption and pay the appropriate user fee.

The IRS offers an online search tool, Exempt Organizations Select Check, to help users more easily find key information about the federal tax status and filings of certain tax-exempt organizations, including whether organizations have had their federal tax exemptions automatically revoked.




Urban Institute Reviews Charitable Contributions Deduction.

This paper attempts to better understand rhetoric over the charitable contributions deduction, arguing that debate surrounding the deduction is ultimately a projection of more fundamental debates relating to the theme of government versus charity. The phrase “government versus charity” can mean government as opposed to charity or government in opposition to charity. The first sense contemplates the need to choose which of government versus charity should supply a given good or service. The second sense contemplates the ideal regulatory posture of government in relation to charity. Competing views over the charitable contributions deduction often reduce to competing views over these two issues.

The full paper is available at:

http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412818-The-Charitable-Contributions-Deduction.pdf




IRS: Restriction on Use of Property Affects Its Fair Market Value.

In a legal memorandum, the IRS concluded that a restriction on the use of donated property within the boundaries of a national park affects the fair market value of the property under section 170.

A taxpayer claimed a charitable deduction for a donation to the National Park Service of land and mineral rights located in a national park. Before the donation, mining was phased out in the park after Congress passed the Mining in the National Parks Act of 1976. Mining was then resumed on a limited basis for years until the last of the mines in the park was closed.

Under section 170, the fair market value of a property determines the amount of the contribution and is calculated as the price at which the property would change hands between a buyer and a seller.

The IRS said examiners should determine if the donated property’s highest and best use is for mining and whether existing legal restrictions on mining are likely to be removed for a potential owner. The IRS also said examiners should consider whether the property became worthless in the year that mining operations in the park were closed.

Citations: ILM 201319010




IRS Looks to Build on College and University Project.

After releasing the almost complete results of more than 30 examinations of colleges and universities on their compensation and unrelated business income last month, the IRS plans to gather more information from across the exempt sector, an agency official told a congressional subcommittee May 8.

Speaking at a hearing of the House Ways and Means Oversight Subcommittee, Lois Lerner, exempt organizations director in the IRS Tax-Exempt and Government Entities Division, said the agency has “already started a second unrelated business income project.”

“We are looking at organizations that are reporting unrelated business activity on their 990s but they’re not filing a [Form] 990-T,” Lerner said. “We think that’s problematic.”

That project started in the current fiscal year, Lerner said, adding that she couldn’t predict when the examinations would be completed.

In response to a question from Ways and Means member Diane Black, R-Tenn., Lerner said plans are in the works to review multiple types of exempt organizations. “I think that it is very important to broaden this out and see what kind of activities are going on in other tax-exempt organizations, because this was a homogeneous group,” she said. “We want to look farther, and we are developing a project for our next year’s workplan that will do just that.”

Other colleges and universities may be included in the larger study, Lerner said.

Lerner was the lone witness at the hearing about the IRS’s colleges and universities compliance project final report  released in April. The report provided findings of more than 30 examinations of colleges and universities on compensation and unrelated business income. With more than 90 percent of the exams finished, the IRS said they resulted in more than 180 adjustments to unrelated business taxable income amounts. The report also revealed that about 20 percent of the private colleges and universities examined failed to meet the rebuttable presumption standard for compensation. (Prior coverage .)

Subcommittee Chair Charles W. Boustany Jr., R-La., asked about the report, noting that colleges and universities and their advisers were frequently wrong about the classification of activities and allocation of expenses related to activities.

“What we did not see was organizations that didn’t seem to have a thought out reason for classifying things the way they classified them,” Lerner said. “But it is very factual related and there were disagreements between the IRS and the organizations, and I think by putting this report out and doing some other work around the issue that we can probably benefit the college and university sector as well as the exempt sector in general.”

“This investigation is notable for what you uncovered,” said Ways and Means member Joseph Crowley, D-N.Y. “And I think we’re all disturbed by what you have discovered in terms of abuse within college and university systems.”

Boustany noted that discussions about tax reform are taking place and said the report contains some troubling details about tax-exempt organizations and how they report unrelated business income and determine executive compensation. He asked Lerner if the report suggested the presence of structural problems within the tax-exempt sector, or if more targeted changes were needed.

“I think that it’s really important for us to get more information than [on] just these 34 organizations, because they were selected because of potential noncompliant activity,” Lerner responded. “I would like to gather more information more broadly to see where the real issues are that could be addressed before changes were made.”

Lerner, in response to questioning from Oversight Subcommittee ranking minority member John Lewis, D-Ga., said that the examinations do not represent a statistically valid sample and that the results apply only to the 34 examined organizations. Four hundred questionnaires that were sent to randomly selected colleges and universities and were completed before the examinations, however, do represent a statistically valid sample and can be considered generally representative of how colleges and universities act, she said.

Lewis also asked whether anything was learned from the examinations that could be useful in investigating other areas of the exempt sector. Lerner said there was.

“This is the first time that we’ve actually looked beyond the fact that the organizations were using comparables to see whether the comparables were really in fact comparable,” she said. “And when I speak to groups about this, what I caution the board members and the executive directors about is, don’t just accept the report from a compensation consultant — you need to ask them questions about this. Because it can be done correctly, and obviously the organizations are trying to do it correctly.”




Boustany Cites High Noncompliance by Colleges on UBIT.

An IRS review of exempt colleges found “almost universal noncompliance by some of the most sophisticated organizations in the tax-exempt sector,” particularly in their calculation of unrelated business income taxes, House Ways and Means Oversight Subcommittee Chair Charles W. Boustany Jr., R-La., said at a May 8 hearing.

http://services.taxanalysts.com/taxbase/eps_pdf2013.nsf/DocNoLookup/11266/$FILE/2013-11266-1.pdf




IRS Reminder: Calendar Year Form 990 Series Returns Due by May 15.

May 15 is the filing deadline for exempt organizations whose tax year ends on December 31, unless the organization submitted Form 8868, Application for Extension of Time To File an Exempt Organization Return. Remember an organization that fails to file for three consecutive years automatically loses its federal tax-exempt status.




Foundation's Grantmaking Expenditures Not Taxable.

The IRS ruled that expenditures made through a private foundation’s grantmaking program through which American art will be brought to international audiences will not be taxable.

Dear * * *

You asked for advance approval of your educational grant procedures under Internal Revenue Code section 4945(g)(3). This approval is required because you are a private foundation that is exempt from federal income tax.

OUR DETERMINATION

We approved your procedures for awarding educational grants. Based on the information you submitted, and assuming you will conduct your program as proposed, we determined that your procedures for awarding educational grants meet the requirements of Code section 4945(g)(3). As a result, expenditures you make under these procedures won’t be taxable.

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR REQUEST

You are dedicated to fostering exploration, understanding, and enjoyment of the visual arts of the United States for national and international audiences. You are committed to supporting projects designed to engage audiences around the globe in an enriched dialogue on American art. Through grants and initiatives, you have made it a priority to bring American art, interpretation, and research resources to international audiences, and have a particular interest in fostering multi-national perspectives.

In furtherance of this international perspective, you will initiate a grant making program called B. The B will further your mission of internationalizing the field of American art by supporting scholars worldwide who share your goals of excellence and originality. In addition to encouraging international scholarship, B will enrich the field through the introduction of new approaches to American art research and will enable scholars outside the United States greater access to American art scholarship. It also will allow them to publish on this topic in their home countries.

Awards under B generally will be made to qualified publishers of selected works. Such grants will be treated as grants to organizations. In limited circumstances described below, however, certain grants will be made directly to individual authors and volume editors and/or contributors. The grants to individuals is the reason you are requesting advance approval under section 4945(g)(3).

B will support scholarly publications that (1) offer translations of key texts on American art, (2) encourage international scholarship on American art, or (3) present focused theses exploring American art in an international context. B is designed to determine the nature of the proposed publication, the professional qualifications of the publisher, the professional qualifications of the author, the commitment and capacity of the author and his or her publisher, and the expected outcomes of publication.

You initially intend to operate B with a three-year budget of x dollars. Grants to support the publication of a book generally will not exceed y dollars, and grants to support the publication of an article generally will not exceed z dollars, although you may vary the size of the grants based on the quality of the applications received and the amount requested. Funds awarded under B will be used for direct costs of publishing the particular work, including translation costs and image rights of black-and-white or full-color illustrations.

You will promote the grants through an extensive list of academic and museum contacts. Grant announcements will be posted on your website and distributed to various relevant associations worldwide. Additionally, information about the grants will be disseminated to individuals through your general e-newsletter, as well as international curators, publishers, and scholars through targeted e-blasts. Posters and postcards are also distributed to major universities and museums to increase the visibility of your grant program.

Each application must be for a scholarly book or article in print or digital format that focuses on historical American art (circa 1500 to 1980), that has an international dimension, and that is under contract for publication. You will strongly encourage applications for:

Translations of books and articles originally written or published in English.

English-language translations of books and articles originally written or published in another language.

Books and articles for publication outside the United States.

Internationally collaborative projects.

Books and articles examining American art in an international context.

Neither new exhibition catalogues nor collection catalogues are eligible for grants under your program; however, translations or reprints of exhibition catalogues that were originally published prior to 2005 may be considered if they contain substantial scholarship.

In reviewing applications, your review committees will consider objective criteria regarding each application. The criteria you will consider include:

The publication’s significant contribution to the field of American art as well as its place in the current literature on the topic.

The publisher’s history, mission, and art list.

The distribution and marketing plan for the publication.

The author’s curriculum vitae.

A partial (in the case of a book) or full (in the case of an article) manuscript, including sample book chapters in both languages if the project involves translation or a detailed English abstract if the article is in a language other than English.

Two or more recent peer reviews of the full manuscript.

The publisher’s endorsement of the manuscript.

Your organization will review applications using internal and external review committees. The external review committee will be comprised of three or more international scholars in the field of American art, each with extensive subject matter knowledge and experience. All external review committee members will be asked to provide a list of potential personal and/or financial conflicts, and will be asked to recuse themselves should any conflicts arise. External review committee members shall remain anonymous to the public and to applicants during their term on the committee. No external review committee member may benefit personally or professionally from the selection of any particular application for the grant.

The internal review committee will consist of your staff including scholars of American art. Your staff will process and review applications received, with a focus on accomplishing your goal of international exposure for American art. Your internal review committee will collect the recommendations of the external review committee and combine these results with your internal review committee. The internal review committee will make the final decision regarding the recipients. No internal review committee member may benefit personally or professionally from the selection of any particular application for a grant.

B awards generally will be paid to the qualified publisher to be used only for the approved publication; however, grants will be made directly to authors in certain circumstances.

Each grant will be made pursuant to a written grant agreement with the publisher or author. The grant agreement will limit the use of the funds to those enumerated in the approved application. Grant recipients will be required to submit periodic reports to you, and a schedule of deadlines for these reports will be outlined in the grant agreement. If required reports are delinquent or there are other indications of a possible diversion of funds, follow-up requests will be submitted. If satisfactory reports are not received after a reasonable time, you will attempt to recover the funds. While conducting an investigation, you will withhold future payments (if any) until the delinquent reports have been submitted. If a diversion is determined to have occurred, no future payments will be made to the recipient and appropriate steps will be taken to recover the grant funds. You will maintain appropriate records regarding the amount of the grant, grant recipient, information sufficient to insure that the recipient was not a “disqualified person” under Code Section 4946 with respect to you for the purposes of the self-dealing rules set forth in Code Section 4941, the purpose of the grant, the grant agreement and final report, and all follow-up information regarding progress reports, any suspension of grants, and any investigations of possible diversion of grant funds.

BASIS FOR OUR DETERMINATION

The law imposes certain excise taxes on the taxable expenditures of private foundations (Code section 4945). A taxable expenditure is any amount a private foundation pays as a grant to an individual for travel, study, or other similar purposes. However, a grant that meets all of the following requirements of Code section 4945(g) is not a taxable expenditure.

The foundation awards the grant on an objective and nondiscriminatory basis.

The IRS approves in advance the procedure for awarding the grant.

The grant is:

A scholarship or fellowship subject to section 117(a) and is to be used for study at an educational organization described in section 170(b)(1)(A)(ii); or

A prize or award subject to the provisions of section 74(b), if the recipient of the prize or award is selected from the general public; or

To achieve a specific objective; produce a report or similar product; or improve or enhance a literary, artistic, musical, scientific, teaching, or other similar skill or talent of the recipient.

To receive approval of its educational grant procedures, Treasury Regulations section 53.4945-4(c)(1) requires that a private foundation show:

The grant procedure includes an objective and nondiscriminatory selection process.

The grant procedure results in the recipients performing the activities the grants were intended to finance.

The foundation plans to obtain reports to determine whether the recipients have performed the activities that the grants were intended to finance.

OTHER CONDITIONS THAT APPLY TO THIS DETERMINATION

This determination covers only the grant program described above. This approval will apply to succeeding grant programs only if their standards and procedures don’t differ significantly from those described in your original request.

This determination applies only to you. It may not be cited as precedent.

You cannot rely on the conclusions in this letter if the facts you provided have changed substantially. You must report any significant changes in your program to the Cincinnati Office of Exempt Organizations at:

* * *

You cannot make grants to your creators, officers, directors, trustees, foundation managers, or members of selection committees or their relatives.

All funds distributed to individuals must be made on a charitable basis and must further the purposes of your organization. You cannot award grants for a purpose that is inconsistent with Code section 170(c)(2)(B).

You should keep adequate records and case histories so that you can substantiate your grant distributions with the IRS if necessary.

We’ve sent a copy of this letter to your representative as indicated in your power of attorney.

Please keep a copy of this letter in your records.

If you have any questions, please contact the person listed at the top of this letter.

Sincerely,

Holly O. Paz

Director, Exempt Organizations

Rulings and Agreements

Citations: LTR 201318008




IRS: Religious Organization's Benefits Plans Are Church Plans.

The IRS ruled that a tax-exempt religious organization’s defined benefit pension plans are church plans within the meaning of section 414(e), retroactive to specified dates.

Date: February 6, 2013

Dear * * *

This letter is in response to your request dated May 13, 2005, as supplemented by correspondence dated March 5, 2012, submitted on your behalf by your authorized representative regarding the church plan status of Plan X, Plan Y and Plan Z within the meaning of section 414(e) of the Internal Revenue Code (Code).

The following facts and representations have been submitted under penalties of perjury on your behalf:

Taxpayer A was established in 19* * * by Order B, a Church C religious order based in Country G, which operates hospitals and health care facilities in three locations in the United States. Taxpayer A is a not-for-profit corporation organized under the laws of State E. Taxpayer A is listed in Directory S, and accordingly, is exempt from Federal income tax under section 501(c) of the Code. Order B is listed in Directory S as being represented in Entity I by virtue of its presence at Taxpayer A. The current president and chief executive officer of Taxpayer A is a member of Order B.

Taxpayer A’s by-laws contain the stated purpose to establish and operate a Church C hospital for the purposes of providing hospitalization and care of the sick and injured, necessary facilities for the treatment of disease, and for scientific purposes; and to establish and operate schools and educational institutions in the hospital, nursing and related fields. Any applicant for appointment to Taxpayer A’s medical staff must, as part of the application, agree to be bound by the Ethical and Religious Directives of Church C Healthcare Services as promulgated by Entity J.

Under Article III of Taxpayer’s by-laws, the sole member of Taxpayer A’s corporation is Network D. Also under the by-laws, Network D has the right to ensure that Taxpayer A is conducting its business and affairs consistently with and in furtherance of the objectives and philosophy of Order B.

Network D is a corporation organized under the Statute N. Among its corporate purposes is to conduct the business affairs of the corporation in a manner consistent with the objectives and philosophy of Order B. Prior to September * * *, 20* * *, members of Network D were from the Provincial Council of Order B, and those members of Entity F Executive were appointed by the Provincial Council. The Provincial Council of Order B is comprised of the local Provincial Superior of Order B and the local Provincial Superior of Order B’s councilors. The Entity F Executive is comprised of Order B members who have been appointed by the Provincial Council to serve on the Entity F Executive.

Effective September * * *, 20* * *, Network D’s by-laws were amended to provide that Network D’s members shall be comprised of seven members appointed by the General Council of Order B, at least four of whom must at all times be members of Order B. As a result, you represent that Taxpayer A is under the control of Network D, a majority of whose members must be members of Order B. If at any time Network D ceases to exist, Taxpayer A’s by-laws provide that the Provincial Council may elect a new corporate member.

Prior to the adoption of Taxpayer A’s current by-laws on October * * *, 20* * *, Taxpayer A’s members were members of Order B’s Provincial Council and members of the Entity F Executive. Since its founding in 19* * *, Taxpayer A has been controlled either directly, or through Network D, by Order B.

Taxpayer A’s board of trustees is responsible for the oversight of Taxpayer A, the appointment of its officers and medical staff, the assessment of its programs, the preparation and recommendation to Network D of Taxpayer A’s capital and operating budget, and certain additional oversight responsibilities set forth in Taxpayer A’s by-laws. The board of trustees is comprised of not less than 12, nor more than 18 members, including three members of Order B or their representatives, appointed by Entity F, at least five members appointed by Network D, two members of Taxpayer A’s medical staff, and any additional trustees (up to 18) appointed by Network D.

Entity F is a corporation which is incorporated under the laws of Country G. Under its by-laws, its membership is limited to members of Order B. The members of Entity F consist of the members of the Provincial Council of Order B and selected members of the Entity F Executive. Any member of the board of trustees of Taxpayer A may be removed by Network D with or without cause. As a result, through its power to appoint Taxpayer A’s trustees, either through Entity F or through Network D, and its power through Network D to remove the trustees with or without cause, you represent that Order B controls the board of trustees..

In 19* * *, Taxpayer A adopted Plan X for the benefit of the employees of Taxpayer A. Plan X is a defined benefit pension plan. Plan X is a new plan, not a successor plan, and meets the requirements of section 401(a) of the Code. Effective September * * *, 19* * *, Plan X’s benefit formula was incorporated into the plan document for Plan Y. Accruals under Plan X were frozen by an amendment to Plan X effective November * * *, 19* * *, which is incorporated into the current plan by an individually designed amendment.

Plan Y is a defined contribution money purchase pension plan adopted by Taxpayer A on September * * *, 19* * *, solely for the benefit of its employees. Plan Y is intended to be qualified under section 401(a) of the Code.

The combined plan document for Plan X and Plan Y was amended and restated periodically, and the most recent favorable determination letter for the combined plan document is dated April * * *, 20* * *. Participation in Plan X and Plan Y has been limited to employees of Taxpayer A at all times.

Plan Z was originally adopted by Taxpayer A effective January * * *, 19* * *, solely for the benefit of its employees. Plan Z is intended by Taxpayer A to be a tax deferred annuity arrangement under section 403(b) of the Code. Participation in Plan Z has been limited to employees of Taxpayer A at all times.

None of the eligible participants in Plan X, Plan Y or Plan Z are, were, or can be considered to be employed in connection with one or more unrelated trades or businesses within the meaning of section 513 of the Code. The plans do not include as participants employees of for-profit entities.

By resolutions dated December * * *, 20* * *, Taxpayer A established Committee H. Committee H’s sole purpose and function is to administer Plan X, Plan Y and Plan Z. Under the resolutions, the initial members of Committee H were the president and chief executive officer of Taxpayer A, and the executive vice president of Taxpayer A. If Taxpayer A’s president is a member of Order B, the president is an ex officio member of Committee H and has the authority to appoint and discharge up to six Committee H members at any time. Under Taxpayer A’s by-laws, the President of Taxpayer A is appointed (and can be removed) by Network D.

You represent that the establishing resolutions for Committee H provide that if the president is not or ceases to be a member of Order B, Network D shall assume the authority to appoint and discharge up to seven Committee H members, so that Committee H continues to constitute an organization that is controlled by or associated with Order B. As established by Taxpayer A, Committee H has all such powers as may be necessary or helpful to discharge its duties as administrator of the plans.

By resolutions dated December * * *, 20* * *, Taxpayer A amended Plan X, Plan Y and Plan Z to name Committee H as the administrator under each of the Plans.

Taxpayer A has not made the election under section 410(d) of the Code with respect to Plan X, Plan Y, or Plan Z. However, it has in the past voluntarily operated Plan Y in compliance with the standards of the Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) to include filing Form 5500, and paying premiums to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.

In accordance with Revenue Procedure 2011-44, Notice to Employees with reference to Plan X was provided on March * * *, 20* * *. This notice explained to participants of Plan X, Plan Y and Plan Z the consequences of church plan status.

Based on the foregoing, you request a ruling that Plan X and Plan Y are church plans within the meaning of section 414(e) of the Code effective as of January 1, 1974; and that Plan Z is a church plan within the meaning of section 414(e) of the Code effective as of January 1, 1987.

Section 414(e) was added to the Code by section 1015 of ERISA. Section 1017(e) of ERISA provided that section 414(e) of the Code applied as of the date of ERISA’s enactment. However, section 414(e) of the Code was subsequently amended by section 407(b) of the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. Law 96-364, to provide that section 414(e) of the Code was effective as of January 1, 1974.

Section 414(e)(1) of the Code generally defines a church plan as a plan established and maintained for its employees (or their beneficiaries) by a church or a convention or association of churches which is exempt from taxation under section 501 of the Code.

Section 414(e)(2) of the Code provides, in part, that the term “church plan” does not include a plan that is established and maintained primarily for the benefit of employees (or their beneficiaries) of such church or convention or association of churches who are employed in connection with one or more unrelated trades or businesses (within the meaning of section 513 of the Code); or if less than substantially all of the individuals included in the plan are individuals described in section 414(e)(1) of the Code or section 414(e)(3)(B) of the Code (or their beneficiaries).

Section 414(e)(3)(A) of the Code provides that a plan established and maintained for its employees (or their beneficiaries) by a church or by a convention or association of churches includes a plan maintained by an organization, whether a civil law corporation or otherwise, the principal purpose or function of which is the administration or funding of a plan or program for the provision of retirement benefits or welfare benefits, or both, for the employees of a church or a convention or association of churches, if such organization is controlled by or associated with a church or a convention or association of churches.

Section 414(e)(3)(B) of the Code defines “employee” of a church or a convention or association of churches to include a duly ordained, commissioned, or licensed minister of a church in the exercise of his or her ministry, regardless of the source of his or her compensation, and an employee of an organization, whether a civil law corporation or otherwise, which is exempt from tax under section 501 of the Code, and which is controlled by or associated with a church or a convention or association of churches.

Section 414(e)(3)(C) of the Code provides that a church or a convention or association of churches which is exempt from tax under section 501 of the Code shall be deemed the employer of any individual included as an employee under subparagraph (B).

Section 414(e)(3)(D) of the Code provides that an organization, whether a civil law corporation or otherwise, is associated with a church or a convention or association of churches if the organization shares common religious bonds and convictions with that church or convention or association of churches.

Section 414(e)(4)(A) of the Code provides that if a plan, intended to be a church plan, fails to meet one or more of the church plan requirements and corrects its failure within the correction period, then that plan shall be deemed to meet the requirements of this subsection for the year in which the correction was made and for all prior years. Section 414(e)(4)(C)(i) of the Code provides, in pertinent part, that the term “correction period” means the period ending 270 days after the date of mailing by the Secretary of a notice of default with respect to the plan’s failure to meet one or more of the church plan requirements.

Revenue Procedure 2011-44, 2011-39 I.R.B. 446, supplements the procedures for requesting a letter ruling under section 414(e) of the Code relating to church plans. The revenue procedure: (1) requires that plan participants and other interested persons receive a notice in connection with a letter ruling request under section 414(e) of the Code for a qualified plan; (2) requires that a copy of the notice be submitted to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) as part of the ruling request; and (3) provides procedures for the IRS to receive and consider comments relating to the ruling request from interested persons.

In order for an organization that is not itself a church or convention or association of churches to have a qualified church plan, it must establish that its employees are employees or deemed employees of a church or convention or association of churches under section 414(e)(3)(B) of the Code by virtue of the organization’s control by or affiliation with a church or convention or association of churches. Employees of any organization maintaining a plan are considered to be church employees if the organization: 1) is exempt from tax under section 501 of the Code; and, 2) is controlled by or associated with a church or convention or association of churches. In addition, in order to be a church plan, the plan must be administered or funded (or both) by an organization described in section 414(e)(3)(A) of the Code. To be described in section 414(e)(3)(A) of the Code, an organization must have as its principal purpose the administration or funding of the plan and must also be controlled by or associated with a church or convention or association of churches.

In this case, Taxpayer A is a not-for-profit corporation which is exempt from federal income tax under section 501(a) of the Code as an organization described in section 501(c)(3) of the Code. In view of the common religious bonds between Church C and Taxpayer A, the inclusion of Order B in Directory S, and the indirect control of Taxpayer A by Church C through Order B, we conclude that Taxpayer A is associated with a church or a convention or association of churches within the meaning of section 414(e)(3)(D) of the Code, that the employees of Taxpayer A meet the definition of employee under section 414(e)(3)(B) of the Code and that they are deemed to be employees of a church or a convention or association of churches by virtue of being employees of an organization which is exempt from tax under section 501 of the Code and which is controlled by or associated with a church or a convention or association of churches.

Effective December * * *, 20* * *, with Taxpayer A’s establishment of Committee H and Committee H becoming administrator of Plan X, Plan Y and Plan Z, the plans are each maintained by an organization whose sole purpose and function is the administration of the plans. Under the establishing resolutions for Committee H, if Taxpayer A’s president is a member of Order B, the president is an ex officio member of Committee H, and has the authority to appoint and discharge up to seven additional Committee H members. The establishing resolutions for Committee H provide that if the president is not or ceases to be a member of Order B, Network D has the authority to appoint and discharge Committee H members. Accordingly, Committee H is an organization that is controlled by or associated with Order B which is a Church C religious order. As a result, the plans are administered by an organization that is controlled by or associated with a church or an association of churches within the meaning of section 414(e)(3)(A) of the Code.

Also, as provided under section 414(e)(4)(A) of the Code, where a plan fails to meet one or more of the church plan requirements and corrects its failure within the correction period, then that plan shall be deemed to meet the requirements of section 414(e) for the year in which the correction is made and for all prior years. Committee H was established to administer Plan X, Plan Y and Plan Z on December 1* * *, 20* * *, which is within the correction period for Plan X, Plan Y and Plan Z.

Based on the foregoing facts and representations, we conclude that Plan X and Plan Y are church plans within the meaning of section 414(e) of the Code, and have been church plans within the meaning of section 414(e) of the Code retroactive to January * * *, 19* * *. We conclude that Plan Z is a church plan within the meaning of section 414(e) of the Code, and has been a church plan within the meaning of section 414(e) of the Code retroactive to January * * *, 19* * *.

This letter expresses no opinion as to whether Plan X and Plan Y satisfy the requirements for qualification under section 401(a) or whether Plan Z satisfies the requirements of section 403(b) of the Code.

This ruling is directed only to the taxpayer who requested it. Section 6110(k)(3) of the Code provides that it may not be used or cited by others as precedent.

A copy of this letter is being sent to your authorized representative pursuant to a Power of Attorney on file in this office.

If you have any questions regarding this letter, please contact * * * at * * *. Please refer all correspondence to SE:T:EP:RA:T3.

Sincerely yours,

Laura B. Warshawsky, Manager

Employee Plans Technical Group 3

Citations: LTR 201318030




IRS Rules on Donation of Depreciated Property.

The IRS ruled that if a taxpayer donates fully depreciated property to one or more charities, the resulting charitable deduction will not be reduced by 20 percent of the accumulated depreciation of the property.

Re: Request for Private Letter Ruling under

Sections 170, 291, and 1250

Dear * * *:

This letter responds to a letter dated July 27, 2012, and supplemental correspondence, submitted by Taxpayer requesting a letter ruling that, if certain section 1250 property is contributed to one or more tax-exempt organizations, the charitable deduction attributable to the value of that contribution will not be reduced by twenty percent of the accumulated depreciation of this section 1250 property under section 291(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code.

FACTS

Taxpayer represents that the facts are as follows:

Taxpayer is a State1 corporation with a principal place of business in City1, State1. Taxpayer is a wholly-owned subsidiary of A and joins in the consolidated Federal income tax return filed for the affiliated group headed by A. A files its consolidated Federal income tax return on a calendar year basis.

Taxpayer owns certain improved real property located at Taxpayer’s B plant in City1, State1 (the “B property”). The B property contains certain depreciable real property that is section 1250 property. Most of this section 1250 property has been fully depreciated. Hereinafter, the fully depreciated B property that is section 1250 property will be referred to as “the Property.”

Taxpayer intends to contribute some or all of the Property to one or more organizations that are exempt from Federal income tax under section 501(c)(3) as a charitable contribution under section 170. Moreover, Taxpayer intends to claim a charitable deduction under section 170 with respect to its contribution of the Property to one or more section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations.

Taxpayer represents that these section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations will have the same basis in the Property as Taxpayer will have at the time of the transfer pursuant to section 1015(a).

RULING REQUESTED

Taxpayer requests the following ruling:

If the Property is contributed to one or more section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations, the charitable deduction attributable to the value of the contribution will not be reduced by twenty percent of the accumulated depreciation of the Property pursuant to section 291(a)(1).

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Section 170 generally allows a deduction, subject to certain limitations, for charitable contributions made during the taxable year to or for the use of organizations described in section 170(c), including section 501(c)(3) organizations.

Section 170A-1(c)(1) of the Income Tax Regulations provides that if a charitable contribution is made in property other than money, the amount of the contribution is the fair market value of the property at the time of the contribution, reduced as provided in section 170(e)(1) and section 1.170A-4(a), or section 170(e)(3) and section 1.170A-4A(c).

Section 170(e)(1) provides that the amount of any charitable contribution of property otherwise taken into account under section 170 shall be reduced by, among other amounts, the amount of gain that would not have been long-term capital gain (determined without regard to section 1221(b)(3)) if the property contributed had been sold by the taxpayer at its fair market value (determined at the time of such contribution).

Section 1.170A-4(a)(1) provides that in the case of a contribution by an individual or by a corporation of ordinary income property, as defined in section 1.170A-4(b)(1), the amount of the charitable contribution that would be taken into account under section 170(a) without regard to section 170(e) shall be reduced before applying the percentage limitations under section 170(b) by the amount of gain that would have been recognized as gain that is not long-term capital gain if the property had been sold by the donor at its fair market value at the time of its contribution to the charitable organization.

Section 1.170A-4(b)(1) defines the term “ordinary income property” as meaning property any portion of the gain on which would not have been long-term capital gain if the property had been sold by the donor at its fair market value at the time of its contribution to the charitable organization.

Section 291(a)(1) provides that in a case where a corporation disposes of section 1250 property, an amount equal to twenty percent of the excess, if any, of (A) the amount that would be treated as ordinary income if such property was section 1245 property, over (B) the amount treated as ordinary income under section 1250 (determined without regard to section 291(a)(1)), shall be treated as gain which is ordinary income under section 1250 and shall be recognized notwithstanding any other provision of Subtitle A of the Code. Section 291(a)(1) further provides that under regulations prescribed by the Secretary, the provisions of section 291(a)(1) will not apply to the disposition of any property to the extent that section 1250(a) does not apply to such disposition by reason of section 1250(d).

If section 1245 property is disposed of, section 1245(a)(1) generally provides that the amount by which the lower of (A) the recomputed basis of the property, or (B) the amount realized (in the case of a sale, exchange, or involuntary conversion) or the fair market value of such property (in the case of any other disposition), exceeds the adjusted basis of such property is treated as ordinary income. Such gain is recognized notwithstanding any other provision of Subtitle A of the Code.

Section 1245(a)(2) defines the term “recomputed basis” with respect to any property as meaning, generally, its adjusted basis recomputed by adding thereto all adjustments reflected in such adjusted basis on account of deductions (whether in respect of the same or other property) allowed or allowable to the taxpayer or to any other person for depreciation or amortization.

If section 1250 property is disposed of after December 31, 1975, section 1250(a)(1)(A) generally provides that 100 percent of the lower of (i) that portion of the additional depreciation attributable to periods after December 31, 1975, in respect of such property, or (ii) the excess of the amount realized (in the case of a sale, exchange, or involuntary conversion), or the fair market value of such property (in the case of any other disposition), over the adjusted basis of such property, is treated as gain that is ordinary income. Such gain is recognized notwithstanding any other provision of Subtitle A of the Code.

Section 1250(b)(1) defines the term “additional depreciation” as meaning, in the case of any property, the depreciation adjustments in respect of such property; except that, in the case of property held more than one year, it means such adjustments only to the extent that they exceed the amount of the depreciation adjustments that would have resulted if such adjustments had been determined for each taxable year under the straight-line method of depreciation.

Section 1250(d)(1) provides that section 1250(a) shall not apply to a disposition by gift.

Section 1.1250-3(a)(1) provides that, for purposes of section 1250(d)(1), the term “gift” shall have the same meaning as in section 1.1245-4(a).

Section 1.1245-4(a) provides that the term “gift” means, generally, a transfer of property which, in the hands of the transferee, has a basis determined under the provisions of section 1015(a) or (d) (relating to basis of property acquired by gifts).

If section 1250 property is disposed of by gift (as defined in sections 1.1250-3(a)(1) and 1.1245-4(a)), section 1250(d)(1) provides that section 1250(a) does not apply to such disposition. Consequently, section 291(a)(1) would not apply to a gift (as defined in sections 1.1250-3(a)(1) and 1.1245-4(a)) of section 1250 property.

In this case, Taxpayer represents that it intends to contribute the Property to one or more organizations that are section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations, that this intended contribution will be a valid charitable contribution that meets the requirements of section 170, and that these section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations will have a basis in the Property equal to Taxpayer’s basis in the Property at the time of transfer pursuant to section 1015(a). These are material representations. Because the basis of the Property in the hands of the section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations will be the same as Taxpayer’s basis in the Property at the time of the transfer pursuant to section 1015(a), the contribution of the Property by Taxpayer to the section 501(c)(3) organizations is a gift for purposes of sections 1250(d)(1) and 1.1250-3(a)(1). Accordingly, the provisions of section 291(a)(1) will not apply to Taxpayer’s disposition of the Property to the section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations.

CONCLUSION

Based solely on Taxpayer’s representations and the relevant law and analysis set forth above, we conclude that if the Property is contributed to one or more section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations, the charitable deduction attributable to the value of the contribution will not be reduced by twenty percent of the accumulated depreciation of the Property pursuant to section 291(a)(1).

Except as specifically set forth above, no opinion is expressed or implied concerning the tax consequences of the facts described above under any other provisions of the Code. Specifically, this letter ruling is based upon Taxpayer’s description of the proposed contribution of property to certain section 501(c)(3) organizations. This letter ruling does not address whether the proposed contribution is a valid charitable contribution that meets the requirements of section 170. Further, the amount of the deduction for the proposed contribution is outside the scope of this letter ruling, and no approval of the amount should be inferred from this letter ruling. Moreover, no opinion is expressed or implied on (i) whether any of the property located at B is section 1250 property, and (ii) the propriety of Taxpayer’s methods of depreciating the property located at B.

This letter ruling is directed only to the taxpayer requesting it. Section 6110(k)(3) provides that it may not be used or cited as precedent.

In accordance with the power of attorney, we are sending a copy of this letter to Taxpayer’s authorized representatives. We are also sending a copy of this letter to the appropriate operating division director.

Sincerely,

Kathleen Reed

Chief, Branch 7

Office of Associate Chief Counsel

(Income Tax and Accounting)

Citations: LTR 201318003




IRS: Colleges and Universities Compliance Project Final Report – Revised.

The IRS has released a revised version of its Colleges and Universities Compliance Project Final Report.

The revised report can be found at:

http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/CUCP_FinalRpt_042513.pdf




IRS Declines to Limit Retroactive Effect of Organization's Revocation.

In technical advice, the IRS declined to limit the retroactive effect of its revocation of a credit counseling organization’s tax-exempt status.

The IRS initially denied the organization’s exemption application partly because of the organization’s close connection to a for-profit company owned by the president of the organization. After the organization said it would educate the public on money management and provide credit counseling, the IRS granted exemption. But a subsequent IRS examination showed the organization, six years after obtaining exemption, had contracted with the same for-profit entity and was operating as a trade or business. The IRS also discovered that the organization was primarily engaged in enrolling people in debt management plans instead of providing counseling. Further, the organization had not told the IRS about its change in operations.

The IRS concluded that the revocation may be retroactive to the year under examination, when the IRS determined the organization had made material changes in its operations.




IRS: Foundation's Expenditures for Mentorship Program Aren't Taxable.

The IRS ruled that expenditures made through a private foundation’s mentorship program for disadvantaged youth will not be taxable.

Dear * * *:

You asked for advance approval of your educational grant procedures under Internal Revenue Code section 4945(g)(3). This approval is required because you are a private foundation that is exempt from federal income tax.

OUR DETERMINATION

We approved your procedures for awarding educational grants. Based on the information you submitted, and assuming you will conduct your program as proposed, we determined that your procedures for awarding educational grants meet the requirements of Code section 4945(g)(3). As a result, expenditures you make under these procedures won’t be taxable.

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR REQUEST

Your letter indicates that you will operate a mentorship program.

The program will provide greater opportunities for disadvantaged youth around the world to realize their full potential and attain mentorships by introducing young adults to leading entrepreneurs, artists, and academics, by sponsoring visa applications, and by covering expenses related to the pursuit of their goals whether in the fields of science, arts, sports, academia, or otherwise.

You intend to both publicize your program on your website, and through foreign and international websites that have the potential of drawing a wide audience from around the world.

You will have application forms completed by both a nominating organization and the potential protégé. In the future you intend to allow applicants to self-nominate.

You aim to support young adults, ages 18 to 30, who have faced, or are facing, significant adversity in life. You do not define what specifically constitutes adversity. It is up to the applicants to demonstrate how their ability to develop in their chosen fields has been stifled by individual circumstances. You will consider individuals who have not had the economic means to pursue their goals, as well as individuals living under oppressive regimes, or in repressive communities. These are just a few examples of the kind of adversity that might qualify a candidate for the mentorship program.

Specific criteria for selection will be based on the following factors:

Age: Applicants should be between the ages of 18 and 30.

Talent: Applicants must demonstrate talent, potential, and perseverance in their chosen fields.

Need: Applicants must demonstrate that they have faced significant adversity, as defined by each applicant’s individual circumstances.

Professional Development Potential: Applicants should demonstrate that the foundation can significantly impact his or her ability to realize his or her full potential.

Leadership Potential: Applicants must demonstrate a genuine desire to give back to their communities in a meaningful and realistic way. Specifically, in accordance with W, protégés must work to bring about positive change in one of the following categories: alleviation of poverty and hunger, improvement of education for all, elimination of discrimination, environmental sustainability, improvement of global health, improvement of global economy, or attainment of world peace.

Substantial contributors, foundation managers, officers, directors, and employees of the foundation, as well as their family members, are ineligible to participate in the mentorship program.

You currently plan to run between two and six mentorships each year. You hope to scale up to ten to twelve mentorships in the future depending on the availability of funding, the particular needs of each recipient, and the overall success of your programs.

You envision providing support to protégés of up to $z per recipient over the course of a year or, some cases, more than a year. The support will be used to cover the expenses of travel, conference participation, art exhibits, supplies, courses, and other expenses related to each protégés particular field of interest, as well as in some cases a cash stipend.

You have adopted the following mandatory procedure in order to ensure continuing compliance with the post-9/11 Executive Orders and with Office of Foreign Assets Control, OFAC, requirements:

You will operate in compliance with all statutes, Executive Orders, and regulations restricting or prohibiting U.S. persons from engaging in transactions and dealings with countries, entities, or individuals subject to economic sanctions administered by OFAC.

You will check the OFAC List of Specially Designated Nationals, SDN, and Blocked Persons before dealing with persons including individuals, organizations and entities and specifically avoid dealing with any persons on the list.

You will not enter into a relationship with a grantee where doubts exist about the grantees’ ability to ensure safe delivery of charitable resources independent of influence by or association with any terrorist organization.

You will not engage in trade or transaction activities that violate the regulation behind OFAC’s country-based sanctions programs or engage in trade or transaction activities with sanctions targets named on OFAC’s SDN list.

You will acquire from OFAC the appropriate license and registration where necessary.

The selection committee varies per protégé. The President and Executive Director, together field applications to select the most promising candidates. The candidates will then be presented to an individualized selection committee made up of experts and luminaries in the applicant’s field, in order to assess the relevance of the stated goals and the potential of the applicant. Once a protégé has been selected, the Board of Directors of the foundation will approve the chosen recipients.

The following are criteria you use for grant renewal.

Recipients must:

Participate actively in their fields, including maintaining frequent contact with you and with their mentors, and participate in conferences, exhibits, or roundtables, as pertinent.

Provide receipts and other documentation showing the use of all grant monies awarded.

Spend the majority of their time in the communities from which they came, and seek to improve the conditions of their particular communities beyond the length of the program. The goal of each protégé should be to one day mentor other youths in his or her chosen field and to bring about positive change in his or her own community.

You will maintain records of your mentorship participants, including the names and addresses of its protégés and mentors, as well as accounts of their activities and any expenses paid to facilitate the mentorship. Records will also include information obtained to evaluate protégés, confirmation that the protégé is not a disqualified person to the foundation, the amount and purpose of any assets spent, how the mentorship was supervised and how any possible diversion of funds was investigated and addressed.

You closely monitor and evaluate the expenditure of funds and the progress made by each recipient. A representative from the foundation will attend conferences and exhibitions at which protégés are participating, and will also continue to maintain frequent contact with all of the participants of the program, including the mentors. Much of the support is provided in the form of in-kind support (such as hotel rooms), or in the reimbursement of specific expenses documented by the protégé. While mentors provide guidance, support, and networking opportunities, the foundation acts as a kind of sub-mentor by monitoring the protégés’ progress, finding adequate housing and other necessary facilities, recording all expenses, and sponsoring foreign individuals for visa or other purposes. To the extent the support is distributed in the form of a stipend/grant to a protégé, the protégé will be required to sign a letter or agreement committing to how the funds will be used, and agreeing to oversight by the foundation and to fulfilling any reporting requirements. Upon completion of each mentorship, the foundation and the protégé will work together to produce a summary report describing the goals achieved, the work produced, and the protégé’s use of resources. If the mentorship goes beyond one year in duration, the foundation will require annual interim reports.

Any possible diversion of grant funds will be promptly investigated. If the foundation discovers that funds have been misused, it will take all reasonable and appropriate steps to recover diverted funds, and will make no further distributions to that recipient, unless it is able to obtain assurances that future diversion will not occur and protégé will take extraordinary precautions to prevent future diversion from occurring.

BASIS FOR OUR DETERMINATION

The law imposes certain excise taxes on the taxable expenditures of private foundations (Code section 4945). A taxable expenditure is any amount a private foundation pays as a grant to an individual for travel, study, or other similar purposes.

However, a grant that meets all of the following requirements of Code section 4945(g) is not a taxable expenditure.

The foundation awards the grant on an objective and nondiscriminatory basis.

The IRS approves in advance the procedure for awarding the grant.

The grant is:

A scholarship or fellowship subject to section 117(a) and is to be used for study at an educational organization described in section 170(b)(1)(A)(ii); or

A prize or award subject to the provisions of section 74(b), if the recipient of the prize or award is selected from the general public; or

To achieve a specific objective; produce a report or similar product; or improve or enhance a literary, artistic, musical, scientific, teaching, or other similar skill or talent of the recipient.

To receive approval of its grant procedures, Treasury Regulations section 53.4945-4(c)(1) requires that a private foundation demonstrate that:

The grant procedure includes an objective and nondiscriminatory selection process.

The grant procedure results in the recipients performing the activities the grants were intended to finance.

The foundation plans to obtain reports to determine whether the recipients have performed the activities that the grants were intended to finance.

OTHER CONDITIONS THAT APPLY TO THIS DETERMINATION

This determination covers only the grant program described above. This approval will apply to succeeding grant programs only if their standards and procedures don’t differ significantly from those described in your original request.

This determination applies only to you. It may not be cited as precedent.

You cannot rely on the conclusions in this letter if the facts you provided have changed substantially.

You must report any significant changes in your program to the Cincinnati Office of Exempt Organizations at:

Internal Revenue Service

Exempt Organizations Determinations

P.O. Box 2508

Cincinnati, OH 45201

You cannot make grants to your creators, officers, directors, trustees, foundation managers, or members of selection committees or their relatives.

 

All funds distributed to individuals must be made on a charitable basis and must further the purposes of your organization. You cannot award grants for a purpose that is inconsistent with Code section 170(c)(2)(B).

You should keep adequate records and case histories so that you can substantiate your grant distributions with the IRS if necessary.

We’ve sent a copy of this letter to your representative as indicated in your power of attorney.

Please keep a copy of this letter in your records.

If you have any questions, please contact the person listed at the top of this letter.

Sincerely,

Holly O. Paz

Director, Exempt Organizations

Rulings and Agreements




Comments Sought on Exempt Organization Return.

The IRS asked for public comment on Form 990, “Return of Organization Exempt From Income Tax Under Section 501(c), 527, or 4947(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code (except black lung benefit trust or private foundation),” and related schedules.  Comments are due by June 25, 2013.

Send comments regarding the burden estimate, or any other aspect of the information collection, including suggestion for reducing the burden, to (1) Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, Attention: Desk Officer for Treasury, New Executive Office Building, Room 10235, Washington, DC 20503, or email at [email protected] and (2) Treasury PRA Clearance Officer, 1750 Pennsylvania Ave. NW., Suite 8140, Washington, DC 20220, or email at [email protected].




IRS Releases Final Report on Tax-Exempt Colleges and Universities Compliance Project.

The Internal Revenue Service today released its final report summarizing audit results from the IRS’ colleges and universities study, which began in 2008. This final report describes the agency’s multi-year project on a major segment of tax-exempt organizations.

“The audits identified some significant compliance issues at the colleges and universities examined,” said Lois Lerner, Director, Exempt Organizations division. “Because these issues may well be present elsewhere across the tax-exempt sector, all exempt organizations need to be aware of the importance of accurately reporting unrelated business income and providing appropriate executive compensation.”

The attached final report focuses on two primary areas within the examinations: reporting of unrelated business taxable income, and compensation, including, employment tax and retirement plan issues.

The full report is available at:

http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/CUCP_FinalRpt_042513.pdf




IRS: Attend the Exempt Organizations Workshop at the 2013 Tax Forums.

This two-hour workshop will include a review of recent changes to the Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax. In addition, the workshop will present several topics that are of interest to tax professionals who work with exempt organizations.

Exempt Organizations will participate in the IRS Nationwide Tax Forums in six cities starting in July. The forums are a major outreach event providing three packed days of seminars, workshops, focus groups and an exhibit hall for the tax practitioner community. In addition to getting the latest tax information, tax professionals can earn continuing professional education credits for their attendance.

For more information, go to:

http://www.irs.gov/Tax-Professionals/IRS-Nationwide-Tax-Forum-Information




FASB: Update No. 2013-06—Not-for-Profit Entities (Topic 958): Services Received from Personnel of an Affiliate (a consensus of the FASB Emerging Issues Task Force)

The amendments in this Update require a recipient not-for-profit entity to recognize all services received from personnel of an affiliate that directly benefit the recipient not-for-profit entity. Those services should be measured at the cost recognized by the affiliate for the personnel providing those services. However, if measuring a service received from personnel of an affiliate at cost will significantly overstate or understate the value of the service received, the recipient not-for-profit entity may elect to recognize that service received at either (1) the cost recognized by the affiliate for the personnel providing that service or (2) the fair value of that service.

The full Update is available at:

http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobkey=id&blobwhere=1175826718911&blobheader=application%2Fpdf&blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs




IRS: Foundation's Expenditures for Mentorship Program Aren't Taxable.

The IRS ruled that expenditures made through a private foundation’s mentorship program for disadvantaged youth will not be taxable.

Dear * * *:

You asked for advance approval of your educational grant procedures under Internal Revenue Code section 4945(g)(3). This approval is required because you are a private foundation that is exempt from federal income tax.

OUR DETERMINATION

We approved your procedures for awarding educational grants. Based on the information you submitted, and assuming you will conduct your program as proposed, we determined that your procedures for awarding educational grants meet the requirements of Code section 4945(g)(3). As a result, expenditures you make under these procedures won’t be taxable.

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR REQUEST

Your letter indicates that you will operate a mentorship program.

The program will provide greater opportunities for disadvantaged youth around the world to realize their full potential and attain mentorships by introducing young adults to leading entrepreneurs, artists, and academics, by sponsoring visa applications, and by covering expenses related to the pursuit of their goals whether in the fields of science, arts, sports, academia, or otherwise.

You intend to both publicize your program on your website, and through foreign and international websites that have the potential of drawing a wide audience from around the world.

You will have application forms completed by both a nominating organization and the potential protégé. In the future you intend to allow applicants to self-nominate.

You aim to support young adults, ages 18 to 30, who have faced, or are facing, significant adversity in life. You do not define what specifically constitutes adversity. It is up to the applicants to demonstrate how their ability to develop in their chosen fields has been stifled by individual circumstances. You will consider individuals who have not had the economic means to pursue their goals, as well as individuals living under oppressive regimes, or in repressive communities. These are just a few examples of the kind of adversity that might qualify a candidate for the mentorship program.

Specific criteria for selection will be based on the following factors:

Age: Applicants should be between the ages of 18 and 30.

Talent: Applicants must demonstrate talent, potential, and perseverance in their chosen fields.

Need: Applicants must demonstrate that they have faced significant adversity, as defined by each applicant’s individual circumstances.

Professional Development Potential: Applicants should demonstrate that the foundation can significantly impact his or her ability to realize his or her full potential.

Leadership Potential: Applicants must demonstrate a genuine desire to give back to their communities in a meaningful and realistic way. Specifically, in accordance with W, protégés must work to bring about positive change in one of the following categories: alleviation of poverty and hunger, improvement of education for all, elimination of discrimination, environmental sustainability, improvement of global health, improvement of global economy, or attainment of world peace.

Substantial contributors, foundation managers, officers, directors, and employees of the foundation, as well as their family members, are ineligible to participate in the mentorship program.

You currently plan to run between two and six mentorships each year. You hope to scale up to ten to twelve mentorships in the future depending on the availability of funding, the particular needs of each recipient, and the overall success of your programs.

You envision providing support to protégés of up to $z per recipient over the course of a year or, some cases, more than a year. The support will be used to cover the expenses of travel, conference participation, art exhibits, supplies, courses, and other expenses related to each protégés particular field of interest, as well as in some cases a cash stipend.

You have adopted the following mandatory procedure in order to ensure continuing compliance with the post-9/11 Executive Orders and with Office of Foreign Assets Control, OFAC, requirements:

You will operate in compliance with all statutes, Executive Orders, and regulations restricting or prohibiting U.S. persons from engaging in transactions and dealings with countries, entities, or individuals subject to economic sanctions administered by OFAC.

You will check the OFAC List of Specially Designated Nationals, SDN, and Blocked Persons before dealing with persons including individuals, organizations and entities and specifically avoid dealing with any persons on the list.

You will not enter into a relationship with a grantee where doubts exist about the grantees’ ability to ensure safe delivery of charitable resources independent of influence by or association with any terrorist organization.

You will not engage in trade or transaction activities that violate the regulation behind OFAC’s country-based sanctions programs or engage in trade or transaction activities with sanctions targets named on OFAC’s SDN list.

You will acquire from OFAC the appropriate license and registration where necessary.

The selection committee varies per protégé. The President and Executive Director, together field applications to select the most promising candidates. The candidates will then be presented to an individualized selection committee made up of experts and luminaries in the applicant’s field, in order to assess the relevance of the stated goals and the potential of the applicant. Once a protégé has been selected, the Board of Directors of the foundation will approve the chosen recipients.

The following are criteria you use for grant renewal.

Recipients must:

Participate actively in their fields, including maintaining frequent contact with you and with their mentors, and participate in conferences, exhibits, or roundtables, as pertinent.

Provide receipts and other documentation showing the use of all grant monies awarded.

Spend the majority of their time in the communities from which they came, and seek to improve the conditions of their particular communities beyond the length of the program. The goal of each protégé should be to one day mentor other youths in his or her chosen field and to bring about positive change in his or her own community.

You will maintain records of your mentorship participants, including the names and addresses of its protégés and mentors, as well as accounts of their activities and any expenses paid to facilitate the mentorship. Records will also include information obtained to evaluate protégés, confirmation that the protégé is not a disqualified person to the foundation, the amount and purpose of any assets spent, how the mentorship was supervised and how any possible diversion of funds was investigated and addressed.

You closely monitor and evaluate the expenditure of funds and the progress made by each recipient. A representative from the foundation will attend conferences and exhibitions at which protégés are participating, and will also continue to maintain frequent contact with all of the participants of the program, including the mentors. Much of the support is provided in the form of in-kind support (such as hotel rooms), or in the reimbursement of specific expenses documented by the protégé. While mentors provide guidance, support, and networking opportunities, the foundation acts as a kind of sub-mentor by monitoring the protégés’ progress, finding adequate housing and other necessary facilities, recording all expenses, and sponsoring foreign individuals for visa or other purposes. To the extent the support is distributed in the form of a stipend/grant to a protégé, the protégé will be required to sign a letter or agreement committing to how the funds will be used, and agreeing to oversight by the foundation and to fulfilling any reporting requirements. Upon completion of each mentorship, the foundation and the protégé will work together to produce a summary report describing the goals achieved, the work produced, and the protégé’s use of resources. If the mentorship goes beyond one year in duration, the foundation will require annual interim reports.

Any possible diversion of grant funds will be promptly investigated. If the foundation discovers that funds have been misused, it will take all reasonable and appropriate steps to recover diverted funds, and will make no further distributions to that recipient, unless it is able to obtain assurances that future diversion will not occur and protégé will take extraordinary precautions to prevent future diversion from occurring.

BASIS FOR OUR DETERMINATION

The law imposes certain excise taxes on the taxable expenditures of private foundations (Code section 4945). A taxable expenditure is any amount a private foundation pays as a grant to an individual for travel, study, or other similar purposes.

However, a grant that meets all of the following requirements of Code section 4945(g) is not a taxable expenditure.

The foundation awards the grant on an objective and nondiscriminatory basis.

The IRS approves in advance the procedure for awarding the grant.

The grant is:

A scholarship or fellowship subject to section 117(a) and is to be used for study at an educational organization described in section 170(b)(1)(A)(ii); or

A prize or award subject to the provisions of section 74(b), if the recipient of the prize or award is selected from the general public; or

To achieve a specific objective; produce a report or similar product; or improve or enhance a literary, artistic, musical, scientific, teaching, or other similar skill or talent of the recipient.

To receive approval of its grant procedures, Treasury Regulations section 53.4945-4(c)(1) requires that a private foundation demonstrate that:

The grant procedure includes an objective and nondiscriminatory selection process.

The grant procedure results in the recipients performing the activities the grants were intended to finance.

The foundation plans to obtain reports to determine whether the recipients have performed the activities that the grants were intended to finance.

OTHER CONDITIONS THAT APPLY TO THIS DETERMINATION

This determination covers only the grant program described above. This approval will apply to succeeding grant programs only if their standards and procedures don’t differ significantly from those described in your original request.

This determination applies only to you. It may not be cited as precedent.

You cannot rely on the conclusions in this letter if the facts you provided have changed substantially.

You must report any significant changes in your program to the Cincinnati Office of Exempt Organizations at:

Internal Revenue Service

Exempt Organizations Determinations

P.O. Box 2508

Cincinnati, OH 45201

You cannot make grants to your creators, officers, directors, trustees, foundation managers, or members of selection committees or their relatives.

All funds distributed to individuals must be made on a charitable basis and must further the purposes of your organization. You cannot award grants for a purpose that is inconsistent with Code section 170(c)(2)(B).

You should keep adequate records and case histories so that you can substantiate your grant distributions with the IRS if necessary.

We’ve sent a copy of this letter to your representative as indicated in your power of attorney.

Please keep a copy of this letter in your records.

If you have any questions, please contact the person listed at the top of this letter.

Sincerely,

Holly O. Paz

Director, Exempt Organizations

Rulings and Agreements




Place Holder






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