Finance





'Pay for Success': a Better Way to Deliver Social Services?

The idea of shifting the risk of failed initiatives from taxpayers to investors is catching on.

Nobody likes to pay taxes, but I suspect that most people would find it a little easier to take if they knew their tax dollars were funding the achievement of concrete public goals. That’s the idea behind “pay-for-success” programs that have been launched during the last year in Illinois, Massachusetts and New York state and are being developed or considered in several others.

Under these programs, government sets out a set of specific goals in areas such as mental illness, homelessness or preventive health care. Private investors and philanthropic organizations then finance the work of nonprofits to deliver cost-effective, evidence-based social services on behalf of the state. The investors receive “success payments” only if the desired results are achieved.

Last December, New York became the first state to launch a pay-for-success program. There the goal was to reduce recidivism among 2,000 recently released prison inmates. Bank of America and Merrill Lynch raised the bulk of the investment capital for the $13.5 million initiative. For them to get a return on their investment, the program must either reduce recidivism by at least 8 percent or increase the rate of employment for released prisoners by at least 5 percent compared to historic averages. If the investors achieve their performance goals, reduced prison and public-assistance costs will save New York taxpayers $7.8 million.

Illinois is using pay for success to improve placement outcomes and reduce re-arrests for young people involved in the child-welfare and juvenile-justice systems. Massachusetts is employing the model to improve employment outcomes and post-secondary degree attainment among participants in adult basic education. The Obama administration has also gotten into the act, funding a model project in Ohio and committing $500 million to fund other state and local pay-for-success programs.

California is the latest state seeking to launch a pay-for-success program. A bill that has passed the state Senate and is awaiting action in the Assembly would create a pilot program beginning next year under which the director of the state’s Office of Planning and Research would identify and submit potential “social impact partnerships’ to the legislature for its consideration each year between 2015 and 2020, when the pilot would sunset. Seed money would come from a Social Innovation Financing Trust Fund. As in other states, investors would be paid only if the desired goals are achieved.

In a government culture that too often focuses on inputs, such as how much money is spent on a program rather than on the outcomes it produces, going through the goal-setting exercise alone makes the pay-for-success approach worthwhile.

To achieve the concept’s full potential, the public sector will need to carefully monitor outcomes and become adept at writing contracts that hold investors’ feet to the fire. But if governments succeed and shift the risk of failed initiatives from taxpayers to private investors, it won’t take long for pay-for-success programs to become very popular.

GOVERNING.COM
BY CHARLES CHIEPPO | AUGUST 5, 2014




Fitch Rates First Nonbank-Sponsored Volcker Compliant TOB.

Fitch Ratings-New York-07 August 2014: The creation of a new nonbanking entity sponsored tender option bond (TOB) structure is positive for the municipal market (and tax-exempt money market funds in particular), as TOBs have historically given these funds access to municipal securities. On Wednesday, Fitch rated the first nonbank-sponsored TOB trust.

The Volcker Rule prohibits banks from sponsoring trusts and providing certain services for the floating and residual certificates issued by traditionally structured TOBs. In this particular transaction, Mesirow Financial, Inc. (Mesirow), a nonbank financial services firm, will serve as the trustor, trust administrator, placement and remarketing agent for the TOB trust. Prohibitions under the Volcker Rule pertaining to proprietary trading and certain hedge fund and private equity activities do not apply to Mesirow because it is a nonbanking entity. Furthermore, we expect the floating certificates and residual certificates issued under this trust will be owned by nonbanking entities, as the certificates issued by this trust would fall under the definition of a covered fund under the Volcker Rule.

The Volcker Rule became effective on April 1, 2014 and currently requires conformance by July 21, 2015. With the creation of this new structure, banks may potentially have the option of transferring sponsorship of existing TOB trusts to nonbanking entities to bring existing trusts into compliance with the Volcker Rule.

Contact:

Richard Park
Director
U.S. Municipal Structured Finance
+1 212 908-0289
Fitch Ratings
33 Whitehall Street
New York, NY

Trudy Zibit
Managing Director
U.S. Municipal Structured Finance
+1 212 908-0689

Rob Rowan
Senior Director
Fitch Wire
+1 212 908-9159

Media Relations: Elizabeth Fogerty, New York, Tel: +1 (212) 908 0526, Email: elizabeth.fogerty@fitchratings.com.

Additional information is available on www.fitchratings.com.

The above article originally appeared as a post on the Fitch Wire credit market commentary page. The original article, which may include hyperlinks to companies and current ratings, can be accessed at www.fitchratings.com. All opinions expressed are those of Fitch Ratings.

ALL FITCH CREDIT RATINGS ARE SUBJECT TO CERTAIN LIMITATIONS AND DISCLAIMERS. PLEASE READ THESE LIMITATIONS AND DISCLAIMERS BY FOLLOWING THIS LINK: HTTP://FITCHRATINGS.COM/UNDERSTANDINGCREDITRATINGS. IN ADDITION, RATING DEFINITIONS AND THE TERMS OF USE OF SUCH RATINGS ARE AVAILABLE ON THE AGENCY’S PUBLIC WEBSITE ‘WWW.FITCHRATINGS.COM’. PUBLISHED RATINGS, CRITERIA AND METHODOLOGIES ARE AVAILABLE FROM THIS SITE AT ALL TIMES. FITCH’S CODE OF CONDUCT, CONFIDENTIALITY, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, AFFILIATE FIREWALL, COMPLIANCE AND OTHER RELEVANT POLICIES AND PROCEDURES ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FROM THE ‘CODE OF CONDUCT’ SECTION OF THIS SITE. FITCH MAY HAVE PROVIDED ANOTHER PERMISSIBLE SERVICE TO THE RATED ENTITY OR ITS RELATED THIRD PARTIES. DETAILS OF THIS SERVICE FOR RATINGS FOR WHICH THE LEAD ANALYST IS BASED IN AN EU-REGISTERED ENTITY CAN BE FOUND ON THE ENTITY SUMMARY PAGE FOR THIS ISSUER ON THE FITCH WEBSITE.




Fitch: US Local Government Pension Reform Hits Another Snag.

Fitch Ratings-New York-05 August 2014: This week’s pension reform ruling in Los Angeles provides the latest example of the challenges local governments face in effecting pension reform, Fitch Ratings says. We believe this challenge is unusual as it concerns reform that only applies to new employees. Los Angeles’ Employee Relations Board ordered the city council to rescind a 2012 pension reform that scaled back pension benefits for new employees of the Coalition of Los Angeles City Unions.

Legal challenges have been a frequent companion to pension reform efforts for some time and are unlikely to abate soon. Economic pressures have sensitized the electorate, officials, and employees to the costs of pension benefits and the potential relief possible with pension reforms. However, legal constraints and current and future beneficiary resistance favor preservation of current benefit levels. These issues are being considered by internal review bodies, courts and, at times, voter initiatives. Recent San Jose and San Diego cases were voter-driven and affected both existing employees and new employees. Neither case has reached final resolution.

Fitch considers the ability to adjust pension benefits for future employees to be critical to Los Angeles’ financial flexibility. We believe Los Angeles will eventually be able to implement this reform, either through a judicial ruling or the meet and confer process. Similar reform has already been implemented for police, fire, and Department of Water and Power unions. This tentative decision will likely be finalized by the board next month and we expect the city to appeal the decision to the state court. Savings from the L.A. pension reform are estimated at approximately $4.3 billion over 30 years, beginning at close to $4 million in the first two years.

Contact:

Amy Laskey
Managing Director
U.S. Public Finance
+ 1 212 908-0568
33 Whitehall Street
New York, NY

Alan Gibson
Director
U.S. Public Finance
+1 415 732-7577
650 California Street
San Francisco, CA

Rob Rowan
Senior Director
Fitch Wire
+1 212 908-9159

Media Relations: Elizabeth Fogerty, New York, Tel: +1 (212) 908 0526, Email: elizabeth.fogerty@fitchratings.com.

Additional information is available on www.fitchratings.com.

The above article originally appeared as a post on the Fitch Wire credit market commentary page. The original article, which may include hyperlinks to companies and current ratings, can be accessed at www.fitchratings.com. All opinions expressed are those of Fitch Ratings.

ALL FITCH CREDIT RATINGS ARE SUBJECT TO CERTAIN LIMITATIONS AND DISCLAIMERS. PLEASE READ THESE LIMITATIONS AND DISCLAIMERS BY FOLLOWING THIS LINK: HTTP://FITCHRATINGS.COM/UNDERSTANDINGCREDITRATINGS. IN ADDITION, RATING DEFINITIONS AND THE TERMS OF USE OF SUCH RATINGS ARE AVAILABLE ON THE AGENCY’S PUBLIC WEBSITE ‘WWW.FITCHRATINGS.COM’. PUBLISHED RATINGS, CRITERIA AND METHODOLOGIES ARE AVAILABLE FROM THIS SITE AT ALL TIMES. FITCH’S CODE OF CONDUCT, CONFIDENTIALITY, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, AFFILIATE FIREWALL, COMPLIANCE AND OTHER RELEVANT POLICIES AND PROCEDURES ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FROM THE ‘CODE OF CONDUCT’ SECTION OF THIS SITE. FITCH MAY HAVE PROVIDED ANOTHER PERMISSIBLE SERVICE TO THE RATED ENTITY OR ITS RELATED THIRD PARTIES. DETAILS OF THIS SERVICE FOR RATINGS FOR WHICH THE LEAD ANALYST IS BASED IN AN EU-REGISTERED ENTITY CAN BE FOUND ON THE ENTITY SUMMARY PAGE FOR THIS ISSUER ON THE FITCH WEBSITE.




SIFMA US Municipal Credit Report, Second Quarter 2014.

The municipal bond credit report is a quarterly report on the trends and statistics of U.S. municipal bond market, both taxable and tax-exempt. Issuance volumes, outstanding, credit spreads, highlights and commentary are included.

Summary

According to Thomson Reuters, long-term public municipal issuance volume totaled $83.4 billion in the second quarter of 2014, an increase of 38.8 percent from the prior quarter ($60.1 billion) but a decline of 6.2 percent year-over-year (y-o-y) ($88.9 billion). Year to date ending June, issuance figures reached $143.5 billion, well below the 10-year average of $190.7 billion due to light supply in the first quarter. Including private placements ($4.7 billion), long-term municipal issuance for 2Q’14 was $88.1 billion.

Tax-exempt issuance totaled $74.0 billion in 2Q’14, an increase of 38.9 percent but a decline of 0.2 percent q-o-q and y-o-y, respectively. Taxable issuance totaled $6.5 billion in 2Q’14, an increase of 19.4 percent q-o-q but a decline of 48.7 percent y o y. AMT issuance was $2.9 billion, a twofold increase q-o-q and a 39.3 percent increase y-o-y.

By use of proceeds, general purpose led issuance totals in 2Q’14 ($19.2 billion), followed by primary & secondary education ($17.1 billion), and water & sewer facilities ($6.7 billion), identical rankings as the prior quarter.

Refunding volumes as a percentage of issuance rose slightly from the prior quarter, with 52.7 percent of issuance compared to 48.8 percent in 1Q’14.

Download the Report.




Social Impact Bonds: Phantom of the Nonprofit Sector.

What issue could bring Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) and Senator Al Franken (D-MN) into bipartisan partnership? Social impact bonds (SIBs)—or pay-for-success (PFS), depending on one’s preferred terminology. Both legislators have been effusive about the reauthorization of the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA), and Franken seems to have made workforce development one of his top priority issues. A core component of WIOA noted by many of its supporters was the legislation’s $300 million commitment to pay-for-success programming aimed boosting effective, evidence-based efforts in job training.

For the two senators and most of the U.S. Congress, SIBs are real, immediate, substantive, and promising—enough to justify devoting hundreds of millions of dollars to pay-for-success programming on a range of social issues. For others, they are a public policy phantom, largely unproven but highly touted by some academics, a number of private foundations, and a bevy of consultants, and broadly endorsed by Republicans and Democrats, nonprofit service providers and for-profit entrepreneurs. As this issue of the Cohen Report explores, this potentially phantom program is getting serious consideration at the federal government level and in a variety of states.

The WIOA legislation is the latest piece of federal policy promoting SIBs/PFS as an avenue for public policy solutions to knotty problems. According to a fact sheet distributed by the office of Senator Patty Murray (D-WA), the bill’s lead sponsor, up to 10 percent of funding for job training projects administered by local Workforce Investment Boards can be used for pay-for-performance initiatives. Don’t think that this was a throwaway component of the legislation. Social enterprise lobbying groups like America Forward (which played a big role in the adoption of the Social Innovation Fund) lauded the PFS provisions of WIOA. America Forward, in fact, specifically noted its role in working with Senator Rob Portman (R-OH), Senator Michael Bennett (D-CO), and Representative Susan Brooks (R-IN) to get the PFS language included. (America Forward is identified as a “nonpartisan initiative” of New Profit, Inc., which was founded by Vanessa Kirsch, who herself founded Public Allies, and is governed by a 15-person board that includes three executives from Bain Capital as well as representatives of other investment firms.)

In America Forward’s list of the “10 Greatest Hits from the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act,” the PFS component ranks first and gets more word-space than any of the other “hits.” Despite exceptionally limited experience in the U.S. and overseas with actual SIB programs or projects, the SIB/PFS juggernaut is going great guns due to enthusiasts such as New Profit. With President Obama’s signing of the WIOA legislation earlier this week, it is an appropriate moment to take stock of where the SIB movement has made inroads into federal and state public policy and where it might go in the future.

Federal pay-for-success

The WIOA’s pay-for-success provision is substantial. As many commentators have written, the amount of money available for workforce development training and placement programs could be as much as $300 million through the Act. PFS in WIOA fits the Obama White House’s longstanding enthusiasm for SIBs. In its Fiscal Year 2012 budget explanations, the Office of Management and Budget observed that Pay for Success Bonds (even though they aren’t bonds) involve philanthropic and private sector investors “to deliver better outcomes” for all levels of government and “minimize risk to government” (because government ostensibly only pays when outcomes are achieved).

In Fiscal Year 2013, the White House called for $100 million for PFS pilot projects. In its FY 2014 package, the White House proposed a $300 million PFS incentive fund to be administered by the Department of Treasury plus $195 million for PFS projects sponsored by the Departments of Labor, Justice and Education. Ironically, the White House suggested that its FY2013 proposal was justified in part by state initiatives such as the one “being implemented…as close as the State of Maryland,” though Maryland’s SIB program was the recipient of a devastating legislative report and eventually stalled in the legislature.

Not surprisingly, the WIOA authorization of workforce development SIBs follows the announcement of an $11.2 million SIB competition administered by the Corporation for National and Community Service’s Social Innovation Fund. With applications due next week, SIF is looking to fund a number of nonprofits and government agencies with grants between $200,000 and $1.2 million to assess the feasibility of PFS efforts and build local capacity to implement them and between $200,000 and $1.8 million for structuring PFS programs. Given SIF’s track record regarding its selection of New Profit as one of the original SIF grant recipients despite much concern about potential conflicts of interest in its selection process, including some trenchant observations from SIF reviewer Paul Light, one might wonder whether the numerous advocates of SIB/PFS programs like this one will do more than influence the agency to reward the major promoters of the concept. Hopefully, nothing that would raise those sorts of suspicions will happen this time around.

Social impact bonds must be a heady experience for a Congress that cannot bring itself to do much of anything in a bipartisan manner. Around the same time as the WIOA legislation was making its way through Congress, Representative Todd Young (R-IN), joined by Representative John Delaney (D-MD), introduced the Social Impact Bond Act with the support of a handful of other members, including a couple with national profiles—Aaron Schock (R-IL) and Joe Kennedy (D-MA). Young, however, is clearly the enthusiast behind the bill and described the purpose of the legislation on his website:

“Under the proposed legislation, the federal government would establish desired outcomes to pressing social challenges that, if achieved, would improve lives and save government money. State and municipal governments could then submit proposals to work towards those outcomes—such as increasing adoption rates of teenagers in foster care, or improving the health and mortality rates of infants born into low-income families—by scaling up existing, scientifically-proven interventions. Private sector investors would provide the capital needed to expand the existing programs, and, if an independent evaluator were able to validate that the desired outcomes were met and money was saved, the investors would be paid back their initial investment plus a small return from the realized government savings.”

The logical implication of the Young legislation would be to convert an unending array of federal programs into potential SIB/PFS funding venues. Their language has a lot of belief and hope instead of evidence for these efforts based on evidence-based programming. For example, Delaney proclaimed, “The Social Impact Bonds already being implemented in the States prove it can be done, and if we want federal savings, we need to get the federal government involved.” As he knows, probably better than most of his colleagues due to a trenchant analysis of SIBs prepared for the Maryland legislature and presented recently in testimony at a congressional hearing, there are only a handful of SIB/PFS programs underway anywhere—perhaps as many as four in the U.S.—and none have reached a point where they can be pointed to a “proof” of the SIB concept.

Delaney added, “This bipartisan legislation harnesses the power of the private sector to improve government services while saving taxpayer dollars.” The history of privatization of public services has not been quite so across-the-board positive as Delaney intimated. Representative Joe Kennedy added an aggressive set of expectations for SIBs in public policy: “By breaking down traditional barriers between the public and private sectors, these tools expand our capacity to address everything from unemployment to child welfare to substance abuse treatment.” Representative John Larson (D-CT) waxed enthusiastic about SIBs’ ability to tap the “entrepreneurial spirit and innovation of the private sector.”

The sales pitch is bold and strong regardless of whether there is sufficient experience behind SIBs to warrant the statements. An organization called Results for America recently convened a discussion with Young and Delaney under the moniker “Moneyball for Government,” involving representatives of the Nurse-Family Partnership, the Center for Employment Opportunities, and the Manpower Development Research Corporation (MDRC)—all engaged in components of current or planned SIB/PFS programs—to embellish the Young/Delaney pitch. Moneyball’s “founding all-stars” are also bipartisan luminaries: former New York City mayor Michael Bloomberg; former director of the Office of Management and Budget in the Obama administration, Peter Orszag; the former director of President Obama’s Domestic Policy Council, Melody Barnes; former Republican Congressman and head of OMB in the Bush administration, Jim Nussle; and former director of the Domestic Policy Council in the Bush administration, John Bridgeland.

SIBs may be part of applying the theory of moneyball to government—like Billy Beane’s Oakland Athletics, small money may yield outsized results on the playing field—but a handful of SIB experiments do not constitute a full season’s worth of experience for making the kinds of glowing proclamations that SIB advocates typically do.

Although experience with SIBs is very limited and there are serious questions about how they might function, they have a coterie of advocates who are committed to promoting and promulgating SIB programs and legislation throughout the nation. With major supporters such as the otherwise liberal Center for American Progress (whose Q&A report on SIBs was co-authored by former Obama administration Office of Social Innovation director Sonal Shah), the private sector-lauding SIB concept draws in supporters who one might otherwise expect to have some qualms about the impact of private sector leadership in the solution of social problems.

State social impact bonds

Policy innovations often don’t wait for evidence of their success, even when they are social impact bonds, which are predicated on private and public investment in evidence-based programs. State legislatures have considered several SIB bills or called for feasibility studies in recent months:

Earlier this year, the Washington state legislature voted to create a “social investment steering committee” to “develop an implementation plan for at least one pilot program that uses social impact bonds or other public-private financing mechanisms to finance and deliver prevention-focused social or health care services.” As of June, however, supporters of the SIB pilot program were not able to get the legislature to back the legislation with appropriations. Although the primary sponsor of the SIB legislation, Republican state representative Hans Zieger, declared that SIBs would “provide incentives to solve problems versus reinforcing the bureaucratic status quo”—especially, in Zieger’s mind, for K-12 education—Appropriations Committee chair Ross Hunter, a Democrat, took credit for having “killed” the program. Viewing private investment for SIBS as similar to borrowing money, Hunter said that Washington State doesn’t typically borrow money for building social infrastructure. He asked, “If we have evidence to justify an investment, then why not put aside money for it?”

Utah this year created the Utah School Readiness Initiative with a significant commitment for SIB programs for “early childhood education programs for at-risk students.” The Utah program follows a 2013 plan forwarded by the Salt Lake County Council for an early childhood education SIB with Goldman Sachs and Chicago venture capitalist J.B. Pritzker as investors, but the state government did not authorize its funding for the deal.

Goldman Sachs is the $10 million investor in the Rikers Island recidivism reduction SIB in New York City, which operates under a 75 percent guarantee from Bloomberg Philanthropies, essentially boosting Goldman’s anticipated return on its investment from an already high 22 percent to over 87 percent. Billionaire Pritzker is the younger brother of Penny Pritzker, the Obama campaign bundler who was appointed Secretary of Commerce by President Obama last year.

This past spring, the Colorado legislature considered a bill to establish “pay for success contracts for early childhood education services program for the purpose of authorizing the office of state planning and budgeting (OSPB) to enter into state pay for success contracts with one or more lead contractors for the provision of early childhood education services that will reduce the need for the state to provide subsequent education support and other social services.” However, in May, the state senate chose to delay further consideration of legislation for the time being.

Funded by the Duke Endowment and the Doris Duke Charitable Foundation, the Institute for Child Success issued a report in May with an enthusiastic endorsement of expanding the Nurse-Family Partnership program and other home visitation programs in South Carolina, concluding that “Pay for Success is a feasible and promising way to improve outcomes for South Carolina children.” It should be no surprise, as the Institute has issued glowing reports on the feasibility of pay-for-success in September 2013 and January 2014 preceding this latest analysis.

In California, the Nonprofit Finance Fund (long supported on SIB/PFS activity by the Rockefeller Foundation) and the James Irvine Foundation have launched the California Pay for Success Initiative. As of May, NFF and Irvine announced the selection of five projects: the Center for Employment Opportunities and REDF to reduce recidivism and increase employment prospects for formerly incarcerated persons in San Diego County; the County of Los Angeles to “support the development of a County Blueprint for use by Los Angeles County Supervisors and executives in assessing and implementing potential Pay for Success opportunities”; the City and County of San Francisco to “enable greater focus on preventative services that is aligned with the Mayor’s strategic priorities in workforce development, housing, public health and human services”; the County of Santa Clara for two projects for “the chronically homeless and the acutely mentally ill” including the provision of 100 units of permanent supportive housing; and the Nurse-Family Partnership, “to scale its home visitation program in multiple Bay Area and Orange County locations.” Social Finance, the consulting entity involved in much of the SIB thinking around the country, also reports that it has been working with the California Endowment since 2013 on a “demonstration project in Fresno, California to reduce costs related to the treatment of children with asthma through active management. If the pilot program, which launched in April 2013, is successful, the partners plan to scale the intervention through a Social Impact Bond (SIB).”

Ohio also has a number of Pay-for-Success projects being considered. In Cuyahoga County, the PFS project would “help homeless children stay with their own families and avoid the foster care system.” The partners in this effort include Frontline, a provider of mental health services for homeless individuals, the county’s Division of Children and Family Services, the Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority, Case Western Reserve’s Center on Urban Poverty and Community Development, and Third Sector Capital Partners. Like the California program, Ohio’s exploration of SIB possibilities is related to a grant award from the Rockefeller Foundation to establish new SIB projects around the nation.

Ohio’s governor, Republican John Kasich, welcomed the Rockefeller Foundation SIB initiative in his state. In Illinois, a similar effort linked to the Rockefeller Foundation has spurred Governor Pat Quinn to launch efforts to explore SIB possibilities addressing recidivism rates, school graduation rates, and lowering hospital readmission rates. Quinn announced the SIB effort at the annual meeting of the Council on Foundations, prompting the Rockefeller Foundation CEO Judith Rodin to laud the governor for his “visionary leadership in advancing innovative ideas.” The first of Illinois’s SIB projects was announced earlier this year, a Pay for Success initiative to increase support for at-risk youth. The project is sponsored by One Hope United as the lead provider for the Conscience Community Network, a collaboration of seven longstanding child welfare service agencies. Providing technical assistance to the effort is, as in other situations, Third Sector Capital Partners.

Connecticut had legislation pending in 2013 and reintroduced in 2014 that would have authorized something akin to a Social Impact Bond, but the specific language seems to limit the structure of the SIB for “accepting a United States Department of Justice fiscal year 2012 Second Chance Act Adult Offender Reentry Program Demonstration Category 2 Implementation grant.”

Legislation in Rhode Island this year that would have authorized a SIB pilot program and created a study commission stalled in the state senate as a result of concerns from some interests about the impact of SIBs leading to a tendency to privatize some state services and that the promoters and financial beneficiaries of SIBs seemed to be large Wall Street firms. A significant part of the opposition was led by the state chapter of the American Federation of State County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME). Jim Cenerini, the legislative affairs director and political action coordinator for AFSCME Council 94, explained, “Our skepticism comes from the fact that the impetus for this was created by a large Wall Street corporation that obviously has something to gain, ideologically and financially, from the implementation of these bonds. It seems wrong that already very wealthy individuals should be able to make money off of reducing recidivism.”

Hawaii’s Department of Budget and Finance presented a report to the state legislature in December 2013 examining the feasibility of using Social Impact Bonds for early childhood education programs, concluding that “while there is much excitement about SIBs from various sectors of society, including government, philanthropy and investment banking…SIBs are in an infancy stage and have many complexities, [and therefore] it may be prudent to wait at least a few years to see whether SIBs grow into a viable financing tool.”

All of these state government initiatives follow earlier major state SIB announcements, such as a program in Massachusetts in 2012 that included an effort to increase the number of supportive housing units to be produced in partnership with the Massachusetts Housing and Shelter Alliance, the Corporation for Supportive Housing, Third Sector Capital Partners, and the United Way of Massachusetts Bay and Merrimack Valley, and Minnesota’s Pay for Performance Act, which authorized $10 million in Human Capital Performance (HUCAP) bonds for a variation of the SIB model.

The reality is that introducing legislation that adapts the standard language of SIBs, much like the legislation that spread for a couple of years promoting low profit limited liability corporations (L3Cs), is relatively easy. Getting legislation passed and seeing SIBs come to fruition and success are much more difficult. Many states have witnessed SIB legislation come and go over the years. The problem, as the Minnesota Council of Nonprofits’ Jon Pratt told Nicole Wallace of the Chronicle of Philanthropy, is that SIBs have “been overpromoted and oversold…We have yet to have a single transaction completed, and yet multiple states and multiple agencies are jumping ahead.”

Pratt’s point is at the crux of the matter. Any critical thought about SIBs gets volumes of commentary from legions of SIB promoters such as Social Finance, Third Sector Capital Partners, and a bevy of consultants who hope for roles and stakes in the movement. Few researchers have issued much in the way of critical commentary. With foundations such as Irvine, the California Endowment, and particularly the Rockefeller Foundation, whose former VP is now leading the Nonprofit Finance Fund in the SIB movement, it isn’t hard to imagine how much easier it is to get funding to write supportive analyses about the upsides of SIBs and how difficult it might be to get support for critical reviews.

With this beehive of activity promoting SIBs and PFS, none of which have reached a point where they demonstrate success or failure, how much do we really know about the concept? Writing in The Hill last month, Deborah Smolover, the executive director of New Profit’s America Forward, suggested some interesting conclusions about this relatively young policy concept—or about the assumptions behind it. She wrote, “Too often, public programs have no incentive to find the most productive providers. In many cases, they don’t even measure results, making it hard to tell which providers are the most effective. By failing to track outcomes, decoupling funding from effectiveness, and prioritizing compliance with rules (and even proscribing new approaches), most government programs actually discourage innovation.”

Noting that “this innovation cycle rarely operates in the public sphere,” Smolover writes, “In the business world, the opposite is true. There, new value is created every day through innovation. The concept is simple: A product, service, or process is invented and tested. If it is successful, it attracts investment to take it to market, and then to expand its reach. Profits gleaned from the invention can be reinvested in research and development efforts that will result in continuous improvement or new inventions that will displace the original. And if customers don’t want the product, it goes away (unlike government programs that may stay in existence long past their useful life.)”

Besides being an unbelievable slight to everyone who has tried—and in many cases, succeeded—in making government work for poor people in the solution of social problems, Smolover’s view of a pristine private market that doesn’t promote and sell products that people don’t need or that cause harm is almost quaint. Will SIBs and PFS initiatives supported by investors from Goldman Sachs, Bank of America, or J.B. Pritzker lead suddenly to a creative, innovative governmental sector woken from the doldrums that Smolover and her colleagues think envelop those of us who have worked for government? Will, somehow, private sector principles work where government has purportedly failed?

That’s the bet that Ted Cruz, Todd Young, and New Profit are making, imagining evidence of success in SIBs and PFS that really hasn’t been achieved yet, here or overseas. It’s a public policy bet that has legislators of both parties and at the national, state, and local levels hopeful that private capital will somehow discover and fund public policy solutions that wouldn’t come to the fore without SIBs. It is a bipartisan dream built on a belief in the efficacy of the free market system that hasn’t borne much social progress fruit in recent years and rooted in a disparaging view of public servants, who have accomplished more than most free market true believers might ever guess.

WRITTEN BY RICK COHEN JULY 2014 13:59




Army Corps to Solicit Public Comment on P3 Pilot Program for Water Projects.

The Army Corps of Engineers will hold a “listening session” on Aug. 27 to solicit ideas and recommendations from the public on ways it can implement a new pilot authority to establish public-private partnerships for building water infrastructure.

The session is one of four the Corps will hold in August and September to gather public comment on implementing various provisions in the recently enacted Water Resources Reform and Development Act (WRRDA). The legislation requires the Corps to develop a P3 pilot program allowing non-federal partners to carry out water resource development projects, including coastal harbor improvement, channel improvement, inland navigation, flood damage reduction, aquatic ecosystem restoration, and hurricane and storm damage reduction. Up to 15 projects are authorized under the program.

The Aug. 27 session will focus on alternative financing through contributions from nonfederal interests and innovative financing for water utility improvements. The other three sessions will cover the following topics:

The Aug. 13 session will focus on deauthorizations, backlog prevention and project development and delivery

On Sept. 10, the Corps will discuss safety issues on the nation’s levees and dams and other regulatory issues.

The final listening session on Sept. 24 will cover non-federal implementation, water supply and reservoir issues and navigation issues on the national waterways.

The listening sessions will take place via webinar, allowing participants to join by telephone or Internet, according to the Federal Register announcement. The Corps will also gather written comments from the public throughout the comment period.

WRRDA authorized an estimated $5.4 billion for Corps projects between 2015 and 2019 and will cover construction and maintenance of locks, dams, levees, navigation channels, harbors and environmental restoration projects.

July 30, 2014




U.S. Treasury to Put Public Pensions Under Scrutiny.

Aug 4 (Reuters) – The Treasury Department’s new office on state and local finance will scrutinize public pensions, appointing a specialist in the area and becoming a resource for retirement planning, its inaugural director said in a speech on Monday.

State and Local Finance Office Director Kent Hiteshew told a meeting of the Council of State Governments that he had appointed the chief investment officer of Maryland’s pension fund as a policy adviser who “will substantially strengthen our office’s understanding of the critical challenges facing a system upon which approximately 23 million Americans depend … for their retirement security.”

Saying that state and local pensions now have enough money to cover only 72 percent of their costs, in comparison to nearly 100 percent in 2000, Hiteshew added that very few pensions are well-funded.

“While the current underfunding started prior to the Great Recession, this was exacerbated by both market forces and trying fiscal times during the last few years,” he added.

Public pensions had $4.89 trillion in assets in the first quarter of 2014, the highest on record, according to data from the U.S. Federal Reserve. But they also had the largest liabilities on record going back to 1945 – $5.03 trillion – and their funding gap has widened since the 2007-2009 recession.

That recession devastated investment returns, which are the chief revenue source for pensions, while simultaneously forcing states to cut retirement contributions. While investments are gaining and many states have increased contributions, public pensions face a bulge of retirees from the “Baby Boom” generation.

Hiteshew’s office will study the state of public pensions and help retirement systems evaluate their financial conditions, and it will look into the growing costs of retiree healthcare.

Also on the office’s agenda are President Barack Obama’s push for more infrastructure financing, including creating a program akin to Build America Bonds, and continued monitoring of the financial situation in Detroit and Puerto Rico.

Build America Bonds were created by the 2009 economic stimulus plan, and the program expired in 2011.

The once popular bonds, which were taxable and paid issuers a hefty rebate, lost their appeal when the rebates were cut during congressional budget battles. Issuers have been slow to warm to Obama’s proposal of “America Fast Forward” bonds that follow the same model, and which the administration says would be protected from spending cuts.

Hiteshew, formerly J.P. Morgan’s managing director for public finance in its northeast region, also intends to help improve liquidity, pricing transparency and financial disclosure in the $3.7 trillion U.S. municipal bond market.

The Treasury Department announced the creation of the office in April, nearly two years after John Cross left his position as associate tax legislative counsel at Treasury, where he had spearheaded major municipal bond initiatives.

The federal government’s heightened interest in the market is apparent across many agencies, including the Securities and Exchange Commission. On Friday, Republican Commissioner Michael Piwowar called for better municipal bond pricing information in the market.

Tue Aug 5, 2014 2:00am IST

(Reporting By Lisa Lambert; Editing by Paul Simao)




GASB: What You Need to Know About Accounting for Leases.

Governments regularly enter into leases for any number of reasons. Leasing can often be an attractive option for governments to have the benefit of certain necessary items—including vehicles, heavy equipment, and buildings—without having to purchase them outright.

Leasing also can offer greater flexibility to governments who do not need the items for their entire useful lives, or to governments who do not wish, at least initially, to take on the burden of ownership. Some governments also lease assets of their own to others.

In the lease accounting area, the existing GASB guidance is nearly identical to the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s (FASB) guidance. Because the FASB has an active lease accounting project underway, it makes sense for the GASB to look at its existing lease accounting standards to consider whether changes would be appropriate.

The Board is very much engaged in deliberating lease accounting issues viewed through the governmental lens, but is closely monitoring the FASB’s leases project and the approaches the FASB has elected to take thus far.

Last summer, as the GASB was preparing to begin deliberations on its lease accounting project, the FASB project staff presented an education session to GASB members to brief them on the FASB leasing proposals. Since then, the GASB and FASB project teams have been meeting periodically to discuss project issues and tentative decisions made by the respective Boards.

A major area of consideration in the GASB project on lease accounting relates to the manner in which leases are shown in the financial statements (and disclosed in the notes) that would meet essential financial statement user needs. The project is considering the following issues:

Based on deliberations to date, the Board has tentatively decided to propose a new accounting model for both lessees and lessors that would eliminate the current distinction between operating and capital leases.

All lessee governments would report in their financial statements:

This would apply for all leases except those that meet the definition of a short-term lease. During the lease term, government lessees would report a lease expense that is composed of:

Government lessors would recognize a receivable for the right to receive payments and a corresponding deferred inflow of resources. Over the lease term, the deferred inflow would be systematically reduced and reported as lease revenue. Lessors would not remove the leased asset from their financial statements.

The GASB is scheduled to release its initial lease proposal later in 2014.




S&P: Why Unfunded Congressional Mandates Pose Little Threat to U.S. State and Local Government Ratings.

Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services has long held the view that U.S. state and local governments enjoy a significant level of fiscal autonomy from the federal government that many of their international peers do not. With locally derived revenue streams, the discretion to determine service levels, and the ability to raise revenues, state and local governments generally have greater autonomy than local governments in countries where the central government controls finances. This forms the foundation of a more limited rating relationship between the U.S. federal government and U.S. state and local governments than exists in many other countries around the globe.

Continue Reading.

29-Jul-2014




McKinsey: Creating Growth Clusters: What Role for Local Government?

A systematic approach to implementation could help start-up ecosystems flourish.

Many governments in industrialized countries aim to encourage entrepreneurship and start-up activity to spur job creation and economic growth. To what extent governments are capable of doing so is uncertain. Nonetheless, policy makers at the regional and municipal levels are closer to the sources of innovation than those at the national level. For example, innovation in the form of start-up activity tends to occur in large metropolitan areas, initially without the involvement of policy makers. Take Berlin, where a vibrant ecosystem developed in the past several years without systematic government intervention.

While an enabling policy context might not be a precondition for seeding entrepreneurial activity, it may become more critical when taking a cluster to scale. To flourish, entrepreneurial activity requires a concentration of talent, infrastructure, capital, and networks—key success factors of a start-up ecosystem, as epitomized by Silicon Valley. Not all economic-policy instruments aimed at nurturing start-ups are at the city level. Still, local policy makers should think systematically about what it takes to support a start-up ecosystem. When doing so, their focus could be on tackling the bottlenecks and constraints that might otherwise inhibit a vibrant start-up ecosystem rather than picking winners by supporting investment in particular sectors or business models.

More specifically, such local initiatives can help link entrepreneurs to schools and universities, ease administrative matters for foreign workers and founders wishing to settle in a location, support development of suitable infrastructure and connectivity, and communicate and market the attractiveness of a location vis-à-vis other start-up centers. New York, for example, founded a tech campus for applied sciences; Tel Aviv built working spaces for entrepreneurs; Berlin is in the process of setting up a privately managed fund to raise capital for start-ups.

Establishing a coherent and supportive entrepreneurial policy at the city level is challenging. Municipal decision makers should identify bottlenecks in the start-up ecosystem and design and carry out initiatives to address them. These moves require a project-oriented, dynamic, and capable organizational structure. This article outlines an implementation approach that local policy makers can use to strengthen a start-up ecosystem. It discusses, in particular, the concept of the start-up delivery unit—an approach employed recently by the mayor and municipal government of Berlin.

Spurring innovation in a dynamic, multistakeholder environment

Berlin, London, New York, and Tel Aviv are cities that stand out for their vibrant start-up ecosystems. London started its East London Tech City in 2010; New York and Tel Aviv have established New York Digital City and Start-up City Tel Aviv. In 2014, Berlin started implementing several initiatives.

These cities faced common challenges in defining and carrying out the initiatives, including having to deal with many stakeholders that create the potential for bottlenecks. A successful start-up policy must fulfill two requirements:

We have found that start-up delivery units—situated primarily in the mayor’s office—are an effective, pragmatic way of realizing these two requirements. Start-up delivery units are inspired by broader governmental delivery units, an approach employed worldwide to facilitate program implementation. Governments have used delivery units for more than 15 years to rigorously track performance, identify obstacles early, solve problems, and correct course. They vary in scope and size but generally are not too large. They can be centralized or within line agencies. McKinsey’s study of delivery units and work with governments on them show that the most successful share several important characteristics: an outstanding leader with a track record of delivering outcomes, direct access to top leadership, talented staff with excellent communication and problem-solving skills, and the ability to use soft power to influence ministries.

Employing a start-up delivery unit

A delivery unit drives and coordinates start-up activities and helps cities progress much more rapidly than they otherwise might. The unit should mirror as much as possible the ad hoc way start-ups do business and provide a credible focal point for immediate problem resolution, stakeholder engagement, and response. We have identified three important steps to launch a start-up delivery unit.

Hiring the right talent

Policy makers’ experience in London and New York suggests that finding the right kind of people to work in start-up delivery units is challenging. The participants must understand how to function not only in the volatile world of start-ups but also in the steadier, slower-paced environment of public administration. Successful start-up delivery units hire an established entrepreneur as their managing director and seek the best talent they can find from within public administration and established companies. Rotating employees in and out of the unit can help it remain fresh, open to new ideas, and improve dialogues.

One way to help overcome skepticism of start-ups toward policy makers is engaging an established entrepreneur to lead the delivery unit. In London, Eric van der Kleij, the founder of the successful start-up Adeptra, was appointed to lead the London Tech City Investment Organisation (TCIO); in New York, Rachel Sterne Haot, the former CEO of the global crowdsourced news start-up GroundReport, was appointed chief digital officer of the NYC Digital program.

The job description should be similar to other top government or private-sector roles. The ability to truly shape the city’s start-up ecosystem is critical. Direct reporting lines to the mayor ensure not only flatter hierarchies and clear chains of command but also imply a career launchpad for the managing director of the unit through enhanced visibility. Of course, competitive salaries and sufficient budget help attract talent as well. London’s TCIO, for example, has an annual budget of £2.1 million pounds, 61 percent of which is spent on the salaries of the delivery unit.

Even competent leadership will only succeed if complemented by a cutting-edge team consisting of 8 to 12 talented private- and public-sector employees. Getting start-up founders themselves to dedicate substantial time is difficult. Instead, the delivery unit could aim for entrepreneurial talent from other private-sector companies and government bodies. London’s TCIO hired staff from Siemens, as well as long-term public servants previously involved in trade and investment promotion.

Additionally, to ensure the delivery unit will not revert to the somewhat slower-paced world of public administration, permanent rotation of staff into and out of the unit is an option and has proved to boost morale in other public-sector contexts (for example, in Denmark, Germany, and Norway).

Conducting ‘delivery labs’

Once the delivery-unit team is in place, a “delivery lab” can be used to inject ideas and translate high-level strategies into detailed implementation plans. A lab is an intense problem-solving environment that collocates the 20 to 40 key people needed to crack a problem. Delivery labs can also help build team spirit and momentum. Labs may comprise workshops of several days with relevant stakeholders, including venture capitalists, corporations, start-ups, diverse levels of governments, universities, and research institutes. For instance, the lab would attempt to pinpoint the key areas of actions in a start-up ecosystem. Questions like the following may be answered: What can we do to increase capital availability in our city? How can we ensure there are enough coworking spaces at reasonable prices? Taking into account that the start-up environment changes rapidly, analyses and solutions should be updated regularly. Ideally, such labs are conducted annually.

To assess the status of a start-up ecosystem in a delivery lab, a systematic and data-driven analysis aiming to clearly define and redefine the challenges to be addressed is valuable. By providing a data-driven basis for decision making, this analysis not only aids in obtaining buy-in of stakeholders but also helps the delivery unit to regularly update problem definitions and identify the root causes of problems.

Based on the problem definitions and the identified root causes, delivery labs can also be used to assess whether existing solutions are still adequate. Some employ “premortem analysis,” a managerial tool used in the private sector to identify implementation obstacles (exhibit). In step one of such an analysis, all initiatives to be implemented are outlined. Then, delivery-lab participants are asked to imagine a worst-case scenario for each initiative and predict why it might fail. Next, responses to each potential failure are designed. To track the progress of initiatives, some start-up delivery units publish an annual report after a delivery lab.

July 2014 | byJulian Kirchherr, Gundbert Scherf, and Katrin Suder




Momentum Continues to Build for P3S.

Interest in P3s continues to grow as governments aim to stretch their tax dollars earmarked for infrastructure projects, an expert panel told an audience Monday at NCPPP’s P3 Connect.

In an era of shrinking government and a public weary of the private sector’s profit motive, the key to project success is conducting a thorough financial review, open communication with the public and the willingness of local officials to understand these complex projects.

“There’s a big difference in P3s for railroads, airports, waterworks, highways and roads and utilities and we need to put them on a spectrum of how different they are from one another,” said Diana Carew, economist and director of the Young American Prosperity Project at the Progressive Policy Institute. “What they do all have in common is the need for the proper policy and legislative framework. There are still some states that lack P3 frameworks.”

Lately, the private sector’s sustained interest in P3s has begun to be shared by government agencies recognizing the role P3s can play in building infrastructure, according to Bill Johnson, director of Miami-Dade Water and Sewer.

Public support for partnerships continues to be an important determinant in the success of P3s, the panelists agreed.

“For the public, having an understanding what a P3 contract is trying to achieve is so important,” Len Gilroy, director of government reform at the Reason Foundation, told the audience. “What may be intuitive for a policymaker may not translate for members of the public. Communicating the decision-making process is very important.”

Finally, the panelists noted the importance of seeking outside advice when entering into P3s.

“Ultimately, much of the financial counseling public agencies look for can be outsourced,” said Emilia Istrate, director of research and outreach at the National Association of Counties. Of the 31 pieces of legislation proposed at a state level in 2011, 14 expressly allowed public agencies to bring in external consultants to help explain the complexities of P3s and to help the state work with the private sector, according to Istrate.

P3 Connect: Defining the Future of P3s in the U.S will run through Wednesday.​

By Editor July 29, 2014




Should Someone Audit Government Auditors?

There’s a push for local governments to establish independent audit committees.

The California state auditor’s office raised lots of eyebrows around Sacramento last spring. In an annual review of the state’s financial statements, auditors identified more than $30 billion worth of errors. They found faulty accounting assumptions, transactions recognized incorrectly and simple arithmetic mistakes, among other problems. Fortunately, these errors were corrected before the final financial report was published.

In a state with almost $300 billion of assets, enormous pension funds and dozens of quasi-independent entities under its purview, a few small mistakes can quickly add up to $30 billion. Controller John Chiang, whose office prepares the financial statements, characterized many of these as honest errors attributable to understaffing and a lack of clear internal procedures — fixable problems.

In fact, there are those who think this is how public financial governance should work: An entity within the government that is also independent of it reviews that government’s financial policies, procedures and reports. When that entity finds errors it shares those errors directly with the governing body. The government then fixes those mistakes. For those who subscribe to this more “corporate” style of financial governance, the California episode is an uplifting story of what’s possible. It might also illustrate things to come.

Throughout the past decade, public companies have overhauled their financial governance practices. Much of that change was brought about by the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act passed in the wake of the Enron scandal. Enron was a colossal mess in part because its auditors rarely questioned management’s aggressive accounting and financial reporting tactics.

In the post-Sarbanes-Oxley world, public companies must establish, among other things, an independent audit committee that oversees the financial audit process, reviews financial policies and procedures, and generally monitors a company’s financial inner-workings. If the audit committee spots a problem, it can circumvent management and report directly to the company’s board of directors.

Experts disagree — sometimes pointedly — about whether these reforms have worked, but there’s no question that these reforms changed financial governance forever.

States and big cities that elect an auditor or create an audit committee can realize many of these oversight benefits. According to some recent academic research in this area, only about one-third of smaller local governments and one-half of big cities have voluntarily established an independent audit function. Most that have not say their internal controls and other financial governance structures are strong enough. Others say audit committees are so politically sensitive that the benefits don’t usually outweigh the costs.

But this might change. Around the time the California auditor’s office published its findings, the Association of Local Government Auditors (ALGA), the main professional association in this area, published its long-awaited guidance on independent audit committees. ALGA recommended that local governments not only establish an independent audit committee, but also make certain that the committee includes financial experts who are not members of the governing body. The guidance goes on to say that properly resourced audit committees should have access to outside experts who can help make sense of complex or unforeseen financial issues.

Hypothetically, this could include everything from decisions about whether to issue debt to the funding of pension plans to how much money to keep in a rainy day fund.

ALGA’s message is subtle, but clear: As public finance becomes ever more complex, even small local governments need a competent, vigilant, independent and expansive voice to make sure the public’s money is managed prudently. The independent audit committee model is far from perfect, but it seems to have emerged as the go-to model, for now.

GOVERNING.COM
BY JUSTIN MARLOWE | AUGUST 2014




Pushing the Community Reinvestment Act into Unchartered Territory.

A handful of communities are putting CRA funds toward more than just housing projects.

A health clinic in the San Francisco Bay Area. A transit-oriented development in Denver. A mixed-use plan in a run-down neighborhood in Dallas. When it comes to how these places and a handful of others view and leverage the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), they are breaking through old barriers.

All of which brings a measure of satisfaction to Bob McNulty, longtime community development activist and president of Partners for Livable Communities. These are exactly the sort of CRA-funded projects that he would like to see take root all across the country.

For years, however, it’s been a challenge to move the key players in any CRA deal — banks, regulators and community development advocates — in new directions. The reason gets down to a basic tenet of the CRA: The program, aimed at low- and moderate-income neighborhoods, is rooted in housing. As a result, there has been resistance and a good deal of caution when it comes to thinking about investing in new and different things.

Part of that resistance revolves around an active game of finger-pointing. Banks say that regulators aren’t willing to be open-minded about different types of investment, so they’re stuck in the housing box. Regulators say they are more than willing to work with banks on testing new investment strategies aimed at low- and moderate-income neighborhoods, but that the banks are evincing a chronic failure of imagination. Community development activists complain that regulators are, in general, going way too easy on banks when it comes to crediting them for “CRA-worthy investments.” There is, the activists say, chronic grade inflation.

McNulty describes it succinctly as a “conspiracy of caution,” where bankers and regulators have settled into a comfortable routine of business as usual. Bankers don’t have to think very hard about new ways to invest in communities. Regulators can cruise along in their comfort zone of monitoring straightforward home loans and housing projects.

There is no doubt that when the CRA was passed, it was aimed primarily at housing. The impetus for it was a disturbing pattern of active disinvestment by banks in low-income and minority areas around the country, particularly with mortgages but also in the area of small business loans. Called “redlining” — because it appeared that banks were drawing red lines around population centers where they considered residents to be bad bets for loans — the practice finally got the attention of the U.S. Senate Banking Committee in the mid-1970s.

At that time, a two-year Banking Committee study found a clear pattern of redlining nationally. Just over 10 percent of money deposited in Brooklyn banks was actually reinvested in the community. Only 10 percent of deposits in Washington, D.C., were reinvested there, with similar ratios turning up in key cities like Cleveland, Indianapolis, Los Angeles and St. Louis. By then, Congress had apparently seen enough, and, over the strong protests of those in high finance, it passed the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977.

Under the new law, banks were being asked to redirect a portion of their lending capital to low- and medium-income areas within a defined geographical range covered by the bank. Regulators would, in turn, do regular reviews of bank lending practices to gauge compliance. There has long been a debate about what sort of investments the CRA should focus on and which ones pass muster. Today, there’s an additional debate about “geography” and “banking.” There’s a new world of Internet finance and spinoff financial institutions. Some of these financial entities aren’t technically banks, but they are key to homeownership and other housing projects.

Under the CRA there aren’t any fines or other direct penalties for failure to measure up. But a bank’s ranking — either “outstanding,” “satisfactory,” “needs to improve” or “substantial noncompliance” — determines whether or not it will win approvals from federal regulators for such key business moves as adding a branch or proceeding with a merger.

For years, some community development activists, like McNulty, have been arguing that bankers and regulators ought to think more holistically about investing in low- and moderate-income areas. That is, there’s more to a community than just housing, that a community’s economic welfare is directly affected by creating more livable places generally and helping build a healthy, educated and prosperous populace specifically. It appears that those who are pushing for that more sweeping view are starting to gain traction.

“There’s some movement in getting out of the affordable housing box,” says Ellen Seidman, a senior fellow at the Urban Institute, who focuses on housing finance and community development. The perception, she adds, has been that regulators “don’t have a lot of creativity or imagination and that lenders didn’t want to take risks.” In order to break the chicken-and-egg cycle, “You need chicken, eggs and farmers,” she says.

As it turns out, one of those farmers is a fed. Elizabeth Sobel Blum, senior community development adviser with the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, is a proponent of a growing movement for a much broader view of CRA investment. Writing in a recent federal reserve paper aimed at CRA compliance officers, she called for a “healthy communities framework” that “involves creating an environment in which there is an abundance of healthy choices.” She notes that there aren’t any “right answers” when it comes to evaluating a bank’s compliance, but she wouldn’t mind seeing banks credited for more than just helping with housing or small business development.

Other feds appear to be joining the chorus. “We do try to promote creativity,” says Paul Kaboth, vice president for community development at the Cleveland Federal Reserve. His shop is actively working with banks to think more broadly about things like skills training, social services, counseling and day care. “You don’t look at it as just housing or small business loans as much as what you’re providing to low- and moderate-income individuals,” he says. The rub, he suggests, is not so much bankers’ resistance to new ideas as their basic conservatism.

Nonetheless, some major financial players like Wells Fargo, Goldman Sachs and FirstBank are getting into the CRA game. As they do, there are adjustments that bankers need to make. CRA is different than the usual deal-making. “Lots of players have to be involved,” says Rob Chaney, who oversees loan operations for FirstBank in Lakewood, Colo., “and someone has to be the champion. There’s a great need for someone to beat the square peg into the round hole.”

As to state and local government, Chaney sees a potential role for the public sector to work in concert with community development organizations. Together, they could come up with more sophisticated investment options for a wide range of issues facing communities beyond housing. In that regard, community activists may have to step up their game. By way of example, he points to the issue of food deserts — the lack of fresh food or supermarkets in low-income neighborhoods. “The tendency,” he says, “is to just throw money at the problem versus asking if there’s a sustainable business model that we can help build that gets businesses to come in and invest, and that has community involvement and engagement to prove that people are really interested in solving these issues over the long term.” The target community itself has to mobilize for banks to have confidence in a deal, he notes.

Indeed, the most successful initiatives are the ones where the community is involved from the start. “When I look at successful community development projects,” says Karl Zavitkovsky, who heads up Dallas’ Office of Economic Development, “it’s important to have community buy-in and it’s important to have a willing financial institution. You can do things in a physical sense, but if the community isn’t aware of the new clinic or new school or retail center, it just doesn’t work as well.”

Acting as a convener is one very important role the city can play, Zavitkovsky points out. But cities can do a lot more than simply be a meeting site for principals. Cities can help assemble viable parcels for development, put up city money to sweeten a given deal and perhaps help convince financiers that a city is willing to be a real partner in a project.

For example, Dallas just cut the ribbon on a project that is located next to a light rail line station and is across the street from a VA Hospital, which employs 4,000 people and generates a huge volume of patient traffic. Despite the location, there’s never been much there in terms of services or livable housing. Local community groups, banks and developers came together to focus attention and investment on the area. For its part, the city bought the land, tore down some “hot sheet” hotels and swung some tax increment financing to help underwrite debt service on a U.S. Housing and Urban Development loan.

The new mixed-use project, Lancaster Urban Village, boasts an 18,000-square-foot development of retail shops along with a couple hundred apartments — a mix of market rate and affordable that made the project CRA-worthy. The project is in a section of Dallas that represents half the city’s geographical area but that only delivers 15 percent of the city’s tax base. That factor alone made the project important from a broad economic development standpoint. And, yes, to be CRA-worthy, such projects have to occur in a low- to moderate-income area, “but when you’re looking to be successful in a neighborhood, it’s really important to have a holistic approach,” Zavitkovsky says.

For banks, that low- to moderate-income test should be as much of a focus as the type of project being funded, says the Cleveland Fed’s Kaboth. “The worst possible outcome for a bank’s CRA officer,” he says, “is you go to your oversight committee and say we should do these loans in these Census areas and there’s reluctance because they’re not sure they’ll get CRA credits.” That’s why he is happy discussing potential projects beforehand, although banks still need to understand that the proof will be in the finished pudding.

Given the success of several alternative and mixed-use projects involving the CRA, it’s clear that there are bankers and regulators ready to disrupt the tradition of caution and move into previously uncharted territory. At that, though, the best projects are still the ones that make business sense, something on which regulators and bankers can certainly agree. “It has to make sense from a business standpoint,” says FirstBank’s Chaney. “It can’t just be about the warm and fuzzy.”

GOVERNING.COM
BY JONATHAN WALTERS | AUGUST 2014




Do We Really Need to Keep Building Convention Centers?

As a new book illustrates, the promised benefits rarely materialize.

Politically, it’s almost irresistible. Revenue from hotel and other taxes, paid largely by people from other places, will be used to subsidize convention centers that lure those visitors to town to spend in hotels, stores and restaurants.

But a new book demonstrates a far less appealing reality. In “Convention Center Follies,” Heywood Sanders, a professor at the University of Texas at San Antonio, tells the tale of projects that continue to be built and expanded at a record pace even though they almost always fail to deliver the promised benefits.

There was a little over 36 million square feet of exhibition space in the United States in 1989. By 2011, that number had nearly doubled to 70.5 million. The problem is that in the midst of a decades-long convention-space explosion, demand has remained flat at best.

Sanders describes the usual scenario in which local convention or visitor-industry officials complain that a convention center is jammed to capacity or, worse, that lucrative events want to come but are too big for an existing facility. Consultants are retained, and they invariably endorse either building a new convention facility or expanding an existing one.

The idea behind convention centers is to bolster the local economy by attracting visitors who would otherwise spend their money elsewhere. The best measure of success is the number of hotel room-nights they generate.

Sanders’ numbers tell the real story. Washington, D.C.’s new convention center was supposed to deliver nearly 730,000 room-nights by 2010; the actual number for that year was less than 275,000. Austin, Texas’ expanded center was supposed to bring 314,000 room-nights by 2005 but produced just 149,000. The 2003 expansion of Portland, Ore.’s convention center was expected to yield between 280,000 and 290,000 room-nights, but the actual number was 127,000 — far less than before the center’s expansion. Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, Pittsburgh and Seattle are among other cities that have had similar experiences. The challenge is to find an exception to the rule.

That’s not all. When projects fail and debt service mounts, consultants routinely conclude that the center needs a “headquarters hotel,” which at the very least requires a large public subsidy. Sometimes the lack of developer interest results in the hotel being publicly owned. It’s a classic example of finding yourself in a hole and continuing to dig.

Many factors result in convention center feasibility studies dramatically overestimating economic impact, but one that stands out is the fact that about half of convention attendees are generally local-area residents who would still spend their money in the region if there weren’t a convention to go to. Consultants generally assume that each convention attendee will stay in a hotel for three nights or more. But because of the preponderance of locals, the reality is generally about one room-night for each attendee.

The consultants don’t compare their past projections against actual performance or use that performance to inform future estimates. Sanders quotes one such consultant, Charles H. Johnson, from a 2005 legal deposition: “Once the deal is done, if we’re not engaged, we … give them our report, our final invoice, and wish them good luck.”

And the consultants routinely use expansions that are underway in other cities (often undertaken at those same consultants’ urging) as evidence of why subsequent clients need to expand to remain competitive. Another consultant, Jeff Sachs, was blunt in his comments to Forbes, saying, “You lose clients if you shoot down projects.”

Sanders makes a strong case for what he believes to be the real goals behind convention-center development. Sometimes it’s to increase area property values. Boston is an example of a new convention center being used to help jump-start a developing neighborhood. In other cases, the facility is seen as an anchor to insure against downtown erosion or, in cities like St. Louis, part of an effort to reverse neighborhood erosion.

All are worthy goals. But taxpayers deserve an honest debate about whether building or expanding a convention center is an effective way to achieve them. And the debate should be informed by realistic economic-impact projections. What we don’t need is a continuation of the charade in which elected officials, local business leaders and convention consultants tout benefits that at least some of them know will never materialize.

GOVERNING.COM
BY CHARLES CHIEPPO | JULY 30, 2014




MMA Municipal Issuer Brief - July 28, 2014

Click to read the Brief.




California High-Speed Rail Bonds Revived by Appeals Court.

The California High-Speed Rail Authority can issue $8.6 billion in bonds to finance the U.S.’s first bullet train, a state appeals court ruled, putting the beleaguered $68 billion project back on track in a win for California Governor Jerry Brown.

While the proposed line from San Francisco to Los Angeles still faces several lawsuits, yesterday’s ruling by a three-judge state appeals court panel in Sacramento removes a substantial roadblock to the project.

The agency suffered a setback in November when a state judge blocked it from issuing the bonds, saying its finance committee didn’t adequately disclose reasons for the financing. The judge told the authority to withdraw its funding plan. The decision threatened to delay and increase the cost of the project, state officials said.

The appeals panel said California law doesn’t require the agency to provide any support or evidence to back up its decision approving issuance of the bonds, while warning that the project still faces hurdles.

“Substantial financial and environmental questions remain to be answered by the authority in the final funding plan the voters required for each corridor or usable segment of the project,” the court said. “But those questions are not before us.”

Funding Plan

The court also reversed the judge’s ruling that the rail authority had to redo its funding plan.

“The High-Speed Rail Authority has always been committed to building a modern high-speed rail system that will connect the state, precisely as the voters called,” agency board chairman Dan Richard said by e-mail. “This system will be a clean, fast, non-subsidized service, and will create jobs and enable smart, sustainable growth while preserving farmland and habitat.”

There will be more legal challenges, said lawyers for the project’s opponents, who are also weighing an appeal of yesterday’s ruling to the California Supreme Court.

Access Monies

“We still have, and the court so indicated, an opportunity to challenge the legality of the authority’s actions when the authority moves to the next step and actually tries to access the monies in the bond fund,” Michael Brady, the attorney for John Tos, a farmer who sued, said in an e-mail. “They have to apply for that money through a different section of the law, a section which is actually much tougher on the authority with respect to what it has to prove.”

The rail authority wants to lay tracks for trains running as fast as 220 miles (354 kilometers) an hour from San Francisco to Los Angeles. That became a more difficult goal after the U.S. Congress cut funds for such projects in 2012.

The state is buying land and rights-of-way needed for the rail line, which is scheduled to begin running three-hour trips by 2029. The project is being challenged by landowners, farmers and taxpayer groups, who say it has so deviated from the proposal approved by voters in 2008 that it’s now illegal.

The rail authority on July 24 won an appeals court ruling throwing out a challenge by some San Francisco Bay area cities to the routing of train tracks connecting the Bay area and the Central Valley. The court found that the environmental review of the project’s impact was sufficient.

The case is California High-Speed Rail Authority v. The Superior Court of Sacramento County, C075668, California Court of Appeal, 3rd District (Sacramento).

By Karen Gullo Aug 1, 2014 8:22 AM PT

To contact the reporter on this story: Karen Gullo in federal court in San Francisco at kgullo@bloomberg.net

To contact the editors responsible for this story: Michael Hytha at mhytha@bloomberg.net David Glovin, Charles Carter




Moody's: Q2 US Public Finance Rating Revisions Consistent with Stabilizing Trend.

New York, July 30, 2014 — Rating revisions in the second quarter were consistent with an overall trend toward stabilizing credit quality in the US public finance sector, says Moody’s Investors Service. Although the number of rating downgrades outpaced upgrades, the amount of debt Moody’s upgraded surpassed the debt it downgraded for the first time in six years, a result of large state government upgrades including California and New York.

Despite stabilizing trends across public finance sectors, Moody’s expects downgrades to continue to exceed upgrades during 2014, but with the possibility of further improvement over the next several quarters.

As usual, the vast majority of ratings remained unchanged during the second quarter, with movement found among only approximately 2% of all public finance ratings.

“Most public finance obligors will continue to see stability in their ratings as improving revenues and sound management practices support their credit profiles,” says Moody’s Analyst Chandra Ghosal. “However, some issuers across multiple sectors have not recovered all the ground lost during the recession. These include local governments with weak local economies, as well as colleges and hospitals with weak competitive positions.”

During the second quarter, upgrades equaled $158 billion and accounted for 65% of the total par value of debt that had a rating change. The upgrades of California, with $86 billion in debt, to Aa3 from A1, and New York, with $62 billion, to Aa1 from Aa2, accounted for a large majority of this total.

Also during the quarter, New Jersey, with $32 billion in debt, was downgraded to A1 from Aa3, and Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority, with $8.8 billion in debt, was downgraded to Ba3 from Ba2. (It was later downgraded to Caa2 on July 1.) These actions accounted for close to half of the $84 billion in debt downgraded.

In all there were 282 rating changes in the second quarter, 91 of which were upgrades and 191 of which were downgrades. In the first quarter of the year, there were 247 rating changes, 97 upgrades and 150 downgrades.

The 529 rating actions through the first six months of 2014 were a 12% increase over the first half of 2013. However, much of the activity arose from Moody’s US Local Government GO Methodology, which led to 256 local governments having their ratings being placed on review, with the final tally for rating actions at 95 upgrades and 68 downgrades.

“The methodology update had a modest impact on the sector, changing less than 2% of our nearly 8,300 local government GO ratings,” says Moody’s Ghosal.

For more information, Moody’s research subscribers can access this report at

https://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBM_PBM173274

Global Credit Research – 30 Jul 2014




GFOA Secures Introduction of Legislation to Expand Availability of Bank-Qualified Bonds.

Last week, a bipartisan group of House lawmakers introduced legislation (H.R. 5199) that would permanently raise the issuer limit on bank-qualified bonds from $10 million to $30 million. The legislation, which breathes new life into the effort to restore the annual issuer limit to $30 million, is the culmination of several months of work by GFOA’s Federal Liaison Center with the offices of congressmen Tom Reed (R-NY), Randy Hultgren (R-IL), John Larson (D-CT) and Richard Neal (D-MA).

Bank-qualified bonds were created in 1986 to give smaller issuers more cost-effective access to credit by allowing them to bypass the traditional underwriting system and sell their tax-exempt bonds directly to local banks. In addition to the higher costs of issuance in the normal underwriting process, many small issuers have a difficult time selling their bonds because investors are not as familiar with their jurisdictions. As a result of these factors, many small issuers have been forced to pay higher interest rates on their bond issuances. Recognizing the utility of bank-qualified bonds to overcome these cost barriers, Congress temporarily expanded their use by raising the issuer limit to $30 million annually in 2009, and as a result, the market for bank-qualified bonds increased in 2009 to approximately $32 billion. However, despite the effectiveness of bank-qualified bonds and bi-partisan support on Capitol Hill, Congress did not extend these provisions beyond their December 31, 2010, sunset date, and on January 1, 2011, the annual issuer limit for bank-qualified bonds reverted to $10 million.

The GFOA urges members to reach out to their members of Congress and request that they co-sponsor HR 5199.

Tuesday, July 29, 2014




S&P: U.S. Regulated Electric Utilities' Annual Capital Spending Is Poised To Eclipse $100 Billion.

In recent years, U.S. electric utilities have intensified their capital spending, in part, to update and replace aging infrastructure. They’ve also had to boost spending to pay for smart grid technology, increased security to safeguard against physical and cyber attacks, and system hardening to protect against more volatile weather. Moreover, the industry is now exploring ways to meet the required carbon pollution reductions under the EPA’s recently proposed Clean Power Plan, which seeks to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. Under this plan, utilities would likely generate less electricity from coal and more electricity from other less carbon-intensive sources, which would require significant incremental capital investments.

Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services believes this ever-growing need to fund improvement projects and comply with upcoming regulations could pressure utilities’ financial measures, resulting in almost consistent negative discretionary cash flow throughout this higher construction period. However, we expect that utilities will be able to maintain their largely investment-grade credit quality by effectively managing regulatory risk and possibly seeking new creative ways to finance the necessary higher spending levels.

Read the Report.




Ballard Spahr: President Obama Seeks to Expand Market for P3 Transportation Projects.

As part of his ongoing effort to urge Congress to address the nation’s critical infrastructure needs, President Obama recently announced the signing of an executive order creating the Build America Investment Initiative (the Initiative). This government-wide Initiative is intended to modernize roads, bridges, and other public infrastructure by complementing government funding with private capital, and could lead to more innovative project financing through public-private partnerships (P3s).

The Initiative is designed to encourage collaboration between state and local governments and the private sector, expand the market for P3s, and make greater use of existing federal tax credit programs. The President’s announcement serves as another reminder of how the federal government continues to shift subsidies for infrastructure from tax-exempt bonds to tax credits. The Initiative’s three major components are detailed below.

Under the oversight of the U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT), the Build America Transportation Center (the Center) will provide information and technical assistance about innovative financing strategies to state and local governments, public and private developers, and investors. Resources include:

‘Navigator Service” for the Public and Private Sector.  This service is designed to make USDOT tax credit programs more understandable and accessible to state and local governments and leverage both public and private project funding. In addition, it will provide resources for identifying and executing P3s to private sector development and infrastructure investors.

Improved Access to USDOT Credit Programs.  The Center will encourage awareness and efficient use of existing USDOT resources, including the Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) program. TIFIA provides financing and loan guarantees to transportation projects; each dollar of TIFIA funding can support about $10 in loans, loan guarantees, or lines of credit. The Center will also focus on the use of other key USDOT programs, including the Private Activity Bond program and the Railroad Rehabilitation and Improvement Financing Program.

Technical Assistance.  Best practices from states and communities that already have established successful P3s will be shared. Through a website and on-site technical assistance, the Center will provide information about USDOT credit programs, case studies of successful projects and examples of deal structures, standard operating procedures for P3s, and analytical toolkits. The Center also will help investors better understand how to use USDOT credit and grant programs together for project development.

Information To Reduce Uncertainty and Delays.  In partnership with the interagency Infrastructure Permitting Improvement Center—part of the Obama administration’s plan to modernize permitting—the Center will help local and state governments, project sponsors, and investors navigate the permitting process.

Build America Interagency Working Group

A federal interagency working group, co-chaired by U.S. Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew and Transportation Secretary Anthony Foxx, will conduct a review aimed at fostering greater private investment and collaboration beyond the transportation sector. The group will work with state and local governments, project developers, investors, and others to address private investments and partnerships in areas including municipal water, ports, harbors, and the electrical grid. The group will focus on improving coordination to speed financing and completion of regionally and nationally significant projects, particularly those crossing state boundaries.

Infrastructure Investment Summit

On September 9, 2014, the Treasury Department will host a summit on U.S. infrastructure investment. The summit will focus on innovative infrastructure financing approaches and highlight other resources for project development. Leading project developers and institutional investors, state and local officials, and their federal counterparts are expected to participate.

July 23, 2014

This publication was written by members of Ballard Spahr’s P3/Infrastructure Group.

Attorneys in Ballard Spahr’s P3/Infrastructure Group routinely monitor and report on new developments in federal and state infrastructure programs. For more information, please contact P3/Infrastructure Practice Leader Brian Walsh at 215.864.8510 or walsh@ballardspahr.com, Emilie R. Ninan at 302.252.4426 or ninane@ballardspahr.com, Steve T. Park at 215.864.8533 or parks@ballardspahr.com, or the member of the Group with whom you work.

BRIAN WALSH
TEL 215.864.8510
walsh@ballardspahr.com

EMILIE R. NINAN
TEL 302.252.4426
ninane@ballardspahr.com

STEVE T. PARK
TEL 215.864.8533
parks@ballardspahr.com

ABOUT BALLARD SPAHR
Ballard Spahr, a national law firm with more than 500 lawyers in 14 offices in the United States, provides a range of services in litigation, business and finance, real estate, intellectual property, and public finance. Our clients include Fortune 500 companies, financial institutions, life sciences and technology companies, health systems, investors and developers, government agencies and sponsored enterprises, educational institutions, and nonprofit organizations. The firm combines a national scope of practice with strong regional market knowledge. For more information, please visit www.ballardspahr.com.




S&P: How Exposed are Bond Insurers to Issuers in Puerto Rico?

The credit deterioration of Puerto Rico’s public corporations and recent legislative changes have raised investor concerns relating to the bond insurers. Director David Veno discusses the exposure different bond insurers have to Puerto Rican issuers.

Watch the video.




MSRB Adds Graphing Tools for Historical Yield Data on EMMA.

Alexandria, VA – To ensure that new graphing tools on the Electronic Municipal Market Access (EMMA®) website are useful to the broadest range of investors, the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) today added a graphical display of yield information on EMMA.

The new graphs allow users to visualize historical yields over time for any of the nearly 1.1 million securities on EMMA, supplementing the trade price graphs that became available on EMMA in June 2014. The new yield graphs also are now integrated into EMMA’s price discovery tool to enable investors and others to visually compare yield information for multiple securities with similar characteristics.

“With the launch of the price discovery tool last month, the MSRB provided investors with a new way of looking at trade data on EMMA to more quickly and easily gauge the price of a municipal security,” said MSRB Executive Director Lynnette Kelly. “The addition of yield graphs on EMMA further enhances the accessibility and usefulness of EMMA trade data.”

The MSRB’s EMMA website supports market transparency by serving as the official source of free trade data and disclosure documents on virtually all municipal securities.




S&P: U.S. Public Finance Rating Changes Were Still Positive In The Second Quarter, But A Bit Less So.

The balance of rating actions in U.S. public finance continued to be positive in the second quarter of 2014, reflecting our view of gradually improving credit conditions and the ongoing implementation of our local government general obligation (GO) rating criteria. However, the positive tilt has declined somewhat and, at 2.23 to 1, the second quarter upgrade-to-downgrade ratio is lower than any other quarter since the second quarter of 2013. The lower upgrade-to-downgrade ratio is tied to our now having implemented our revised local government rating criteria, released in September 2013, to much of our rated universe of affected local governments. With economic conditions very similar to what they were nine months ago, the upgrade ratio has drifted back in the direction of where it was just before the implementation of our revised criteria. In addition, when we lowered New Jersey’s GO rating in April, we also lowered all of the state’s appropriation-backed debt.




S&P: Not All Loans Are Equal - Some Terms and Conditions That Make Disclosure Critical In Evaluating Credit Risk.

Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services has commented on the need for U.S. public finance issuers that we rate to provide greater disclosure of their use of alternative financing products such as bank loans and direct-purchase debt. We have focused on our need to be made aware of these transactions so that we can analyze the potential credit risks inherent in them. In this article we highlight some of the actual terms and conditions that may be included in these transactions that, in our view, make disclosure to us essential for our evaluation of an obligor’s credit rating.

With greater use of these products and a more diverse group of lenders, we find the terms and conditions less standardized and uniform, creating, in our view, potential for considerable credit risk exposure. In our opinion, this additional risk stems from potential acceleration of principal and interest payments, and the potential for cross–default provisions between alternative financing debt and capital market debt. The documentation under which the lender agrees to purchase the alternative financing often contains events of default or covenants with remedies that, in our view, increase the potential for triggering accelerated repayment of principal and interest. Combined with cross-default provisions, breached covenants and default events could accelerate not only payments under the alternative financing, but also capital market debt, which could create a liquidity crisis for the obligor and potentially have multi-notch negative rating implications.

Therefore, we regard as critical the incorporation of alternative financings into the analysis of an obligor’s debt profile. Standard & Poor’s typically reviews the events of default set forth in an obligor’s debt issuance documents to determine if the remedies can pose stress to an obligor as outlined in our contingent liquidity criteria. If so, we then review the events for consistency with our criteria for analyzing automatic termination events for standby bond purchase agreements (those that permit termination without notice or funding). These typically include what we consider “major” events, e.g., the obligor fails to pay principal of or interest on or repudiates the debt issuance, the obligor fails to make payment on or repudiates any debt on parity with, or senior to, the debt issuance, or the issuer or obligor challenges the validity or enforceability of the debt documents. (For a complete list see USPF Criteria: “Standby Bond Purchase Agreement Automatic Termination Events”.)

Our concerns with alternative financing agreements, and our focus from a credit perspective, is whether any “non-major” events, if triggered, could lead to a remedy such as rapid acceleration of debt repayment and in turn, liquidity stress for the obligor. “Non-major” events can cover the spectrum from very broad to very specific events, depending on the obligor.

Examples of “non-major” events we have seen in actual documents leading to immediate acceleration include:

Other events leading to acceleration from 30 to 60 days:

As these examples show, the financing documents may allow the obligor a specific cure period before an event of default leading to acceleration is triggered. The combination of the magnitude of potential accelerated debt relative to an obligor’s liquidity, and the immediacy of such liquidity calls, will be key to our determining the impact on an obligor’s outstanding rating.

23-Jul-2014




Bank Loans Grow In Municipal Market While Bond Issues Shrink.

Significant developments in the way municipal entities borrow money are under way. Last year, issuances of new municipal bonds in traditional municipal bond markets dropped to near historic lows and the outlook for 2014 is similarly weak. According to the Municipal Bond Credit Report, Fourth Quarter 2013, prepared by the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA), new capital markets municipal offerings in 2013 totaled $315.2 billion, a 13% decline from 2012. Of this amount, $266.7 billion represented tax-exempt issuances. The SIFMA 2014 Municipal Issuance Survey forecasts the 2014 total issuances to be $309.5 billion, of which $265 billion is expected to be tax-exempt, marking another decrease in volume.

Of great interest to commercial banks is the fact that, in contrast to this downturn in offerings of traditional municipal bonds, there is a marked increase in the amount of direct lending by banks and other financial institutions to municipal borrowers. While exact numbers are difficult to come by, Standard & Poor’s has estimated that direct bank loans to muni issuers may account for as much as twenty percent (20%) of new municipal borrowings.[1] While there is no single factor that explains this rather dramatic change in landscape, there are a number of significant reasons why this may be occurring.

First, interest rates have been at or near historically low levels for the last five or so years. This low interest rate environment has offered unique opportunities to refinance outstanding bond debt on more favorable terms by enabling banks to offer very competitive interest rates to municipal borrowers on both tax-exempt and taxable debt. This has proven to be true even after factoring in the full or complete loss of a corresponding interest expense deduction that financial institutions may incur to carry tax-exempt debt pursuant to Sections 265 and 291 of the Internal Revenue Code.

The “all in” cost of direct bank loans is also made more competitive by the absence of certain bond-related costs of issuance that are generally not part of a direct bank loan structure, such as the underwriter’s discount, rating agency fees, costs of preparing and printing an Official Statement, underwriter’s counsel fees, remarketing agent fees, liquidity provider or other credit enhancement fees, bond trustee fees and bond trustee counsel fees.

In addition to the obvious purpose of lowering debt service and the costs of issuance, municipal borrowers are taking advantage of bank loan refinancings to reduce their mix of fixed and variable rate debt, to restructure debt amortization, to shed burdensome bond document covenants and to reduce liquidity risk that may exist under outstanding variable rate demand bonds (VRDBs).

For example, direct bank loans seem to have become the vehicle of choice to refinance outstanding VRBDs by effectively converting those letter of credit obligations and risks into direct loan obligations, often in refinancing transactions with the former letter of credit bank.

Such a direct loan may also be preferred by financial institution lenders over letters of credit, standby bond purchase agreements or other liquidity facilities due to the evolving capital adequacy rules and standards under Dodd-Frank (and its progeny) and because the treatment of credit-enhancement facilities remains unsettled for risk-based capital computation purposes.

Another advantage presented by direct bank loans over traditional capital market issuances is flexibility, both in negotiating credit terms and in the administration of the debt relationship going forward. A muni borrower may be able to more flexibly negotiate the terms of a borrowing by dealing one on one with a single lender rather than by negotiating with an underwriter based on what the underwriter believes to be necessary to sell the bonds in the capital markets. Further, the trust indenture that governs a borrower’s ability to issue additional debt over time may lock the municipal borrower into a fixed, common set of covenants and documentation requirements, making it potentially more difficult to address special debt needs that may arise.[2]

Flexibility in credit administration is achieved because it is much easier to obtain the consent of a single lender to modifications or waivers of credit documents than having to work through a bond trustee and DTC to locate and obtain consents from a disparate set of bondholders.

On the regulatory front, direct bank loans presently have an advantage over capital market issues involving an underwriter because the regulatory burden on the borrower is substantially reduced. With no underwriter in the deal, the bond issue is not subject to many of the regulatory compliance requirements imposed on underwriters of municipal securities by the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The requirements that come along with an underwritten deal include: the underwriter must obtain a continuing disclosure agreement with the municipal borrower pursuant to SEC Rule 15c2-12 and determine whether the municipal borrower is presently in compliance with all of its other continuing disclosure undertakings as a condition to selling the bonds; an official statement or placement document must be used in connection with the bond offering and filed and supplemented on the SEC’s Electronic Municipal Markets Access System (EMMA); and mandatory continuing disclosure filings must be made on EMMA by the municipal borrower.

You should be aware, however, that these so-called regulatory advantages are currently under close scrutiny by the MSRB and various other regulators. There is a growing belief by the regulators that the use of such direct bank loans creates something of a shadow market that deprives the capital markets of essential information regarding muni bond issuers, including information which would otherwise be available if an underwriter were involved in the financing.

To illustrate, the MSRB has published Notice 2012-18 that strongly urges state and local governmental issuers to voluntarily file with EMMA the same types of information and disclosures that would be applicable if the issue was publicly underwritten. Notice 2012-18 summarizes the MSRB’s concerns as follows:

“The increased use by state and local governments of bank loans to meet funding needs has raised concern among market participants about the level of disclosure about such loans. Because, as described below, bank loans generally do not require the same level of disclosure as public offerings for municipal securities, holders of an issuer’s outstanding debt, as well as potential investors and other market participants, may not become aware of such bank loans or their impact on the issuer’s outstanding debt until the release of an issuer’s audited financial statements. Thus, for example, bondholders may not be aware of the terms and conditions of a bank loan that may require the acceleration of debt repayment if the borrower encounters financial stress. In other circumstances, where bank loans are on parity with or senior to other outstanding debt, the bondholders’ security position could be diluted.”

Because of these expressed concerns, it would not be surprising if future legislative or administrative initiatives were to impose increased disclosure requirements on direct bank loans to municipal entities. Perhaps that is even to be expected in this era of concern for municipal market transparency and full disclosure.

Finally, the rating agencies are beginning to take a much harder look at outstanding bank debt when doing their rating analysis of municipal issuers. Standard and Poor’s, in its commentary noted above, has indicated that it is concerned with the increasing use of such facilities by municipal borrowers and the liquidity and other credit risks presented by direct bank loans. According to S&P’s commentary, these risks are increasing as a more diverse group of banks enters this lending arena and the terms and covenants within the bank agreements are less clearly defined and uniform. In S&P’s view, this creates the potential for considerable credit risk exposure. These risks are, or will be, part of the ratings analysis and could be the basis for a negative credit action or outlook change.

In summary, direct lending to municipal entities presents a lending opportunity for Pennsylvania banks and other financial institutions that should continue until at least the current interest rate climate changes in an adverse direction. However, as these direct bank loans become even more widely used, they are moving onto the regulators’ and rating agencies’ radar screens in significant ways. There is no doubt more to come on these evolving fronts.

[1] Source: Standard & Poor’s commentary, Alternative Financing: Disclosure is Critical to Credit Analysis in Public Finance, February 18, 2014
[2] It should be noted that for active issuers, using a uniform set of documents and covenants may provide other benefits that should not be overlooked, such as not having to comply with several different, and potentially conflicting, covenant regimes. Such an arrangement would also have the benefit of serving as a convenient vehicle for achieving parity of covenants and security among bondholders without having to negotiate and execute intercreditor agreements each time that new parity debt is issued.

7/23/2014

by Daniel Malpezzi | McNees Wallace & Nurick LLC

This article was published in the Early Summer 2014 edition of PABanker Magazine (Pennsylvania Bankers Association).




Muni Rally Pushes Yields to Lowest Since May 2013 on Supply.

Municipal bond yields fell to the lowest in 14 months as demand for state and local securities climbed ahead of a drop in issuance next week.

Interest rates on benchmark 10-year munis dropped to 2.22 percent yesterday, the lowest since May 2013. Yields have fallen about 0.22 percentage point since July 11, heading for the biggest two-week decline since January, data compiled by Bloomberg show.

States and local governments have scheduled about $3.6 billion of bond sales during the next 30 days, the least since February, Bloomberg data show. Municipalities are set to sell about $2.1 billion of long-term debt next week, down from $7.2 billion this week.

“Less supply and more demand are just driving yields down,” said Dan Toboja, senior vice president of muni trading at Ziegler Capital Markets in Chicago. “It doesn’t look like there’s a ton of supply coming down the pike either.”

The expected slowdown comes as demand in the $3.7 trillion muni market is picking up. Individual investors added about $686 million to muni mutual funds in the week ended July 23, the most since May 7, Lipper US Fund Flows data show. That compares with $158 million in inflows the prior week.

By Elizabeth Campbell Jul 25, 2014 8:08 AM PT

To contact the reporter on this story: Elizabeth Campbell in Chicago at ecampbell14@bloomberg.net

To contact the editors responsible for this story: Stephen Merelman at smerelman@bloomberg.net Mark Schoifet




Window Closing to Challenge Wall Street Over Swaps: Bloomberg Muni Credit.

The clock is running out on a way for U.S. states and cities to try to recoup payments to Wall Street on bond deals that blew up in the financial crisis.

Six years after credit-market turmoil began hitting local governments with rising bills for bond and derivative deals that backfired, the time limit will soon lapse for issuers to seek to claw back their losses by arguing that banks misled them about the risks, said former Congressman Bradley Miller, an attorney with Grais & Ellsworth LLP in New York.

With a six-year statute of limitations closing, officials in Los Angeles may vote to press Bank of New York Mellon Corp. and Dexia SA (DEXB) to renegotiate or terminate interest-rate swaps costing $4.9 million a year. Harris County, Texas, which encompasses most of Houston, is hiring an adviser to look at whether risks were presented fairly when it entered deals that are costing about $7 million a year.

“It’s one of the things from the financial crisis that keeps reverberating,” said Houston attorney David Peterson, a partner at Susman Godfrey who has handled litigation related to the collapse of the auction-rate securities market. “Municipalities are wondering what they got in return for taking the risk. It’s the issuers who end up suffering, and at the end of the day the taxpayers who end up paying.”

The Unraveling

The costs resulted from complex financings that Wall Street banks pitched as a way to cut borrowing expenses and that unraveled after the 2008 financial crisis. States and localities have paid more than $4 billion to banks to back out of the agreements, while issuers such as Chicago and Baltimore opted to remain in the money-losing trades.

With the transactions, municipalities sold bonds with floating interest rates, then entered into related derivative contracts to protect against the risk borrowing costs would jump. Through the derivatives, municipalities received payments based on indexes such as the London interbank offered rate, or Libor, meant to cover the cost of the bonds. In return, they made fixed interest payments to the banks.

The tactic turned costly in 2008, when borrowers faced soaring interest bills as credit markets seized up. At the same time, the payments they received under the swaps fell as the Federal Reserve pushed its benchmark overnight rate close to zero.

’70s Vintage

Miller, a former North Carolina Democratic representative who sat on the House Financial Services Committee, said banks may have violated rules requiring them to deal fairly with local governments that hire them to arrange bond sales.

He said that under those rules, first put in place in the 1970s, underwriters must explain complex transactions in an understandable way and disclose the material risks. Issuers have six years to bring arbitration cases from the time they determine the deals backfired, under Financial Industry Regulatory Authority guidelines.

While issuers were told of risks of entering swaps sold along with variable-rate debt, the magnitude of what could go wrong may not have been sufficiently explained, Peterson said.

“It appears they rarely, if ever, showed how vulnerable issuers were to the variables,” said Joseph Fichera, chief executive officer of New York-based Saber Partners LLC, which is poised to be hired by Harris County. “Savings were calculated without adjusting for the risks that could affect the savings, which is a core financial principle that should have been followed.”

Uphill Fight

Public officials in cities such as Oakland have tried to pressure banks into breaking the decades-long contracts with little success. In Los Angeles, finance officials already met with at least one swap provider and were told they “will be unlikely to offer a significant discount,” according to a June 27 memo to the mayor and city council from Miguel Santana, the city administrative officer.

A last-ditch effort to fight the contracts through arbitration may also prove difficult.

Miller said he was aware of only one municipal issuer, a nonprofit insurer in Louisiana, that tried to recoup money from banks in arbitration by arguing it was misled. It lost the decision. In other cases, issuers pursued claims in court instead of arbitration, after being challenged by banks, Miller said.

“It doesn’t take a very close reading of the contracts to realize that these kinds of cases are difficult to pull off,” said Robert Fuller, a principal at Capital Markets Management LLC, a Hopewell, New Jersey-based swaps adviser.

Alabama Precedent

Some municipalities may find a road map in a case settled by an Alabama sewer company. In March, Baldwin County Sewer Services LLC was able to recover losses after an arbitration panel ruled that a failed swap deal amounted to “a continuing but hidden fraud.” Arbitrators told Birmingham-based Regions Financial Corp. (RF) to pay $7.4 million, the net amount of swaps payments the utility made.

Katrina Cavalli, spokeswoman for the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, which represents banks that underwrite municipal securities and in some cases serve as counterparties for swaps, declined to comment in an e-mail.

In Los Angeles, the challenge to the city’s swap deals is being led by Councilman Paul Koretz, who filed an ordinance that may be considered after the council’s recess ends later this month.

Bank Expenses

His proposal was in response to a report by the Fix LA coalition. The group, which includes local labor unions and community groups, found that the city spent $204 million on bank fees in 2013, including swap payments, investment-management fees, the cost of bond insurance and remarketing fees, letters of credit and service fees. That year, Los Angeles spent $163 million on streets, the report said.

Paul Neuman, a spokesman for Koretz, said the swaps have been a drain on the city as it pushed through budget cuts in the recession’s aftermath.

“It is a shame that some financial institutions are benefiting when we face such difficulties, especially when we followed their advice,” he said in an e-mail.

Kevin Heine, a Bank of New York Mellon spokesman, declined to comment on the measure. Phone messages left after business hours at the Brussels and Paris press offices of Dexia, as well as e-mails to the bank’s press address, weren’t returned.

In Harris County, Treasurer Orlando Sanchez said he’s hiring Saber Partners to review swaps and decide whether the county should pursue an arbitration claim. The county will have paid about $31 million to Citibank from 2010 to 2014, according to county documents, plus $19 million in interest on the bonds to which the swaps are attached.

Scott Helfman, spokesman for New York-based Citigroup Inc., declined to comment.

“We need to get to the bottom of what happened with our swaps,” said Sanchez. “I want an independent set of eyeballs to look at it.”

By Darrell Preston Jul 24, 2014 5:00 PM PT

To contact the reporter on this story: Darrell Preston in Dallas at dpreston@bloomberg.net

To contact the editors responsible for this story: Stephen Merelman at smerelman@bloomberg.net William Selway, Mark Tannenbaum




MSRB to Make Kroll Bond Ratings Available to the Public Through its EMMA Website.

Alexandria, VA – The Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) announced today that it plans to provide free public access on its Electronic Municipal Market Access (EMMA®) website to public finance ratings from Kroll Bond Rating Agency (KBRA).

“The addition of KBRA credit ratings to EMMA gives investors yet another tool to make more informed decisions about municipal bonds,” said MSRB Executive Director Lynnette Kelly. “The MSRB welcomes KBRA’s participation and support of EMMA’s goal to enhance access to municipal market information.”

The MSRB began providing ratings from Fitch Ratings and Standard & Poor’s on EMMA in 2011. Read more about the ratings information currently available on EMMA. Ratings information from KBRA will become available this fall.

KBRA, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch are registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission as a Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization (NRSRO). The MSRB has invited all NRSROs to provide their municipal credit ratings on EMMA.

The EMMA website is the official repository for information on virtually all municipal securities. EMMA provides free public access to official disclosures, trade data, credit ratings, educational materials and other information about the municipal securities market.




Has S&P Been Exaggerating Local Governments' Stability?

One analyst says the new way the credit rating agency scores local governments downplays the risk investors are taking and could encourage ratings shopping.

Since last fall, when S&P released new scoring criteria, the agency has been reassessing ratings for thousands of local governments. Generally, and as predicted by S&P itself, the new criteria resulted in more upgrades of governments than downgrades. But a Janney Montgomery Scott analyst pointed out in his July note on the bond market that those changes have not put S&P’s ratings more in line with competitors Moody’s Investors Service and Fitch Ratings.

In some cases, rather, agencies’ ratings scores for the same local governments have diverged even more.

“I do not remember a time when I saw so many credits with not just a one-or-so-notch difference here and there, but multiple-notch differences in some cases,” said Tom Kozlik, the analyst who wrote the note. “This is not part of the typical ratings cycle (where sometimes one rating agency is a little higher and vice versa, I suspect). As a result, I expect that rating shopping could be on the rise if the current trend continues.”

Ratings shopping, where a government issuer chooses to publish just its highest credit agency rating, came under scrutiny in the aftermath of the financial crisis but the focus from regulators and investors was on the rosy ratings from all credit agencies assigned to mortgage-backed-securities. According to Kozlik, however, investors should bring similar skepticism to S&P’s ratings of local governments. “In other words,” he wrote, “we do not think that some of S&P’s ratings reflect the risk investors are taking.”

Jeff Previdi, the S&P managing director for local governments who spearheaded the agency’s criteria change, defended the process. He said that the criteria had been heavily tested and had gone through a public comment period. The new criteria scores municipalities in seven categories: management, economy, budgetary flexibility, institutional framework (governance), budgetary performance, liquidity and debt/liabilities. The score for economy counts for 30 percent of the total score; all other categories are given a 10 percent weight.

The intent was to make the process and scoring as transparent as possible, Previdi said. Additionally, he added, the upgrades have tended to outpace downgrades for a very simple reason: Governments are doing better now than when they were last assessed.

“When we are reviewing under the new criteria, we’re not working with the same metrics of the old criteria,” he said. “It’s not done in a vacuum. Over this time we’ve been in a generally positive environment for local governments — that’s informing some of the results you see.”

Even so, Kozlik noted in his report that there has been a pattern of governments only publishing an S&P rating. In June, for example, there were a little more than 200 local governments that sold debt competitively. Of those, one-quarter of them only published an S&P rating, according to Kozlik’s review. Another 11 governments only published an S&P rating but also had an outstanding Moody’s rating within the past three years (Kozlik dismisses 16 cases where the outstanding Moody’s rating is prior to 2011). Like S&P, Moody’s has also revamped its ratings criteria in the wake of the financial crisis, however changes have mostly focused on giving pension and other long-term liabilities more weight in the final score. Most local government pension liabilities shot up during the financial crisis and many have still not gained back much – if any – ground. This change has contributed to Moody’s issuing more downgrades.

Kozlik also took issue with S&P’s assessment that the economy has significantly improved for local governments. Earlier this year, Janney released a report calling for a cautious outlook for local governments based on stagnating revenues that are not keeping pace with demands. “Sure, in some cases a year or two can make a significant difference in municipal credit quality.” he said. “I also think that there are too many [cases] for timing to be a key factor in explaining the trend.”

He concludes the note by advising investors that own a bond with only an S&P rating, to review the credit themselves and check to see if it also has a Moody’s rating. Moody’s has been issuing about twice as many downgrades as it has upgrades, “a trend that makes sense to us,” Kozlik wrote, “because we are still seeing mostly difficult credit conditions pressure local governments.”

GOVERNING.COM
BY LIZ FARMER | JULY 16, 2014




Finding the Money for Water Infrastructure.

A new federal loan program, patterned after a successful one for transportation, has a lot of potential for badly needed water projects.

Enhancing the nation’s water infrastructure remains a challenge for public officials as they balance the need for improvements against constrained budgets. The recently enacted federal Water Resources Reform and Development Act has the potential to advance the nation’s water infrastructure by streamlining approvals for environmental reviews of projects, creating a pilot program to explore the use of public-private partnerships by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and making it easier to leverage private-sector investments to augment public funding.

As officials contemplate how they will finance water infrastructure improvements, one provision in the law, the newly created Water Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (WIFIA) loan program, is of particular interest.

Co-administered by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Army Corps, WIFIA will provide secured loans and loan guarantees to both government and non-government entities for up to 49 percent of eligible project costs. WIFIA is patterned after a highly successful federal loan program for transportation projects called the Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA), which has provided $17 billion in federal credit assistance and spurred approximately $64 billion in total project investment since its inception in 1998.

I believe state and local government agencies, drawing on the lessons from TIFIA, could employ WIFIA to take the first small steps toward addressing badly needed water infrastructure improvements.

There are important details to consider. Projects financed through WIFIA must exceed $20 million in total cost and must be deemed creditworthy by EPA or the Army Corps. In addition, the projects must be rated as investment-grade by at least one rating agency. Like TIFIA loans, interest rates under WIFIA are tied to U.S. Treasury bond rates, and maximum loan repayment periods of 35 years and a five-year repayment deferral after substantial completion are allowed. This pricing approach and the repayment flexibility are major reasons for the success of the TIFIA program.

The total five-year appropriation for WIFIA is $350 million, equally split between EPA and the Army Corps, beginning with $40 million in 2015. This represents the credit subsidy available for qualified projects, not the total amount of financing available. The credit risk of each WIFIA loan application will be “scored” by the Office of Management and Budget, and these credit-subsidy amounts will then be paid out of the authorized funding available.

While WIFIA provides a welcome additional source of financing for water projects, a number of challenges remain. The administrative roles of EPA and the Army Corps and their respective application procedures have yet to be fully fleshed out. Coordination between the agencies might also be challenging, and with limited funding for program administration, prospective borrowers should anticipate a slow process initially as the two agencies ramp up their activities. Of greatest concern is the modest level of program funding, which will not have a material effect on the enormous investment backlog in the water sector.

Public officials should draw on the lessons learned from TIFIA’s evolution and be prepared initially to face administrative and procedural challenges while EPA and the Army Corps develop internal capabilities and implementation procedures. Understanding and anticipating federal requirements will be critical to securing WIFIA commitments, and prospective borrowers will need to be patient.

Another lesson from TIFIA is that successful WIFIA project financings could dramatically increase market demand for credit assistance and might lead to increased political support for the program. As TIFIA-financed projects began to positively impact the market, Congress ramped up funding and adopted changes to help the Department of Transportation streamline the program. Initial WIFIA successes will be critical to the program’s long-term viability.

The potential impact of WIFIA on the U.S. water and wastewater market is being closely tracked by the industry, and public officials will likely begin to see increasing interest from private operators and investors. Public water utility officials would be wise to not only become familiar with WIFIA but to study the nuances of TIFIA and how it became the program it is today.

GOVERNING.COM
BY ED CROOKS | JULY 21, 2014




The Decoupling Of Treasury Yields and the Cost of Equity for Public Utilities.

Anyone who has attended a rate case hearing recently is well aware that the debate over the rate of return now tends to focus on the implications for public utility investors of a largely unprecedented trend in the current capital markets—specifically, intervention by the Federal Reserve in the government bond market. The current capital market conditions are unique from a historical perspective. No US government policy intervention in recent history has had such an important effect on the risk-free rate relied upon by public utility analysts in their routine modeling of market and utility investor behavior. This briefing note examines how these capital market conditions affect the cost of capital for electric and gas utilities.

A key question within this debate is whether the historic risk premium required by equity investors to invest in stocks remains accurate in today’s capital market conditions. Financial analysts have often relied upon the historic equity risk premium for use in estimating required rates of return in models like the Capital Asset Pricing Model. The calculation of the historic premium measures the difference in expected return as between the S&P 500 index and long-term US treasury bonds. For example, if on average the historic S&P 500 return were 12% annually, while long-term treasury bonds yielded 5%, then the historic risk premium required by equity investors would be deemed to be 7%. Financial analysts typically use over eighty years of data when assessing the historic premium, thus capturing a wide variety of conditions in the capital markets. In recent years, the historic premium has fallen within the range of 6 to 7 percent.

Current capital market conditions raise doubts about whether the risk premium, measured using historical data, is applicable today. The doubts arise as analysts attempt to answer key questions. How have equity investors responded to the artificial reduction in treasury yields triggered by the Federal Reserve’s bond buying program? Have they lowered their total return expectation as rapidly as treasury yields have fallen? Rate-of-return models that rely upon the historical premium assume that investors’ total return expectations move in lock step with treasury yields. Hence, if the historic premium is still valid, it implies a significant decrease in required returns on equity for both industrial firms and public utilities.

NERA’s empirical investigations in recent rate cases show that the historical premium has not been a good measure of the forward-looking premium required by investors. The spread between the risk-free rate and the required returns for holding equities has broadened as the Federal Reserve has aggressively acted to keep interest rates at record lows and stimulate the economy. For public utilities, this is reflected in a relatively stable awarding of allowed returns in the context of a rapid decline in treasury yields, the market’s metric of the “risk-free” rate. As shown in Table 1 below, since 2006, the average allowed return for electric utilities has hovered in the range of 10.0 to 10.5 percent, while treasury yields fell 200 basis points and then started to recover. If the market risk premium had been unchanged during this period, the allowed returns—which themselves are based on the capital market data put forth by public utilities and intervenors alike—would have declined as precipitously as the treasury yields did. They did not. A constant historical equity risk premium ignores the elevated cost of holding risky securities relative to the riskless security benchmark. A forward-looking premium thus provides the most accurate gauge of investor demands in the current market environment where required returns on equities have decoupled from treasury yields.

NERA estimates the forward-looking risk premium using the well-established dividend growth model. This model offers an estimate of the total return required by equity investors, derived from two principal inputs: 1) the dividend yield and 2) profit growth rate. Once armed with the total expected return, NERA subtracts the current government bond yield to arrive at the implied equity risk premium. This approach has the advantage that it incorporates the most recent information from capital markets and thus is most consistent with the intent of any cost of equity calculation, which is to reflect current forward-looking expectations.

In its most recent analysis, NERA found the forward-looking risk premium to be 8.36 percent, which compares to a historic risk premium of 6.70 percent, a difference of 166 basis points. This shows that the use of a historic risk premium would significantly understate the cost of equity for utilities. While the observed equity risk premium does not translate on a one-for-one basis to a required return for utilities—utility betas are often below one—it does signal the scale of the disconnect between historic conditions and those prevailing today.

It is not surprising that the market’s reaction to the policy-driven interest rate drop has been a higher required return for riskier assets. Market-driven events have led to similar outcomes. For example, in past “flight to quality” situations, the yields on riskier bonds and required returns on equities have crept higher as yields on government bonds and high-rated corporates declined.1 In addition, academic studies assessing the risk premium over time have shown a negative relationship between risk premia and interest rates.2

State regulators implicitly recognize the higher equity risk premium that prevails in today’s market. They do so by approving rates-of-return that contain a higher premium over government bond yields than has historically prevailed. (See Table 1 above.) For its part, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) explicitly acknowledged, in its ruling in Docket No. ER14-500-000, that the “current low treasury bond rate environment creates a need to adjust the CAPM results, consistent with the financial theory that the equity risk premium exceeds the long-term average when long-term US Treasury bond rates are lower than average, and vice-versa.”

Whether the change in premium is reflected by adjusting the model results on an ex post basis, as was done in the FERC docket, or to the model inputs on an ex ante basis, as NERA has done in recent state dockets, is not so important. Most important is making sure that the rate of return somehow incorporates the current forward-looking investor expectations and does not rely solely upon unadjusted historic expectations.

NERA’s Role in Cost of Capital Determinations

Prices in regulated industries rely upon costs, which include the cost of capital as a core component. NERA has been at the forefront of issues concerning the cost of capital for regulated industries for nearly 50 years—ever since Alfred Kahn devoted an Appendix in his great work, The Economics of Regulation, to NERA’s Herman Roseman’s cost of capital work in the 1960s.

Utility businesses have changed drastically over those 50 years, in structure, ownership, pricing, and competitiveness. Throughout all of these changes, regulation has continued to play a key role in the protection of consumers who buy from the remaining “natural” monopolies—local distribution in gas and water, transmission and distribution in electricity, and local service in telecommunications. For these regulated businesses around the world, the cost of capital remains an enduring issue—the base of regulated prices and a continuing subject of debate, concern, and empirical investigation—in which NERA continues to play a key part.

Footnotes

1. The autumn of 1998 is one such example.

2. See W. Carleton, W. Chambers and J. Lakonishok, “Inflation Risk and Regulatory Lag,” Journal of Finance, (May 1983). A similar approach is presented in R. Harris, “Using Analysts’ Growth Forecasts to Estimate Shareholder Required Rates of Return,” Financial Management (Spring 1986).

July 15 2014
Article by Kurt G. Strunk
NERA Economic Consulting




S&P Credit FAQ: Bond Insurers and the Recent Downgrades of Puerto Rico's Public Corporations.

The recent credit deterioration of Puerto Rico’s public corporations and enactment of legislation that would enable some of the entities to restructure their debt have prompted investor questions on the potential impact on bond insurer ratings. (See also “Puerto Rico GO Rating Lowered One Notch To ‘BB’ Following Debt Legislation; Outlook Negative,” published July 11, 2014.) Below Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services provides answers to the most frequently asked questions.

Continue Reading.




S&P: How Asset-Backed Contribution Arrangements Can Muddle Pension Deficit Reporting.

(Editor’s note: The opinions stated herein represent Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services’ views on the analytical consequences of financial reporting of asset-backed contribution schemes. Our comments in this article do not affect our current ratings criteria.)

Postretirement plans with asset-backed contribution (ABC) arrangements have come under various criticisms in the U.K. Last year, the U.K. Pensions Regulator warned trustees to “critically and carefully” evaluate the risks attached to these increasingly popular arrangements, which are essentially securitizations of assets that provide annual income stream to the pension plan (see the Appendix for an overview of ABC arrangements and the related accounting). And in a recent public announcement, the U.K.’s Financial Reporting Council (FRC) promised a crackdown on arrangements that resulted in companies removing their postretirement obligations from their balance sheets (or “derecognizing” them) while retaining the ultimate responsibility for the unfunded deficit.

The FRC investigated the accounting and financial reporting of a number of ABC arrangements. While acknowledging the existence of the arrangements in general, noting the commercial reason behind them, it criticized structures that introduced additional features with the sole purpose of transforming the pension obligations into equity instruments in the sponsoring entity’s consolidated financial statements. Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services agrees with the FRC that the economic substance of these arrangements is that of a debtlike liability rather than an equity instrument, because the companies would eventually need to contribute to the pension plan’s deficit if the ABC structure fails to do so.

Continue Reading.




S&P: U.S. Pension Funding Improves, But How Long Will It Last?

The good news is that Americans are generally living longer and healthier lives, but the bad news is that retirees will be increasingly hard-pressed to afford their own longevity, either individually or through their employers. The budgetary pressures on Medicare, Social Security, and many state-funded employee pension plans will likely mount as more baby boomers retire, while the boomers themselves fear that their retirement savings will be eaten up by inflation, depleted by poor investment performance—or just plain give out before they do. Moreover, an extended period of lackluster economic growth could depress tax revenues and investment returns. Clearly, more retirees and less money to pay for their care does not add up.

While the big fear is that the U.S. will come to resemble Japan, a nation struggling to support an increasingly older population in a somnolent economy, Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services believes the public and private sectors in the U.S. are slowly coming to terms with this incipient pension and retirement crisis. Across all sectors, pension funding benefited from strong stock market performance in 2013 and a healthier economy, which boosted overall tax revenues. How long such buoyant market returns will continue is anyone’s guess, but if capital markets flourish and the economy grows, we expect more robust pension funding.

Continue Reading.




Investment Center to be a “One-Stop Shop” for P3S According to White House.

As part of a larger package aimed at building private infrastructure investment, President Obama on Thursday unveiled the Build America Transportation Investment Center, a “one-stop shop for state and local governments” seeking guidance on developing public-private partnerships for transportation projects.

“First-class infrastructure attracts investment, and it creates first-class jobs,” Obama said in announcing the Center’s creation during a visit to the Port of Wilmington, Del. The I- 495 bridge across the Christina River, which was closed in June after engineers discovered it was structurally unsound, served as the backdrop for the public appearance.

The new center will provide a “navigator service,” allowing experts to provide hands-on support to the public and private sector to identify and execute successful P3s and share best practices from states that are leading the way on private investment, according to a fact sheet released by the White House.

The Department of Transportation, which will run the center, will encourage the use of existing DOT resources – including the Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) program, private activity bonds and the railroad rehabilitation and improvement financing program – that can improve the prospects for a P3 to become viable.

Transportation Secretary Anthony Foxx expressed his hope that local and state leaders would use the new resources provided by the investment center. “We have a huge opportunity in front of us if we just seize it,” Foxx said. The White House noted that the top six states for P3s command two-thirds of the value of P3s in the U.S. and twenty states have not P3s for any transportation infrastructure.

“None of the steps we are taking should be seen as a substitute for adequate public financing, because there isn’t a substitute for that,” Foxx told reporters in a conference call, reported the New York Times.

The center grows out of a presidential memorandum launching the Build America Investment Initiative and charges Transportation Secretary Anthony Foxx and Treasury Secretary Jack Lew with overseeing a task force aimed at reducing barriers to private investment in municipal water, ports, harbors, broadband and the electric grid infrastructure, reported the Washington Post.

NCPPP
By Editor July 18, 2014




MMA Municipal Issuer Brief - July 14, 2014

Read the Brief.




California Water Use Curbs a Credit Negative, Moody’s.

The new restrictions on water use California approved this week are a “credit negative” for the state’s water utilities because lower water sales will reduce their revenue, Moody’s Investors Service said.

A decline in water sales would pressure utilities with weak debt service coverage to increase rates to stabilize revenues, Moody’s said today in a research note.

“The prospect of charging customers more to deliver less water could be politically challenging,” Moody’s said.

The California State Water Resources Control Board this week approved emergency statewide rules that take effect on Aug. 1. They impose a fine of as much as $500 per day on property owners who overwater lawns so that runoff flows onto streets and those who wash cars with hoses that lack shutoff nozzles.

After three years of record-low rainfall, 80 percent of the most populous U.S. state is now experiencing extreme drought, according to the U.S. Drought Monitor, a federal website.

By Alison Vekshin Jul 17, 2014 4:04 PM PT

To contact the reporter on this story: Alison Vekshin in San Francisco at avekshin@bloomberg.net

To contact the editors responsible for this story: Stephen Merelman at smerelman@bloomberg.net Jeffrey Taylor, Michael B. Marois




Moody's: Detroit's Current Plan of Adjustment Favors Pensioners over Bondholders.

New York, July 17, 2014 — Under Detroit’s proposed plan of adjustment, recovery rates are likely to favor pensioners over bondholders, says Moody’s Investors Service. In the report “Detroit’s Proposal Favors Pensioners over Bondholders” Moody’s estimates the recovery on the unfunded portion of the city’s pension liabilities could reach 52%, which would likely exceed the recoveries on other unsecured claims.

Recoveries on unfunded pension liabilities, however, could be as low as 18% should the proposed special pension funding deal fall through. The recoveries on certificates of participation issued to fund pensions could be as low as 0% should the bankruptcy court allow the city to repudiate them.

Moody’s says pension recoveries as measured by aggregate liabilities, that is both funded and unfunded pension claims, could reach 82%, higher than 74% settlement announced for general obligation unlimited tax, or GOULT, bonds.

“The proposed plan of adjustment provides evidence that pension obligations are a substantial source of competition among creditors in Chapter 9 bankruptcy,” says Moody’s Assistant Vice President Tom Aaron.

Under the proposed plan, recoveries for pensioners get a boost from numerous sources, including dedicated outside funding and some contingent restoration of benefits. For example, state and privately donated funds exceeding $800 million over 20 years nearly triples the recovery rate. These funds would be in return for shielding the city’s art collection from creditors’ claims and for pensioners accepting the plan.

Detroit’s plan of adjustment calls for a number of reductions to pension benefits that affect both current employees and retirees. If pensioners do not vote to accept the proposal, outside funding is not available, or both, then the benefit reductions proposed in the plan of adjustment become more severe.

Moody’s notes Detroit assumes significant risk by taking on responsibility for any unfunded pension liability after 2023. Moody’s estimates of unfunded pension liabilities after benefit reductions range as high as $1.6 billion, using the city’s assumptions. However, the liability remains highly influenced by the assumptions used in its calculation.

For more information, Moody’s research subscribers can access this report at

https://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBM_PBM172662




Fitch: Few Surprises for Bondholders In Detroit LTGO Settlement.

Fitch Ratings-Chicago/New York-14 July 2014: Detroit’s settlement with its limited tax general obligation (LTGO) bondholders is in line with Fitch Rating’s expectations.

The settlement would repay the LTGO bondholders without a lien on state aid 34 cents on the dollar. That exceeds earlier offers of 10-20%. A previous settlement agreement provides for ULTGO bondholder recovery of 74 cents on the dollar and includes a clause requiring LTGO bondholders (and other classes of impaired unsecured creditors) to receive lower recovery. The city has $164 million of LTGOs without a lien on state aid and $379 million of LTGOs with a state aid lien. A court will begin hearing the plan of confirmation on August 14.

Detroit’s treatment of LTGO and other bondholders strains the boundaries of what most creditors would have expected to be entitled to in a bankruptcy.

Fitch expects situations like Detroit’s to continue to be rare as few governments are as severely stressed as and there is a long-demonstrated willingness of most municipal governments to avoid default and bankruptcy. Also, the nation’s slow economic recovery has begun to lessen the financial stress on many other issuers.

Contact:

Amy Laskey
Managing Director
U.S. Public Finance
+ 1 212 908-0568
33 Whitehall Street
New York, NY

Rob Rowan
Senior Director
Fitch Wire
+1 212 908-9159




WSJ: Bond Insurer Takes On Detroit.

DETROIT—Detroit expected a bruising battle with everyone from major banks to municipal unions when it filed its bankruptcy case last year.

But its most persistent adversary has turned out to be a scrappy bond insurer that represents just 5% of the city’s debt.

New York-based Syncora Guarantee Inc., with about $400 million at stake, has attempted to block the city’s access to casino-tax revenue, new borrowing to repair streetlights and the city’s settlement with two major banks. It has sought decades of records from foundations trying to help save the city’s art collection, and complained to the judge when it was linked to a statement by the city’s emergency manager about the “Huns of Wall Street.”

Six bond insurers are the city’s biggest creditors after backing payments on $6.1 billion of Detroit’s debt, according to a March report by Raymond James.

When a municipality defaults on insured bonds, the insurer becomes responsible for interest and principal payments to bondholders, then tries to recover as much of those payouts as possible from the debtor.

Now, Syncora insists the city’s debt-cutting and reinvestment plan aimed at restructuring originally pegged at about $18 billion in long-term obligations unfairly offers modest cuts to its pensioners and much more severe cuts to some bondholders backstopped by insurers like Syncora. A federal trial in bankruptcy court on the plan is scheduled for mid-August.

Voting on the city’s plan ended Friday for 70,000 creditors, including 32,000 pension holders. The city expects to announce the results no later than July 21, officials said. According to a person familiar with the matter, city officials are cautiously optimistic that pension holders have approved Detroit’s debt-cutting plan.

The plan will help the city shed roughly $7 billion in debt and leave it with about $1.4 billion to reinvest in city services and blight removal, says an internal report from the investment-banking firm Miller Buckfire & Co. released by the city.

Syncora has also helped push for monetizing the Detroit Institute of Arts collection through a possible sale or lease to help repay city debt. It essentially rejects the city’s proposal to allow outside donors to contribute the equivalent of more than $800 million over 20 years to reduce pension cuts and allow the museum to stay intact.

“We think this is about us getting as much recovery as we can and getting similar recovery to other similarly situated creditors like the pensioners and retirees,” James Sprayregen, a Kirkland & Ellis attorney in charge of Syncora’s Detroit case, said. “But from the get-go for whatever reason, we have been vilified as the big bad Wall Street creditor against the little people. And we think that’s very inappropriate and unfair.”

City officials say Syncora has filed a flurry of legal arguments in an attempt to grind the bankruptcy process to a halt. At various times, the city has called Syncora’s methods “scorched earth litigation strategy,” as well as a “carpet-bombing approach.”

“It’s safe to say they have employed a kitchen sink strategy with all of their objections,” said Bill Nowling, a spokesman for Detroit Emergency Manager Kevyn Orr. “All that does is add more work for the judge and more delay for the confirmation of the plan.”

Detroit has reached settlements with several other insurers with deals better than what is called for in the city’s plan for Syncora. For example, the city would pay limited-tax general-obligation bondholders about 34 cents on the dollar for their $164 million in debt. That debt is backed by Ambac Assurance Corp. and BlackRock Inc., according to city documents.

But Syncora’s estimated $400 million at stake stems largely from guaranteed payments on a $1.4 billion debt deal engineered in 2005 by then-Detroit Mayor Kwame Kilpatrick that the city is trying to completely wipe out. Company financial reports and legal filings warn that paying up on insured bondholders in Detroit could help push Syncora out of business because the city is offering less than 10 cents on the dollar. So far, Syncora already has paid $62 million to cover losses in Detroit debt through last year, according to the company.

The stock price of its parent company, Syncora Holdings Ltd., closed at $1.99 and the firm has cautioned that Detroit’s bankruptcy plan could exhaust its reserves to pay out claims. “They’re at a tipping point,” said Peter Delahunt, managing director for the municipal-bond department at Raymond James.

James Spiotto, an expert in Chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy with Chapman Strategic Advisors in Chicago, said that Syncora raised potentially important issues about whether a city should be able to sell debt to pay pensions and say afterward that the deal was legally flawed but keep the money. “The city got a benefit from it,” Mr. Spiotto said.

By MATTHEW DOLAN
July 14, 2014

—Katy Stech and Aaron Kuriloff contributed to this article.




Muni Strength to Continue in Second Half: Analysts.

The second half of 2014 promises more positive returns for municipal bonds even as investors react to declining credit quality in Puerto Rico, according to midyear analyst reports.

Based on the trends in the first six months, demand is forecast to be strong to steady while new supply is expected to lag behind redemptions, providing support for muni prices. Experts are predicting modest interest-rate increases, based on statements from the Federal Reserve, and see volume of roughly $300 billion for the calendar year.

“June was a fairly active month in terms of municipal bond issuance and headlines, yet the market ended close to unchanged,” wrote Peter Hayes, head of the municipal bonds group at BlackRock Inc., with fellow authors James Schwartz, head of municipal credit research and municipal strategist Sean Carney, in a monthly municipal update on July 7.

“Municipals essentially ended [June] flat, but hit the mid-year point emphatically in the black,” the BlackRock analysts wrote, noting that the S&P Municipal Bond Index posted a year-to-date return of 6.08%.

“Demand held firm while the net-negative supply scenario remained intact, underpinning muni pricing,” they added. Net negative supply occurs when redemptions outpace new issuance.

Issuance for June was $34 billion, which BlackRock said is consistent with the five-year average for the month and was up 32% from the prior month.

Municipal performance was buoyed by weak U.S. economic data – first quarter gross domestic product growth was revised downward to negative 2.9% ¬ and “a still-accommodative Fed,” the BlackRock analysts wrote.

The team said municipals are on pace for $300 billion in total issuance for 2014, in line with the firm’s earlier forecast of $305 billion. That volume implies a net-negative supply of $40 billion.

Other positives in the first half included triple-A-rated municipals outperforming U.S. Treasuries across the yield curve, with the ratio ending the second quarter at 98%, down from 102% at the start of the quarter, analysts from Prudential’s fixed income team noted in a third quarter outlook published on July 8.

Brian Rehling, chief fixed income strategist at Wells Fargo Advisors, pointed to the Bank of America-Merrill Lynch Municipal Master Index, which returned 5.90% at the close of the first quarter, as evidence of the market’s strength in his July 8 weekly fixed income report.

He said the longer duration inherent in the municipal market and a favorable supply calendar led to the tax-exempt market posting strong returns in the first half of the year, despite some isolated credit events.

Puerto Rico and Detroit were the most attention-grabbing stories of the first half, yet the market took them in stride, muni analysts said.

“It was notable that municipal investors were able to look past both the downgrade of Puerto Rico, which took the high-profile credit below investment grade, and the bankruptcy in Detroit,” Rehling said in his report.

More recent developments in the U.S. territory, including a new law allowing public corporations to restructure their debt, have the potential to undercut muni demand.

“Multiple downgrades for various Puerto Rico credits and the significant sell-off could lead to mutual fund outflows following a six-month period of moderately positive flows into municipal funds,” the Prudential analysts wrote.

“While a range-bound interest rate environment should be supportive of modestly positive fund flows,” they added, “the negative returns and headlines associated with Puerto Rico could upset this picture.”

Roosevelt D. Bowman, senior fixed income analyst at U.S. Bank Wealth Management said in a weekly market update on Wednesday that investor sentiment towards Puerto Rico “continued to sour as government officials proposed a restructuring of some debt issues.

“We remain very wary of Puerto Rican fixed income as a faltering economy, the associated sluggish tax revenue, and budget challenges all continue to weigh on the commonwealth,” Bowman wrote.

The forecast ahead, however, is mostly favorable for munis, the analysts said.

Rehling expects overall muni credit to continue to outperform as it did in the first half and suggests investors own bonds for stability, avoid reaching for yield, and maintain portfolio diversification.

“During 2014’s second half, we expect interest rates to move modestly higher from current levels, but anticipate that any increases will be well-contained,” Rehling wrote.

“A controlled rising rate environment should allow fixed income investors to generate positive returns, albeit lower than experienced in past year,” Rehling said, suggesting an average annual total return of between 2% and 4% for well-diversified, domestic, investment-grade, fixed-income investors.

Anthony Valeri, investment strategist at LPL Financial suggests staying defensive to curtail the impact on municipals from rising interest rates going forward.

“Among high-quality bonds, shorter-term bonds with less sensitivity to rising interest rates may help buffer fixed income portfolios from price declines associated with rising interest rates,” Valeri wrote in his July 3 fixed-income mid-year outlook.

At Prudential, the fixed income team believes the municipal market continues to provide attractive taxable-equivalent yields for individuals in the top tax bracket, and regard near-term technical factors, such as net supply, as “extremely supportive.”

Prudential analysts cited research from JPMorgan that estimates net supply of negative $21 billion for July and August, and net supply of negative $35.4 billion in 2014, with a full year gross issuance estimated at $300 to $310 billion.

BlackRock believes performance in the second half is likely to be derived from security selection and the ability to rotate between sectors and adjust duration as conditions warrant.

“We expect this will be particularly important as summer apathy sets in and as events in Puerto Rico evolve, potentially presenting opportunities to capture value in the market,” the BlackRock analysts wrote.

In the meantime, the team is recommending a barbell approach to both credit and the yield curve, favoring maturities below two years for trading flexibility and above 15 years.

“While short-term and intermediate munis are looking expensive, longer maturities continue to appear attractive versus Treasuries and, we believe, represent the best absolute and relative value.”

The Bond Buyer
BY CHRISTINE ALBANO
JUL 10, 2014 2:46pm ET




The Not-So-Sunny Side of Pension Obligation Bonds.

Some governments, particularly those with money problems, borrow to quickly pay down their pension obligations. But a new study shows it can leave them more financially vulnerable.

A tool that some governments have used to immediately pay down their pension obligations through borrowing can leave those governments more financially vulnerable than they were before, a new study says.

The tool, called Pension Obligation Bonds (commonly referred to as POBs), allows governments to issue taxable bonds for the purposes of putting money toward or fully paying off the unfunded portion of a pension liability. The proceeds from the bond issue go in the pension fund. The theory is that the rate of return on the investment will be greater than the interest rate the government pays to bond investors so that the transaction is favorable to the government; it makes money off the deal.

In actuality, however, a study issued in July by Boston College’s Center for Retirement Research found that the stock market and interest rate swings have meant that many governments have paid dearly for issuing POBs, especially those that issued bonds in the mid-2000s or early 1990s. And, because financially distressed governments are more likely to issue the bonds, the results often mean even more financial problems.

The report noted that the governments more likely to issue POBs are ones that have pension plans that represent “substantial obligations.” The governments have large outstanding debt and are short of cash. However, rather than necessarily relieving such governments of financial pressures, the bonds actually create a more rigid financial environment. Issuing bond debt to pay off a long-term obligation like a pension liability turns a somewhat flexible pension obligation into a hard and fast annual debt payment. Thus, “governments that have issued a POB have reduced their financial flexibility,” the study says.

The governments of Illinois, California and New Jersey have been very active in issuing POBs over the last three decades, according to the report, which converted totals to 2013 dollars. Illinois and California have each issued more than $25 billion total, although more than $10 billion of Illinois’ bonds have been issued after the stock market began rebounding in 2009. New Jersey has issued more than $11 billion in POBs since 1985. Yet the states still stand out as having some of the nation’s highest unfunded liabilities. Illinois in particular has one of the country’s worst funded ratios (less than 40 percent of its public employee pension system is funded). New Jersey and Illinois (and up until recently, California) have also continued to struggle with balancing their budgets, even after the recession ended in 2009.

POBs’ net returns (what the investment has earns after making bond payments) has varied, depending on when the bonds were issued. According to the center’s research, the net rate of return has averaged in the low, single digits for most years (the 30-year average is 1.5 percent). Governments that issued Pension Obligation Bonds in 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2007 actually lost money on their investment. Detroit, for example, issued debt at the peak of the market in the mid-2000s to fund its pension plan and did so using a complicated interest rate swap deal. The result was that the deal went the wrong way for the city. Detroit was still on the hook to pay bondholders and though its pension was well funded, it had even less day-to-day cash to meet its financial obligations. That debt played a key role in Detroit’s decision to file for bankruptcy last July.

The authors said that POBs do have the potential to be used responsibly — that is, “by fiscally sound governments who understand the risks involved or could play a role as part of a broader system reform package.” For example, in 2002 and 2003, Sheboygan County and Winnebago County in Wisconsin borrowed more than $7 million combined and earned investment returns greater than 20 percent on the borrowed money. Meanwhile, they paid less than three percent interest on their debts so earned an extra 17 percent return as a reward for taking on additional risk. But, such examples such are few and far between.

Governing.com
BY LIZ FARMER | JULY 8, 2014




Retirees Win Big in Illinois.

An Illinois Supreme Court ruling this month that overturned the state’s effort to cut retiree health care costs casts doubt on Illinois’ pending pension reform. This could potentially hurt its credit rating, a new note by Moody’s Investors Service said. In a note released July 11, Moody’s placed the state’s credit rating on a negative watch and said that the majority of the justices “expressed views that run counter to the rationale used in recent pension reform legislation for certain city and state plans. We therefore perceive increased risk that the Illinois Supreme Court will rule the pension reform legislation unconstitutional, which would jeopardize $32.7 billion of pension liability reduction.”

In its 6-1 ruling, the court overturned a lower court ruling and found that Illinois’ constitutional pension protections are not just limited to core pension earnings, but extend to other benefits provided under the retirement systems. The ruling wiped out changes Illinois made in 2012 that allowed the state to force retirees, including those who retired prior to enactment of the law, to pay higher health insurance premiums. The move provided annual savings of approximately $90 million, according to the state.

Here’s why Moody’s is concerned that the opinion places pension reform in jeopardy: The majority opinion states, “Where there is any question as to legislative intent and the clarity of the language of a pension statute, it must be liberally construed in favor of the rights of the pensioner.” This and other sections of the ruling “signal how the court could side with pensioners when it eventually addresses the constitutionality of recent state pension reforms, which have already been challenged, as well as Chicago’s pension reforms, which we expect will be challenged,” Moody’s said.

In December, Illinois passed reform that reduced cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs) for employees and retirees in four of the five state pension systems. (As a concession, the legislation also increased state contribution requirements and reduced employee contribution rates.) Moody’s estimated that these and other changes reduced accrued liabilities of the three largest pension systems by approximately $32.7 billion combined, or 17 percent.

Liz Farmer
Governing.com




NASACT GASB Review: 2014

GASB Review: 2014
Register Now!

A NASACT Training Webinar
Wednesday, July 23, 2014
2:00 – 3:50 p.m. Eastern Time

Overview

NASACT, in conjunction with the Association of Government Accountants and the Association of Local Government Auditors, is pleased to announce the latest in its series of training events addressing timely issues in government auditing and financial management.

As fiscal year-end for most state governments quickly approaches and a new year begins, it’s an opportune time for financial statement preparers and auditors to get a refresher on standards that will be effective for June 30, 2014, financial statements as well as recently released GASB statements that will require attention in fiscal year 2015.

This webinar will provide “must know” guidance on recently-issued GASB statements including GASB 71 – Pension Transition for Contributions Made Subsequent to the Measurement Date – an amendment of GASB Statement No. 68. Also included will be coverage on previously-issued GASB statements that are effective for June 30, 2014 and 2015.

For 2014, these statements include:

Statement 65 – Items Previously Reported as Assets and Liabilities
Statement 66 – Technical Corrections – 2012, an amendment of GASB Statements No. 10 and No. 62
Statement 67 – Financial Reporting for Pension Plans
Statement 70 – Accounting and Financial Reporting for Nonexchange Financial Guarantees

Statements effective for 2015 are:

Statement 68 – Accounting and Financial Reporting for Pensions
Statement 69 – Government Combinations and Disposals of Government Operations
Statement 71 – Pension Transition for Contributions Made Subsequent to the Measurement Date

Join GASB chairman David A. Vaudt, GASB director of research David R. Bean, and other GASB staff for this informative two-hour training session. You will also be given an opportunity to ask questions and share experiences during the last 25 minutes of the audio conference.

CPE: Two credits

Cost: $299.00 per group (unlimited attendance); $50 per person;

Agenda:

2:00 – 2:05 p.m.
Welcoming Remarks
Kinney Poynter, Executive Director, NASACT

2:05 – 3:20 p.m.
GASB Review: 2014
David A. Vaudt, Chairman, GASB
David R. Bean, Director of Research, GASB
Other GASB Staff

3:20 – 3:45 p.m.
Live Q&A
Kinney Poynter, Executive Director, NASACT

3:45 – 3:50 p.m.
Wrap-up
Kinney Poynter, Executive Director, NASACT

Instructions and Materials: An email will be sent Monday, July 21, by 4:30 p.m. Eastern to all who have registered for this conference with the instructions on how to join the webinar and a link to the materials. Please note the instructional email will be sent only to the email address attached to the registration.

Learning Objectives: At the conclusion of this webinar, participants will be able to:

Delivery Method: Group-Live (for group settings) or Group-Internet Based (for individuals)

Level of Knowledge: Overview

Field of Study: Accounting (Governmental)

Advanced Preparation: All government officials and employees are encouraged to attend. No prerequisites are required. No advance preparation is necessary.

The National Association of State Auditors, Comptrollers and Treasurers is registered with the National Association of State Boards of Accountancy (NASBA) as a sponsor of continuing professional education on the National Registry of CPE Sponsors. State boards of accountancy have final authority on the acceptance of individual courses for CPE credit. Complaints regarding registered sponsors may be addressed to the National Registry of CPE Sponsors, 150 Fourth Avenue North, Suite 700, Nashville, TN, 37219-2417 or by visiting the website www.nasba.org.




Municipal Credit Default Swap Activity Jumps, But Overall Market Is Still Thin.

Summary

The bankruptcy of Detroit brings new pressure on municipal bond investors and related exchange-traded funds like HYD, NUV, PML, PZA, IIM, NIO and VMO specializing in municipal bonds to heighten risk management and to hedge where appropriate. One potential tool in that regard is the single name credit default swap market, which is featured almost constantly in discussions of municipal entity credit risk. A recent example is “Traders Find Short Bets on Puerto Rico a Challenge,” a Wall Street Journal blog. The author notes:

“Default insurance on Puerto Rico, sold in the form of derivatives called credit-default swaps, is available from few dealer banks. The contracts also have barely traded because the protection is not available to buy in meaningful amounts and disclosures from the Commonwealth have been limited, some market participants said.”

The purpose of this note is to bring clarity and precision to discussions of municipal credit default swaps by providing facts from the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation trade warehouse. It is simply not the case that Puerto Rico credit default swaps have “barely traded.” The DTCC data makes clear that Puerto Rico credit default swaps have never traded in any week since the DTCC began reporting weekly on trading volume beginning with the week ended July 16, 2010. In fact, only 11 municipal or sub-sovereign names have ever been reported as trades to the DTCC trade warehouse during the 2010-2014 period. This note explains the details.

Continue Reading.

Donald van Deventer, Kamakura Corporation
Jul. 10, 2014 4:01 PM ET




P3S Could Speed Construction of Port and Inland Waterway Infrastructure, Army Corps Testifies.

The Army Corps of Engineers and lawmakers have high hopes that a newly created public-private partnership pilot program could help dent the backlog of critical infrastructure projects at the nation’s ports and inland waterways, an agency official told the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee’s P3 Panel July 10.

The P3 pilot program, established in the recently enacted Water Resources Reform and Development Act, is designed to push the corps to seek private investment to speed work on port and inland navigation projects.

Using public-private partnerships will be a new way for the Corps of Engineers to finance the completion of infrastructure projects, said Jim Hannon, chief of the agency’s operations and regulatory division. “We think there are some benefits that provide better value for money to the taxpayer by investigating opportunities to use these [P3] financing tools.”

Applying P3s to water projects may prove to be more complex than initially imagined. Hannon noted that the corps does not have the authority to charge tolls or user fees for many of its projects and would need to find ways to spread the costs to other stakeholders beyond ports, shippers and private sector partners.

“How do we account for the federal investment share of the project in the budgeting process?” said Hannon. “Does it get counted upfront or is it accounted for over the entire length of the agreement.”

The corps currently faces a massive backlog of more than 1,000 projects and studies on with an estimated price tag of $60 billion to $80 billion, according to the Heritage Foundation. Of the 257 locks in operation in 2009, 10 percent were built in the 1800s and the average age of federally owned locks was 60 years old.

“We approach the P3 opportunity as another way to get toward those other lock and dams improvements that are going to wait 20 to 30 years under the current program to get going,” Mike Toohey, president and CEO of the Waterways Council, told the panel.

The panel also heard from John Crowley, executive director of the National Association of Waterfront Employers, and Dave Kronsteiner, president of the board of commissioners at the Port of Coos Bay, Ore.

By Editor July 11, 2014




S&P: U.S. State And Local Government Credit Conditions Forecast: Ramping Up After A Slower-Than-Expected Start.

With 2014 now halfway over, credit conditions for U.S. state and local governments continue to stabilize and are strengthening modestly. This is despite a sharp downward revision to the estimate of first-quarter GDP growth by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and some emerging softness in state tax revenue collections in April. In Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services view, it’s useful to recall that measures of GDP, while important, are coincident indicators with data releases that lag the time period they measure. And our economists don’t see the BEA’s revision as signaling the start of a contractionary cycle. On the contrary, our forecast looks for a rebound in real GDP growth to 3.9% in the second quarter (annualized) followed by respectable rates of 3.3% in the third and fourth quarters.

After peaking in the third quarter of 2008, household debt declined for 17 of the subsequent 19 quarters. In our view, this deleveraging process was integral to the economy’s slow recovery from the Great Recession. Now, however, households have increased their debt loads for three consecutive quarters, suggesting the economy has turned an important corner. Nevertheless, weak first-quarter growth will likely take a bite out of our forecast for overall real GDP growth in 2014, which was already at 2.3%, down from the 2.75% we anticipated just three months ago.

Read the full report.




CDFI Fund Invites Comment on Annual CDFI Reporting Form.

The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Community Development Financial Institutions Fund (CDFI Fund) is requesting public comment on a new reporting form for all certified Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFIs). The CDFI Fund is releasing this request for comment today in anticipation of its publication tomorrow in the Federal Register.

The objective of the Annual Certification and Data Collection Report Form is to enable the CDFI Fund to recertify CDFIs while reducing the burden of the process that currently occurs every three years. In addition to recertifying CDFIs, this report also seeks to collect financial and impact data on all certified CDFIs annually to provide the CDFI Fund and the community development finance industry with more insight into the state and accomplishments of CDFIs.

A certified CDFI is a specialized financial institution that works in markets that are underserved by traditional financial institutions. CDFIs provide a unique range of financial products and services in economically distressed target markets, such as mortgage financing for low-income and first-time homebuyers and not-for-profit developers, flexible underwriting and risk capital for needed community facilities, and technical assistance, commercial loans and investments to small start-up or expanding businesses in low-income areas.

CDFI certification is a designation conferred by the CDFI Fund and is a requirement for accessing many of the CDFI Fund’s award programs. The CDFI Annual Certification and Data Collection Report Form will replace the extensive process conducted every three years with a shorter annual report. This report will also collect financial and impact data from all CDFIs regardless of whether they have received monetary awards in their last fiscal year. This report will collect standardized data on the full universe of certified CDFIs.

Comments are specifically invited on:

Written comments should be received on or before September 8, 2014 to be assured of consideration. All comments should be directed to Brette Fishman, Management Analyst at the Community Development Financial Institutions Fund, U.S. Department of the Treasury, 1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. 20020; by e-mail to annualreport@cdfi.treas.gov; or by facsimile to (202) 508-0083. Please note that this is not a toll-free number.

July 8, 2014




U.S. Plans Up to $4 Billion in New Cleantech Loan Guarantees.

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has issued a loan guarantee solicitation, making as much as $4 billion in loan guarantees available for innovative renewable energy and energy efficiency projects located in the U.S. that avoid, reduce or sequester greenhouse gases.

According to the DOE, this solicitation is intended to support technologies that are catalytic, replicable and market-ready. Although any project that meets the appropriate requirements is eligible to apply, the department has identified five key technology areas of interest: advanced grid integration and storage; drop-in biofuels; waste-to-energy; enhancement of existing facilities including micro-hydro or hydro updates to existing non-powered dams; and efficiency improvements.

“As [President Barack Obama] emphasized in his Climate Action Plan, it is critical that we take an all-of-the above approach to energy in order to cut carbon pollution, help address the effects of climate change and protect our children’s future,” says Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz.

“Investments in clean, low-carbon energy also provide an economic opportunity. Through previous loan guarantees and other investments, the department is already helping launch or jumpstart entire industries in the U.S., from utility-scale wind and solar to nuclear and lower-carbon fossil energy. Today’s announcement will help build on and accelerate that success.”

Currently, the DOE says its Loan Programs Office (LPO) supports a diverse portfolio of more than $30 billion in loans, loan guarantees and commitments – supporting more than 30 projects nationwide. The projects that the LPO has supported include one of the world’s largest wind farms; several of the world’s largest solar generation and thermal energy storage systems; and more than a dozen new or retooled auto manufacturing plants across the country, the department adds.




Jones Day: FERC Acts to Ensure that Utility Cost-Based Rates Include an Adequate Return on Equity.

In June, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC” or “Commission”) issued Opinion No. 531, which details three significant changes to the way FERC determines the rate of return on equity (“ROE”) in public utility rate cases.1 First, FERC modified its longstanding discounted cash flow (“DCF”) model for calculating ROE.2 Second, FERC ended its practice of applying a post-hearing adjustment to ROE based on changes in United States Treasury bond yields.3 Third, FERC decided that the ROE of the group of public utilities in question should not be set at the “point of central tendency” established by the range of reasonable ROEs, but instead should be set at the point halfway between the range’s point of central tendency and the range’s highest point.4 Each of these changes is explained below.

In conjunction with Opinion No. 531, FERC set for hearing a backlog of cases involving disputes over public utility rates.5 In each case, the Commission stated that “we expect the evidence and any DCF analyses presented by the participants in this proceeding to be guided by our decision in Opinion No. 531.”6 As compared to FERC’s preexisting approach to ROE, Opinion No. 531 appears likely to increase the ROE component in public utility cost-based rates, thereby increasing a public utility’s overall return. However, the long-term reach of FERC’s new ROE analysis remains unclear.

How Regulators Use the DCF Model and Establish a Range of Reasonable ROEs

Under cost-of-service ratemaking, certain costs are considered operating expenses and are recovered dollar-for-dollar in the utility’s annual revenue requirements, while other costs are capitalized, “thus entering the cost of service in the form of annual allowances for depreciation and return on the undepreciated portion of the investment.”7 In order to attract necessary capital, the utility must offer “a risk-adjusted expected rate of return sufficient to attract investors.”8 This “return” on the utility’s investments represents the cost expended by the utility to raise capital.9

For more than 30 years, the dominant method used by FERC to estimate investors’ required rate of return has been the DCF model. The premise of the DCF methodology is that “an investment in common stock is worth the present value of the infinite stream of dividends discounted at a market rate commensurate with the investment’s risk.”10 This “constant growth” DCF model can be expressed as a formula:

k = D/P (1+0.5g) + g.

In this formula, D is the current dividend, P is the price of the company’s common stock, and g is the expected growth rate in the company’s dividends. The formula solves for k, which represents the rate of return investors require to invest in a company’s common stock.11

In a rate case, FERC applies the DCF formula to each member of a group of comparable utilities, known as a proxy group. This generates a range of ROEs. Screening criteria, which can result in the exclusion of particular companies from the analysis, are applied to establish a range of reasonable ROEs. The ROE of the public utility that is the subject of FERC’s review is selected from within this range. FERC’s past practice has been to set the subject public utility’s ROE at the point of central tendency of the proxy group’s range of ROEs.

Applying the Two-Step DCF Methodology to Public Utilities

Since the mid-1990s, FERC has used a “one-step” DCF methodology in public utility rate cases (i.e., in the electric industry) while using a “two-step” DCF methodology in natural gas pipeline and oil pipeline rate cases. Under the one-step DCF methodology, FERC calculates two dividend yields for each proxy group company: one based on the proxy group company’s highest stock price from a six-month study period, and one based on the proxy group company’s lowest stock price from the same study period. Next, FERC develops two estimates of short-term dividend growth rates. A low cost of equity for each proxy group company is developed using the lowest dividend yield plus the lowest dividend growth rate projection. A high cost of equity for each proxy group company is developed using the highest dividend yield plus the highest dividend growth rate projection.12

In Opinion No. 531, FERC decided that henceforth it will apply the two-step DCF methodology in public utility rate cases. The result is a single average dividend yield calculated for each company in the proxy group. The dividend growth rate estimate for each proxy group company will take into account both projected short-term growth rates (constituting two-thirds of the total growth rate estimate) and projected long-term growth (one-third of the total).13 The short-term growth rate estimate will be based on the five-year forecast for each proxy group company, as published in the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (“IBES”). The long-term growth rate estimate will be based on forecasts of the long-term growth of the economy as a whole, stated in terms of gross domestic product.14 In the case before it, FERC reopened the record and established a “paper hearing” to give the participants in that case “an opportunity to present evidence concerning the appropriate long-term growth projection to be used for public utilities under the two-step DCF methodology.”15

Eliminating the Post-Hearing ROE Adjustment Based on U.S. Treasury Bond Yields

FERC’s cost-of-service ratemaking for public utilities relies predominantly on “test-period” evidence, which is evidence about the subject utility’s costs limited to a specific time period that ends before the rate case goes to hearing. Use of test-period evidence gives the parties a known universe of facts to dispute. One exception is FERC’s use of post-test-period data regarding ROE. FERC’s practice has been to adjust the subject utility’s ROE based on U.S. Treasury bond yields. FERC determines the change in U.S. Treasury bond yields as of the date of its order as compared to such yields as of the end of the hearing in the case.16 FERC then adjusts the final ROE by the amount of the change in U.S. Treasury bond yields. For example, a 1 percent drop in bond yields between the end of a hearing and FERC’s order would result in a 1 percent downward adjustment to the utility’s ROE.17

In Opinion No. 531, FERC decided that U.S. Treasury bond yields no longer “provide a reliable and consistent metric for tracking changes in ROE after the close of the record in a case.”18 Instead, FERC will allow participants in a rate case “to present the most recent financial data available at the time of the hearing, including post-test period financial data then available.”19 FERC already uses this approach in natural gas pipeline and oil pipeline rate cases.20

Selecting an ROE From Within the Range of Reasonable ROEs

Once a range of reasonable ROEs is developed by applying the DCF model to each member of a proxy group, FERC must select one ROE from within that range. Traditionally, FERC has set the subject public utility’s ROE at the “point of central tendency” within the range of ROEs. For a diverse group of public utilities, the point of central tendency is the midpoint within the range, which, as FERC uses the term, is the arithmetic mean of the single lowest and the single highest ROE. In contrast, for an individual public utility, the point of central tendency is the median.21 The median is the middle number in a series, such that half of the numbers are higher and half are lower than the median.

In Opinion No. 531, the issue in dispute was the appropriate ROE for the New England Transmission Owners, a group of utilities that had transferred operational control of their transmission facilities to ISO-New England. FERC decided that it would not set the ROE at the midpoint of the range of ROEs. Instead, FERC selected the point halfway between the midpoint and the highest point in the zone of reasonableness (the 75th percentile), which FERC described as the “central tendency for the top half of the zone of reasonableness.”22 In Opinion No. 531, the resulting midpoint was 9.39 percent, but the point at the 75th percentile of the range was 10.57 percent.

In rejecting the midpoint ROE, FERC explained its concern that the “capital market conditions in the record are anomalous, thereby making it more difficult to determine the return necessary to attract capital.”23 The New England Transmission Owners had argued that five other “benchmark methodologies” showed that the DCF-based midpoint in that case was too low to attract capital: (i) a risk premium analysis, which examines the premium that investors require to invest in equities; (ii) a capital asset pricing model (“CAPM”), which is a model that examines investor expectations about the future by taking into consideration the tendency of a stock’s price to follow changes in the market as a whole; (iii) an analysis of natural gas pipeline ROEs; (iv) a DCF analysis applied to non-utilities; and (v) an expected earnings analysis, which involves a comparison of the earnings investors can expect to receive from investing in public utilities, as compared to investing in other opportunities of comparable risk.24

FERC found that the risk premium analysis, the CAPM, and the expected earnings analysis were “informative” and supported the conclusion that the midpoint ROE was too low to attract capital. FERC did not consider the DCF analysis of non-utilities or the natural gas pipeline ROE analysis to be probative because they did not analyze the returns of public utilities.25

At several points, FERC’s analysis focused on the unique characteristics of companies in the business of building and owning electric transmission assets. For example, FERC found persuasive the fact that state regulatory commissions have approved public utility ROEs above the DCF midpoint ROE. According to FERC, transmission investment “entails unique risks that state-regulated electric distribution does not.”26 Investors in electric transmission infrastructure face risks such as “long delays in transmission siting, greater project complexity, environmental impact proceedings, requiring regulatory approval from multiple jurisdictions overseeing permits and rights of way, liquidity risk from financing projects that are large relative to the size of a balance sheet, and shorter investment history.”27 FERC emphasized that it has an obligation to set an ROE in this case “at a level sufficient to attract investment in interstate electric transmission,” explaining that such investment “helps promote efficient and competitive electricity markets, reduce costly congestion, enhance reliability, and allow access to new energy resources, including renewables.”28

Opinion No. 531 may allow a utility to justify an ROE greater than the median without making a company-specific showing of relative risk. In prior decisions, FERC has required a showing that the risk affecting the subject company be higher than the risk faced by the other members of the proxy group. As recently as 2013, FERC explained that any analysis attempting to “demonstrate that a deviation from the median ROE is justified” must present a comparison between “the risk level of the subject company and the risk level of each of the proxy group companies. This is the crux of the analysis, and if it is lacking, the analysis is incomplete.”29 In light of the general evidence relied on in Opinion No. 531, a company-specific showing of relative risk may no longer be the “crux” of the analysis.

Finally, FERC explained that its decision to set the New England Transmission Owners’ base ROE above the range’s point of central tendency involved considerations that are distinct from its analysis of “incentive adders” pursuant to Section 219 of the Federal Power Act.30 FERC’s task when evaluating a base ROE is to set the ROE at a level that “enables the utility to attract investment.” In contrast, FPA Section 219 authorized FERC to establish incentive above that base ROE. FERC cautioned that it will not permit its new analysis of base ROE and its analysis of FPA Section 219 incentives to be combined in a way that results in an ROE that exceeds the top of the zone of reasonableness established by its new two-step DCF methodology.31

Likely Effect on Public Utility Rates

FERC’s departure in Opinion No. 531 from three aspects of its existing policy on ROE will result in a higher ROE for the New England Transmission Owners. In the Initial Decision under review in Opinion No. 531, the Administrative Law Judge found that the prospective ROE for the New England Transmission Owners should be set at 9.7 percent.32 In contrast, FERC’s analysis in Opinion No. 531 resulted in a tentative finding that the appropriate ROE was 10.57 percent.33

Opinion No. 531’s higher ROE did not result from FERC’s switch to the two-step DCF model. The two-step DCF model alone resulted in a midpoint ROE of 9.39 percent34—lower than the prospective 9.7 percent ROE approved in the Initial Decision. Rather, the higher ROE resulted from FERC’s decision to select the midpoint of the “upper half” of the zone of reasonableness rather than selecting the midpoint of the full zone. Moreover, FERC’s focus on the midpoint as the point of central tendency (because the ROE of a group of utilities was at issue) raises questions about how FERC’s analysis from Opinion No. 531 will be applied in the context of setting a single public utility’s ROE, where the Commission uses the median of the range of reasonable ROEs as opposed to the midpoint.35 Notwithstanding the differences in the ROE analysis for a single utility and grous of utilities, the Commission’s order in Seminole Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Florida Power Corp. instructs the parties to apply Opinion No. 531 in establishing a single utility’s ROE.36

FERC also emphasized that the new two-step DCF model produces “a narrower zone of reasonableness, consistent with the fact [that] different firms in a regulated industry would not ordinarily be expected to have widely varying levels of profitability.”37 This narrower zone of reasonableness may result in a point of central tendency within the “upper half” of the zone of reasonableness that is close enough to the overall point of central tendency to support the selection of that higher ROE.

In sum, although two aspects of Opinion No. 531 will apply in all future public utility rate cases, the largest identifiable change in the ROE in that order was based on a case-specific analysis—performed in the context of “anomalous” capital market conditions—of the level of return needed to encourage investments in transmission where that ROE will apply to a group of public utilities rather than to a single public utility. Had FERC’s ROE policies remained unchanged, the result would have been lower ROEs. Therefore, Opinion No. 531 is likely to increase public utility returns in cost-based rates, but the scope and magnitude of this effect as applied to other public utilities remains unclear.

Footnotes

1 Martha Coakley v. Bangor Hydro-Electric Co., Opinion No. 531, 147 FERC ¶ 61,234 at P 7 (2014) (“Opinion No. 531”). A public utility is an entity subject to the Federal Power Act because it owns facilities used for the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce or for the sale of such energy at wholesale in interstate commerce. 16 U.S.C. § 824 (2012).

2 Opinion No. 531 at PP 32–41.

3 Id. at PP 157–160.

4 Id. at P 151.

5 ENE (Environment Northeast) v. Bangor Hydro-Electric Co., 147 FERC ¶ 61,235 (2014); Seminole Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Florida Power Corp., 147 FERC ¶ 61,236 (2014); Seminole Electric Corp. v. Duke Energy Florida, Inc., 147 FERC ¶ 61,237 (2014); Golden Spread Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Southwestern Public Service Co., 147 FERC ¶ 61,238 (2014); Golden Spread Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Southwestern Public Service Co., 147 FERC ¶ 61,239 (2014).

6 Seminole Electric Corp. v. Duke Energy Florida, Inc., 147 FERC ¶ 61,237 at P 21.

7 Alfred E. Kahn, The Economics of Regulation: Principles and Institutions 27 (2nd ed. 1988).

8 Canadian Ass’n of Petroleum Producers v. FERC, 254 F.3d 289, 293 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

9 See id.

10 Opinion No. 531 at P 14 (citing, as an example, Canadian Ass’n of Petroleum Producers, 254 F.3d at 293).

11 Id. at P 15.

12 Id. at PP 25–26.

13 Id. at P 39.

14 Id. at P 39.

15 Id. at P 43.

16 Id. at P 157.

17 Id. at P 159.

18 Id. at P 160.

19 Id. at P 160.

20 Id. at P 160.

21 Id. at P 26.

22 Id. at P 151.

23 Id. at P 145.

24 Id. at P 146.

25 Id. at P 146.

26 Id. at P 148.

27 Id. at P 149.

28 Id. at P 150.

29 El Paso Natural Gas Co., 145 FERC ¶ 61,040 at P 698 (2013); see also id. at P 686 (reversing the Administrative Law Judge’s finding that the pipeline’s relative risk justifies an ROE “well above” the median of the proxy group companies, and setting the pipeline’s ROE at the median). See, e.g., Southern California Edison Co., 92 FERC ¶ 61,070 at 61,266 (finding that the appropriate ROE for the subject public utility should be above the point of central tendency for the comparison group because the utility “is more risky than the comparison group”), reh’g denied, 108 FERC ¶ 61,085 (2004).

30 Opinion No. 531 at P 153.

31 Id. at P 165.

32 Id. at P 5.

33 Id. at P 142.

34 Id. at P 147.

35 See S. Cal. Edison Co. v. FERC, 717 F.3d 177, 186 (D.C. Cir. 2013).

36 Seminole Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Florida Power Corp., 147 FERC ¶ 61,236 at P 16.

37 Opinion No. 531 at PP 38, 161.

Last Updated: July 2 2014

Article by Kenneth B. Driver, James C. Beh, Kevin J. McIntyre, Matthew R. McGuire and William Weaver

The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.




How S&P Intends to Implement its Revised Rating Methodology and Assumptions for Affordable Multifamily Housing Bonds and Apply them to Ratings.

On June 19, 2014, Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services published its revised criteria, “Rating Methodology and Assumptions for Affordable Multifamily Housing Bonds”. Included in the scope of the criteria are affordable multifamily housing bonds supported by unenhanced affordable housing projects (AHP), federally subsidized housing projects (e.g., Section 8), privatized military housing projects, and multifamily loan pools rated in the U.S. These criteria exclude and do not apply to bonds secured by FHA-insured mortgage loans; Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae, or Freddie Mac mortgage-backed securities; or other federal credit enhancement programs.

The new criteria became effective upon publication. The criteria apply to all new and existing in-scope transactions. We plan to complete our review of all existing ratings within six months. We will accept requests for expedited review of ratings during this process. Though highly unlikely, we could lengthen this schedule if a material credit event occurs, particularly if the impact could take some time to assess. However, we would clearly communicate any change in our plans.

The criteria update is part of Standard & Poor’s commitment to the market to enhance the transparency, rigor, and specificity of its criteria across sectors and asset classes. Our objective is to provide market constituents with greater insight into how we rate affordable multifamily housing bond transactions and to enhance the global comparability of our ratings through a clear, coherent, and globally consistent criteria framework.

We began communicating the process of updating our criteria when we published an advance notice of proposed criteria change in March 2013. We then published our proposed revised ratings framework, “Request for Comment: Rating Methodology and Assumptions for Affordable Multifamily Housing Bonds” on April 1, 2013. During the subsequent two-month comment period, we interacted with market participants within the U.S., released a CreditMatters TV segment, and conducted a teleconference in order to outline the framework and respond to questions on the proposed criteria change. We used these outlets to increase participants’ awareness and understanding of the proposed changes and to solicit, evaluate, and incorporate feedback where appropriate. In conjunction with the release of the new criteria, we responded to market participants with an article outlining the feedback we received and what changes were incorporated into the final criteria in the publication “RFC Process Summary: Rating Methodology And Assumptions For Affordable Multifamily Housing Bonds”, published June 19, 2014.

We are now providing information about the likely ratings impact of the criteria changes, a more detailed explanation of the implementation process, and comments on how we intend to apply the revised criteria to our current ratings.

How We Expect The New Criteria To Affect Ratings

The criteria affect approximately 350 rated issues, comprising about 150 discrete projects and programs. Based on our preliminary analysis, the expected impact on outstanding issue ratings is as follows:

How We Will Implement The New Criteria

We intend to review all of the in-scope transactions within six months of the effective date of the new criteria. Our implementation schedule is as follows:

June 19, 2014
Standard & Poor’s Released the Rating Methodology and Assumptions for Affordable Multifamily Housing Bonds

Week of June 23—June 27, 2014
We applied these criteria to all new issues in scope of these criteria regardless of the original request date of the rating.
Any rating reviews, whether scheduled or event-driven, were assessed under the new criteria.

Week Of June 30-July 3, 2014
Ratings that may be impacted based on our quantitative testing will be placed on CreditWatch with positive or negative implications, as applicable, or under criteria observation based on the revised methodology.
Ratings that are scheduled for their regular reviews will also be placed on CreditWatch with developing implications, pending the receipt of additional information needed to complete the reviews under the new criteria.

Week Of July 7-July 11, 2014
We plan to send out questionnaires to issuers/obligors requesting the information we need to review all existing in-scope transactions under the new criteria.
We will upload the criteria and related articles, as well as explanatory materials, including CreditMatters TV videos, onto our dedicated public website www.sandp.com/hess to allow for easy access and maximum transparency.
We will conduct a WebEx seminar to outline the criteria framework and answer questions from issuers and obligors.
We cannot disclose the timing of any reviews for particular credits beyond the guidance provided in this notice.

Week Of Aug. 6-Aug. 11, 2014
We plan to send out a second request for information 30 days after the initial request if no response is received, or if the information we receive is insufficient to complete our review under the new criteria.

Week Of Sept. 5-Sept. 10, 2014
We intend to maintain the ratings on all debt rated under the previous criteria. However, for issuers and obligors who have not responded with complete information for in-scope transactions within 30 days after our second request for information, those issues will be placed on CreditWatch with negative implications in accordance with our credit rating suspension/withdrawal policy.

July 7-Oct. 10, 2014
Once we complete our reviews of ratings that have been placed on CreditWatch as described above, we will then review the remaining in-scope ratings.
We will accept requests for expedited review of ratings during the implementation period.

How We Will Communicate Our Rating Actions
We will publish rating reports on all transactions reviewed under the revised criteria.

Format Of Our Rating Reports
Each rating report will include our assessment of the following components:

Upon release, ratings and rating reports will be available on RatingsDirect. Ratings and criteria are available on www.standardandpoors.com.

Related Criteria And Research

Rating Methodology And Assumptions For Affordable Multifamily Housing Bonds, June 19, 2014
RFC Process Summary: Rating Methodology And Assumptions For Affordable Multifamily Housing Bonds, June 19, 2014
Rating Methodology And Assumptions Ffor U.S. and Canadian CMBS, Sept. 5, 2012
CMBS Global Property Evaluation Methodology, Sept. 5, 2012
Application Of CMBS Global Property Evaluation Methodology In U.S. And Canadian Transactions, Sept. 5, 2012

Primary Credit Analysts:

Mikiyon W Alexander, New York (1) 212-438-2083;
mikiyon.alexander@standardandpoors.com

Karen M Fitzgerald, CFA, New York (1) 212-438-4858;
karen.fitzgerald@standardandpoors.com

Valerie D White, New York (1) 212-438-2078;
valerie.white@standardandpoors.com

01-Jul-2014




Growth In Green Bond Market Underscores Need For Market Standards.

The significant growth that we have seen in the past year in green/climate bond issuances – $11.4 billion in 2013 and an estimated $40 billion in 2014 – strongly suggests a threshold market acknowledgement of the enormous potential in these instruments. Growth in the market and a rapid increase in the volume of climate/green bonds strongly suggest that we are approaching a broad yet fundamental market acceptance of this new asset class. If so, it is important that we begin to shift gears and move from proving the model to creating the market infrastructure that incorporates meaningful standards to support a wider and more liquid market for climate/green bonds.

Green bonds and climate bonds are issued to pay for environmental projects. These are often issued by large institutions, such as World Bank, Bank of America, and Toyota that invest in both environmental and non-environmental projects. However, the proceeds from these bonds are invested exclusively in environmental projects. Many, but not all green bonds are climate-focused. Climate bonds, however, are totally linked to assets that encourage a rapid transition to a low-carbon and climate resilient economy.

These bonds can be considered the equivalent of infrastructure bonds tailored specifically to finance climate solutions, thus providing institutional investors with the opportunity to direct their capital into investments that more appropriately meet their financial and social preferences.

When tied to specific climate change mitigation investments, these finance instruments allow markets to raise capital or, more specifically, support the private sector in raising capital to:

Green bonds are not so different after all

Bonds are financial products best suited to both the financing of energy projects with long payback periods and to providing institutional investors with security of returns over the longer term. They are used to unlock “patient capital,” specifically taking savings which require secure returns over long periods of time (such as those held by pension funds) and investing them in low-carbon projects that have high up-front costs but solid payback rates over the longer term. Developing a market specifically for climate-themed bonds will help grow markets more broadly for associated “green” debt capital.

These bonds need not differ significantly from existing issuances of debt. The only difference is that the funds they attract are supported by real and verifiable energy projects that in some certifiable manner serve to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. They also allow investors to report to their members on how their secure investments are making a contribution to addressing climate change.

However, to foster liquidity in a themed bond space, an agreed set of rules and criteria is absolutely essential to assure investors of the integrity of each environmental themed bond. A system of standards for the labeling of green debt holds the promise of being a key enabler for pension fund investment and freeing up significant amounts of private capital in support of climate change mitigation.

To flourish, green bonds need standards

In a direct effort to encourage transparency, disclosure, and integrity in this environmental bond market, a consortium of nearly fifty financial institutions are backing a set of voluntary “Green Bond Principles” (GBPs). These GBPs were initially drafted by four of the financial institutions – Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Citi, Crédit Agricole Corporate, and JP Morgan Chase – with guidance from issuers, investors, and environmental groups. They are designed to serve as voluntary guidelines on recommended processes for the development and issuance of green bonds.

These critical standards are intended to help issuers, investors, and underwriters by:

These voluntary guidelines are fundamentally designed to encourage transparency and integrity in the market and to prevent “greenwashing” – the practice of deceptively promoting something as green or good for the environment. This is particularly important as the issuer base shifts from trustworthy, multinational development banks to corporate issuers. To the extent that the GBP can achieve the objectives outlined above, these instruments will ultimately truly matter when they can consistently attract a new and broader investor base, thus becoming vehicles for channeling lower cost capital into energy efficiency, renewable energy, and climate change adaptation efforts.

The Green Bond Principles can further serve to catalyze this market, transforming green/climate bonds into a “mainstream” asset class by creating more certainty around investment integrity. U.S. sub-national issuers of capital can and should play a critical role in helping to foster and develop this new asset class as well as the market infrastructure in which these instruments may flourish. The bottom line is that these new investment vehicles need to be treated like, and designed like, more traditional financial products, and the Green Bond Principles are a very good start to growing this important climate market instrument.

By Vic A. Rojas
Vic A. Rojas is Senior Manager, Financial Policy, for Environmental Defense Fund.




Army Chief of Engineers Looks to P3S for Nation's Water Infrastructure Needs.

The Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is looking at new ways to finance the essential civil works infrastructure on U.S. waterways, including public-private partnerships according to Lt. Gen. Thomas Bostick, the agency’s commanding general.

“We can only do so much through process efficiencies. We’re going to have to work together in public-private partnerships to find some alternative financing means that come from outside the federal government,” Bostick told reporters last week.

Some Corps projects have an identifiable revenue stream. The Corps currently collects fees on shipping companies that use deep-sea ports and inland waterways. However, projects such as levees do not have an obvious revenue stream, according to Bostick.

“We have to find a way to monetize the things we want the private sector to invest in,” Bostick said. “At the end of the day, they need to make a profit, and we have to find ways to set up long-term contracts that will allow them to accrue benefits based on the investments they make.”

Bostick’s comments come as the Corps faces a backlog of $60 billion in recapitalization projects, according to a 2013 review. That same year, the American Society of Civil Engineers issued a grade of a D- to the network of 15,000 miles of levees and infrastructure along the thousands of miles of inland waterways in the United States. Hydro-power dams earned a modestly higher grade of D.

“The infrastructure is slipping in its ability to deliver consistent and reliable services,” Bostick told Federal News Radio. “Since 2000, we’ve had a 50 percent increase in the downtime of our hydroelectric equipment. Since 2009, delays and interruptions have more than doubled on our inland waterway locks and dams. And 16 percent of our dams are categorized as ‘extremely’ or ‘very high’ risk, which increases the urgency for dam safety work.”

Congress funds the Corps’ recapitalization projects at around $2 billion per year. But even as the Corps continues to focus on the nation’s highest priorities, the projects it is working on this year will require an additional $23 billion to complete.

“That gives you some idea of how long our current projects will take at the pace we’re getting appropriations,” he said.

By Editor July 1, 2014




Municipal Market Advisors Municipal Issuer Brief - June 30, 2014

Municipal Market Advisors Municipal Issuer Brief – June 30, 2014




Senator Files PAB Proposal as Amendment to Transportation Bill.

The Senate’s leading advocate for expanding private water-wastewater infrastructure financing has filed his plan as an amendment to a transportation bill expected to receive a vote in the Senate Finance Committee next month. It is not clear, however, whether the committee will accept the amendment.

Offered by Sen. Bob Menendez (D-N.J.), the amendment would eliminate state-based caps on the amount of private activity bonds (PABs) that can be used to finance water and wastewater infrastructure. The amendment is based on the “Sustainable Water Infrastructure Act” (S. 2345), a stand-alone bill Sen. Menendez introduced last month.

Current law allows private entities (with state government approval) to issue PABs to fund a variety of infrastructure projects that deliver a public benefit, but the total amount of PABs that may be issued annually in each state is limited. This means water projects must compete for limited PAB financing with a variety of other infrastructure sectors.

Sen. Menendez proposed the amendment in advance of the Finance Committee’s consideration of a bill to shore up the federal highway trust fund. The committee plans to markup the highway legislation next month.




New Tennessee Law Insulates State Credit Rating from Cities' Financial Problems.

Credit markets view the move as a positive for the state but negative for municipalities.

As the debate about how much financial help states should offer their distressed cities takes place across the country, one state has made a move to avoid the question altogether.

In July, a new law goes into effect in Tennessee that forbids the state from spending its own resources to repay the debts of distressed municipal governments. The legislation does not alter Tennessee’s emergency loan assistance program, which puts the onus on local governments to request assistance before any default. But the new law is a win-lose in that it’s viewed by the credit markets as a positive for the state and a negative for its local governments.

As Tennessee has historically had a policy of not paying debt service for stressed municipalities, the action is more of a clarification, rather than a change in policy. Still, said Julius Vizner, assistant vice president at Moody’s Investors Service, it’s an important distinction.

Financially Distressed Cities Isolate Poor and Minorities, Former Receiver Says
“The state is drawing a line here between its fiscal responsibilities and realities,” Vizner said. “In general, the fact that the state is not incurring a liability for any potential future case of a local government [wanting direct aid], is a credit positive.”

States vary in how involved they get with their distressed municipalities and there are arguments for and against doing so. A big reason to intervene is that state intervention can reduce any chilling effect – that one government’s distressed finances could spread to neighboring localities. Michigan, for example, views state intervention as key to its survival and has had long history of state involvement in city finances. Typically, aid comes in the form of a state-appointed emergency financial manager for its cities. But in the case of Detroit’s bankruptcy, this year the state went the beyond that. In June, Gov. Rick Snyder signed into law a funding package that allocated nearly $200 million in state funds for a so-called grand bargain to try to help the Motor City emerge from bankruptcy. The package also included $366 million pledged over 20 years by philanthropic foundations and would go toward pension payments for Detroit’s retired city workers and keeping the Detroit Institute of Art’s work from being sold to pay creditors.

There are, however, counterarguments for states getting very involved in their distressed municipalities and Tennessee’s desire to keep its high credit rating protected isn’t unfounded. (Tennessee is rated either AAA or one notch below, depending on the rating agency.) Recently, Standard and Poor’s rating agency revised its outlook on Michigan’s credit down to stable from positive. The state maintained its AA- rating but S&P noted that Michigan’s budget reserve fund will decrease because of the transfer to Detroit. In their comments, the analysts said the “appropriation to the Detroit bankruptcy settlement also raises questions as to potential future state contributions to other distressed localities and school districts” and that S&P would continue to monitor the situation.

Unlike Michigan, Tennessee does not allow its municipalities to file for bankruptcy and none of its local governments are rated below investment grade. So, even if a government were to default on debt, it wouldn’t necessarily present the same threat to the state economy the same way that similarly distressed municipalities in Michigan might. It would depend on the circumstances, said Vizner, but Tennessee’s overall economy is healthy so a local government default would likely be viewed as an anomaly.

Pew Charitable Trusts, which has conducted extensive research on state interventions, said that not every state actually needs a program. It advises that states design programs to be proactive in detecting and tackling local government financial challenges. However, most programs are reactionary.

GOVERNING.COM
BY LIZ FARMER | JULY 1, 2014




The Risks States Take for Their Distressed Cities.

Wall Street can be hard on a state that moves to keep its local governments solvent or help them through bankruptcy. But it’s a chance that some states have decided is worth taking.

Two years ago, Wells Fargo declared state and local governments’ efforts to deal with critical fiscal issues to be “light years ahead” of the federal government’s. It’s hard to argue with that assessment. But beyond the Beltway, the interplay between states and local governments in the wake of the Great Recession has raised unprecedented challenges. It has displayed stark differences in the roles states choose to play in dealing with their distressed localities. And it has highlighted the question of how much credit risk those states are willing to take on to help get their local governments’ houses in order.

In looking at the municipal bankruptcies (or near-bankruptcies) in Alabama, California, Michigan, Pennsylvania and Rhode Island, the roles of the respective states ranged from adverse (Alabama) to seemingly irrelevant (California) to positive (Maryland, Michigan, Pennsylvania and Rhode Island). The Great Recession demarcated states into those with oversight programs that either protected against municipal insolvency or offered good support for troubled communities; those that accepted risks and reacted by changing their laws; and those that appeared to contribute to the distress and avoid the acceptance of any risk. The hard issue for state leaders was — and is — a fear of credit-risk contagion.

State involvement in local fiscal distress carries risks both fiscal and political. Nowhere is that playing out more starkly than in Detroit’s bankruptcy with the truly extraordinary and bipartisan involvement by Michigan Gov. Rick Snyder and the state’s legislative leaders.

When Standard and Poor’s recently revised its outlook on Michigan’s credit downward from positive to stable, it cited several economic and fiscal factors, including softening revenue. But the rating agency noted another factor: Michigan’s recent decision to dip into its rainy-day fund to contribute $195 million to Detroit’s city-government retirees as a critical part of the so-called “grand bargain” for the Motor City’s exit from bankruptcy. S&P wrote that the state’s action “raises questions as to potential future state contributions to other distressed localities and school districts.”

S&P’s action wasn’t a big surprise in Lansing. In a statement to the Bond Buyer, a spokesperson for the governor’s office wrote: “We knew the Detroit settlement package and [budget stabilization fund] was a concern with the rating agencies, which is why the Governor felt it was important to address head on and show why the package was a financially responsible, smart way for the state to address Detroit,” adding that the contribution was unlikely to set a precedent for other distressed local governments in the state. Subsequently, Fitch Ratings affirmed its AA rating and stable outlook on the state’s general-obligation bonds, and Moody’s affirmed its Aa2 rating with a positive outlook.

Needless to say, S&P did not analyze what its rating might have been had the governor and bipartisan state legislative leadership not stepped up to the plate; as far as Michigan’s leaders were concerned, the far greater potential credit risk was not to act. Indeed, the question for states is how to balance the credit risk of non-involvement versus involvement. In some states — especially smaller ones such as Rhode Island or Maryland, where a default by Providence or Baltimore would have led to significant repercussions to the states’ economies and credit ratings — whether the state needed to establish a proactive role could not really be in question. In a similar sense, state leaders in Albany and Lansing have clearly recognized the critical role of New York City and Detroit to their states’ economies.

Cities’ and counties’ fiscal distress or bankruptcy cannot be isolated from their states’ economies, as much as legislators in Springfield, Ill., or Montgomery, Ala. might wish they could. Thus, statutory “emergency rooms” of some sort — or “pre-emergency rooms,” such as long-established programs in New Jersey and North Carolina that have worked to prevent any municipal bankruptcy filings — have demonstrated efficient means to provide state oversight without debt adjustment. Many states require municipalities to regularly submit audit reports and budgets to a state division of local government, and other oversight programs allow intervention when budgets are out of balance. Some states may also offer temporary assistance through loans or emergency grants.

The focus of such state oversight programs is to maintain or improve local governments’ fiscal and managerial functionality. State policy-makers recognize that when that functionality disappears in the calamity of a bankruptcy, it will be the state’s taxpayers and its credit rating that will be at risk.

Programs like these, of course, present their own risks to states, such as setting a precedent that would trigger comparable assistance to other distressed communities; forgoing investments in infrastructure or education in order to prop up a city or county’s pensions; or creating an impression that a state will weigh in against its investors in favor of its poorly managed municipalities.

But in accepting risks like these, a state is betting that its constructive role will not just cure a cancer and prevent its spread, but, more importantly, lay the foundation for accruing economic benefits to the region and state that outweigh any capital-markets costs. And the state is aiming to lay the foundation for a more constructive state-local relationship for the future.

BY FRANK SHAFROTH | JUNE 30, 2014

Frank Shafroth is the director of the Center for State and Local Government Leadership at George Mason University.




Illinois Pension Reform in Question on Insurance Ruling.

Illinois can’t cut contributions to government retirees’ health-insurance premiums, the state’s top court said in a ruling with possible implications for Governor Pat Quinn’s bid to fix a $100 billion pension shortfall.

The Illinois Supreme Court, in a 6-1 decision today, ruled the health-insurance premium subsidies are pension benefits protected by the state’s constitution that can’t be diminished or impaired, as Illinois lawmakers tried to do with a 2012 law that let an administrator determine the level of contributions.

Protection of pension benefits is the same provision in the Illinois constitution retirees are relying on in challenging Quinn’s plan to cut the pension shortfall with reductions in cost-of-living adjustments and increasing the retirement age for workers who are now 45 or younger.

Illinois has the largest pension-funding shortfall of any U.S. state. The remedial legislation has been delayed by court order until the case is decided.

The threat to Illinois’ pension overhaul may prolong a selloff in state bonds that began in May, when lawmakers failed to extend a 2011 income-tax increase. That leaves the state with a $2 billion hole that will require stiffing vendors, borrowing money and delaying payments to employees.

The extra yield municipal-bond investors demand to own Illinois general obligations instead of benchmark AAA munis rose yesterday to 1.28 percentage points, the highest since February, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Illinois has the lowest rating among U.S. states and the widest yield spread among the 17 states tracked by Bloomberg.

Lawsuits Reinstated

Today’s ruling reinstates lawsuits filed by members of three Illinois employee unions. Those cases had been dismissed by a state court judge in Sangamon County, which includes the state capital of Springfield.

The ruling supports the argument that “retirement security, including affordable health care and a modest pension, cannot be revoked by politicians,” Henry Bayer, executive director of the Illinois chapter of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, said in a statement.

The ruling will have no direct impact on the pension reform litigation arguments, said Maura Possley, a spokeswoman for state Attorney General Lisa Madigan.

“While this decision is very clear on the fact that the pension clause covers health care benefits, the arguments in the pension reform litigation are different than the ones in this health care case,” Possley said.

Ruling Disappoints

Sarah Wetmore, vice president and research director at the non-profit Civic Federation in Chicago, said her organization was disappointed with the high court ruling.

“The Civic Federation supported the changes that the state had made to retiree health-care subsidy, that they were necessary and rational to make the program more sustainable over the long-term,” she said in a phone interview.

“We think this means the state is going to have to come up with a plan to make those payments going forward, whether that means cutting in other areas or raising additional revenue. It’s an expensive program for the state and it’s going to become more expensive in the future,” she said.

Wetmore declined to speculate on the effect of today’s decision on the pension reform bill litigation. “It’s certainly not helpful for the state,” she said.

Grant Klinzman, a spokesman for Quinn, said the governor remains confident that the pension reform law is constitutional.

“If the court’s decision is predictive, the challenge of reforming our pensions will remain,” Illinois Senate President John Cullerton said in a statement.

Cullerton and Quinn are Democrats.

Those pursuing the health insurance-premium claims are members of the Illinois’ State Employees Retirement System, the State Universities Retirement System and the Teachers’ Retirement System of the State of Illinois.

The case is Kanerva v. Weems, 2014-IL-115811, Illinois Supreme Court (Springfield).

By Andrew Harris Jul 3, 2014 1:32 PM PT

To contact the reporter on this story: Andrew Harris in federal court in Chicago at aharris16@bloomberg.net

To contact the editors responsible for this story: Michael Hytha at mhytha@bloomberg.net Joe Schneider, Fred Strasser




Moody's: New Pension Disclosures Under GASB 67/68 Will Have Limited Impact on US State and Local Government Ratings.

New York, June 30, 2014 — The new state and local government pension accounting standards, Government Accounting Standards Board (GASB) 67 and 68, scheduled to start later this year, will not change the methodology that Moody’s Investors Service uses to adjust US state and local government pension data in its rating process. Some liability measures could be affected, however, by new information in the additional disclosure that the standards will require, specifically on the sensitivity of liabilities to changes in the discount rate.

Moody’s explains the impact of the GASB 67/68 reporting changes on its credit analysis in the report, “Moody’s US Public Pension Analysis Mostly Unchanged By New GASB 67/68 Standards.”

“The revised standards do not change our approach to calculating Moody’s Adjusted Net Pension Liability, or ANPL, for state and local governments, the measure of these liabilities that we use in our ratings,” says Analyst Tom Aaron. “The new information that will be disclosed on the sensitivity of discount rates, however, could materially impact the results of our adjustments in some cases.”

The additional disclosure is unlikely to impact ratings in the vast majority of cases, says Moody’s. When it does, the information could be credit positive or credit negative, depending on pension plan liability characteristics.

Moody’s will use the new liability disclosure related to discount rate changes for estimating the specific duration of a given plan. Absent other data, Moody’s had previously assumed a uniform plan duration of 13 years in making its discount rate adjustments to plan liabilities.

Moody’s will continue to adjust reported liabilities in their entirety using a high-grade corporate bond index tied to the actuarial valuation date.

Important changes in GASB 67/68 that will not change Moody’s pension adjustments include the disclosure of local governments’ shares of a multi-employee cost-sharing plans, and the appearance of net pension liabilities on local government balance sheets.

The accounting standards will change with pension plan disclosures for fiscal year 2014 and bond issuer disclosures for fiscal year 2015.

For more information, Moody’s research subscribers can access the report at:

http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBM_PBM171874.

***

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WSJ: Illinois Supreme Court Rules Against Cuts in Retiree Health Benefits.

CHICAGO—A ruling by the Illinois Supreme Court Thursday is casting new doubts on an overhaul of the public employee retirement system that passed last year to prop up the state’s deeply underfunded pensions.

The court ruled health-insurance subsidies for retired state workers are protected under the Illinois Constitution, siding with public-sector unions who challenged cuts to the benefits passed by lawmakers two years ago. The decision set off renewed debate over the constitutionality of a larger overhaul of the retirement system, which passed last fall and is being challenged by state workers and retirees on similar grounds.

“If the court’s decision is predictive, the challenge of reforming our pension systems will remain,” state Senate President John Cullerton said.

Gov. Pat Quinn stood by the pension law, which reduces future retirement costs by shrinking cost-of-living increases for retirees, raising retirement ages for younger employees and capping the size of pensions. He said he expects the law will survive the legal challenge that’s pending.

The pension changes came after nearly three years of grueling debate, during which the state’s credit rating fell to the lowest among U.S. states. Illinois has underfunded its retirement system for decades, and the shortfall has grown to $100 billion. Chicago also is watching state-level decisions that could affect the city, which is trying to close its own yawning gap between current assets and promised retirement benefits.

Courts are playing a key role in several states in determining just how far lawmakers can go in cutting pension benefits for workers and retirees as they try to stabilize funds and reduce future costs.

In Illinois, lawyers for state workers and retirees took Thursday’s decision as a sign the state’s top court will hold true to the constitution, which explicitly forbids the diminishment of pension benefits once they’re promised. But Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan in a statement said the arguments are different in the larger pension overhaul case and aren’t directly affected by Thursday’s ruling.

A spokeswoman for Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel said the court ruling doesn’t affect city efforts to address pension or health-care costs.

Still Christopher Mooney, director of the Institute of Government and Public Affairs at the University of Illinois, said the 6-1 ruling likely means the court will scrap the larger overhaul. The case for allowing reductions in health benefits was stronger than what the state will argue when defending the larger cuts in pension benefits, he said.

“We’re basically back to square one. They are going to have to figure out something else,” he said.

Illinois’s 10-year general obligation bonds were unchanged Thursday, according to Thomson Reuters Municipal Market Data. Trading was light ahead of the Independence Day holiday.

By MARK PETERS
Updated July 3, 2014 4:23 p.m. ET

Write to Mark Peters at mark.peters@wsj.com




WSJ: Creditors Win Bid to Challenge Detroit Bankruptcy.

DETROIT—A legal challenge in Detroit’s municipal bankruptcy case must be heard before a trial on the city’s debt-cutting plan, a federal appeals court ruled late Wednesday.

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals said a lower district court judge improperly held up an appeal by municipal bond insurer Syncora questioning the city of Detroit’s use of casino tax revenue during the case.

“In a bankruptcy case of such scope and complexity, that is not the proper way to adjudicate appeals that implicate legal questions of fundamental importance to the bankruptcy proceedings,” the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals said in its ruling.

By ordering the lower court to act, a federal appeals court may have thrown a potential wrench in the timetable to exit the city of Detroit from municipal bankruptcy by this fall.

The appeals court ordered a federal-district court judge to rule by July 14 on a request by Syncora Guarantee Inc. and its associated Syncora Capital Assurance Inc. to stop the city from using its casino tax revenue rather than preserve the funds potentially to pay back creditors including Syncora. The city generates about $170 million a year from taxes levied on its three casinos.

“Without a final decision on that question, the city will not know what amount its coffers will contribute to the bankruptcy estate, the creditors cannot know the size of the pie they are being asked to share, and the bankruptcy court cannot be confident that it is considering a legally and financially viable plan,” the appeals court said Wednesday.

A trial before a federal bankruptcy judge on the city’s proposed debt-cutting plan to resolve an estimated $18 billion in long-term obligations is scheduled to begin Aug. 14. It wasn’t immediately clear whether the appeals court ruling would push back the beginning of the trial in the nation’s largest municipal bankruptcy case. The city’s emergency manager had hoped to see the city exit Chapter 9 bankruptcy by the end of September when his term is set to end.

A representative for Syncora didn’t have an immediate comment.

Bill Nowling, spokesman for Detroit Emergency Manager Kevyn Orr, said in an email Wednesday night that “it is too soon to say what impact (the ruling) could have on the length of the bankruptcy proceedings.”

Detroit made ill-fated interest-rate bets known as swaps with Wall Street banks in the hopes of avoiding higher rates. They were tied to $1.4 billion in bonds the city issued from 2005 to help address funding shortfalls in its pension funds.

In 2009, to escape default on the original deal, the city pledged the casino tax revenue as collateral. When the city filed for bankruptcy, other creditors including Syncora tried to stop it from getting casino-tax revenue, which the city says it needs to stay afloat.

By MATTHEW DOLAN
Updated July 3, 2014 9:39 a.m. ET

Write to Matthew Dolan at matthew.dolan@wsj.com




Muni Takeaways From the Morningstar Conference.

Muni managers take sides in the Puerto Rico debate, address the bond landscape in Chicago, Detroit, and California, and discuss the advantages of CEFs in the muni space.

Last week, Morningstar hosted the 26th annual Morningstar Investment Conference. During the conference, attendees heard keynotes from some of the industry’s highest-profile fund managers, including Franklin Templeton’s Michael Hasenstab, PIMCO’s Bill Gross, and AQR’s Cliff Asness. While these speakers didn’t disappoint, several of the most interesting and engaging conversations happened between keynotes in more intimate panel discussions. On June 20, I moderated a panel with three prominent municipal bond managers to discuss the current market, where they see opportunities, and why closed-end funds can be great vehicles for municipal bonds.

The panelists included John Miller, co-head of fixed income and head of munis at Nuveen Investment, Rob Amodeo, head of municipals at Western Asset Management, and Joe Deane, head of municipal bonds at PIMCO. These three managers run billions of dollars in municipal bond assets and have decades of experience in the asset class. Each runs both open-end and closed-end municipal bond funds.

Puerto Rico: The Great Divide

The hottest topic of the day was Puerto Rico. Deane wasn’t shy about his negative view of the territory. He noted that it is the third largest-municipal issuer, behind California and New York, but it’s a “small island in the Caribbean” with a tiny population relative to other large issuers. He pointed to a “brain drain” on the island as a major stumbling block to any recovery. Because Puerto Ricans are citizens of the United States, many highly educated residents have left for places like Miami and New York City because of better job opportunities. PIMCO no longer holds any Puerto Rico bonds.

Though Amodeo admitted that Puerto Rico has its problems, he believes COFINA bonds (sales-tax-backed bonds) are worth holding. According to Amodeo, those bonds bring in $1.3 billion in revenue to cover $700 million in debt service. In the past, government corruption meant that a good portion of tax revenue went missing, but Amodeo pointed to new measures put in place that he believes will make it more difficult for politicians to divert the revenue.

Miller agreed with Deane that Puerto Rico had high hurdles to overcome and noted that after issuing nearly $4 billion in bonds just a few months ago, the territory is once again facing liquidity issues. Miller, however, agreed with Amodeo that COFINA bonds were the best to own on the island, and, as of May 30, some of his portfolios held those bonds.

Chicago, Detroit, and California

After a lively debate over Puerto Rico, the panelists were largely in agreement over the situations in Chicago, Detroit, and California. Miller, who lives and works in Chicago, believes that while it has big problems with its pension liabilities, the city can still right its course. In his opinion, the city has two options to deal with the unfunded (and constitutionally guaranteed) pensions: raise taxes or cut pension benefits. He says Chicago mayor Rahm Emanuel is hesitant to take either path and has, so far, pushed back on the governor of Illinois for reforms at the state level. As for his investments, Miller likes general-obligation bonds backed by Assured Guaranty and bonds issued by the Chicago Transit Authority.

Turning to Detroit, Amodeo noted a “reranking of risk” regarding the city’s general-obligation and revenue bonds. Historically, general-obligation bonds have been considered safer than revenue bonds and have been priced to reflect that relative safety. The Detroit bankruptcy has challenged that assumption. The city’s revenue bonds (specifically, water and sewer bonds) are in better shape than its general-obligation bonds, the holders of which are likely to receive less than full value for those bonds. Amodeo does hold water and sewer revenue bonds from Detroit in his portfolios.

Finally, Deane pointed to California as a success story in the muni market. A few years ago the state was facing massive budget issues, but fiscal belt-tightening stopped the bleeding, leaving the state’s finances in much better shape. He believes those actions provide a blueprint for other cities and states in similar situations.

Advantages of CEFs

All three panelists agreed that there are many advantages of investing in municipal bond closed-end funds. First and foremost, the funds’ closed structures are a positive. Because closed-end funds aren’t subject to investor flows, for example, Amodeo says that he can invest in illiquid securities that offer higher yields than comparable, more-liquid holdings. In the same vein, Miller said that when open-end funds are selling to meet investor outflows, he snaps up deeply discounted securities.

Deane spoke of the advantages of leverage, but also warned of the added volatility. A positive-sloping yield curve is advantageous to leveraged funds, which can borrow at lower short-term rates and invest in higher-yielding, longer-term securities. This comes with added risk of volatility, especially because the funds may hold long-duration securities. However, Deane believes that over time, leverage will work to an investor’s advantage if he or she is willing to weather the volatility.
Finally, Amodeo noted that, from an investor’s perspective, the ability to purchase shares when they trade at a discount is a nice advantage. He also said that he snapped up shares of his own municipal CEFs last year when discounts gapped out.

Final Thoughts

Amodeo is avoiding tobacco bonds because of concerns over high taxes on cigarettes as well as the competition from e-cigarettes. His firm is also cautious on toll roads because he believes more drivers are weighing the cost of drive time versus paying the toll.

Miller discussed some of the supply issues the industry has been facing and believes those issues will lead to much lower supply this year. Miller says municipalities are loath to take on more debt, slowing new issuance, and continued low interest rates will lead to fewer repricings this year.

Deane prefers revenue bonds to general-obligation bonds, arguing that unfunded pensions will cause big problems for states and cities to deal with over the medium term. He noted specifically that a change in accounting rules for pension liabilities may create major problems for city and state balance sheets. In the past, cities and states could pick a funding ratio used to calculate the unfunded liability (the higher the number, the lower the calculated obligation). But new accounting rules will force cities and states with unfunded pensions to use a predetermined number, which is likely to be much lower than the ratio they are currently using. This change would cause the reported unfunded liability to go up, creating an even larger hole for cities and states to dig out of.

Finally, all three panelists agreed that tax reform regarding municipal securities is not a near-term concern, as the coming election and partisan climate in Washington make a consensus on tax reform extremely unlikely.

In all, the panelists were constructive on the muni market with reservations about certain sectors and locations.

By Cara Esser | 06-27-14 | 06:00 AM |

About the Author: Cara Esser is a senior fund analyst on the active funds manager research team for Morningstar and heads up the team’s coverage of closed-end funds.




S&P: U.S. State Pension Funding: Strong Investment Returns Could Lift Funded Ratios, But Longer-Term Challenges Remain.

U.S. state pension funded levels continue to decline but have likely bottomed out as the effects of the 2008 and 2009 equities market downturn make their way out of the valuations, according to Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services’ 2014 annual survey. Strong market performance in 2013 and 2014 coupled with a shift to market valuation of assets will probably contribute to improved funded ratios in the near future. Although this is likely the low point, which is good news, we believe pension funded level recovery could be slow and uneven and sizable funding gaps will remain for most states. While reform efforts continue, which will help over the long term, we see continued pressure related to market volatility, increased competition for limited state financial resources, and changes in actuarial assumptions.

In our view, factors that will contribute to significant fluctuations to pension funded ratios include:

Read the full Report.




U.S. Public Pension Funding Gaps to Widen Under New Rules.

Some U.S. public pensions, which lack savings for $1.4 trillion of promises to retired government workers, will record wider gaps in fiscal years starting after July 1 because of changes in accounting rules.

Pensions in Illinois, Kentucky, Pennsylvania and other states will see funded levels decline, in some cases by more than half, as they comply with new Governmental Accounting Standards Board rules that for the first time will require future pension costs to be included on balance sheets and change how they must calculate their underfunding.

The new rules won’t affect the amount that states and municipalities actually owe, though they could prompt them to address their underfunding, said Dean Mead, research manager at the Norwalk, Connecticut-based board known as GASB, which makes accounting rules used by most governments. The changes may force some states to cut borrowing or spending.

“It could affect their policy decisions,” Mead said in a telephone interview. “It’s their choice how to react to the new numbers.”

Under the new rules, governments will have to calculate an estimate of how much they owe for future pension liabilities and put that on their balance sheets. Under current rules they put estimates in footnotes on financial statements. Some plans predicted to run out of money will have to lower investment return assumptions used in calculating their future costs, making their liability seem larger.

Funding Adjustments

“They may not want to discuss these numbers,” said Keith Brainard, the Georgetown, Texas-based research director with the National Association of State Retirement Administrators in Washington. “Because of these new numbers, some policy makers will make funding adjustments so they won’t look so bad.”

Teachers Retirement System of the State of Illinois could see its funded level decline to 17.5 percent from 48.4 percent under the changes, according to 2012 estimates from the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College.

Illinois Teachers doesn’t agree with the estimates, said spokesman Dave Urbanek. The only effect of the new GASB rules will be that the fund will have to report a new number. Though the pension has earned 9 percent on average in the past 30 years, the state has never fully funded the plan since it was created in 1939, he said.

“We will have a full range of unfunded liabilities that people can pick from,” said Urbanek. “The bottom line is that we have a problem.”

Fixes Made

Funding for the Kentucky Employee Retirement System would decline to 23.7 percent from 40.3 percent, according to the Boston College estimates.

Executive Director William Thielen said by e-mail that he wasn’t aware that the changes would affect the funding ratio. The rules will require the fund to use new reporting terms and “include significantly more information” in financial reports, he said.

Some municipalities have taken action to try to increase funding ahead of the new rules taking effect: Alaska moved $3 billion from its rainy day fund to shore up pensions. California passed legislation to close a $74 billion gap in the California State Teachers’ Retirement System.

The new numbers may not affect debt costs in the $3.7 trillion municipal bond market because of limited supply and small differences in yields between issuers, said Richard Ciccarone, president of Merritt Research Services in Chicago. Still, borrowers that don’t address shortfalls may eventually be penalized, he said.

“Over time, as the pension crisis continues, you’re going to see spreads widening,” Ciccarone said.

By Darrell Preston Jun 26, 2014 9:00 PM PT

To contact the reporter on this story: Darrell Preston in Dallas at dpreston@bloomberg.net

To contact the editors responsible for this story: Stephen Merelman at smerelman@bloomberg.net Michael B. Marois, Mark Schoifet




Moody's: US Nuclear and Coal-Fired Power Plant Retirements to Jolt Some Local Governments.

New York, June 18, 2014 — Aggressive changes to environmental and safety policies combined with abundant, cheap natural gas will trigger the largest wave of electric generating plant retirements in the US in 35 years, says Moody’s Investors Service in a new report. Moody’s has identified the 10 US local governments it rates that are most exposed to credit risk from these closures. The risk is already captured in their ratings, although ratings could change as new information about possible closures develop.

“The retirement of large-scale, base-load nuclear and coal-fired plants will have a significant impact on many local governments, as power plants are often the top taxpayer for a city, county, or school district, paying a larger share of property taxes than the government’s other companies and individual residents,” say Moody’s Associate Analyst Andrew Pfluger and Vice President/Manager Julie Beglin in the report “US Nuclear and Coal-Fired Power Plant Retirements to Jolt Some Local Governments.”

Leading the list of Moody’s-rated local governments that receive the greatest share of their revenues from payments by a plant at risk for closure or already scheduled for retirement are Hendrick Hudson Central School District, Westchester, NY (general obligation debt rated A1), which receives 30.9% of its operating revenues from the Indian Point nuclear plant; Mexico Central School District, NY (A1), which receives 27.3% of its operating revenues from the James A. Fitzpatrick nuclear plant; the Town of Ontario, NY (Aa2), which receives 25.8% of its operating revenues from the R.E. Ginna nuclear plant; and the Town of Somerset, MA (Aa2), which receives 20.1% of its revenues from the Brayton Point coal plant.

The other local governments on the list are Wayne Central School District, NY (Aa3); Lacey Township, NJ (Aa3); Putnam County School District, GA (Aa3); Plymouth (Town of), MA Aa2); Kewaunee (County of) WI (A1); and Mount Holly (City of) NC (Aa3).

The 10 most-exposed rated local governments average 14% of their total operating revenues from at-risk power plants. Of the five most exposed local governments, four receive an average of 25.3% of their total operating revenues from at risk nuclear power plants, compared to 20.1% for the coal-fired plant. Nuclear power plant retirements may have a greater net credit impact on local governments than coal-fired power plants in terms of tax base and employment, says Moody’s, because of their typically larger scale.

Although a retiring plant may present significant credit risk, local governments often benefit from several mitigants that soften the impact. These include strong reserves, conservative budgetary practices, ability to secure alternate sources of revenue, alternative use of plant sites, and assistance from state legislatures to ease the transition.

For more information, Moody’s research subscribers can access this report at www.moodys.com/research/PBM_PBM169742.

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Fitch: Florida School Funding Shifting Toward Local Taxes.

Fitch Ratings-New York-26 June 2014: Florida’s shift toward greater dependence on local taxes and modest increase in per-pupil funding are neutral for the state’s local school district credit quality, Fitch Ratings says. The move away from reliance on state appropriations is included in the state’s 2015 budget.

The budget raises the state’s per student funding total only modestly, to $6,937 or 2.6%. Total school funding grows a slightly stronger 3.1%. Per student funding has grown consistently since fiscal 2012 but remains below the fiscal 2008 peak. It will likely take years of more sizable funding growth to keep up with current cost pressures and restore downsized operations and reserves from past budget cuts.

The Florida Education Finance Program (FEFP), the primary mechanism to finance operating costs of Florida K-12 schools, is funded through a combination of state appropriations and local funding. The latter derives exclusively from property taxes levied by each individual school district.

Local school property taxes aggregating to $8.2 billion are budgeted to generate about $400 million or 70% of the $575 million increase in FEFP funding. The state’s $10.6 billion contribution still represents the majority of FEFP funding but the gap is narrowing. The local funding boost is facilitated by a 5.4% uptick in aggregate school district taxable values while the average school property tax rate holds steady at last year’s 5.9 mills.

Fitch expects the growth in the tax base to enhance school districts’ ability to fund needs subsidized through property taxes that are not factored into the FEFP, such as capital projects, facility maintenance, and debt service.

Contact:

Larry Levitz
Director
U.S. Public Finance
+1 212 908-1174
33 Whitehall Street
New York, NY

Rob Rowan
Senior Director
Fitch Wire
+1 212 908-9159

Media Relations: Elizabeth Fogerty, New York, Tel: +1 (212) 908 0526, Email: elizabeth.fogerty@fitchratings.com.

Additional information is available on www.fitchratings.com.

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Fitch: Proposed Fund Balance May Pressure CA School Districts.

Fitch Ratings-New York-25 June 2014: A number of California school districts could see their credit quality weaken if a fund balance cap included in the fiscal 2015 budget becomes effective, Fitch Ratings says. Gov. Jerry Brown signed the education trailer bill to the budget last week that contains the cap. It will only become effective if the state’s rainy day reserve (which includes a school funding reserve) constitutional amendment is approved by voters in November. If approved, it is not expected to be implemented until after fiscal 2018.

Even before the cap is triggered, Fitch expects some increased pressure by stakeholders to draw down reserves in anticipation of the cap being applied, which may result in some credit quality deterioration.

If applied, the cap would limit most school districts’ assigned and unassigned general fund balances to 6% of expenditures. The current minimum is 3% of expenditures. The 6% cap would be well below the median Fitch-rated California school district balance of 20% and we view it as low, given the volatile history of California’s K-12 funding system. Fitch believes that could also result in liquidity pressures.

There are potential mitigants to these risks. The school funding reserve ought to dampen funding volatility somewhat, reducing the concern about lower fund balances. Both budgetary and cash flow concerns could be mitigated by district’s ability to maintain reserves outside the general fund to which the cap would not apply. Finally, districts may apply for exemptions from the cap if they provide a reason for needing additional funding, such as for capital or other long-term needs.

Contact:

Karen Ribble
Senior Director
U.S. Public Finance
+1 415 732-5611
650 California Street
San Francisco, CA

Rob Rowan
Senior Director
Fitch Wire
+1 212 908-9159
33 Whitehall Street
New York, NY

Media Relations: Elizabeth Fogerty, New York, Tel: +1 (212) 908 0526, Email: elizabeth.fogerty@fitchratings.com.

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WSJ: Tobacco Bonds Feel Heat From E-Cigarettes.

Hit to Traditional Cigarette Sales Threatens Revenue Flows that Back Securities

John Miller isn’t quitting tobacco bonds, but the growth of electronic cigarettes means he might get burned.

Mr. Miller, co-head of fixed income at Nuveen Asset Management LLC, which oversees about $90 billion in municipal bonds, is among those buying even as a steeper-than-forecast drop in smoking and the increased popularity of e-cigarettes threaten the revenue that backs the securities. In 1998, tobacco companies agreed to settle lawsuits by paying states to offset the health-care costs of smoking, with the payments based on shipments of cigarettes.

Some states and municipalities from New Jersey to California sold tax-exempt bonds backed by that money, including many zero-coupon bonds that don’t pay interest until maturity. The settlement was reached long before the existence of e-cigarettes, which aren’t included in any payments.

Mr. Miller still sees the debt as a bargain, saying borrowers will have plenty of cash to make scheduled interest payments even if smoking continues its decline. He has spent about $50 million to add California tobacco bonds to the Nuveen High Yield Municipal Bond Fund this year. Mr. Miller likes the fact that the bonds are easily tradable even though declines in smoking mean he risks not being paid back on schedule.

“Estimates of the average lives of the bonds and final maturities can lengthen and shorten depending on a variety of events, e-cigs being just one, but are very likely to be repaid eventually given enough time,” he said.

He isn’t alone. Bill Gross’s Total Return Fund, the largest bond fund in the world with $229 billion in assets, holds about $301 million of tax-exempt debt from Ohio’s Buckeye Tobacco Settlement Financing Authority, as well as tobacco bonds from California and West Virginia. The Pacific Investment Management Co. fund increased its exposure to tobacco bonds in 2013, according to Morningstar Inc. data. A high-yield fund at BlackRock Inc. increased its exposure to tobacco bonds in the first four months of this year, according to Morningstar.

“Tobacco bonds can provide yield in a low-rate environment, and the sector offers some liquidity at a time when supply is scarce,” said Timothy Milway, a director and credit analyst at BlackRock. Pimco didn’t respond to a request for comment.

The interest in the junk-rated securities underscores the risk some investors are taking in a bid to boost income at a time of low interest rates and uneven economic growth. High-yield debt backed by tobacco companies’ settlement payments is the best performing sector in the $3.7 trillion municipal-bond market. It has returned 16.5% this year, which includes price appreciation and interest payments, compared with 9.3% for all below-investment-grade municipal bonds, according to Barclays.

Still, the $87 billion tobacco-bond market has been hit in recent years by faster-than-expected declines in smoking, which has reduced payments. Now, some analysts said the rise of electronic cigarettes could lead to further shortfalls and eventual defaults by tobacco-bond issuers.

The prospectus for a 40-year tobacco bond issued by Ohio in 2007 was among those that cited a study estimating a 1.8% annual decrease in cigarette use. Instead, consumption has declined at an annual average of 3.3% since 2000, according to Moody’s Investors Service, which said in 2012 that about three-quarters of the tobacco bonds it rates may default if smoking continues to decline at 3% or 4% a year.

In a report last month, Moody’s said that the rapid growth of electronic cigarettes and other smokeless tobacco products could further reduce cigarette shipments. The market for electronic cigarettes and other vaporizing devices is expected to reach $2.5 billion this year, up from $1.8 billion in 2013, according to Wells Fargo. The market could surpass the projected $78 billion in sales this year of traditional cigarettes within a decade, according to Wells. That has got tobacco makers, including Altria Group Inc., Reynolds American Inc., and Lorillard Inc., moving into the market.

“Over the years, we’ve witnessed demand for combustible cigarettes drop steadily year in and year out, and that’s prior to the introduction of what can be considered a competing product,” said Robert Amodeo, head of municipal debt at Western Asset Management Co., which manages about $30 billion in state and municipal debt and doesn’t hold tobacco bonds.

Others said the price of the securities already accounts for the growth of electronic-cigarette alternatives. “The amount of stress, both from the decline in consumption as well as the prospects of the competition of e-cigarettes, is priced into the marketplace in our view,” said Hector Negroni, co-founder of hedge fund Fundamental Credit Opportunities in New York. He declined to discuss the fund’s tobacco holdings.

Credit-rating firms in 2003 downgraded a variety of tobacco-settlement bonds, leading investors to sell the bonds and states to delay issuing new debt. States have since adjusted expectations for smoking declines when selling bonds or refinanced debt to account for drops in traditional cigarette sales. In March 2012, Alabama sold about $93 million in tobacco debt, maturing from one to nine years, that will default only if sales fall more than 25% each year. Minnesota and Illinois have also sold bonds that can withstand declines of about 9% a year.

Bill Newton, acting director of finance for the state of Alabama, said the bonds refinanced existing tobacco debt at lower interest rates after data predicted continuing declines in smoking. Electronic cigarettes weren’t considered, he said.

Not all observers believe that usage of e-cigarettes will continue to increase. Morgan Stanley said in an April report that electronic cigarettes “are clearly not a disruptive technology.”

Meanwhile, lawmakers in states including New Jersey and Minnesota are taking measures to tax electronic cigarettes like traditional tobacco products, which could reduce growth.

“Something that might slow this down is if more legislation gets implemented to tax or ban e-cigarettes, which would be beneficial to the sale of combustible cigarettes,” said BlackRock’s Mr. Milway.

By AARON KURILOFF
Updated June 24, 2014 9:05 p.m. ET




GFOA: City of Junction City, Oregon, wins the Cash Basis Award.

“The GFOA Award Program for Small Government Cash Basis Reports is happy to announce a first-time winner of the award – the City of Junction City, Oregon. Receiving this award demonstrates the

exceptional dedication that the City of Junction City has to transparency, accountability, and financial reporting on a modified cash basis. All staff involved in attaining this distinction for the city should be commended for their accomplishment. Congratulations!

The Award Program for Small Government Cash Basis Reports aims to improve the quality and consistency of financial reporting for small governments. It is designed for the thousands of small governments for which financial reporting in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) is not a viable option. For some participants, the program may be a first step toward GAAP financial reporting.

Go to the Award Program webpage to download an application on the program. Checklists are also available for general-purpose governments, school districts, and stand-alone business-type entities, along with a sample small government annual financial report. Questions? E-mail cashbasis@gfoa.org. For information on volunteer opportunities, e-mail cashbasisreview@gfoa.org.

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Monday, June 23, 2014




The Road Hazards Ahead for Transportation Funding.

A decade-long revenue decline is about to get worse.

The U.S. Department of Transportation says balances in the federal Highway Trust Fund will drop so low next month that payments to states for work already underway will be delayed. Meanwhile, the Congressional Budget Office warns that trust-fund balances will be entirely depleted by 2015, putting funding for new projects at risk as well. To add to the uncertainty, the federal surface transportation measure known as MAP-21, which authorizes funding for state and local projects, expires Sept. 30.

Highways, bridges, passenger rail and public bus systems depend on a mix of federal, state and local support. If any element falters, the entire system is weakened, with risks to both passenger safety and economic growth. The federal government has provided roughly a quarter of all highway and transit funding (including both capital investment and operations), and some states rely on the federal government for as much as 40 percent. For these states, a depleted Highway Trust Fund and uncertainty about MAP-21 create major fiscal challenges.

Over the past decade, gas-tax revenues, one of the largest transportation revenue sources, have fallen substantially on an inflation-adjusted basis across federal and state governments as a result of increased vehicle fuel efficiency and changed driving habits. At the federal level and in most states, gas taxes have remained at a fixed amount per gallon even as transportation construction costs have risen. This has contributed to a 25 percent decline in states’ own transportation funding.

This story line runs from coast to coast. Maine’s state gas- and vehicle-tax revenue has declined by 7 percent since 2001, adjusting for inflation. Its gas tax as a share of the price of gasoline has dropped by more than a fifth. Meanwhile, according to Federal Highway Administration data, 30 percent of road-miles in the state are rated as “poor” and 30 percent of its bridges are considered structurally deficient or functionally obsolete. Nebraska’s state gas- and vehicle-tax revenue has declined by 26 percent, while 11 percent of road-miles in the state are rated as “poor.”

Oregon residents have special reason to fret about the shrinking federal Highway Trust Fund. A study by the Pew Charitable Trusts showed that the Beaver State is among those that rely the most on the federal trust fund, receiving 36 percent of its highway and transit dollars from the fund in 2011, the latest year for which comprehensive data are available. Oregon officials warn that the state could lose $150 million or more annually if Congress doesn’t find a way to prop up the trust fund.

Even states that have added new ways to finance transportation projects will still need federal dollars. Colorado, for example, raised vehicle-registration fees and formed public-private partnerships but continues to rely on federal support for almost a third of its highway and transit budget.

As states wrestle with difficult questions raised by aging or inadequate highway and transit systems, it becomes more and more important for them to contemplate different funding options and the need to prioritize projects. In addition, state leaders must better communicate concerns and ideas to members of Congress and to relevant committee staffs on both sides of the aisle as federal policymakers consider options for addressing the shortfalls in the Highway Trust Fund.

Funding challenges in the nation’s transportation systems will require both elected leaders and voters to recognize the role that each level of government plays in supporting this critical infrastructure. Public safety and economic growth are at stake.

BY SUSAN K. URAHN | JUNE 25, 2014




RBC Capital Markets State Economic Heat Map – Q1, 2014.

In RBC Capital Markets’ heat map for states, analyst Chris Mauro noted that recent statistics point to a slowdown in economic development in many states. “The first quarter of 2014 continued the trend of softer economic data with only five states moving to a higher tier in our Heat Map and seven states moving to a lower one,” Mauro wrote. However, this year’s there’s been a shift. This time the weakness throughout the quarter came from a mix of states in the Midwest and the South (which typically post stronger economic growth numbers), while most of the improvement came from states in the Northeast. Part of the reason is likely because of lower crop prices, which severely affected on farm income in the Plains states. The plunge in farm income knocked North Dakota from the RBC’s top tier, for example. Housing prices in some areas continued to rebound as eight states posted a larger than 10 percent gain in the first quarter compared to the first quarter of 2013. Nevada and California led the charge, each with gains of 19 percent.

View the Report.




S&P: U.S. Charter School Ratings Continued to Slip as 2013 Medians Sent Mixed Signals.

The number of charter schools that Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services rates has continued to grow since our last report on the sector’s median performance ratios (see “Charter School Medians Reflect Operating Pressures In A Growing Sector,” published June 27, 2013). Most of the growth has been in the ‘BB’ category (‘BB+’, ‘BB’, and ‘BB-‘), as it was in the previous year, and we’ve downgraded a number of schools to speculative-grade as well. We believe this increase at the lower end of our rating scale reflects the culmination of years of per-pupil funding cuts and the resulting pressure on schools’ operations, along with increased competition in some markets. In addition, schools are entering the capital markets and requesting ratings earlier in their lifecycles.

For these reasons, we anticipate that ratings will continue to move to the lower end of our rating spectrum, and our outlook on the sector remains negative overall (see “The U.S. Charter School Outlook Is Still Negative in 2014,” published Feb. 24, 2014 on RatingsDirect). Of our 214 public charter school ratings, currently, 41 (19%) have negative outlooks while only 5 (2%) are positive. Although funding may be beginning to stabilize in many states, it generally hasn’t returned to pre-recessionary levels, and some schools are struggling to operate in this “new normal.”

Overview

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S&P: California County and Local Government Investment Pools Report Few Changes Despite Persistently Low Interest and Improved State Revenue in 2014.

Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services’ yearly survey of California local county investment pools (LCIPs) and local government investment pools reveals most pool managers expect participants’ liquidity demands in the upcoming year to be unchanged or less than previous-year demands. This is mostly due to additional revenue and the budgeted payment of most of the remaining interyear prior funding deferrals disclosed in Gov. Jerry Brown’s fiscal 2015 May budget revision (please refer to the article, titled “California Governor’s Fiscal 2015 May Budget Revision Proposal Highlights Good News,” published May 22, 2014, on RatingsDirect).

Economic growth and the authorization of temporary personal income taxes and sales-and-use taxes have helped bolster California’s revenue profile; we expect similar trends to persist through at least fiscal 2015, further supporting the revenue projections included in the governor’s May 2015 budget revision. With interest rates expected to remain low and state revenue improvement expected to continue, a significant majority of pool managers cite interest rate risk as their primary concern. Our survey, however, shows few managers have made, or plan to propose, changes to their investment strategy to manage this risk.

Overview

Interest Rate Risk Has Not Affected Duration

Consistent with the 2013 survey, the 2014 survey found that 37 LCIPs monitor, and can report, their current portfolio duration. Some LCIPs, however, did not respond to this question. We also asked LCIPs to express the greatest risk they see to the portfolio during the next year: interest rate risk, unplanned liquidity, or underlying investment default. Survey results show that 70% of respondents answered interest rate risk, slightly higher than the 65% that responded similarly in 2013. In addition, all three of the statewide investment pools surveyed cited interest rate risk as the most significant risk they expect for the next year.

From an LCIP standpoint, interest rate risk is the risk that adverse interest rate movement will create a negative effect on investments held in the pool, as a whole. In the low interest rate environment that has persisted for the past several years, interest rate risk means overall market rates in the economy increase, causing a decrease in the value of fixed-income investments. Duration is a measure commonly used to measure interest rate risk.

Although an increasing number of respondents cited interest rate increases as their primary portfolio risk, survey results reveal the average duration among LCIPs monitoring this data remained unchanged from the 1.173 average reported last year; this is only slightly lower than the 1.182 average reported in 2012. Although the average was unchanged, responses show some LCIPs report shorter durations; this is perhaps a better demonstration of their concern that interest rates will likely rise gradually over time. LCIP managers also cited added investment flexibility as one of their reasons for a continued short duration. Such consistency in average duration across all LCIPs, however, further enforces our position that pool managers believe duration is meeting their expectations of adequately matching higher yield and principal preservation despite continued expectations of gradually increasing interest rates.

Asset Allocations Demonstrate Little Change

With consistently low interest rates and higher state revenue, we believe there is an increased likelihood LCIPs could slightly modify their asset allocations in search of additional yield, potentially exposing LCIPs to a modest amount of added risk. The willingness of LCIP managers to take on additional risk in search of added return, however, appears minimal. The 2014 survey found that 56% of LCIPs expect to adjust, or have already adjusted, their investment strategy due to the current interest rate environment. The remaining 44% report no recent or proposed changes. Of those that have changed or expect to change their strategy, most describe the adjustments as more of an effort to rebalance the portfolio as a whole rather than undertake a new or more aggressive investment approach. A handful of respondents who expect lower liquidity needs on the portfolio, however, made corresponding portfolio adjustments to extend the duration of their portfolio modestly.

Just 39% of assets matured in less than 90 days for the fiscal year-ended March 31, 2014, down slightly from 41% in 2013 and consistent with the 39% reported in 2012. In addition, 63% of responses indicated the LCIPs’ largest holdings are federal agency bonds (government-sponsored entities), which generally provide a higher yield and have low-risk characteristics similar to those of treasuries. The second-largest investment was in the state local agency investment fund. The ranking of these two leading categories of investments remains unchanged for the past two years. Similar to last year, on average, LCIPs invest 51% of fund assets in their largest holdings.

2014 California County And Local Government Investment Pool Survey Results
Pool Participants* Book value (Mil$) Market value (Mil$) Market-to-book value Effective duration Weighted average maturity (days) Weighted average life (days) % of assets maturing in less than 90 days
Alameda County 3,577.3 3,573.8 0.999 NP NP 516.0 42.0
Alpine County 30.7 30.8 1.001 0.38 138.7 138.7 79.8
Amador County 70.2 NP NP NP 704.0 NP 35.0
Butte County 412.7 410.9 0.996 1.83 634.0 634.0 32.0
Calaveras County 106.3 106.6 1.002 1.07 416.1 394.2 46.1
Colusa County 48.8 68.5 1.404 0.67 180.0 180.0 84.1
Contra Costa County 2,470.0 2,460.0 0.996 0.50 160.6 N.A. 70.0
Del Norte County 35.1 35.1 1.000 NP 511.0 252.1 60.0
El Dorado County¶
Fresno County 2,443.4 2,456.7 1.005 2.20 895.0 895.0 12.0
Glenn County 59.8 59.7 0.998 1.04 NP NP 11.0
Humboldt County 311.4 310.3 0.996 0.55 N.A. 804.0 24.0
Imperial County 465.8 466.4 1.001 NP NP NP 37.9
Inyo County 114.5 114.2 0.998 NP 846.0 843.2 5.5
Kern County 2,479.0 2,464.0 0.994 0.57 522.0 N.A. 46.0
Kings County 268.2 267.1 0.996 0.63 239.0 739.0 23.3
Lake County¶
Lassen County 70.6 70.6 1.000 0.32 116.0 NP 25.0
Los Angeles County 23,491.2 23,385.5 0.995 1.84 693.0 N.A. 42.9
Madera County 334.9 334.7 1.000 2.27 334.0 828.0 74.8
Marin County 791.1 791.0 1.000 0.21 80.0 235.0 51.1
Mariposa County 27.6 27.5 0.996 N.A. NP NP NP
Mendocino County 198.3 198.4 1.000 0.95 339.5 368.7 48.1
Merced County 637.8 638.0 1.000 1.38 434.0 434.0 46.1
Modoc County 24.3 24.3 1.000 NP NP NP 61.5
Mono County 65.8 65.6 0.997 2.00 714.0 NP 8.4
Monterey County 1,013.3 1,010.8 0.997 0.69 485.0 690.0 46.6
Napa County 529.6 527.4 0.996 0.88 338.0 NP 23.1
Nevada County 181.4 181.1 0.998 1.28 571.0 NP 40.2
Orange County 6,890.5 6,891.3 1.000 NP 440.0 443.0 33.0
Placer County 1,116.1 1,111.6 0.996 2.30 NP 1785.0 NP
Plumas County¶
Riverside County 5,256.3 5,248.8 0.999 1.33 500.1 328.1 39.1
Sacramento County 2,389.5 2,390.2 1.000 0.84 311.0 311.0 55.0
San Benito County 94.7 94.9 1.002 1.33 325.0 485.0 29.6
San Bernardino County 5,033.6 5,033.1 1.000 1.02 400.4 386.9 38.0
San Diego County 7,543.4 7,536.1 0.999 0.88 288.0 390.0 35.0
San Francisco City & County 6,725.0 6,717.0 0.999 1.22 708.0 456.3 25.0
San Joaquin County 1,881.5 1,881.7 1.000 NP NP 284.0 39.0
San Luis Obispo County 595.7 595.7 1.000 NP 205.0 205.0 80.0
San Mateo County 3,333.7 3,331.2 0.999 1.91 715.4 715.4 18.0
Santa Barbara County 1,125.3 1,123.1 0.998 0.69 579.0 NP 31.0
Santa Clara County 4,567.6 4,572.2 1.001 1.00 NP 426.0 24.3
Santa Cruz County 657.4 656.6 0.999 1.62 589.0 589.0 22.0
Shasta County 370.2 368.3 0.995 2.18 785.9 N.A. 11.8
Sierra County 16.0 16.0 1.001 0.54 NP NP 57.5
Siskiyou County 104.2 103.4 0.992 NP 522.0 890.0 40.5
Solano County 797.9 798.7 1.001 0.88 326.2 305.8 38.2
Sonoma County 1,483.8 1,488.9 1.003 1.51 N.A. 877.0 10.1
Stanislaus County 1,022.4 1,026.2 1.004 NP 545.0 1279.0 20.2
Sutter County 193.5 192.7 0.996 3.93 1303.0 1135.0 16.0
Tehama County 130.3 129.9 0.997 NP NP NP 27.0
Trinity County 36.7 36.4 0.991 NP NP NP 100.0
Tulare County 1,113.7 1,114.7 1.001 NP 736.0 736.0 25.3
Tuolumne County 117.6 119.2 1.014 NP 564.0 NP 46.0
Ventura County 1,994.4 1,995.0 1.000 NP 346.0 NP 25.5
Yolo County 328.2 328.3 1.000 0.54 198.0 231.0 63.0
Yuba County 296.7 296.3 0.999 NP 425.0 NP 31.2
Average 1.007 1.22 480.1 577.4 38.8
CAMP (statewide) 1,740.5 1,740.6 1.000 0.15 52.9 82.0 64.3
CalTrust Short-Term (statewide) 674.1 674.4 1.001 0.66 368.7 492.4 33.6
CalTrust Medium-Term (statewide) 647.9 649.7 1.003 1.65 609.6 707.0 5.1
PMIA 57,518.5 57,568.2 1.001 NP NP 185.0 40.1
*All valuation dates are as of March 31, 2014. ¶Not participating. N.A. — Not available. NP — Not provided.

Primary Credit Analyst: Daniel J Zuccarello, New York (1) 212-438-7414;
daniel.zuccarello@standardandpoors.com
Secondary Contacts: Gabriel J Petek, CFA, San Francisco (1) 415-371-5042;
gabriel.petek@standardandpoors.com
Matthew T Reining, San Francisco (1) 415-371-5044;
matthew.reining@standardandpoors.com
Research Contributor: Kaiti Wang, San Francisco (1) 415-371-5084;
kaiti.wang@standardandpoors.com




Record Run Trouncing Treasuries Shows Tax-Free Lure: Muni Credit.

Even when the municipal-bond market loses, it’s proving a winner.

Tax-free state and local debt has declined 0.5 percent in June, on pace for the first monthly decline of 2014, Bank of America Merrill Lynch data show. That still leaves the $3.7 trillion market in better shape than Treasuries, which have lost 0.7 percent. Munis are on pace to outperform their federal counterparts in total return for an unprecedented 10th straight month. They’re also beating investment-grade company debt.

Tax-exempt borrowings are luring individuals who in April faced levies on bond interest payments as much as 24 percent higher than in 2012. At one point this month, buyers were willing to purchase munis at the lowest yields relative to Treasuries in three years, data compiled by Bloomberg show.

“We just got a kick up in tax rates, and that will bring more people into the market and help it clear at lower ratios,” said Phil Fischer, head of muni research at Bank of America in New York. “There’s a tremendous amount of demand for munis.”

Investors in munis compare yields on state and local securities to those on Treasuries to assess relative value. The ratio for 10-year bonds fell to 86 percent on June 4, the smallest since June 2011, Bloomberg data show. The lower the figure, the costlier munis are relative to Treasuries.

Revealing Ratio

The ratio has averaged 94 percent since 2001, though during the past three years it has typically been about 104 percent. Investors tend to accept lower yields on munis versus Treasuries because of the tax exemption on local debt.

The strongest start to a year since 2009 for munis has pushed the ratio lower. Since Bank of America data on tax-exempt debt begin in 1989, state and local bonds have never outperformed Treasuries for 10 straight months. The previous record of nine lasted from June 2004 to February 2005.

Munis are outpacing this month’s 0.6 percent loss on investment-grade corporate bonds, while trailing the 0.6 percent gain for high-yield company securities.

More than half of the municipal market is owned by individuals, who usually buy the debt for tax-free income rather than total returns. The bonds are generally exempt from federal, state and local taxes for residents in most states where they’re issued.

‘Key Driver’

Individual investors have added money to muni mutual funds in 18 of 23 weeks this year after a record wave of withdrawals in 2013, when the fixed-income market sold off broadly, Lipper US Fund Flows data show. The revived demand, combined with the fewest new muni sales since 2011, pushed benchmark 10-year yields to a one-year low this month.

“The tax increases have been a key driver on the demand we’ve seen,” said Kevin Ramundo, who helps oversee $28 billion of state and local debt at Fidelity Investments in Merrimack, New Hampshire. “Barring any type of non-muni event, I can see munis continuing to perform quite well.”

This year, high earners faced bills that for the first time include federal tax increases that took effect last year: a top marginal rate of 39.6 percent, up from 35 percent; and a 20 percent tax on long-term capital gains and dividends, up from 15 percent. The top tax bracket is the highest since 2000.

The increases coincide with a 3.8 percent tax on investment income applied to top earners last year as a result of the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.

43.4% Tax

With a top federal tax rate of 43.4 percent when including the new tax on investment income, the 2.4 percent yield on benchmark 10-year munis is equivalent to a taxable interest rate of 4.24 percent.

By comparison, Treasuries maturing in 10 years yield about 2.6 percent. Stated another way, when adjusted to a comparable taxable rate for the highest earners, AAA muni yields are about 160 percent of those on their federal counterparts.

The municipal market “isn’t as cheap as it was,” said Jamie Iselin, head of munis at New York-based Neuberger Berman, which oversees about $9 billion in local debt. “But I also wouldn’t say — especially when you tax-adjust it — that it’s rich either.”

By Brian Chappatta Jun 18, 2014 5:00 PM PT

To contact the reporter on this story: Brian Chappatta in New York at bchappatta1@bloomberg.net

To contact the editors responsible for this story: Stephen Merelman at smerelman@bloomberg.net Mark Tannenbaum, Mark Schoifet




Municipal Issuer Brief - June 23, 2014

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Bond Market Likes Charter School Scores.

The charter school bond market is back, and even a Securities and Exchange Commission action against Chicago-based UNO Charter School Network Inc. this month for defrauding bondholders is unlikely to slow that growth.

Charter schools nationally raised $1.3 billion in bond offerings last year, the most since they were first issued in 1998. Investors eager for higher yields are fueling the market, which is dominated by junk bonds.

UNO’s problems are “typical of some charter schools, of growing pains and getting the management house in order,” says Standard & Poor’s Financial Services LLC analyst Carlotta Mills, whose agency gave that network a low investment grade rating with a “stable outlook.”

The bond market for charter schools grew steadily in the decade leading up to 2007, with $1 billion raised that year, but the financial crisis halved offerings in 2008. Chicago charter schools have raised $215 million in the bond market since 1999.

Noble Network of Charter Schools, one of the city’s fastest-growing charter systems, tapped the bond market for $20 million last year. Before that, UNO’s troubled $37.5 million offering in 2011 was the most recent deal and that system’s largest.

Local critics complain that charter schools aren’t as transparent as traditional public schools, a criticism underscored by the UNO violation, in which a school executive handed $13 million in construction and window installation contracts to a relative.

The SEC action, its first bond case against a charter operator, required UNO to revamp its management and submit to monitoring to prevent conflicts of interest. UNO is “taking all necessary steps to move forward and continue providing quality public charter school education in Chicago,” it said in a June 6 statement.

S&P justified its relatively rosy December rating on UNO—an update on an earlier rating—by pointing to the school’s ability to win renewal of three charters, recovery from recent deficits, improved cash levels and waiting lists for its schools.

Since 2006, UNO has used about $60 million in bond financing to build 16 schools with about 7,500 elementary and high school students. In addition to UNO and Noble, Chicago International Charter School and Perspectives Charter Schools have issued bonds. Charters typically count on making future payments on the bonds with per-pupil funding they receive from the school board.

“The municipal bond market is clamoring for more charter school bonds, but the reality of the situation is that we would need a dramatic increase in facilities funding or large charitable donations to make new school buildings possible,” says Craig Henderson, a founding board member at the Chicago International Charter School and an investment manager who specializes in tax-free muni bonds.

The Chicago charter schools have ratings just above investment grade, mainly because they are large networks with waiting lists of students. They also qualify as tax-exempt investments, thanks to the Illinois Finance Authority, which issues the bonds, although the state does not back them.

Finance Authority Chairman Bill Brandt says the UNO violation caused “consternation,” but charter schools fit the agency’s mission to foster education, employment and economic development. “As long as the school continues to have a significant amount of folks that want to go there and waiting lists and continues to perform financially as well as they have been, the bonds aren’t implicated,” Mr. Brandt says.

Investors are blowing off a slew of risks to earn higher interest rates. S&P rates 210 charter school bonds, with nearly half of them below investment grade, says Ms. Mills, who is based in San Francisco. And that’s just a portion of the approximately 730 bonds ever issued because only half qualify for a rating.

Bondholder risks include schools failing to win renewal of their charters because of poor academic or financial performance, government cuts to education funding and inexperienced management. Defaults are more common than in municipal finance generally.

Still, the industry has a significant local presence. Milwaukee-based Robert W. Baird & Co., underwriter for UNO’s troubled offering, is the second-biggest underwriter for charter school bonds across the country. Chicago-based B.C. Ziegler & Co. is the 10th-largest issuer. Chicago-based Nuveen Investments Inc., recently purchased by New York-based TIAA-CREF, is a major investor in charter school bonds.
With the industry feeding a Chicago charter school appetite to expand, there are likely to be more growing pains in the future.

By Lynne Marek June 23, 2014




S&P: Rating Methodology and Assumptions for Affordable Multifamily Housing Bonds.

Read the full report.




S&P: Why U.S. Availability Projects are Not Rated the Same as the Counterparty.

Read the Report.




S&P: Texas Unlimited Property Tax Infrastructure Districts Balance Debt Levels With Growth Needs.

Read the Report.




San Bernardino Targets $190,000 Firefighter Pay in Court.

San Bernardino, California, said that to exit bankruptcy it must terminate a union contract that pays an average annual salary of $190,000 to each of its top 40 firefighters.

In about three weeks, the city may try to use a federal bankruptcy law to cancel firefighter and police contracts if talks on new agreements fail, its lead bankruptcy attorney, Paul Glassman, told U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Meredith Jury at a hearing yesterday.

Since filing for bankruptcy in August 2012, the city has been mired in conflict with its unions and its biggest creditor, the California Public Employees’ Retirement System, which it owes about $143 million, according to court papers.

The city told the judge yesterday that it has a final deal with Calpers. That leaves the unions as some of the last groups the city must win over, or beat in court, to put together a debt-adjustment plan that will return the community of about 200,000 to fiscal stability.

“We are different from every other creditor in the room,” David Goodrich, an attorney for the city firefighters union, said in court. He said San Bernardino is conspiring to close the fire department and contract out with another agency for the service. The city plans “to go after our pay and benefits and possibly the fire department itself,” he said.

Calpers Confidential

Glassman didn’t give details of the deal with Calpers, citing confidentiality rules imposed as part of mediation. The agreement will become public when the city brings it before Jury for approval.

City officials looked at the top 120 firefighters, its financial adviser Michael Busch told Jury. The average pay for the top 40 was $190,000 annually; the next 40 averaged $166,000 and the next 40, $130,000.

That scale is protected by a voter-approved city charter amendment that went through several years ago. The amendment limits how the city can negotiate union workers’ pay.

The city may ask voters to remove the amendment in November, Glassman said. Jury called that an “important” step in the bankruptcy.

The police force should know within three weeks whether it has a deal with the city, union attorney Ron Oliner said in court. The firefighters have already concluded that a deal isn’t possible and want to begin the battle over whether the city has the right to cancel the contract in bankruptcy court, Goodrich said.

San Bernardino, about 60 miles (97 kilometers) east of Los Angeles, was the third California city to file for bankruptcy in a three-month span in 2012. It cited a fiscal emergency brought on by a $46 million budget shortfall caused in part by the real estate crisis.

The case is In re San Bernardino, 12-bk-28006, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Central District of California (Riverside).

By Steven Church Jun 19, 2014

To contact the reporter on this story: Steven Church in Wilmington, Delaware at schurch3@bloomberg.net

To contact the editors responsible for this story: Andrew Dunn at adunn8@bloomberg.net Joe Schneider




CDFA Excellence in Development Finance Awards.

2014 Call for Entries & Nominations

The CDFA Excellence in Development Finance Awards recognize outstanding development finance programs, agencies, leaders, projects and success stories. These awards, presented to award winners annually at the CDFA National Development Finance Summit, honor excellence in the use of financing tools for economic development, as well as the individuals who champion these efforts. Organizations may nominate themselves and/or their projects for one of these awards. Individuals may also nominate themselves or be nominated by their peers and colleagues.

The CDFA Excellence in Development Finance Awards cover a wide variety of financing tools and provide for both the public and private sector to be honored. Creative and innovative entries are highly welcomed, and the private sector is strongly encouraged to collaborate with their public sector partners on submissions. These awards honor excellence, leadership and the creative use of development finance tools such as bonds, TIF, tax credits and access to capital. The awards also honor the cutting edge use of development finance tools to support innovation and energy development. These awards honor individuals and agencies alike to build a distinguished and recognized development finance industry.

Entries and nominations for the CDFA Excellence in Development Finance Awards will be accepted through September 12, 2014. The following is an overview of the nine award opportunities (click on each entry to learn more):

Questions? Contact CDFA at etehan@cdfa.net




County Lawmakers Approve Compromise Deal Over Miami Dolphins Stadium.

MIAMI — Miami-Dade County lawmakers agreed on Tuesday to commit tax revenues to the Miami Dolphins football team if it can attract big-ticket events like the NFL’s Super Bowl and World Cup soccer matches to its privately owned stadium.

In return, the team agreed to self-finance a $350 million overhaul of its privately owned stadium.

The compromise deal came after the Florida Legislature rejected a previous proposal to use public funds to finance the stadium upgrade.

Local taxpayers soured on publicly financed stadium deals for privately owned sports teams after critics complained about the generous terms of a $500 million park for the Miami Marlins baseball team in 2008, funded largely by tax money.

Local officials recently rebuffed efforts by retired soccer superstar David Beckham to secure publicly owned waterfront land for a 20,000-seat stadium, even though Beckham agreed to finance it privately.

Since the recession, “people have found it a little distasteful for millionaire players and billionaire owners to get new facilities when police officers and firefighters are losing their jobs,” said Victor Matheson, a sports economist at the College of the Holy Cross in Massachusetts.

Under the deal Miami-Dade County commissioners approved on Tuesday by a 7-4 vote, the Dolphins can receive up to $5 million a year from county tourist taxes if they secure big sporting events, with payments starting in 2024.

The Dolphins hope to host World Cup matches in an upgraded stadium if Qatar is stripped of the 2022 tournament following allegations of corruption in the selection process.

Dolphins owner and billionaire real estate tycoon Stephen Ross said the $350 million overhaul of the nearly 30-year-old Sun Life Stadium, including a roof, more seating and a new Jumbotron, were needed to attract future Super Bowls.

Representatives for the team and the National Football League declined to comment.

Earlier this month, Miami-Dade County reached a deal with the Miami Heat to extend the team’s use of a publicly owned arena through 2035. The county raised its tax-funded subsidy by more than $2 million a year after the National Basketball Association team agreed to pay $1 million a year to the county’s parks department.

By REUTERS
JUNE 17, 2014, 6:12 P.M. E.D.T.




Municipal Issuer Brief - June 16, 2014

Read the Brief.




D.C. Water Considers First-Ever Century Bond by a Public Utility.

D.C. Water and Sewer Authority is contemplating being the nation’s first public utility to issue a bond that’s paid off over 100 years.

If Washington, D.C. is undertaking a project that will benefit – at minimum – the next three generations, then why make just one generation pay for it?

That question is the impetus for what would be a highly unusual move as D.C. Water and Sewer Authority contemplates offering a century bond this summer to help finance a major infrastructure project already underway. Century bonds, which are paid off over 100 years, are rare in the private sector and are mostly issued by colleges and universities. But it’s unheard of for a public utility to issue such a bond.

The tunnel project that DC Water is selling the bonds to help finance is a key reason why the utility is considering such a long-term bond in the first place. Thanks to innovative engineering and the fact that the tunnel will technically be empty of water most of the time, DC Water General Manager George Hawkins said it’s designed not to need significant maintenance for at least 100 years.

“This is by far the largest project we will undertake,” he said. “We want to match up the degree to which we are funding this project to its expected life. And we’re not saddling any one group of rate payers with this enormous cost. That’s sort of unfair because it’s … designed to last much longer.”

The $2.6 billion underground tunnel system will be 13 miles long and most of it will sit 10 stories underneath the District’s surface. Its diameter is equivalent to the size of a subway tunnel and its main purpose is to prevent flooding and runoff into the Anacostia and Potomac rivers during rainstorms. (Many of the city’s water pipes are more than 100 years old and some neighborhoods, particularly in the northeast section of the city, suffer from chronic flooding during flash rainstorms.) About one mile of the tunnel is finished at a cost of $250 million.

Hawkins said the utility is still weighing its options as it looks to sell a total of $400 million in bonds in late July. If it decides against a century bond (which would be taxable debt), DC Water will offer a 35-year tax-free bond, three-quarters of it at a fixed interest rate. If officials decide that the municipal market conditions, like the 100-year interest rate offered to DC Water, aren’t favorable then the utility will offer a traditional bond.

Although it’s unprecedented for a public utility to issue a century bond, analysts say there is likely still a strong market for such an offering. Higher education institutions have typically done well offering them – in 2012, the University of California system sold $860 million in taxable bonds, the largest century bond ever, after expanding its offering by more than $300 million because demand was so high.

“Investors are anxious to get exposure to municipal risk,” said Matt Fabian, an analyst for Municipal Market Advisors. “So a long maturity bond with limited call features [early repayment] ensures stability to an investor’s portfolio. They won’t have to worry about it maturing or being called away.”

Pension fund managers would especially be interested in such a long-life bond, said Sherman Swanson, managing director at Siebert Brandford Shank & Company. Because pension funds pay out retirement benefits and new employees are entering into the fund every year, a pension fund’s liabilities extend decades into the future.

“They’re trying to manage the assets they own to their liabilities,” Swanson said. “They need to get that longer in most cases.”

Liz Farmer |
lfarmer@governing.com | @LizFarmerTweets | Google+




Cook County Property Tax Bills to Have TIF Information.

The next set of Cook County property tax bills will show for the first time how much of each bill is going into controversial special taxing districts known as TIFs, county Clerk David Orr announced Thursday.

About 12 percent of county taxpayers own property that is in a tax increment financing district. Those districts are set up by the city and suburbs to divert money to economic development efforts. But critics contend many municipalities, including Chicago, have turned them into slush funds to pay for pet projects.

“The tax bills will be in the mail soon, but for the first time taxpayers will be able to see exactly how much of their money is going into the TIF fund,” Orr said, referring to the second installment of property tax bills that will be due Aug. 1, about a month after they are mailed out.

Previous year’s bills had a line item for TIF districts, but without the exact amount for each property. Instead, it referred taxpayers to a website that just showed the percentage of the bill that went to TIFs. From now on, the amount and percentage will be broken out on the bill, just as they are with each taxing agency.

In one example released Thursday, a TIF district centered around 43rd Street and South Cottage Grove Avenue will take a $1,739.42 bite out of one homeowner’s property taxes, accounting for 85 percent of the bill. But those percentages can vary dramatically even between neighboring properties, because they depend on the values of those particular parcels at the time the TIF is established.

Orr’s office also announced that Chicago homeowners can expect tax bill increases of .5 to 1.5 percent, although those increases could be higher or lower, depending on the individual property’s assessed value and any changes in various exemptions afforded to homeowners and seniors.

“That will create individual fluctuations, which is why it’s rather difficult to say every taxpayer is going to receive ‘X’ amount of increase or decrease,” said Bill Vaselopulos, the clerk’s director of real estate and tax services. “It’s a case-by-case basis.”

City bills are rising primarily because of increases enacted by Chicago Public Schools, the Chicago Park District and the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District, Vaselopulos said.

In the suburbs, tax increases could be as much as 2 percent, although those increases will vary from suburb to suburb and property owner to property owner, Vaselopulos said.

“There will be increases, but relatively small,” in part because about a third of taxing districts were limited to maximum increases of 1.7 percent, or the rate of inflation, under Illinois tax cap laws, Vaselopulos said. The overall amount of taxes to be collected by all 1,500 taxing agencies is $12.1 billion, an increase of about 1 percent.

This year’s increases are generally lower than in previous years, Vaselopulos said.

Orr has long worked to shed light on the amount of money collected by TIF districts. In those districts, any increases in property taxes that result from higher assessed values are paid into a special fund for up to 23 years. Money in those funds is then used to promote economic development, largely by paying for bricks-and-mortar improvements in the area.

The amount of total taxes to be paid by Chicago property owners this year is nearly $4.3 billion, according to data from Orr’s office. The city expects about $375.9 million to flow into 151 TIF districts, according to the city budget. More than one in five city properties lies within a TIF district.

June 19, 2014|By Hal Dardick | Tribune reporter

hdardick@tribune.com




Supply Doldrums End in Citigroup $330 Billion Call: Muni Credit.

The supply slump that’s fueling the best run for municipal debt since 2009 is poised to end next year as governments ramp up borrowing for long-delayed projects from water to transportation, Citigroup Inc. predicts.

States and localities are set to borrow $330 billion in 2015, 18 percent more than this year, for the first increase in annual issuance since 2012, according to Citigroup. Governments will need to meet regulations for water and sewer systems and finance road and bridge upgrades, said George Friedlander, chief municipal strategist in New York at the third-biggest U.S. bank by assets.

An increase would be a welcome change for investors who are struggling to find bonds in 2014. Localities have sold $123 billion this year through June 13, the slowest pace since 2011, following a 15 percent drop in issuance last year, data compiled by Bloomberg show. Banks that handle the sales also stand to benefit should a renewed borrowing wave generate more underwriting fees.

“There’s a lot of pent-up need for infrastructure,” said Friedlander, whose bank was the third-biggest muni underwriter in 2013. “That’s been true a long time, but some of it is reaching its maturation age where it needs to get done, water in particular.”

Investment Lacking

The municipal market shrank the past three years as the 18-month recession that ended in 2009 led officials to curb spending and capital projects. There is work to be done: Municipalities need about $3.6 trillion of infrastructure investment by 2020, according to a 2013 report from the American Society of Civil Engineers.

The issuance drop has helped propel the $3.7 trillion market to a 6.1 percent gain this year through June 18, surpassing earnings of 2.6 percent for Treasuries and 5.2 percent for investment-grade corporate debt, according to Bank of America Merrill Lynch data.

With fewer sales, the cash available to purchase new borrowings often surpasses deal sizes, said Peter Hayes, head of municipal debt at New York-based BlackRock Inc., which oversees $108 billion of local securities. Investors are also less likely to sell their bonds, he said.

“Deals are so oversubscribed, not only from the traditional muni buyers but from the non-traditional buyers as well,” Hayes said.

Vying Viewpoint

Janney Montgomery Scott LLC, meanwhile, sees the bond drought worsening.

Issuance will decrease every year to as low as $175 billion in 2017 as rising interest rates and an austerity push limit borrowing, Tom Kozlik, director of municipal credit analysis in Philadelphia, wrote in a report last month.

As the economy strengthens, yields on 10-year Treasuries, a benchmark for borrowing rates, will climb 0.72 percentage point to 3.35 percent a year from now, according to the median forecast of 73 analysts in a Bloomberg survey.

The years of $300 billion or more of total issuance “are likely in the past,” Kozlik said.

Janney’s 2017 call would mark a decline of about 60 percent from the peak level of 2010, the final year of the federally subsidized Build America Bonds program.

Function First

BlackRock doesn’t expect issuance to sink as low as Janney predicts and estimates annual volumes will range from $275 billion to $325 billion, said Sean Carney, a muni strategist at BlackRock.

“That seems like the home for municipal issuance going forward,” Carney said. “There’s just a certain amount of issuance that needs to come each year to function.”

Municipalities may borrow more as increasing revenue swells spending limits, Carney said.

U.S. states plan to raise expenditures in fiscal 2015 for the sixth straight year, although the projected 2.9 percent boost would be the slowest rate since 2010, according to a report from the National Association of State Budget Officers.

A pickup in state and local borrowing would also mean more business for underwriters.

The governments paid banks $523 million to handle $97.4 billion of long-term deals this year through May, based on an average cost of issuance of $5.37 per $1,000 of bonds, data compiled by Bloomberg show. That compares with $691 million on $127 billion of debt in the same period last year, based on an average cost of $5.46 per $1,000.

Needs Abound

In Citigroup’s estimation, issuers will direct the additional bond proceeds to water and sewer systems, roads and hospitals.

Health-care systems may move forward with projects after assessing the fallout of the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Friedlander said. Localities that have been waiting for Congress to replenish the U.S. Highway Trust Fund, which pays for transportation projects with gasoline and diesel-fuel taxes, will instead finance road and bridge upgrades on their own, he said. Lawmakers are working on an infusion into the fund, which is set to run out of cash in July, according to the U.S. Department of Transportation.

“The amount that’s being funded now is a small portion of what needs to be in the highway, bridge and tunnel area, but it will get gradually higher,” Friedlander said.

Utilities will need to update water systems and address environmental regulations, Friedlander said. Drought may also spur issuance, according to Philip Fischer, head of muni research in New York at Bank of America.

Drought covered about 37 percent of the contiguous 48 states, particularly California, Texas and Oklahoma, as of June 3, according to a report from the National Drought Mitigation Center at the University of Nebraska, Lincoln.

“There seems little double that the threats posed by droughts of this magnitude demand a large uptick in new water infrastructure investment,” Fischer wrote in report this month.

By Michelle Kaske Jun 19, 2014 5:00 PM PT

To contact the reporter on this story: Michelle Kaske in New York at mkaske@bloomberg.net

To contact the editors responsible for this story: Stephen Merelman at smerelman@bloomberg.net Mark Tannenbaum, Pete Young




WSJ: Accounting Changes Proposed for State, City Retiree-Benefit Plans.

States and cities could be forced to report at least half a trillion dollars of additional costs on their books under proposed rules that would shine a harsher light on the growing expense of retired workers’ health insurance and other benefits.

The proposals, unveiled Monday by an accounting-standards group, would require state and local governments to add retiree-benefit promises to their balance sheets, making governments’ overall financial position appear worse. In addition, many governments would have to change the way they calculate their benefit obligations in a way that could make their shortfalls appear bigger than they do now.

The move by the Governmental Accounting Standards Board is intended to give taxpayers, policy makers and investors more information about the toll that retirees’ promised benefits will take on states’ and cities’ finances. The proposals wouldn’t require governments to raise more money to pay for retiree benefits, and they wouldn’t force governments to change the level of benefits they provide.

“It will provide a better picture of the cost and liabilities for these benefit promises,” said GASB Chairman David Vaudt.

The proposals come as governments grapple with rising costs for current and retired workers. Some states have been racked by legislative battles over how to trim costs. Several municipalities, including Detroit and Stockton, Calif., have filed for bankruptcy protection in recent years amid retiree-benefit burdens, among other issues.

Some municipal-bond investors applauded the GASB proposal. The rule would show “how good a shape or how bad a shape the issuer is in,” said Marilyn Cohen, president of Envision Capital Management, a Los Angeles fixed-income money manager.

According to a Standard & Poor’s report last fall, California and New York are among the states with the highest level of unfunded retiree-benefit obligations. California, for instance, in March said it had $64.6 billion in unfunded health benefits for state retirees. A spokesman for the New York state comptroller’s office said, “We are reviewing the proposals.” A spokesman for the California state controller’s office had no immediate comment.

The GASB proposals, which the board approved last month, are subject to public comment and possible reconsideration before the board adopts them. The board is accepting public comments through Aug. 29, and plans to hold public hearings on the proposals in September in New York, Illinois and California.

The proposals follow similar changes GASB made in 2012 to state and local governments’ disclosure of pension obligations, which also were intended to give taxpayers and investors more information but would make pension funding appear weaker.

According to the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College, a group of 150 public-employee pensions that were 72%-funded in 2013, meaning their assets were 72% of their obligations, would have been only 65%-funded under the revamped rules.

The pension changes are only now fully taking effect, and Mr. Vaudt said it is too soon to tell what impact they will have in pressing state and local governments to address their pension underfunding.

Still, with the new retiree-benefit proposal, some investors believe the added visibility for benefit-plan underfunding could add to pressure on governments to address the problem. “This is a major step toward getting these funded,” said Matt Fabian, a managing director for Municipal Market Advisors, a Concord, Mass., research firm. “This is a problem that is as big as pension funding. Investors are clamoring for this.”

Moody’s Investors Service estimates states’ total unfunded retiree benefit liabilities at $530 billion, which would be added to governments’ balance sheets under the GASB proposals. Currently, the liabilities are reported only in the footnotes to government financial statements. The figure doesn’t include local governments’ benefit obligations, for which it is difficult to get an accurate total.

Another important change would revamp the way the obligations are valued. Most governments haven’t yet committed money to pay for their retiree benefits and work on a “pay as you go” basis. But to the extent that governments haven’t funded their benefits, they would have to measure the current value of those benefits using a lower interest-rate assumption. That has the effect of increasing the obligations’ current value and widening the plans’ funding shortfalls.

Marcia Van Wagner, a Moody’s analyst, is cautious about whether any changes in reporting retiree benefits will lead to more pressure on governments to fund their benefit plans. Governments have already been trying to trim benefits and reduce costs because of their overall financial problems, she said, not specifically because of any changes in accounting rules.

“I’m not sure that accounting standards really drive the policies of state and local governments,” she said.

Even Ms. Cohen questions whether the changes will help put more pressure on governments about funding their retiree benefits. “In theory, yes. In actuality, we’ll have to see.”

By MICHAEL RAPOPORT

Updated June 16, 2014 6:06 p.m. ET

Write to Michael Rapoport at michael.rapoport@wsj.com




Detroit Rolls Out New Model: A Hybrid Pension Plan.

In the face of Detroit’s tumultuous bankruptcy proceedings, in which multiple parties are quarreling to protect their interests, the city and its unions have quietly negotiated a scaled-back pension plan that could serve as a model for other troubled governments.

One of the most closely watched issues of the case is whether a government pension plan can be legally cut in bankruptcy. Detroit, saddled with a pension system it cannot afford, has introduced a new plan with the cooperation of its unions, which have been among the most vocal opponents of cutbacks.

While both retired and active workers now participate in the same city pension system, the new plan is intended only for Detroit’s active workers, who will shift to it on July 1. Retirees will keep 73 percent to 100 percent of their current base pensions under the city’s proposal to exit bankruptcy.

The new plan is called a hybrid, which means the workers will keep some of their current plan’s most valuable features but will give up others. Trading down to a less generous pension plan is often said to be a legal nonstarter for government workers, so if Detroit succeeds, its hybrid could become a model for other distressed governments from Maine to California. Countless elected officials — from Rahm Emanuel, the Democratic mayor of Chicago, to Chris Christie, the Republican governor of New Jersey — are caught between ballooning pension obligations, angry local taxpayers who don’t want to pay for them and labor lawyers who say it’s impossible to cut back.

“We have a festering sore here,” Christopher M. Klein, the judge in the bankruptcy case of Stockton, Calif., said at a hearing in May, referring to that city’s surging pension costs. “We’ve got to get in there and excise it.”

Detroit’s current pension system simply costs too much relative to its battered tax base, and the watchword for Detroit this summer is feasibility. For the city to emerge from bankruptcy, its emergency manager, Kevyn D. Orr, must convince Steven W. Rhodes, the judge overseeing Detroit’s bankruptcy case, that his long-term financial plan is feasible. The matter is to be decided at a trial to start in August.

There would be little hope of persuading Judge Rhodes if Detroit’s workers were still covered by the existing pension plan and struggling local taxpayers were still liable for the relentlessly mounting obligations. For many years, the current plan allowed city workers to earn benefits that others in Detroit could only dream about — full pensions at 55, longevity bonuses, annual cost-of-living increases, an extra “13th check” in December and bankable sick leave that could be converted to cash, among others. In recent years, the resulting pensions have been greater than the per capita income of the residents who were expected to pay for them.

On June 30, Mr. Orr will freeze that pension plan, meaning that the city’s current workers will not accrue any further benefits on those terms.

Starting the next day, in the new hybrid plan, they will still earn so-called defined-benefit pensions — a specified monthly payment based on tenure, age and earnings history — something their unions consider critical. But they will also start to bear most of the new plan’s investment risk. That means Detroit’s taxpayers — who pay a city income tax in addition to property and sales taxes — will no longer face cash calls every time the plan’s investments drop in value. Officials hope that making the workers backstop the investments will discourage overreliance on high-risk strategies.

This unusual combination of features gives both the city and the unions an opportunity to declare victory and provides Mr. Orr with ammunition for the coming feasibility trial.

But it also flies in the face of a legal principle known as the vested-rights doctrine, which holds that the pension formula in force on the day a public worker goes on the job cannot be reduced for the full duration of employment. No such legal protection exists for workers in the private sector, whose pension plans can be frozen at any time. But in the public sector, the vested-rights doctrine is an article of faith, zealously defended, and it helps explain why a bankrupt city like Stockton is proposing to saddle its other creditors with big losses but not touch the pension plan.

The vested-rights doctrine is especially powerful in California, growing out of court decisions dating back to 1947. Unions in San Jose recently used it to keep the city from making its workers contribute more toward their pensions. Employees of four California counties argued in court last year that they had a vested right to pad their pensions by counting things like unused vacation time in their benefit calculations, despite laws prohibiting the practice. In March, Judge David B. Flinn of Contra Costa County Superior Court ruled that there was no such thing as a vested right to an illegal benefit — but the ruling applies only to current workers. Retirees are still receiving the padded pensions.

California’s state pension system, Calpers, is a powerful proponent of the vested-rights doctrine, and many state and local governments follow its lead.

In Detroit’s bankruptcy, however, the vested-rights doctrine does not appear to be an issue. The Michigan law for distressed cities gives emergency managers like Mr. Orr the power to set the terms of public employment. That means he can legally freeze Detroit’s existing pension plans and establish new ones for city workers, said Bill Nowling, a spokesman for Mr. Orr.

“He is not making any benefit cuts,” Mr. Nowling added.

For Detroit’s retirees, it’s a different matter. They are not being asked to give up benefits they had hoped to earn in the future; they are being told they must give up benefits they have already earned. Michigan’s constitution forbids this, so Mr. Orr is using the Chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy process, in which federal law applies. A bitter battle is already taking shape.

By the time the fate of the retirees has been decided, Detroit’s workers will already be earning hybrid benefits. To shift the investment risk their way, Detroit has set up a series of eight “levers” to pull if the plan’s investments falter. They include setting up a reserve fund that must be used to cover losses, raising the workers’ required contributions, lowering retirees’ cost-of-living increases and making workers build up their benefits more slowly.

Should investments not produce the expected returns — in a protracted bear market, for example — leaving too little money to meet all obligations, officials will be required to pull as many levers as it takes to get the plan back to the 100 percent funded level within five years. Only if all eight levers are pulled and the plan is still not responding adequately can Detroit’s taxpayers be called on to rescue it.

To measure the level of funding, the plan will assume a 6.75 percent rate of return. That still allows for a substantial amount of risk, although it is less than the 7.9 percent assumption the city was using when it declared bankruptcy. Officials of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, which led the negotiations, did not respond to calls seeking comment. The union is one of 48 that represent Detroit’s municipal workers.

Even as they were negotiating the hybrid pension plan, Detroit’s unions were still appealing a ruling last December by Judge Rhodes that pensions could be cut under federal bankruptcy law, despite protective language in Michigan’s constitution. The unions are required to drop the appeal if they vote for Detroit’s plan of adjustment. From California, Calpers has asked to serve as a “friend of the court” in the appeal, saying Judge Rhodes’s decision “raises issues that are of critical importance to Calpers and its 1.7 million members.”

Calpers’s brief argues that Judge Rhodes ruled improperly and asks the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit to vacate his finding that state laws protecting pensions are not binding in bankruptcy cases. Although California’s laws have no force in a federal case in Michigan, Calpers expressed concern that rulings concerning Detroit’s bankruptcy might recast the legal landscape in California.

“Such a precedent can be, and has been, misconstrued for the broad proposition that all pensions are subject to impairment in Chapter 9,” the Calpers brief said.

By MARY WILLIAMS WALSH

JUNE 18, 2014 11:53 AM




The GASB’S OPEB Proposals are Now Available Online.

June 17, 2014

The GASB recently published two proposed Statements intended to significantly improve financial reporting by state and local governments of other postemployment benefits (OPEB), such as retiree health insurance. The GASB also published a third Exposure Draft that would establish requirements for pensions and pension plans that are outside the scope of the pension standards the GASB released in 2012.

The three proposals, which were approved on May 28, are available to download at no charge on the GASB website.

The first Exposure Draft related to OPEB, Accounting and Financial Reporting for Postemployment Benefits Other Than Pensions (OPEB Employer Exposure Draft), proposes guidance for reporting by governments that provide OPEB to their employees and for governments that finance OPEB for employees of other employers.

The second Exposure Draft related to OPEB, Financial Reporting for Postemployment Benefit Plans Other Than Pension Plans (OPEB Plan Exposure Draft), addresses the reporting by the OPEB plans that administer those benefits.

The third Exposure Draft, Accounting and Financial Reporting for Pensions and Financial Reporting for Pension Plans That Are Not Administered through Trusts That Meet Specified Criteria, and Amendments to Certain Provisions of GASB Statements 67 and 68, would complete the pension standards by establishing requirements for those pensions and pension plans that are not administered through a trust meeting specified criteria.

To help users, preparers, and auditors of financial statements familiarize themselves with the proposals, the GASB developed an OPEB web page that features new “plain English” resources.




Muni Market 2014 Halftime Show.

The municipal bond market continued to roar ahead in the second quarter with long tax-free yields continuing their decline in April and May before rising slightly in June. Many of the same factors that were at work in the first quarter were again at work in the second quarter. Lower supply from a more austere universe of municipal issuers, higher demand from bond fund inflows, some asset allocation out of stocks and into bonds, and a general overall recognition of better municipal credit quality were all significant factors in the past three months. Liquidity – the ability to buy and sell bonds at reasonable spreads – has completely turned around from a year ago. Then we had the “taper tantrum” that saw record municipal bond fund outflows amidst fear of the Federal Reserve’s scaling back bond purchases. That period of June and July 2013 was marked by the almost total nonexistence of what one would consider a market-level bid. This was, of course, on longer-maturity municipal bonds, which are what bond funds owned and had to sell to meet redemptions.

The graphs below demonstrate several salient points.

 

Municipal Bonds

Municipal Bonds

 
As we look forward, we continue to grow somewhat more cautious. Although long high-grade municipal bonds continue to look attractive compared to long US Treasuries, the continued rally (drop) in nominal yields has us readying for a pause that refreshes. Our concern is that we have travelled a road where long intermediate- to high-grade paper went from 3.5% yields in early 2013 all the way to 5-5.25% in late summer and now back to the 4% level or below, in many cases. Though a case can be made for continued downward pressure in rates, we are starting to become somewhat defensive. Portfolios have self-shortened as bonds yield to shorter call dates; and, at the margin, we have raised 5-10% cash in accounts. Many issuers will be issuing bonds to refund older higher-coupon debt as we approach the end of this year. This trend will continue into 2016. Although the amount of “net “new issuance might not be that large, the new issues still have to clear the market. That bulge, along with a possible flare-up in rates due to wage inflation, could present a buying opportunity; and we would like to have the ammunition with which to seize it. In addition, many market participants point out the large reinvestment bulge coming on July 1st from coupon payments, maturing bonds, and called bonds. With longer yields down 100-125 basis points from their peak, that reinvestment scenario may be more muted than people think.

John Mousseau, CFA, Executive Vice President & Director of Fixed Income

By Cumberland Advisors (David Kotok) | Bonds | Jun 18, 2014 02:30PM GMT




N.J. Senior Home Offers Investors Unrated Debt: Muni Deal.

A retirement center in Voorhees, New Jersey, that’s lost money for three years is selling unrated municipal bonds this week as returns on high-yield debt reach almost double the overall market.

SJF-CCRC Inc., an affiliate of the Jewish Federation of Southern New Jersey, runs Lions Gate, a continuing-care retirement community about 17 miles (27 kilometers) southeast of Philadelphia. Through the New Jersey Economic Development Authority, the nonprofit is offering $61.7 million in tax-exempt securities, principally to refinance debt on 152 apartments, 12 cottages, a 78-bed nursing facility, a 32-bed rehabilitation unit and a 70-bed assisted living center, according to bond documents.

Yields could go as high as 5.5 percent on the 30-year portion, said Andrew Nesi, executive vice president at the underwriter, Herbert J. Sims & Co. Inc., in Fairfield, Connecticut. That would be 2 percentage points higher than benchmark munis, data compiled by Bloomberg show.

“There are people who are looking for investments in this area,” Nesi said. “There’s not a lot of high-yield supply.”

High-yield debt is earning 9.9 percent this year, compared with 5.7 percent for the $3.7 trillion municipal market, S&P Dow Jones Indices show. High-yield funds have added cash for 23 straight weeks, Lipper US Fund Flows data show.

Yield-hungry investors would have to digest some risk. The Voorhees center has posted operating losses every year since 2011 and for the first three months of this year, deal documents show. Opening the rehabilitation facility last year drove expenses higher than revenue, as not all beds were filled all the time, said Douglas Hacker, Lions Gate’s chief financial officer.

Operating losses for such facilities are common for the first 10 years, Hacker said. Finances have stabilized for Lions Gate, which opened its first beds in 2006, he said.

“We have met our debt covenants,” Hacker said. “We’re a solid organization now and into the long-term future.”

The center is joining issuers offering $4.7 billion in bonds this week, down from $9.5 billion last week.

By Romy Varghese Jun 15, 2014 5:00 PM PT

To contact the reporter on this story: Romy Varghese in Philadelphia at rvarghese8@bloomberg.net

To contact the editors responsible for this story: Stephen Merelman at smerelman@bloomberg.net Pete Young, Mark Tannenbaum




Fitch: First Volcker-Compliant TOB Helps Muni Market Liquidity.

NEW YORK, Jun 17, 2014 (BUSINESS WIRE) — The development of a tender option bond (TOB) structure that complies with the Volcker rule paves the way for tax-exempt money market funds to remain a buyer of municipal bonds. However, this structure does not provide a clear means for bringing outstanding TOBs into compliance. The Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association estimated the TOB market at $80 billion. Fitch rated a new Volcker-compliant TOB structure brought to market by Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith last week.

We expect other banks that participate in the tender-option bond market to utilize similar structures for new TOBs in the second half of the year. For existing TOB trusts, banks may unwind the trusts and create new joint venture trusts or may potentially use a third-party non-banking entity as a sponsor to make those structures compliant.

In a typical TOB structure, the sponsor will deposit a fixed-rate bond or note into a trust that then issues one floating rate certificate (with a tender option) and one residual certificate. Tax-exempt money market funds may buy TOBs as the floating rate certificate’s tender option is often issued by the sponsor, shortening the maturity of the deposited bond.

The Volcker rule, which is expected to be fully implemented by July of 2015, prohibits banks from sponsoring the trust and providing any liquidity, credit, or remarketing services for the floating and residual certificates issued by traditionally structured TOBs.

The new structure establishes a joint venture trust that the liquidity provider, the floating interest holders, and the residual interest holders join. Each joint venture must have 10 or fewer parties. Joint ventures of this size were exempted from the Volcker Rule.

Additional information is available on www.fitchratings.com .

The above article originally appeared as a post on the Fitch Wire credit market commentary page. The original article, which may include hyperlinks to companies and current ratings, can be accessed at www.fitchratings.com . All opinions expressed are those of Fitch Ratings.




MSRB Report: VRDO Market Down Five of Last Six Years.

WASHINGTON — The market for variable rate demand obligations has contracted five of the last six years, the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board said in a report released Wednesday.

VRDOs are long-term securities with short-term interest rates. Interest rates are reset periodically by remarketing agents on behalf of the issuers. The obligations have a tender feature that allows them to be sold at par. After VRDO issuance peaked at almost $120 billion in 2008, it declined in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2013, the report shows. New issuance of VRDOs in 2013 fell to $13.2 billion, compared to $15.2 billion the previous year. During the first quarter of 2014, issuance totaled $1.49 billion, about 3% less than the amount in the first quarter of 2013.

While new issuance has stabilized in the area of $14 billion annually since 2011, the MSRB said, the overall size of the VRDO market has also shrunk considerably in recent years. It contracted 22% to $222 billion between April 2012 and March 2014, the report showed. VRDO par volume dipped 7% in 2013 from the previous year, while the number of trades declined by 9%.

Matt Fabian, a managing director at Municipal Market Advisors, said the continuous shrinking of the VRDO market is the result of a variety of factors. Investor demand for VRDOs remains very strong, Fabian said, but there isn’t enough supply to go around.

“It is entirely a supply issue,” he said.

VRDO issuers traditionally relied on bond insurance, Fabian said, but the decline of the bond insurance industry led many banks who provided letters of credit for VRDOs to stop doing so. Also, a large number of VRDO issuers were in the healthcare sector, Fabian added, and the uncertainty surrounding that sector generally has led those issuers to reduce the size of their VRDO programs.

Michael Decker, co-head of municipal securities at the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, said many issuers are going away from VRDOs because of the “costs and complexities” involved in them, such as needing letters of credit and remarketing agents.

“Some issuers might like to find a more simple solution,” Decker said.

Bank direct purchases have largely stepped up to replace VRDOs, but Fabian said that the money market mutual funds that were major investors in VRDOs will continue to need floating-rate options, making the successful emergence of a Volcker Rule-compliant tender option bond structure extremely important. The first such TOB deal was completed late last week.

The MSRB report also details a decline in the market for auction rate securities, which were long-term securities that have variable interest rates that are reset on a short-term basis. No new ARS have been issued since 2008, and the size of the ARS market decreased 31% to $27 billion from April 2012 and March 2014.

The Securities and Exchange Commission and state regulators sued many broker-dealers for misleading investors about the liquidity risks associated with ARS. The ARS market collapsed on a widespread basis in early 2008 after firms that historically supported the auctions but were under no contractual obligation to do so, stopped propping them up. Most of the cases were settled.

BY KYLE GLAZIER
JUN 18, 2014 11:55am ET




Buffett Warning Unheeded as Catastrophe Bond Sales Climb.

Bond buyers are betting more than ever on the mercy of Mother Nature as they seek to boost yields being suppressed by central banks.

Demand for notes linked to insurance against hurricanes and other natural disasters is prompting investors to accept the lowest relative yields in almost a decade for this time of the year, when the Atlantic storm season gets underway. Buyers are speculating that the $22 billion market can continue its streak without an annual loss even as Warren Buffett said last week that Berkshire Hathaway Inc. is avoiding writing hurricane insurance in Florida because premiums have been pushed too low.

Investors who have snapped up $5.76 billion of new catastrophe bonds this year, the fastest pace of issuance ever as measured by data provider Artemis, are being emboldened by weather forecasts and average annual returns of 8.5 percent since 2002. Offerings this year include a record $1.5 billion transaction linked to potential hurricane damage in Florida.

“Wind season looks to be slightly below average in terms of the hurricane outlook and that’s attractive,” John Brynjolfsson, chief investment officer at Irvine, California-based hedge fund Armored Wolf LLC, which oversees about $700 million including the disaster-linked notes, referred to as cat bonds. “Although cat bonds are relatively tight, on a comparative basis they look attractive to capital markets investors.”

Spreads Narrow

Cat bond yields have dropped to about 4.7 percentage points more than benchmark interest rates, the lowest second-quarter level since 2005 and down from 6.57 percentage points a year ago, according to John Seo, managing principal at Fermat Capital Management LLC. The Westport, Connecticut-based firm oversees $4.5 billion, more than 90 percent of which is invested in cat bonds.

“The hurricane does not know the rate that was charged for the hurricane policy, so it’s not going to respond to how much you charge,” Buffett said at the Edison Electric Institute’s annual convention in Las Vegas on June 9. “And if you charge an inadequate premium, you will get creamed over time.”

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration predicts only one to two storms will escalate to major hurricanes during this year’s season, which lasts from June through November, compared to a historic average of three major storms. A measure of loss probabilities for cat bonds issued this year averages 1.32 percent, down from an average 1.95 percent for securities sold in 2013, according to Steve Evans, Artemis’s founder.

Reinforcing Models

Catastrophe bonds in the U.S. have returned 22 percent the past two years, about the same gains delivered by junk-rated corporate notes, during a period that included the damage caused by superstorm Sandy that tore through the northeastern U.S. in October 2012.

“Some of the events that kind of captured headlines, such as superstorm Sandy, as devastating and headline-grabbing as they were, did not trigger any losses of note,” Brynjolfsson said. That has helped to “reinforce the integrity of the modeling firms,” he said.

Insurance companies and reinsurers typically sell cat bonds to help cover their most extreme risks, with the proceeds of the issues set aside and paid out in the event of a qualifying disaster. Buyers get a relatively high interest margin for holding the notes and risk forfeiting their entire investment if the securities are triggered before they mature.

Japan Losses

Catastrophe-bond investors haven’t experience major losses on bonds since 2011, when damage caused by the earthquake in Japan that March caused $300 million of losses for securities issued by Muteki Ltd. that helped cover earthquake risks taken on by German reinsurer Munich Re.

The market’s track record through the 2008 financial crisis and natural disasters of recent years is “especially important for the key investors in the sector, which are pension funds, endowments and sovereign wealth funds,” said Michael Millette, global head of structure finance at New York-based Goldman Sachs Group Inc.

Demand has “grown steadily over the past four years,” with most funds typically allocating less than 1 percent of their assets to cat bonds, he said in a telephone interview.

Investors are willing to accept lower yields because they provide returns that aren’t correlated with other asset classes such as equities.

Florida Bonds

“When you factor in that you can’t find anything else that is non-correlating with a decent return, it’s easy to see that cat bonds are still very attractive,” Artemis’s Evans said in a telephone interview from London.

In Florida, where state-run Citizens Property Insurance Corp. issued a record $1.5 billion sale in April, Chief Risk Officer John Rollins said the insurer is seeing an increasingly diverse pool of investors.

The three year floating-rate notes, with a spread of 750 basis points more than borrowing benchmarks was originally marketed for $400 million, and attracted investors including “a pension fund for Scottish miners, a mutual fund backed by Japanese middle class savers, a fund dedicated to managing royal assets,” Rollins said in a telephone interview from Tallahassee.

‘More Mainstream’

Rollins said he saw no indication of “limited demand” even as new issuers are debuting on the market.

The Texas Windstorm Insurance Association announced an offering this month after contemplating the securities for three years, according to General Manager John Polak.

Three years ago, “the terms and conditions associated with cat bonds weren’t quite as attractive and competitive as they are today,” he said in a telephone interview from Austin. Now, cat bonds are “more mainstream” and “most importantly, pricing is at a point where it’s a realistic consideration” for the association.

The offering is expected to grow from the initially marketed $300 million to $400 million, according to Polak.

Italian insurer Assicurazioni Generali SpA (G), based in Trieste, also issued its first cat bond this year, 190 million euros ($256 million) in floating rate notes at a spread of 225 basis point more than the London interbank offered rate, Bloomberg data show. The notes, which mature in 2017, cover damages from European windstorms.

“I think there’s kind a tipping point that has been passed,” Citizens’ Rollins said. “If we have significant weather activity, if we have some bond get triggered, I think there will be recalibration mostly in the area of price, but not in the unwinding of structures. I don’t anticipate that a test of these structures will not be passed.”

By Caroline Chen Jun 17, 2014 9:05 AM PT

To contact the reporter on this story: Caroline Chen in New York at cchen509@bloomberg.net

To contact the editors responsible for this story: Shannon D. Harrington at sharrington6@bloomberg.net Dan Kraut




Sewage-to-Fertilizer Plan Shows No Junk Bonds Stink.

A central Florida facility that would convert sewage into fertilizer is the latest project to tap relentless demand for the riskiest municipal bonds.

The Orange County Industrial Development Authority plans to offer $62 million of unrated debt next week on behalf of a unit of VitAG Corp., which plans facilities that combine biosolids with sulfuric acid and ammonia to produce fertilizer. The federally tax-free securities will finance a plant on a site in Zellwood, Florida, near tourist center Orlando.

The malodorous initiative may still come up roses for high-yield investors who have been inundated with cash for 23 straight weeks, Lipper US Fund Flows data show. The wave has buoyed bonds for industrial-development projects. They’re the riskiest subset of junk-rated munis, accounting for the most defaults in part because of the dependence on a single project.

“This is like the worst of the worst,” yet investors will probably buy it, said Tom Metzold, co-director of munis in Boston at Eaton Vance Management, which oversees about $24 billion in local debt. “When too much money chases too few bonds, deals come to market that have no right coming to market. The risk-reward profile is so out of balance, it’s nuts.”

Outsize Return

Local agencies can issue debt in the $3.7 trillion municipal market on behalf of private companies, whose credit backs the securities.

Speculative-grade industrial-development debt has gained about 14 percent this year, more than double the return for all munis, Barclays Plc data show. The bonds, which carry an average tax-free yield of 6.4 percent, are luring investors as interest rates remain near generational lows.

“We’re aware that municipal-bond investors are looking for yield and the high-yield market has performed well,” said Ed Zughaft, senior vice president of finance for VitAG, which is based in Beech Island, South Carolina. “We’re hopeful that we can take advantage of the timing here. We’ve already received a lot of interest from investors.”

Biosolids, organic materials derived from treating sewage sludge, contain nitrogen nutrients, which are used in fertilizer to replenish soil. The company would follow other commodity-based ventures that have turned to the tax-exempt market in the past 14 months for financing.

Private Equity

The Iowa Finance Authority sold $1.2 billion of junk-rated debt in April 2013 to fund the building of a nitrogen fertilizer plant by Egypt’s Orascom Construction Industries. At the time, it was a record speculative muni offering. In November, a Louisiana public authority issued $140 million of unrated bonds for a German wood-pellet producer. The deal’s tax-exempt portion yielded 10.5 percent.

Private-equity firm KKR & Co. (KKR:US) bought $95 million of taxable debt in the wood-pellet offer. In this month’s Orange County deal, an affiliate of TPG Capital, a Fort Worth, Texas-based private-equity firm with $54.5 billion in assets, will contribute at least $20 million in equity, according to offering documents.

An affiliate of Denham Capital Management LP, a $7.3 billion U.S. private-equity fund focused on energy and mining, will get $1 million from the financing proceeds, offering documents show. Denham owned part of VitAG until last year.

7.5% Yield

Bond documents cited an estimated annual interest rate of 7.5 percent on the debt, which has portions due in 2024 and 2036. For top earners, that equals a 12.4 percent rate on taxable securities. Benchmark 10-year Treasuries yield about 2.6 percent.

“There are some big investors in it,” said Justin Land, who helps manage $3 billion of munis at Naples, Florida-based Wasmer, Schroeder & Co. The company will look at the deal for its high-yield fund. “It can work, though like anything else in project finance, there are a lot of ways it can fail.”

Projects funded with unrated bonds are ramping up to meet the demand for speculative securities, which have grades at least 10 steps below AAA. Unrated bonds fall into the high-yield camp.

Investors next week can also buy debt for a senior-living facility called Rose Villa near Portland, Oregon, Bloomberg data show. The securities don’t have a rating.

By Brian Chappatta and Toluse Olorunnipa June 17, 2014




Tax Increment Financing: Tweaking TIF for the 21st Century.

Tax increment financing (TIF) can be a powerful economic development tool. Under the right circumstances, TIF can generate enough funding to make a real difference. And with the right safeguards in place, TIF encourages government and the private sector to form a partnership based on each other’s strengths.

“Without TIF or other government programs, the only redevelopment will be for the rich, by the rich,” says Stephen B.Friedman, a consultant with decades of TIF experience in Illinois and Wisconsin and a member of ULI’s Public/Private Partnership Council. For neighborhoods in need, he continues, “TIF works because government looks the private sector in the eye and puts the public money where the private sector is also willing to put the private money. You have to have a meeting of the minds about what works for the community and for the developers.”

Built on a foundation of growing tax revenues, TIF is vulnerable to both national and local economic downturns. Indeed, as the Great Recession spread throughout the United States, TIF districts became weak at just the time they were needed most. Moreover, as local governments cut budgets to the bone, the revenue generated in TIF districts came under close examination. In states where both TIF and education spending depend heavily on revenue from property taxes, TIF’s impact on education became a frequent flashpoint for controversy.

“The recession caused the whole development finance industry to take a hard look at what they are doing,” says Toby Rittner, chief executive officer of the Council for Development Finance Agencies (CDFA). At one extreme,

California Governor Jerry Brown in 2011 ended TIF for redevelopment and ordered the special authorities that managed TIF revenues to close. But most cities and states shared the view of TIF held by Minnesota’s legislature, which expanded a diminished TIF program as part of a 2010 jobs bill.

The hard look produced changes. “We discovered that TIF has a lot of depth,” says Rittner. “Coupled with a comprehensive approach to economic development, it can be used for more than just infrastructure and traditional redevelopment activities, and it can leverage other financing tools.”

TIF originated in an act of policy creativity in California in 1952: federal dollars flowing to remedy what was then called urban blight required a local match. In the subsequent decades, every state in the United States except Arizona has experimented with TIF in one form or another—and then in another and another. As the federal dollars dried up in the 1970s and 1980s, TIF nourished redevelopment. TIF has been exported: pilot projects are underway in Scotland and ­England, with versions tailored to their tax regimes.

From the developer’s perspective, TIF is just one of many ways to partner with government to share the costs of development. From the government’s perspective, TIF’s distinctive feature is that it provides a means to access new tax revenues to support the creation of these same new revenues, and more. Public investment increases private property values, which increases property tax revenues. Those new revenues can be leveraged to pay for the improvements that attract the private investment, setting up a virtuous cycle of increasing development that pays for itself and increases the tax base.

In the United States, TIF is governed by state law, but implemented by municipal governments. Although this discussion refers to cities, TIF can also be implemented by county governments, economic development authorities, or other municipal governments.

The following hypothetical example illustrates the components of TIF.

River City’s economic development plan aims to transform the city’s vacant industrial waterfront into a mixed-use district of offices, retail space, and housing lining a linear waterfront park. River City designates a TIF district on the waterfront, with a duration of no more than 15 years. The property tax revenue generated by the district at the time of designation becomes the frozen base revenue. The base revenue continues to flow to government coffers as usual.

The “increment” is any property tax revenue generated above the frozen base. Provided there is a spark to stimulate it, the increment grows over time, generating funding to pay—directly or through borrowing—for public investments in the district. River City can create a spark by working with a private developer on a development proposal. The city issues bonds secured by the forecast increment—the increase in property tax revenue expected from the developer’s proposal—to pay for upfront development costs, whether borne by the developer, the government, or both. At the end of 15 years, the TIF district is dissolved and the increment returns to general tax revenues.

(San Francisco Office of Community Investment and Infrastructure)

Diversity and Complexity

TIF interacts with tax regimes that differ by state. For revenue generation, TIF is most powerful in places with high property taxes. Because states with high property taxes often dedicate those revenues to education, TIF laws that allow access to the school district’s portion of the property tax increment can produce significant revenue. Although many states allow TIF to access retail sales taxes at a district level, sales taxes are relatively weak revenue generators.

Either the public or private sector can take the first step in initiating a TIF district. A community-driven TIF district “means the city is taking a proactive role and making policy decisions about priorities,” says Amanda Rhein, senior director for transit-oriented development at the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority and a member of ULI’s Public/Private Partnership Council. A developer-driven TIF district, however, relieves the city of the need to court developers with an untested plan. A city’s policy culture may favor one approach, but many cities do both. Developers should expect development negotiations to be more intense if they are the ones initiating TIF discussions.

Today, depending on the state, TIF supports everything from expanding affordable housing to attracting manufacturers to industrial zones, including provisions for job training. In some states, TIF must be used solely for public projects, such as infrastructure; other states allow, and even encourage, TIF in support of private development costs, such as those for rehabilitating existing buildings or subsidizing the interest on loans for new construction.

TIF laws include what is known as a “but for” clause—a way of saying that private sector projects that would happen anyway, without support from the increment, are ineligible for the financing. Though a too-literal interpretation of the “but for” clause can unnecessarily restrict TIF’s economic development uses, “there has to be some way of assuring the public that the city is not just giving money away,” says Rachel Weber, TIF expert and associate professor of urban planning and policy at the University of Illinois at Chicago. “A city should be able to distinguish between ‘what is needed’ versus ‘what would be nice’ to fulfill its economic development goals.”

Cities have options on bearing investment risk. They may use the increment to secure bonds—especially useful for large, upfront development costs. They may also use what is called “pay-as-you-go” financing and expect the developer to secure the credit: the city participates by promising the developer a portion of the increment. Cities may also choose to fund, rather than finance, the endeavor, spending the accrued increment directly on the project.

Developers should not expect 100 percent of the increment to be available. Rittner advises cities to reserve some of the increment to pay administration expenses. Moreover, the amount of need—the financing gap for each project—typically dictates the portion of the increment awarded. In times of scarce private financing, the financing gap may be bigger than the city is able or willing to fill with TIF. Indeed, Rhein notes, “developers often cannot depend on TIF alone; they need to be creative about layering public sector programs—drawing on TIF, but also other tax credit and grant programs.”

Chicago

Shortly after Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel took office in 2011, he fulfilled a campaign promise by convening a TIF Reform Task Force. Advising on a program generating $500 million a year from 163 TIF districts comprising about 10 percent of the city’s property tax base and covering 30 percent of its land area, the task force focused on increasing transparency and accountability. Under Illinois law, over the 23-year life of a TIF district, as long as money is flowing into a district, the city can continue to initiate new projects, increasing the importance of an ongoing process for accountability. In addition to recommending aligning TIF with a multiyear economic development plan and capital budget, the task force advocated establishing metrics to monitor performance of the city’s TIF program.

Among the reforms, the city has inaugurated strategic reviews every five years and in July 2013 unveiled the public TIF Portal, a web mapping tool linked to each district and its associated projects. “The city is becoming smarter in how they give their money away and stricter in terms of financial audits and holding recipients accountable to their promises,” says Weber, a member of the task force. “The city has taken more of an investment mind-set to ensure they are not providing a huge windfall to the developer at the public’s expense.”

Political debate continues in Chicago, especially regarding education spending and whether TIF is still appropriate in the city’s central area, now in its second decade of strong development. “The city is a lot more reticent to do downtown projects,” Friedman observes. “The focus now is on the outer neighborhoods.” In addition, Emanuel in November 2013 issued an executive order requiring annual calculation of the “TIF surplus” that can be returned to the original taxing bodies, including Chicago Public Schools.

Atlanta

Atlanta’s TIF program, known as TAD (for tax allocation district) and run by Invest Atlanta, the city’s economic development authority, has also undergone changes. “The lull during the recession allowed us to reevaluate our program, use it to create jobs, and better align it with citywide economic development efforts,” says Rhein, who participated in Invest Atlanta’s strategic review in 2011.

Historically, Atlanta used TAD for gap financing, funding developers through grants that covered 5 to 15 percent of project costs via bonds backed by the increment. After the strategic review, Invest Atlanta expanded its project evaluation criteria to include job creation and business attraction. New types of projects include building retrofits, facade improvements, and streetscape enhancements. An energy efficiency grant program rewards participants in the federal government’s Better Buildings Challenge.

In Georgia, school districts and county governments join a city TAD at their discretion. School districts have opted to join half of Atlanta’s ten TADs. When school districts join, Rhein explains, “they negotiate something such as payments in lieu of taxes or a lump sum out of the bond issuance.”

In recent years, Atlanta has also begun using TAD funding for major infrastructure projects, such as the Atlanta BeltLine transit and economic development plan, and a downtown streetcar.

California

By terminating redevelopment authorities and their TIF powers, Brown sent a signal that the goal of compact, walkable development at infill locations—and needs such as affordable housing—will have to be met in new ways. Ongoing discussions throughout the state focus on how to replace what was lost with a comprehensive tool kit. ULI’s five district councils in California worked together on potential next steps, and in November 2013 released the report After Redevelopment: New Tools and Strategies to Promote Economic Development and Build Sustainable Communities.

“If California is going to continue to lead on sustainable development and meet the state’s growing needs for affordable housing and infrastructure investment, cities and counties require the authority, legal powers, and financing tools to encourage infill development,” explains Libby Seifel, head of the Seifel Consulting and a member of the ULI report’s working group. Although the governor recently announced support for expanding eligible projects in infrastructure financing districts (IFDs), which can use TIF, Seifel fears “that IFDs alone are too narrow and will not generate enough public investment unless leveraged with other funds. As the ULI report states, California needs a comprehensive set of tools to achieve the state’s environmental, housing, and economic goals.”

Best Practices

To get started on considering TIF, developers should learn the state’s TIF law and the city’s policy culture, and “understand the terms of the city’s boilerplate development agreement before initiating a request for participation,” advises Rhein.

Friedman advises developers to remember, as negotiations proceed, that TIF is “not an entitlement, it’s a gap filler. Be prepared for a complex set of negotiations, the expectation that you will open your business practices to scrutiny, and that a variety of public goals and values will be injected into your project.”

Because to foster a true public/private partnership, the CDFA recommends that the best practices of accountability, transparency, and due diligence apply equally to both partners. This is the best way to guarantee that TIF’s virtuous cycle is optimally achieved.

Sarah Jo Peterson is senior director, policy, at ULI.
Urban Land Magazine | Jun. 13, 2014




Moody’s Rates First TOB that Passes Volcker Rule.

Fears that a $75 billion corner of the municipal bond market for Tender Option Bonds would be closed down by the Volcker Rule may have been squashed with a new deal from Bank of America Merrill Lynch. The tiny $8.545 million deal has been structured to comply with Volcker Rule restrictions by using two loopholes in the Investment Company Act of 1940.

BofA’s new Tender Option Bonds (TOB) creation has received Moody’s Aaa/VMIG imprimatur. If regulators approve the new structure, it could be a template to restart the dormant TOB market.

Here is an example of a general TOB structure from Nuveen. The Volcker Rule does not apply to Nuveen, but the TOB structure is roughly equivalent to all muniland issuers.

TOB Structure

Bank of America and its investment arm Merrill Lynch have altered the way the TOB trust (green box in the chart above) is organized to satisfy Volcker Rule restrictions on a bank owning hedge funds or trusts.

Rather than being separate parties in a TOB, Merrill Lynch combined all the deal participants into a joint venture trust between BofA and the investors in the trust. This structure takes advantage of the joint venture exception in the 40 Act. Moody’s says:

Merrill Lynch’s transaction relies on the joint venture exemption from 40 Act registration. Unlike a typical TOB where Merrill Lynch would have acted as the issuer of the TOB trust, in the new structure, Merrill Lynch sold the bonds via a sale agreement to a joint venture trust. The joint venture agreement is between Bank of America, N.A. (A2/ P-1) as trustor and liquidity provider and the floating and inverse floating rate investors (the parties purchasing the interests in the joint venture).

BofA established the joint venture trust and Merrill Lynch sold the underlying bonds (State of Maryland General Obligation Bonds, State and Local Facilities Loan of 2013, First Series B Tax-Exempt Bonds due August 1, 2019 and the Cusip for the TOB is 46641N) into the trust.

The other parties in the joint venture trust will be money market and closed-end funds that buy the cash flow portions of the deal. The new structure limits the number of these outside parties in the trust to take advantage of another 40 Act registration exemption related to the number of parties in a trust (or hedge fund). Moody’s again:

The agreement limits participation to 10 parties. Joint ventures among 10 or fewer participants are exempt from registration under the 40 Act. TOBs structured as joint ventures do not fit the definition of hedge funds included in the Volcker Rule, making it possible for banks to sponsor and invest in them.

Here are the parties in the deal, according to Moody’s:

Liquidity provider and Trustor – Bank of America NA

Trustee – US Bank Trust NA

Venturers (that’s what they call it instead of “investors”) – to be determined but limited to 10

Remarketing agent – Merrill Lynch

This is muniland structured finance at its best. There are many other nuances to the deal that you can find in the Moody’s rating announcement. Stay tuned for reactions from regulators. Moody’s foresees current TOBs possibly altering its legal structure if the new BofA trust structure meets regulator approval.

By Cate Long JUNE 13, 2014




Detroit Reaches Bankruptcy Settlement with Some Bondholders.

DETROIT—The city of Detroit has reached new agreements with its largest municipal union and a separate settlement with a group of bondholders, likely reducing the number of creditors to oppose the city’s bankruptcy plan at a trial scheduled for this summer.

Terms of the settlements weren’t immediately released.

The tentative labor agreements between the city and the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees Council 25 build on earlier agreements and cover almost all employees represented by the union. But the pacts still need to be ratified by the union’s membership by June 30, according to a statement from federal mediators Friday.

The union also agreed to support a larger debt-cutting plan by the city to make cuts to pension benefits as part of its plan to exit municipal bankruptcy. Those pension cuts, however, will be softened if the pension holders approve a complex plan relying on more than $800 million in outside funding from donors, foundations and the state of Michigan.

Pension holders “simply cannot risk the further serious reduction in pension, pay and job security if the Plan, and our collective bargaining agreements, are not approved,” AFSCME Council 25 President Al Garrett said in a statement, calling on his members to vote for the city’s bankruptcy plan.

The separate bondholders deal was worked out between Detroit’s emergency manager and two principals that either hold or insure the majority of limited-tax general obligation bonds issued by the city, according to a statement on Friday from the federal mediators in the bankruptcy case.

“The settlement recognizes the unique status and niche of LTGOs in the municipal finance market,” the mediators said. “The insurer of the LTGOs has made clear it will honor its insurance commitments on the existing policies.”

Several bondholder groups declined to comment. But one confirmed a deal had been reached.

“Given Detroit’s unique circumstances, Ambac has accepted a settlement with the City for the limited tax general obligation bonds,” the company said Friday. “Ambac’s net par exposure related to Detroit’s limited tax general obligation bonds was $92.7 million as of March 31, 2014. We expect to continue to pay claims of scheduled principal and interest on the bonds insured by Ambac.”

According to the latest version of the city’s debt-cutting plan filed in April, the city of Detroit owed about $547 million in principal and interest on these LTGO bonds.

Compared with unlimited-tax general obligations bonds, these limited-tax bonds aren’t usually backed by a specific tax-revenue stream, prompting the city to argue that it could offer a much lower payout for those bondholders in bankruptcy. But bondholders opposed the cut as unfair, warning it could roil the municipal-bond market in Michigan and potentially drive up borrowing costs for municipalities.

Detroit’s plan to exit bankruptcy—the nation’s largest Chapter 9 case with an estimated $18 billion in long-term obligations—originally called for a different treatment for the city’s bondholders. Unlimited-tax general obligation bondholders who reached an agreement with the city in April are to receive about 74 cents on the dollar in recovery on their claim under the plan. But limited tax general obligation bondholders who were still at odds with the city would only get between 10 to 13 cents on the dollar.

It was unclear on Friday whether the agreement would boost the recovery for these bondholders and by how much.

The mediation team, led by U.S. District Judge Gerald Rosen, added that “with this settlement, only a few remaining, albeit significant, disputes remain” between the city and its creditors. A trial has been scheduled for mid-August on the merits of the city’s debt-cutting plan.

A spokesman for Detroit Emergency Manager Kevyn Orr said he didn’t have an immediate comment about the deal, which mediators said was still being completed.

By MATTHEW DOLAN
Updated June 13, 2014 6:29 p.m. ET

Write to Matthew Dolan at matthew.dolan@wsj.com




Ballard Spahr: Water Resources Legislation Could Lead to Increase of U.S. Water P3s.

President Obama recently signed into law the Water Resources and Reform Development Act of 2014 (WRRDA). The statute begins to address ways to fund the billions of dollars necessary to update the country’s drinking water systems, dam infrastructure, levees, solid waste, wastewater, inland waterways, and ports. The legislation could lead to more widespread financing of water infrastructure projects through P3s.

Continue Reading.

June 13, 2014

by Brian Walsh, William C. Rhodes, Lee A. Storey, Steve T. Park, and Christopher R. Sullivan




Municipal Issuer Brief - June 9, 2014

Read the Brief.




East Dundee Appeals Wal-Mart TIF Case to State Supreme Court.

East Dundee appealed its dismissed lawsuit against Carpentersville and Wal-Mart to the Illinois Supreme Court this week. The retailer has announced plans to close its East Dundee store, above, and build a supercenter in neighboring Carpentersville.

East Dundee didn’t waste time taking legal action against Carpentersville to stop Wal-Mart’s pending move to the neighboring village.

East Dundee appealed its dismissed case versus the village and Wal-Mart to the Illinois Supreme Court, less than 24 hours after Carpentersville officials reviewed Wal-Mart’s draft application for financial assistance.

Wal-Mart, slated to build a supercenter at Lake Marian Road and Route 25, seeks $4.3 million from a tax increment finance district that encompasses its future location in Carpentersville. If Carpentersville doesn’t come through with the money, Wal-Mart won’t build there, according to the draft application.

East Dundee argues the retailer should not receive funding from a TIF district because the new site is three miles from the East Dundee store, which is also in a TIF district. State law mandates a distance of at least 10 miles to stop communities from poaching businesses from each other.

While the Carpentersville village board isn’t due to vote on Wal-Mart’s redevelopment agreement until late summer, East Dundee would rather strike now, Village President Lael Miller said.

“They may actually start doing some work prior to (Carpentersville’s vote), we don’t know.” Miller said. “We anticipate we’ll move forward with this and we’ll take our chances.”

History isn’t on East Dundee’s side, and the latest appeal marks the village’s fourth attempt at blocking Wal-Mart from leaving.

In February 2013 a judge denied East Dundee’s move for a temporary restraining order and threw out a lawsuit aimed at preventing Wal-Mart from receiving funding from the Carpentersville TIF district.

Six months later, Kane County Judge David Akemann dismissed the lawsuit against the world’s largest retailer and Carpentersville, saying East Dundee had no standing in the case because TIF money had not yet changed hands.

East Dundee appealed that decision in April and the Illinois Appellate Court Second District sided with Akemann when it dismissed the case.

Carpentersville Village President Ed Ritter isn’t concerned about East Dundee’s latest filing and expects Wal-Mart to go on as scheduled.

“We’re very confident that Wal-Mart will be open in Carpentersville before the end of 2016,” Ritter said.

In 2012, Wal-Mart announced it would close its 23-year-old store in East Dundee to build in Carpentersville.

The departure means East Dundee would lose about $850,000 in annual revenues from Wal-Mart. Miller estimates the village has spent about $83,000 in legal fees since the litigation began 17 months ago.

But it made more than $1.2 million from Wal-Mart in the same time frame, he said.

“Yes we did spend money but obviously we made more money in the meantime as well,” Miller said.

By Lenore T. Adkins




NFL Falcons Stadium Bond Fight Taken to Top Georgia Court.

An Atlanta bond issue to help finance a new stadium for the National Football League’s Falcons is being challenged before the Georgia Supreme Court over claims it violates the state’s constitution.

Home Depot Inc. co-founder Arthur Blank, who owns the Falcons, is getting help from the city to build a $1.2 billion football stadium to replace the Georgia Dome, which opened in 1992. The new site’s neighbors, who failed to persuade a state judge to invalidate the city bond issue of as much as $278 million, have appealed that decision to the state’s top court. They argue the city hotel tax to pay for the bonds is unconstitutional.

Superior Court Judge Ural Glanville in Atlanta last month validated the bonds and overruled all objections. Glanville found that the security for the bonds was “sound, feasible and reasonable,” and the stadium project met public purposes guidelines.

The neighbors’ appeal filed June 5, “delays the issuance of the bonds until final resolution” by the Georgia Supreme Court, John Woodham, the objectors’ attorney, said in an e-mail today. This would delay the city of Atlanta’s “public financing component” of the stadium project during that time, he said.

Construction of the stadium will proceed, Douglass Selby, an attorney for the city, said yesterday in a phone interview. While the bonds won’t be issued until the appeal is resolved, the city sought validation of the bonds early to accommodate any objections or appeals, he said.

Although the stadium will be state-owned through the Georgia World Congress Center Authority, the Falcons will operate it and keep stadium revenue under a licensing agreement. Jennifer LeMaster, a spokeswoman for the World Congress Center Authority, didn’t immediately return a call after regular business hours yesterday seeking comment on the case.

The Atlanta Falcons won’t comment on the bond issue because the team isn’t a party to the proceedings, Kim Shreckengost, a spokeswoman for AMB Group LLC, the Falcons’ parent company, said yesterday in an e-mail.

“We do have full confidence that our partners at the city, Invest Atlanta and the GWCCA will appropriately handle these challenges,” she said. “Construction of the new stadium has been under way for several months and we will continue to move forward.”

Neighborhoods Burdened

Neighborhood critics say the city-adopted plan unfairly burdens residents of two predominantly black neighborhoods. A group of community leaders, including three activists and a retired Baptist minister, won a court ruling in February allowing them to intervene in the city’s bond process.

The residents’ legal argument hinged on the claim that extending the city’s hotel tax to repay the bonds unconstitutionally turns a general law, applicable statewide, into one governing a single project. The city said in court filings that the bonds are authorized by state law and the plan’s use of 39 percent of the hotel tax is appropriate.

Glanville found no merit in the objectors’ arguments. Georgia law requires court approval before government general-obligation revenue bonds can be issued.

The case is Georgia v. Atlanta Development Authority, 2014-cv-242035, Superior Court, Fulton County (Atlanta).

By Margaret Cronin Fisk June 11, 2014

To contact the reporter on this story: Margaret Cronin Fisk in Detroit at mcfisk@bloomberg.net

To contact the editors responsible for this story: Michael Hytha at mhytha@bloomberg.net Joe Schneider




Can Kentucky Stop Nonprofits from Abandoning Pension Obligations?

The Kentucky Retirement System is appealing a judge’s decision that allowed one of the employers in its membership to abandon the underfunded system as part of its bankruptcy restructuring.

A federal judge ruled on May 30 that Seven Counties Services, a health services provider, could leave the pension system because it qualified as a nonprofit corporation rather than a government entity.

Citing the 1963 federal Community Health Act, which was designed to begin the privatization of mental health services, the opinion said that Seven Counties was a result of the “metamorphosis from state-run mental health services to a community-based, private non-profit structure.” The ruling could clear the way for other similarly financially strapped institutions across the state to do the same. The state has a total of 13 community mental health centers that could qualify as nonprofits and opt to leave the system.

The retirement system’s board of trustees voted 12-0 on June 11 in a closed-door meeting to appeal the ruling. State lawmakers and Gov. Steve Beshear had publicly urged the board to do so in the weeks before the meeting.

Kentucky has the worst-funded retirement system in the country, holding roughly 23 percent of the money it has promised to pay its current workers and retirees in retirement benefits. That means the state system, not including police and fire employees and teachers, has roughly $8.7 billion in unfunded liabilities, according to the most recent actuarial report. About $91 million of that is attributed to Seven Counties and the retirement system would have to cover that cost if the agency is actually allowed to exit.

Some have said covering that $8.7 billion would drive up what state government employers across the state would have to put in annually to the pension fund to keep it solvent. By some estimates, governments would collectively spend more than 38 percent of their payroll costs next year on retiree payments alone. That’s up from 5.9 percent in 2006.

Jim Carroll, co-founder of the 3,600-member Facebook group Kentucky Government Retirees, said his group is “gratified” that the retirement board has voted to appeal the Seven Counties Services bankruptcy ruling. “As stakeholders, we are pleased that the board had moved to protect the long-term viability of the financially troubled [retirement] fund,” he said in an emailed statement.

But others are more skeptical, saying the state retirement system was already in a “death spiral” before the bankruptcy ruling. Chris Tobe, a Louisville-area pension investment consultant, noted that state employer contributions into the pension fund this year have collectively been only about half of what is actuarially recommended. That means the 23 percent funded ratio will likely sink lower after this year.

“The appeal is a desperate measure to try to prevent any of the other 12 mental health agencies from jumping ship,” Tobe said.

BY LIZ FARMER | JUNE 12, 2014




Washington State’s Pension Lesson.

A new brief from the University of Washington’s Center for Education Data & Research analyses the state’s teacher pension system, which has offered new enrollees a choice between a traditional plan or a hybrid plan since 1996. As other states consider similar changes to traditional pension plans, the paper notes that Washington provides a look into what could happen.

The paper finds that the “state’s financial exposure is significantly lower under the hybrid plan” as its per-teacher pension liability is approximately half as large as under the traditional plan. Interestingly, when given a choice, at least six in 10 teachers (statistics vary by year) choose the hybrid plan, the paper says. This runs counter to claims by traditional pension supporters that the defined benefit plans are more attractive and therefore better for recruiting talent.

Additionally, teachers may obtain more money under the state’s hybrid-plan. “In calculating potential retirement wealth accumulations under [the hybrid plans],” the authors note,”we find that teachers enrolled in Washington’s hybrid plan are likely to have a level of retirement security that is comparable or greater than that provided by the traditional plan.” The paper concludes that Washington State’s experience “suggests that teacher pension systems can be reformed in a way that is attractive to both teachers and states and ensures that significant resources are being set aside for teacher retirements.”




Pittsburgh Rebirth Tainted as Pension Fuels Deficit: Muni Credit.

The fiscal rebound of Pittsburgh, the former steel-city capital that shed a Rust-Belt fate by rebuilding its economy around universities and hospitals, has struck an obstacle that’s bedeviling municipalities nationwide.

Pennsylvania’s second-most-populous city faces an operating deficit next year for the first time since 2005, partly because of higher pension contributions after officials lowered assumptions for the retirement system’s investment returns.

Pittsburgh faces a month-end deadline to approve a plan to plug the shortfall, illustrating how even municipalities that have dodged bankruptcy struggle with pension burdens. The city, which teetered on the brink of insolvency a decade ago, earned its highest rating ever from Standard & Poor’s in February.

“We’ve come a long way; we see the light at the end of the tunnel,” said Michael Lamb, the city’s controller. “We have put more money in pensions than we’re required to, but we’re still not doing enough.”

Lower Target

In December, Pittsburgh decided to lower its pension-return target — adding $8 million to annual costs — to fall in line with national trends, according to consultants hired by the state to oversee the city’s recovery. The average assumed return rate last year for 150 U.S. public plans was 7.66 percent, compared with 8.08 percent in 2001, according to the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College.

More municipalities will lower targets as rating companies factor retirement liabilities into credit assessments, said Howard Cure, head of municipal research in New York at Evercore Wealth Management LLC, which oversees about $5.2 billion.

Pittsburgh has evolved from its industrial past, when plants producing coke used in steel-making would shower parked cars with ash. As manufacturing dwindled amid global competition, residents left. About 306,000 people live in the city at the confluence of the Ohio, Allegheny and Monongahela rivers, compared with about 604,000 in 1960.

By 2003, Pittsburgh was in crisis. It cut about 13 percent of its workforce that year, firing 446 employees, including almost 100 police officers. It also earned the dubious distinction of having the lowest credit rating of any major U.S. city. Pennsylvania officials placed it in the Act 47 program for distressed communities in December 2003, giving the state oversight over its finances and requiring recovery plans.

Turnaround Time

Since then, city officials have turned around Pittsburgh’s finances through steps such as taxing companies’ payrolls and temporarily freezing wages, said Dean Kaplan, a managing director at Public Financial Management Inc., one of the state-appointed consultants.

In a sign of the diversifying economy, U.S. Steel Corp. (X), which has been based in Pittsburgh since 1937, no longer ranks among the top 10 employers. The biggest is the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, and the city is also home to companies such as PNC Financial Services Group (PNC) and H.J. Heinz Co.

In November 2012, the state’s consultants said Pittsburgh was ready to exit the distressed program. Revenue had exceeded operating expenses every year since 2005, although transfers to pay debt and pensions in 2008 and 2010 generated shortfalls approved by the city’s fiscal overseers. State officials rejected the consultants’ recommendation in March, saying legacy costs such as pensions jeopardize the budget.

Deficit Ahead

That caution was borne out in the recovery plan consultants released last month in response to the state’s denial. The city faces a projected $14 million operating deficit in the year beginning in January and may use up its reserves by 2018, the report said.

The city’s change in how it levies real estate taxes curbed revenue, Kaplan said. At the same time, minimum pension contributions will jump to $43 million next year, or 8.6 percent of the general-fund budget, from $31 million, or 6.5 percent of this year’s plan. The swelling costs resulted from adjusting actuarial assumptions to reflect recipients’ longer life expectancy, and from lowering the target investment return on pension assets to 7.5 percent from 8 percent, Kaplan said.

Pay Up

The state’s consultants said the city should pay even more than required amounts over the next five years to sustain its pension system, which serves about 7,500 people and is about 58 percent funded. The average state and local plan had about 72 percent of the money needed to meet retirement obligations last year, the Center for Retirement Research said. In 2010, the city avoided a state takeover of its pensions by dedicating parking revenue through 2041 to the system.

The five-year road map recommends raising real-estate taxes and parking rates. Mayor Bill Peduto, a Democrat, wants to avoid the increases, and to do so, “all options are on the table,” said a spokesman, Tim McNulty, who declined to offer specifics. Officials have planned a public hearing on the consultants’ proposal for June 16, he said.

Kaplan said the city, which last sold municipal bonds in 2012, must also invest in roads and bridges. The consultants’ blueprint calls for selling $50 million of bonds in 2015 and again in 2017 for infrastructure.

Officials “are not going to have a hard time placing it” because of the city’s progress during the past decade, said Dennis Derby, who helps manage munis, including Pittsburgh debt, at Wells Capital Management in Menomonee Falls, Wisconsin.

S&P raised Pittsburgh’s rating in February to A+, its fifth-highest level, citing its diverse economy.

Pittsburgh general-obligation bonds maturing in September 2021 traded June 6 at an average yield of 2.4 percent, the lowest in 14 months and 0.52 percentage point above benchmark munis, data compiled by Bloomberg show.

By Romy Varghese Jun 12, 2014

To contact the reporter on this story: Romy Varghese in Philadelphia at rvarghese8@bloomberg.net

To contact the editors responsible for this story: Stephen Merelman at smerelman@bloomberg.net Mark Tannenbaum, Alan Goldstein




New York City Gets Low Yields in First Bond Sale Since Union Deals.

(Reuters) – A scarcity of new paper in the U.S. municipal bond market helped New York City borrow more at lower rates on Wednesday, in its first bond deal since Mayor Bill de Blasio’s multibillion-dollar accord with labor unions in May.

Critics said they expected investors to shy away from the city’s debt because of the new mayor’s liberal, big-ticket policies. But the city suffered no blowback in this sale, at least in part because of technical market factors, including low yields and tight supply.

New York increased the size of the deal to $1.02 billion from a planned $850 million offering of general obligation refunding bonds.

In the longest maturity, 2034, the city was able to borrow at a yield of 3.87 percent – 30 basis points lower than it did in March, when the same maturity sold with a 4.17 percent yield, according to the Mayor’s Office of Management and Budget.

Morgan Stanley was the senior manager on the negotiated deal, which had a two-day retail order period beginning on Monday resulting in about $203 million of retail orders.

The deal priced for institutional investors on Wednesday, when the size of the offering was increased, the OMB said.

Some analysts sounded a note of alarm on the city’s finances and creditworthiness after de Blasio reached an agreement with teachers, who had gone for years without a contract under former Mayor Michael Bloomberg.

De Blasio’s labor deal could cost the city close to $20 billion through 2021, not including healthcare savings, when applied to all city workers. It has helped create budget gaps of $2.2 billion to $3.2 billion from 2016 to 2018, according to the city’s estimates.

(Reporting by Hilary Russ; Editing by Jonathan Oatis)




S&P: What Should the Market Expect from the Rating Process for Catastrophe Bonds?

For the first five months of 2014, Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services rated $3.365 billion of catastrophe bonds (cat bonds). Included in this total is the largest cat bond issued to date, from Everglades Re (please see Everglades Re Ltd., published May 2, 2014, on RatingsDirect). Since 1999, we have rated more than $53 billion of cat bonds. Cat bonds have and continue to attract capital from new investors. Risk spreads continue to decrease as capital inflows increase. U.S. hurricanes remain the dominant exposure as all but $300 million of 2014’s rated issuance covers losses from this peril. For the first time, we rated a cat bond providing indemnified coverage for losses from typhoons in Japan (see Aozora Re Ltd., published May 30, 2014).

Frequently Asked Questions

Which office will rate a transaction and how does that affect the rating?

We have seven analysts in the U.S and U.K. that can be the lead analyst on a cat bond issuance. Typically, the office that rates a transaction will be the same as the office of the insurance company analyst. For example, Swiss Reinsurance Co. has global exposure, but because Swiss Re’s lead company analyst is located in the U.K., a cat bond it sponsored would be rated by a Standard & Poor’s U.K. analyst. This is irrespective of the covered peril. A U.K. or U.S. analyst can rate a bond covering losses from hurricanes in the U.S., earthquakes in Japan, or windstorms in Europe. For bonds sponsored by companies where the company analyst is not located in the U.K. or U.S., the analyst of a cat bond could be in either the U.S. or U.K., depending on availability.

The applicable criteria for this asset class does not differ between offices. In almost all cases, analysts from the U.S. and U.K. will participate in a rating committee for a cat bond. Our goal is to apply the criteria consistently regardless of the office or analyst, achieving a similar outcome in every case.

How long does the rating process take?

The time it takes to rate a cat bond generally ranges from three to five weeks, and much of this time overlaps the marketing period of a transaction. The periods are general ranges but the time frame can be shortened if the issuing parties are familiar with the process. We have had a couple of transactions that needed to be completed in a limited period where the 17g5 website was set up in two or three days, the requisite information was promptly posted, and we were able to complete our review and assign a final rating within two weeks.

The ratings on cat bonds are subject to SEC regulation 17g5. Before we begin the analytical process, an engagement letter must be in place between Standard & Poor’s and the arranger, following which a secure website must be set up to allow for controlled and confidential sharing of documentation between the deal counterparties and the designated rating agency. Only when a sufficient level of documentation is uploaded to the secure website can ratings analysis commence. This process to establish a secure website and have sufficient levels of documentation made available typically takes between two and three weeks. As issuers have become familiarized with the process, the time it takes to establish the website has been decreasing.

The typical process is for the underwriters to announce and market a transaction with a preliminary rating and we will assign a final rating by the closing date.

Once we begin the analytical review, we can typically assign a preliminary rating within two to three weeks. The preliminary rating typically involves review of the insurance risk being transferred via the cat bond. If the cat bond has a unique feature (e.g., the attachment point is based on indemnified losses versus previous issues, has a parametric trigger, or the attachment point was based on industry losses or covers a new peril such as flood), it could take more time for us to assign a preliminary rating.

Because cat bonds are subject to 17g5, all information needs to be posted to the transaction’s website. We will post any queries to the website as well. If there is a delay in posting information or a response, the time it takes to assign a rating could increase.

The review of the transaction documents takes a similar amount of time (two to three weeks), assuming receipt of blacklined (versus a transaction rated by Standard & Poor’s) documents and opinions. The document review is completed with the assistance of Structured Finance analysts to determine if our criteria related to special-purpose vehicles has been met.

Much of the information posted to the 17g5 website for our review is the same as that posted to the investor website.

Please note that all timings are indicative and the actual timing could vary depending on the specific characteristics of each transaction.

What information do you require to rate a natural peril catastrophe bond?

We usually request the following information:

For indemnity deals, we request:

What criteria do you use to rate catastrophe bonds?

The applicable criteria is Rating Natural Peril Catastrophe Bonds: Methodology And Assumptions, which was published Dec. 18, 2013, on RatingsDirect. The article sets forth the analytical process of rating cat bonds. The following is a brief synopsis of the process.

For bonds that have a robust legal structure, our rating is the weak-link (lowest) of three factors (see Assessing Credit Quality By The Weakest Link, published Feb. 13, 2012) subject to ratings caps.

These factors are:

Will Standard & Poor’s rate a deal in which a company uses its own model?

As set forth in our criteria, we would likely not rate a natural catastrophe bond that used a model generated by a ceding company. However, it is possible for us to rate a transaction where the ceding company did its own modeling using a model from either Risk Management Solutions Inc., EQECAT Inc., or AIR Worldwide Corp. However, this would increase the length of our review because we would have to review each adjustment and assumption made by the ceding company that differed from those that would have been used by the modeling firm, and be comfortable that they have the requisite experience to run the model and complete tasks typically performed by the modeling firm.

How does Standard & Poor’s incorporate property catastrophe risk and cat bonds quantitatively in its credit analysis?

Our capital model uses a company’s catastrophe-modeled exposures–the exceedance probability curve. We incorporate a tax-adjusted aggregate one-in-250-year property-line-only probable maximum loss (PML) catastrophe capital charge, net of reinsurance and other forms of mitigants (e.g., catastrophe bonds), and net of reinstatement premiums. The PML should also capture the impact of investments in catastrophe bonds. Unless a rating committee believes there is basis risk inherent in the cat bond, the company will typically receive full credit for reinsurance when determining its one-in-250-year property-line-only PML.

There are two premium adjustments. First, we remove risk charges related to catastrophe premiums (or the catastrophe load) to prevent double-counting catastrophe risk. In the absence of catastrophe loading provided by the (re)insurer, we assume a reduction in premium risk charges based on the company’s risk profile. The second adjustment is to reduce the net aggregate one-in-250-year modeled loss by 70% of the associated net property catastrophe premiums written (to account for a 30% expense ratio). We make this adjustment because the catastrophe losses would typically relate to current premium writings that reduce the impact of the loss.

This charge is also net of any applicable tax relief because tax-paying (re)insurers receive an income tax benefit from catastrophe losses that mitigates the potential capital impact. To tax-adjust the output, we use the company’s effective tax rate. We use the one-in-250-year charge across all rating levels in our capital analysis. In other words, the charge is not scaled for various rating levels. Furthermore, we apply the net aggregate PML property catastrophe charge-based one-in-250-year return period to all rated insurers and reinsurers globally.

Does Standard & Poor’s have to maintain an interactive rating on a cedant?

No. Paragraphs 64-68 of the criteria address this question. Examples of cat bonds we’ve rated but do not have an interactive rating on the cedant are Metrocat Re (Metropolitan Transportation Authority), Embarcadero Re (California Earthquake Authority), and Tar Heel Re (North Carolina Joint Underwriting Association & North Carolina Insurance Underwriting Association).

When does Standard & Poor’s publish its ratings?

We publish a presale article for the preliminary rating and a closing article for the final rating. We publish a presale after a transaction is announced, and publish a closing article after the transaction closes. A rating letter is issued only for a final rating.

Under Standard & Poor’s policies, only a Rating Committee can determine a Credit Rating Action (including a Credit Rating change, affirmation or withdrawal, Rating Outlook change, or CreditWatch action). This commentary and its subject matter have not been the subject of Rating Committee action and should not be interpreted as a change to, or affirmation of, a Credit Rating or Rating Outlook.

Primary Credit Analyst: Gary Martucci, New York (1) 212-438-7217;
gary.martucci@standardandpoors.com
Secondary Contact: Maren Josefs, London (44) 20-7176-7050;
maren.josefs@standardandpoors.com




A Visit with BlackRock’s Muni Managers.

The New York offices of BlackRock, the giant fund manager, crackle with the energy of money. BlackRock is the largest fund complex in muniland, with over $100 billion in municipal fund assets along with undisclosed amounts of separately-managed accounts that hold municipal bonds.

Peter Hayes leads the BlackRock Municipal Bonds Group. He is also a member of the Americas Fixed Income Executive Team and BlackRock’s Global Operating Committee. Hayes is muniland’s biggest kahuna. When he and his team talk, people listen.

Hayes, BlackRock’s head of municipal credit research Jim Schwartz and head muni strategist Sean Carney hosted reporters for a discussion last week.

Hayes said that muniland was oversold at the end of 2013. Now he is seeing a bigger crossover presence chasing yield. Crossover refers to non-traditional buyers who don’t use the municipal tax exemption.

Tax hikes on high income earners have helped produce steady muni fund inflows since January 15, according to Hayes. BlackRock has also had good growth in separately managed accounts (SMA). Muniland issuance is down 25 percent in 2014. Relative value is lower than the pre-crisis level, and Hayes says we may be in this environment for the duration of 2014. It is the strongest technical environment in some time, says Hayes.

Before its downgrade to junk status, Puerto Rico was 10 percent of high-yield indices. Now it is about 22 percent, says Carney. There is a significant amount of zero coupon bonds that skew the indices. Hayes says that Puerto Rico bought about a year’s liquidity with the March $3.5 general obligation (GOs) offering. If there is a debt moratorium, it will ripple through all the Puerto Rico credits.

All three are uniform in their concerns about state tax revenues. Schwartz is closely watching Puerto Rico, Detroit, the Illinois budget negotiations and Connecticut, which has high debt. Overall in the U.S., state sales tax revenues were up only 1 percent year over year. Personal income taxes were down 0.5 percent, which was anticipated after personal gains were loaded in 2013 due to federal tax changes.

Schwartz believes that Detroit could have mediated COPs outside of bankruptcy and saved $100 million of legal fees. There has been no definitive legal decision on GOs in Detroit. He said the Illinois legislature had some fictitious budget numbers and that the state’s payables would go up from $5 to $10 billion again as a way to manage revenue shortfalls.

Schwartz echoed a statement made by Hayes about Puerto Rico buying time, but not fixing its problems. Puerto Rico now provides too much information and needs to be better organized. PREPA, the electricity monopoly, is the first issue that needs to be addressed. My sense is that Blackrock is keenly interested in buying Puerto Rico bonds when the situation stabilizes, but there are too many unknowns to do so now.

Small rural hospital issuers may have a rough year, says Schwartz. The new healthcare act is drawing revenues away from them. Nevertheless, demand for new bonds is so strong that a recent $60 million Texas hospital deal has $1 billion of orders.

Chapter 9 cases are another variable in muniland that have left a lot of uncertainty about general obligation bonds. You don’t know where you stand until you get in front of a specific judge, says Schwartz. Dealing with different underlying state laws and constitutions makes these situations more complex.

Hayes mentioned taking a recent driving tour of New York City and was astonished at how much residential building was happening and how helpful that will be for the city’s tax base.

Overall, the duration of muniland is down to 15.3 years from 16.3 years in 2013. This is due to shrinking issuance.

BlackRock has been buying MCDX municipal credit default indexes to hedge portfolio risk, but very few single names (credit default swaps that insure against default for a single entity like California or New York City). The MCDX indices have been more liquid since Puerto Rico brought its March GO deal because hedge funds have been more active players in muni credit default swaps.

BlackRock has also been buying in the secondary market where possible. The company changed the mandate of its intermediate municipal mutual fund to allow the purchase of taxable (corporate) bonds. The fund now has about 3 percent corporate bonds.

Hayes said that it is hard to see outflows beginning again unless interest rates go up or investors start taking gains. Muniland has gotten so rich, it is hard to sustain these high-fund inflow levels.

By Cate Long

JUNE 9, 2014




Reed Smith: Show Me The Money: For Water And Transportation Projects, the Question is Always How to Pay.

Two recent important developments in Congress illustrate the opportunities, and limits, in financing infrastructure projects in today’s Washington. First, the House of Representatives and the Senate, by overwhelming margins, agreed to a conference report ironing out the differences on H.R. 3080, the Water Resources Reform and Development Act of 2014 (“WRRDA”), which pays for navigation, dredging, and flood protection projects throughout the country. The legislation heads to the President’s desk for his expected signature. Second, the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee unanimously approved legislation reauthorizing the nation’s surface transportation program S. 2322, the MAP-21 Reauthorization Act. However, the circumstances behind each bill are not the same: the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund (“HMTF”), which funds water projects, has a surplus of more than $8 billion. Meanwhile, the Highway Trust Fund (“HTF”), which funds highway and mass transit projects, is almost insolvent. The funding disparities between the two indicate the challenges in providing infrastructure funding in today’s Washington.

$5.4 billion to pay for 34 water projects through Fiscal Year 2019.

According to the Congressional Budget Office, WRRDA authorizes $5.4 billion for water projects, which includes 34 projects, through Fiscal Year 2019. The key, in this era of no congressional earmarking, is that funds must go to water infrastructure projects that have (1) a completed report by the Army Corps that indicates that the project is in the federal interest, and (2) a completed environmental impact statement (section 1005(a)). As we noted previously, the HMTF is supported entirely by user-fees, yet sees half of its revenue diverted from port projects to support the federal government’s activities. Section 2101(b) of WRRDA addresses this by requiring all trust funds to be used for water projects by Fiscal Year 2025, leading to a large supply of funds for water projects.

But what about highways and mass transit?

Compare the relatively easy passage of WRRDA with the reauthorization of the nation’s transportation infrastructure program. Bridge, highway and mass transit projects are financed federally by the HTF, which itself is funded primarily by the 18 cent gasoline tax. Unfortunately, the Department of Transportation estimates the HTF will face a shortfall before the end of this fiscal year: gas tax revenue has fallen, requiring transfers from the general fund (i.e., the United States taxpayer), with the latest being a $9.7 billion transfer shortly after the start of FY 2014. However, the balance has continued to drop. The DOT notes “as of April 25, 2014, the Highway Account cash balance was $8.7 billion,” which will likely require another cash infusion before September 30. The MAP-21 Reauthorization Act would reauthorize surface transportation projects for six years at the baseline level established by the CBO, which is equal to current funding plus inflation. Even that amount is unsustainable, without new funding to the HTF. Nor is it enough to address the nation’s infrastructure deficit, as noted by the American Society of Civil Engineers and others. Before the MAP-21 Reauthorization Act can become law, Congress will have decide whether additional transfers from the general fund are required or whether a long-term funding mechanism is possible.

The likelihood of Congress making any decision on raising revenue seems unlikely, given the pending midterm elections. What is more likely is that Congress, failing to pass any legislation on transportation funding, waits until the 114th Congress convenes in 2014 to start anew.

Last Updated: May 29 2014
Article by Christopher L. Rissetto and Robert Helland
Reed Smith




U.S. Municipal Bond Market Continued to Shrink in Q1 - Fed.

(Reuters) – The amount of outstanding U.S. municipal bonds continued shrinking in the first quarter to $3.661 trillion from $3.671 trillion in the final quarter of 2013, Federal Reserve data released on Thursday showed.

Households, the backbone of the market, held $1.604 trillion bonds in the first quarter, compared to $1.626 trillion the quarter before and $1.676 trillion in the first quarter of 2013.

The Federal Reserve does not seasonally adjust the levels of outstanding debt, but does seasonally adjust the flow of the funds data. That data shows households shed $110.9 billion bonds in the first quarter. Banks, however, acquired $36.2 billion and mutual funds $28.8 billion in the quarter.

(Reporting By Lisa Lambert; Editing by Meredith Mazzilli)




U.S. Housing Finance Agencies Use Alternative Financing To Meet Their Mission

U.S. housing finance agencies (HFAs) have filled a role as financiers of affordable single-family homeownership since the early 1970s. Traditionally, they did this by purchasing loans from lenders using proceeds from tax-exempt municipal bonds they issued. Because the interest rate on the bonds was typically lower than that on taxable debt, HFAs held an advantage over other loan financiers as long as the loan was for a first-time homebuyer and conformed to other qualifications regarding the borrower and the property.

The benefit of tax-exempt financing has disappeared since the financial crisis, to which the Federal Reserve responded in part by keeping market mortgage rates low. Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services surveyed 32 HFAs in September 2013 about their experience with and thoughts on low interest rates. At the time, the rate on a 30-year fixed rate mortgage was 4.57%, according to Freddie Mac. Eighty-one percent of the HFAs responded that higher mortgage rates would be a benefit, but rates have fallen even lower, to 4.14% currently.

(Watch the related CreditMatters TV segment title, “Innovative Single-Family Home Financing And Stable Loan Performance Continue To Shape U.S. Housing Finance Agencies,” dated June 6, 2014.)

HFAs Respond With Various Ways Of Financing Loans

HFAs have adjusted to the new normal of low mortgage rates by financing loans without issuing bonds. Our survey, answered by 33 HFAs, shows that HFAs financed 89% of the dollar amount of loans ($8.1 billion total) that they did in 2008 ($9.2 billion total) despite issuing 61% fewer mortgage revenue bonds (MRBs) in 2013 than in 2008. So, while lower interest rates have hindered HFAs’ ability to meet their objective, the impact hasn’t been as great as one might expect. On the debt side, HFAs financed only $3.3 billion of loans with bonds in 2013 compared with $8.4 billion in 2008.

HFAs filled the gap with various financing techniques, primarily the sale of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) with backing from Ginnie Mae or Fannie Mae. HFAs originate the loans in an MBS sale, but instead of warehousing them for a bond program, they package the loans into MBS and sell them on the “to-be-announced” (TBA) market, which is not limited to tax-exempt investors and avoids the problem of issuing bonds with the possibility of declining mortgage rates before the loans are purchased. The sale price typically includes a premium from buyers looking for a security that provides moderate yield with high credit quality. TBA sales surpassed MRB financing in 2012 and remain the most prevalent form of loan origination, with $3.6 billion in 2013, up from just $214 million in 2008. In six years, MBS sales went from the least-used loan origination method to the most common, increasing by 1,695% in par amount. Other loan-origination techniques that have supplanted MRBs are sales of non-MBS loans, which rose to about $800 million in 2013 compared with $235 million in 2008, and direct purchase loan participations, which increased to more than $400 million in 2013 from $300 million in 2008 but have slipped to fourth position in 2013 compared with second place in 2008.

These trends are in step with the responses from our 2013 survey. Forty-four percent of HFAs reported that they had sold MBS on the TBA market by 2013, and 22% had sold whole loans. Another 16% said they were considering entering the TBA market, and 3% said they might begin to sell whole loans.

MBS sales, in particular, seem to have found a permanent position in HFA loan financing. Once considered a method of last resort, HFAs now see MBS sales as a desirable way to diversify their revenue. Since the sale price comes with a premium paid at purchase, the HFAs receive the benefit of the transaction immediately. This contrasts with bond programs, which provide a steady stream of revenue over many years.

Balance Sheets Have Shrunk, But Equity Has Grown

Alternate loan origination methods have enabled HFAs to recover most of their lost loan production, but because the loans do not remain with the HFAs, the amounts of the individual loans are becoming smaller. Excluding the New York City Housing Development Commission, which does not have a significant single-family program, the average HFA had $3.4 billion in assets and $2.5 billion in loans in 2008. By 2013, HFA assets had decreased to $3 billion and loans had fallen to $2.1 billion; at the same time, HFA equity has increased. The equity-to-asset ratio reached 20.42% in 2012, up significantly from 16.39% in 2008. With the increase in equity, HFA ratings have generally crept upward with 11 upgrades and five downgrades since 2008.

HFAs have proven to be resilient and innovative in addressing affordable housing needs despite an environment that many consider suboptimal for affordable housing lending. Perhaps loan production would be stronger with higher interest rates, but the persistently low rates have caused HFAs to use different methods to stay on course with their mission. The new lending strategies have had the unintended effect of improving HFA credit quality despite their reduced balance sheets. Since Standard and Poor’s projects that interest rates will average less than 5% through 2015, we believe that HFAs will continue to originate loans outside of MRBs. Should prepayments continue on existing loans, causing further redemption of debt, equity ratios will likely strengthen, further supporting a climate that has allowed for the recent positive rating actions on housing finance agencies.

Chart 1  |  Download Chart Data

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Chart 2  |  Download Chart Data

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Related Criteria And Research

Related Research

A Survey Of U.S. Housing Finance Agencies Finds Many Would Welcome Higher Interest Rates, Sept. 3, 2013

Primary Credit Analyst: Lawrence R Witte, CFA, San Francisco (1) 415-371-5037;
larry.witte@standardandpoors.com
Secondary Contact: Mikiyon W Alexander, New York (1) 212-438-2083;
mikiyon.alexander@standardandpoors.com



Market Shrinking: Bank Holdings Up, MMF Holdings Down.

WASHINGTON — The total amount of outstanding municipal securities and loans in the market dropped .28% to $3.66 trillion in the first quarter this year from the fourth quarter of last year, as bank holdings rose 1.43% and money market fund holdings plummeted 3.86%.

These are the highlights from the Federal Reserve Board’s Flow of Funds report for the first quarter of this year, which was released Thursday.

Outstanding munis in the first quarter of this year decreased to $3.66 trillion from $3.67 trillion at the end of last year and were down 1.9% over a 12 month period.

The decline in outstanding munis has been a trend since the end of 2010, said Michael Decker, managing director and co-head of municipal securities for the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association.

In the fourth quarter of 2008, outstanding munis peaked at about $3.77 trillion, but have dropped 2.9% through the first quarter of this year.

“The market is shrinking, even if a bit more slowly,” said Matt Fabian, a managing director at Municipal Market Advisors. “It makes it less comfortable for buyers because there is more competition.”

As for the reasons why, Decker said, “I think many issuers are still wrestling with a kind of anemic recovery and are fiscally not were they were before the financial crisis began. They’re de-leveraging,” reducing their amount of debt to shore up their finances.

While gross muni bond issuance was strong for part of the period since 2010, that was mostly due to refundings done to take advantage of low interest rates. But new money issuance hasn’t kept pace with redemptions and calls, Decker said.

Fabian agreed and said he has determined that 3.4% or about $105 billion of the current outstanding munis will mature before the end of the year and that new issuance won’t make up for that.

The drop in money market fund holdings and the increase in bank holdings also are trends.

Money market funds fell 3.86% to $296.4 billion in first quarter of this year from $308.3 billion at the end of last year and were down 5.15% from $312.5 billion in the first quarter of 2013.

Decker said there has been a 42% drop in money market fund muni holdings since the end of 2008 when they were $509.5 billion.

“That trend is likely to continue,” he said, adding, “It’s a trend directly related to the rise in bank holdings.”

“Many issuers have shifted at least part of their variable rate and short-term debt from public market products like variable rate demand notes to bank products like floating rate notes or loans with floating rate components,” he said.

VRDNs have liquidity features and can be put back to banks. During the financial crisis, liquidity banks’ ratings were downgraded, many below investment-grade, which caused investors to put bonds back to banks and that triggered penalty rates on the VRDNs for issuers. Also letters of credit and other liquidity products became hard to get and expensive.

While that situation has abated somewhat, issuers have found that issuing floating rate notes or taking floating rate loans from banks can be more cost-effective because they don’t to pay for remarketing agents or liquidity providers, Decker said.

Fabian added, “Low rates are wearing away many investors” from MMFs.

As money market fund muni holdings have plummeted, bank muni holdings have showed gains. Bank holdings rose 1.43% to $433.1 million in the first quarter of this year from $427.0 million at the end of last year. They have jumped 12.73% from $384.2 billion in the first quarter of 2013.

“This is also a very significant trend,” said Decker. “Banks have been getting involved in the municipal market in different ways.”

Not only are they providing fixed rate products to state and local governments, but Decker says he has heard anecdotally that some banks are buying fixed-rate muni bonds with maturities as far as 15 years out.

“It’s an attractive product for them,” he said. Munis have relatively low credit risk and general obligation bonds are particularly attractive under the capital requirements of bank regulators.

Also banks have faced fewer commercial lending opportunities during the recovery because the business sector has not be expanding and, as a result, banks have money to spend, he said.

But Fabian said the increase in bank holdings is the slowest since the first quarter of 2011. “They are not a limitless source of demand,” he said of banks.

BY LYNN HUME
JUN 5, 2014




MSRB to Unveil EMMA Price Discovery Tool.

WASHINGTON — The Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board plans to soon unveil a new price discovery tool on EMMA that will allow investors to compare the prices and yields of municipal securities that share the same characteristics.

The tool is designed to improve price transparency for retail investors and others in the municipal market, something regulators have called for.

In its Report on the Municipal Securities Market that was issued in July, 2012, the SEC recommended that the MSRB “promptly pursue enhancements to its EMMA website so that retail investors have better access to pricing and other municipal securities information.”

With the new tool, investors will be able to enter the nine-digit Cusip of any municipal security on the MSRB’s EMMA website and find other munis that have the same maturity dates, interest rates and other features.

Investors will be able to select up to five securities from those results and do a side-by-side comparison of prices and yields. They will also be able to graph up to five securities for a visual representation of trading trends that show the daily high and low prices over a period of time.

In addition, EMMA will show a graphical summary of the daily high and low price for every municipal security on EMMA, with a scatter plot of trade prices over time. The grid display of trade data for individual securities will provide a daily summary of trade prices, yields, principal amounts and other trade information.

These enhancements will be second set of EMMA changes the MSRB has announced this year.

In February, the board unveiled an updated look to the EMMA website, with a focus on improving ease of navigation for investors and other users.

A “pilot” feature was added to the site allowing users to search all state, city, county and other municipal securities issues in a particular site. This “issuer home page” is prominently presented via a map on the site’s landing page. A daily recap feature highlights the most actively-traded securities each day, and provides links to marketwide data.

The board has invited reporters to join a webinar scheduled for June 5 at 1:00 p.m. for a demonstration of the new price discovery tool.

BY LYNN HUME
JUN 3, 2014




Municipal Issuer Brief - June 2, 2014

Read the Brief.




Green Bonds Seen Tripling to $40 Billion on New Entrants.

With more than $16.6 billion issued worldwide this year, 2014 is on track to surpass $40 billion in green bonds as more companies issue the debt to finance clean energy projects, according to a report by Bloomberg New Energy Finance.

That’s only about 1 percent of the total $1.4 trillion U.S. corporate bond market, as asset-backed securities and self-labeled corporate bonds surge, the London-based research company said in a report yesterday.

Green bonds offer a simple method for investors to tap into fixed income markets and finance clean energy, including energy efficiency and sustainable business practices, and have already exceeded the $14 billion issued last year.

A coalition of banks, including Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase & Co., Credit Agricole SA (ACA) and others created a common set of criteria for green bonds in January to act as a catalyst for the development of the market.

By Ehren Goossens Jun 3, 2014

To contact the reporter on this story: Ehren Goossens in New York at egoossens1@bloomberg.net

To contact the editors responsible for this story: Reed Landberg at landberg@bloomberg.net Will Wade, Robin Saponar




The 7 Deadly Sins of Public Finance.

There’s no sure-fire way to get fiscal policy right. But there are a few simple ways to get it disastrously wrong.

This is part of the ongoing Finance 101 series that breaks down the basics of public finance for public officials.

The temptation of the quick fiscal fix has seduced just about every lawmaker at one time or another. Scraping pennies together to balance the budget? Perhaps skipping a contribution to the public employee pension plan is the best way to get through the year. Can’t afford to pay for building maintenance? Push some of it off into the following year’s liabilities. Governments have been using these and other money-shuffling tricks since balanced budgets and municipal financing were invented. But in the aftermath of the Great Recession, short-sighted gimmicks like these became more common as governments looked for any solution to combat dwindling revenues. Revenue is back up now in most places, but some of the fiscal trickery has hardened into common practice.

“If it happens for a year or two in a down economy, that’s understandable,” says Tom Kozlik, an analyst with the finance firm Janney Montgomery Scott. “In 2009 and 2010, you didn’t want that to be the time you raise taxes. But, as an analyst, if I’m looking at a situation where the same things are happening pre- and post-recession, then it’s a significant problem.”

What follows is Governing’s list of the most tempting financial schemes that can severely weaken a government’s fiscal future when practiced as a matter of course. Although the consequences aren’t necessarily lethal, those that make heavy use of these 7 Sins of Public Finance find that they only succeed in digging deeper financial holes.

1. Balancing the Budget with One-Time Fixes

States and many cities have a legal obligation to balance their budgets each year. But there are all sorts of tricky maneuvers that can place a government in technical compliance with that rule. Shifting payments into the next fiscal year, for example, can instantly take the problem off the current books. But it serves only to make the following year’s budgeting that much more difficult. Borrowing money for operating costs, another common tactic, may be even more dangerous. It adds to the public’s long-term debt without creating any related future public benefit.

Bad Choice
One of the most perilous quick fixes is the practice of taking costs out of one fund and transferring them to another. New York did that in 1992, when it balanced its general fund budget by taking the state’s historic canal system and moving it to the Thruway Authority. The canal system, which includes the Erie Canal, has traditionally been a financial albatross — it costs up to $90 million to run each year but generates only a few million dollars in revenue. The deficiencies are highlighted every time the Thruway raises its tolls, particularly during a stretch in the 2000s when it raised tolls four out of five years to cover the canal system. The problem is that New York never solved the real issue — the canals are simply draining a different fund. “You’re creating the illusion that things are in balance but you haven’t actually changed any of the financial facts,” says Peter Hutchinson, a state and local government consultant for Accenture. “In the case of the Thruway Authority, the issues with the Erie Canal didn’t go away.”

Better Choice
DeKalb County, Ga., was downgraded by rating agencies in 2012 after years of transferring money from one fund to bail out another in an effort to meet operating costs. The result was an overall deficit that never seemed to go away. Finally officials in DeKalb took a painful but responsible step. They raised taxes, cut expenses (including a reduction in staff) and added to cash reserves. The county also imposed new controls on fund transfers. By the 2014 fiscal year, DeKalb had stopped cash-flow borrowing and its credit outlook was raised to positive.

2. Ignoring the Long-Term Consequences of a Deal

Few governments have a long-term financial plan and even fewer have multiyear budgets. Many don’t even require a fiscal analysis of proposed legislation. That’s made it possible for some, facing immediate demands for wage increases, to buy off public employee constituencies by increasing retirement benefits at an unsustainable long-term cost. Other governments have been wooed by the prospect of privatizing assets as a way to get quick cash, a move that some have called the governmental version of an unwise payday loan.

Bad Choice
In 2008, Chicago accepted a one-time fee of a little more than $1 billion in exchange for giving up control of its 36,000 parking meters for 75 years. The public outcry started almost immediately as the new private owners pushed through a substantial increase in parking rates. A report by an inspector general brought in to assess the consequences estimated that the process used to award the deal cost the city $974 million, and that the amount charged to the private purchaser should have been much higher.

Better Choice
Chicago learned a lesson. Five years later, Mayor Rahm Emanuel, elected in 2011, halted a possible deal to privatize Chicago’s Midway International Airport. Citing the problems with the city’s parking deal, he insisted that an airport privatization arrangement share revenue with the city and demanded a Travelers’ Bill of Rights to cap parking costs and food prices. The demands were enough to scare off the potential investors, almost certainly a benefit to the city in the long run.

3. Taking on Too Much

One of the reasons privatizing assets has become alluring to governments is because many of them have been burned by taking on more public investments than they could handle. This frequently involves development projects funded by municipal bonds. If a project’s tax revenues don’t deliver, governments have to pay the difference to bondholders out of their general fund budgets — a promise that becomes an embarrassing burden for some that can ill afford the actual risk. “It’s a question of scale,” says Julie Beglin, vice president of Moody’s Investors Service local government team. “Is the scale affordable for the government if the project doesn’t go well?”

Bad Choice
In 1996, Hamilton County, Ohio, got voters to approve a sales tax increase to help pay for two new Cincinnati sports stadiums by offering them a property tax break. But the stadiums, which cost more than $1 billion, never generated the downtown business that local officials had hoped to see. As the county found the stadium debt financing eating up an increasing share of its budget, it repealed the property tax break, then raised taxes. It sold off a hospital and refinanced the stadium debt. But the annual stadium costs — $30 million in 2008 — keep rising. In 2014, the county is projected to put as much as $50 million toward its two stadiums.

Better Choice
By contrast, the development of a downtown sports arena in Washington, D.C., in the mid-1990s has been heralded as the starting point of a hugely successful revitalization of the center of that city. The arena was privately developed; the city provided the land and infrastructure in what was then a barren and oft-times dangerous part of town. Now the area is home to retail, restaurants and hotels that churn out millions in annual tax revenue. The city is attempting to apply the same concept today with a major league soccer stadium after local officials refused to take on the main responsibility for developing the project.

4. Misapplying a Temporary Windfall

This is the sin that many governments commit when it seems like the good times will never end. Every economic boom is followed by a bust, but elected officials are often tempted to spend money as if that weren’t true, using one-time surpluses in especially good years to cover recurring expenses that they will have to meet in the bad years. When the downturn comes, the money to meet these expenses isn’t there. “State and local officials get into this over and over again,” says Steve Dahl, a consultant for Deloitte. “They make very generous decisions at the top of a bull market run instead of recognizing where they are in the economic cycle.”

Bad Choice
In the early 2000s, California reacted to its booming economy by granting pay raises and increased benefits to public employees, including some benefits that were awarded retroactively. Thanks to that decision and to the stock market crash later in the decade, the state and its localities have seen their entitlement bills multiply. In the first 10 years of this century, the state’s pension contribution mushroomed from $611 million to $3.5 billion. Had pensions been left alone, today’s bills would not be nearly as high.

Better Choice
Meanwhile, in Southern California’s Riverside County, the Eastern Municipal Water District was using its skyrocketing revenues from connection fees during the boom to pay only for one-time expenses. It expanded wastewater treatment plants and water storage facilities, and improved its recycled water program. “So, when everything went bust, their expenses were very affordable as they hadn’t incurred debt,” notes Suzanne Finnegan, chief credit officer of Build America Mutual. “It’s ironic sometimes that when you really need the discipline is when things are going well.”

5. Shortchanging Pension Obligations

The most serious threat to some government pension plans has been a chronic unwillingness by lawmakers to contribute what is necessary to keep the plans fully funded. To be sure, many governments skipped or pared down payments into pension plans during the recession. But some places did that for years prior to the downturn and continue to do it today. The longer they delay, the larger the long-term liability becomes.

Bad Choice
Over the last decade, New Jersey’s public employee pension system has gone from a fully funded enterprise to a roughly $56 billion unfunded liability. The financial crisis certainly played a part. But the situation in New Jersey is worse than in most other places mainly because the state wasn’t making its full pension payments even before the crisis began. In 2011, lawmakers passed a new pension law that legally spared the state a portion of its annual payments into the fund. It also gave New Jersey seven years before it had to start making its full contributions. “In other words,” says Howard Cure, director of bond credit research at Evercore Wealth Management, “rather than continue to fully fund the pension, they used it as an excuse. Now they’re back to the same hole.” This year, in response to that hole, Gov. Chris Christie retroactively changed the pension funding formula to allow the state to contribute $94 million less in order to help balance the 2014 budget. Now, thanks to the formula change, the state is slated to put a total of $900 million less into the fund by the time it’s required to start making its full payments. The likely outcome is that the unfunded liability will continue to grow.

Better Choice
Lexington, Ky., had a similar problem with habitually shortchanging its pension plan. But in 2012, it put together a pension task force made up of city officials and public employee union representatives, guided by an outside financial consulting firm. The result was a new agreement that guarantees Lexington will increase its annual contribution to the pension fund to $20 million from $11 million. In return, employees agreed to an older retirement age and increased paycheck deductions.

6. Making Unrealistic Projections About Rate of Return

Every budget or financial planning document has to start with some assumptions about the rate of interest that will be earned on an invested portfolio. It’s tempting — too tempting sometimes — to stretch those assumptions beyond what sensible economics can justify. Some pension funds still base their total liabilities owed on an expected annual investment return of more than 8 percent, a figure that affects the formula used in figuring out how much governments should contribute each year. “That means they’re targeting a pension funding level that’s lower than what most people might consider prudent,” says Donald Fuerst, a senior pension fellow at the American Academy of Actuaries. Similarly, a budget that expects too much from a volatile revenue stream like the sales tax can be burned in any given year if the economy hits the skids.

Bad Choice
In 2012, Rockland County, N.Y., faced a $40 million budget deficit and was hit with a credit rating downgrade to one step above junk status. In its downgrade action, Standard & Poor’s cited the county’s “vulnerable” management practices based on overly optimistic budgeting. The following year, the county based one-fifth of its revenue returns on sales tax receipts — and expected a 4 percent increase in those returns when consumer spending growth had been far slower. The financial practices prompted the state to step in, demanding that county officials scale back their estimates and develop a realistic financial plan to escape Rockland’s deficit woes, which had mounted to $125 million by 2014.

Better Choice
Many states that assumed at least an 8 percent return on investment from their pension funds have since reduced their expectations. New York state’s public pension funds, for example, lowered their target return rate to 7.5 percent from 8 percent in 2010 (in addition to other changes in actuarial assumptions concerning career duration, salaries and life expectancy). This had the effect of increasing the unfunded liability (and thus, the state’s required contribution) but it was more in line with the fund’s financial realities. Starting this year, pension funds throughout the country will have to follow new accounting rules that include a lower assumed rate of return on their unfunded liabilities.

7. Ignoring Financial Checks and Balances

Don’t lose track of the money you have. It seems like the most obvious advice in the world. But in government finance and fund accounting, where there are many different ways to count the same revenue, weak financial controls can lead to serious dollar losses. Governments can lose track of how much money they actually owe one of their special funds. Or lax internal monitoring can result in poor financial choices not getting flagged until it’s far too late.

Bad Choice
Earlier this year, a legislative audit criticized Idaho Treasurer Ron Crane for acting on investments without the guidance of others. At issue were $31 million worth of mortgage-backed securities that Crane transferred from the Local Government Investment Pool to the state’s Idle Pool in order to protect the credit rating of the local pool. (Both pools are vehicles for storing government cash that isn’t needed immediately.) Later, Crane took $31 million in cash from the Idle Pool and put it back in the local one. The problem cited by the audit was that while the securities had a face value of $31 million, their market value was only $19 million as the move was made during the depths of the recession. The audit concluded that the treasurer’s office overrode internal controls meant to contain financial risks, resulting in inappropriate transfers that cost at least $10 million in “a disproportionate share of investment losses.”

Better Choice
A number of organizations have published best practice guides that help governments limit their vulnerability to financial reporting problems. The Government Finance Officers Association recommends that reporting systems incorporate an antifraud program and that financial managers periodically evaluate internal control procedures to ensure they are still working as envisioned. The Association of Local Government Auditors recommends that, at a minimum, governments have an ethics policy, established performance measures and an audit committee. State governments also cite best practices for their local governments to follow. Vermont, for example, has fact sheets available to localities offering advice on financial management of fixed assets, cash receipts and accounts receivable.

BY LIZ FARMER | JUNE 2014




Record Debt Shrinkage Means Growing Bill for U.S. Roads.

The U.S. municipal-bond market is performing a vanishing act.

While businesses and consumers are borrowing more as the economy revives and the Federal Reserve holds its benchmark interest rate near zero, America’s local governments are doing the opposite. States, cities and public agencies have reduced their debt load by $111 billion since 2010, the biggest decline peak to trough since records began in 1945, according to Fed data released yesterday.

The $3.66 trillion market is on pace to contract for an unprecedented fourth straight year. Localities recovering from the recession that ended five years ago are paying down debt instead of pumping money into aging roads and bridges. The scarcity of bonds has helped fuel the longest rally in munis since 1991.

“There is a retrenchment going on, and I think that’s going to continue,” said Tom Kozlik, director of municipal credit analysis at Philadelphia-based brokerage Janney Montgomery Scott LLC. “One of the last things that an issuer wants to do, if it doesn’t have to, is add fixed costs in terms of debt.”

Municipalities have sold about $106 billion of long-term, fixed-rated bonds this year, a 25 percent decline from the corresponding period of 2013, data compiled by Bloomberg show.

Surprising BlackRock

“The low absolute level of gross issuance has caught the market, including ourselves, a little by surprise,” said Sean Carney, a muni strategist at New York-based BlackRock Inc., which manages $108 billion of local debt.

Issuers from California, the most-populous state, have offered 47 percent fewer bonds this year. The nation’s most-indebted state has focused on spending money raised in previous sales instead of borrowing more, said Tom Dresslar, spokesman for Treasurer Bill Lockyer.

Another reason for the borrowing dip: The state has fewer bonds to refinance after a wave of such deals last year. California has refunded $800 million of debt in 2014, down 72 percent from a year earlier, according to Dresslar. Meanwhile, sales of bonds for new projects have dropped 24 percent.

“We have taken a somewhat more conservative approach for the last couple of years or so,” Dresslar said.

1991 Redux

Even as the menu of muni offerings has diminished, individuals have been chasing the rally in tax-free bonds. Investors added $2.9 billion to muni mutual funds in May, Chris Mauro, a strategist at RBC Capital Markets in New York, wrote in a June 4 research note.

Munis have gained each month this year, the first time that’s occurred since 1991, according to Bank of America Merrill Lynch indexes. The market has earned 6.2 percent in 2014, compared with 5.1 percent for corporate bonds.

The performance is more a sign of dropping supply than surging interest in tax-exempt securities, said Chris Mier, chief muni strategist at Loop Capital Markets in Chicago. The market is dominated by individual investors, who own more than half of local-government debt.

“It’s not that the demand is inordinately high, it’s just that the supply impact is stronger,” said Mier.

2010 Peak

The market began to shrink after the end of the Build America Bonds program, an economic-stimulus measure that began in 2009 and subsidized interest costs of debt that localities sold for infrastructure projects. Issuance under the program tallied $188 billion by the time it lapsed at the end of 2010. Municipal issuance that year totaled $408 billion, the most since at least 2002, Bloomberg data show.

Borrowing has also waned as a result of a political shift among officials forced to cut budgets when tax revenue faltered during the recession that ended in June 2009.

“It is understandable given the pull-forward that had taken place in past years, coupled with post-crisis management styles and general aversion to adding new debt,” BlackRock’s Carney said.

California Governor Jerry Brown, a Democrat, has pledged to chip away at debt used to pay for prior shortfalls, and has moved to save surplus tax money. In Florida, Republican Governor Rick Scott has boasted of cutting $3.6 billion of debt.

Mier, the Loop analyst, said the aversion to borrowing will ebb as municipalities’ finances recover. It wasn’t until a year ago that state tax collections recovered to their 2008 peak, adjusted for inflation, according to the Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government in Albany, New York.

Officials have a ready list of projects to tackle. Areas such as schools, roads, transit and water need about $3.6 trillion of investment by 2020, according to a report last year from the American Society of Civil Engineers.

“The political sentiment will move back in the other direction and you will see more debt issuance again,” Mier said.

By William Selway Jun 5, 2014

To contact the reporter on this story: William Selway in Washington at wselway@bloomberg.net

To contact the editors responsible for this story: Stephen Merelman at smerelman@bloomberg.net Mark Tannenbaum, Alan Goldstein




Fitch: Full-Spectrum Funding Needed for U.S. Water Projects.

Fitch Ratings-New York-02 June 2014: The recently passed Water Resources Reform and Development Act of 2014 (WRRDA) is an important step toward strengthening U.S. water infrastructure. Public sector and private sector participation are important to completing the $630 billion in water and sewer infrastructure needs projected over the long term. However, the ban on the use of tax-exempt bond proceeds for projects receiving Water Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (WIFIA) support will limit the reach of the program, Fitch Ratings says. Access to the full spectrum of funding options would improve project economics and could enlarge the number of projects under consideration within the WIFIA program.

WRRDA establishes a public-private partnership (PPP) that promotes private investment in much-needed water and wastewater infrastructure. WIFIA, modeled on the successful Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) program for surface transportation, provides low-cost loans capped at 49% of a project’s cost. However, TIFIA doesn’t exclude the use of tax-exempt financing.

PPPs provide a useful alternative to advance project delivery for public service needs. Tax-exempt financing enables PPPs to lower the marginal cost of project development. Allowing tax-exempt private activity bonds and other financing tools to be used with WIFIA support would maximize access to diverse funding sources for critical infrastructure development and invite worthy proposals that might not apply for WIFIA under the current prohibition.

For example, the San Diego County Water Authority recently began a desalination project that leans heavily on tax-exempt bond proceeds. The Carlsbad Desalination Plant improves the water authority’s source diversification and drought tolerance. Proceeds for the plant are funded by the California Pollution Control Financing Authority (CPCFA) through a nearly $800 million bond issue of plant and pipeline bonds. Fitch rated the CPCFA’s bond issue ‘BBB-‘ with a Stable Outlook. This important project would not be eligible for WIFIA support due to its use of a tax-exempt financing option.

Contact:

Yvette Dennis
Senior Director
Global Infrastructure and Project Finance Group
+1 212 908-0668
33 Whitehall Street
New York, NY

Cherian George
Managing Director
Global Infrastructure and Project Finance Group
+1 212 908-0519

Rob Rowan
Senior Director
Fitch Wire
+1 212 908-9159

Media Relations: Elizabeth Fogerty, New York, Tel: +1 (212) 908 0526, Email: elizabeth.fogerty@fitchratings.com.

The above article originally appeared as a post on the Fitch Wire credit market commentary page. The original article can be accessed at www.fitchratings.com. All opinions expressed are those of Fitch Ratings.

ALL FITCH CREDIT RATINGS ARE SUBJECT TO CERTAIN LIMITATIONS AND DISCLAIMERS. PLEASE READ THESE LIMITATIONS AND DISCLAIMERS BY FOLLOWING THIS LINK: HTTP://FITCHRATINGS.COM/UNDERSTANDINGCREDITRATINGS. IN ADDITION, RATING DEFINITIONS AND THE TERMS OF USE OF SUCH RATINGS ARE AVAILABLE ON THE AGENCY’S PUBLIC WEBSITE ‘WWW.FITCHRATINGS.COM’. PUBLISHED RATINGS, CRITERIA AND METHODOLOGIES ARE AVAILABLE FROM THIS SITE AT ALL TIMES. FITCH’S CODE OF CONDUCT, CONFIDENTIALITY, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, AFFILIATE FIREWALL, COMPLIANCE AND OTHER RELEVANT POLICIES AND PROCEDURES ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FROM THE ‘CODE OF CONDUCT’ SECTION OF THIS SITE. FITCH MAY HAVE PROVIDED ANOTHER PERMISSIBLE SERVICE TO THE RATED ENTITY OR ITS RELATED THIRD PARTIES. DETAILS OF THIS SERVICE FOR RATINGS FOR WHICH THE LEAD ANALYST IS BASED IN AN EU-REGISTERED ENTITY CAN BE FOUND ON THE ENTITY SUMMARY PAGE FOR THIS ISSUER ON THE FITCH WEBSITE.




Municipal-Bond Website Gets Makeover to Help Buyers.

Internet-Information Revamp Could Help Retail Investors Navigate the Muni-Bond Market

The Internet storehouse of free municipal-bond data and documents is getting a makeover, adding tools and information for retail investors in a market critiqued for years as opaque and unwieldy.

The website revamp could help retail investors navigate the $3.7 trillion municipal-bond market. Individuals own about 72% of the debt issued by cities, states and other municipalities, either directly or through mutual funds, according to the Securities and Exchange Commission. Many buy the bonds for tax-free income as a way to help fund their retirements. Individual ownership of municipal debt exceeds that of any other financial asset class except for the U.S. stock market, where trades are made mostly on exchanges and where prices are freely available and constantly updated.

One new tool coming this month to the Electronic Municipal Market Access site, known as EMMA, allows investors to compare the trade histories of bonds with similar characteristics, helping to establish comparable prices for securities that don’t change hands often. New features also let users graphically display what others are paying for a security on any given day.

“All of this is part of a long-range plan to bring greater transparency to the market,” said Daniel Heimowitz, chairman of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board.

In 2012, the MSRB released a plan for improving transparency in the municipal-bond market, which included additions to the EMMA site, which gets about 90,000 unique visitors a month. The site, launched in 2008, stores municipal issuers’ disclosures, documents, trade data and other information.

For the past few years, the SEC has been pressing for the muni-bond market to improve and make it easier for individual buyers to assess their investments.

SEC Commissioner Daniel M. Gallagher praised the EMMA site in a speech last week at the MSRB’s Municipal Securities Regulator Summit in Washington before adding that retail investors still need more help.

“Despite these advances in post-trade price transparency, retail investors continue to face headwinds in the bond markets,” Mr. Gallagher said, adding that “the opacity of the markets, especially given the lack of a centralized collection and continuous dissemination of bid/ask quotes—that is, pretrade price transparency—makes it difficult for retail investors to feel confident that they received the best execution.”

The site will help investors who want some basic information about a bond and what it should cost, said Ron Valinoti, operating manager of Municipal Bond Information Services LLC, a consortium of 11 companies formed to improve municipal-bond valuations and price monitoring. “The little guy doesn’t always know how the muni market works, and the website is set up to help them learn,” Mr. Valinoti said.

Users of the new price-discovery tool can enter the nine-digit alphanumeric code that identifies a given bond and search for securities with recent trades that share its characteristics, such as maturity date, the bond’s source of repayment and interest rate.

Lynnette Kelly, executive director of the MSRB, said those new functions will help widen the view into the market that the website already provides.

By AARON KURILOFF
June 2, 2014 5:50 p.m. ET

Write to Aaron Kuriloff at aaron.kuriloff@wsj.com




FT: USAA Sells First Meteor Strike ‘Cat Bonds’

USAA, the US insurer, has sold $130m of catastrophe bonds that allow investors to collect yields of 15 per cent or more by betting on the chances of a meteor strike or volcanic eruption.

The bonds are the first to cater to these two types of natural disasters, but investors nevertheless clamoured to buy the new debt. The size of the deal was increased from a planned $100m, underscoring strong appetite for insurance-linked catastrophe bonds, sales of which are on course to reach record levels this year.

The USAA cat bonds, known as Residential Reinsurance 2014 Ltd Series 2014-I, met “robust” demand from investors, according to people close to the sale.
In addition to providing coverage for a meteor strike and the standalone risk of a volcanic eruption – two firsts for the insurance-linked industry – the USAA bonds also cover so-called “unmodelled” risks of wildfires, severe thunderstorms and blizzards in US states where such disasters are not typically assessed.

“They [USAA] have a number of larger cat bond deals still in effect,” said Steve Evans, owner of Artemis.bm, which collects data on insurance-linked debt. “What they tend to do is use these smaller issues in order to test the market a little bit. Last year they issued some of the riskiest notes ever, this year they’ve chosen to test by including meteor and volcanic eruption risk.”

The USAA sale comes on the back of continued strong demand for cat bonds, which offer investors higher yields as well as returns that are uncorrelated to other types of securities.

Such bonds allow insurers to transfer some of the risk that they will have to pay out billions of dollars in the event of a major natural disaster. While the debt offers juicy returns, investors are at risk of losing their principal if catastrophes such as earthquakes or hurricanes do occur.

The amount of cat bonds and insurance-linked debt sold so far this year has reached $5.5bn, according to Artemis.bm, taking the amount of the debt sold over the past 12 months to a record $9.2bn.

“In recent cat bond deals the majority have priced at the mid or upper-end of pricing guidance, which shows investors have reached a place where they feel they can’t go down any more on pricing,” said Mr Evans.

USAA’s debt deal was divided into two classes of bonds. The size of the riskiest class of the bonds, where investors receive a coupon of 15 per cent in exchange for an expected loss rate of about 11 per cent, was increased from $50m to $80m.

A third of these riskier bonds went to hedge funds while another third went to cat bond funds that specialise in investing in insurance-linked debt, said people familiar with the deal.

Almost two thirds of the $50m second class of the bonds, with a coupon of 3.5 per cent for an expected loss rate of less than 1 per cent, were sold to pension funds and money managers.

USAA declined to comm­ent on the sale, which was run by Goldman Sachs and Swiss Re Capital Markets.

By Tracy Alloway in New York




Nervous About Borrowing, U.S. States and Cities Alter Municipal Bond Landscape.

(Reuters) – U.S. cities and states are leery of borrowing more money despite near-record low interest rates, forcing bond funds to scour for investments and boosting returns on existing debt.

The drought in issuance is also slowing city and state capital projects and threatens to disrupt the summer high season for bond buying.

So far this year, sales are running 25.4 percent below the same period in 2013, according to preliminary Thomson Reuters data. May’s issuance, $22.41 billion of bonds sold in 907 deals, was the lowest for the month in three years and the smallest since January, when only $18.17 billion in bonds came to market.

The paltry pace of issuance has investors competing to get a slice of new deals and in many cases forcing them to bid on lower-quality credits than they would like.

“Many of the new issues that are coming to market are eight to 10 times oversubscribed. So it’s difficult getting bonds,” said Burton Mulford, portfolio manager at Eagle Asset Management, which emphasizes high-grade debt.

Eagle has begun buying more single-A credits, the mid-to-low end of the investment-grade scale. Instead of focusing on deals of at least $75 million, it has been looking at some $35 million and $40 million deals, Mulford said.

Cities and states’ refinancing binge, which was fueled by low interest rates, ended in 2013 as rates rose and retail buyers avoided the municipal market, spooked by bad financial news from Detroit and Puerto Rico. Issuance started falling.

As 2014 dawned, many expected bond sales to drop further, given that governments’ financial managers are gun-shy about taking out debt after the budget crises resulting from the 2007-09 recession. Political leaders facing elections in November, too, may want to appear conservative about borrowing.

Last year’s 0.4 percent growth in municipal bond sales was the smallest in 20 years, and the trend is set to continue “because of the slow and uneven pace of revenue recovery,” according to Moody’s Investors Service.

Most states are not fully utilizing their borrowing capacity and are spending less on infrastructure, which is primarily financed by bonds, the National Association of State Budget Officers said in a report released on Thursday. The growth in debt for infrastructure in almost all states has been “very minor or flat” despite the era of low interest rates, the group found.

Spending austerity and political attitudes, along with lack of federal policy supporting infrastructure spending and higher interest rates, will keep the year’s total bond sales between $250 billion and $275 billion, Janney Capital Markets estimated. Last year’s sales totaled $311.8 billion.

“It’s helping drive prices up and yields down, but demand is pretty strong as well,” J.R. Rieger, head of fixed income at S&P Dow Jones Indices said of the supply shortage. “The muni market started the year relatively cheap compared to Treasuries and corporates… I think investors recognized it.”

The S&P Municipal Bond Index has had a year-to-date return of 6.09 percent. The high-yield index has returned 9.65 percent, more than double its counterpart for U.S. corporate junk bonds.

Yields started 2014 fairly high but have recently fallen. Those on top-rated 10-year bonds began 2014 at 2.79 percent and on highly rated 30-year debt at 4.20 percent on Municipal Market Data’s benchmark scale. By the end of last week, 10-year bonds were at 2.16 percent and 30-years at 3.26 percent.

Meanwhile, yields on A-rated, 10-year bonds were 2.77 percent and on A-rated, 30-year issues were 3.89 percent on Thursday, according to MMD, a Thomson Reuters company.

With $8.6 billion in deals expected to come to market this week, the supply shortage could ease during the summer. Still, investors might be caught scrambling to find places for the cash they receive from bond redemption and coupon payments during the summer “reinvestment season.”

Loop Capital Markets expects the amount of cash coming available in June, July and August to total $151.53 billion, down slightly from $160.74 billion last year.

Loop has revised its forecast for 2014 issuance to $275 billion from the $300 billion it estimated in December. But Loop Managing Director Christopher Mier said the combination of large amounts of cash with short bond supply may not have a predictable impact on the market.

“You can’t just assume this money is coming back, and there’s a particular reason you don’t want to make that assumption this year: there’s been a significant decline in yields and a significant outperformance,” he said. Mier added that investors may opt to buy equities instead.

BY LISA LAMBERT
WASHINGTON Mon Jun 2, 2014 7:04am EDT




Florida Benefits as Yield-Thirsty Investors Line Up for Hurricane Bonds.

In 2008, Florida’s government-run property insurer paid Warren Buffett $224 million to agree to buy its debt if a major storm struck. Six hurricane-free years later, the state is turning investors away.

With hurricane season set to start June 1, municipal securities sold by Florida’s taxpayer-owned property insurers are rallying, and the state boosted a catastrophe-bond sale last month by almost four times, to $1.5 billion.

Florida, typically the nation’s most hurricane-prone state, is benefiting from a thirst for yield as investors seek higher returns with municipal interest rates close to generational lows. The demand is bolstering state-run Citizens Property Insurance Corp. and the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund Finance Corp., which have record cash reserves.

“We haven’t had a hurricane make landfall in eight years,” said Jack Nicholson, who runs the catastrophe fund from Tallahassee. The taxpayer-owned entity provides backup coverage for insurance companies. “I’d rather be lucky than smart any day.”

The last hurricane to strike Florida was Wilma in 2005. If the streak ends this year, the fourth-most-populous state may need to sell bonds for recovery costs. Dwindling issuance in the $3.7 trillion municipal market and investors’ search for yield bodes well for the catastrophe fund, according to Bank of America Corp., JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Wells Fargo & Co.

Andrew’s Legacy

The banks, which underwrite the reinsurer’s bonds, estimated on average that the fund would be able to sell $8.3 billion of debt within a year to meet its obligations after a hurricane. That’s more than twice what the fund would need to borrow if it runs out of cash.

The catastrophe fund was created by the state in 1993, a year after Hurricane Andrew ravaged Miami. The fund, which has about $11 billion in cash, is obligated to pay out as much as $17 billion for this hurricane season.

In 2008, it had $3.6 billion in cash to cover $29 billion in potential liabilities. The U.S. was in the first year of the longest recession since the 1930s and Nicholson wasn’t sure if investors would be willing to finance the gap after a major storm.

Buffett Deal

Florida cut a deal with Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway Inc., paying the Omaha, Nebraska-based company in exchange for a guarantee that it would buy the state’s bonds if a storm caused more than $16 billion in losses.

Buffett, 83, whose $65.3 billion net worth makes him the world’s third-richest person, didn’t respond to a request for comment sent to an assistant.

The state of about 19.6 million people won’t need special deals to attract investors this year because of pent-up demand for higher-yields, said Michael Schroeder, chief investment officer at Naples, Florida-based Wasmer, Schroeder & Co.

If the catastrophe fund were to issue federally taxable 30- year bonds this year, they’d probably carry interest rates about 2.50 percentage points more than benchmark Treasuries, Bank of America estimated in a May 1 letter. Benchmark Treasuries maturing in 2044 yield about 3.3 percent.

The fund’s bonds, which are exempt from state taxes, are rated Aa3 by Moody’s Investors Service, fourth-highest.

Interest Abounds

“If they had to do a deal today, it would not be a problem,” said Schroeder, whose firm manages about $3.5 billion in munis, including Florida hurricane bonds. “You’d have a significant number of players that would be interested.”

Texas, North Carolina and Louisiana also have systems to provide insurance in high-risk areas. California offers state- run earthquake insurance.

Citizens Property, which offers Florida homeowners direct coverage, is also benefiting from investors’ willingness to take on hurricane-linked risk. The insurer increased the size of its catastrophe bond offering to a record $1.5 billion last month, after initially marketing $400 million, said Jennifer Montero, its chief financial officer in Tallahassee.

“We were oversubscribed,” she said. “There’s so much money that investors don’t know where to put it.”

The taxable three-year bonds priced to yield 7.5 percent, she said.

Risk Appetite

Catastrophe bonds offer higher returns in exchange for risking the loss of principal. If hurricanes or other disasters cause a specified amount of damage, insurers can use the principal to cover recovery expenses. Holders of the Florida bonds face a 1.7 percent chance of losing their entire principal, according to Citizens.

More buyers are willing to take that risk, said Caleb Wong, who helps oversee catastrophe bonds at New York-based OppenheimerFunds Inc., which manages $237 billion.

“The fact that there has been no sizable event in Florida recently, I think that has had some impact in drawing some investors,” he said.

The catastrophe bonds helped Citizens’ balance sheet, which also includes a record $7.6 billion in cash and proceeds of $1.5 billion in munis issued in 2012. Fitch Ratings gave the Citizens debt its fifth-highest grade, pointing in part to the cash stockpile. Citizens, which was created in 2002, is the state’s largest property insurer, with 940,000 policies.

“They’re at the point that they could deal with what they estimate to be a once-in-100-year storm without having to go to the market,” said Karen Krop, a Fitch analyst.

Bond Backing

The catastrophe fund and Citizens repay bonds by levying assessments on owners of homes and cars.

Citizens last sold tax-exempt municipal bonds in June 2012. The catastrophe fund last sold debt in April 2013, raising $2 billion.

Federally taxable bonds issued by the catastrophe fund that mature in July 2020 traded this week with an average yield of 2.66 percent, matching the lowest since their issue last year, data compiled by Bloomberg show. The yield was about 0.9 percentage point above Treasuries, down from about 1.8 percentage points at issue.

Both the fund and Citizens have amassed record cash reserves during the eight-year span without hurricanes. Combined, they have more than $18.5 billion available to pay claims.

1992 Reminder

That may not be enough, as a direct hit to a population center like Miami could cause more than $80 billion of damage, according to state estimates. Andrew in 1992 caused more than $45 billion of damage in the Miami area, adjusting for 2010 prices, National Weather Service records show.

Three to six hurricanes will probably form in the Atlantic this year, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration predicted May 22. One or two may qualify as major, with winds of 111 miles (179 kilometers) per hour or more. The Atlantic season runs through November.

Florida’s streak of seasons with no hurricanes is a record, according to data from the National Hurricane Center. From 1851 to 2004, 273 hurricanes struck the U.S. mainland, according to the center. Florida was hit more often than any other state, with 110 hurricanes making landfall.

The unpredictability of hurricanes can be a draw, as weather isn’t correlated with financial risks such as recessions, said Schroeder. And with municipal issuance dwindling, buyers may pounce on bonds issued to pay for a destructive hurricane.

Schroeder doesn’t count himself among investors eager for that opportunity, he said from his office along the west coast of Florida.

“It would do a lot of damage,” he said.

By Toluse Olorunnipa | May 30, 2014

–With assistance from Noah Buhayar in New York.




Muni Market Starved for Bonds Gets Most Supply in Three Months.

Localities in the $3.7 trillion municipal market are planning the largest wave of debt sales in almost three months, bucking a trend of diminished borrowing that’s pushed yields to the lowest since June.

States and cities have set $8.6 billion of bond sales over the next 30 days, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. That’s 35 percent above this year’s average, and close to the highest since March, when Puerto Rico issued $3.5 billion of general obligations in the largest muni deal of 2014.

At 2.26 percent, benchmark 10-year muni yields are sinking as demand for tax-exempt securities outpaces the slowest period for bond sales since 2011. Investors have added $2.9 billion to muni mutual funds in the past four weeks, the most in 16 months, Lipper US Fund Flows data show. A wave of maturing and refinanced debt in coming months is poised to add to demand.

“We’re coming into the reinvestment season and there seems to be cash on the sidelines,” said Ken Kollar, a trader with Arbor Research & Trading Inc. in New York. “Supply will be easily absorbed.”

Next week, Phoenix, the Miami-Dade County Expressway Authority, the Chicago Park District and Portland, Oregon, join issuers offering $5.9 billion in debt, compared with almost $5 billion in this holiday-shortened week. Miami-Dade will borrow to upgrade highways and Portland’s debt will help finance a bridge.

Phoenix and the Chicago Park District are refinancing debt. Muni bondholders are set to receive $92 billion from maturing and refunded bonds in the three months through August, Citigroup Inc. estimates. That may exceed issuance by $20 billion.

By Elizabeth Campbell and Brian Chappatta

To contact the reporters on this story: Elizabeth Campbell in New York at ecampbell14@bloomberg.net; Brian Chappatta in New York at bchappatta1@bloomberg.net

To contact the editors responsible for this story: Stephen Merelman at smerelman@bloomberg.net Mark Tannenbaum, Alan Goldstein




Moody's: State Debt Survey Shows New Debt Issuance Falls to Lowest Level in 20 Years.

New York, May 22, 2014 — The rate of growth in the outstanding debt issued by the US states in 2013 slowed for a fourth consecutive year and was also the slowest growth in debt for the last 20 years, says Moody’s Investors Service in “2014 State Debt Medians: Appetite for Borrowing Remains Weak.” Moody’s expects state debt levels to continue to show only modest growth in 2014.

“The continued slowdown in the growth of net tax-supported debt primarily reflects a new conservative attitude toward debt among the states,” says Kimberly Lyons, a Moody’s Assistant Vice President and Analyst. “Growing spending pressures coupled with inconsistent revenue growth and uncertainty over future revenue trends have forced states to take a cautious approach when considering the addition of new debt service costs to their budgets.”

The combined 2013 total net-tax support debt (NTSD) for all 50 states increased to $518 billion from $516 billion in 2012, according to Moody’s. Approximately half of all states saw a decline in their NTSD, including some historically large debt issuers such as California.

Total NTSD growth slowed to 0.4%, slightly less than the 1.4% growth rate in 2012. The modest growth rate is well below the 10-year average of 6% growth and considerably lower than the high growth rates of some recent years such as the 9% rate in 2009 and 17% rate in 2004.

The lower borrowing also led to a decline in the median leverage ratios for the states, with NTSD per capita declining to $1,054 from $1,074 in 2012. Additionally, NTSD as a percentage of personal income declined to 2.6% from 2.8%, and NTSD as a percentage of gross state product also fell to 2.4% from 2.5%.

Debt service costs increased by 8% in 2013, up from the 3% increase in 2012. Growth in debt service costs reflects a return to normal debt service schedules after years of artificially low debt service, a result of higher than normal debt refunding for savings in a low interest rate environment, says Moody’s.

Moody’s also found very low levels in variable rate demand debt and privately placed bank loans among states. Variable rate demand debt comprises just $21.6 billion of outstanding state debt (4% of total) and private bank loans just $3.5 billion (0.01%). Moody’s said its review of the private agreements finds similar credit terms to those contained in bank-supported financings for state borrowers in the public market.

Moody’s 2014 state debt medians are based on the rating agency’s analysis of calendar year 2013 debt issuance and fiscal year 2013 debt service. For more information, Moody’s research subscribers can access the report at

https://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBM_PBM170895.

Global Credit Research – 22 May 2014

***

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US Muni Treasurers Warn LCR Could Crimp Spending.

Municipal bonds are not highly liquid. To some, that’s stating the obvious, but if US regulators write it into their version of Basel III’s liquidity coverage ratio, state and city treasurers say their financing costs will rise.

It may seem unlikely, but if the residents of Cary in North Carolina notice public verges becoming unkempt, or pilots using Boston’s Logan International Airport start seeing potholes, there could be a single cause – a rule drawn up in Switzerland and implemented by the US Federal Reserve Board.

This rule is the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR). If last October’s Fed draft version is introduced unchanged, bonds issued by US states, cities and towns will not count towards the new liquidity buffers that banks are required to hold. This will reduce the value of the bonds and demand for them will drop, the argument goes. With banks currently holding around 10% of the stock of municipal debt, issuers fear they will have no choice but to pay higher coupons.

“As a muni issuer, we are concerned that if our bonds are not included it will reduce the market for them, increasing the interest we will have to pay, and increasing costs to our citizens and rate payers,” says Town of Cary’s finance director, Karen Mills. “We have service levels in Cary, such as how often we should sweep the streets or mow the medians, and it is a balancing act. If we have higher interest rates then we can’t spend as much on other things.”

We have service levels in Cary – such as how often we should sweep the streets or mow the medians – and it is a balancing act

The LCR is supposed to ensure banks can survive a short-term liquidity squeeze. It forces institutions to hold enough high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) to cover their liabilities over a 30-day period of stress. For an individual bank, the ratio is calculated as its total HQLA divided by the estimated net cash outflows – based on the run-off rates set by regulators. The Fed has proposed banks will need to have an LCR of 80% by the start of 2015, rising by an additional 10% each year until the minimum becomes 100% in 2017.

HQLAs are split into three categories, as in the international version of the LCR, finalised by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in January 2013 (Risk February 2013). Level 1 assets, such as US Treasury debt and other government agency debt that is unconditionally guaranteed by the US government, can be held without limit and not receive a haircut. Level 2a assets, including debt issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, receive a 15% haircut. Level 2b assets, which include investment-grade corporate bonds and stocks in the S&P 500 index, get a 50% haircut (Risk July 2011). Taken together, Level 2 assets can be no more than 40% of the buffer, with 2b assets alone capped at 15% of the total.

“The proposed rule likely would not permit covered bonds and securities issued by public sector entities, such as a state, local authority or other government subdivision below the level of a sovereign (including US states and municipalities), to qualify as HQLA at this time,” the rules say. The Fed argues municipal bonds are not “liquid and readily marketable”, citing low daily trading volumes as one justification.

Critics would like to see more of the Fed’s reasoning. “There was not much in the proposed rule that justified throwing out municipal bonds from the definition of HQLA. There were maybe two sentences and we were hoping they would show more careful consideration,” says Susan Collet, vice-president of government relations at Bond Dealers of America, a trade association representing bond brokers.

So, what was the Fed looking for? In short, assets that can be liquidated quickly in large volumes with little impact on prices. The rules say HQLAs must have a high potential to generate liquidity through sale or secured borrowing in a stressed environment. They also “exhibit low risk and limited price volatility, are traded in high-volume, deep markets with transparent pricing, and are eligible to be pledged at a central bank”, according to the draft US rules. Defenders of municipal bonds argue the market satisfies much of this. On one point there is no debate: research by Citi points out that all US municipal bonds are accepted as collateral by the Fed at a 2–5% haircut, depending on maturity – the same applies to US agency securities. By comparison, the Fed accepts US AAA corporate bonds at a 3–6% haircut and all other investment-grade corporate bonds at 5–8%.

The other points are debatable. On the subject of price volatility, Citi’s research claims that in 2008/2009, only Freddie Mac mortgage loans were subject to less depreciation – about 0.4% – over a 30-day period than AA-rated municipal obligations. This is because the sector, by and large, has robust ratings, its supporters say.

“Our rating has been pretty steady. We had one blip during 9/11, but other than that it has been AA-credit quality, even through the crisis,” says John Pranckevicius, chief financial officer at the Massachusetts Port Authority (Massport).

For the sector as a whole, research from Moody’s Investors Service shows the average rating for investment-grade munis between 1970 and 2012 was AA3. The average rating for investment-grade corporates was roughly Baa1. Municipalities that commented on the proposed LCR tended to be highly rated (see box, Corporates fear jump in commercial paper costs).

“The history of default is so vastly less than on the corporate side,” says George Friedlander, a municipal bond strategist at Citi and author of the bank’s recent research on this issue. “During a financial crisis credit spreads widen out. Sectors with a history of default widen out more. That is a measure of liquidity – it is what spreads try to reflect. On that basis, the fact so many muni credits are vastly higher in average rating and lower in average default experience makes a case for them to be included as a stronger sector.”

The two other main HQLA criteria are trading volume and depth of market. “As a purchaser, we manage a $400 million portfolio, and we try to purchase other North Carolina municipal bonds and have a hard time finding them,” says Town of Cary’s Mills.

This might suggest the secondary market for municipal bonds is illiquid, trading infrequently, and the head of one small private investment firm, says that was certainly the case following the collapse of Lehman Brothes in 2008, when investors had to sell at a discount to exit their positions.

But according to data from the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (Sifma), which is quoted in numerous municipalities’ comment letters to the Fed, 0.27% of the municipal market’s outstanding par value is turned over every day on average, which is the same as federal agency debt and higher than the 0.19% seen for corporate bonds.

“I think there are US credits in the muni market that are high quality and have high liquidity, and have as much liquidity as some of the other assets the Federal Reserve says it would be acceptable to be holding,” says Richard Ellis, state treasurer for Utah and chairman of the National Association of State Treasurers.

The argument matters because banks are becoming increasingly important as investors. As of September 2013, they held $413 billion of municipal securities and loans, according to the Fed’s flow of funds report – a year-on-year increase of 15.7% and a jump of more than 60% since the end of 2010. In total, roughly 11% of the market is held by banks.

“We have a lot of bonds outstanding, so a lot of folks have them, from big banks to regional players. All we are saying is if we’re not included as HQLAs, then possibly – we don’t know for sure – they could choose different assets to our bonds,” says a debt manager at another small municipality in North Carolina.

Some banks are already threatening to pull back, say state treasurers. Utah’s Ellis says he has spoken to financial advisers at Salt Lake City-headquartered Zions Bank who raised the possibility that the institution may have to cut its holdings. According to the bank’s most recent annual filing, it holds $558 million in held-to-maturity municipal securities with a further $66 million in the available-for-sale category. “Zions has a lot of local debt, with much of it coming from small issuers – some with only a hundred thousand dollars outstanding – and now the bank is asking, ‘What do we do? We have to unload these.’ These are issuers without good market access, so their borrowing costs would be significantly higher,” says Ellis. “Until now, the bank has bought some of these less-liquid bonds into its portfolio because they are assets it is happy to hold and it is supporting the local economy. Now there’s a disincentive for the bank to do that.”

One of those financial advisers is Jon Bronson, managing director at Zions Bank Public Finance, who confirms that if municipal bonds are not HQLAs then the bank will have less reason to hold them. This could affect other local investors, he adds. Bronson helps the bank to sell municipal bonds into the portfolios of several local community banks and sits on the board of one. “Every bank’s response will be different,” he says. “I’m on the board of a bank that buys munis in the secondary market and knowing the Basel III rules are coming – and those assets are currently not deemed HQLA – that little bank’s appetite for munis will probably change.”

There are other impacts too. Municipal debt can no longer be used to offset the potential cash outflows from municipal deposits, and Town of Cary’s Mills says North Carolina-headquartered BB&T declined to bid when the town was renewing a certificate of deposit.

One capital markets vice-president at a large regional bank confirms the new rules are having an impact: “On the periphery, yes, it certainly could have an impact. As far as our firm’s outlook goes, they have asked us to step back.”

State treasurers and municipal issuers worry where this will end up – if banks pull back, the market for municipal debt will shrink, increasing their financing costs. “If interest rates are higher, we will have less capital to maintain assets,” says Massport’s Pranckevicius

Massport maintains runways, terminals, parking garages, hangars, piers and cranes, he adds, and those facilities employ more than 20,000 people.

“We create jobs through our capital programme. With higher interest rates, our costs would be higher, resulting in less dollars around to do the work that needs to get done on our capital assets. It becomes a spiral. You don’t repair assets because costs have increased, so your assets deteriorate. If you could put money to work, and people to work, it would create jobs, and that has a spillover effect into the construction industry. That’s our concern,” he says

Some are less sympathetic, saying municipal issuers are confused about what the LCR is supposed to do. One regulatory specialist at a North American bank points to the default of Detroit last year, and other municipalities shortly before. The municipal market has also been historically reliant on monoline insurance to guarantee its bonds – an issue at the centre of a court battle involving Detroit’s outstanding swaps contracts – suggesting investors are not assured of their credit on its own terms (Risk September 2013).

“The LCR is not about yield or community reinvestment, or getting money to worthy borrowers. It is supposed to be about keeping cash in reserve, or other marketable securities that are high quality and liquid,” he says.

Treasurers reject any comparison to Detroit. “We have a triple-A bond rating from all agencies. To compare us to Detroit is a non-comparison,” says the second North Carolina municipality’s debt manager. In addition, those hoping to change the existing definition are not expecting the blanket inclusion of municipal debt as a Level 1 asset, says Citi’s Friedlander: “The proportion of muni assets that are below-investment grade is very small but no-one is asking that they are included.”

While the fight goes on, municipalities say they are not reflecting the rule’s potential impact in their funding forecasts. Instead, they are hoping amendments will make it into the final version of the LCR, which is expected within weeks.

“These bonds need to be included at Level 2a. Level 2b is already overcrowded with other assets and the restrictions are too tight. But there is a reasonable chance of getting that outcome,” says Friedlander. “The case for this is excellent. I am encouraged because it is so strong.”

Author: Joe Rennison
Source: Risk magazine | 28 May 2014




WSJ: Mom and Pop Investors Return to Municipal Bonds.

Muni Debt Prices Storm Back After Last Year’s Rout

Municipal-bond prices have come roaring back, reversing last year’s rout despite enduring financial challenges facing U.S. cities and states.

The resurgence in the $3.7 trillion market comes as bond buyers attempt to find higher investment returns amid a tumble in U.S. interest rates.

Long coveted by mom-and-pop investors for their tax benefits and relative stability, municipal bonds – debt sold by cities, states and local government-related entities – are benefiting from a broad bond-market rally and a decline in new debt being issued by municipalities that are still trying to tighten their belts.

The municipal-bond market posted its worst year in 2013 in almost two decades, registering losses in the wake of Detroit’s record municipal bankruptcy-protection filing, concerns over hefty pension costs in Illinois and economic worries in Puerto Rico.

Investors have poured $3.1 billion into municipal-bond mutual funds this year, compared with $2.96 billion over the same period in 2013, according to data from Lipper as of Wednesday. The gains mark a shift after investors pulled $39.9 billion from the funds in the last 31 weeks of 2013, the data show.

Yields on municipal debt fell to 2.325% on Wednesday, according to Barclays PLC, their lowest in almost a year. Yields fall when prices rise.

The gains have made the debt a star performer for investors this year, in a twist few predicted. Municipal bonds have returned 5.869% in 2014, reflecting interest payments and price appreciation. That compares with total returns of 5.769% on highly rated corporate bonds, 3.3% for the S&P 500 and 2.982% on U.S. Treasury debt, according to Barclays data.

“I don’t think the need for tax-exempt income ever went away, and there appears to be pent-up demand,” said John Miller, co-head of fixed income at Nuveen Asset Management LLC, which oversees about $90 billion in municipal bonds.

Cities and states aren’t borrowing enough to meet the demand from investors, said Vikram Rai, a fixed-income strategist at Citigroup Inc., which forecasts issuance will fall to $280 billion this year, from $334 billion in 2013. “The primary market supply is very anemic and that’s really driving down yields,” he said.

Many municipal bonds are still considered nearly as safe as Treasurys, because they are backed by the taxing authority of various governments. Their prices typically move in tandem with the U.S. government-debt market, and this year, Treasury bond prices have staged a surprising rally.

The riskiest municipal bonds are rallying the most, though many brokers and investment advisers still are steering retirees and other individual investors away from junk-rated municipal bonds, as their clients are looking for stable income and savings.

These buyers generally “are looking for the safety that muni bonds have and shy away from those municipalities that have lower credit ratings or are in trouble,” said Benjamin Chuckrow, a senior vice president with Wells Fargo Advisors in Saratoga Springs, N.Y.

He warns clients interested in municipal debt that there are two types of risks to consider: whether the issuer is in good financial health and what may happen to the bond’s value between now and when it matures. If interest rates rise before the bond matures, investors who want to sell beforehand could get lower prices.

To be sure, some state and local governments are struggling to mend their finances amid anemic U.S. economic growth. Many have cut their budgets and plugged pension gaps.

Puerto Rico is attempting to recover after its debt was downgraded to junk in February, but the bonds’ prices have risen since the U.S. territory sold $3.5 billion of debt in March. One Puerto Rico general obligation bond traded at 71.5 cents to the dollar this week, up from 63.75 in December. The S&P Municipal Bond Puerto Rico Index has returned 10.6% this year through Wednesday.

In comparison, high-yield municipal bonds have returned 9.33% this year, Barclays said.

Illinois, which has struggled to address its underfunded pension, in February sold $1 billion in general obligation bonds, paying less to borrow than the state did eight months earlier. The new deal came as lawmakers reached an agreement that would close the pension gap by about $100 billion.

“State and local governments were in a severe squeeze following the housing downturn and the deep recession,” said Dean Maki, chief U.S. economist at Barclays. “Now, that is stabilizing.”

Rising federal tax rates also have brought investors back to tax-exempt municipal debt, said George Rusnak, managing director of global fixed income at Wells Fargo Private Bank. “You’re seeing individuals have stronger demand for tax-free income,” he said.

By AARON KURILOFF
Updated May 29, 2014 8:12 p.m. ET




Clean Energy Bond Finance Model: Qualified 501(c)(3) Bonds.

The Clean Energy + Bond Finance Initiative created this recommended financing model factsheet for clean energy development. The Qualified 501(c)(3) model achieves low-cost capital for renewable energy installations at nonprofit facilities.




Groups: 501(c)(3) Bonds a Useful Tool for Financing Clean Energy Projects.

WASHINGTON – Qualified 501(c)(3) bonds are a financing tool that can be used to increase nonprofits’ clean-energy infrastructure and reduce their energy expenditures, the Clean Energy and Bond Finance Initiative said in a recently released paper.

The initiative, known as CE+BFI, was formed by the Council of Development Finance Agencies and the Clean Energy Group.

Qualified 501(c)(3) bonds can finance energy-efficiency or renewable-energy installations for nonprofit facilities. They are issued by state and local government entities, and their proceeds are loaned to nonprofit borrowers. The bonds are repaid by revenues of the nonprofits, and in some cases some of the debt service can be paid from the money the nonprofits save on their utility bills as a result of the clean-energy improvements, according to the paper.

At a webinar Thursday, Jason Rittenberg, CDFA director of research and advisory services, said that his group felt it was important to discuss 501(c)(3) bonds because a lot of the types of clean-energy projects that have been done by state and local governments through bond financing can similarly be done by nonprofits through 501(c)(3) bond financings. He noted there are fewer restrictions for 501(c)(3) bonds than other types of private-activity bonds, and data recently provided to Congress shows that most PABs are 501(c)(3) bonds.

“The flexibility and established investment reputation of this financing tool will encourage the spread of retrofits, installation of renewable energy infrastructure, reduce energy expenditures among donation-dependent nonprofits, and contribute to state and nonprofit clean energy goals,” CE+BFI said in the paper.

Nonprofits who have used 501(c)(3) bonds to finance clean-energy projects include Loyola University in Chicago, which used the bonds to finance facilities with energy saving features and Elmhurst College in Illinois, which used bonds to finance a student housing facility that achieved Leadership in Energy & Environment Design silver certification and a green surface parking lot. World Wildlife Fund also used the bonds to finance construction of its ‘green headquarters’ in Washington D.C.

One benefit to using these bonds for clean-energy projects is that they make marginal projects financially feasible, since bonds offer borrowers low interest rates over long periods of time. Another benefit is that investors are already familiar with 501(c)(3) bonds, so there would be a market for bonds of good quality. And 501(c)(3) bonds are repaid by revenues of the borrower, rather than by public funds as is the case with general obligation bonds, the paper pointed out.

“Bond financing can allow an organization to complete an eligible project sooner, at a larger scale, and with more favorable terms than would be feasible through capital fundraising efforts or other financing tools,” CE+BFI said. “Financing large projects through 501(c)(3) bonds also frees up cash flow in the short term to serve other purposes, providing the borrower greater flexibility in financing its operations.”

There are many potential projects that could be financed with 501(c)(3) bonds, because nonprofit facilities are common across the county and both new and older buildings could benefit from improvements that reduce monthly energy expenditures. Additionally, a single issuance could finance improvements for multiple facilities or nonprofit organizations.

“Whether combining multiple improvements to a single, large facility or pooling retrofit projects among several nonprofit owned facilities, 501(c)(3) bonds can scale clean energy investments to a considerable degree,” CE+BFI said.

The paper notes there are some limitations to using this type of financing. One limitation is that qualified 501(c)(3) bonds offer little cost benefit to smaller projects as a result of the administrative costs of structuring transactions, according to the paper.

Also, nonprofits have to demonstrate that they will be able to use future revenue to pay debt service, the paper said. Private, detailed assessments would need to be conducted to make sure the projects would produce enough cost savings to support repaying the bonds.

Further research should be done to determine whether energy cost savings equal to or greater than monthly debt service would serve as an acceptable credit enhancement, and what the potential is for issuers to collaborate to finance large-scale projects across a wide geographical area, CE+BFI said.

by Naomi Jagoda MAY 29, 2014 4:08pm ET




GASB Proposes Major Improvements for Reporting Health Insurance and Other Retiree Benefits.

The GASB recently voted unanimously to approve two Exposure Drafts proposing significant improvements to financial reporting by state and local governments of other postemployment benefits (OPEB), such as retiree health insurance. The GASB also approved a third Exposure Draft that would establish requirements for pensions and pension plans that are outside the scope of the pension standards the GASB released in 2012.

The most significant effect of the OPEB Exposure Drafts would be to require governments to recognize their net OPEB liabilities on the face of their financial statements – providing all financial statement users with a more comprehensive understanding of these significant OPEB promises than is currently available.

The Exposure Drafts, including instructions on how to submit written comments, are each expected to be available in mid-June on the GASB website.

May 29, 2014

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China Still Has Work To Do On The Municipal Bond Market.

China has just taken another step down the long road to a domestic municipal bond market. On May 19, 2014, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) expanded a trial that allows selected local and regional governments (LRGs) to tap the bond market. Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services views this as an important step toward establishing a transparent LRG bond market. Such a market is vital to reducing the risks to China’s sovereign creditworthiness stemming from local governments’ use of off-balance-sheet debt. But a municipal bond market similar to those in developed economies and containing the risks of local government financing will need many more important changes, in our view. These include changes to the legal framework and greater restrictions on LRG off-balance-sheet borrowing.

A New Year, Another Municipal Bond Trial

The MOF’s latest move granted increased debt-issuing responsibilities to more LRGs than it did in 2013. In addition to organizing the process of bond issuance, the selected LRGs also take on the responsibility of making interest and principal payments to bondholders. The 2014 trial is extended to the Beijing municipality, Jiangxi province, Ningxia province, and Qingdao City. The LRGs of the six regions included in both the 2013 and 2014 trials are Shanghai municipality, Zhejiang province, Guangdong province, Shenzhen City, Jiangsu province, and Shandong province.

The latest LRG bond trial shows increased emphasis on transparency. A new requirement in the 2014 trial is the need for greater disclosure. The MOF requires the LRGs involved in the trial to publish news relevant to the bond issues–including the government debt situation as well as economic and fiscal developments–on a timely basis. The announcement on the trial also warned against inaccurate or misleading submissions as well as material omissions of information; this could be a reflection of the public’s doubt on the reliability of LRG data.

Still No Full Freedom To Borrow

Despite the latest change, the selected LRGs are still some way from having full freedom to sell bonds. The central government continues to control the LRG bond issuance process in a few ways. Most importantly, the amount of bonds LRGs are allowed to issue are subject to annual quotas assigned by the State Council (the Chinese cabinet). The LRGs are also only allowed to issue fixed-rate bonds with maturities of five, seven, and 10 years in the proportion 4:3:3.

Some investors could inevitably read the significant influence of the central government over this process as implying sovereign support for the LRG bonds. Bonds issued by local governments in the past few years were priced close to central government bonds. Secondary market activities also show LRG bonds trading at lower yields than the highest rated nongovernment bonds. The effort to develop the Chinese municipal bond market can only be considered a success if investors price debts of different LRGs according to their individual credit characteristics rather than the perception that the bonds have central government support.

More Changes Needed To Further Develop Municipal Bond Market

Getting investors to price bonds based on the LRGs’ differentiated credit metrics isn’t easy. Not least because it is difficult for the central government to absolve responsibility if an LRG defaults on its debt in a unitary state. A default by an LRG could also hurt confidence across the sector and affect the financing of other LRGs. Therefore investors will expect the central government to come to the rescue if an LRG comes close to defaulting.

Also, from the experience of other more developed bond markets, our view is new indirect restrictions to ensure fiscal stability may have to be in place before removing direct controls such as annual bond issuance quotas. Otherwise, there is the risk of a sudden uncontrolled growth in LRG debt. Measures to achieve this in other countries include public finance laws or rules that limit annual net bond issuances to a proportion of capital spending and prescribed ceilings on total LRG debt levels. These measures are effective if the government regularly publishes regional economic and fiscal indicators that are generally regarded as reasonably accurate. Changes to laws or rules governing government public finance may have to happen before the municipal bond market in China develops further.

Even a well-developed municipal bond market does not ensure fiscal stability. This objective is likely to be the main impetus for the MOF’s efforts but it requires off-balance-sheet LRG borrowing to be insignificant. Otherwise, allowing LRGs significantly more freedom to sell bonds will simply add to their borrowing capacity. Consequently, it is also likely that the municipal bond market development will not move far ahead unless the MOF is able to reduce LRGs’ access to off-balance-sheet financing.

Under Standard & Poor’s policies, only a Rating Committee can determine a Credit Rating Action (including a Credit Rating change, affirmation or withdrawal, Rating Outlook change, or CreditWatch action). This commentary and its subject matter have not been the subject of Rating Committee action and should not be interpreted as a change to, or affirmation of, a Credit Rating or Rating Outlook.

Primary Credit Analysts: KimEng Tan, Singapore (65) 6239-6350;
kimeng.tan@standardandpoors.com
Liang Zhong, Hong Kong (852) 2533-3573;
liang.zhong@standardandpoors.com

 




S&P: U.S. Not-for-Profit Health Care Sectors 2013 Pension Plan Medians: Time To Exhale?

The U.S. not-for-profit health care sector finally saw an improvement in the funded status of its pension plans in 2013 due to higher discount rates and stronger asset values. The increase is good news for an industry grappling with credit stress brought on by health care reform and other factors. A higher funded status should mean lower statutory minimum contributions to defined-benefit (DB) pension plans over time, although perhaps not immediately.

Read the full report.




S&P: U.S. Infrastructure Funding: How Insurance Companies and the Private Sector Could Bridge the Gap.

The U.S. infrastructure spending gap stands at a whopping $200 billion per year. Traditional funding sources, such as state and local governments, are no longer in a position to help. But Standard & Poor’s believes insurance company pension funds and private sector investment could spur significant funding capacity. In this CreditMatters TV segment, Senior Managing Director Jay Dhru discusses the possibilities.

Watch the video.




High-Yield Issuers Should Seize the Moment.

Investors’ ravenous demand for high-yield municipal bonds has created an optimal environment for lower-rated issuers, analysts say.

High-yield fund flows totaled $408.1 million for the week ending May 22, and have remained positive for all but one week this year, according to Lipper FMI data. High-yield funds reported outflows 69.2% of the time in 2013.

“It’s a good time for high-yield issuers, BBB category all the way down to nonrated,” Adam Buchanan, vice president of institutional sales and trading at Ziegler Capital Markets, said in an interview. “Due to this market environment, we’re telling issuers bring transactions to market.”

Investor’s desire for high-yield bonds increased this year because of the limited amount of deals coming to market. Volume as of April 30 totaled $89.34 billion, compared to $122.72 billion for the same period in 2013, according to The Bond Buyer’s and Ipreo’s data.

The lack of supply has allowed underwriters to price the few bonds that do come to market at relatively low yields.

“Issuers should look at this market and say yields are being driven lower by demand,” Jim Colby, chief municipal strategist at Van Eck Global, said in an interview. “There is an appetite for high-yield it’s a good time to bring deals to market.”

He said that Van Eck is proof of investors’ appetite for high-yield to a certain extent, since it’s attracted flows into its high-yield fund.

Buchanan also pointed to this year’s tightening credit spreads as another example for why it’s an ideal time to bring high-yield issuances to market.

“There has been a lot of chatter about recent yield transactions and how much their spreads have tighten[ed],” Buchanan said. “Higher-rated yield sector borrowers’ spreads have also come in, for example spreads on AA rated healthcare bonds have tightened 20-30 basis points since December of last year.”

Credit spreads between the Municipal Market Data’s benchmark AAA 10-year GO and its 10-year Baa GO has tightened by 29 basis points to 122 basis points from Jan. 2, 2013, to market close on Friday.

“The spread tightening in yield is from a supply and demand imbalance,” Buchanan said. “High-yield supply is down 50%-plus year-over-year, while the overall market supply is down 30%. Additionally, tax-exempt fund inflows are being driven by high yield funds. The supply/demand imbalance is geared towards the high yield sector and it’s creating an excellent environment for yield sector borrowers.”

Despite these favorable market conditions, analysts are not seeing a large or varied amount of high-yield issuers come to market.

“High-yield is now the domain of many Puerto Rico, many securitized tobacco, and many airports,” Colby said. “It’s a real opportunity for other types of issuers.”

Colby said investors want to see as many different types of investors as are able to come to market.

“I think if you’re building a portfolio and the mantra is diversification,” Colby said. “If you’re not forgetting you need to hedge your bet in some intelligent manner, you want [different high-yield] in your portfolio. What you want is broad diversification and in this kind of an asset class where you really need to pay attention to credit, a broad diversification of issuers is something to be desired.”

Michael Schroeder, president and chief investment officer at Wasmer, Schroeder & Co., said in an interview that this is an environment more high-yield issuers should take advantage of.

“A lot of BBB hospitals have not been issuing much in the high-yield department, and we are not seeing that they will be anytime soon,” he said. “Maybe that will change. It is a good time for issuers to be borrowing, people want high-yield.”

Colby said that in addition to hospitals, charter schools and transportation issuers should be borrowing more.

For the buyside there are credit dangers associated with high-yield bonds, analysts warn. High-yield issuers often have low ratings and therefore a greater chance of defaulting than issuers with investment-grade ratings.

Buchanan acknowledged that while high-yield credit conditions have improved, it is still the risk sector of the marketplace.

“Its credit by credit when you get to the high-yield sector, there are certainly well positioned good nonrated credits out there though, there’s no doubt about that,” he said.

Both Buchanan and Colby said that much of the risk associated with high-yield bonds can be avoided if investors do a credit analysis.

“The dangers are always there if you don’t do your credit work, you don’t do your homework,” Colby said. “[Many investors] just react to the apparent opportunity, which is a yield comparison. But investors, whether they are individual or ETF investors have to make sure your deals are properly protective of bondholder rights, and assert the responsibility of issuer to follow through on their commitments.”

Schroeder noted the inherent risks in high-yield sector, and said investors should be careful, especially in the current rich market.

Buchanan does not see anything that will change market conditions to make them less appealing for high-yield issuers in the immediate future.

“There continue to be dovish comments from [Federal Reserve chair Janet Yellen] and uneven economic data, which has given a bid to treasuries,” he said. “Couple that with low supply and fund flows, this is a unique combination.”

The Federal Open Markets Committee Meeting minutes released on Wednesday re-affirmed the Federal Reserve’s stance that it will not look to raise interest rates until housing data and the inflation rate are stronger.

He does acknowledge though that headline risk could disrupt the high-yield rally, and described it as the “one thing” market participants have to watch.

By HILLARY FLYNN
MAY 27, 2014




Groups Want Congress to Overturn Ban on Use of Bonds with WIFIA Program.

DALLAS – Water groups and state and local officials are already urging members of Congress to amend a new federal loan program for infrastructure projects to allow tax-exempt bonds to be used in conjunction with the financial assistance.

The Water Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act, included in the Water Resources Reform and Development Act Congress passed that President Obama is expected to sign this week, provides $350 million of low-cost loans and credit enhancement for ports, inland waterways, and water supply and treatment infrastructure projects in a five-year pilot program.

The bill limits WIFIA’s contribution to no more than 49% of a project’s cost and caps the overall federal share at 80%. Proceeds from tax-exempt municipal and private activity bonds cannot be used, directly or indirectly, for a project receiving WIFIA support.

Proponents of the WIFIA program hail it as an important new finance tool for funding large projects, while opponents say the prohibition of tax-free debt is a fundamental flaw that will lead to increased privatization of public infrastructure.

Conversations have begun with lawmakers on Capitol Hill in an attempt to amend the water bill in the remainder of this session of Congress or in 2015, said Tommy Holmes, legislative director at the American Water Works Association.

“We’ve already starting talking to Congress,” Holmes said. “We’d like to get that 49% cap raised and be able to use tax-exempt bonds as part of the financing.

“It’s going to be very difficult to get that bill amended this quickly, but it is not impossible,” Holmes said. “If we can’t, we’ll take it up again when the new Congress comes in next year.”

The ban on tax-exempt bond financing was part of the WIFIA proposal in the original Senate bill, and was included by the conference committee that reconciled the differences between Senate and House water bills that passed in 2013, Holmes said. The House bill did not contain any WIFIA program.

“It was a budget decision,” he said. “They wanted to avoid a hit on the U.S. Treasury from reduced revenue due additional tax-exempt debt.”

The National League of Cities, also said it was concerned about the ban on using tax-exempt bonds in conjunction with WIFIA assistance. “We vow to continue to work with Congress to improve this important provision in order to maximize its effectiveness for communities, NLC executive director Clarence Anthony said in a release.

The water bill, H.R. 3080, was approved by large margins in both chambers of Congress last week. The new WIFIA program is a significant breakthrough in confronting the water infrastructure, said David LaFrance, chief executive officer at AWWA. A 2012 report from association put the price tag for maintaining and expanding drinking water systems at $1 trillion over the next 25 years, with a similar amount for waste water systems.

“WIFIA will reduce the financing costs of critical infrastructure projects, allowing communities to fix and expand water systems at a lower cost to their customers,” LaFrance said.

However, the 49% limit and the ban on tax-exempt financing are mistakes that lawmakers should correct, LaFrance said.

“WIFIA will be most effective when communities can fund 100% of project costs, and any non-WIFIA share should be allowed to be financed with tax-exempt debt,” LaFrance said.

Saving just two percentage points on a 30-year loan can result in a savings of 25% of total borrowing costs, LaFrance said, which on a large project can amount to millions of dollars that would otherwise be absorbed through customer bills over many years.

Many utilities and communities won’t be able to take advantage of the low-interest WIFIA loans because of the ban on tax-exempt bonds as a funding method, said Diane VanDeHei, executive director of the Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies.

Utilities will have to issue taxable debt that carry higher interest rates than could be achieved with conventional government bonds or attract private investments to complete WIFIA projects, she said.

“The tax-exempt financing restriction was not conceived as a matter of policy, but was necessary to achieve a clean budget score,” VanDeHei said. “AMWA is confident that lawmakers who have consistently supported WIFIA will continue working with us to do so in the months ahead.”

The ban on tax-exempt debt for WIFIA projects is a “raw deal” and “a wolf in sheep’s clothing” for municipal water systems, said Wenonah Hauter, executive director of Food & Water Watch.

“WIFIA is anything but innovative,” she said.

“WIFIA will give low-interest loans primarily to private water corporations, compete with the state revolving funds for federal resources, and place inappropriate pressure on local governments to privatize their drinking water and wastewater systems,” Hauter said.

Water utilities have financed $1.7 trillion of water infrastructure needs over the last decade with tax-exempt bonds, she said.

“Cities and towns will not be able to use tax-exempt bonds to cover the portion of an infrastructure project that WIFIA doesn’t fund,” Hauter said. “This effectively makes WIFIA useless for most municipalities.”

Strengthening federal support of state water revolving loan programs would be more effective than the enacted WIFIA legislation, she said.

Federal funding for local water and sewer systems has dropped 80%, adjusted for inflation, since 1980, Hauter said. The Environmental Protection Agency has estimated that $384 billion is needed over 20 years to maintain deteriorating water systems, she said, but federal assistance over the last 16 years totals only $15 billion.

The ban on tax-exempt bonds for WIFIA opens the door to more public-private partnerships in water projects and more privatization of water suppliers, said Erin Diaz of watchdog group Corporate Accountability International.

“The privatization of water systems around the globe has often resulted in devastating results for the economy and people




Looming Public Pension Crisis Is Bigger Than It Appears.

Summary

  • Public pension plans are vastly underfunded and imperil state and local budgets over the long-term.
  • High credit ratings and optimistic actuarial assumptions mask the full extent of the looming crises.
  • Low yields on long-term municipal bonds reflect hunger for yield and obliviousness to underlying risks.

With 30-Year muni bonds yielding a paltry 3.39% on average (according toBloomberg), investors seem to be assuming both that inflation will remain historically low over that holding period and public pension costs will not imperil state and municipal budgets. In fact, the average muni yield of 3.39% was equivalent to the 30-year treasury yield as of 5/23/2014 despite the fact that the federal government has powerful options available to it to avert default (i.e. seigniorage). Even when factoring in munis’ favorable tax treatment, the effective 30-year muni-Treasury spread is small.

Famed investor Warren Buffett weighed in on public pensions in his 2013 shareholder letter:

“Local and state financial problems are accelerating, in large part because public entities promised pensions they couldn’t afford. Citizens and public officials typically under-appreciated the gigantic financial tapeworm that was born when promises were made that conflicted with a willingness to fund them….During the next decade, you will read a lot of news – bad news – about public pension plans.”

While there has been some public discussion about the looming public pension crisis, most of the conversation has been driven either by special interest groups that sought to deny pensioners the benefits they were promised or public sector unions advocating for their members. The reports produced by the state plans, themselves, use an accounting gimmick (overestimating future investment returns) to understate the amount of the unfunded liability. Using data from data.gov and the Boston College Center for Retirement Research, I estimate that there was at least a $1.1+ TRILLION cumulative unfunded liability in state and local plans, for which data is available, as of the 2010 plan year end (usually June 30, 2010). That represents more than half the entire aggregate annual budgets of all fifty US states. Detailed aggregate, state-by-state, and plan-by-plan data is presented at the bottom of the article.

Surprisingly, aggregate 2012 state-level data shows that most states underperformed all of the relevant benchmark indexes for their plan year periods. 2002-2010 plan-level data shows that not a single plan (out of the 120 analyzed) attained its assumed rate of return over that 9 year period; most were short by a large margin. All but one of the plans showed a funding shortfall as of year-end 2010, using my methodology (that does not give funds credit for returns assumptions that have proven to be wildly optimistic), and, in aggregate, plans had only about two-thirds of the assets required to be fully funded.

At a high level, the implication for muni-bond holders is clear. Many of the states with very high levels of unfunded liabilities sport high credit ratings. While most of the state plans’ actuarial reports assume a 7.5%-8% future rate of return on investments, the 2012 data shows that most pension plans underperformed both the Barclays US Aggregate Bond Index and major stock indexes over the 2012 fiscal year (July 2011 – June 2012)–and posted nowhere near their assumed rates of return. Estimating the individual plans’ annual rate of return between the 2001 fiscal year end and the 2010 fiscal year end (the most recent time period for which the BC data is available for many of the plans) shows that not a single plan (out of 120 for which data was available) achieved its assumed rate of annual return over that period; most underperformed by a considerable margin. While higher market returns in 2011-2013 may have closed some of that gap, the extent to which anticipated returns were overestimated for the 9 year period analyzed is very large.

Individual investors tend to have exposure to municipal bonds by either owning the bonds directly or through a mutual fund. In addition, there are a number of uninsured long-term or high yield muni-bond ETFs:

SPDR Nuveen Barclays Capital Muni Bond (TFI)

Market Vectors AMT-Free Long Municipal Index ETF (MLN)

SPDR Nuveen S&P High Yield Municipal Bond ETF (HYMB)

Market Vectors High-Yield Municipal Bond Index ETF (HYD)

However, taking a bearish position on the muni market is a challenging exercise. Long term puts do not seem to be available for any of the above-listed ETFs. While there is a Markit muni CDS (credit-default-swap) index (MCDX), it does not currently present a trading opportunity for most individual investors. Normal short positions (i.e. in the above-listed ETFs) are inherently risky, because of the unlimited downside exposure, and are not really suitable for most individual investors.

Analysis

The 2012 plan year, for most states, runs from July 2011 – June 2012. Over that period, stock and bond indexes posted returns from 3.14% to 7.48%:

Rate of Benchmark returns for June 2011 – June 2012

Closing Price

30-Jun-11

Closing Price

30-Jun-12

% Change

Source

NASDAQ

2,773.52

2,935.05

5.82%

Yahoo Finance

S&P500

1,320.64

1,362.16

3.14%

Google Finance

Dow Jones

12,414.34

12,880.09

3.75%

Google Finance

Barclays US Aggregate Bond Index

7.48%

Barclays

* Barclays index calculated as product of monthly reported (1+RoR) rates of return over the holding period

Surprisingly, most of the state pensions underperformed every single one of these indexes and Arkansas, Hawaii, and New Jersey even posted negative returns for the 2012 plan year. Below is the estimated (approximate) 2012 fiscal year annual return for the aggregate of each state’s (non-local) plans (as reported by Data.gov), calculated as the value of the investment returns divided by the ending plan balance less the net outflows for the year less the posted returns–and contrasted with the benchmark indexes. The number of plans that underperformed every single one of the indexes is staggering.

Est Rate of

Indexes

State

Return in 2012

Exceeded

Alabama

18.04%

4*

Alaska

1.11%

0

Arizona

1.23%

0

Arkansas

-0.42%

0

California

3.26%

1

Colorado

2.15%

0

Connecticut

3.52%

1

Delaware

4.72%

2

Florida

5.00%

2

Georgia

1.97%

0

Hawaii

-0.18%

0

Idaho

1.55%

0

Illinois

0.83%

0

Indiana

1.02%

0

Iowa

3.48%

1

Kansas

0.96%

0

Kentucky

1.43%

0

Louisiana

0.02%

0

Maine

0.72%

0

Maryland

0.92%

0

Massachusetts

-0.26%

0

Michigan

12.18%

4*

Minnesota

3.09%

0

Mississippi

0.51%

0

Missouri

3.41%

1

Montana

16.35%

4

Nebraska

1.04%

0

Nevada

3.14%

0

New Hampshire

2.29%

0

New Jersey

-1.34%

0

New Mexico

0.35%

0

New York

4.61%

2

North Carolina

7.61%

4

North Dakota

9.13%

4

Ohio

1.30%

0

Oklahoma

1.37%

0

Oregon

1.22%

0

Pennsylvania

2.86%

0

Rhode Island

1.72%

0

South Carolina

0.68%

0

South Dakota

1.81%

0

Tennessee

5.34%

2

Texas

8.11%

4*

Utah

2.65%

0

Vermont

19.53%

4

Virginia

1.76%

0

Washington

1.70%

0

West Virginia

1.61%

0

Wisconsin

1.04%

0

Wyoming

-0.70%

0

* Indicates plan has fiscal year that differs from that used to calculate the index

The Boston College data set has annual data points for 126 individual state and local pension plans between 2010 and 2011. However, there are many missing data points for 2011 and a number of artifacts/outliers that appear to be problematic. Removing those from the data set yields 2001-2002 through 2009-2010 performance data for 120 plans. Analyzing this data (estimating the annual rate of return in year X as the investment return for year X divided by the ending market value of investments in year X-1), alongside each plan’s assumed rate of return demonstrates that, over that time period, every single one of the plans dramatically overestimated their annual rate of return over the time period in question.

Recent Estimated Returns

Estimated Gross %

Estimated rate of

2010 Annual

Relative to Returns Assumption

Return (2002-2010)

return (2002-2010)

Returns Assumption

Alabama ERS

-3.58%

-0.40%

8.00%

Alabama Teachers

0.13%

0.01%

8.00%

Alaska PERS

-9.55%

-1.11%

8.00%

Alaska Teachers

-5.49%

-0.63%

8.00%

Arizona Public Safety Personnel

-3.67%

-0.42%

8.25%

Arizona SRS

12.05%

1.27%

8.00%

Arkansas PERS

11.11%

1.18%

8.00%

Arkansas Teachers

25.98%

2.60%

8.00%

California PERF

15.57%

1.62%

7.75%

California Teachers

7.45%

0.80%

7.75%

Chicago Teachers

9.64%

1.03%

8.00%

City of Austin ERS

41.27%

3.91%

7.75%

Colorado Municipal

39.85%

3.80%

8.00%

Colorado School

31.68%

3.10%

8.00%

Colorado State

28.22%

2.80%

8.00%

Connecticut SERS

-10.58%

-1.23%

8.25%

Connecticut Teachers

45.74%

4.27%

8.50%

Contra Costa County

28.42%

2.82%

7.75%

DC Police & Fire

21.56%

2.19%

7.00%

DC Teachers

22.07%

2.24%

7.00%

Delaware State Employees

18.48%

1.90%

7.50%

Denver Employees

27.03%

2.69%

8.00%

Denver Schools

31.36%

3.08%

8.00%

Duluth Teachers

-6.36%

-0.73%

8.50%

Fairfax County Schools

19.17%

1.97%

7.50%

Florida RS

11.33%

1.20%

7.75%

Georgia ERS

9.56%

1.02%

7.50%

Georgia Teachers

4.57%

0.50%

7.50%

Hawaii ERS

10.39%

1.10%

8.00%

Houston Firefighters

39.48%

3.77%

8.50%

Idaho PERS

19.07%

1.96%

7.25%

Illinois Municipal

46.38%

4.32%

7.50%

Illinois SERS

5.32%

0.58%

7.75%

Illinois Teachers

16.47%

1.71%

8.50%

Illinois Universities

20.43%

2.09%

7.75%

Indiana PERF

40.51%

3.85%

7.00%

Indiana Teachers

7.97%

0.86%

7.00%

Iowa PERS

23.84%

2.40%

7.50%

Kansas PERS

17.36%

1.79%

8.00%

Kentucky County

9.22%

0.98%

7.75%

Kentucky ERS

10.71%

1.14%

7.75%

Kentucky Teachers

-1.35%

-0.15%

8.00%

LA County ERS

-13.83%

-1.64%

5.00%

Louisiana SERS

20.42%

2.09%

8.25%

Louisiana Teachers

8.22%

0.88%

8.25%

Maine Local

39.03%

3.73%

7.25%

Maine State and Teacher

22.25%

2.26%

7.25%

Maryland PERS

14.08%

1.47%

7.75%

Maryland Teachers

14.89%

1.55%

7.75%

Michigan Municipal

43.92%

4.13%

8.00%

Michigan Public Schools

40.87%

3.88%

8.00%

Minneapolis ERF

19.58%

2.01%

6.00%

Minnesota PERF

-16.47%

-1.98%

8.50%

Minnesota State Employees

42.14%

3.98%

8.50%

Minnesota Teachers

-4.94%

-0.56%

8.50%

Mississippi PERS

3.47%

0.38%

8.00%

Missouri DOT and Highway Patrol

31.10%

3.05%

8.00%

Missouri Local

25.22%

2.53%

7.25%

Missouri PEERS

13.35%

1.40%

8.00%

Missouri State Employees

43.95%

4.13%

8.50%

Missouri Teachers

13.03%

1.37%

8.00%

Montana PERS

-3.96%

-0.45%

7.75%

Montana Teachers

-5.37%

-0.61%

7.75%

Nebraska Schools

16.74%

1.73%

8.00%

Nevada Regular Employees

7.13%

0.77%

8.00%

New Hampshire Retirement System

8.43%

0.90%

7.75%

New Jersey PERS

6.49%

0.70%

8.25%

New Jersey Police & Fire

6.87%

0.74%

8.25%

New Jersey Teachers

6.10%

0.66%

8.25%

New Mexico PERF

5.55%

0.60%

7.75%

New Mexico Teachers

14.77%

1.54%

7.75%

New York City ERS

4.76%

0.52%

8.00%

New York City Teachers

4.50%

0.49%

8.00%

New York State Teachers

10.69%

1.14%

8.00%

North Carolina Local Government

57.96%

5.21%

7.25%

North Carolina Teachers and State Employees

55.07%

5.00%

7.25%

North Dakota PERS

16.95%

1.76%

8.00%

North Dakota Teachers

9.97%

1.06%

8.00%

NY State & Local ERS

23.87%

2.41%

8.00%

NY State & Local Police & Fire

23.98%

2.42%

8.00%

Ohio PERS

26.43%

2.64%

8.00%

Ohio Police & Fire

30.85%

3.03%

8.25%

Ohio School Employees

7.59%

0.82%

8.00%

Ohio Teachers

12.21%

1.29%

8.00%

Oklahoma PERS

18.53%

1.91%

7.50%

Oklahoma Teachers

20.88%

2.13%

8.00%

Oregon PERS

27.69%

2.75%

8.00%

Pennsylvania School Employees

18.23%

1.88%

7.75%

Pennsylvania State ERS

57.45%

5.17%

8.00%

Phoenix ERS

5.95%

0.64%

8.00%

Rhode Island ERS

14.12%

1.48%

7.50%

Rhode Island Municipal

14.14%

1.48%

7.50%

San Diego County

32.88%

3.21%

8.00%

San Francisco City & County

20.41%

2.09%

7.66%

South Carolina Police

4.50%

0.49%

8.00%

South Carolina RS

6.63%

0.72%

8.00%

South Dakota PERS

19.90%

2.04%

7.75%

St. Louis School Employees

34.37%

3.34%

8.00%

St. Paul Teachers

37.72%

3.62%

8.50%

Texas County & District

44.55%

4.18%

8.00%

Texas ERS

8.49%

0.91%

8.00%

Texas LECOS

8.39%

0.90%

8.00%

Texas Municipal

21.60%

2.20%

7.00%

Texas Teachers

18.69%

1.92%

8.00%

University of California

2.86%

0.31%

7.50%

Utah Noncontributory

37.43%

3.60%

7.75%

Vermont State Employees

19.09%

1.96%

6.25%

Vermont Teachers

20.55%

2.10%

6.25%

Virginia Retirement System

24.73%

2.49%

7.00%

Washington LEOFF Plan 1

23.80%

2.40%

8.00%

Washington LEOFF Plan 2

25.03%

2.51%

8.00%

Washington PERS 1

23.17%

2.34%

8.00%

Washington PERS 2/3

24.28%

2.44%

8.00%

Washington School Employees Plan 2/3

24.07%

2.43%

8.00%

Washington Teachers Plan 1

23.33%

2.36%

8.00%

Washington Teachers Plan 2/3

24.19%

2.44%

8.00%

West Virginia PERS

37.88%

3.63%

7.50%

West Virginia Teachers

39.35%

3.76%

7.50%

Wisconsin Retirement System

48.69%

4.51%

7.20%

Wyoming Public Employees

23.12%

2.34%

8.00%

* Excludes MA (outlier w/-80%- returns in 2009)

* Excludes TN (missing actuarial data from 2010)

* Excludes plans with missing data

Michigan SERS

Nevada Police Officer and Firefighter

Note that the plans calculate their unfunded liabilities assuming the above (high) rate of returns on their investments and an actuarial methodology called asset smoothing. As a result, they are almost universally arguing that $1 of assets in their plan today actually offsets more than $1 of NPV worth of plan liabilities. To calculate my estimate of their unfunded liabilities, I assume that $1 of assets at their period end market value offsets $1 of NPV of liabilities (no asset smoothing). Below is a plan by plan account of the estimated unfunded liabilities according to my calculations versus each plan’s.

Actuarial vs. Market Value of Assets

Actuarial Assets

Market Value of

Actuarial Liabilities

Liabilities Less

% Shortfall

Market Value of Assets vs. Liabilities

2010 ($1000s)

Assets 2010 ($1000s)

2010 ($1000s)

Assets (at Market)

Alabama ERS

$ 9,739,331

$ 8,176,732

$ 14,284,119

$ 6,107,387

42.76%

Alabama Teachers

$ 20,132,779

$ 17,037,673

$ 28,299,523

$ 11,261,850

39.80%

Alaska PERS

$ 6,469,832

$ 5,391,527

$ 10,371,672

$ 4,980,145

48.02%

Alaska Teachers

$ 3,259,868

$ 2,716,557

$ 6,006,981

$ 3,290,424

54.78%

Arizona Public Safety Personnel

$ 5,591,304

$ 4,585,863

$ 8,255,185

$ 3,669,322

44.45%

Arizona SRS

$ 27,572,000

$ 22,146,960

$ 36,073,000

$ 13,926,040

38.61%

Arkansas PERS

$ 5,409,000

$ 4,728,500

$ 7,304,000

$ 2,575,500

35.26%

Arkansas Teachers

$ 10,845,000

$ 9,883,574

$ 14,702,000

$ 4,818,426

32.77%

California PERF

$ 257,070,000

$ 201,616,074

$ 308,343,000

$ 106,726,926

34.61%

California Teachers

$ 140,291,000

$ 129,768,107

$ 196,315,000

$ 66,546,893

33.90%

Chicago Teachers

$ 10,917,417

$ 8,947,470

$ 16,319,744

$ 7,372,273

45.17%

City of Austin ERS

$ 1,711,600

$ 1,711,577

$ 2,460,700

$ 749,123

30.44%

Colorado Municipal

$ 2,926,045

$ 2,883,504

$ 4,005,566

$ 1,122,062

28.01%

Colorado School

$ 20,321,736

$ 19,870,277

$ 31,339,754

$ 11,469,477

36.60%

Colorado State

$ 12,791,946

$ 12,487,105

$ 20,356,176

$ 7,869,071

38.66%

Connecticut SERS

$ 9,349,605

$ 7,791,337

$ 21,054,197

$ 13,262,860

62.99%

Connecticut Teachers

$ 14,430,200

$ 12,284,330

$ 23,495,900

$ 11,211,570

47.72%

Contra Costa County

$ 5,341,822

$ 5,027,157

$ 6,654,037

$ 1,626,880

24.45%

DC Police & Fire

$ 5,137,409

$ 2,925,742

$ 5,137,409

$ 2,211,667

43.05%

DC Teachers

$ 1,671,184

$ 1,317,470

$ 1,671,184

$ 353,714

21.17%

Delaware State Employees

$ 6,808,957

$ 5,909,159

$ 7,096,326

$ 1,187,167

16.73%

Denver Employees

$ 1,942,870

$ 1,725,680

$ 2,284,760

$ 559,080

24.47%

Denver Schools

$ 2,961,720

$ 2,940,926

$ 3,332,814

$ 391,888

11.76%

Duluth Teachers

$ 255,309

$ 192,403

$ 312,650

$ 120,247

38.46%

Fairfax County Schools

$ 1,822,603

$ 1,607,663

$ 2,384,061

$ 776,398

32.57%

Florida RS

$ 120,929,666

$ 107,179,990

$ 139,652,377

$ 32,472,387

23.25%

Georgia ERS

$ 13,046,193

$ 10,956,296

$ 16,295,352

$ 5,339,056

32.76%

Georgia Teachers

$ 54,529,416

$ 45,925,549

$ 63,592,037

$ 17,666,488

27.78%

Hawaii ERS

$ 11,345,600

$ 9,821,633

$ 18,483,700

$ 8,662,067

46.86%

Houston Firefighters

$ 3,116,848

$ 2,721,637

$ 3,337,473

$ 615,836

18.45%

Idaho PERS

$ 9,632,100

$ 9,599,892

$ 12,187,900

$ 2,588,008

21.23%

Illinois Municipal

$ 24,251,137

$ 25,141,889

$ 29,129,228

$ 3,987,339

13.69%

Illinois SERS

$ 10,961,540

$ 9,201,831

$ 29,309,464

$ 20,107,634

68.60%

Illinois Teachers

$ 37,439,092

$ 31,323,784

$ 77,293,198

$ 45,969,414

59.47%

Illinois Universities

$ 13,966,643

$ 12,121,542

$ 30,120,427

$ 17,998,885

59.76%

Indiana PERF

$ 12,357,199

$ 10,581,319

$ 14,506,052

$ 3,924,733

27.06%

Indiana Teachers

$ 8,804,964

$ 8,140,769

$ 19,896,625

$ 11,755,856

59.08%

Iowa PERS

$ 21,537,459

$ 19,878,080

$ 26,468,420

$ 6,590,340

24.90%

Kansas PERS

$ 13,589,658

$ 11,352,784

$ 21,853,783

$ 10,500,999

48.05%

Kentucky County

$ 7,296,322

$ 6,327,382

$ 11,131,174

$ 4,803,792

43.16%

Kentucky ERS

$ 4,712,945

$ 3,948,108

$ 11,692,945

$ 7,744,837

66.24%

Kentucky Teachers

$ 14,851,330

$ 12,456,619

$ 24,344,316

$ 11,887,697

48.83%

LA County ERS

$ 38,839,392

$ 33,433,888

$ 46,646,838

$ 13,212,950

28.33%

Louisiana SERS

$ 8,512,403

$ 8,064,543

$ 14,764,015

$ 6,699,472

45.38%

Louisiana Teachers

$ 12,868,484

$ 12,021,431

$ 23,674,842

$ 11,653,411

49.22%

Maine Local

$ 2,045,337

$ 1,781,153

$ 2,122,833

$ 341,680

16.10%

Maine State and Teacher

$ 8,369,763

$ 7,288,320

$ 12,676,367

$ 5,388,047

42.50%

Maryland PERS

$ 11,937,944

$ 10,983,303

$ 19,009,788

$ 8,026,485

42.22%

Maryland Teachers

$ 20,908,150

$ 19,256,510

$ 31,963,421

$ 12,706,911

39.75%

Michigan Municipal

$ 6,945,423

$ 5,973,039

$ 9,317,222

$ 3,344,183

35.89%

Michigan Public Schools

$ 43,294,000

$ 35,855,478

$ 60,927,000

$ 25,071,522

41.15%

Minneapolis ERF

$ 844,033

$ 844,033

$ 1,286,151

$ 442,118

34.38%

Minnesota PERF

$ 13,126,993

$ 11,338,582

$ 17,180,956

$ 5,842,374

34.00%

Minnesota State Employees

$ 8,960,391

$ 7,692,531

$ 10,264,071

$ 2,571,540

25.05%

Minnesota Teachers

$ 17,323,146

$ 14,939,540

$ 22,081,634

$ 7,142,094

32.34%

Mississippi PERS

$ 20,143,426

$ 16,788,214

$ 31,399,988

$ 14,611,774

46.53%

Missouri DOT and Highway Patrol

$ 1,375,845

$ 1,312,717

$ 3,258,867

$ 1,946,150

59.72%

Missouri Local

$ 3,592,226

$ 3,695,341

$ 4,432,332

$ 736,991

16.63%

Missouri PEERS

$ 2,892,411

$ 2,404,425

$ 3,658,713

$ 1,254,288

34.28%

Missouri State Employees

$ 7,923,377

$ 6,727,623

$ 9,853,155

$ 3,125,532

31.72%

Missouri Teachers

$ 28,931,331

$ 23,755,741

$ 37,233,602

$ 13,477,861

36.20%

Montana PERS

$ 3,889,890

$ 3,315,906

$ 5,241,819

$ 1,925,913

36.74%

Montana Teachers

$ 2,956,583

$ 2,521,446

$ 4,518,168

$ 1,996,722

44.19%

Nebraska Schools

$ 7,040,909

$ 5,940,537

$ 8,542,119

$ 2,601,582

30.46%

Nevada Regular Employees

$ 19,665,764

$ 16,604,769

$ 27,616,270

$ 11,011,501

39.87%

New Hampshire Retirement System

$ 5,233,838

$ 4,847,852

$ 8,953,932

$ 4,106,080

45.86%

New Jersey PERS

$ 28,734,593

$ 24,332,712

$ 41,347,836

$ 17,015,124

41.15%

New Jersey Police & Fire

$ 22,558,521

$ 19,844,138

$ 29,274,359

$ 9,430,222

32.21%

New Jersey Teachers

$ 33,265,327

$ 25,892,496

$ 49,543,348

$ 23,650,852

47.74%

New Mexico PERF

$ 12,243,713

$ 10,016,491

$ 15,601,461

$ 5,584,970

35.80%

New Mexico Teachers

$ 9,431,300

$ 8,232,523

$ 14,353,500

$ 6,120,977

42.64%

New York City ERS

$ 42,556,400

$ 35,383,794

$ 42,556,400

$ 7,172,606

16.85%

New York City Teachers

$ 31,135,400

$ 26,398,410

$ 31,135,400

$ 4,736,990

15.21%

New York State Teachers

$ 105,302,082

$ 76,844,937

$ 105,302,082

$ 28,457,145

27.02%

North Carolina Local Government

$ 18,570,514

$ 15,795,385

$ 18,646,430

$ 2,851,045

15.29%

North Carolina Teachers and State Employees

$ 57,102,198

$ 48,773,836

$ 59,876,066

$ 11,102,230

18.54%

North Dakota PERS

$ 1,621,723

$ 1,474,185

$ 2,208,386

$ 734,201

33.25%

North Dakota Teachers

$ 1,841,960

$ 1,437,950

$ 2,637,165

$ 1,199,215

45.47%

NY State & Local ERS

$ 158,159,164

$ 114,057,641

$ 158,159,164

$ 44,101,523

27.88%

NY State & Local Police & Fire

$ 28,605,772

$ 20,194,091

$ 28,605,772

$ 8,411,681

29.41%

Ohio PERS

$ 60,599,000

$ 63,515,006

$ 79,630,000

$ 16,114,994

20.24%

Ohio Police & Fire

$ 10,681,012

$ 10,075,500

$ 15,384,437

$ 5,308,937

34.51%

Ohio School Employees

$ 10,787,000

$ 8,953,363

$ 14,855,000

$ 5,901,637

39.73%

Ohio Teachers

$ 55,946,259

$ 54,140,413

$ 94,720,669

$ 40,580,256

42.84%

Oklahoma PERS

$ 6,348,416

$ 5,774,379

$ 9,622,628

$ 3,848,249

39.99%

Oklahoma Teachers

$ 9,566,700

$ 8,351,966

$ 19,980,600

$ 11,628,634

58.20%

Oregon PERS

$ 51,583,600

$ 47,685,015

$ 59,329,500

$ 11,644,485

19.63%

Pennsylvania School Employees

$ 59,306,848

$ 45,598,475

$ 79,005,428

$ 33,406,953

42.28%

Pennsylvania State ERS

$ 29,443,945

$ 25,886,102

$ 39,179,594

$ 13,293,492

33.93%

Phoenix ERS

$ 1,868,093

$ 1,535,174

$ 2,697,288

$ 1,162,114

43.08%

Rhode Island ERS

$ 6,405,209

$ 5,487,924

$ 13,238,855

$ 7,750,931

58.55%

Rhode Island Municipal

$ 1,196,385

$ 1,000,481

$ 1,626,621

$ 626,140

38.49%

San Diego County

$ 8,433,310

$ 6,868,944

$ 9,999,161

$ 3,130,217

31.30%

San Francisco City & County

$ 16,069,058

$ 13,136,786

$ 17,643,394

$ 4,506,608

25.54%

South Carolina Police

$ 3,612,700

$ 2,851,474

$ 4,850,457

$ 1,998,983

41.21%

South Carolina RS

$ 25,400,331

$ 19,681,137

$ 38,774,029

$ 19,092,892

49.24%

South Dakota PERS

$ 7,119,875

$ 6,496,635

$ 7,393,251

$ 896,616

12.13%

St. Louis School Employees

$ 944,357

$ 937,594

$ 1,066,271

$ 128,677

12.07%

St. Paul Teachers

$ 1,001,444

$ 815,307

$ 1,471,630

$ 656,323

44.60%

Texas County & District

$ 17,808,600

$ 17,729,760

$ 19,931,200

$ 2,201,440

11.05%

Texas ERS

$ 23,628,567

$ 19,580,610

$ 27,668,876

$ 8,088,266

29.23%

Texas LECOS

$ 802,897

$ 668,353

$ 930,747

$ 262,394

28.19%

Texas Municipal

$ 16,986,000

$ 17,992,494

$ 20,481,500

$ 2,489,006

12.15%

Texas Teachers

$ 111,293,000

$ 95,688,405

$ 134,191,000

$ 38,502,595

28.69%

University of California

$ 41,195,318

$ 34,574,454

$ 47,504,309

$ 12,929,855

27.22%

Utah Noncontributory

$ 16,895,039

$ 15,802,205

$ 20,544,827

$ 4,742,622

23.08%

Vermont State Employees

$ 1,265,404

$ 1,169,845

$ 1,559,324

$ 389,479

24.98%

Vermont Teachers

$ 1,410,368

$ 1,305,250

$ 2,122,191

$ 816,941

38.50%

Virginia Retirement System

$ 52,729,000

$ 44,645,816

$ 72,801,000

$ 28,155,184

38.67%

Washington LEOFF Plan 1

$ 5,560,900

$ 4,586,358

$ 4,393,300

$ (193,058)

-4.39%

Washington LEOFF Plan 2

$ 7,927,000

$ 5,081,657

$ 7,927,000

$ 2,845,343

35.89%

Washington PERS 1

$ 9,293,000

$ 7,626,486

$ 12,538,100

$ 4,911,614

39.17%

Washington PERS 2/3

$ 25,978,000

$ 16,368,663

$ 25,978,000

$ 9,609,337

36.99%

Washington School Employees Plan 2/3

$ 3,459,000

$ 2,237,385

$ 3,459,000

$ 1,221,615

35.32%

Washington Teachers Plan 1

$ 7,791,300

$ 6,404,061

$ 9,201,300

$ 2,797,239

30.40%

Washington Teachers Plan 2/3

$ 9,106,000

$ 5,547,281

$ 9,106,000

$ 3,558,719

39.08%

West Virginia PERS

$ 3,974,609

$ 3,866,588

$ 5,325,830

$ 1,459,242

27.40%

West Virginia Teachers

$ 4,143,540

$ 4,143,540

$ 8,904,312

$ 4,760,772

53.47%

Wisconsin Retirement System

$ 80,626,900

$ 75,872,072

$ 80,758,800

$ 4,886,728

6.05%

Wyoming Public Employees

$ 5,799,531

$ 5,495,337

$ 6,855,643

$ 1,360,306

19.84%

Total

$2,629,875,887

$ 2,231,596,280

$ 3,375,676,773

$ 1,144,080,493

33.89%

Overstatement of

Assets

$ 398,279,607

Estimated Unfunded Obligations

$ 1,144,080,493

In total, my calculations show over a $1.1 trillion unfunded liability in the 120 state and local plans excluding any unfunded liabilities in additional local plans within each state for which data is unavailable (the plans excluded from the plan-level analysis: MA, TN, etc. would increase this aggregate shortfall if included). While investment returns are likely to be higher in the 2012-2014 fiscal years, closing some of this gap, it would be imprudent to assume that the strong performance of the underlying investment indexes continues at that elevated rate.

Policymakers at the state and local levels will be forced to make difficult trade-offs in the years ahead. $1.1 trillion is more than half of the aggregate total state budgets for the most recent fiscal years for whichdata is available (5/25/2014). It is a very big number, and no amount of unreasonable assumptions or whitewashing will make it go away on its own. Retirees, future retirees, taxpayers, and municipal bond holders all deserve better than the uncertain future presented by the status quo. The political cost of taking action is high but the ultimate financial cost of inaction will be far higher.

If you are holding muni bonds (either directly or indirectly) in your search for yield, you should consider the specific risks of the state or municipality, and its unfunded obligations, in the context of your investment.

NOTE: The full excel workbook containing the raw data, and my calculations, is available upon request. If you make use of any of the data in this article, please cite the following sources:

1) Lenny Grover’s article on Seeking Alpha

2) Data.gov

3) Boston College Center for Retirement Research

May. 27, 2014 10:08 AM ET  

 




Toll Road Bonds Offer Rare Value In Pricey Muni Market – Citi.

Citi says the municipal-bond market looks rich and that it doesn’t see good things ahead for munis for the remainder of this year, with possibly one exception: the toll road sector. Citi’s muni strategy troika of Vikram Rai, Mikhail Foux and George Friedlander foresee a time soon, likely next year, “when the need for infrastructure investment overwhelms fiscal restraint,” and they expect a slew of new bond issuance to support municipal infrastructure needs. Citi says new projects in the toll-road sector already seem to be picking up, and sees investor opportunities ahead. From Citi today:

Toll road projects serving large metropolitan areas with high wealth levels and a diverse geographic and economic base (for instance, projects in the New York tri-state area and San Francisco Bay area) are typically blessed with relatively strong inelastic demand for their services and also possess strong independent rate setting ability. Thus, these highly rated issues have traded more like essential service revenue bonds and have richened fairly drastically with the rest of the high grade municipal sector. While there is no doubt that these bonds aren’t exactly suitable for investors looking for yield pick-up, we still consider them cheap vs. high grade bonds in essential service categories such as gas, power and electric utilities. These bonds also offer strong defensive play against a darkening of the municipal credit landscape.

But, for investors looking for yield pick-up while willing to slide down the credit spectrum, we would encourage exploring newly issued BBB/BB rated toll road bonds. While evaluating these new issues, we prefer projects which offer essentiality i.e. there is no threat from other toll free options which could force new toll roads to compete for business based on toll charges.

May 27, 2014, 12:01 P.M. ET
By Michael Aneiro




The Outlook on Pay for Success / Social Impact Bonds.

Pay for Success is an approach to funding social service programs designed to improve outcomes and ultimately reduce the costs of addressing these issues. In a Pay for Success contract, private investors provide funding for preventative or interventional services up-front, and government reimburses these investors with a return on their investment, only if results are achieved.

In doing so, private investors take on the initial risk, governments pay based on outcomes, and cost-saving programs with demonstrated effectiveness gain access to new and additional funding sources. Pay for Success projects are underway in several states in the U.S., including California.

The Housing California conference, an annual conference held in April with more than 1,000 participants involved in housing, included an informative session on the outlook on Pay for Success, or Social Impact Bonds, with LeSar Development Consultants, Corporation for Supportive Housing, Third Sector Capital Partners, Santa Clara County, and California State Assemblymember Toni Atkins’ office.

The audience, a mix of affordable housing developers, local government staff, and lenders, were receptive to Pay for Success, interested in learning how it could be applied to their programs, particularly around affordable housing.

Some of the key highlights of the panel looking at the outlook for Pay for Success included:

Change the Nomenclature to Gain More Understanding and Support – move away from the misnomer “social impact bond” to nomenclature that more accurately describes the tool –“Pay for Success” or “Pay for Performance”. Santa Clara County’s COO Gary Graves shared that upon hearing about “Social Impact Bonds”, he was skeptical, as the notion of floating a bond was unappealing. Once understanding that Pay for Success actually does not involve bond financing, but rather contracts that are paid upon outcomes being reached, and learning more, Mr. Graves became a proponent of the idea and Santa Clara County has a Pay for Success program under development.

Counties Are Key Partners, Along with Cross-Sector Community Partners – Pay for Success programs that are currently emerging in California have Counties serving as the public agencies that pay upon successful outcomes being reached, and a broad cross-sector of the community collaborating. In Santa Clara County, the County was spurred to action by the community, who advocated for the County to adopt a Pay for Success program. Community partners and the County worked in collaboration to complete a landscape analysis process to determine which services could fit into a Pay for Success model. Now, the County is issuing a Request for Proposals to select a lead agency for the program.

Homelessness, Workforce Development, Recidivism, Frequent Health Users, Supportive Housing, and Child Welfare are emerging areas where Pay for Success programs are being developed. Santa Clara County’s landscape analysis identified homelessness and acute mental health treatment as two areas where services could fit into a Pay for Success model. One success outcome measure will be keeping a homeless family housed for at least a year.

In Minnesota and Massachusetts, PFS projects are focused on supportive housing. Minnesota also has a workforce development PFS program underway. In Los Angeles, the PFS model is used by Just In Reach provides housing, workforce, and substance abuse services to homeless inmates to reduce recidivism. Success outcome measures include reducing bed days in incarceration.

Challenges remain for this burgeoning field. Some of the most significant challenges are:

Some of these challenges are being overcome by communities and local government seeing the benefits of a Pay for Success model and forging ahead despite the drawback. In Santa Clara County’s case, the County had difficulty identifying cashable savings from their acute mental health treatment Pay for Success program, because while they anticipated wait times at local emergency rooms would decrease, they did not anticipate it would equate to cash savings. Despite this, strong community support of paying for verifiable outcomes convinced County Supervisors and the County to move forward with the program. Another obstacle Santa Clara County is facing is a lack of provider capacity, so they have agreed to invest $1,000,000 upfront toward capacity-building for homeless providers and community-based organizations in preparation for program ramp-up, all with the goal of bolstering homeless health care. With community and political will, the Pay for Success challenges are being overcome.

For more information about Pay For Success, read the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco’s Community Development Investment Review – Pay For Success Financing (Volume 9, Issue 1, 2013).

MAY 23, 2014
By Leilani Barnett.

Leilani Barnett is Regional Manager of Community Development with the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, covering California’s Central Valley.

 

 




Mayer Brown: New US Water Infrastructure Legislation Passed Today: Will WIFIA Repeat The Success Of TIFIA?

The US Department of Transportation’s TIFIA (Transportation Finance & Innovation Act) credit support program is by far the most successful federal program providing financial support for surface transportation public-private partnerships (P3). Few major P3 transportation projects in recent years would have been possible, and few P3s in the pipeline will go forward, without TIFIA assistance. Now, Congress has set out to try to repeat the success of TIFIA with a similar program—just substituting a “W” for the “T” in the acronym—to support major water infrastructure projects.

The new WIFIA (Water Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act) program is part of the Water Resources Reform and Development Act (WRRDA) that passed the House on May 21 and the Senate on May 22, and is expected to be signed by the President shortly.

WRRDA authorizes funding for the construction and repair of waterway and port projects across the United States. It also allows Congress to authorize the Army Corps of Engineers to spearhead the development, maintenance and support of vital US port and waterways infrastructure, as well as supporting targeted flood protection and environmental restoration needs.

Consciously building on the increased use of public-private partnerships for the financing, construction and operation of major surface transportation infrastructure, WRRDA encourages P3s for development of major water infrastructure projects. Specifically, the legislation establishes WIFIA in order to provide credit assistance for drinking water, wastewater and water resources infrastructure projects. WIFIA is designed to leverage federal funds by attracting substantial private or other non-federal investments to promote increased development of critical water infrastructure and to help speed construction of local projects.

WIFIA is very closely modeled on the USDOT TIFIA program and has many similar elements, including interest rate (tied to long-term Treasury rates) and maximum maturity (35 years); maximum percentage of eligible project cost that can be financed (generally 49 percent, although in contrast in TIFIA program, WIFIA legislation provides that up to 25 percent of each year’s financing assistance can be made be available for loans exceeding 49 percent of project cost); deferral of loan repayment for up to five years after substantial completion; credit rating requirements; and non-subordination/ “springing parity lien” in the event of bankruptcy.

Also consistent with the initial authorization of TIFIA program, WIFIA is established as a five-year “pilot” program, with the Comptroller General directed to report to Congress prior to the end of this period on status of program implementation and with recommendations for improvements, continuation authorization or termination.

The most significant difference between TIFIA and WIFIA is in the level of authorized spending. Authorized spending for the WIFIA program starts at $20 million in the first year and increases to $50 million in the fifth year. If “scored” for federal budget purposes similar to the scoring for the TIFIA program, this would provide for approximately $200 million in financing in the first year, increasing to approximately $500 million in the fifth year. That compares to TIFIA’s current funding level under MAP-21 legislation of $1 billion (which allows credit support of for loans of approximately $10 billion). By way of further comparison, the first year (1999) appropriation for the TIFIA program was $80 million. Given that the nation’s water infrastructure needs are, by most estimates, even larger in total than its transportation needs, this is clearly a “pilot” program—with a very small “p.”

WRRDA directs the Army Corps of Engineers and the Environmental Protection Agency to implement and manage the WIFIA program. The Army Corps of Engineers is authorized to carry out projects for flood damage reduction, environmental restoration, coastal or inland harbor navigation improvement, and inland and intracoastal waterways navigation improvement. The Environmental Protection Agency is authorized to carry out projects that are eligible for assistance under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act or the Safe Drinking Water Act in addition to projects that enhance energy efficiency or that repair, rehabilitate or replace public water systems or publicly owned treatment works. Amounts appropriated for WIFIA financing assistance are allocated jointly to the Corps of Engineers and the EPA, possibly with subsequent implementing regulations to clarify the specific amounts to be made available to each agency.

Given USDOT’s successful implementation and management of the TIFIA program, supporters of P3 can hope the Corps of Engineers and EPA learn from USDOT’s experience with the TIFIA program and build on established and now well-understood policies and program guidelines.

WRRDA has one other notable provision supporting the use of P3 approaches to water infrastructure projects. It establishes a Water Infrastructure Public-Private Partnership Program, authorizing the Corps of Engineers to enter into agreements with state and local governments and private entities to finance construction of at least 15 water resources development projects, including coastal harbor improvement, channel improvement, inland navigation, flood damage reduction, aquatic ecosystem restoration and hurricane and storm damage reduction.

To identify these projects, the Corps of Engineers must consider the extent to which the project is significant to the US economy, leverages federal investment by encouraging non-federal contributions to the project, employs innovative project delivery and cost-savings methods, has received federal funds in the past and experienced delays or missed scheduled deadlines, has unobligated Corps of Engineers funding balances and has not received federal funding for recapitalization and modernization since the project was authorized. The Corps of Engineers must then, in consultation with the non-federal applicant, develop a detailed project management plan.

To qualify for participation in the Water Infrastructure Public-Private Partnership Program, each project must also have specific Congressional authorization provided by subsequently enacted legislation. Projects qualifying for the Public-Private Partnership Program will benefit from potential waiver from or modification of applicable federal regulations as well as technical assistance from the Corps of Engineers.

As an initial project that might be implemented under this new Public-Private Partnership Program, Alaska Congressman Don Young is expected shortly to introduce House Resolution 4668 designed to promote a P3 framework for the privately financed development of a major new port facility in Alaska’s Seward Peninsula.

The final version of WRRDA does not change the existing requirements for issuance of private activity bonds (PABS) for water infrastructure projects. During the multi-year consideration of this legislation, various stakeholder groups advocated in particular for eliminating the state volume cap on water and wastewater infrastructure PABS and instead providing that they be treated in the same manner as PABS for airports, ports and certain solid waste disposal projects. This change would have allowed local communities to more effectively leverage the municipal capital markets and, in combination with other finance mechanisms, was estimated would have leveraged an additional $2 billion to $6 billion annually in private investment in water infrastructure projects.

WRRDA is further evidence of the strong and bipartisan support in Congress for the use of P3 structures for major US infrastructure projects. The next question will be how far and how fast states and localities, and the federal government itself, will partner with the private sector to take advantage of these new incentives.

Originally published on 22 May 2014

Last Updated: May 23 2014
Article by John R. Schmidt, David Narefsky, Joseph Seliga, George K. Miller and Natalie Veltman
Mayer Brown

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© Copyright 2014. The Mayer Brown Practices. All rights reserved.

This Mayer Brown article provides information and comments on legal issues and developments of interest. The foregoing is not a comprehensive treatment of the subject matter covered and is not intended to provide legal advice. Readers should seek specific legal advice before taking any action with respect to the matters discussed herein.

 




Waller: Municipal Debtors: "Cram Down" of Special Revenue Debt.

Municipal financing differs in a number of significant ways from traditional commercial financing. Therefore, while chapter 9 of title 11 of the United States Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”) incorporates many provisions applicable in cases under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, including section 1129(b), a/k/a the “cram down” section, it also contains its own provisions with respect to the confirmation of a plan of adjustment – i.e., sections 943 and 944 of the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (incorporating sections of the Bankruptcy Code). When considering the differences between cram down scenarios in cases under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code and cases under chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, one must consider the prevalence of special revenue financing by municipal debtors and the protections that are built into chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code.

I. CAN SPECIAL REVENUE DEBT BE IMPAIRED?

A. Special Revenue Financing

Our system of federalism grants state governments the independence and the freedom (with the consent of their citizens) to authorize local governmental bodies to finance various governmental functions and necessary improvements through the issuance of municipal bonds. Municipalities issue their own debt obligations either based on their full faith and credit (general obligation bonds) or based upon the revenues to be collected by the municipality from the financed improvement (revenue bonds). Local government borrowing differs in a fundamental way from either individual or corporate borrowing. The municipal borrower is an entity having special characteristics that differ from those of private actors. See Joel A. Mintz et al., Fundamentals of Municipal Finance 45 (2010). The local government exists solely to provide governmental services; it does not exist for profit-making purposes. Id. Due to the public benefit of financed projects, like water and sewer systems, municipalities are limited in the actions they can take with these assets, including certain restrictions on the right to mortgage or transfer the property, or to allow foreclosure or possession of the property by a secured creditor in the event of default.1 Further, limitations exist due to the state’s interest in protecting the credit of the state and insuring that municipalities do not harm the state’s credit by undertaking obligations which cannot be repaid.

As municipalities have grown, so has their need for financing. Protecting the integrity of municipal financing is essential to the continued confidence of the municipal bond markets. Thus, municipalities have traditionally made every effort to honor their public debt obligations.

i. Protections for Special Revenue Creditors

Unlike general obligation bonds, which are backed by the full faith and credit of the issuer and, therefore, rely on the assessment and collection of taxes for repayment, revenue bonds do not increase the tax burden of the citizens. They are non-recourse obligations repaid solely from the revenues (and other specified pledged funds) generated by the project that is being financed, such as a sewer or water system, toll road, toll bridge, tunnel, or the like. Consequently, in many jurisdictions, revenue bonds may be issued without voter approval or other procedures often required for the issuance of general obligation bonds. See Fundamentals of Municipal Finance, at 3-4.

To entice the public to purchase revenue bonds in particular, states have enacted statutory provisions designed to promote this type of financing. Since repayment of the revenue bonds are limited to the stream of income from the financed public projects, states authorize the issuing municipality to irrevocably pledge (or set aside) the revenue stream (or net revenue stream) for the benefit of the revenue bondholders. Typically, the pledge includes the creation of a first lien on the revenue stream. Some states even provide that the pledged revenue streams are held in trust for the benefit of the special revenue creditors. For example, Alabama recognizes that pledged revenues “shall constitute a trust fund or funds which shall be impressed with a lien in favor of holders of the warrants to the payment of which such pledged funds are pledged” and that the pledged revenues are “irrevocably pledged for the payment of the principal and interest on such warrants as provided in Section 11-28-3.” Ala. Code §§ 11-28-2, 11-28-3.

Other protections that are authorized by state law and that are often contained in revenue bond documents are covenants in which the issuer pledges: (a) to issue all bonds necessary to finance the project; (b) to complete project construction expeditiously; (c) to maintain specified amounts of reserve funds; (d) to fix, establish, and collect appropriate fees, rates, tolls, or user charges; and (e) to restrict the investment of bond proceeds. Fundamentals of Municipal Finance, at 3-4. In addition, where revenue bonds are issued to finance a series of projects undertaken by the same issuer, the municipality that issued them will usually pledge not to issue any additional bonds that are secured by the same revenue stream, unless current revenues are sufficient to cover a specified percentage of both current and future debt service on both outstanding bonds and the new bonds. Id. Once entered into, the revenue bond covenants may not be modified or abandoned by the municipality. Id.2

Since bondholders are unable to take ownership of certain public assets, municipalities will often transfer certain control rights to bondholders to provide the holders with a meaningful remedy in the event of nonpayment. One such remedy is the right to the appointment of a receiver to oversee the particular project in question, and, if appropriate, raise rates sufficient to pay the special revenue debt issued to finance the project.

The states and their municipalities have designed these financing structures to guaranty that the revenue stream relied upon by special revenue bondholders will be protected and not impaired. These statutory provisions protect not only bondholders but also protect the overall credit of the state and all of its municipalities. See Fundamentals of Municipal Finance, at 4. As will be discussed in more detail below, given the prevalence of this type of financing, and with it being particular to municipal debtors, Congress, in amending chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code in 1988, intended to protect and preserve the bargain made between the municipal debtors, as issuers, and the holders of special revenue debt.

B. Chapter 9 And A Brief History Of Municipal Bankruptcy Legislation3

Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code is the sole chapter under which a municipality may seek bankruptcy relief. Chapter 9 has evolved since it was first enacted in 1934. Prior to 1988, chapter 9 lumped all of a municipality’s debt into one pot and did not distinguish between general obligation bonds and special revenue bonds. In 1988, Congress approved a series of amendments (the “1988 Amendments”) aimed at distinguishing between the two types of bonds. The intent of Congress in enacting the 1988 Amendments was to ensure that state laws protecting special revenue financing were honored in a chapter 9 proceeding and the rights of special revenue creditors would receive additional protections not granted prior to the 1988 Amendments. See S. Rep. No. 100-506, at 13 (1988) (the “Senate Report”). Specifically, the 1988 Amendments sought to ensure that special revenue bondholders would have unimpaired rights to the project revenues pledged to them.

The ultimate intent of Congress in enacting the 1988 Amendments was to provide assurances to the capital markets that special revenues essential to municipal financing remain unimpaired in the event of a Chapter 9 filing. The Senate Report for the 1988 Amendments noted that “[r]easonable assurance of timely payment is essential to the orderly marketing of municipal bonds and notes and continued municipal financing.” Id. at 21. The Senate Report further noted that:

To eliminate the confusion and to confirm various state laws and constitutional provisions regarding the rights of bondholders to receive the revenues pledged to them in payment of debt obligations of a municipality, a new section is provided in the amendment to ensure that revenue bondholders receive the benefit of their bargain with the municipal issuer and that they will have unimpaired rights to the project revenues pledged to them. . . .

Id. at 12 (emphasis added). For example, prior to the 1988 Amendments, special revenue bondholders were at risk that section 552(a) of the Bankruptcy Code would strip them of their liens on post-petition revenues. The Senate Report addressed that issue:

In the municipal context, therefore, the simple answer to the Section 552 problem is that Section 904 and the tenth amendment should prohibit the interpretation that pledges of revenue granted pursuant to state statutory or constitutional provisions to bondholders can be terminated by the filing of a chapter 9 case. Likewise, under the contract clause of the constitution (article I, section 10), a municipality cannot claim that a contractual pledge of revenue can be terminated by the filing of a chapter 9 proceeding.

Id. at 6 (emphasis added). The risk posed by section 552(a) was eliminated by the 1988 Amendments. See In re Cnty. of Orange, 179 B.R. 185, 191-92 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995).

While protecting the integrity of special revenue bonds in chapter 9, Congress was also determined to protect the integrity of the state laws that authorize special revenue municipal financing. With revenue bonds, “the general taxpayers are usually not committed to repaying the bonds or funding operational deficits through general tax revenues . . . [and] it would be quite problematic and contrary to state law if a bankruptcy filing resulted in revenue bonds being converted into general obligation bonds.” Senate Report, at 5. With regard to the 1988 Amendments, one court has noted:

The 1988 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code added the definition of “special revenues” in § 902(2). The 1988 Amendments were intended to preserve a dichotomy between general obligation and special revenue bonds for the collective benefit of bondholders (to secure the benefit of their bargain), municipalities (to maintain the effectiveness of the revenue financing vehicle) and taxpayers (to ensure that revenue obligations were not transformed into general obligations).

In re Heffernan Mem’l Hosp., 202 B.R. 147, 148 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1996).

C. Sections 927, 928(a) And 1111(b) Protect Special Revenue Debt From Impairment During the Case and From a Cram Down.

The confluence of sections 927, 928(a) and 1111(b) of the Bankruptcy Code demonstrate Congress’ intent to protect the benefit of the bargain made by a municipal debtor, as issuer, and the holders of special revenue debt obligations under chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code both during the case and at confirmation.

i. Congress preserved the extent, validity and priority of liens on special revenues post-petition.

Through section 928(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, Congress preserved the extent of the creditors’ liens on special revenues of a municipal debtor. Section 902 defines special revenues as:

(A) receipts derived from the ownership, operation, or disposition of projects or systems of the debtor that are primarily used or intended to be used primarily to provide transportation, utility, or other services, including the proceeds of borrowings to finance the projects or systems; (B) special excise taxes imposed on particular activities or transactions; (C) incremental tax receipts from the benefited area in the case of tax-increment financing; (D) other revenues or receipts derived from particular functions of the debtor, whether or not the debtor has other functions; or (E) taxes specifically levied to finance one or more projects or systems, excluding receipts from general property, sales, or income taxes (other than taxincrement financing) levied to finance the general purposes of the debtor[.]

11 U.S.C. § 902(2). In turn, section 928(a) of the Bankruptcy Code preserves the extent of a creditor’s lien on special revenues by granting such creditor a continuing post-petition lien on special revenues to the same extent as existed prepetition. Specifically, section 928(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides:

Notwithstanding section 552(a) of this title and subject to subsection (b) of this section, special revenues acquired by the debtor after the commencement of the case shall remain subject to any lien resulting from any security agreement entered into by the debtor before the commencement of the case.

11 U.S.C. § 928(a). Whereas, in a chapter 11 case a secured creditor with a consensual lien will not maintain its liens on collateral of the same type generated post-petition, in a chapter 9 case a consensual lien secured by special revenues continues to attach to post petition revenues to the same extent it existed prepetition.

ii. Congress similarly preserved the value of liens on special revenues.

Through the combination of sections 1111(b) and 927 of the Bankruptcy Code, Congress also preserved the value of liens against special revenues. Section 1111(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides:

(1)(A) A claim secured by a lien on property of the estate shall be allowed or disallowed under section 502 of this title the same as if the holder of such claim had recourse against the debtor on account of such claim, whether or not such holder has such recourse, unless – (i) the class of which such claim is a part elects, by at least two-thirds in amount and more than half in number of allowed claims of such class, application of paragraph (2) of this subsection; or (ii) such holder does not have such recourse and such property is sold under section 363 of this title or is to be sold under the plan.

(2) If such an election is made, then notwithstanding section 506(a) of this title, such claim is a secured claim to the extent that such claim is allowed.

11 U.S.C. § 1111(b). Congress enacted Section 1111(b) in an attempt to prevent the harsh results faced by non-recourse lenders in a cram-down scenario. See, e.g., Great Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Pine Gate Assocs., Ltd., 2 B.C.D. 1478 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1976). In Pine Gate, the court exercised its cram-down powers under Chapter XII to cash out a nonrecourse undersecured mortgagee at the appraised value of the property, rather than the amount of debt, at a time of depressed prices. In opposition to the debtor’s proposed plan, the lenders argued that their negotiated “benefit of the bargain” under the non-recourse financing arrangement was either (i) full payment or (ii) the right to foreclose on the property, and that their interests would not be adequately protected unless they were paid in full or allowed to foreclose. The Pine Gate court disagreed, holding that the proposed treatment of the secured claim through a cash payment equal to the appraised value of the collateral was sufficient. In reaching its decision, the court relied upon authority for the proposition that a secured creditor was entitled to receive no more than the appraised value of secured property as just compensation for the loss of the property and satisfaction of its security interest.” Pine Gate, 2 B.C.D. at 1478. Accordingly, while the debtor retained ownership of the property, the mortgagee was not paid in full, did not retain its lien, and was deprived of its right to sue for a deficiency. See In re S. Vill., Inc., 25 B.R. 987 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982) (discussing the Pine Gate decision).

As a result of Pine Gate, it became clear that a debtor could seek relief through bankruptcy during a period when property values were depressed, propose to repay secured indebtedness only to the extent of the then-appraised value, cram-down a non-recourse secured lender, and preserve all potential future appreciation for the debtor alone.” See In re DRW Prop. Co., 57 B.R. 987, 990 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986). In addition, “[t]he undersecured nonrecourse lender would not be entitled to vote in the unsecured class, thereby making confirmation of the plan much easier.” Id. (citing In re S. Vill., 25 B.R. 987 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982); Jeffrey A. Stein, Section 1111(b): Providing the Undersecured Creditors with Post-Confirmation Appreciation in the Value of the Collateral, 56 Am. Bankr. L.J. 195 (1982)). Secured creditors were shocked by this result and sought relief from Congress when the Bankruptcy Code was proposed and debated. See Richard F. Broude, Cramdown and Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code: The Settlement Prerogative, 39 Bus. Lawyer 441 (1984).

As a result of the concern communicated to Congress, the final version of the Bankruptcy Code included section 1111(b) for purposes of alleviating the problem recognized under Pine Gate and restoring the “benefit of the bargain” expected by nonrecourse lenders. Kenneth N. Klee, All you Ever Wanted to Know About Cram Down Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 53 Am. Bankr. L.J. 133 (1979); Michael J. Kaplan, Nonrecourse Undersecured Creditors Under New Chapter 11 – The Section 1111(b) Election: Already a Need for Change, 53 Am. Bankr. L.J. 269 (1979). Accordingly, as codified in the Bankruptcy Code, section 1111(b) now represents Congress’ attempt “to create a balance between the debtor’s need for protection and a creditor’s right to receive equitable treatment.” See In re Trenton Ridge Investors, LLC, 461 B.R. 440, 505 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2011) (quoting In re Union Meeting Partners, 160 B.R. 757, 769 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993)).

Section 1111(b) balances those interests in two ways. First, if a nonrecourse mortgagee is substantially undersecured, the mortgagee may retain the recourse status conferred by section 1111(b)(1)(A) and cause that class of claims to vote to reject the plan. Id. In such a circumstance, the undersecured creditor can make it impossible to confirm a plan absent a cramdown in accordance with section 1129(b)(2)(B), which would require that the unsecured claims be paid in full or that junior interests receive nothing under the plan. Id. In this way, the undersecured creditor can force the debtor into a situation where the debtor must propose a plan satisfying the unsecured debt or eliminate the debtor’s interest in the property. Id. (citations omitted).

Second, a secured creditor is permitted to make an election pursuant to section 1111(b)(2). Upon making such an election, the secured creditor forfeits its right to recourse against the debtor (i.e., the right to pursue an unsecured claim), but is instead granted an allowed secured claim in the amount of the debt rather than in a judicially determined amount. Id. Hence, the creditor may benefit from any future increase in the value of the property. Id.; see also Tuma v. Firstmark Leasing Corp., 916 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1990) (with section 1111(b), Congress sought to give creditors the opportunity to capture future appreciation in the value of their collateral); In re Bloomingdale Partners, 155 B.R. 961, 974 n.7 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1993) (“Congress [arguably] enacted section 1111(b) to prohibit debtors from cashing-out creditors at judicially determined values.”); In re Weinstein, 227 B.R. 284, 295 n.12 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998) (“The real benefit of the [section 1111(b)] election is that it protects the creditor against a quick sale of its collateral. . . . By making the election, the creditor guards against an opportunistic sale . . . .”).

In 1988, Congress amended chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, proposing “to clarify the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code applicable to municipalities and to correct unintended conflicts that currently may exist between municipal law and bankruptcy law.” Senate Report, at 1. Congress approved the 1988 Amendments to chapter 9 because it wanted to ensure that the market for municipal debts remained stable. Id. at 21 (Senate Judiciary Committee recognizing that “[r]easonable assurance of timely payment is essential to the orderly marketing of municipal bonds and notes and continued municipal financing.”). In approving the 1988 Amendments, Congress recognized that the pledges common to municipal finance must not be adversely affected, even where a bankruptcy filing has occurred, in order to ensure stability in the special revenue financing market. Id. at 3. Congress also recognized that there were restraints on the treatment of special revenue financing imposed by state constitutions. Accordingly, Congress included limitations on both the: (i) conversion of non-recourse obligations into recourse obligations; and (ii) the ability to impair the holders of special revenue debt obligations.

As part of the amendments in 1988, Congress addressed the non-recourse nature of special revenue financing. One of the main concerns that the 1988 Amendments sought to address was that “[s]ection 1111(b) provides that in some circumstances non-recourse debt may be treated as recourse debt.” Senate Report, at 22. The problem presented was that “[m]any municipal obligations are, by reason of constitutional, statutory, or charter provisions, payable solely from special revenues and not the full faith and credit of the municipality.” Id. Thus, to resolve this problem, the 1988 Amendments adopted section 927, prohibiting conversion of revenue bonds into general obligation bonds in a chapter 9 case. “[The 1988 Amendments] [therefore] avoid[] the potential conversion of revenue bonds into General Obligation bonds under Section 1111(b).” Senate Report, at 2; see also H.R. Rep. No. 100-1011 (1988), at 7 (new section 927 to be added to ensure that non-recourse revenue bonds cannot be converted under section 1111(b) into recourse, or general obligation, debt because allowing such may violate some state constitutions and statutes). The reasoning behind Section 927 has been summarized as follows:

The amendments protect the future effectiveness of revenue bond financing against the possibility of an adverse judicial determination in connection with a municipal bankruptcy. Specifically, the amendments insure that in the event of a municipal bankruptcy, taxpayers will not be required to pay bondholders for bankrupt municipal projects that were intended to be funded exclusively through project revenues. The amendments insure that state constitutional and statutory debt limits will not be preempted by the application of bankruptcy laws. Finally, the amendments insure that revenue bondholders receive the benefit of their bargain with the municipal issuer, namely, they will have unimpaired rights to the project revenues pledged to them.

Senate Report, at 12-13 (emphasis added).

Section 927 of the Bankruptcy Code reads as follows:

The holder of a claim payable solely from special revenues of the debtor under applicable nonbankruptcy law shall not be treated as having recourse against the debtor on account of such claim pursuant to section 1111(b) of this title.

11 U.S.C. § 927. While adding section 927 to chapter 9, Congress could also have elected to remove the incorporation of section 1111(b) into chapter 9. However, pursuant to section 901, Congress incorporated section 1111(b), but chose merely to limit it. Section 1111(b), subject to the limitations imposed by section 927, still stands. Thus, in the context of special revenue bonds, the section 1111(b) election is automatic, not requiring any affirmative act by the secured creditor. The ability to elect full recourse treatment for non-recourse debt has been statutorily removed by section 927.

Although Congress recognized that the existing chapter 11 choice for full recourse treatment of non-recourse debt would be unavailable to chapter 9 creditors due to state constitutional limitations on recourse financing, it did not intend for the result to be the continued impairment of special revenue financing by results such as that reached in Pine Gate. Indeed, the existing structure of the Bankruptcy Code prevents such an impairment. By incorporating section 1111(b) into chapter 9, but also limiting the conversion of nonrecourse debt to recourse debt, Congress made the section 1111(b)(2) election automatic, providing that the debtor must pay the full value of the claim. Any other reading would render the incorporation of section 1111(b) and the limitation set forth in section 927 superfluous. Further, it makes no sense to read chapter 9 as taking both the recourse protection as well as the section 1111(b)(2) protection away from secured lenders when Congress could have achieved such a result by simply not including section 1111(b) in section 901. Accordingly, in a case under chapter 9, a special revenue finance creditor must be treated as having an allowed secured claim in the full amount of the outstanding debt.

D. In Addition To The Foregoing Provisions Of The Bankruptcy Code, Municipal Debtors Face Additional Constitutional Limitations.

In addition to Congress’s intent to protect the bargains made with respect to special revenue financing, municipal debtors, as governmental units, are also subject to certain limitations imposed by the United States Constitution (the “Constitution”) and the municipality’s applicable state constitution.

Limitations set forth in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution may impose obstacles or otherwise prohibit a cramdown with respect to a creditor whose claim is secured by special revenues. The Fifth Amendment provides:

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

U.S. Const. amend. V. (emphasis added). The limitations of the Fifth Amendment also apply, through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to takings by state governments and their subdivisions. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). As a result, the Fifth Amendment is applicable to municipal debtors, and a municipal debtor may not take property without just compensation.

The protections afforded by the Fifth Amendment are not abrogated by the Bankruptcy Code. The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code indicates that the drafters of the Bankruptcy Code considered the Fifth Amendment to be a limitation upon the impairment of property rights in bankruptcy, and current bankruptcy law gives great deference to property rights. Julia Patterson Forrester, Bankruptcy Takings, 51 Fla. L. Rev. 851, 863 (Dec. 1999). The Supreme Court of the United States has addressed the takings issue in the context of bankruptcy on several occasions, holding each time that the bankruptcy power is limited by the Fifth Amendment. See United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 75, 78 (1982); Wright v. Vinton Branch of Mtn. Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440, 456-58 (1937); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 589 (1935); see also Continental Ill. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island, & Pac. Ry., 294 U.S. 648, 669 (1935) (stating that the bankruptcy power is not unlimited); Holt v. Henley, 232 U.S. 637, 639 (1914) (holding that an amendment to bankruptcy law must be applied prospectively to avoid affecting existing property rights). In the context of a chapter 9 case, it is important to determine the scope of the property rights held by a creditor where the debt at issue is secured by special revenues, and the impact that may have on the debtor’s ability to effect a cramdown.

While most people think of property as a thing that is owned by someone, bankruptcy specialists understand property as a collection of rights with respect to things. Stephen J. Ware, Security Interests, Repossessed Collateral, and Turnover of Property to the Bankruptcy Estate, 2002 Utah L. Rev. 775, 776 (2002). A sophisticated understanding of property dissolves the unitary conception of ownership into a metaphorical “bundle” of rights reflecting the fact that more than one person can have rights with respect to a particular thing. Id. Consistent with this understanding, courts have held that contractual rights are cognizable property interests protected under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Century Exploration New Orleans, Inc. v. United States, 103 Fed. Cl. 70, 76 (Fed. Cl. 2012) (citing Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934) (stating that valid contracts are property protected by the Fifth Amendment); Lion Raisins, Inc. v. United States, 416 F.3d 1356, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). Even further, courts have generally classified as property, or rights to property, transferable interests generating pecuniary value. 21 West Lancaster Corp. v. Main Line Restaurant, Inc., 790 F.2d 354, 357 (3d Cir. 1986) (citing United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 55 (1958) (for tax lien purposes, life insurance policies are property to the extent of their cash surrender value, since policy holder could compel payment of that amount); Note, Property Subject to the Federal Tax Lien, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1485, 1486–87 (1964) (federal classifications have focused on transferability and leviability of interest)). In the words of one court, the question to be asked is, “[is] the interest . . . bargainable, [is] it transferable, [does] it have value?” Randall v. Nakashima & Co., Ltd., 542 F.2d 270, 278 (5th Cir. 1976). Based upon the foregoing, the question then becomes, “Which parts of the contract – of the bargain – constitute property subject to the protections afforded by the Fifth Amendment?”

While it is clear that the Fifth Amendment provides certain protection, there is no set formula for determining when justice and fairness require that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). Rather, a takings analysis depends on the facts of each case, as the Supreme Court of the United States has explained:

[T]he Court’s decisions have identified several factors that have particular significance. The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant, and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant considerations. . . . So, too, is the character of the governmental action. A “taking” may more readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government . . . than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the public good.

Id. (citations omitted). Consistent with the Penn Central opinion, the Supreme Court of the United States has further explained that, when considering whether an impermissible taking has occurred, courts should consider: (i) the economic impact of the action; (ii) its interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and (iii) the character of the governmental action. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979).

Based upon the foregoing, many questions arise in the context of a chapter 9 debtor seeking to cramdown the holders of debt, particularly special revenue debt. Can a municipal debtor impair covenants, such as the covenant to control the value of the stream of special revenues – i.e., covenants with respect to controlling the proverbial spigot – without violating the Fifth Amendment? Is a municipal debtor entitled to divert special revenues to pay additional obligations for the good of the municipality? To the extent certain provisions of the contractual relationship between a municipal debtor and a creditor secured by special revenues are deemed property, the Fifth Amendment arguably prohibits such actions or, at least, imposes obstacles to the debtor’s ability to do so.

E. State Trust Law May Remove Special Revenues From A Municipal Debtor’s Control and Its Ability to Impair in a Case Under Chapter 9.

As mentioned above, some state laws provide that special revenues pledged to the repayment of special revenue obligations are pledged and held in trust. For example, the Supreme Court of Alabama has stressed, a pledge “means set apart, appropriated, or charged with the payment of a specific obligation authorized by law. . . . That the pledge may, by appropriate remedy, require such revenues conserved and applied to the secured demand . . . needs no citation of authority.” Heustess v. Hearin, 104 So. 273, 274 (Ala. 1925). See also Sylvan G. Feldstein, et al., The Handbook of Municipal Bonds 1295 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. eds., 2008) (defining “pledged revenues” as “revenues legally pledged to the repayment” of the warrants).

It is fundamental that a debtor can only restructure “claims” against it in accordance with the requirements of the Bankruptcy Code. “[A] debtor owes a ‘debt’ to [a] creditor, who has a ‘claim’ against the debtor.” In re Threatt, No. 04-82082C-13D, 2004 WL 2905344, at *2 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Dec. 13, 2004) (quoting 8 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1300.12[5] (15th ed. 2d. rev. 2004)). “Claims against a debtor” are defined as including “claims against the property of the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 102(2) (emphasis added).4 These fundamental principles of bankruptcy law were incorporated into chapter 9. When special revenues are by state law transferred to be held in trust for the benefit of the holders of the debt secured by the special revenues, the municipal debtor may not be able to impair the creditors’ property interests in the revenues.

A bankruptcy court must look to state law to determine the debtor’s interest in a particular piece of property. Under settled principles of state trust law, property held in trust by one for the benefit of another is deemed to be property belonging to the beneficiary, not the trustee. Because, under state law, trust assets belong to the beneficiaries, the trust assets are not debtor’s property or property of the debtor’s estate, and shall not be distributed to any other creditors or sold unless all trust beneficiaries have been paid. See, e.g., In re Monterey House, Inc., 71 B.R. 244 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986) (“That the corpus of a trust is not property of the estate is so widely accepted as to be beyond dispute.”); Matter of Vacuum Corp., 215 B.R. 277, 280 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1997) (“Because the debtor does not own an equitable interest in property he holds in trust for another, that interest is not ‘property of the estate’ and is also not ‘property of the debtor’ for purposes of § 547(b).”); Matter of Quality Holstein Leasing, 752 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir. 1985) (“Congress did not mean to authorize a bankruptcy estate to benefit from property that the debtor did not own.”); United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 205 n. 10 (1983) (“Congress plainly excluded property of others held by the debtor in trust at the time of the filing of the petition.”); Pearlman v. Reliance Ins. Co., 371 U.S. 132, 135-36 (1962) (“[Bankruptcy law] simply does not authorize a trustee to distribute other people’s property among a bankrupt’s creditors.”).5

Courts have treated numerous types of municipal debtors as “trustees” of funds held on behalf of municipal bondholders. See, e.g., State ex rel. Central Auxiliary Corp. v. Rorabeck, 108 P.2d 601, 603 (Mont. 1941) (officers of irrigation district responsible for levy and collection of tax sufficient to pay principal and interest on bonds of the district, as well as county treasurer who is custodian of those funds, are trustees for district bondholders); Blackford v. City of Libby, 62 P.2d 216, 217-18 (Mont. 1936) (city becomes trustee on behalf of warrantholders of special improvement district); Fidelity Trust Co. v. Vill. of Stickney, 129 F.2d 506 (7th Cir. 1942) (holding the money which municipality collects in payment of special assessments is trust fund). In those cases, the courts held that the municipality merely served as a custodian of the funds held for the bondholders, and could not apply the funds toward other purposes. See, e.g., In re City of Columbia Falls, Mont., 143 B.R. 750, 762 (D. Mont. 1992) (“A fund that is derived from a special levy or one created for a specific purpose is in the hands of municipal officials in trust. The municipality is merely a custodian, and its duties relative to such funds are purely ministerial. . . .”; holding funds held in trust may not be applied to purchase of other property). In addition, courts have found a fiduciary relationship exists between the municipality and the bondholders. See, e.g., Vill. of Brookfield v. Prentis, 101 F.2d 516 (7th Cir. 1939) (municipality issuing special assessment bonds for local improvement is a trustee of the special assessment funds charged with all duties of such a fiduciary, including the obligation to spread the assessment, collect it, and make disbursement thereof in conformity with the statutory provisions to those holding bonds payable out of the assessments); Sampson v. Vill. of Stickney, 173 N.E.2d 557 (Ill. App. 1961) (holding special assessments bondholder entitled to accounting from municipality who acted as trustee; “[t]he rule is that when a municipality issues special assessment bonds it becomes a trustee of the funds resulting from the collection under the special assessments, and is charged with all attending fiduciary duties.”).

Based upon the foregoing, a bankruptcy court could find that, because the holders of debt secured by special revenues hold an ownership interest solely in the special revenues, and because the special revenues are held in trust and are not property of the debtor, such holders do not have a claim against the debtor or the debtor’s property. See, e.g., Ni-Fuel Co. v. Jackson, 257 B.R. 600, 619 (N.D. Okla. 2000) (remanding to state court those claims which are not “property of the estate,” and involved “no claims” against the bankrupt debtors); In re Threatt, 2004 WL 2905344, at *2 (holding the movant has “no claim” against the debtor or against any property of the debtor; hence, there is no debt owed to movant and movant is not a creditor in the case). Without a claim against the debtor or the property of the debtor, the holder of debt secured by special revenues is arguably not subject to the cram-down provisions contained in the Bankruptcy Code.

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Footnotes

1 U.S. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n, Field Hearing on the State of the Municipal Securities Market, Distressed Communities, Remarks of James E. Spiotto, July 29, 2011, at 36 (generally, foreclosure is not permitted for essential governmental property as it would be against public policy). http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/municipalsecurities/statements072911/spiotto.pdf (the “Spiotto Statements”).

2 See also Spiotto Statements.

3 For an excellent discussion of the history or chapter 9 and the 1988 Amendments, see Spiotto Statements.

4 11 U.S.C. § 101 also defines the term “claim” to mean—(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.”

5 Further, the Senate Report on the 1978 Bankruptcy Act and statements of the floor managers of the Act in both the House and Senate demonstrate that the Bankruptcy Act “will not affect various statutory provisions . . . that create a trust fund for the benefit of a creditor of the debtor.” See S. Rep. No. 989 at 82, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1978, pp. 5787 at 5868; 124 Cong. Rec. S17.413 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Sen. DeConconcini); 129 Cong. Rec. H11.096 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards).

Last Updated: April 28 2014
Article by David Lemke, Blake D. Roth and Courtney Rogers
Waller Lansden Dortch & Davis

For further information visit Waller




Hedge Funds Take Muni-Bond Market By Storm.

Something big is cooking in Puerto Rico, and it demands our immediate investment attention.

For the last seven years, the beleaguered Puerto Rican economy has been mired in the muck, enduring GDP contraction in five of those seven years.

To keep the commonwealth afloat, policymakers have suffered through innumerable debt offerings, which now tally roughly $73 billion, according to bond documents.

But did Puerto Rico just hit rock bottom in February?

Likely so.

In February, the three largest rating firms slashed Puerto Rico’s credit below investment grade, citing “liquidity problems” as the culprit.

Since then, however, the commonwealth has been getting tons of “big money” attention.

Puerto Rico’s mid-March bond issue (valued at $3.5 billion) is now the largest U.S. municipal junk bond sale in history.

Trading of the bonds has been fast and furious, with demand outstripping supply by a huge margin.

Orders totaled more than $16 billion from 270 different accounts.

The second-most-popular bond in the first quarter had orders totaling only $131 million.

Yields on the bonds have spiked as high as 9.425%.

 

But here’s where the story really gets juicy . . .

Hedge funds accounted for roughly 70% of the Puerto Rican bond issue.

Why is that significant? Because hedge funds rarely dip their toes into the municipal bond pool.

Och-Ziff Capital Management, Paulson & Co, Fir Tree Partners, Perry Capital LLC and Brigade Capital Management each bought more than $100 million of the bonds.

Billionaire hedge fund manager, John Paulson, is among the believers, saying that “Puerto Rico will become the Singapore of the Caribbean.”

Paulson has municipal debt interests in Puerto Rican hotels and continues to strategically add to his Puerto Rican portfolio. In fact, he’s on pace to invest $1 billion in the territory over the next two years, mostly through real estate.

The fact that Puerto Rico’s governor just announced that it will balance the budget without selling debt – for the first time in 20 years – only adds to the investment appeal.

One particular stock now stands ready to explode as a result of the situation.

Onward and Upward,

Robert Williams

Founder, Wall Street Daily




Why Insured Municipal Bonds are Staging a Comeback.

Since 2005, the percentage of municipal bonds that are insured has plummeted. But, it’s recently started to rise.

After a long dry spell, we are starting to see renewed interest and growth in the insured municipal bond market. For investors, the promising outlook may be due to the recent outperformance of insured bonds relative to uninsured bonds. For financially troubled municipal issuers, the recent credit-rating upgrades by Standard & Poor’s (S&P) of two large bond insurers has aided the growth of the insured municipal bond market.

Signs of growth in the market

In 2005, the percentage of municipal bonds that were insured was 57%; in 2012, it was 3.5%. Why the dramatic fall? Bond insurers were obligated to pay for underperforming or defaulted structured-finance instruments (i.e., mortgage-backed securities) that they insured during the financial crisis in 2008, which weakened the financial condition of the insurers.

Today, insured municipal bonds are showing strong signs of a recovery. The percentage of municipal bonds that were insured in 2013 increased to 3.9% (the first annual increase since 2005.), and the rise has continued this year, hitting 4.3% as of April 30, 2014. Bond insurers expect the insured market to increase to 7.0% to 8.0% of issuance later in 2014.

At the same time, the rating agencies are more bullish on the companies that insure municipal bonds. S&P upgraded two of them in March: Assured Guaranty (AA/stable) and National Public Finance (MBIA) (AA-/stable). The upgrades were supported by the insurers’ strong capital levels, good operating performance, a decline in their legacy structured-finance portfolios and their payment of claims for recent high-profile municipal bankruptcies. Higher credit ratings will help support the insured municipal market by increasing the value of bond insurance and will also make bond insurance more attractive to issuers by lowering borrowing costs.

Why consider insured municipal bonds?

Municipal bond insurance does not cover market risk due to interest rate movements, but it can help investors reduce credit risk in an overall portfolio. Based on current pricing of selected Detroit and Puerto Rico credits, investors can see the value of municipal bond insurance. The table below shows that credits wrapped with insurance from Assured Guaranty performed 20+ points better than the same uninsured bonds following Detroit’s bankruptcy and the selloff of Puerto Rico bonds over their financial concerns.

Conclusion

After experiencing years of decline, we believe the insured portion of the municipal bond market is staging a comeback. Suitable investors in higher tax brackets may wish to talk to their advisors about adding insured municipal bonds to their long-term fixed income allocations.

 

Sources

The Bond Buyer, “Bond Insurance: Then & Now: The Revival of an Industry,” April 30, 2014
Citi, “U.S. Municipal Strategy Special Focus: The Return of Monolines,” March 28, 2014
Bank of America Merrill Lynch, “Municipal Weekly,” May 2, 2014
Standard & Poor’s, “U.S. Bond Insurance and the Financial Guarantee Sector Stand at a Crossroads”
Important information

Municipal securities are subject to the risk that legislative or economic conditions could affect an issuer’s ability to make payments of principal and/ or interest.

NOT FDIC INSURED MAY LOSE VALUE NO BANK GUARANTEE
All data provided by Invesco unless otherwise noted.

Invesco Distributors, Inc. is a U.S. distributor for retail mutual funds, exchange-traded funds, institutional money market funds and unit investment trusts.

Invesco unit investment trusts are distributed by the sponsor, Invesco Capital Markets, Inc. and broker dealers including Invesco Distributors, Inc. These Invesco entities are indirect, wholly owned subsidiaries of Invesco Ltd.

By Tim O’Reilly and Greg Rawls

©2014 Invesco Ltd. All rights reserved.

blog.invesco.us.com

 




S&P: Limited Visibility For Climate Change's Effects on U.S. State and Local Government Credit Quality.

Weather-related events place local governments, which are generally the first responders to disaster, on the front lines of caring for their citizens. They must also manage budget volatility following such events, as well as repair and adapt their infrastructure to prepare for changing risks. In Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services’ experience, U.S. municipal and state governments have historically been able to manage the risk of natural disasters without diminishing their credit quality. The credit impact of most natural disasters has been limited. There are some exceptions, however: Hurricane Katrina, which hit an underprepared Gulf Coast at a time when the federal government was ill-equipped to respond, led to a number of negative credit actions on local communities and Louisiana, and Hurricane Ike led to a downgrade of Galveston, Texas’ general obligation and water and sewer ratings. To some extent, our ratings on local governments and states incorporate the potential for disasters in high-risk areas, such as the Gulf Coast and the earthquake-prone West, by considering financial flexibility and liquidity in the context of potential losses from a major storm or quake. However, the potential for increasingly frequent climate-related disasters makes the issue more relevant for local governments all across the U.S.

While the timing and severity of weather events remain unpredictable, the increasing uncertainty arising from changing climate patterns represents a difficult-to-quantify risk for local governments. This risk could result in more credit pressure for local governments if the federal government were to not provide timely and sufficient financial support for relief, or if the local government’s ability to prepare for disasters — for example through improvements that reduce the impact on infrastructure of extreme weather, transportation adaptation, or flood control measures — comes at the cost of financial flexibility and increased leverage.

Overview

In our 2011 article on natural disasters and credit quality (see “Ready for the Big One? How Natural Disasters Can Affect U.S. Local Governments’ Credit Quality,” on Ratings Direct), we noted that Standard & Poor’s evaluates the impact of natural disasters in light of key credit factors — both quantitative (such as the government’s financial position and the tax base’s relative strength and diversity) and qualitative (including management’s emergency preparedness and the adequacy of its response).

The Effects Of Weather Events On U.S. Municipal Governments

The immediate effects of extreme weather on local governments may include volatile fiscal performance, strained liquidity, increasing debt burdens, and economic loss during periods of extended extreme weather or disaster recovery. While federal disaster relief is available, increased recovery costs for local governments could result if future federal government austerity affects reimbursement levels. Even when federal relief is available, it might not completely cover the loss of taxing and revenue capacity for entities that rely on property taxes and retail sales, and distribution of federal funds can take several years. Municipalities, therefore, may be tasked with managing the immediate disaster costs — for emergency response costs, debris removal, and restoration of services — using immediately available liquid resources at a time when revenue streams, such as sales taxes and development-related fees, may temporarily decline. If future federal budgets were to limit disaster relief (from the Federal Emergency Management Agency, for instance), an increase in the magnitude and frequency of weather-related events could exacerbate this dynamic over time, forcing local governments to assume more of the recovery costs.

Perhaps most difficult to measure are the long-run economic consequences of a failure to prepare for climate change. In the past two years alone, major weather events have been severe enough to put a dent in national GDP growth for a short time. By some estimates, the deep freeze that gripped the eastern U.S. in early 2014 crimped national first quarter 2014 GDP growth by one- to two-tenths of a percentage point, and Superstorm Sandy lowered growth during the fourth quarter of 2012 although the recovery effort quickly boosted output once again. At the local and regional level, short-run economic effects may be more pronounced and are sometimes accompanied by lost taxing capacity when a portion of the property tax base is damaged. The interdependence of urban infrastructure, such as water and wastewater, power, transportation, and communications systems can magnify the downside risk, as we saw from the damage to the entire New York metropolitan region and the New Jersey coast following Superstorm Sandy.

These short-term losses may be followed by a rebound in GDP as construction and rebuilding activity ramp up following a disaster. Over the long run, however, taxing capacity at the local level may suffer if, for example, there are significant out-migrations as occurred following Hurricane Katrina, or if reconstruction and development are prohibited in high-risk areas following a disaster, as has occurred in many communities in the Gulf Coast. In other cases, such as in California’s Sacramento Valley, we have observed the dampening effect of weather-related risk on private development activity in high-risk areas as insurers tighten their underwriting standards for disaster coverage, and governments place constraints on new development. This limits the tax base growth that many municipal issuers rely on to fund their recurring and disaster-related expenditures.

Responding To Climate-Change Risk: Local Strategies And Their Credit Effects

State and local governments are key stakeholders in national climate change-related efforts. States create policies and programs that encourage or discourage adaptation and mitigation at all levels of government through regulation, funding, and public adoption of “clean” technologies. Currently, many state and local governments’ efforts to address climate change have focused on land-use planning and incremental improvements to public facilities and infrastructure. Some state and local efforts to reduce carbon emissions have also been undertaken: most notably, in 2012, California became the first state to implement a cap-and-trade program to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, which generates a relatively small amount of revenue for the state, but which we believe has had little effect on the state’s credit quality.

A growing number of state and local governments are also making adaptive improvements to reduce the effects of weather events on critical infrastructure. These include flood control improvements and water storage and delivery system upgrades, as well as storm-preparedness improvements by utility and transit providers to increase infrastructure resistance to severe storms.

In California’s Sacramento Valley, for instance, joint federal and local efforts are currently underway to finance levee improvements designed to achieve 200-year flood protection, according to FEMA’s most recent standards, which have become stricter in the wake of Hurricane Katrina and subsequent storms. These types of financing projects increase debt burdens and cost-sharing with federal and state agencies. If shared revenues and tax-supported debt together are not sufficient to cover costs, these projects may have the potential to erode credit quality by placing strain on resources available for capital spending.

New York State’s Sea Level Rise Task Force is one example of a nonfederal effort to identify and address climate change. The 2010 task force report identifies the risks associated with climate change — particularly rising sea levels — to communities and infrastructure. It also recommends actions for state and local governments to undertake to address these risks, including studying the impact of sea-level change on communities, making regulatory changes to address sea level change, implementing funding mechanisms, and seeking federal aid for adaptation and disaster-prevention measures. However, the recommendations are short on cost details.

In our view, New York’s task force and the California investment highlight some of the efforts underway to understand and mitigate weather-related vulnerability. We expect continued focus on this area given the pattern of natural disaster activity over the past decade. The pace and progress of actual investments will likely be slow due to funding constraints at all levels of government.

What’s Costlier, Preparing Or Doing Nothing?

Ultimately, the risk for U.S. public finance issuers of a changing climate emanate from the impact of unpredictable weather patterns on infrastructure and economic growth. While we continue to believe that local governments — in collaboration with regional, state, and federal entities -– can withstand the effects of extreme weather with limited impact on credit quality, only time will tell whether an increase in the unpredictability of climate-related events will make ratings more volatile. But as evidence of climate change and related risks mounts, the costs associated with not preparing for them may continue to grow.

20-May-2014

 

Primary Credit Analyst: Sarah Sullivant, San Francisco (1) 415-371-5051;
sarah.sullivant@standardandpoors.com
Secondary Contacts: Robin L Prunty, New York (1) 212-438-2081;
robin.prunty@standardandpoors.com
Lindsay Wilhelm, New York (1) 212-438-2301;
lindsay.wilhelm@standardandpoors.com
Victor M Medeiros, Boston (1) 617-530-8305;
victor.medeiros@standardandpoors.com
Horacio G Aldrete-Sanchez, Dallas (1) 214-871-1426;
horacio.aldrete@standardandpoors.com
Jeffrey J Previdi, New York (1) 212-438-1796;
jeff.previdi@standardandpoors.com

 




Municipal Bond Market Monthly - Janney Fixed Income Strategy - May 22, 2014

ay 22, 2014

MUNICIPAL BOND MARKET MONTHLY – JANNEY FIXED INCOME STRATEGY – May 22, 2014




Awakening the Potential of Clean Energy Bonds.

A paper by the Brookings-Rockefeller Project on State and Metropolitan Innovation has investigated the barriers that are currently holding back widespread adoption of clean energy bonds. The paper has provided recommendations for development finance agencies seeking to tap their potential.

Clean energy bonds hold enormous potential to drive investment in renewable power and energy efficiency and reduce their cost of capital. Yet progress has been sluggish with only a handful of examples of clean energy bonds to date.

The paper, “Clean Energy Finance through the Bond Market: A New Option for Progress,” was released on April 9. It details the difficult environment that currently exists with regard to financing clean energy projects.

Strengthening Weak Investment

Fickle federal support, extremely high costs of capital, and weak demand for clean energy investments have dampened growth. But the report said state, municipal and local bonds offer a proven way to address these issues, following a model that has been successfully used to fund major infrastructure projects throughout the past century.

The Council of Development Finance Agencies (CDFA) has identified over 50,000 state, county and municipal development finance agencies with a total tax-exempt bond market of $3 trillion. CDFA estimates the potential for clean energy bonds as being “in the tens of billions of dollars in the next several years.”

Building New Programs

Compared to this impressive potential, the current list of clean energy bond offerings is staggeringly small. New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) has raised $24.3 million in bonds that will be used to finance energy efficiency improvements. Smaller offerings have recently taken place in Oregon, Connecticut and Pennsylvania.

Since 2009, Morris County, N.J. has used a combination of bonds and power purchase agreements to finance solar installations. And Hawaii has enacted legislation to issue clean energy bonds funded in part by an on-bill utility surcharge.

Weighing Risk and Return

Toby Rittner, president and CEO of CDFA and coauthor of the report, said he sees the mismatch between the potential of clean energy bonds and their current levels as a failure by development finance agencies, investors and rating agencies to appreciate the low risk that clean energy projects offer.

“With energy, we get frustrated or we get concerned about risk. It really doesn’t make a whole lot of sense. We’ve found very little historical evidence to say why there is this concern over risk,” Rittner said. “We need the market to frame projects in a way where they’re showing there’s reduced risk. Bond-financed clean energy projects are the same risk as a traditional piece of infrastructure.”

Collaboration between state energy offices and development finance agencies can help initiate clean energy investment, according to the report. Rittner said local organizations and municipalities should lead the way by creating clean energy investment options.

“We’re recommending a much more intensive collaboration between clean energy financing and bonding officials,” said Lew Milford, president of Clean Energy Group (CEG) and coauthor of the report, during a webinar called Clean Energy Financing through the Bond Market. The webinar, which referenced the release of the Brookings report, took place on April 22 and was hosted by CDFA, Brookings and CEG.

“States should be considering things like joint investment plans,” Milford said. He also said states should be looking at instruments like pooled bonds for clean energy. He recommends finding ways to link clean energy funds and funds raised by utilities and the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to create larger pools of capital.

New York leveraged EPA funds last year. Jeff Pitkin, treasurer of NYSERDA, said during the webinar that this bond deal won the 2013 Deal of the Year Award for small issuer financing from The Bond Buyer. The state used a credit enhancement guarantee that included EPA funding.

Rittner has identified four major problems that currently inhibit the widespread use of infrastructure bonds for clean energy projects.

Changing Development Finance

The first major barrier is changing how the development finance agencies perceive these projects as risky since they simply aren’t used to financing energy projects.

“In the bond world and in the finance world, we finance roads and bridges and sewers and wastewater treatment facilities and city halls,” Rittner said. “We finance all sorts of infrastructure with traditional financing like bonds.”

It is not surprising that development finance agencies with little experience or technical knowledge of clean energy projects are hesitant to step up to the plate. But improved cooperation between these agencies and clean energy offices is critical to widespread bond funding of clean energy, sharing of information, and reduction of perceived risks.

Building Market Scale

The second major issue is that the lack of a large market for clean energy bonds is inhibiting rapid scaling. In essence, most state and local agencies are waiting until the clean energy finance model has been proven, with few willing to take the lead by innovating and experimenting with different financing models.

“The only way to get to scale is to get a lot of small places all heading in the same direction,” Rittner said. Yet he sees evidence that this is starting to happen, since some states are experimenting with credit enhancement tools through green banks and PACE financing programs.

Standardizing Performance Data

Third, lack of standardized documentation and performance data make it difficult to convince institutional investors or ratings agencies of how safe clean energy investments really are. While the data that does exist supports this claim, it is lacking in both quantity and quality.

Improved data and increased standardization will ultimately result in securitized portfolios of clean energy loans that investors can purchase and trade. A further challenge of securitization is that, as Rittner said, “no two deals are the same, but you can create really big tranches of standard programs or portfolios” that can be bundled into single products.

“We need a lot more standardization,” Milford said. “A lot more documentation, a lot more data. We’ve suggested a number of things that can be done to get to that point. A lot more work needs to be done in this space and federal labs can play a role as well.”

A number of initiatives led by National Renewable Energy Laboratory’s Solar Access to Public Capital working group and Environmental Defense Fund’s Investor Confidence Project are currently focused on developing securitized solar PV and energy efficiency markets. Local and state agencies have a part to play by adopting standardized documentation and data collection processes.

“We need to develop more substantial amounts of performance data that would allow these structures to stand on their own,” Pitkin said.

Creating Investor Demand

Finally, institutional investor demand for clean energy bonds remains limited. “I think this is changing rapidly,” Rittner said.

Rittner said sales of energy efficiency loan portfolios in Oregon, New York, Connecticut and Pennsylvania in the last 18 months are signs of this change. Despite failing to attract attention from Wall Street, these portfolios have been oversubscribed and shown strong performance and low default rates.

Rittner said he sees it as just a matter of time before rating agencies and institutional investors stand up and take notice. He said he anticipates this sea change will take place during the next two years – as long as irresponsible market players do not set the industry back.

“We think there is a demand for clean energy securities,” Milford said. “We’re looking for partners to try to help us achieve a lot of these goals.”

“I think we’ve seen efficient markets and processes for structured finance products,” Pitkin said. “We think that same market has the potential to deal with securitization. The traditional methodology that’s used relies upon a great deal of historical information that this sector doesn’t have yet.”

by Michael Puckett and Kat Friedrich

You may email the authors of any of the Clean Energy Finance Forum’s articles via our contact form.

 




Municipal Issuer Brief - May 19, 2014

Municipal Issuer Brief – May 19, 2014




S&P: How Utilities Pay For Post-Sandy "Storm-Hardening" Infrastructure Investments Could Factor Into Credit Quality.

In October 2012, Superstorm Sandy knocked out electric service to 1.4 million of New York’s Consolidated Edison Inc.’s approximately 3.3 million electric customers and about 920,000 of Long Island Power Authority’s (LIPA) approximately 1.1. million customers. The lights also went out for about 1.7 million of New Jersey’s Public Service Electric & Gas Co.’s (PSE&G) 2.2 million electric customers. For many, the outages lasted weeks, resulting in strong economic impacts that reverberated through the region as businesses closed and gasoline sales ground to a halt. Because the repercussions of the storm-related power outages were so wide, utility and government officials realized they needed strong utility responses to prevent this from happening again. Specifically, the utilities clearly needed to pursue investments in what the industry calls “storm hardening.”

Although these utilities’ solutions and their costs share common elements, the funding sources available reflect varying views among government officials as to where the financial responsibility for funding these investments lies. The availability of federal aid is also an important element of the funding solutions. Standard & Poor’s believes that the means for funding and cost recovery can be important factors in determining credit quality.

Overview

The Storm-Hardening Programs’ Common Attributes

Given the breadth of these utilities’ service areas and their extensive coastal exposures, storm hardening costs will be substantial — about $1 billion per utility. Common elements of their storm hardening programs include raising key structures, such as substations, to heights that are better able to withstand storm surges. The utilities will also replace existing poles with stronger poles in those areas at risk for storm surges and they will step up activities to reduce the potential for trees and branches knocking down power lines.

FEMA Comes To LIPA’s Aid

The long outages that LIPA’s customers experienced triggered considerable ire among customers and politicians, leading to state legislation that imposed greater regulatory oversight. It whittled LIPA’s capacity to set rates on its own, subjecting rate adjustments to hearings if rate increase proposals exceed prescribed thresholds. In addition, the legislation transformed the utility’s operations by transferring day-to-day operations to an affiliate of one of the region’s investor-owned utilities and sets three days as the baseline for restoring service following a major power failure. If LIPA does not meet this target, the system operator must provide New York’s Department of Public Service with an assessment of the utility’s pre-event preparedness and post-event restoration efforts. The state also asked LIPA to freeze its base rates for at least one year, which it did, and the state is seeking a second year on that freeze. We believe these actions could reduce the utility’s financial flexibility. We consider financial flexibility to be critical to responding to potentially volatile costs and preserving credit quality. Our negative outlook on LIPA reflects the constraints these conditions could impose on financial performance.

Against the backdrop of the state’s response to the storm outages, the utility found a financing lifeline in the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). FEMA reimbursed LIPA for about 90% of its storm restoration costs. The agency reimburses these types of costs for not-for-profit utilities because they cannot take advantage of the federal tax benefits that investor-owned utilities can. Moreover, in an unusual move, the agency also agreed to finance much of LIPA’s prospective storm hardening activities. This decision provides the utility with the capacity to buttress its system without incurring substantial infrastructure investment financing needs while its base rates remain frozen. The FEMA reimbursement plan helps shore up credit quality while enabling LIPA to invest in reliability as it faces ratemaking constraints.

Limits On Consolidated Edison’s Options

Unlike LIPA, New York’s Consolidated Edison, an investor-owned utility, will not have the benefit of FEMA resources to strengthen its system’s storm resiliency. It also funded its storm recovery and restoration costs differently from LIPA, by capitalizing portions of its $363 million of spending. It recorded the uncapitalized balance as a regulatory asset for deferred recovery. In 2012, the company had no current federal income tax liability as a result of, among other things, deduction of costs incurred in connection with Sandy.

Consolidated Edison asked the state’s rate regulator for cost recovery for about $1 billion of prospective storm hardening projects. The regulator approved the projects, albeit within a framework of stable rates. We believe that the company will need to effectively control costs and avoid cost overruns in its sizable capital program to mitigate the rate freeze’s impact. The costs of storm hardening also need to be considered within the context of the recent East Harlem natural gas explosion. Although the explosion’s cause has yet to be determined, and we believe Consolidated Edison carries insurance that should cover a portion of potential costs if it is found liable, it is our view that such a finding could lead to penalties and higher compliance costs for the utility’s aging gas distribution system. Our outlook on the company is stable, but possible penalties and additional capital investment needs could harm its financial condition and might lead to modestly lower ratings.

PSE&G Benefits From Supportive State Regulation

By comparison, neighboring PSE&G appears to operate under more beneficial state regulation. On May 1, the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities’ staff recommended that the regulator allow the utility to recover from customers $1.2 billion of the $2.6 billion of the multiyear storm hardening investments it had proposed. PSE&G ultimately plans to align its storm hardening spending with the amounts the regulator approves. Staff’s recommendation includes a 9.75% return on equity on the first $1 billion of investment and a rate of return on the balance that this utility’s next rate case will determine.

Vehicles For Recovering Investments Can Influence Credit Quality

Although very different avenues for funding storm hardening investments are available to these utilities, and some of the investments might weigh negatively on credit quality, the utilities and their regulators nevertheless are consistent in recognizing that investments that will help these systems better withstand storms are critical to enhancing operational predictability and improving customer satisfaction. Although we believe that these investments can contribute to greater operating stability and benefit utilities’ enterprise and financial risk profiles, cost recovery — whether from customers or government reimbursements — remains an overarching consideration for credit quality.

Primary Credit Analyst: David N Bodek, New York (1) 212-438-7969;
david.bodek@standardandpoors.com
Secondary Contacts: Geoffrey E Buswick, Boston (1) 617-530-8311;
geoffrey.buswick@standardandpoors.com
Kyle M Loughlin, New York (1) 212-438-7804;
kyle.loughlin@standardandpoors.com
Barbara A Eiseman, New York (1) 212-438-7666;
barbara.eiseman@standardandpoors.com
Gabe Grosberg, New York (1) 212-438-6043;
gabe.grosberg@standardandpoors.com

 




U.S. School Revenue Dropped in 2012 for First Time in 35 Years.

Public elementary and secondary schools saw annual revenue decline $5 billion in 2012, the first drop since 1977, according to a U.S. Census Bureau report.

Total expenditures fell for a third consecutive year, to $594 billion, a drop of $2.5 billion, according to the study of the 50 states and the District of Columbia issued today in Washington.

New York was the top spender, at $19,552 per pupil. The District of Columbia, AlaskaNew Jerseyand Connecticut rounded out the top five.

The states spending the least per pupil were Utah, at $6,206, followed by Idaho, Oklahoma, Arizona and Mississippi.

State governments were the leading source of support for public schools, with $270 billion provided in 2012. Local taxes followed closely at $265 billion, the report said.

By Tim Jones  May 22, 2014 11:56 AM PT  

To contact the reporter on this story: Tim Jones in Chicago at tjones58@bloomberg.net

To contact the editors responsible for this story: Stephen Merelman at smerelman@bloomberg.netStacie Sherman

 




Moody's: Directing Investments at New Priorities Can Benefit Not-for-Profit Hospitals.

 New York, May 21, 2014 — Hospital systems that direct their investment dollars into improving efficiency, information technology and outpatient services will be the ones best positioned to soften the impact of declining patient utilization rates, says Moody’s Investors Service in the report “Building Value: Investments Aimed at New Priorities Create Opportunities for Not-For-Profit Hospitals.”

“Hospital systems that can supplement inpatient revenue with new, diversified revenue streams are more likely to remain successful and enhance consumer value,” says Brad Spielman, a Moody’s Vice President and Senior Credit Officer. “These investments are generally less expensive than building inpatient capacity and can help mitigate inpatient utilization declines.”

The outpatient services of the hospitals, however, are facing several new types of competitors as consumers become more sensitive to price. Nontraditional competitors include the healthcare services provided by drug stores and unaffiliated outpatient centers.

The popularity of health insurance plans with high deductibles is helping to drive the growth in less expensive outpatient services, says Moody’s.

“As the dominant healthcare model in the country shifts from volume to value, income pressures will increase, putting hospitals’ income statements at further risk,” says Moody’s Spielman.

Many organizations have also hitched their pursuit of value to the acquisition and implementation of comprehensive and expensive IT systems. The return on these investments can be allusive, while the cost can immediately weaken both income statements and balance sheets, says Moody’s.

For more information, Moody’s research subscribers can access this report at

https://www.moodys.com/research/PBM_PBM170100.

***

NOTE TO JOURNALISTS ONLY: For more information, please call one of our global press information hotlines: New York +1-212-553-0376, London +44-20-7772-5456, Tokyo +813-5408-4110, Hong Kong +852-3758-1350, Sydney +61-2-9270-8141, Mexico City 001-888-779-5833, São Paulo 0800-891-2518, or Buenos Aires 0800-666-3506. You can also email us at mediarelations@moodys.com or visit our web site at www.moodys.com.

Brad Spielman
VP – Senior Credit Officer
Public Finance Group
Moody’s Investors Service, Inc.
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Suite 1900
San Francisco, CA 94111
U.S.A.
JOURNALISTS: 212-553-0376
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Kendra M. Smith
MD – Public Finance
Public Finance Group
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Releasing Office:
Moody’s Investors Service, Inc.
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Preparer Survey on the Effectiveness of Statement 34.

The Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) is currently conducting pre-agenda research to inform its assessment of the effectiveness of Statement No. 34, Basic Financial Statements—and Management’s Discussion and Analysis—for State and Local Governments, and related standards. The objective of this research is to gather feedback on these broad questions:

The GASB has developed an online survey to gather feedback from preparers of governmental financial statements. The GASB would greatly appreciate you taking the time to complete the preparer survey, which can be accessed by following this link http://www.gasb.org/GASB-reexam-survey.

It is anticipated that the survey will take longer than a typical GASB survey, given the magnitude of the requirements in Statement 34. You can, however, download a copy of the survey in its entirety to consider before entering your responses into the online version. The deadline for completing the survey is Friday, June 6, 2014.

Your input is vital to the GASB’s standards-setting process. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact Roberta Reese (rereese@gasb.org) or Lisa Parker (lrparker@gasb.org).




SIFMA Commends House Committee for Taking Action to Stop Eminent Domain Scheme.

Washington, DC, May 21, 2014 – SIFMA today issued the following statement from Kenneth E. Bentsen, Jr., SIFMA president and CEO, after the House Committee on Appropriations voted to adopt a legislative provision (Section 233) which, if signed into law, would effectively eliminate the threat that eminent domain could be used to seize mortgages, a serious concern of housing market participants for over two years:

“SIFMA commends the members of the House Committee on Appropriations for adopting a provision which would  prevent the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) from using taxpayer monies to facilitate a scheme by which eminent domain would be used to seize mortgage loans from Main Street investors.  Should FHA allow this scheme to move forward, investors in pension plans, 401Ks, mutual funds and other savings and retirement accounts will suffer the losses.  Today’s action is an important development in the fight to remove a cloud hanging over our housing markets.”

 




MuniNet Guide: Five Handy Online Calculators for Municipal Research.

We’ve come a long way from the abacus.

The online world is not flat, which continues to increase the power of the Internet.  Certainly, we can access vast amounts of information online.  We can also, in a growing number of examples,interact with that information, through tools or calculators that allow us to change variables and see the impact of those changes.

At what rate are these calculators cropping up and changing the online experience?  Well, we don’t have a calculator for that.  (Not yet, at least.)  But we can point you to five powerful online tools that can help with your municipal-related research.

Continue reading.




Investors Withdraw Appeals Against California Eminent Domain Plan.

May 16 (Reuters) – Pacific Investment Management Co, BlackRock Inc and DoubleLine Capital LP and other investors on Friday withdrew appeals of a ruling that had dismissed their lawsuits to block a California city’s plan to seize mortgages and keep delinquent borrowers in their homes.

In a filing in the U.S. Court of Appeals in San Francisco, lawyers for mortgage-bond trustees moved to end appeals in two related cases.

The move was made because the plan, based on a legal process called eminent domain to seize private property for a public purpose, had not materialized, said John Ertman, partner at law firm Ropes & Gray, which representing mortgage trustees Wells Fargo and Deutsche Bank.

But the lawsuit would be “immediately re-filed” if the city of Richmond, California, took steps toward adopting the plan, he said.

The trustees sued Richmond last year over the plan aimed at keeping local residents who owed more than their properties were worth in their homes.

The other trustees are Bank of New York Mellon, U.S. Bank, and Wilmington Trust.

U.S. District Judge Charles Breyer ruled last September that the original case was premature, and that ruling was appealed roughly a month later. Friday’s withdrawal was filed in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in San Francisco.

“We continue to believe that using eminent domain to seize mortgage loans is unconstitutional, and harmful to homeowners and ordinary savers with a pension, 401(k) or IRA,” Ertman said.

He said the trustees were dismissing the appeal since Richmond had not progressed toward seizing loans since Judge Breyer’s ruling and the filing of their appeal seven months ago.

San Francisco-based private investment firm Mortgage Resolution Partners (MRP) crafted the eminent domain plan for Richmond. The investor group had said that if the city of Richmond was allowed to go ahead with its plan, it may result in steeper down payment requirements and higher interest rates. (Reporting by Sam Forgione; Editing by Andrew Hay)

BY SAM FORGIONE

NEW YORK Fri May 16, 2014 8:25pm EDT




SIFMA: Detroit's LTGO Treatment Would "Shatter" Muni Industry.

CHICAGO — Detroit’s bankruptcy exit plan would “send shock waves through the municipal bond market,” and the federal judge overseeing the case should reject it, the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association argued Monday in a brief filed with the bankruptcy court.

SIFMA said it realizes the difficulty that Detroit has faced in crafting a plan of debt adjustment that allows it to deliver essential services and repaying obligations.

But its proposal to repay limited-tax general obligation bondholders only 10% to 13% would be illegal under Michigan law, unfairly discriminate against a class of creditors, and cause “havoc” on a muni industry that treats GO bonds as a gold standard.

“The predictable result is that the confidence of investors in the gold standard of GO bonds would be shattered which, in turn, will require municipalities in the future to offer more generous terms, i.e., higher interest rates and a lien on specified collateral, in order to attract sufficient investors,” the association said in the brief. “The impact cannot be underestimated.”

There is no precedent in Chapter 9 for impairing a class of creditors like the LTGO bondholders so badly, SIFMA argues.

Detroit has reached a settlement with its unlimited-tax general obligation bondholders that calls for a 74% recovery. In its brief, SIFMA focuses on the city’s proposed treatment of its LTGO holders, who have not settled. Detroit filed its fourth debt plan last week, and creditors began voting on it Monday. A trial on the plan’s confirmation is set for July 24.

If the city succeeds in cramming down its LTGO holders, the move could weaken financial markets and even lead to a loss of jobs and a “stifling of economic growth,” SIFMA said.

“Given that all eyes in the bond market are on Detroit, this all but certain effect on demand for GO bonds, with resultant higher borrowing costs, would have a significant negative impact well beyond this case, on municipalities and taxpayers across the United States.”

Under Michigan state law, the LTGO holders enjoy a pledge of first budget obligation of ad valorem taxes, SIFMA argues. In addition to violating state law, the city’s proposed LTGO treatment unfairly discriminates against a class of creditors. The court should reject the plan, the association says.

It’s not the first time that SIFMA, as well as other industry groups such as the Bond Dealers of America, have blasted Detroit’s proposed treatment of its GO bondholders. SIFMA in July, days after Detroit filed for bankruptcy, warned Michigan Gov. Rick Snyder that the city’s proposal would cost cities across the state and urged him to uphold the local GO pledge.

Law firms Steinberg Shapiro & Clark and Nixon Peabody LLP filed the brief on behalf of SIFMA.

BY CAITLIN DEVITT

MAY 12, 2014 5:06pm ET




Bond Markups as Low as 3% Said Excessive to Finra in Trading.

The Wall Street watchdog that culls bond-trade data is honing in on limits for acceptable commissions that are lower than their stated guidelines.

While dealers have been told for decades that they can’t mark up bonds more than 5 percent without regulators deeming their fees excessive, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority considers the real ceiling for most corporate-bond trades as 3 percent or even less, according to three people with direct knowledge of the matter.

Government agencies have been more closely examining transactions that traditionally occurred over the telephone in a U.S. debt market that’s almost doubled in the last decade to $40 trillion, attracting record cash from the growing population of pensioners and retirees in need of fixed income. Finra is going through its bond-price data looking for evidence of wrongdoing as it tries to nab brokers who charge customers more than they should.

“You’ve got a gotcha situation where people are trying to figure out what the limit is,” said W. Hardy Callcott, a securities attorney at Sidley Austin LLP in San Francisco. “They do have thresholds for different securities, but they don’t tell you what those thresholds are.”

Brokers who take too big of a cut on bond trades may be fined by Finra or receive disciplinary actions they’re required to disclose in public records.

Tolerating Markups

Regulators probably have opted not to reveal specific limits on commissions because such guidance may lead traders to charge as much as they can, Callcott said in a telephone interview last week.

Finra has different thresholds for acceptable commissions based on market conditions and the credit quality of the bonds being traded, one of the people said. The watchdog is willing to tolerate higher markups for riskier debt, said the person, who asked not to be identified because the conversations are private.

Nancy Condon, a Finra spokeswoman, declined to comment. Finra is an independent organization that writes and enforces rules governing the activities of more than 4,140 securities firms.

Scrutiny of practices in the debt market is increasing after individuals poured about $588 billion into bond funds since the beginning of 2009, according to Investment Company Institute data.

Litvak Verdict

The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission is separately examining to what extent smaller buyers are disadvantaged and whether the behavior constitutes market manipulation, Bloomberg News reported March 20. Brokers can choose which rivals and clients may see their bond prices on electronic trading systems by turning quotes on and off.

Bonds aren’t traded as frequently as stocks, which are listed on exchanges. Some will rarely change hands, making it difficult for buyers and sellers to assess a market rate.

Finra next month is expanding its bond-price reporting into the $1.5 trillion market for private company debt, which is only sold to institutional buyers. The plan extends the reach of a system introduced in 2002 into an area more likely to be rife with questionable practices because the securities are less frequently traded.

The watchdog plans to use the data to help identify dealers who profit from excessive fees, according to the people. It’s historically been more profitable to trade bonds than stocks because the debt markets are less transparent, making it easier for brokers to take a bigger fee for each exchange.

Being Scared

Finra’s computer-enhanced surveillance has helped fuel uncertainty about what constitutes acceptable practices on Wall Street, especially after former Jefferies Group LLC mortgage-debt trader Jesse Litvak was convicted in March for taking markups on some trades that were too big.

Litvak, a former managing director, was found guilty by a federal jury on March 7 of securities fraudand making false statements connected to the U.S. government’s Troubled Asset Relief Program. He was scheduled to be sentenced May 30 and planned to appeal the decision.

Prosecutors accused Litvak of defrauding investors of $2 million by misrepresenting how much sellers were asking for securities, or what customers would pay, and keeping the difference for New York-based Jefferies.

“You can understand why people would be scared,” said Neil Barofsky, a white-collar defense attorney at Jenner & Block and former special inspector general of the U.S. government’s Troubled Asset Relief Program.

1943 Study

For Litvak, the U.S. “had a case where the facts were not overwhelming and a defense that ‘Everyone is doing it,’” Barofsky said.

The conviction may bolster government efforts to prosecute other traders and banks related to the 2008 financial crisis and its aftermath, according to Barofsky. When asked if charges against others were likely, Assistant U.S. Attorney Eric Glover said in March the investigation is “ongoing and active” and declined further comment.

Finra’s board adopted what became known as the “5 percent policy” based on a study conducted in 1943 to serve as a guideline of what’s an acceptable markup in bond trading. The watchdog said last year that it’s working on completing an updated version of the rules.

Concrete Guidance

In 2011, Finra proposed dropping a numerical guideline altogether, then decided to retain the 5 percent reference in the latest draft of the rule released in 2013.

“Other than being on the opposite side of an enforcement proceeding, it is the only concrete guidance that Finra has issued,” attorneys at law firm Bingham McCutchen LLP wrote in a February 2013 report posted on their website.

Since the 5 percent threshold for bond-trade profits is based on a 71-year-old study, “it leaves the industry to an ever-changing and arbitrary determination of what appropriate markups should be,” they said.

In 2002, a Finra predecessor introduced the Trace bond-pricing reporting system to foster competitive pricing, starting with 500 bonds. It will begin disseminating prices on corporate bonds sold privately under Rule-144A for the first time in June.

Those bonds aren’t traded as frequently, so Wall Street takes more risk in brokering the debt and usually expects to be compensated accordingly. Finra has said it’s also planning to add trades in non-agency mortgage-backed securities, another less-liquid corner of the bond market, to Trace.

The expansion is exacerbating angst among bond traders concerned that they face retroactive punishment for activities that once were accepted, according to Callcott.

“If you tell people what they’re supposed to do, in my experience the vast majority are going to try to comply with it,” Callcott said. “The thing that’s frustrating to me is that they have a number and they won’t tell you what the number is.”

By Lisa Abramowicz  May 16, 2014 12:50 PM PT

To contact the reporter on this story: Lisa Abramowicz in New York atlabramowicz@bloomberg.net

To contact the editors responsible for this story: Bob Ivry at bivry@bloomberg.net Caroline Salas Gage, Shannon D. Harrington




Illinois Launches Legal Argument for Pension Reform.

CHICAGO – Illinois acted within its sovereign authority in passing pension reforms given its precarious fiscal condition and the size of its unfunded pension obligations.

That’s the heart of the state’s initial legal defense of the pension legislation from Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan.

“In light of the magnitude of the pension problem and all of the other efforts the state has made to date, the act represents a valid exercise of the state’s reserved sovereign powers to modify contractual rights and obligations including contractual obligations of the state” under the Illinois constitution, say filings Illinois made Thursday.

Madigan filed the defense in response to a series of lawsuits seeking to overturn the December pension legislation as a violation of the state constitution which affords pension benefits strong contractual rights that cannot be impaired or diminished.

The lawsuits have been consolidated in Sangamon County Circuit Court, home of the state capital, and are being heard by Judge John W. Belz, though the Illinois Supreme Court is expected to have the final word.

Madigan’s responses to each of the lawsuits includes a response to the dozens of assertions laid out by the plaintiffs, which include the union coalition We Are One Illinois and various associations that represent state employees and retirees. In many instances, the state simply denies legal assertions made in the lawsuits.

Madigan then takes the additional step in the filings of laying out the state’s defense for adopting the pension changes, arguing they were both reasonable and necessary given the state’s precarious financial position, the size of its unfunded liabilities, and the need to fund critical services. “The Act’s limited changes to pensions were necessary to address these circumstances,” the filings contend.

The filings lay out the roots of the state’s financial deterioration and integral link to the rise in its unfunded pension obligations. Beginning around 2000 and continuing over the next decade the state’s underfunding of the systems “contributed significantly to a severe financial crisis for the state.”

That “adversely affected the long-term financial soundness of those retirement systems, the cost of financing the state’s operations and outstanding debt, and the state’s ability to provide critical services to Illinois residents and businesses.”

The filings outline steps taken by the state to improve its balance sheet and the pension system including the 2010 passage of legislation cutting pension benefits for new employees, an overhaul of its Medicaid system, spending cuts, and the 2011 enactment of a temporary income tax hike.

Those measures proved insufficient and the state’s “credit rating continued to suffer, causing it to incur still higher costs to finance its debt, thereby further reducing” revenues for critical services and to reduce unfunded liabilities.

The filings draw much of the information on the state’ fiscal struggles from a lengthy preamble to the legislation included by the attorney general’s father, House Speaker Michael Madigan, D-Chicago.

The legislation limits cost-of-living increases, caps pensionable salaries, and raises the retirement age for some while cutting employee contributions by 1%, shifting contribution calculations to a more actuarially sound method, and gives the pension funds enforcement rights over state payments.

Much of the expected $140 billion of savings stem from the COLA increases annuitants now receive. The state filings target the existing automatic COLA as a key driver for the rising pension burden and argue those adjustments “are not part of the core pension benefit.”

The state acknowledges that in past years the General Assembly failed to contribute sufficient funds to keep the system healthy, but also chides unions saying their past efforts to push wage increases came at the expense of greater pension contributions during tough fiscal times.

The state argues that the legislation provides “consideration” for the negative changes by stabilizing the pension system. The plaintiffs argue that pension benefits are protected by the state’s pension clause, that the reforms violate the contract clause, and violate the constitution’s takings clause that protects private property.

Belz on Thursday granted the plaintiffs’ request to stay the June 1 implementation of the pension legislation. Rating agencies have said the state’s weak credit rating could stabilize if the pension changes are eventually upheld and the state shores up its budget by extending a temporary income tax.

The state’s rating has sunk over the last several two years to the A-minus level, the weakest among states due to its pension and budgetary strains. Two rating agencies assign a negative outlook and Standard & Poor’s a “developing” outlook. The state has $100 billion of unfunded pension obligations.

The plaintiffs did not have an immediate reaction to the state attorney general’s filings.

BY YVETTE SHIELDS

MAY 16, 2014 3:48pm ET




Chicago Crisis Obscures $8.4 Billion Pension Gap in Small Towns.

Larry Morrissey is mayor of the old industrial hub of Rockford, Illinois, and he says that if bankruptcy revived the U.S. auto industry, it might save his city of 151,000 from “the slow death” of pension costs.

“Bankruptcy is designed to avert that kind of a slow, perpetual indentured servitude for individuals and corporations — why the hell should cities be treated differently?” said Morrissey.

This borders on fantasy in Illinois, where municipalities can’t file for court protection without legislative approval. Yet the discussion reveals alarm over mounting shortfalls among the 650 pensions in large and small towns outside Chicago that cover police and firefighters. Fiscal crises in the state and its biggest city have diverted attention from the $8.4 billion in liabilities those systems faced in 2012, up from $4.1 billion in 2001.

Partisan gridlock in the legislature and lawsuits have stalled attempts to stabilize them, and costs are mounting in tandem with mayor’s frustration.

“In the next three to five years, you’re going to find communities in situations they cannot financially recover from,” said Scott Eisenhauer, mayor of the central Illinois town of Danville, with a population of 32,000. “Pension debt is now factored into bond ratings, and you’ll find that some of them won’t be able to borrow like they once did because of pension debt.”

General Disarray

Illinois pays more to borrow than any of the 17 states tracked by Bloomberg, with investors demanding an extra 1.03 percentage points above AAA munis to own state debt, Bloomberg data show. The penalty trickles down to localities.

The state itself faces a $100 billion pension liability, the largest in the U.S. In December, after years of inaction, lawmakers approved a benefit-cutting bill last December designed to wipe out the shortage in the next 30 years. Its fate is likely to be determined by the Illinois Supreme Court, perhaps not until 2015.

Rating companies have also raised the specter of insolvency in Chicago, the nation’s third-largest city, where gaps in its four pensions total $20 billion. Democratic Governor Pat Quinn hasn’t signed a bill passed last month to stabilize two of them, expressing concerns about an associated property-tax increase.

Although state retirement funds cover municipal employees and teachers, police and fire retirements are handled by local units. Many struggle.

No Unicorns

Moline’s police fund was 41 percent funded in 2010, according to the Illinois Department of Insurance. In Cairo, the firefighter system was 24 percent funded.

As a group, police pensions outside Chicago were 56 percent funded in 2012, down from 76 percent in 1999, while firefighter systems dropped to 55 percent from 78 percent over the same period, according to the Illinois Department of Insurance.

Morrissey said liabilities in Rockford, about 85 miles (137 kilometers) northwest of Chicago, have grown to $120 million from $20 million in 1999. Only benefit cuts or bankruptcy, he said, can control them.

“What makes anybody think a miracle’s going to happen?” Morrissey said. “We don’t live in the land of fairies and magic beans.”

Diverting Blame

Morrissey said bankruptcy allowed General Motors Co. and Chrysler Group LLC to become profitable. The record for municipalities is less clear cut. Voters in Stockton, California, approved a sales-tax increase last November to help move toward solvency. Detroit still needs state assistance to emerge from bankruptcy, Emergency Manager Kevyn Orr said May 13.

Illinois unions representing police and firefighters dismiss bankruptcy talk as a cover for mismanagement and a desire to break promises and contracts.

“That’s really idiotic,” said Sean Smoot, director and chief legal counsel for the Police Benevolent and Protective Association of Illinois, which represents about 10,000 active and retired police officers.

Crises are largely of towns’ own making, said Sean Devaney, president of the Associated Fire Fighters of Illinois.

“Blaming police and fire benefits are really convenient talking points for some of these mayors to relieve themselves from poor decisions,” Devaney said.

Last Resort

About two-thirds of the 50 states prohibit or place tight restrictions on municipal bankruptcy, while a dozen allow it. The legacy of Detroit’s Chapter 9 filing in 2013 is that more states are intervening early to prevent crises from spinning out of control, said James Spiotto, managing director at Chapman Strategic Advisors and a municipal bankruptcy specialist.

Illinois oversees some towns, such as the Mississippi River communities of East St. Louis and Washington Park, through a program to assist distressed cities.

Joe McCoy, legislative director for the Illinois Municipal League, said mayors’ talk of bankruptcy is a vote of no confidence in the state’s leadership.

“It may be the only viable option short of these problems being addressed by the general assembly,” he said. “They don’t have a lot of confidence in the general assembly to address intractable problems.”

By Tim Jones  May 18, 2014 5:11 PM PT

To contact the reporter on this story: Tim Jones in Chicago at tjones58@bloomberg.net

To contact the editors responsible for this story: Stephen Merelman at smerelman@bloomberg.netMark Schoifet




GASB: Tax Abatement Disclosures.

Project Description:

The objective of this project would be to consider developing disclosure guidance for governments that have granted tax abatements. For purposes of this project, tax abatements are a reduction of or exemption from taxes, offered by a government to a specific taxpayer, typically for the purpose of spurring economic development. The project would not consider guidance for programs that reduce the tax liabilities of broad classes of taxpayers, such as senior citizen or veterans, and which are not the product of individual agreements with each taxpayer. The project also would not consider issues related to recognition.
Status: Added to Current Agenda: December 2013

TAX ABATEMENT DISCLOSURES—PROJECT PLAN


Background
: Tax abatement programs are highly prevalent in the U.S.—governmental entities in 44 states currently have them. The results of external research conducted under a Gil Crain Memorial Research Grant from the GASB suggest that tax abatements are an issue of concern among citizen groups, county board members, and municipal bond analysts, and that each group desires to receive information about the level of abatement activity and the results of the abatement programs. However, the researchers found relatively few states (six) with statutes requiring any level of external reporting after tax abatements are granted. These findings indicate that there is an important information need that is largely unmet.

Tax abatement programs are widespreadand the dollar amounts and number of governmental entities involved can be substantial. For example, 40 percent of localities in Michigan granted at least one tax abatement between 1980 and 2001 under a statewide industrial development abatement program that abated local government taxes by an estimated $1 billion annually.1 That is the equivalent of approximately 4.2 percent of all sub-state tax revenue in Michigan.2

Further, the academics awarded the Gil Crain grant for 2010 found that 44 states have statutes regarding programs in line with the definition of a stand-alone property tax abatement program. (This is consistent with a 2007 study that concluded governments in 42 states are allowed by their states to offer tax abatements.3). However, they identified just six states with statutes addressing reporting requirements. Fourteen states addressed accountability for abatement programs in their statutes by including provisions for benefit recovery (clawbacks) in instances of nonperformance by the recipient of the abatement. It may be possible that more states require reporting or impose consequences for nonperformance in policies and procedures outside their statutes.

Their review of websites involved 36 counties (across 14 states) which had been identified through a Lexis-Nexis search as having tax abatement programs. The review turned up only one of the 36 county websites with any reporting on tax abatements after they were granted.

The academics concluded, “While other county websites included information about tax abatements in general or about the granting of a particular abatement, none provided information that would be useful in monitoring abatements currently in effect. Finding even limited information on these websites required much effort and diligence. Certainly, the average citizen could not be considered to have reasonable access to tax abatement information from any of these counties’ websites.”

Constituents have periodically raised the possibility of a pronouncement requiring governments to disclose additional information about tax abatements. At present, generally accepted accounting principles do not require state and local governments to disclose information related to tax abatements.

In September 2013 the project staff conducted interviews and received feedback from 78 individuals responsible for keeping records on tax abatements within governments that had been identified as authorizing stand-alone tax abatements. This research indicates that governments generally do keep records on the type of information identified by users as being necessary for their decision-making and assessment of a government’s accountability of stand-alone tax abatements that have been authorized.

Finally, some tax abatements, depending on how they are structured (for example, refunds, rebates. or credit), do involve cash inflows and cash outflows. In these instances, the taxpayer first pays the taxes and the government refunds, rebates, or credits the appropriate amount back to them once they have fulfilled their obligations associated with receiving the tax abatement. In other tax abatements, there is no flow of resources but rather a foregone cash inflow and associated cash outflow. In these instances, the taxpayer pays a tax amount that is net of the tax abatement authorized. However, this foregone flow of resources has affected the government’s net position. Users also have expressed a need for this information to make assessments of how other taxpayers have subsidized the taxes that have been abated to other taxpayers.

User needs. The survey of users was conducted by the academics awarded the Gil Crain grant was administered to staff and members of citizen groups, municipal bond analysts, and county board members. Responses were received from 38 citizen group staff and members (response rate of 26.4 percent), 68 county board members (8.8 percent), and 114 bond analysts (10.3 percent). The overall response rate of 10.9 percent is low but in line with typical responses to targeted email surveys (10–15 percent) and characteristic for these populations.

One portion of the survey offered statements about tax abatement programs drawn from the literature and asked respondents to rate their agreement or disagreement with the statement on a five-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). The statements specifically relevant to financial reporting were:

  1. Governments should report annually on tax abatement agreements outstanding.
  2. Legislators (for example, county commissioners or county board members) involved in granting tax abatements should receive timely reports comparing expected performance to actual performance.
  3. Citizens and other interested parties should have access to annual reports comparing expected performance to actual performance for all tax abatement agreements outstanding.
  4. Information about taxes recovered through recapture provisions should be reported to legislators who grant tax abatements.
  5. Information about taxes recovered through recapture provisions should be accessible to citizens and other interested parties on an annual basis.

Overall, the level of agreement in each of the three groups of users was very high on all five of these statements (an average greater than 4.0). Citizen group members and staff particularly agreed with statements a (average ranking of 4.53), b (4.54), and c (4.62). The difference between the rankings by citizens and county board members was statistically significant for several of the statements, and the county board member rankings were lower across the board (though still above 4.0 on each statement). The highest level of agreement among county board members was with statement b (4.23). The rankings by municipal bond analysts fell in between those of citizens and county board members. Municipal bond analysts most strongly agreed with a (4.31), c (4.40), and d (4.33).

Bond analysts were asked to rate how often they consider five issues related to tax abatements when analyzing municipal securities on a five-point scale (1 = never, 5 = always):

  1. Revenues forgone through property tax abatements
  2. Expected and actual outcomes related to existing property tax abatements
  3. Taxes recovered through recapture provisions when abatements recipients fail to meet conditions in the tax abatement agreements
  4. The degree to which a government uses property tax abatements to attract new businesses or to retain and expand existing businesses
  5. The degree to which a government uses tax incentives to encourage economic development.

Four of the five factors linked to tax abatements were identified by bond analyst respondents as being considered somewhat regularly (average mean of approximately 3.0—1, 2, 4, and 5).

The surveys of all three user groups asked them to rank the importance of seven items that could be reported by governments about tax abatements they have granted:

  1. Name of recipient
  2. Date abatement was granted
  3. Amount of tax abatement in the current year
  4. Length of tax abatement and projected abatement amounts in future years
  5. Commitments made by the government (e.g., infrastructure improvements)
  6. Contractual promises made by the recipient (if any)
  7. Recipient’s compliance with contractual promises.

The survey again used a five-point scale (1 = not at all important, 5 = very important). All three groups rated the importance of items iii–vii highly (average of 4.0 or greater). Citizen respondents rated i and ii highly as well, and county board member respondents rated those items near 4.0 (3.97 and 4.02, respectively). Citizen respondents rated items iv–vii particularly highly (each over 4.5). Those items also were the most highly rated among county board member respondents. The highest-ranked items among bond analyst respondents were iii and iv.

The surveys concluded by asking the three groups of users their opinions about how, if at all, tax abatements should be reported in audited financial reports. The questions were posed to all municipal bond analysts and to citizens and board members who responded with a 2 or higher when asked to rate their familiarity with audited government financial reports (1 = not at all familiar, 5 = extremely familiar; the average citizen response was 3.42 and for board members 3.60). Respondents were asked to identify their preference among five reporting options:

Tax Abatement Reporting Options

Options

% Selecting Option

Citizens
(n = 30)

Board
(n = 44)

Analysts
(n = 99)

As a reduction in revenues (e.g., total revenues – amount abated = net revenue)

40

48

27

As an expenditure or use of government resources

20

7

8

Only as a disclosure in the notes to the financial statements

30

32

42

Only as unaudited supplementary information after the notes

0

9

16

Not reported in an audited annual financial report

10

4

7

The greatest support across the three groups was given to recognition as a reduction in revenues and disclosure only. In fact, recognized property tax revenues do not include abated taxes either because they were not levied on the abatement recipients or they were levied but are not expected to be collected. The academics acknowledge that a part of the explanation of the relative popularity of the reduction of revenues option may be the parenthetical specification of “total revenues – amount abated = net revenue.” Respondents may have been signaling a desire to know all three components of that equation; whereas the net revenue is an issue of recognition in the financial statements, the reporting of gross revenues and the amount abated may be more suitable to note disclosure.

Accounting and Financial Reporting Issues: The project will consider the following issues:

  1. What information about tax abatements, if any, should be disclosed in the notes?
  2. What tax abatement information do governments currently have available?
  3. What costs, if any, might a government incur to collect information about tax abatements?

Project History: The GASAC considered this topic during its discussion of priorities at its March 2012 and 2013 meetings. The GASAC members have ranked the topic among the highest in priority of all research activities and potential projects in the GASB’s technical plan.

Work Plan:

Board Meetings Research
January-February 2014:
Appointment of task force.
March 2014: Review project history and relevant literature.
April 2014: Discussion of criteria for identifying what types of tax abatements would be within the scope of the project.
May 2014:
May 2014: Discussion of whether and what tax abatement information should be disclosed.
July 2014: Continue discussion of whether and what tax abatement information should be disclosed.
August 2014: Review draft standards section.
September 2014: Review preballot draft of Exposure Draft.
October 2014 (T/C):  Review ballot draft and issue Exposure Draft.
November 2014-January 2015: Redeliberate issues based on respondent feedback.
July 2015: Review preballot draft of final Statement.
August 2015: (T/C): Review ballot draft and issue final Statement.

TAX ABATEMENT DISCLOSURES—PROJECT PLAN

Minutes of Meetings, April 8-10, 2014

The Board began deliberations on the Tax Abatement Disclosures project, focusing on defining the scope of transactions that will be covered by this project and creating a tentative definition of the term tax abatement.

The Board discussed whether to include the following components in the definition of a tax abatement: (a) the mechanism for reducing taxes, (b) the purpose of the tax abatement, (c) the breadth and applicability of abatement programs, (d) the existence of an agreement, and (e) the type of revenue being abated.

The Board tentatively agreed to include the purpose of the tax abatement, the existence of an agreement, and the type of revenue being abated in the tentative definition of a tax abatement. The mechanism for reducing taxes and the breadth and applicability of abatement programs were tentatively excluded from the definition.

Based on these tentative decisions, the Board tentatively agreed to propose the following definition for a tax abatement, for the purposes of this project, subject to further revision after subsequent deliberations:

For financial reporting purposes, a tax abatement is a reduction in taxes that results from an agreement between one or more governmental entities and an individual taxpayer in which (a) one or more governmental entities forgo tax revenues that the taxpayer otherwise would have been obligated to pay and (b) the taxpayer promises to take a specific action that contributes to economic development or otherwise benefits the government(s) or its citizens.

Further, the Board tentatively agreed that the scope of possible standards that it will consider for tax abatement disclosures should be limited to transactions that meet the proposed definition of a tax abatement.

Minutes of Meetings, March 3-5, 2014

The Board received and discussed the results of staff research on the key issues of the Tax Abatement Disclosures project. Preliminary research findings were presented covering the following areas: nature and extent of tax abatements; commitments made in tax abatement agreements; user needs; and the availability of information. No formal deliberations took place at this meeting.

TAX ABATEMENT DISCLOSURES—TENTATIVE BOARD DECISIONS

These tentative decisions have been made since the inclusion of the project as a part of the current technical agenda. The Board tentatively agreed to the following:

 


1Sands, Gary and Laura A. Reese. Public Act 198 Industrial Facilities Tax Abatements: Current Practices and Policy Recommendations. (East Lansing, MI: Land Policy Institute, Michigan State University, October 2007).
22007 Census of Governments, State and Local Government Finances, U.S. Bureau of the Census. Available at: http://www.census.gov/govs/www/estimate07.html.
3Wassmer, Robert W. “The Increasing Use of Property Tax Abatement as a Means of Promoting Sub-National Economic Activity in the United States” (December 12, 2007). Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=1088482.

Wassmer, Robert W. “The Increasing Use of Property Tax Abatement as a Means of Promoting Sub-National Economic Activity in the United States” (December 12, 2007). Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=1088482.

2Sands, Gary and Laura A. Reese. Public Act 198 Industrial Facilities Tax Abatements: Current Practices and Policy Recommendations. (East Lansing, MI: Land Policy Institute, Michigan State University, October 2007).

32002 Census of Governments, State and Local Government Finances, U.S. Bureau of the Census. Available at: http://www.census.gov/govs/www/estimate02.html.

4Dalehite, Esteban G., John Mikesell, and Kurt C. Zorn. “Variation in Property Tax Abatement Programs Among States.” Economic Development Quarterly, 2005, pp. 157–173.




GASB: Lease Accounting - Reexamination of NCGA Statement 5 and GASB Statement.13

Project Description:

The objective of this project is to reexamine issues associated with lease accounting, considering improvements to existing guidance. This project will provide a basis for the Board to consider whether operating leases meet the definitions of assets or liabilities. Current guidance is provided by National Council on Governmental Accounting (NCGA) Statement 5, Accounting and Financial Reporting Principles for Lease Agreements of State and Local Governments, GASB Statement No. 13, Accounting for Operating Leases with Scheduled Rent Increases, GASB Statement No. 62, Codification of Accounting and Financial Reporting Guidance Contained in Pre-November 30, 1989 FASB and AICPA Pronouncements, and GASB Statement No. 65, Items Previously Reported as Assets and Liabilities. Statement 62 incorporates the provisions of FASB Statement No. 13,Accounting for Leases, as amended and interpreted, into the GASB’s authoritative literature.

Status:

Added to Current Agenda: April 2013
Added to Research Agenda: April 2011

LEASE ACCOUNTING—PROJECT PLAN


Background
: Governments routinely enter into leases. Under the current authoritative literature, many of these leases are reported as operating leases. Even though operating leases represent long-term commitments to make payments, no liabilities are reported, although there are disclosures. Likewise, no assets are reported when governments have long-term rights to receive operating lease payments. In Concepts Statement No. 4, Elements of Financial Statements, the Board established definitions of assets and liabilities. This project provides an opportunity for the Board to consider whether operating leases meet the definitions of assets or liabilities.

The FASB and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) have current projects that propose to replace private sector guidance. Because of the potentially significant changes of the FASB/IASB project, the staff has received technical inquiries regarding whether there are any plans for the GASB to update its leasing guidance.

This project undertaken by the GASB is being performed in concert with the similar FASB/IASB project to maximize efficiency and timeliness. A simultaneous lease accounting project on the GASB agenda provides the opportunity to follow the progress of the FASB/IASB leasing project to assess any proposed new or amended leasing guidance in the context of the state and local government environment on a contemporaneous basis. This allows the Board to consider and address amendments to FASB Statement 13 (GASB Statement 62) in a timely manner.

Finally, part of the GASB’s strategic plan is to evaluate the effectiveness and impact of existing standards that have been in effect for a sufficient length of time. NCGA Statement 5 was issued in 1982 and GASB Statement 13 in 1990. This project provides an opportunity for a fresh look at the existing guidance for any improvements not contemplated by the FASB/IASB project given the unique nature of governmental entities and the complexities of their leasing transactions.

Accounting and Financial Reporting Issues: The major topic being researched is the forms of financial reporting display and disclosure that would meet essential financial statement user needs. The project is considering the following issues:

  1. What types of leases are entered into by state and local governments?
  2. What specific user needs exist regarding governmental leases and what decision-useful or accountability information is needed to meet those needs?
  3. Are current accounting and financial reporting standards appropriate to meet essential user needs?
  4. Should there be a distinction between types of leases, such as operating and capital?
  5. If current standards are not considered adequate, what additional potential requirements should be considered?

Project History: A proposal to add the project to the research agenda was discussed by the GASAC at its March 2011 meeting and the project was added to the research agenda in April 2011.

At its February 2013 meeting, the GASAC ranked the project fifth in priority among research and potential projects. The project was added to the current agenda in April 2013.

The project was added to the current agenda in April 2013. At the June 2013 meeting, the FASB staff presented an education session on the proposed revisions to lease accounting contained in its revised Exposure Draft that was issued in May 2013.

At its August 2013 meeting, the Board discussed the scope of the project, the definition of a lease, and related scope issues. The Board tentatively agreed with the timeline and scope of the project. The Board then discussed minor revisions to the definition of a lease. The Board tentatively decided to replace “agreement” with “contract” and replace “capital assets (land and/or depreciable assets)” with “an asset (the underlying asset). The Board also tentatively decided to add the phrase “in an exchange or exchange-like transaction” to the definition of a lease.

The Board then discussed the inclusions and exclusions to the scope of lease guidance.

The Board tentatively decided to continue to include contracts not identified as leases but that meet the definition of a lease. The Board tentatively decided to not provide an example of such a contract, and remove the example currently provided. The Board tentatively decided to continue to exclude the following from the scope of the guidance: agreements that are contracts for services that do not transfer the right to use capital assets from one contracting party to the other; leases to explore for or use of minerals, oil, natural gas, and similar nonregenerative resources; licensing agreements for such items as motion picture films, video recordings, plays, manuscripts, patents, and copyrights; and agreements that meet the definition of a service concession arrangement (SCA). In addition, the Board tentatively decided that biological assets, including timber should be excluded from the scope of the lease guidance, while intangible assets other than licensing agreements would continue to be included in the scope.

Current Developments: At the September 2013 meeting, the Board discussed issues associated with lease classifications and lease terms that drive the accounting treatment of leases. After discussing characteristics of various types of leases, the Board considered alternate methods to classify leases for accounting purposes. The Board tentatively agreed that while there might be inherent differences in leases, a single accounting model could be developed in the interest of not creating unnecessary complexity, with potential exceptions for certain circumstances.

The Board then discussed elements relevant to the duration of a lease, including the definition of a lease term, how to account for fiscal funding clauses, and the reassessment of a lease’s term. The Board tentatively decided that the lease term should start with the noncancellable period. The Board also tentatively decided that the lease term should include the periods covered by renewal options (or exclude periods covered by termination options) that are probable of being exercised based on an assessment of qualitative factors. The Board tentatively agreed to include in the noncancellable period of the lease term periods covered by fiscal funding and cancellation clauses with a remote possibility of cancellation. Leases that contain a fiscal funding or cancellation clause with a more than remote possibility of cancellation should be treated as having a termination option. The Board also tentatively agreed the lease term should be reevaluated when there is a change in relevant factors that would result in a change in judgment as to the lessee’s likelihood to exercise or terminate the lease, or when the lessee actually exercises or terminates the lease opposite of what was previously expected. The Board tentatively decided the relevant factors used in the initial assessment also should be the factors that trigger a reassessment.

At the October 2013 meeting, the Board discussed lessee recognition and measurement, including the foundation for recognition and measurement, and lessee recognition of assets and liabilities. The Board also began discussions on the lessee initial measurement of liabilities. The Board tentatively decided that the notion of leases as financings be the foundation for the governmental leasing model.

The Board continued deliberations by discussing the recognition of assets and liabilities for lessees. The Board tentatively agreed that the right to use the underlying asset be recognized as an asset by the lessee and that the obligation to make lease payments be recognized as a liability by the lessee. Furthermore, the Board tentatively decided that the obligation to return the underlying asset at the end of the lease not be recognized as a liability by the lessees; it also should not be recognized as a deferred inflow of resources or an outflow of resources. The Board then discussed other rights and obligations that may arise from a lease. The Board tentatively agreed that other rights be considered part of the overall lease asset and that other obligations be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.

The Board then discussed potential exceptions to the overall lease model. The Board tentatively decided that exceptions be made for short-term leases, under which the lessee government is not required to recognize assets or liabilities. The Board tentatively decided that a short-term lease be defined as a lease that, at the beginning of the lease, has a maximum possible term under the contract, including any options to extend, of 12 months or less. The Board tentatively agreed that the presence of a purchase option not affect the definition of a short-term lease. However, the Board also tentatively decided that leases that transfer ownership not qualify for the short-term lease exception, even if those leases meet the other criteria.

The Board then discussed the overall approach to the measurement of lease assets and liabilities for lessees. The Board tentatively decided that the general approach to measuring lease assets and liabilities be to measure the liabilities first and base the assets on that amount. The Board also tentatively decided that the general measurement approach for a lease liability be based on the present value of future payments.

The Board discussed the lessee measurement of lease liabilities and the types of payments that should be included. The Board tentatively decided that the following types of lease payments be included in the measurement of the initial lease liability:

The Board tentatively decided that lease payments that depend on a lessee’s performance or usage of an underlying asset not be a component of the initial lease liability. The Board also discussed residual value guarantees as a potential component of the lease liability as well, and requested additional staff research before making a tentative decision.

At the November 2013 teleconference, the Board discussed certain topics related to the initial measurement of assets that are created when entering into a lease. Specifically, the Board discussed prepayments, lease incentives, and initial direct costs. The Board tentatively agreed that prepayments (amounts paid for the lease prior to measuring the lease liability) should be included in the value of the reported lease asset. The Board also tentatively decided that lease incentives received should be reductions in the cost of lease assets. The Board tentatively decided that initial direct costs should be either capitalized (if they are ancillary charges to place the asset into use) or expensed (all other costs). The Board also discussed measurement in governmental funds and tentatively decided that lease liabilities should be measured consistent with the current measurement requirements for capital leases.

At the December 2013 meeting, the Board continued discussions on issues related to initial measurement of a lease liability and asset for lessees. The Board also discussed issues related to subsequent measurement of lease liabilities and assets, additional issues related to short-term leases, and issues related to leases with multiple components, noncore assets, and other expense topics.

Work Plan: In addition to the topics below that will be deliberated by the Board, the project staff will continue to monitor the progress of the FASB and IASB projects on leases.

Work Plan:

Board meetings Topics to be considered
January 2014:
Discuss lessee disclosures.
March 2014:
Discuss lessor—recognition and measurement
April 2014:
Continue discussion of lessor—recognition and measurement.
May 2014:
Discuss lessor disclosures.
July 2014:
Discuss special topics.
August 2014:
Review draft Standards section.
September 2014:
Review preballot draft of proposed Statement.
November 2014:
Review ballot draft and issue Exposure Draft.
December 2014–March 2015:
Due process, including field test.
April–October 2015:
Redeliberations.
November 2015:
Review preballot draft of final Statement.
December 2015(T/C):
Review ballot draft and issue final Statement.

LEASE ACCOUNTING —RECENT MINUTES

Minutes of Meetings, April 8-10, 2014

The Board began deliberations by discussing potential note disclosure requirements for lessees in relation to the general description of leasing arrangements. The Board tentatively agreed to propose a requirement for lessees to disclose a general description of the lessee’s leasing arrangements, including the basis, and terms and conditions, on which variable lease payments are determined and the existence, and terms and conditions, of residual value guarantees provided by the lessee. The Board also tentatively decided not to propose a requirement for lessees to disclose the existence and terms of purchase options; the existence, and terms and conditions, of renewal and termination options; the restrictions or covenants imposed by leases; or information about significant assumptions and judgments made in accounting for leases.

The Board continued deliberations by discussing potential disclosure requirements for lessees related to assets and liabilities. The Board tentatively agreed to propose that lessees be required to disclose only the general reconciliations of the changes in the lease liability and of the changes in capital assets currently required by Statement No. 34, Basic Financial Statements—and Management’s Discussion and Analysis—for State and Local Governments, and not to include a requirement for a more detailed reconciliation. Furthermore, the Board tentatively agreed to propose a requirement for the total amount of assets recorded under leases, and the related accumulated amortization, to be disclosed separately from owned assets. The Board also tentatively decided not to propose a requirement for lease assets to be disaggregated by major classes of underlying assets.

The Board then discussed potential disclosure requirements for lessees involving expenses related to leases. The Board tentatively decided not to propose that lessees separately disclose the amount of amortization expense recognized for lease assets. The Board also tentatively decided to propose a requirement for lessees to disclose the total variable lease payments actually incurred. Furthermore, the Board tentatively decided to propose that the due process document supersede any existing disclosures related to operating leases.

The Board continued deliberations by discussing potential disclosure requirements for lessees in relation to future lease obligations. The Board tentatively agreed to propose a requirement for lessees to disclose a maturity analysis of future minimum lease payments that shows the payments for each of the first five years and five-year increments thereafter, with the payments shown undiscounted and total interest summed for all years. The Board also tentatively decided not to propose that the lessee disclosure requirements include amounts of sublease rentals to be received. The Board agreed that this topic would be addressed in the lessor disclosure deliberations.

Furthermore, the Board tentatively decided to propose a requirement for lessees to disclose commitments relating to leases, other than short-term leases, for which the lease term has not begun with a conforming edit to NCGA Statement 1, Governmental Accounting and Financial Reporting Principles. The Board also tentatively decided not to propose a requirement for lessees to disclose a maturity analysis of the nonlease components of a contract.

The Board then discussed other considerations regarding lessee disclosures. The Board tentatively decided not to propose that the due process document refer to the noncash transaction disclosure requirement in Statement No. 9, Reporting Cash Flows of Proprietary and Nonexpendable Trust Funds and Governmental Entities That Use Proprietary Fund Accounting. The Board also tentatively agreed to replace the example in Statement 9 of “obtaining an asset by entering into a capital lease” with “obtaining a right-of-use asset by entering into a lease.” Furthermore, the Board tentatively decided not to propose that the due process document refer to the related party disclosures in Statement No. 62, Codification of Accounting and Financial Reporting Guidance Contained in pre-November 30, 1989 FASB and AICPA Pronouncements.

The Board continued deliberations by discussing other potential disclosure requirements. The Board tentatively decided not to propose a requirement for disclosure of the discount rate(s) used in measuring lease liabilities. The Board also tentatively decided to propose an amendment to Statement 62 to exempt lease liabilities from imputed interest guidance. Furthermore, the Board tentatively decided not to propose a requirement for lessees to disclose the fair value of the lease liability, the amount of initial direct costs capitalized as part of lease assets during the reporting period, and information about arrangements that upon transition no longer meet the definition of a lease. The Board also tentatively decided not to propose a requirement for lessees to disclose the amount of interest expense related to leases or a requirement for lessees to disclose together all lease-related expenses. In addition, the Board tentatively decided not to propose a requirement for lessees to disclose cash paid for principal and interest on leases.

The Board tentatively agreed to propose a requirement for disclosure of payments made in excess of contractual requirements, such as residual value guarantees or penalties. The Board also tentatively decided not to propose a requirement for lessees to disclose the actual lease terms for significant leases and the weighted-average lease term of all leases, as well as the categorization of renewal options by likelihood.

The Board tentatively agreed to propose that lessee disclosure requirements not include information about below-market leases. The Board tentatively decided not to propose a requirement for lessees to disclose information about a government’s decision-making. Furthermore, the Board tentatively agreed to propose an amendment to Statement 62 to exempt disclosure of the underlying asset as collateral. The Board also tentatively agreed to propose that lessee disclosure requirements include the components of a net impairment loss (that is, gross impairment loss and adjustment to the lease liability).

The Board continued deliberations by discussing short-term lease disclosures for lessees. The Board tentatively decided that the existing disclosure requirements for accounting policies are sufficient to cover disclosure of accounting treatment for short-term leases and that no additional guidance is necessary in the due process document. The Board also tentatively agreed to propose a requirement for lessees to disclose the amount of expense and expenditure recognized for the period related to short-term leases. The Board also tentatively decided not to propose a requirement for lessees to disclose commitments under short-term leases or qualitative information about circumstances when the next period’s short-term lease expense is expected to be significantly different than the current period’s expense.

Minutes of Meetings, March 3-5, 2014

The Board met in a joint session with the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board (FASAB). The Board and FASAB began by discussing the foundation of a new accounting model for lessors. The Board tentatively decided that a new accounting model for lessors should be considered and that symmetry between the lessee and lessor accounting models should be a key factor in development of the lessor model.

The Board and FASAB then discussed the tentative decisions the Board has made to date. No further tentative decisions were made by the Board.

Minutes of Meetings, February 13, 2014

The Board discussed topics related to impairment of a lease asset. The Board tentatively decided to propose that in circumstances in which an asset underlying a lease is damaged and requires restoration or replacement, the time period during which the underlying asset is not usable generally is the relevant factor in assessing whether the impairment test has been met. This amended the Board’s previous tentative decision that a lessor’s responsibility to repair or replace an impaired underlying asset may indicate that impairment of the lease asset (right to use) will be temporary.

The Board continued deliberations by discussing impairment indicators. The Board tentatively decided to propose that the following be included in the text of a proposed Leases standard:

a) Impairment indicators present with respect to the underlying asset may result in a change in the manner or duration of use of the lease asset
b) A change in the manner or duration of use of the lease asset may indicate impairment of that asset.

The Board then discussed whether a lessor’s responsibility to restore or replace the underlying asset may indicate that the magnitude of the decline in service utility of the lease asset is not significant. The Board tentatively decided not to include that statement in a potential Leases standard.

The Board continued deliberations by discussing how to measure and recognize the impairment of a lease asset. The Board tentatively decided to propose that the lease asset should be adjusted first by the same amount as any change in the related lease liability. If the carrying value of the lease asset is reduced to zero, any further adjustments should be recognized in the flows statement. The Board also tentatively decided to propose that an impaired lease asset first be adjusted by any change in the corresponding lease liability, with any remaining adjustment recognized as the impairment loss.

The Board continued its discussions by reviewing examples of different impairment scenarios presented by the project staff. The Board provided suggestions to staff for changes to the examples if they are to be included in a due process document or future implementation guidance.

Minutes of Meetings, January 27-29, 2014

The Board began deliberations by discussing a possible exception to the overall lease accounting model for noncore assets, which could be defined as assets that are not essential to a government’s operations. The Board tentatively decided to propose that there not be an exception made to the overall leases model for leases of noncore assets.

The Board continued deliberations by discussing topics on lease-related expenses. The Board tentatively decided to propose that the existing guidance related to the accounting treatment for operating leases with scheduled rent increases be superseded. The Board also tentatively decided to propose that lease payments for short-term leases that have a rent holiday or rent reduction provisions be recognized as expenses based on the terms of the contract. Furthermore, the Board tentatively decided to propose that lease payments not included in the liability measurement be recognized as expense in the accrual accounting-based flows statement in the period in which the obligation for those payments is incurred.

The Board then discussed recognition in governmental funds. The Board tentatively decided to propose conforming edits to the existing guidance on accounting for leases in governmental funds. Furthermore, the Board tentatively decided to propose that the general guidance for recognition of liabilities in governmental funds adequately addresses short-term leases, and only limited amendments to existing provisions are needed.

The Board then discussed issues relating to the lease asset. The Board tentatively decided to propose that the right-of-use asset in a lease is an intangible asset that should be accounted for in accordance with existing authoritative guidance for capital assets. The Board also tentatively decided to propose that the relationship between the underlying asset and the lease asset could mean that the lease asset is impaired if indicators of impairment are present with respect to the underlying asset. Furthermore, the Board tentatively decided to propose that a lessor’s responsibility to repair or replace an impaired underlying asset may indicate that an impairment of the lease asset (right to use) will be temporary. The Board discussed how a lessee would measure an impairment of the lease asset and requested that the staff develop example calculations.

The Board continued deliberations by discussing guidance on presentation of lease assets and liabilities. The Board tentatively decided to propose that existing guidance on presentation of capital assets would apply to the lease asset. The Board also tentatively decided to propose that existing guidance on presentation of general long-term liabilities apply to the lease liability and that it be referred to as a long-term liability in a proposed Statement. Additionally, the Board tentatively decided to propose that specific guidance on the presentation of lease activities in the statement of cash flows be provided through implementation guidance rather than in the proposed Leases standard as existing standards related to the statement of cash flows are sufficient.

Minutes of Meetings, December 10-12, 2013

The Board continued its discussion on the measurement of lease liabilities by a lessee and the types of payments that should be included. The Board tentatively decided to propose that the following types of lease payments be included in the measurement of the initial lease liability:

The Board then discussed several alternatives with respect to the determination of the discount rate. The Board tentatively decided to propose that lease liability payments be discounted using the rate the lessor charges the lessee. However, if that rate cannot be readily determined, the lessee’s incremental borrowing rate should be used. The Board tentatively decided not to propose an exception to use a risk-free interest rate in certain situations. The Board also continued its discussion of the initial measurement of lease assets and tentatively decided to propose that the first component of the lease asset be the initial measurement of the lease liability.

The Board continued deliberations by discussing subsequent measurement of the lease asset and lease liability by a lessee during the term of the lease. The Board tentatively decided to propose that a lessee remeasure a lease liability by calculating the amortization of the discount on the lease liability and reducing the lease liability by the actual lease payment amount less the amortization of the discount. The Board tentatively decided to propose that lease assets be amortized using a systematic and rational basis. The Board also tentatively decided to propose that lease assets be amortized over the shorter of the useful life of the underlying asset or the lease term. However, the Board also tentatively decided to propose that the lessee amortize the right-of-use asset as if the lessee owns the underlying asset, using the lessee’s depreciation policy, if the lease transfers ownership or if by assessing qualitative factors, it is probable that a purchase option will be exercised. In those situations, if the underlying asset is a non-depreciable asset such as land, the lessee should not amortize the right-of-use asset. Furthermore, the Board tentatively decided that the proposed guidance on leases that transfer ownership be included in the text of a standard.

The Board then discussed classification in the accrual-basis flows statement and the Board tentatively decided to propose that the lessee report the amortization of the lease asset as amortization expense and the amortization of the discount on the lease liability as interest expense.

The Board then discussed the reassessment of lease liabilities for lessees. The Board tentatively decided to propose that there be a reassessment of a lease liability when there is a change in the likelihood (probable to not probable or vice versa) of a purchase option being exercised based on an assessment of qualitative factors. The Board also tentatively decided to propose that, based on an assessment of qualitative factors, there be a reassessment of the residual value guarantee component of a lease liability when there is either a change in the amounts expected to be payable or when there is a change in the likelihood (probable to not probable or vice versa) that a payment will be required. Furthermore, the Board tentatively decided to propose that there be a reassessment of a lease liability when the result of a change in an index or a rate used to determine lease payments during the reporting period may be significant.

The Board tentatively decided to propose that a reassessment of the discount rate be required in any of the following situations:

The Board also tentatively decided to propose that in the event of a reassessment the Board’s tentative decision regarding the initial selection of a discount rate also be the approach for selection of a discount rate.

The Board continued deliberations by discussing the recalculation of the lease liability and asset. The Board tentatively decided to propose that adjustments arising from remeasurements of lease liabilities also adjust the right-of-use asset. The exception is adjustments due to a change in the rate upon which a variable lease payment is based, which should be recognized as revenue or expense in the current period.

The Board then discussed whether a lease asset should be subject to existing guidance on impairment. The Board requested to defer a tentative decision on this question until it discusses classification of the lease asset. The Board then considered a situation in which a lease asset also meets the proposed definition of an investment. The Board tentatively decided to propose that the asset be measured in accordance with guidance for investments rather than leases.

The Board then continued discussions on short-term leases. The Board tentatively decided to propose that a short-term exception be an accounting requirement, rather than a policy election, for all leases that qualify. The Board also tentatively decided to propose that lessees not be required to recognize assets or liabilities associated with the right to use the underlying asset for short-term leases. Furthermore, the Board tentatively decided to propose that lease payments for short-term leases be recognized as expenses/expenditures based on the terms of the contract.

The Board also discussed cancellable leases and tentatively decided to propose that cancellable periods (those periods for which a lessee and lessor each have the right to cancel the lease) be excluded from the lease term. The Board also tentatively decided to propose that the maximum possible term for a cancellable lease be defined as any noncancellable period, including any notice periods.

The Board then discussed whether contracts with multiple components (lease and nonlease, or multiple leases) should be bifurcated for accounting purposes and, if so, how the consideration should be allocated to the different components. The Board tentatively decided to propose that governments separate contracts into lease and nonlease components, subject to a practicality exception related to measurement. The Board also tentatively decided to propose that governments separate lease contracts involving multiple assets into multiple lease components only if there are different lease terms, subject to a practicality exception related to measurement.

For allocation of consideration between multiple components, the Board tentatively decided to propose that lessees first use prices in the contract for individual components, if available, if those prices are reasonable based on other observable stand-alone prices. If individual prices are not included in the contract, or the prices are not reasonable, the Board also tentatively decided to propose that lessees allocate consideration based on relative observable stand-alone prices, if those prices are available for all components of the contract. If observable stand-alone prices are not available for all components, the Board tentatively decided to propose that lessees (1) allocate the stand-alone price to any components for which there are such prices and then (2) consider any remaining components to be a single unit of account and assign the remaining consideration to that unit.

The Board continued deliberations by discussing how to account for a contract if components are not separated and the idea of providing guidance for concurrent contracts. The Board tentatively decided to propose that guidance be provided when multiple lease components are considered one unit for accounting purposes. The Board also tentatively decided to propose that accounting for multiple lease components that are considered as one unit for accounting purposes be based on the primary component. Furthermore, the Board tentatively decided to propose that guidance be provided for treating separate contracts that were signed concurrently. The Board will consider issues associated with concurrently signed contracts at a later meeting.

Minutes of Meetings, October 29-31, 2013

The Board discussed lessee recognition and measurement, including the foundation for recognition and measurement, and lessee recognition of assets and liabilities. The Board also began discussions on the lessee initial measurement of liabilities. The Board tentatively agreed that the major criticisms of current lease accounting, opportunities for structuring around a bright-line classification test and omission of a perceived liability, are items that the Leases project should attempt to address. The Board also recognized that the proposed accounting model for leases may have differences from the private sector as a result of factors found in the state and local government environment. The Board tentatively decided that the model should attempt to measure resources available to provide services, and obligations to sacrifice such resources, with consideration given to the characterization of expenses. The Board also discussed whether leases are executory contracts but did not reach a tentative decision. The Board tentatively decided to propose that the notion of leases as financings be the foundation for the governmental leasing model.

The Board continued deliberations by discussing the recognition of assets and liabilities for lessees. The Board tentatively agreed to propose that the right to use the underlying asset be recognized as an asset by the lessee and that the obligation to make lease payments be recognized as a liability by the lessee. Furthermore, the Board tentatively decided to propose that the obligation to return the underlying asset at the end of the lease not be recognized as a liability by the lessees; it also should not be recognized as a deferred inflow of resources or an outflow of resources. The Board then discussed other rights and obligations that may arise from a lease. The Board tentatively agreed to propose that other rights be considered part of the overall lease asset and that other obligations be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.

The Board then discussed potential exceptions to the overall lease model. The Board tentatively decided to propose that exceptions be made for short-term leases, under which the lessee government is not required to recognize assets or liabilities. The Board tentatively decided to propose that a short-term lease be defined as a lease that, at the beginning of the lease, has a maximum possible term under the contract, including any options to extend, of 12 months or less. The Board tentatively agreed to propose that the presence of a purchase option not affect the definition of a short-term lease. However, the Board also tentatively decided to propose that leases that transfer ownership not qualify for the short-term lease exception, even if those leases meet the other criteria. Furthermore, the Board tentatively decided to propose that it not be necessary to make an exception for leases that transfer ownership of underlying assets.

The Board then discussed the overall approach to the measurement of lease assets and liabilities for lessees. The Board tentatively decided to propose that the general approach to measuring lease assets and liabilities be to measure the liabilities first and base the assets on that amount. The Board also tentatively decided to propose that the general measurement approach for a lease liability be based on the present value of future payments.

The Board discussed the lessee measurement of lease liabilities and the types of payments that should be included. The Board tentatively decided to propose that the following types of lease payments be included in the measurement of the initial lease liability:

The Board tentatively decided to propose that lease payments that depend on a lessee’s performance or usage of an underlying asset not be a component of the initial lease liability. The Board also discussed residual value guarantees as a potential component of the lease liability as well, and requested additional staff research before making a tentative decision.

Minutes of Meetings, September 17-19, 2013

The Board discussed issues associated with lease classifications and lease terms that drive the accounting treatment of leases. After discussing characteristics of various types of leases, the Board considered alternate methods to classify leases for accounting purposes. The Board tentatively agreed that while there might be inherent differences in leases, a single accounting model could be developed in the interest of not creating unnecessary complexity, with potential exceptions for certain circumstances.

The Board then discussed elements relevant to the duration of a lease, including the definition of a lease term, how to account for fiscal funding clauses, and the reassessment of a lease’s term. The Board tentatively decided that the lease term should start with the noncancellable period. The Board also tentatively decided that the lease term should include the periods covered by renewal options (or exclude periods covered by termination options) that are probable of being exercised based on an assessment of qualitative factors. The Board tentatively agreed to include in the noncancellable period of the lease term periods covered by fiscal funding and cancellation clauses with a remote possibility of cancellation. Leases that contain a fiscal funding or cancellation clause with a more than remote possibility of cancellation should be treated as having a termination option. The Board also tentatively agreed the lease term should be reevaluated when there is a change in relevant factors that would result in a change in judgment as to the lessee’s likelihood to exercise or terminate the lease, or when the lessee actually exercises or terminates the lease opposite of what was previously expected. The Board tentatively decided the relevant factors used in the initial assessment also should be the factors that trigger a reassessment.

Minutes of Meetings, August 6-8, 2013

The Board began deliberations for the leases project by reviewing the history of leases and current literature, the tentative scope of the project, the definition of a lease, and related scope issues. The Board tentatively agreed with the timeline and scope of the project. The Board then discussed minor revisions to the definition of a lease. The Board tentatively decided to replace “agreement” with “contract,” and “capital assets (land and/or depreciable assets)” with “an asset (the underlying asset).” The Board also tentatively decided to add the phrase “in an exchange or exchange-like transaction” to the proposed definition of a lease.

The Board then discussed the inclusions and exclusions to the scope of lease guidance. The Board tentatively decided to propose including contracts not identified as leases but that meet the definition of a lease. The Board tentatively decided to not provide in the proposal an example of such a contract, and remove the example currently provided. The Board tentatively decided to propose continuing to exclude the following from the scope of the guidance: agreements that are contracts for services that do not transfer the right to use capital assets from one contracting party to the other; leases to explore for or use of minerals, oil, natural gas, and similar nonregenerative resources; licensing agreements for such items as motion picture films, video recordings, plays, manuscripts, patents, and copyrights; and agreements that meet the definition of a service concession arrangement. In addition, the Board tentatively decided to propose that biological assets, including timber, be excluded from the scope of the lease guidance, while intangible assets other than licensing agreements would continue to be included in the scope of lease guidance.

Minutes of Meetings, June 25-27, 2013

The FASB project staff on leases provided the Board with background information on the provisions of the recently released revised Exposure Draft, Leases. The session was educational in nature. No deliberations were conducted and no decisions were reached.

LEASE ACCOUNTING—TENTATIVE BOARD DECISIONS TO DATE

The Board tentatively agreed to propose that:




GASB: On the Horizon.

Fair Value Measurement and Application

The idea of fair value – which involves the measurement of certain assets and liabilities, primarily investments – has a long history in governmental accounting. The Board approved a Preliminary Views,Fair Value Measurement and Application, laying out its initial thinking on this topic, in June 2013. In it, the Board proposed new standards regarding how fair value should be measured, to which assets and liabilities those fair value measurements should be applied, and what information about fair values should be disclosed in the notes to the financial statements. A new Exposure Draft of proposed standards that incorporates feedback on the Preliminary Views from stakeholders will be released this week.

A new Exposure Draft of proposed standards that incorporates feedback from stakeholders will be released this week

Under the Board’s forthcoming proposed guidance, fair value would be defined as the price that would be received from the sale of an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between market participants at the measurement date. In the Board’s view, fair value is a market-based measurement and represents an exitprice (what a government would get to sell an asset), as opposed to an entry price (what a government would pay to purchase an asset), which is often different.

The proposal would further expand the requirement that most investments are reported at their fair value by applying this measurement attribute to various types of alternative investments. It defines an investment as “a security or other asset that a government holds primarily for the purpose of income or profit, and its present service capacity is based solely on its ability to generate cash or to be sold to generate cash.”

If guidance ultimately results from the project, it would improve comparability and consistency of governments’ measures of fair value. Financial statement users would be better informed about how governments ascertained fair value. It would also bring clarity to certain issues important to pinpointing fair value that may be uncertain at present.

More information on the Fair Value Measurement and Application project

Fiduciary Responsibilities

One of the reasons a government may have to include a separate legal entity or a particular activity in its financial statements is that the government has a fiduciary responsibility for the entity or activity. In other words, the government acts in a trustee or agent capacity for the resources associated with the entity or activity.

The Board added a project on Fiduciary Responsibilities to the current technical agenda in August 2013 after pre-agenda research activities were conducted following the Governmental Accounting Standards Advisory Council identifying the issues as a key priority. The Board is currently deliberating the issues in this project and first will expose its preliminary views for public comment in late 2014.

The project’s central objective is to consider whether to develop additional guidance on how to decide if a government should report fiduciary activities

Currently, the concept of what constitutes fiduciary responsibility is not well defined in governmental accounting standards. GASB research and technical inquiries from constituents have indicated inconsistency in the current reporting of various types of fiduciary activities. Research also has indicated a general inconsistency in the reporting of fiduciary activities between governments that perform only business-type activities (such as colleges, utilities, and hospitals) and general purpose governments (such as states and cities).

The project’s central objective is to consider whether to develop additional guidance on how to decide if a government should report fiduciary activities in its general purpose external financial reports. It also will address such issues as confusion about the proper uses of private-purpose trust funds and agency funds, and whether a stand-alone business-type activity engaging in fiduciary activities should present fiduciary fund financial statements.

More information on the Fiduciary Responsibilities project




GASB Stakeholder Focus: The Request to Delay Statement 68.

Governments should continue gearing up to implement the GASB’s recent pension standards as planned in light of a recent Board decision not to delay the implementation date. The decision came after extensive Board discussion, research, and outreach in response to a request by certain stakeholders to delay implementation.

The Stakeholder Request

Two organizations of GASB stakeholders—one representing financial statement preparers and the other persons involved in various aspects of public employee pensions—asked the GASB at the end of February and in early March to delay the implementation of the revised pension standards, Statement No. 68, Accounting and Financial Reporting for Pensions. Governments are required to implement Statement 68 for fiscal years beginning July 1, 2014, and later.

One of the more difficult but essential tasks of the Board is to weigh the competing needs of its stakeholders

The organizations’ request for delay was based primarily on a concern that audit procedures related to the pension standards were unsettled and, consequently, the financial reports of governments implementing Statement 68 might not receive a “clean” audit opinion.

Other individual stakeholders and stakeholder organizations wrote to the GASB asking that the implementation of Statement 68 not be delayed. These groups and individuals cited the importance of the information that would result from implementation of the Statement, and the fact that many governments and their pension plans are already working toward implementation, as reasons for allowing Statement 68 to be implemented as originally required.

The GASB’s Response

In light of the fact that the effective date of Statement 68 was just four months away at that time, the GASB moved quickly to evaluate the request. Shortly after the request was received, the Board discussed it with the GASAC members at their scheduled meeting on March 11 and 12. The GASAC’s 30 members are broadly representative of the GASB’s stakeholders and include all of the major organizations representing preparers, auditors, and users of financial statements.

the Board follows the same set of open and objective due process procedures for all subjects

Annual financial reports of various types of governments in all 50 states were examined to assess how many governments would be affected by the issue raised by the groups seeking a delay. The experiences of other standards setters that had previously delayed implementation of a pronouncement were reviewed and the repercussions of those actions considered. The GASB staff also followed up with the organizations and individuals mentioned above, consulted with other groups representing GASB stakeholders, and conducted interviews with financial statement users and auditors. The purpose of the latter interviews was to obtain insight into the audit procedures that might be applied as governments implement Statement 68 and auditors’ experience in performing those procedures for the first time with their clients.

The user interviews were intended to inform the Board’s understanding of how municipal bond analysts, taxpayer associations, and other users would potentially view a government receiving a modified audit opinion in these circumstances and what ramifications, if any, there would be. Users generally preferred that Statement 68 not be delayed.

The Board’s Decision

The Board considered all of the information and feedback that had been assembled and deliberated the request for a delay during its open public teleconference meeting on March 24. After a lengthy discussion, the Board unanimously concluded that the implementation of Statement 68 should not be delayed.

Although many factors contributed to the Board’s decision, four particular factors were most influential:

  • Financial statement users consider the information that will result from implementation of Statement 68 to be highly important.
  • Pension plans are already well into the process of implementing related standards for their own separately issued financial reports. Consequently, if the implementation of Statement 68 were postponed, some governments would incur the added cost of engaging an actuary to provide information under the old pension standards in addition to the information already obtained under the new standards.
  • Delaying the new standards may not address the concern about a modified audit opinion.
  • Concerns about the effort required to implement Statement 68 are real and significant, particularly with regard to governments in some cost-sharing multiple-employer pension plans. However, the Board was fully aware of these issues when it originally considered the costs and benefits associated with establishing the implementation date. No new evidence has been brought forth to date that would result in the reconsideration of this issue.

Conclusion

Many accounting and financial reporting issues the Board considers generate a wide range of stakeholder views, usually representing multiple sides of the issues. One of the more difficult but essential tasks of the Board is to weigh the competing needs of its stakeholders. The Board seeks to establish standards that lead to users receiving the information they need to make decisions and assess government accountability, while simultaneously minimizing the impact on the governments that will be responsible for providing that information.

Few accounting and financial reporting issues the Board considers resonate with the general public the way that pensions do. Nevertheless, the Board follows the same set of open and objective due process procedures for all subjects, whether they touch upon controversial areas of public policy or deal with narrow technical issues of accounting practice.




CDFI Fund Opens Application Period for FY 2014 CDFI Bond Guarantee Program.

Up to $750 Million in Bond Guarantee Authority AvailableThe U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Community Development Financial Institutions Fund (CDFI Fund) today opened the fiscal year (FY) 2014 application period for the CDFI Bond Guarantee Program. Application materials are available on the CDFI Fund’s website in anticipation of the Notice of Guarantee Authority (NOGA) being published in the Federal Register on May 13, 2014. The NOGA makes up to $750 million in bond guarantee authority available to eligible Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFIs) in FY 2014.

Through the CDFI Bond Guarantee Program, selected certified CDFIs or their designees will issue bonds that are guaranteed by the Federal government and use the bond proceeds to extend capital within the broader CDFI industry for community development financing and for long-term community investments. The Secretary of the Treasury may guarantee bond issues having a minimum size of $100 million each, up to an aggregate total of $750 million. Multiple CDFIs may pool together in a single $100 million bond issuance provided that each eligible CDFI participates at a minimum of $10 million.

The CDFI Bond Guarantee Program supports CDFIs that make investments for eligible community or economic development purposes. Authorized uses of the loans financed through bond proceeds may include a variety of financial activities, such as supporting commercial facilities that promote revitalization, community stability, and job creation/retention; housing that is principally affordable to low-income people; businesses that provide jobs for low-income people or are owned by low-income people; and community or economic development in low-income and underserved rural areas.

Deadlines

Please reference the NOGA and application instructions for detailed information regarding the following application deadlines for consideration for FY 2014 bond guarantee authority.

  • Qualified Issuer Applications must be submitted through myCDFIFund by 11:59 p.m. EDT on June 23, 2014.
  • Guarantee Applications must be submitted through myCDFIFund by 11:59 p.m. EDT on June 30, 2014.
  • The last day the CDFI Fund will accept questions regarding the FY 2014 application for the CDFI Bond Guarantee Program is Wednesday, June 18, 2014. All questions must be submitted electronically to the program office:bgp@cdfi.treas.gov.

Qualified Issuer Applications and Guarantee Applications received in FY 2013 and that were neither withdrawn nor declined in FY 2013 will be considered under FY 2014 authority.

Application Materials

In addition to being available through myCDFIFund, the FY 2014 NOGA and application materials are available on the CDFI Fund’s website at www.cdfifund.gov/bond.

Application Workshops

The CDFI Fund will conduct three application workshops (two days per workshop, 9 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.) for potential applicants regarding the FY 2014 Qualified Issuer and Guarantee Application requirements. Specifically, the workshops will include an in-depth discussion of the financial structure of the program, including:

  • Roles of the Qualified Issuer, Program Administrator, and Servicer;
  • Capital Distribution Plan requirements;
  • Eligible CDFI and Secondary Loan Requirements;
  • Costs of the CDFI Bond Guarantee Program;
  • Review processes for the Qualified Issuer and Guarantee Applications;
  • Reporting; and
  • Compliance-related activities.

Attendees will have the opportunity to ask CDFI Fund staff questions and receive clarification about the topics discussed during each module.

The two-day application workshops will be held:

  • June 2-3, 2014 in Detroit, MI, at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago – Detroit Branch;
  • June 10-11, 2014 in Washington, DC, at the U.S. Treasury Department; and
  • June 17-18, 2014 in San Francisco, CA, at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.

Registration is required and opens on May 12, 2014. The registration link will be posted on the CDFI Fund’s website at www.cdfifund.gov/bond. There is no registration fee; however, due to limited space, registration will be honored on a first come, first served basis.

For interested parties unable to attend an in-person application workshop, the presentation materials will be posted on the CDFI Fund’s website atwww.cdfifund.gov/bond.

Questions

Inquiries regarding legal documents related to the CDFI Bond Guarantee Program should be directed to the CDFI Fund’s Office of Legal Counsel by email at legal@cdfi.treas.gov.

For more information about the CDFI Bond Guarantee Program, please visit www.cdfifund.gov/bond, or call the CDFI Fund’s Help Desk at (202) 653-0421.




California Public Debt Issuance Monthly Data CDIAC | May 16, 2014

Read the Report.




Foley: Department Of Energy Announces New Loan Guarantee Program For Renewable Energy And Energy Efficiency Projects.

The Department of Energy’s Loan Program Office (the “DOE”) announced on April 16, 2014, a new loan guarantee program for up to $4 billion under Section 1703 of Title XVII of the Energy Policy Act. The announcement coincides with the DOE’s release of a Draft Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Project Solicitation (the “Draft Solicitation”) for innovative renewable energy and efficient energy projects in the U.S. that reduce, avoid, or sequester greenhouse gases. The aim of the Draft Solicitation is to foster renewable energy and energy efficiency technologies that are “catalytic, replicable, and market ready.”

The Draft Solicitation identifies five (5) technology areas of interest to the DOE.

Continue Reading.

Last Updated: May 15 2014

Article by Jason W. Allen and Justus J. Britt

Foley & Lardner




S&P: Disclose Bank Loans or Risk Rating.

Standard & Poor’s, citing concern over hidden debt exposure in the municipal bond market, sent letters this month warning issuers they could lose their ratings if they don’t disclose their direct loans.

S&P told issuers that it now requires notification and documentation of any private debt they owe, including bank loan financings, whether or not that debt is rated by S&P.

“We are concerned about the undisclosed terms in the loans, or simply the magnitude of these loans,” Steve Murphy, the head of public finance at S&P, said in an interview.

The letters were sent out on May 6 to all of the roughly 24,000 issuers S&P rates, Murphy said. Direct loans’ impact on issuers’ credit quality has been on S&P’s radar awhile. These letters “fall in line with S&P’s commentary regarding issuers’ direct loans,” a spokesman for S&P said in an interview.

S&P’s primary concern is bank loans, whether called direct purchases or direct loans, a spokesman for S&P wrote in an email. Broadly, the term direct loans refers to alternative financings, meaning non-traditional placement in the public market.

Direct loans occur when issuers choose to raise capital by selling municipal securities to a select number of investors instead of making the bonds available to the public. Direct loans have increased to offset a decline in variable-rate demand bond issuance in recent years, S&P wrote in a report released on March 26.

Direct loans are attractive because they are less costly to issue than VRDOs, Matt Fabian, managing director at Municipal Market Advisors, said in an interview..

“There is no bond counsel, there is no legal fee, there is no paying a remarketing fee, which VROS pay,” he said. “You don’t have to disclose the purchase. Any bond going to one investor has very limited disclose requirements.”

VRDO balances have fallen by about half in five years, MMA wrote in an April 14 report.

The amount of direct loans outstanding is difficult to determine because banks are not obligated to report these purchases. Murphy said that bank loans do not have to be disclosed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, or with any other regulator.

“There is no way of knowing the amount [of direct loans] occurring in aggregate,” Murphy said. “That’s part of the issue we have with this.”

Fabian said that for official private placement there is very limited disclosure, and that for bank’s direct purchases there is none.

“Direct loans would be disclosed in financials, but muni financials lag by nine months or so,” he said. “You have a nine month window and if they are done earlier in the fiscal year, somewhat longer.”

MMA cited industry estimates that direct purchases totaled $40 billion to $50 billion in 2013, and that projections show similar volume in 2014. MMA said those numbers understate the full amount of direct purchase activity, which it estimated at as much as $55 billion.

One of the major risks of direct purchases is that they reduce public municipal supply available at a time when the buy-side is starved for more issuance. Supply this year has remained low, totaling only $89.34 billion as of April 30 this year compared to $122.72 billion for the same period in 2013, according to data provided by Ipreo and The Bond Buyer.

“As DPs replace a greater amount of new money projects —- that, in the current market, might otherwise go into fixed rate bonds — they will incrementally reduce the income available to traditional lenders,” MMA wrote in the report.

A second major risk is that there could be terms in a direct loan covenant that harm investors holding public bonds released by the same issuer.

“[These direct loans] could have credit annexes and credit terms that could force the loan to be accelerated,” Fabian said. “They could have a covenant like a cash covenant or a credit covenant, where if the issuer were to violate it, the covenant could be immediately payable. If you are a bond holder of an issuer that has a direct loan, if that direct loan is forced to accelerate it could eat up all the issuers’ cash. It could push them into default or restructuring.”

Direct loans undermine investors’ confidence in the disclosed materials available and makes them more gun-shy, because weaker issuers may be closer to their debt limit than investors believe, Fabian said.

S&P described the disclosure requirements related to direct loans as “eccentric at best”. Murphy said that if issuers do not comply with sending S&P the documents they will be downgraded.

“We have a very specific sequence we follow in terms of credit ratings,” he said. “We contract the obligor to request documents not just for bank loans, but for any additional information requested when performing surveillance. If we do not receive anything in 15 days, a second request is sent and 10 days after that request is received, if we are not sent any documentation a third request is sent out and the issuer is placed on credit watch for an additional 15 days.”

BY HILLARY FLYNN

MAY 15, 2014 4:43pm ET




S&P 2014 Review of U.S. Municipal Water and Sewer Ratings: How They Correlate with Key Economic and Financial Ratios.

12-May-2014

In our annual update of the key statistics underlying our assessments of debt issues in the U.S. municipal water and sewer sector, we’re focusing on the medians and means of several widely used variables. As in previous reports, we present data for economic and financial measures to offer insight into correlations that exist between these measures and the ratings we’ve assigned to issuers in this sector.

When assigning a bond rating, Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services takes into account a variety of factors, both qualitative and quantitative. We believe a thorough examination of the quantitative information sheds light on the strengths and weaknesses of individual issuers relative to others. By providing this information, we hope to increase transparency and continue our open and accurate discussions about credit quality among all participants in the municipal water and sewer bond sector.

Overview

  • U.S. municipal water and sewer retail system bond ratings remain mostly in the ‘AA’ and ‘A’ category.
  • While our ratings strongly correlate with key measures of an issuer’s debt, liability, and service area population, they also factor in important qualitative factors.
  • Given this sector’s stability, we have not seen, and do not foresee, significant deviations in the ratings and ratios.

It is important to remember that the ratios and other measures we provide here are not the sole determinants of our rating assignments, nor can they serve as rating benchmarks because they do not account for the issuer’s complete financial, operating environment, or sector risk. Moreover, these means and medians reflect recent historical information, while we intend our credit ratings to be forward-looking. Also, because our long-term ratings are designed to hold up through business cycles, a particular issuer’s ratios may appear to be inconsistent with its assigned debt rating at a particular point within a cycle. We also exercise some degree of caution when making national comparisons of revenue bond issuers because the operating environments may differ from state to state. Issuers often face differences in regulations that determine their ability to raise rates and issue debt, what their required service provisions may be, and the regulatory environment in which they operate. However, these differences tend to be minor.

Rating Distributions Continue To Cluster In The ‘AA’ And ‘A’ Categories

Given the stability of the municipal water and sewer sector, a quick look at the overall rating distributions for municipal water and sewer bonds reveals two immediate conclusions: (1) the ratings are almost exclusively investment-grade, with only 0.3% of all bonds rated below ‘BBB-‘, and (2) nearly half of the ratings are now in the ‘AA’ category. In this year’s report, we focus on exclusively, or predominantly, retail systems and exclude ratings on larger wholesale systems. However, we do include data for the systems that determine a wholesaler rating. For example, we have excluded the ratings on certain debt issued by Trinity River Authority, Texas, but have added the data related to its principal wholesale customers. This explains some of the differences in ratings counts from last year’s report.

Of our total rated universe of more than 1,500 issuers, just over 90% fall in either the ‘AA’ or ‘A’ category. Approximately 47% of the ratings are in the ‘AA’ category, with 45% in the ‘A’ category. Currently, about 6% of the ratings in this report are ‘AAA’, with only 2% rated ‘BBB+’ or lower (see chart 1). While ratings cluster around the ‘AA’ and ‘A’ categories, with a median rating of ‘A+’, a self-selection bias admittedly affects the distributions. Many water and sewer systems of potentially poorer self-assessed credit quality may choose not to apply for a public Standard & Poor’s rating, or they may access capital though state revolving funds. The absence of those potentially lower-rated issuers may artificially elevate the rating distribution.

Chart 1  |  Download Chart Data

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When we dive deeper into the rating distributions according to the systems’ service area population, some differences begin to emerge. As in previous years, for systems with populations of less than 20,000, the ratings are predominantly in the ‘A’ category (72%). The ‘BBB’ category is now home to less than 5% of systems with service areas with populations under 20,000, while 24% are rated ‘AA’ and less than 1% are ‘AAA’ (see chart 2).

Chart 2  |  Download Chart Data

image

For systems with populations between 20,000 and 150,000, the spread between those in the ‘AA’ category (57%) and those in the ‘A’ category (39%) has widened in recent years. Approximately 5% of those in this population range are rated ‘AAA’, while less than 1% are ‘BBB+’ or lower (see chart 3).

As population levels increase, so does the percentage of higher-rated issuers. For systems with a service area population ranging between 150,000 and 500,000, the majority of the ratings are in the ‘AA’ category (64%), while only about one-third are ‘A+’ or lower. In this range, about 25% are rated ‘AAA’ (see chart 4). Similarly, for very large systems with populations above 500,000, about 20% are ‘AAA’, 60% are ‘AA’, and about 20% are rated ‘A+’ or lower (see chart 5).

Chart 3  |  Download Chart Data

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Chart 4  |  Download Chart Data

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Chart 5  |  Download Chart Data

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Summary Of Key Economic, Financial, And Debt Ratios

The ratios we provide below reflect three of the four main areas Standard & Poor’s evaluates when rating issuers: economic, financial, and debt factors. Measures for the fourth factor, administration and management, are generally more qualitative. The ratios include:

Table 1  |  Download Table

U.S. Water And Sewer Credit Ratios: Medians And Means By Rating Category
AAA AA A BBB or lower
Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean
Population 237,492 575,254 74,051 227,882 18,919 64,802 12,500 476,784
Median household effective buying income as % of U.S. 120 128 103 108 85 90 83 92
Unemployment rate (%) 6.1 6.3 7.1 7.4 7.5 8.1 7.8 8.8
Concentration (%) 6.4 10.2 8.7 12.6 10.3 15.6 8.9 13.5
Water rate ($) 30.88 31.55 32.84 35.63 40.84 42.68 34.95 39.70
Sewer rate ($) 36.26 39.91 38.81 41.38 40.45 44.02 43.21 44.40
Total operating revenues* ($) 65,116 125,725 15,835 41,096 4,245 12,311 3,472 52,513
Days’ cash* 472 629 417 556 283 402 144 261
Senior-lien debt service coverage* (x) 3.30 3.97 2.40 3.65 1.73 2.45 1.35 1.50
All-in debt service coverage* (x) 2.35 2.96 1.87 2.29 1.43 1.66 0.97 1.19
*Average of last three years.

Table 2  |  Download Table

U.S. Water And Sewer Credit Ratios: Medians And Means By Population
Pop Above 500,000 Pop 150,000 to 500,000 Pop 20,000 to 150,000 Pop Below 20,000
Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean
Population 998,454 1,459,872 241,934 268,001 50,095 61,715 9,164 9,529
Median household effective buying income as % of U.S. 98 104 99 103 97 103 85 94
Unemployment rate (%) 7.6 7.9 7.3 7.6 7.2 7.8 7.2 7.5
Concentration (%) 8.0 15.4 7.5 11.5 9.0 12.2 12.1 16.7
Water rate ($) 30.12 33.66 31.2 33.1 33.6 36.0 40.36 42.27
Sewer rate ($) 42.54 44.48 41.15 42.58 37.64 40.03 40.56 44.93
Total operating revenues* ($) 174,087 243,840 49,140 58,055 13,017 16,453 2,692 3,890
Days’ cash* 281 353 404 537 375 508 349 422
Senior-lien debt service coverage* (x) 2.02 3.04 2.15 3.32 2.27 2.98 1.91 2.63
All-in debt service coverage* (x) 1.53 1.81 1.80 2.33 1.75 2.15 1.43 1.65
*Average of last three years.

Table 3  |  Download Table

U.S. Water And Sewer Credit Ratios: Medians And Means Within The ‘AA’ Category
AA+ AA AA-
Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean
Population 172,038 419,393 86,642 252,853 43,871 128,640
Median household effective buying income as % of U.S. 107 115 107 113 97 100
Unemployment rate (%) 6.5 6.9 7.3 7.4 7.2 7.6
Concentration (%) 7.8 13.9 8.0 10.9 9.6 13.4
Water rate ($) 31.85 34.98 31.95 33.94 34.30 37.30
Sewer rate ($) 38.50 42.70 37.20 38.62 40.81 43.16
Total operating revenues* ($) 32,382 75,292 18,140 45,206 11,391 23,623
Days’ cash* 443 501 431 583 397 555
Senior-lien debt service coverage* (x) 2.32 3.44 2.46 3.74 2.39 3.66
All-in debt service coverage* (x) 1.96 2.42 1.93 2.44 1.80 2.13
*Average of last three years.

The Relationships Between Our Ratings And Select Ratios

As in previous years, the data show correlations between several ratios-—including the issuer’s population, income levels, and liquidity—-and our ratings on these debt issues. This is not surprising because the economic base (i.e., the population and income levels) tends to provide the foundation for credit quality in general. What’s more, larger systems tend to enjoy the benefits of economies of scale because they can tap into a larger base to generate revenue, address system emergencies, and adapt to fluctuations in demand often more expeditiously and efficiently than smaller systems. Similar to population, a system’s total operating revenues correlate to rating level: Systems with larger budgets generally get rated higher.

Given the overwhelming majority of ratings are ‘A-‘ or higher, ratings below this level usually have a unique set of credit factors associated with them. This year, ratings at the ‘BBB’ level or lower include those on Detroit; Jefferson County, Ala.; Stockton, Calif.; New Orleans; and Atwater, Calif. Each of these issuers has experienced significant stress related to either their enterprise fund, general government operations, or both.

A direct correlation exists between our issue ratings and ratios such as median and mean population, days’ cash on hand, and coverage ratios. For several of the data points, we used the average of the previous three years for analysis. Although the sector is extremely stable and only minor deviations typically occur from year to year, using a three-year average tends to smooth any atypical year-over-year changes.

Across all rating categories, the range from the minimum value to the maximum value is, for almost every data point, extremely large. For example, days’ cash levels for ‘AAA’ issuers range from less than 100 days to more than 2,000 days. Given the size differences between the smallest issuers and the exceptionally large issuers, the means may be skewed but can nevertheless provide some insight.

Income levels, unemployment rates, and population

In general, better economic indicators correlate with higher ratings. From the ‘BBB’ category to the ‘AAA’ category, median household effective buying income increases to 120% of the national average from 83%, while the median unemployment rate declines to 6.1% from 7.8%. Additionally, the median population for ‘AAA’ rated issuers is significantly higher than those in any other rating category.

Liquidity ratios

The issuers’ days’ cash on hand, a measure of liquidity, are also stronger at the higher rating levels, although median liquidity levels remain healthy, in our view, for each category. However, for smaller systems, a high days’ cash number does not always equal a nominally high amount of cash. For example, a very small system with 180 days’ cash may have a nominally low amount of cash available to address any emergencies or wet weather conditions that cause a decline in demand.

The median days’ cash level is about 144 days for ‘BBB’ category issuers and rises to 283 for those in the ‘A’ category, 417 for those in the ‘AA’ category, and 472 for ‘AAA’ issuers. When aggregating by population, the correlations are not quite as strong, with median liquidity levels of the midsize issuers greater than those of the larger issuers. Again, liquidity measures are typically strong across all rating categories despite population levels.

Coverage ratios

As with days’ cash on hand, the coverage ratios also have strong correlations with credit quality because the higher-rated issuers tended to have better debt service coverage. Mean and median coverage levels improved noticeably between each rating category. The median senior-lien coverage ratio is 1.3x for ‘BBB’ credits and rises to 3.3x for ‘AAA’ credits. However, these correlations do not exist when taking population ranges into account because issuers in the 20,000 to 150,000 range had higher coverage means and medians than larger systems. These trends are consistent with previous years.

A closer look at the ‘AA’ category

While ‘A+’ remains the median rating level, a slightly greater percentage of ratings are in the ‘AA’ category versus the ‘A’ category. Within the ‘AA’ category, a slightly higher percentage of ratings are at ‘AA-‘ (20%) than ‘AA’ (17%), with about 8% at ‘AA+’. Some of the correlations that were evident from category to category are still evident within the ‘AA’ category itself. Specifically, median population levels and unemployment rates improve with rating quality. Financial indicators, such as days’ cash and debt service coverage, do not differ significantly from ‘AA-‘ to ‘AA+’, though the liquidity ratio rises slightly (see table 3).

As Always, Numbers Don’t Tell the Whole Story

While the ratios presented here may show particular trends from category to category, or even within certain categories, they are not the sole determinants for the assignment of a rating. Management policies and practices, coupled with the environment in which the utility operates, will often lead to higher coverage or liquidity ratios. Those governance factors may be the primary reason for a higher rating, with the operating performance a result of higher-quality management. While strong financial metrics can certainly lead to higher ratings, it is also the underlying management of the system, the resources available to staff and the ability to maintain those strong financial metrics that ultimately underpins the rating assignment.

Primary Credit Analyst: James M Breeding, Dallas (1) 214-871-1407;
james.breeding@standardandpoors.com
Secondary Contact: Theodore A Chapman, Dallas (1) 214-871-1401;
theodore.chapman@standardandpoors.com



S&P General Obligation Medians for Counties Under the Revised Local GO Criteria: 1Q 2014 Update.

15-Apr-2014

We present the medians by rating category and they apply to U.S. counties. These ratios exclude municipalities and special districts such as school districts. We are publishing a separate GO municipality median report concurrently with this article. We plan to continue updating this article quarterly as we move through the one-year implementation period.

We drew the medians from 325 county reviews completed through March 12, 2014, of the approximately 1,000 total ratings in our portfolio for counties that fall under the revised GO criteria. We have committed to reviewing all issuers that fall under the new GO criteria by September 2014.

We calculate the metrics, for which we provide the medians, based on raw, or in some cases, data that we have adjusted (for more information, see the related research article below), and they are only one component of the rating analysis. The metrics play a part in the quantitative analysis in five factors: economy, budgetary flexibility, budgetary performance, liquidity, and debt and contingent liabilities. Qualitative adjustments within each factor (which the medians do not reflect) also play an important part in the analysis.

Download Table

General Obligation Medians For Counties Under The Revised Criteria
%
Rating No. MVPC ($) Proj PC EBI FB/exp GF op res TGF op res TG cash/exp TG cash/DS Net DD/rev TGF DS/exp
AAA 55 109,300 120 25 2 0 43 587 66 8
AA 194 82,827 89 33 2 1 44 744 56 6
A 72 58,061 77 20 2 0 33 375 72 7
BBB and lower 4 45,576 80 (10) (4) (3) 16 277 57 7

Median Definitions

Related Criteria And Research

Related Criteria

USPF Criteria: Local Government GO Ratings Methodology And Assumptions, Sept. 12, 2013

Related Research

S&P Public Finance Local GO Criteria: How We Adjust Data For Analytic Consistency, Sept. 12, 2013

Primary Credit Analysts: Karl Jacob, Boston (1) 617-530-8134;
karl.jacob@standardandpoors.com
Christopher M Krahe, Chicago (1) 312-233-7063;
christopher.krahe@standardandpoors.com
Jeffrey J Previdi, New York (1) 212-438-1796;
jeff.previdi@standardandpoors.com
Horacio G Aldrete-Sanchez, Dallas (1) 214-871-1426;
horacio.aldrete@standardandpoors.com



S&P General Obligation Medians for Municipalities Under the Revised Local GO Criteria: 1Q 2014 Update.

15-Apr-2014

We present the medians by rating category, and they apply to U.S. municipalities covered under the GO criteria including cities, towns, townships, boroughs, and villages. They exclude special purpose districts such as school districts. We are publishing a separate county GO median report concurrently with this article. We plan to continue updating this article quarterly as we move through the one-year implementation period.

We draw the medians from 1,245 municipality reviews completed through March 12, 2014, of the approximately 3,000 in our portfolio of total ratings for municipalities that fall under the revised GO criteria. We have committed to reviewing all issuers that fall under the new criteria by September 2014.

We calculate the metrics, for which we provide the medians, based on raw data, or in some cases, data we have adjusted (for more information, see the related research articles), and they are only one component of our analysis. The metrics play a part in the quantitative analysis in five factors: economy, budgetary flexibility, budgetary performance, liquidity, and debt and contingent liabilities. Qualitative adjustments within each factor (which the medians do not reflect) also play an important part in the rating outcome.

Download Table

General Obligation Medians For Municipalities Under The Revised Criteria
%
Rating No. MVPC ($) Proj PC EBI FB/exp GF op res TGF op res TG cash/exp TG cash/DS Net DD/rev TGF DS/exp
AAA 126 158,096 152 30 3 2 55 562 73 8
AA 774 86,775 103 29 3 1 51 532 85 9
A 285 50,247 80 21 1 0 50 439 113 11
BBB and lower 60 47,300 77 0 0 (1) 29 300 108 11

Median Definitions

Related Criteria And Research

Related Criteria

USPF Criteria: Local Government GO Ratings Methodology And Assumptions, Sept. 12, 2013

Related Research

S&P Public Finance Local GO Criteria: How We Adjust Data For Analytic Consistency, Sept. 12, 2013

Primary Credit Analysts: Karl Jacob, Boston (1) 617-530-8134;
karl.jacob@standardandpoors.com
Christopher M Krahe, Chicago (1) 312-233-7063;
christopher.krahe@standardandpoors.com
Jeffrey J Previdi, New York (1) 212-438-1796;
jeff.previdi@standardandpoors.com
Horacio G Aldrete-Sanchez, Dallas (1) 214-871-1426;
horacio.aldrete@standardandpoors.com



Anaheim Says $265 Million Bond Deal Terminated by Citigroup.

Citigroup Inc. terminated a deal to purchase $265 million of revenue bonds from Anaheim, California, after opponents sued over plans to expand the city’s convention center, a city spokeswoman said.

Citigroup was the lead underwriter on the bonds offered March 24, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. The bonds were rated AA- by Standard & Poor’s, according to a disclosure document. The deal was set to close May 14.

A local group that calls itself the Coalition of Anaheim Taxpayers for Economic Responsibility filed the suit May 12, alleging that the public financing authority wasn’t allowed to offer the debt because California lawmakers dissolved redevelopment agencies, one of which was a member of the financing authority.

“Unfortunately, the originally targeted investors were not willing to accept the litigation risk and chose not to proceed even though the city, the city attorney and bond counsel were of the opinion that such litigation would not likely succeed,” Anaheim spokeswoman Ruth Ruiz said by e-mail.

Scott Helfman, a spokesman for Citigroup, decined to comment on the termination.

The city council in March approved the funding and plans to build a 200,000-square-foot expansion of the convention center, which is less than two miles south of the city’s star attraction, Disneyland.

Proceeds from a 2 percent hotel room tax were to pay for the bonds.

Ruiz said city officials are trying to determine if they can move forward with the project.

“It is unfortunate that a few local activists, in contradiction to the overwhelming community support shown at the council meeting where the bonds were authorized, have taken legal action against this project,” she said.

By Michael B. Marois  May 16, 2014 8:14 AM PT

To contact the reporter on this story: Michael B. Marois in Sacramento at mmarois@bloomberg.net
To contact the editors responsible for this story: Stephen Merelman at smerelman@bloomberg.net




Phoenix Sells $300 Million Amid Pension Push: Muni Credit.

Phoenix, facing pension costs that have doubled in six years, may become the largest U.S. city to put new workers in 401(k)-style plans if voters pass a ballot measure in November.

Backers of the plan say a move last year to roll back pensions didn’t go far enough to curb retirement expenses, which swallowed $218 million, or 22 percent of Phoenix’s general-fund expenditures in the year through June 2013, up from 11 percent in 2007, budget documents indicate. Standard & Poor’s cited the costs in stripping Phoenix of its AAA rating in December.

Investors get to weigh in on the sixth-most-populous city’s fiscal wellbeing next month, when Phoenix plans to sell $297 million of debt. The state’s capital city still has time to get a handle on its pension obligations, said Todd Curtis, who manages the Aquila Group of Funds’ $271 million Aquila Tax-Free Trust of Arizona.

“Pensions are a growing concern within the credit analysis of any city in the country,” Curtis said from Phoenix. “Being an Arizona buyer, I am not too worried about Phoenix. They have a long history of taking steps to balance their budget.”

Pension Deficit

Local officials nationwide are contending with pension deficits exacerbated by the recession that ended almost five years ago. The 25 most-populous U.S. cities have more than $125 billion less than needed to meet promises to retirees, according to Morningstar Inc.

Unfunded obligations for pensions and retiree health care are crowding out spending on schools, police and libraries, Pew Charitable Trusts said in a March 2013 report. Pension costs have helped tip Detroit and the California cities of Stockton and San Bernardino into bankruptcy since 2012.

Phoenix pensions are 61 percent funded, trailing the median of 75 percent for the 25 largest cities, Morningstar said in a December report. The proportion of Phoenix’s spending going toward pensions is the group’s third-highest, trailing California’s San Jose and San Diego, according to Morningstar. Voter-approved changes in March 2013 should ease the pressure on Phoenix, the company said.

Phoenix Rising

The city of about 1.5 million has rebounded from the recession, which led to the smallest municipal workforce in 40 years and cuts to parks, recreation and cultural facilities, Pew said.

Home prices in Phoenix reached a five-year high in November, although they’re still down almost 40 percent from a 2006 peak, according to the S&P/Case-Shiller property-value index.

Phoenix balanced its budget last year as the rebounding economy boosted revenue, allowing it to restore police and fire services, pool and library hours and programs for youth and seniors. The city cut services to deal with a $277 million budget shortfall two years earlier caused by declining tax revenue, according to the city’s 2013 fiscal report.

Pension costs threaten to reverse the progress, Jim Waring, the vice mayor, said in an interview.

Benefit Crossroads

Waring, a Republican, supports the November ballot measure to cap pension benefits available to current employees — a measure intended to curb padding of benefits through late-career raises and special pay — and to put new civilian hires into a 401(k)-style system rather than a defined-benefit pension. The 401(k) is a tax-deferred retirement account that workers manage themselves.

Savings would total $150 million in the first 10 years, said Scot Mussi, executive director of theArizona Free Enterprise Club, which backs the measure. City officials haven’t produced an estimate.

Phoenix would be the most-populous city to replace pensions with 401(k)-type accounts for new hires, said Jordan Marks, executive director of the union-backed National Public Pension Coalition. Voters in San Diego approved such a system in 2012, and it went into effect that year.

“Where we’re going to be in 20 years is a potentially unsustainable path,” Waring said. “We’re trying to get ahead of the curve.”

Phoenix, which hasn’t offered general-obligation debt since 2012, plans to refinance bonds issued in 2003, 2004 and 2005, said Treasurer Randy Piotrowski. The city plans to price the bonds June 2, he said.

Highest Rating

Even after S&P downgraded Phoenix in December to AA+, its second-highest level, Phoenix is still tied with Houston for the highest rating of the seven most populous cities.

“Pension costs have been on the radar of all investors,” Piotrowski said. “However, we haven’t heard any direct concerns from investors.”

The pension change that voters approved last year — which increased employee contributions toward pensions and established later retirement ages — is projected to save $600 million over 23 years, the city’s then-acting chief financial officer, Neal Young, wrote in the 2013 fiscal report.

The population of Phoenix, home of PetSmart Inc. (PETM) and Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc. (FCX), grew almost 3 percent from 2010 to 2012, according to the U.S. Census.

Waring said the measures, which were backed by Democratic Mayor Greg Stanton, didn’t reverse the growth in pension liabilities.

Stanton’s policy director, Seth Scott, didn’t return two phone calls and an e-mail message seeking the mayor’s position on the latest initiative.

‘Free Market’

The Phoenix Pension Reform Act is principally funded by the Arizona Free Enterprise Club, according to its website. The club, which describes itself as a “free market policy and lobbying group,” raised $501,000 in 2012, all through membership dues, according to its most recent tax filing.

City unions have formed the Arizona Retirement Security Coalition to fight the measure. Money from outside Phoenix is fanning the perception of a pension crisis to persuade voters to hand over management of municipal retirement accounts to private firms, said Frank Piccioli, president of the American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees Local 2960, which represents about 2,200 city employees.

Marks of the National Public Pension Coalition was in Phoenix this week planning how to defeat the measure. Marks said Phoenix could set a “dangerous” precedent for stripping municipal workers of guaranteed pensions.

Piccioli couldn’t name the funders of the drive to cut pensions, and Mussi declined to name donors. Neither side of the ballot measure has filed financial disclosure statements ahead of a June 30 deadline.

“The long-term outlook is a very healthy pension system,” Piccioli said. “We are not in crisis. This is not Detroit.”

By James Nash  May 15, 2014 5:00 PM PT

To contact the reporter on this story: James Nash in Los Angeles at jnash24@bloomberg.net
To contact the editors responsible for this story: Stephen Merelman at smerelman@bloomberg.net




Fitch: Despite Local CA Victory, OPEB Battles Will Go On.

Fitch Ratings-San Francisco-08 May 2014: The California Supreme Court’s decision last week against reviewing a lower court’s decision on other post-employment benefit (OPEB) liabilities removed one legal challenge to public employers’ efforts to reduce obligations, Fitch Ratings says. However, many other hurdles remain. We generally view OPEBs as more flexible than pensions. This decision supports that view, as well as the view that local governments’ (in this case California’s) ability to make material adjustments to these benefits.

The April 30 denial by the California Supreme Court leaves standing a December 2013 opinion by the state’s Court of Appeals, which affirmed the city of San Diego’s ability to cap its contributions toward retiree health care benefits. The appeals court cited substantial legal precedent in concluding that San Diego’s OPEBs were an employment benefit rather than a vested contractual right and, unlike pension benefits, could be reduced for current employees and retirees.

California courts have looked closely at the circumstances under which OPEBs have addressed the validity of subsequent reductions. A series of decisions over the past several years by both the federal 9th Circuit Court and the state Supreme Court have held that OPEBs in general are not vested with contractual rights, but this status may be granted or implied through labor negotiations or other governing board actions. As a result, local governments’ legal authority to reduce OPEBs must be determined on a case-by-case basis, leading to repeated litigation of benefit cuts across multiple jurisdictions.

Fitch expects OPEB litigation to continue as public employers in California increasingly look for means to reduce long-term liabilities and growing expenses. Several cases arising from OPEB cuts made during the recent recession continue to wend their way through the state’s courts, and any new efforts to reduce benefits are likely to face legal challenges as well. Litigation is likely to slow the pace of OPEB reform in California and the prospect of litigation may also lead some employers to reconsider such efforts.

Contact:

Stephen Walsh
Director
U.S. Public Finance
+1 415 732-7573
650 California Street
San Francisco, CA

Rob Rowan
Senior Director
Fitch Wire
+1 212 908-9159
33 Whitehall Street
New York, NY




NYT: Detroit Bankruptcy Deadline May Be Missed, Imperiling State Funds.

The federal judge handling Detroit’s bankruptcy indicated on Thursday that the current timetable for finishing the case might be unrealistic given the many disputes outstanding, raising questions about whether Detroit can exit bankruptcy before the end of its emergency manager’s term.

Judge Steven Rhodes made the observation in a hearing after saying he had heard that the state had promised to give Detroit some money — but only if the city could get him to approve its bankruptcy exit plan by the end of September. He said state lawmakers needed to understand he could not guarantee meeting that deadline.

“There are a bazillion things that could happen between now and Sept. 30,” the judge said.

Judge Rhodes seemed to be alluding to the thick stack of objections to Detroit’s bankruptcy plan that piled up in the courthouse this week in response to a deadline. For months, a team of mediators has been trying to negotiate out-of-court settlements to Detroit’s many obligations, and until recently it seemed to be having remarkable success, particularly with the so-called grand bargain, which proposed to use the city’s famous art collection to raise $816 million for retirees’ pensions. The grand bargain calls for $466 million from private foundations and the Detroit Institute of Arts and a $350 million appropriation from the state — with the contingency that Judge Rhodes said he heard about through the grapevine.

Many of the new objections complain that Detroit is improperly proposing to treat its pensioners more favorably than its investors, and some of them cite the art deal as an example of what is wrong. Bankruptcy law requires debtors to treat similarly situated creditors equitably, and now creditors are arguing that Detroit’s proposal must be rejected because it fails to do so.

“The debtor’s plan is hopelessly defective,” said one creditor, Syncora Capital Assurance, in a filing that arrived on Monday. “If it were an automobile, it would be pronounced a lemon and promptly sent to the scrapyard.”

Detroit’s plan of debt adjustment, which lays out the terms it wants to use to settle its various debts, is scheduled to go to trial in July, when Judge Rhodes will have to decide how to handle any remaining objections. Even before the judge warned that the timetable might be unrealistic, bankruptcy experts said they were taken aback by the number and complexity of objections to the plan and wondered how the judge would manage it all.

“This case is a law school exam,” said David Skeel, a bankruptcy law professor at the University of Pennsylvania. “Every issue you could possibly want to ask about a recovery plan is being raised. Even teachers who teach this over and over don’t know all the issues.”

Some of the new objections come from investors that had not complained about Detroit’s approach until now. In addition to their concerns about equitable treatment, some go to great length to explain the laws underlying municipal securities, which can be very different from those governing the corporate debts that turn up in Chapter 11 bankruptcies. Some of Detroit’s bonds fall into a category that has never been impaired in bankruptcy before, and the holders are resolute that it cannot happen in Detroit.

Mr. Skeel and other bankruptcy experts said it would be difficult, though not impossible, to negotiate settlements to so many disputes before the all-important confirmation hearing in July. Most parties to a bankruptcy prefer to settle before the final trial, even if it means bearing a loss, because they know that if they go to trial the judge may leave them with an even bigger loss, and an unfavorable legal precedent to boot.

“Everybody wants to go into July with as few major objections left as possible,” Mr. Skeel said. “No one wants to be surprised. If the plan is fatally flawed, that has to be discovered now, and not in July. There’s a possibility that if you’ve got a battle royale, the whole thing gets derailed.”

Officials have been pushing Detroit to get everything squared away by September, when the term of its emergency manager, Kevyn Orr, expires and the city’s elected leaders will regain their full powers. Now, though, backup plans are being prepared to bring in a new emergency manager if the city is still mired in bankruptcy when Mr. Orr departs.

The hearing on Thursday was originally scheduled to hear the arguments of two bond insurers that stand behind Detroit’s shakiest debt — about $1.4 billion of certificates issued in 2005 and 2006 to raise money for Detroit’s pension system. Not only has Detroit stopped making its payments on the certificates, it has filed a lawsuit arguing that the borrowing was illegal to begin with and that the certificates are unenforceable.

Detroit’s plan of adjustment says the two insurers — Syncora and the Financial Guaranty Insurance Company — have no valid claim in the bankruptcy and that it does not owe them a cent. But it offers to accept 40 percent of the certificates as valid if the creditors in this group will vote for its overall plan of adjustment. The result would be a small recovery, perhaps about 5 cents on the dollar of the certificates’ face value. Along with the two insurers are several European banks that bought certificates that were not insured.

Financial Guaranty has responded with a counterclaim to Detroit’s lawsuit. It argues that the 2005 deal was perfectly legal, but that if Judge Rhodes finds that it was not, then the city’s pension system will have to disgorge the $1.4 billion and send it back to the investors. Such an outcome would severely undermine Detroit’s hopes of getting its books balanced and coming back to normal.

Judge Rhodes questioned Financial Guaranty’s lawyer, Alfredo Perez, about its counterclaim and said he would issue a written opinion later on whether the insurer could proceed.

He also granted limited permission to the insurer’s request to determine whether investment bankers can improve on Detroit’s proposal to raise money connected to the city’s art collection, a crucial part of the grand bargain. Judge Rhodes said Financial Guaranty could work with officials of the Detroit Institute of Arts on evaluating artwork that the museum now has in storage, but barred it from removing any of the works on display to have them appraised. He also denied the creditors’ motion seeking detailed records of how the art came to be in the museum’s collection. The creditors had said the records would show which artwork was given to the institute free and clear, and which was given with instructions that might make it hard to sell.

Before the hearing on Thursday, Financial Guaranty went out and tested the market appetite for Detroit’s collection and came back with four bids for some or all of the artwork. The bids differ widely, but the insurer contends they show that Detroit could raise a lot more money by simply marketing even some of the artwork than it has by tying it up in the grand bargain.

No one can force Detroit to sell its art collection, but Financial Guaranty says that if Detroit does decide to sell the art, then the terms must meet the requirements of bankruptcy law: The sale must be an arms-length transaction, and the proceeds must be distributed equitably, not channeled to a single, favored group of creditors. The insurer says the grand bargain fails these tests because the terms are not arms-length, and all the proceeds would be used to pay pensions, shutting out the bondholders.

By MARY WILLIAMS WALSH

Mary W. Chapman contributed reporting from Detroit.




WSJ: More Detroits Are on the Way.

Even as pension bombs tick, cities and states still borrow far beyond their means.

The most significant step taken after New York City’s near-bankruptcy in 1975 was to curb creative-accounting practices. How was that accomplished? Through a state requirement that the city balance its budget in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. The city has not had a fiscal crisis since.

 So it’s not surprising that since the city’s new mayor, Bill de Blasio, released his first budget last week, there’s been intense public debate involving the comptrollers of both the city and the state about whether the deferral of payments contractually due city employees was properly accounted for. Between the scrutiny of the press, civic organizations and public officials, the city’s record of 30 years without a fiscal crisis is likely to last.

Sadly, no other local government chose to follow the example of New York City, a choice that has led to chronic shortfalls. Earlier this year, former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker and I released the “Final Report of the State Budget Crisis Task Force” after nearly three years of study and analysis. The report sought to understand whether the states’ current fiscal problems were cyclical—caused by the financial collapse of 2008 and likely to abate with economic recovery—or whether they were structural, the result of long-term revenue and spending imbalances. The report’s main finding is that in most states and cities the problems are structural and the crisis is deepening.The crisis has many elements but a few stand out. First, contributions to employee pension funds are often well below the levels needed to ensure the payment of the benefits that are contractually or constitutionally guaranteed, let alone those that past trustees and legislatures added on a discretionary basis. Sometimes the contributions are not made at all for years at a time. Everyone with a role in determining these contribution levels has an incentive to keep them as low as possible. Politicians don’t like to raise taxes to meet future obligations, while public unions would rather take the long-term risk of underfunding rather than face immediate layoffs or benefit reductions.

The largest single expenditure in most state budgets is for Medicaid. Unfortunately, health-care costs have been rising faster than either inflation or state and local tax revenues, and most economists believe they will rise even faster in the next few years.

But the most critical piece of the states’ fiscal dilemma is that they are borrowing to cover their operating deficits. They do this directly—by issuing debt securities—but also indirectly. Some states, like New York, make contributions to their pension systems in promissory notes rather than cash. States and cities also sell assets and treat the proceeds as operating revenues, in effect selling off the family silver to stay afloat.

In 2009 Arizona sold its capitol buildings for more than $700 million. In 2008 Chicago leased its parking meters for 75 years for nearly $1.2 billion. In 1991 New York sold Attica Prison for $200 million to itself through a bond issuance, providing a temporary revenue boost but costing taxpayers far more in the long run in interest. While state constitutions contain various balanced-budget clauses, they generally don’t define revenues or prevent such creative accounting.

The consequences of our state and municipal fiscal crises are plain: We are drastically underinvesting in physical infrastructure—roads, bridges, ports, etc.—the necessary underpinning of future growth. Just as important, we are also underinvesting in human infrastructure, most notably our children’s ability to compete. No one is satisfied with the output of our educational system, yet states spent over half a billion dollars less on prekindergarten education last year than they had the year before.

Permitting states and municipalities to continue these practices will result—indeed, has already begun to result—in harmful service cuts and a failure to fund promises made to creditors, public employees and the beneficiaries of essential public services, including elderly people without minimal levels of financial support. What this means is we can expect to see more Detroits. Last July the Motor City filed the country’s largest municipal bankruptcy after racking up $18 billion in promises it could no longer afford to keep.

Meanwhile, the federal government is facing understandable pressure to rein in spending and reduce deficits. One proposal is to reduce health-care spending by raising the age of Medicare eligibility to 67 from 65. Yet this would greatly increase the spending burden on state and local governments currently obligated to fund health care for some 19 million retirees until they are eligible for Medicare. Worse, we can only guess the scale of such impact since there is currently no mechanism in the federal government that properly measures the effects of federal proposals on the states.

No one seriously argues that when credit markets won’t allow more state or local government borrowing, Washington should write checks to get them through their crises. Even if an administration proposed such a Band-Aid, it would be politically impossible for Congress to approve it. Yet if the number of cities and states in extreme distress were to grow significantly, the political pressure to do something would increase inexorably. The ultimate cost would be staggering.

It is time for the federal government to take the steps needed to avoid the social and financial crisis that must be expected if nothing changes. Washington now provides almost 30% of what the states spend annually and already imposes many mandates on states and localities in return for its largess. The federal government could condition its continued financial support on states and local governments adopting budget systems that would require recurring expenses to be matched by current revenues.

The political difficulty involved in such a step will be far less than the pain that will result if states and localities are not forced to move toward a responsible system of accrual budgeting. One thing is clear: Continuing to use cash budgeting practices that allow states and cities to inflate revenues, defer costs and multiply the burdens on future generations is the worst option.

By

RICHARD RAVITCH
May 15, 2014 6:46 p.m. ET

Mr. Ravitch is the former lieutenant governor of New York and an adviser to the bankruptcy judge in Detroit.




GASB Issues Exposure Draft on Fair Value Measurement and Application.

Norwalk, CT, May 15, 2014—The Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) today issued for public comment a proposed Statement addressing accounting and financial reporting issues related to fair value measurements.

The Exposure Draft, Fair Value Measurement and Application, describes how fair value should be defined and measured, what assets and liabilities should be measured at fair value, and what information about fair value should be disclosed in the notes to the financial statements.

“The proposed changes to the GASB’s fair value standards are intended to increase clarity, consistency, and comparability in governments’ fair value measurements and their related disclosures,” said GASB Chairman David A. Vaudt. “The Board believes that fair value measurements enhance the relevance of reported financial information, particularly when accompanied by robust disclosures.”

The GASB is proposing that fair value be defined as the price that would be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between market participants at the measurement date. The Exposure Draft also proposes that investments would generally be measured at fair value. Investments would be defined as a security or other asset that a government holds primarily for the purpose of income or profit and the present service capacity of which is based solely on its ability to generate cash or to be sold to generate cash.

Certain investments would continue to be excluded from measurement at fair value, such as investments in money market instruments with remaining maturities at time of purchase of one year or less.

Under current accounting standards, state and local governments are required to disclose how they arrived at their measures of fair value if they are not based on quoted market prices. In the Exposure Draft, the GASB is proposing to expand those disclosures to include the inputs a government uses to measure fair value and the judgments made to arrive at those inputs.

The Exposure Draft is available on the GASB website, www.gasb.org. Stakeholders are encouraged to review the proposals and provide comments by August 15, 2014.

The GASB will hold a live, one-hour, CPE webinar on the Exposure Draft at 1 p.m. EDT on Tuesday, July 15 aimed at auditors and preparers. On Thursday, July 17 at 1 p.m. EDT, the GASB will host a one-hour, non-CPE webinar for financial statement users. Registration for both events will be announced on the GASB website in the coming weeks.




GFOA Best Practice of the Week - Guidance for Affordable Care Act Implementation.

 Recently, the White House announced that 8 million Americans have signed up for private health coverage under the Affordable Care Act. Approximately a third are younger than 35 years old, and the costs of the expansion are reportedly less than expected; for instance, the administration predicts that Medicare and Medicaid costs in 2020 will be $180 billion less than 2010 estimates. Many governments are looking for more information about complying with the act and making sure their health-care benefit is sustainable. Take a look at the GFOA’s best practices for ideas on implementation, as well as insurance and cost containment options.

Developing a Process for Complying with the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act recommends steps for successfully implementing a process for reviewing federal health-care benefit requirements. One tip: review the requirements at least quarterly to make sure you’re aware of any newly issued or soon-to-be issued regulations related to the Affordable Care Act.

Strategic Health-Care Plan Design helps jurisdictions with guiding principles and key objectives for managing health-care costs and improving participant wellness. This best practice gives users advice in determining the purpose of its health-care plan, using performance measures to establish and define cost objectives, using analytical tools to measure the cost drivers and health risk factors of plan participants, determining appropriate cost-containment measures in relation to the plan’s performance goals, working with other departments to make sure the long-term strategic plan design for health care is understood and will be taken into consideration during labor negotiations, establishing ongoing education initiatives, and considering the effect of OPEB on the costs and sustainability of the jurisdiction’s overall health-care benefit package.

Strategies for Budgeting and Managing Health-Care Costs suggests strategies for managing employee health-care benefit costs more effectively. These include monitoring medical plan provider network and prescription drug discounts, setting an appropriate level of cost-sharing with employees, encouraging good consumer behaviors, analyzing the risks of self-insurance, using measurements to assess plan performance, and reviewing federal requirements.

Wednesday, April 30, 2014




GFOA: A Guide to Starting the Lean Journey.

You’ve heard of Lean and you are intrigued. You are acquainted with the basic Lean tools and concepts such as Kaizen, the 8 wastes, root cause analysis, and process maps – but what are the next steps? The purpose of this guide is to help you get off to a good start on your Lean journey, including:

  • Considering Lean. You first must consider if Lean is the right journey for you.
  • Become aware of what a Lean organization looks like. Stephen Covey says “Begin with the end in mind.” Learning about Lean and the experiences of others and what they have accomplished puts you in a better position to begin the journey.
  • The strategy for implementing Lean at home. Once you have learned about Lean you and decide it is the suitable journey for you, then you are ready to begin the Lean journey in your own organization.
  • Building a Lean culture. Lean is not just collection of tools. It is a mindset and way of working. Lean will have its greatest impact when that mindset pervades the organization.
  • Building support for Lean. Change is often hard for employees. Change is sometimes for employees so thought must be given on how to make the transition easier.
Download

 

Author:

Shayne Kavanagh
Jeff Cole
Harry Kenworthy

Year:

2014




CUSIP Global Services Launches Municipal Pre-Refunded Linkage Service.

New York, NY, May 13th 2014 – CUSIP Global Services (CGS) today announced the launch of its Municipal Pre-Refunded Linkage Service. Created to identify and link partially pre- refunded municipal bonds into one record, the new product will reduce clerical errors that could arise from the manual process typically followed in today’s market. The service will also aid in the risk management of partially pre-refunded bonds, which are frequently backed by U.S. Treasuries.

The new service assigns CUSIP numbers when a municipal bond is partially pre-refunded, a situation that occurs when a portion of the outstanding principal amount of an issue is pre- paid before the scheduled maturity date. The service contains over 59,000 linked issues which include reference data for the partially pre-funded parent, the newly issued pre- refunded bond and the newly issued bond for the un-refunded balance. The service is delivered daily via FTP in the form of an initial master file along with daily updates.

“We are constantly surveying our clients for ways we can offer solutions to help in their daily operations,” said Jim Taylor, Managing Director and Head of CGS. “This product underscores our commitment not only to the municipal market, but to all of those who are looking for easier ways to properly track municipal assets in their portfolio.”

About CUSIP Global Services

The financial services industry relies on our unrivaled experience in uniquely identifying instruments and entities to support efficient global capital markets.

Our extensive focus on standardization over the past 45 years has helped us earn the reputation for being the trusted originator of quality identifiers and descriptive data, ensuring that essential front- and back-office functions run smoothly.

CGS is managed on behalf of the American Bankers Association (ABA) by S&P Capital IQ, with a Board of Trustees that represents the voices of leading financial institutions For more information, visit www.cusip.com.

About The American Bankers Association

The American Bankers Association represents banks of all sizes and charters and is the voice for the nation’s $14 trillion banking industry and its two million employees. Learn more at www.aba.com.For More Information:

Michael Privitera S&P Capital IQ Communications michael.privitera@spcapitaliq.com 212-438-6679




Opportunities Abound for Bond-Financed Infrastructure, But So Do Obstacles.

ORLANDO — Transportation finance experts expect robust bond financing of new transportation and infrastructure projects in the near future, even though federal policy is making those investments increasingly tricky.

Several market participants provided that perspective to municipal analysts attending the National Federation of Municipal Analysts’ conference here Wednesday.

Nearly everyone agrees that there is a major investment shortfall in America’s infrastructure needs, they told the analysts, and the response needs to be both intelligent and creative.

The U.S. spends roughly 3% of its gross domestic product on its infrastructure, said Alexander Heil, chief economist for the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. That is comparable to the expenditures of most other industrialized countries, including most of Europe. Despite this, the American Society of Civil Engineers gives the U.S. a D+ grade on its infrastructure scorecard. ASCE calculates that the nation will require about $3.6 trillion in infrastructure investment by 2020, of which about only $2 trillion is likely to be available.

Heil told conference attendees to be mindful that demographic trends will shape American infrastructure demand. Millenials are less likely to be interested in car ownership than previous generations, he said, leading to the conclusion that some caution may be warranted when considering whether assets with an expected lifespan of 100+ years will still be paying off generations from now.

“We need to look at risk. We need to look at uncertainty,” Heil said.

Duane Callender, director of the Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act loan program at the U.S. Department of Transportation, said that 75% of TIFIA’s approximately $16 billion of loans to more than 40 programs over 15 years have gone to highway programs. Callender said he expects more transit and multi-modal projects to join the program’s portfolio, and that strong bipartisan support of TIFIA means the program will probably remain well-funded for the time being.

But TIFIA is clearly the “good,” in federal policy best characterized as “the good, the bad, and the ugly,” said Citigroup managing director and public finance sector head Tom Green. On a more negative note, the gas tax-fueled federal Highway Trust Fund, is being repeatedly patched with general fund transfers because the federal gas tax has remained stagnant for two decades, Green pointed out. He said Citi sees promise in the idea of allowing states to decide whether to toll their sections of interstate highways, an idea that has been opposed by trucking and other groups.

While Green said he sees many opportunities for bond-funded new money projects on the horizon, federal regulation of high-quality liquid assets (HQLAs) is throwing up a road block. The Federal Reserve System’s Board of Governors, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency proposed a rule in October that would require large banks to maintain a minimum liquidity coverage ratio, defined as the ratio of HQLA to total net cash outflows. Assets would qualify as HQLA if they could be easily and immediately convertible to cash with little or no loss of value during a period of liquidity stress. Munis are not included because federal regulators have suggested they are not liquid enough, though muni market participants — including Citi — have argued the opposite. Under the proposed rule, high-quality corporate or foreign bonds could qualify as HQLA, but not munis. That would hamper the market, Green told analysts.

“There’s no logic to that,” he said.

A conference attendee said there has been some talk of funding infrastructure by reviving Build America Bonds at a lower subsidy rate, but Green said Republican opposition makes that unlikely.

BY KYLE GLAZIER

MAY 7, 2014 4:11pm ET




Pension Plans Go Risky With Investments.

ORLANDO — Unfunded public pension liabilities can be vastly different depending on the assumptions made and how they are calculated, but it is clear that plans are taking far more risk today than they have in the past, pension experts told municipal analysts at a conference here Wednesday.

Representatives of the Governmental Accounting Standards Board, Moody’s Investors Service, and the Rockefeller Institute of Government spoke to members of the National Federation of Municipal Analysts at the group’s annual conference.

Calculations of unfunded pension liabilities sometime seem contradictory, causing a government’s plans to appear either well-funded or poorly-funded despite starting with the same numbers. Rockefeller Institute senior Fellow Donald Boyd said the calculation of a liability can swing very wildly depending on the projected rate of return of its pension investments.

Boyd said there is no “right” discount rate, but pointed out that a typical plan could show a liability that is 63% lower when assuming an 8% rate of return vs. a 4% rate of return. Boyd advocated for a conservative assumption, which places more initial burden on governments because it assumes a lower level of long-term pension benefit payouts will be covered by the plan’s investment earnings.

“You ought to have a pretty risk-free or low-risk rate,” he said.

Boyd added that many public plans are heavily-invested in equities, leaving them exposed to more market volatility than in the past. Further, some state and local officials wrongly believe that under performance in the short-term will be canceled out over the course of 30 years of investment, Boyd said.

“The risk has grown very, very substantially over the past couple of decades,” he warned.

GASB standards approved in 2012 that become effective on July 1 require governments to disclose a “net pension liability” figure for the first time on their balance sheets in addition to funding projections. The net pension liability is the difference between the total pension liability and the assets set aside in a trust and restricted to paying benefits. The GASB standards are not binding, but state and local governments must meet them in order to receive clean or non-qualified opinions from auditors on their financial statements. GASB research manager Dean Mead said he does not expect the new standards to have any impact on funding levels. “I don’t have any reason to believe this will have any impact on funding at all,” Mead told analysts, adding that groups such as the Government Finance Officers Association have put out their own guidance for pension funding.

“How they fund is their business and not ours,” Mead said.

Marcia Van Wagner, a senior analyst at Moody’s said the rating agency has created its own adjusted pension analysis formula to create a more workable measurement of how pension liabilities impact municipal credit. Moody’s change in pension methodology resulted in an almost immediate downgrade of 19 muni issuers when the agency rolled it out last year. Moody’s treats pension liabilities more like bond debt, which Van Wagner said carries a comparable level of legal and moral obligation to pay in most cases. Van Wagner said the new GASB standards will be helpful by providing a more fulsome picture of pension liabilities, but will not likely impact the way Moody’s evaluates pensions.

“We are looking forward to more detail,” she said.

BY KYLE GLAZIER

MAY 7, 2014 3:21pm ET




NFMA Bestows Industry Awards on Four Individuals and NASACT.

ORLANDO — The National Federation of Municipal Analysts presented annual awards during its conference here on Wednesday, honoring four individuals and an organization for contributions to the municipal bond industry.

Jeffrey Burger, a senior portfolio manager at Standish Mellon Asset Management, presided over the ceremony which, the NFMA has held every year since 1984.

James Spiotto, managing director of Chapman Strategic Advisors LLC, won an award for industry contribution. Spiotto has been a prominent voice on the subject of municipal bankruptcy and has appeared around the country to speak about the implications of bankruptcy and defaults for the muni industry.

“Simply put, there is no stronger Chapter 9 legal counsel than Jim Spiotto and, importantly, no one more generous and willing to share his knowledge and experience than Jim,” Burger said. “Jim has been instrumental in helping the municipal analyst community to navigate the complexities of Chapter 9 through his years of research and analysis on the subject. His work has been ground-breaking. Additionally, his analysis of state-by-state bondholder legal protections has become an invaluable resource for the industry.”

Richard Raphael a managing director at Fitch Ratings, received the career achievement award. Raphael is a charter member of the NFMA who Burger called an “analyst’s analyst.”

Assured Guaranty managing director Mary Francoeur and Standish Mellon senior analyst Mark Stockwell both received meritorious service awards. Both have, and continue to, serve in leadership positions with the NFMA. Francoeur holds the chairmanship of the annual conference, disclosure, communications and sponsorship committees. Stockwell is currently serving as disclosure chair and is a former NFMA chairman.

“Mary is extremely dedicated to the NFMA and cares so much about our organization, Burger said. “She is a person that can be called upon and relied upon to do whatever is needed for the NFMA and is always willing to be first to step up.”

“If we were to simply look at Mark’s contributions to the NFMA during his service as an officer, that would be sufficient to warrant recognition, however it is what Mark accomplished prior to his time as an NFMA officer and what he continues to do on behalf of the NFMA that makes him even all the more worthy of this honor,” said Burger.

The National Association of State Auditors, Comptrollers and Treasurers received an award the previous day for excellence in disclosure. The award recognizes NASACT’s work in promoting interim disclosure reporting by the states and the development of its “Voluntary Interim Financial Reporting: Best Practices for State Governments,” which it released last fall, the NFMA said in a statement.

BY KYLE GLAZIER

MAY 8, 2014 11:38am ET




Michigan Bill Would Impose 20 Years' Oversight on Detroit.

CHICAGO — Michigan would create a seven-member committee to oversee Detroit for 20 years under legislation expected to be unveiled late Thursday, lawmakers said.

The bills would also authorize a state contribution of $195 million in a one-time lump cash infusion toward the bankrupt city’s pension debt.

The money would come from Michigan’s rainy-day fund, which currently has a balance of $580 million. The money would be repaid with annual appropriations of $17 million from the state’s tobacco settlement fund.

The lump sum payment is a change from Gov. Rick Snyder’s original proposal, in which the state was to contribute $350 million over 20 years. Snyder had proposed bonding against the tobacco funds to generate the proceeds.

The 10-bill package, expected to be unveiled late Thursday, is part of a so-called “grand bargain” between the state, the city, its pension systems, a group of private foundations and the city owned Detroit Institute of Arts museum.

In return for a roughly $816 million contribution, which includes the state funds, the DIA would be spun off to an independent nonprofit board that would protect the art collection from any future sale or privatization.

Detroit’s final plan of debt adjustment relies on the grand bargain, as most of the creditor settlements feature the additional funds.

The oversight board would have final say over the city’s finances, budget and contracts, according to Rep. John Walsh, R-Livonia, who is taking the lead on the legislation.

The state would control most of the appointments to the oversight committee. Members would be appointed by the governor, state treasurer, state House speaker, state Senate Majority Leader, and the Detroit mayor. It’s modeled after the board that oversaw New York City during that city’s late 1970s fiscal crisis.

“If there are periods of fiscal health in the city, then it could go dormant,” Walsh said.

House leaders earlier this week formed a new committee to handle the Detroit-related legislation. The House Committee on Detroit’s Recovery and Michigan’s Future will be chaired by Walsh and made up of two Republicans and two Detroit Democrats.

Snyder wants lawmakers to pass legislation before they break at the end of June.

BY CAITLIN DEVITT

MAY 8, 2014 3:04pm ET




Strategists Concerned Muni Investors Can't Manage Tobacco Bonds' Risk.

Tobacco bonds have lured investors with some of the highest returns in the muni market this year, raising concern among strategists that traditional municipal bond investors’ are taking on too much risk.

The S&P Municipal Bond Tobacco Index, which tracks all tobacco bonds, had a total return of 10.87% through April 30, while the S&P National AMT-Free Municipal Bond Index returned 4.67%.

“The question is, ‘is the currently yield environment rewarding investors for all that risk we’ve been talking about?’,” J.R Rieger, global head of fixed income indices at S&P Dow Jones Indices at S&P, said in an interview. “Relative to the reward, is a pretty risky sector in general.”

Rieger said that investors are mainly interested in tobacco bonds because they offer high-yields in a market where lack of supply has driven down municipal bond yields. Muni supply for 2014 totaled $89.34 billion as of April 30, compared to $122.7 billion for the same period last year.

The Buckeye Tobacco Settlement Finance Authority’s benchmark tobacco bond with a 5.875% coupon maturing in 2047 traded at a yield of 7.69% on Thursday, according to data provided by Bloomberg. This year the yield hasn’t dropped lower than 7.28% it fell to on March 5.

“We’re seeing that demand is coming back into municipal bond funds, and as funds reach for anything with yield on it tobacco has that longer-duration high-yield aspect to it,” Rieger said. “An average yield of over six percent is very hard to find in other sectors of the municipal market.”

High-yield tobacco bonds topped the Barclays’ Municipal Index’s municipal returns by sector for both the month of April and year to date, according to a May 5 report. High-yield tobacco bonds reported 2.8% returns for April 2014, and returns of 14.1% so far this year.

As fund managers have poured more money into high yield funds, strategists are dubious about traditional municipal bond investors’ ability to properly manage the tobacco bonds’ credit risk. The Buckeye Tobacco benchmark bond mentioned above is currently rated B3 by Moody’s Investors Service, B-minus by Standard & Poor’s and B by Fitch ratings.

Tracy Rice, vice president and senior analyst at Moody’s, and Irina Faynzllberg, vice president and senior credit officer at Moody’s, wrote in a report Thursday that 79% of the tobacco bonds Moody’s rates earned B1 or lower.

Tobacco bonds are unique because they are not paid from taxes on cigarettes, but from funds from the 1998 Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement. In the agreement the major tobacco companies agreed to pay states between $5 billion and $7 billion every year to manufacture and ship cigarettes in the U.S. without being subject to state lawsuits for medical costs associated with tobacco use.

That agreement tied tobacco bonds’ performance to the amount of revenue generated from tobacco sales.

Last Thursday, the National Association of Attorneys General released data showing that domestic cigarette shipment volumes fell 4.9% in 2013, one of the largest annual declines since the group began reporting the figures in 1999, Rice and Faynzllberg wrote in the report, which concluded the decline was a credit negative for the bonds

“What we saw from data published recently was that there was a decline of 4.9%, outside of our range of 3%-4%,” Debash Chatterjee, associate managing director at Moody’s, said in an interview. “If you look at average annual decline over time, with some years higher and some lower, the long term trend still meets our expectations. Based on that expectation, a lot of these bonds could see default, and our ratings reflect that.”

Moody’s found that around 80% of the aggregate rated tobacco bond balance has a break-even annual rate of decline in cigarette shipments of less than 4%, and approximately 65% has a break-even annual rate of decline in shipments of less than 3%.

“Therefore, 65%-80% of the tobacco settlement bonds will default according to our projection of shipments falling at a rate of 3%-4% per year,” Rice and Faynzllberg wrote in the report.

The bond’s reliance on revenue from cigarette sales makes them highly volatile. Among all the sectors included in Barclay’s high yield muni index, tobacco was the top performer in 2011 and 2012, with annual returns of 23.0% and 32.4% respectively; these returns dropped to the second worst in 2013 when the sector reported an 11.6% loss. Triet Nguyen, managing partner at Axios Advisors wrote in an April 17 report.

With the 14.1% return so far in 2014, high-yield tobacco bonds have already recouped all of last year’s losses.

Nguyen said in an interview this volatility may be why crossover buyers such as hedge funds are attracted to tobacco bonds.

“Given their familiarity with mortgage-backed securities, crossover investors are very comfortable with cash flow securitization deals like tobacco bonds,” he said.

Very few traditional municipal buyers have built the necessary models to do a cash flow analysis, he said.

“Traditional muni buyers have not been as disciplined in monitoring out the cash flow scenarios related to tobacco bonds.”

Nguyen wrote in the April 17 report that he finds it surprising that many municipal investors still trade tobacco bonds in the traditional manner, which is on a yield-to-worst basis.

The YTW spread between S&P Municipal Bond Tobacco Index and S&P National AMT-Free Municipal Bond Index has widened to 379 as of April 30, from 296 for the same time last year.

“The preferred approach, at least in our view, would be to model each issue’s future cash flows to maturity, with cigarette consumption rates as a key variable, and then decide if the current market price provides you with an acceptable internal rate of return based on various potential default scenarios,” he wrote.

He wrote that alternatively investors could go back into a price they are willing to pay for the bonds based on their preferred default scenario.

“Having said that, we suspect very few muni buyers have devoted their resources to build internal tobacco bond cash flow models, putting them at something at a disadvantage versus many of the larger broker-dealer firms who have, in fact, made that analytical investment,” he wrote.

“Most of the longer maturities will probably end up defaulting, so you have to take that into account,” Nguyen said in the interview.

Richard Larkin, senior vice president and director of credit analysis at HJ Sims, said in an interview that he has been predicting for over 10 years that tobacco bonds will default in the not too distant future.

Larkin said that he projects bonds may now default even sooner, as early as mid-2020s and early-2030s.”I think mid-2020 would be a little earlier than we would think for the bonds to default, but when we say a significant portion of bonds would default, you have to look at it from deal for deal,” Chatterjee said. “For example, A lot of bonds have a longer maturity than others. The ones that are outstanding in late 2030s to mid-2040s are exposed to a bigger risk.”

BY HILLARY FLYNN

MAY 8, 2014 5:14pm ET




No-Bid Sales Drop as Philadelphia Chooses Auctions.

U.S. states and cities are selling bonds via competitive bidding at the fastest pace in more than a decade as officials strive to cut costs almost five years after the recession.

Localities have issued $22.8 billion of bonds via auction this year through May 2, or about 27 percent of sales in the $3.7 trillion market, data compiled by Bloomberg show. That’s the highest rate since the figures begin in 2003, and is up from 15 percent in 2009.

Auctions account for almost half of New York’s sales, marking a shift from negotiated deals where rates are set in discussions with underwriters. Philadelphia said in April that its first competitive deal in eight years saved $7 million on a $65 million offer. Buffalo said last month that 18 bidders for $33 million of securities reduced borrowing costs.

“It’s helping us get the lowest possible rates for our taxpayers,” said Patrick Curry, executive assistant to Buffalo Comptroller Mark Schroeder. “We’re finding we get very good rates when there is more competition.”

Wall Street banks are fighting for dwindling business. The municipal market shrank the past three years as officials hesitated to embark on projects even with yields close to generational lows. Soliciting bids for bonds means governments are choosing the same process they use to buy asphalt and toilet paper. They’ve cut costs elsewhere: Combined state and local payrolls are about 660,000 below 2008 peak levels.

On Target

New York, the third-most-populous state, raised competitive sales to 49 percent in fiscal 2013-2014 from about 2 percent in 2009, state data show.

“Our goal of selling half our bonds on a competitive basis reflects our belief that doing so will lower borrowing costs, increase transparency and provide an essential benchmark for bonds sold on a negotiated basis,” Morris Peters, spokesman for New York’s budget division, said in a statement.

Municipalities’ use of bidding may increase as a ban on underwriters serving as advisers takes effect July 1, said Joy Howard, principal with WM Financial Strategies, a financial adviser in St. Louis.

Advisers’ Duty

“Financial advisers have a fiduciary duty and will have to recommend the method of sale they believe will produce the best result,” said Howard, whose clients often use bidding. “For most highly rated general-obligation bonds, it will be difficult to suggest that a method of sale other than competitive bidding is best.”

Missouri’s state auditor, Thomas Schweich, pushed legislation this year to boost competitive sales after a 2013 study found local issuers, who used negotiated deals 88 percent of the time from 2008 to 2011, could have saved $43 million with auctions. The plan drew opposition from investment banks that stand to earn fees on negotiated business, said Jeff Earl, senior legislative adviser to the auditor.

“The opposition was able to get enough lawmakers to keep it from passing,” Earl said. “This could save school districts some money.”

While local officials and academics say that negotiated sales are needed during volatile markets, “the competitive method is less costly for government in most cases,” Craig Brown, assistant professor of finance at the National University of Singapore, said by e-mail.

Pricing Variation

Securities sold in negotiated sales are underpriced by as much as 4.7 percent, according to a 2011 study by Brown, whose research includes methods of sale in the U.S. municipal market.

“The competitive method seems to be better for taxpayers on average,” said Brown. That route also is “less prone to corruption” because auctions determine which underwriters win the deals, he said.

In October, St. Louis-based underwriter L.J. Hart & Co. agreed to pay a $200,000 fine to settle charges by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority that it violated rules on gifts by giving local official tickets valued at $183,546 to sports events over three years. The firm didn’t admit or deny breaking Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board rules.

The gifts were to thank clients, not to win business, Larry J. Hart, founder and principal, said in an interview.

“Our firm’s policy on giving tickets to sporting events has always been restricted to existing clients as appreciation for past business transactions and as reminder advertising between financings,” he said. “We never offer tickets as an inducement to non-clients to select our firm as the municipal bond underwriter.”

California Approach

California, the most-indebted state, uses both methods, sometimes within weeks. The most-populous state sold about $1.8 billion of bonds through negotiation in March, followed by $750 million in April via bidding.

In eight segments with similar maturities, the competitive sale had narrower yield spreads than the negotiated, by as much as 0.36 percentage point, Bloomberg data show.

The sale method didn’t drive the lower yields on the competitive sale, said Tom Dresslar, spokesman for Treasurer Bill Lockyer. He attributed the lower cost to an improving financial picture as the state enjoys its biggest surplus in more than a decade.

“In both the March and April deals, we got the best possible price for taxpayers,” said Dresslar. “It’s difficult to provide a valid comparison when you look at the spread.”

Size Matters

The state generally sells deals under $1 billion competitively and those over $1 billion via negotiated. The larger deals often require added compensation for underwriters, he said.

“A one-size-fits-all approach would not serve our citizens well,” he said.

Competitive sales have risen in part because of a drop in refinancing to lower interest costs, according to the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, which represents investment banks. One type of refunding requires negotiated sales to complete the transactions.

“In the last few years, refundings have comprised a big part of the market,” said Michael Decker, managing director and co-head of munis at the group.

About 49 percent of issuance this year through April 23 was related to refunding, compared with 61 percent a year earlier, according to Bank of America Merrill Lynch data.

‘Strong Pricing’

Philadelphia, which sold long-term debt competitively in April for the first time since 2006, said it doesn’t plan to halt negotiated sales. At the same time, it cited $7 million in savings, partly because 14 bidders competed.

“We got very strong pricing, and part of that is because of the competitive sale,” Nancy Winkler, city treasurer, said in an interview. “It saved us money.”

Municipalities’ challenge in negotiated sales is showing that they got a good price, said Bob Eichem, chief financial officer for Boulder, Colorado. The case for negotiated sales is stronger with new or infrequent borrowers, he said.

“The thing with a competitive sale is that you know on the day you sold you got the absolute lowestinterest rate possible,” said Eichem, who has been in city finance for 35 years. “With negotiated sales, it’s difficult to say you got the absolute lowest.”

By Darrell Preston  May 8, 2014 5:00 PM PT

To contact the reporter on this story: Darrell Preston in Dallas at dpreston@bloomberg.net

To contact the editors responsible for this story: Stephen Merelman at smerelman@bloomberg.netMark Tannenbaum, Justin Blum




Moody's: Municipal Bond Defaults Remain Low in Number, but New Trends are Emerging.

New York, May 07, 2014 — Municipal bond defaults have increased in number since the financial crisis, but remain extremely infrequent, says Moody’s Investors Service in the report, “US Municipal Bond Defaults and Recoveries, 1970 — 2013.” With seven Moody’s rated defaults in 2013, after five in 2012, there has been an average of 5 defaults per year over the 2008-13 period.

That is much higher than the 1.3 per year average in the preceding 1970-2007 period, but the one-year default rate for municipal issuers remains extremely low. For the last five years it has averaged 0.03%, up from the 0.01% average for the 1970-2007 period.

Since the financial crisis, there has been a shift in the composition of Moody’s-rated defaulters, with general government defaults and bankruptcies on the rise, although few in number. In 2013, there were seven Moody’s-rated municipal defaults, five of which were general government defaults, including the first-ever school district default and Detroit, now the largest US municipal bankruptcy filing. A major not-for-profit healthcare system and a small charter school also defaulted in 2013.

In all, Moody’s rates approximately 15,700 municipal issuers.

“Looking ahead, our outlook for state and local governments is stable, but downside risk will persist in some places,” says Al Medioli, the Moody’s Vice President, Senior Credit Officer who co-authored the report. “This reflects a sluggish and uneven recovery, economic stress on households, demographic trends, and growing pension liabilities.”

Moody’s notes that few issuers are in distress, but those that are remain unpredictable and can be accompanied by a high level of correlation in credit quality across related issuers.

“When credit risk rises in a given region or state, severe stress and default are likely to occur in clusters,” says Moody’s Medioli. “For example, state and local governments share exposures to a dominant pension plan, many school districts are dependent on states for funding and operational mandates, and federal policies may impact entire sectors.”

When municipal issuers do default, there has been a new and growing trend toward more variability in recoveries and also toward lower recoveries, says Moody’s, although they remain generally higher than corporate recoveries.

On average, the ultimate recovery rate for municipal bonds was about 60% for the period 1970-2013, compared with 48% for corporate senior unsecured bonds over 1987-2013. However, individual historical recovery rates of defaulted bonds are highly dispersed, ranging from full recovery to 2%.

In 2013, the three separate recoveries from the Jefferson County, AL and Harrisburg, PA defaults mirrored this trend, averaging 69% but ranging from 100% to 31%. The proposed recoveries for Detroit and Stockton, cities now in Chapter 9 bankruptcy, also vary widely based on creditor class.

For more information, Moody’s research subscribers can access this report at https://www.moodys.com/research/US-Municipal-Bond-Defaults-and-Recoveries-1970-2013–PBM_PBM170048.

***

NOTE TO JOURNALISTS ONLY: For more information, please call one of our global press information hotlines: New York +1-212-553-0376, London +44-20-7772-5456, Tokyo +813-5408-4110, Hong Kong +852-3758-1350, Sydney +61-2-9270-8141, Mexico City 001-888-779-5833, São Paulo 0800-891-2518, or Buenos Aires 0800-666-3506. You can also email us at mediarelations@moodys.com or visit our web site at www.moodys.com.

 

 

 

Alfred Medioli
VP – Senior Credit Officer
Credit Policy
Moody’s Investors Service, Inc.
250 Greenwich Street
New York, NY 10007
U.S.A.
JOURNALISTS: 212-553-0376
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Anne Van Praagh
MD – Sovereign Risk
Credit Policy
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Fitch: Fracking Water Supply Risk Would Fall on U.S. Utilities.

Fitch Ratings-New York-02 May 2014: Despite more stringent state laws, water and sewer utilities must comply with EPA water regulations and would bear much of the financial burden if hydrofracking (fracking) operations lead to contamination of a water supply, Fitch Ratings says. This week the state of Michigan joined a growing list of states that require disclosure of the chemicals injected into the ground during fracking processes.

State regulations require oil and gas companies to disclose the chemicals used for fracking. However the utilities are subject to federal disclosure laws that allow companies to claim trade-secrets exemption. Even if the chemicals used for fracking are disclosed, they may not be on the EPA’s list of regulated contaminants. As water utilities are ultimately responsible for complying with EPA regulations for monitoring, treating and delivering water that is safe for public consumption, they would bear much of the financial, operational and regulatory burden of safeguarding water that could potentially be contaminated by fracking operations.

In this scenario, Fitch would expect a serious blow to a utility’s revenues, with losses concurrent with other growing direct and indirect costs. This would lead to debt service coverage reductions, liquidity strains and possibly the need for additional leverage.

In the coming days we will release a report entitled “Fracking: Possible Implications to Water & Sewer Credits” that will provide more detail on this possible scenario and illuminate the risks for bondholders.

Contact:

Doug Scott
Managing Director
U.S. Public Finance
+1 512-215-3725
111 Congress Avenue
Austin, TX

Rob Rowan
Senior Director
Fitch Wire
+1 212 908-9159
33 Whitehall Street
New York, NY
Media Relations: Elizabeth Fogerty, New York, Tel: +1 (212) 908 0526, Email: elizabeth.fogerty@fitchratings.com.

Additional information is available on www.fitchratings.com.

The above article originally appeared as a post on the Fitch Wire credit market commentary page. The original article, which may include hyperlinks to companies and current ratings, can be accessed at www.fitchratings.com. All opinions expressed are those of Fitch Ratings.

ALL FITCH CREDIT RATINGS ARE SUBJECT TO CERTAIN LIMITATIONS AND DISCLAIMERS. PLEASE READ THESE LIMITATIONS AND DISCLAIMERS BY FOLLOWING THIS LINK: HTTP://FITCHRATINGS.COM/UNDERSTANDINGCREDITRATINGS. IN ADDITION, RATING DEFINITIONS AND THE TERMS OF USE OF SUCH RATINGS ARE AVAILABLE ON THE AGENCY’S PUBLIC WEBSITE ‘WWW.FITCHRATINGS.COM’. PUBLISHED RATINGS, CRITERIA AND METHODOLOGIES ARE AVAILABLE FROM THIS SITE AT ALL TIMES. FITCH’S CODE OF CONDUCT, CONFIDENTIALITY, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, AFFILIATE FIREWALL, COMPLIANCE AND OTHER RELEVANT POLICIES AND PROCEDURES ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FROM THE ‘CODE OF CONDUCT’ SECTION OF THIS SITE. FITCH MAY HAVE PROVIDED ANOTHER PERMISSIBLE SERVICE TO THE RATED ENTITY OR ITS RELATED THIRD PARTIES. DETAILS OF THIS SERVICE FOR RATINGS FOR WHICH THE LEAD ANALYST IS BASED IN AN EU-REGISTERED ENTITY CAN BE FOUND ON THE ENTITY SUMMARY PAGE FOR THIS ISSUER ON THE FITCH WEBSITE.




How Will State and County Government Employees Fare under Kentucky's New Cash Balance Pension Plan?

Kentucky recently replaced its traditional pension with a new cash balance plan for state and county employees hired after 2013. Employees who join the government payroll at relatively young ages and remain for no more than 25 years will accumulate more benefits in the cash balance plan than the traditional plan, while many of those with more years of service and hired at older ages will accumulate less. More than half of employees hired in 2014 who complete at least five years of service will fare better in the cash balance plan, which distributes benefits more evenly across the workforce.

 

Richard W. JohnsonBenjamin G. Southgate

Read complete document: PDF

Document date: April 30, 2014
Released online: April 30, 2014




Testimony on the Status of the Highway Trust Fund and Options for Financing Highway Spending.

Testimony by Joseph Kile, Assistant Director for Microeconomic Studies, before the Committee on Finance, United State Senate

In 2013, governments at various levels spent $156 billion to build, operate, and maintain highways, and they spent $60 billion on mass transit systems. For both types of infrastructure, most of that spending was by state and local governments; about one-quarter of that total came from the federal government, mostly through the Highway Trust Fund. For several decades, the trust fund’s balances were stable or growing, but more recently, annual spending for highways and transit has exceeded the amounts credited to the trust fund from taxes collected on gasoline, diesel fuel, and other transportation-related products and activities. Since 2008, in fact, lawmakers have transferred $54 billion from the U.S. Treasury’s general fund to the Highway Trust Fund so that the trust fund’s obligations could be met in a timely manner.

Moreover, with its current revenue sources, the Highway Trust Fund cannot support spending at the current rate. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that, at the end of fiscal year 2014, the balance in the trust fund’s highway account will fall to about $2 billion and the balance in its transit account will be only $1 billion. Spending for highways and transit will be $45 billion and $8 billion, respectively. By comparison, revenues collected for those purposes are projected to be $33 billion and $5 billion, respectively. The Department of Transportation (DOT) has indicated that it will probably need to delay payments to states at some point during the summer of 2014 in order to keep the fund’s balance above zero, as required by law. Then, if nothing changes, the trust fund’s balance will be insufficient to meet all of its obligations in fiscal year 2015, and it will incur steadily accumulating shortfalls in subsequent years. If lawmakers do not take action, all of the receipts credited to the fund in 2015 would be needed to meet obligations made before that year; none would be available to cover any new commitments that would be made in 2015.

Several options (or combinations of those options) could be pursued to address projected shortfalls in the Highway Trust Fund:

  • Spending on highways and transit could be reduced. If lawmakers chose to address the projected shortfalls solely by cutting spending, no new obligations from the fund’s highway account or its transit account could be made in fiscal year 2015; that would also be the case for the transit account in fiscal year 2016. Over the 2015–2024 period, the highway account would see a decrease of more than 30 percent in the authority to obligate funds, and the transit account’s authority would decrease by about 65 percent, compared with CBO’s baseline projections.
  • Revenues credited to the trust fund could be increased—for example, by raising existing taxes on motor fuels or other transportation-related products and activities or by imposing new taxes on highway users, such as vehicle-miles traveled (VMT) taxes. The staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) estimates that a one-cent increase in taxes on motor fuels—primarily gasoline and diesel fuel—would raise about $1.5 billion each year for the trust fund. If lawmakers chose to meet obligations projected for the trust fund solely by raising revenues, they would need to increase motor fuel taxes by an amount between 10 cents and 15 cents per gallon, starting in fiscal year 2015.
  • The trust fund could continue to receive supplements from the Treasury’s general fund. Lawmakers could maintain funding for surface transportation programs at the average amounts provided in recent years, but to do so they would need to transfer $18 billion in 2015 and between $13 billion and $18 billion every year thereafter through 2024. Spending resulting from such general fund transfers could be paid for by reducing other spending or by increasing broad-based taxes, or such transfers could add to deficits and thus increase federal borrowing.

The projected shortfalls in the Highway Trust Fund have generated interest in greater use of borrowing by state and local governments to finance highway projects. In particular, state and local governments (and some private entities) can use tax-preferred bonds that convey subsidies from the federal government in the form of tax exemptions, credits, or payments in lieu of credits to finance road construction. Similarly, some of those governments make use of direct loans from the federal government to finance projects.

Federal policies that encourage partnerships between the private sector and a state or local government may facilitate the provision of additional transportation infrastructure, but a review of those projects offers little evidence that public-private partnerships provide additional resources for roads except in cases in which states or localities have chosen to restrict spending through self-imposed legal constraints or budgetary limits.

Only a small number of highway projects in the United States have involved public-private partnerships with private financing. Some that have been financed through tolls have failed financially because the private-sector partners initially overestimated their revenues and as a result have been unable to fully repay their projects’ debts. Perhaps as a response, projects that are still under construction rely less on tolls as a revenue source; more commonly, private partners are compensated from a state’s general funds, thus limiting the private risk of not being repaid and leaving the risk of lower-than-expected revenues to the public partner.

Regardless of its source, however, borrowing is only a mechanism for making future tax revenues or user fee revenues available to pay for projects sooner; it is not a new source of revenues. Borrowing can augment the funds available for highway projects, but revenues that are committed for repaying borrowed funds will be unavailable to pay for new transportation projects or other government spending in the future.

Read Complete Document

May 6, 2014




Financial Accounting Foundation Issues 2013 Annual Report.

Offers Glimpse into “The Road Ahead” for the FAF, the FASB, and the GASB

Norwalk, CT, May 8, 2014—The Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF) today issued its 2013 Annual Report, available online at www.accountingfoundation.org.

Themed as “The Road Ahead,” the 2013 Annual Report outlines the future direction of the FAF and its standard-setting Boards, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB). As stated in the introduction:

The issues we face are varied and complex. How should we continue to work toward more comparable global accounting standards? To what degree should we provide accounting alternatives for private companies while preserving the strength and consistency of GAAP? How can we make the financial position of governments more transparent for taxpayers, bond buyers and other users of financial statements?

These questions are examined from the perspective of the leaders of all three organizations and in letters to stakeholders from FAF Board Chairman Jeffrey J. Diermeier, FAF President & Chief Executive Officer Teresa S. Polley, FASB Chairman Russell G. Golden, and GASB Chairman David A. Vaudt.

The report also provides illustrative, high-level overviews of the accomplishments of the FAF, the FASB, and the GASB, presented in a way that gives even the most time-pressed readers a comprehensive overview of the year’s highlights.

Other features in the 2013 Annual Report include:

Those interested in receiving a hard-copy version of the annual report may request one by e-mailingszafar@f-a-f.org. Hard copies will be distributed in late May.

For more information about the FAF, visit www.accountingfoundation.org.

About the Financial Accounting Foundation

The FAF is responsible for the oversight, administration, and finances of both the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and its counterpart for state and local government, the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB). The Foundation is also responsible for selecting the members of both Boards and their respective Advisory Councils.




GFOA: Tips on Creating a Budget Document that Communicates with Stakeholders.

The importance of the budget document can’t be overstated. It identifies the services that will be provided to the community, and how they will be paid for, and provides the rationale behind key decisions. Effective Presentation of the Budget Document, a GFOA best practice that was updated this year, provides tips on organization, level of detail, design, consistency, highlights, and format to help governments create a high-quality document that stakeholders will be able to understand – improving transparency and promoting better communication.



Detroit Files New Debt Plan.

CHICAGO — Detroit filed an updated plan of debt adjustment with the bankruptcy court Monday that incorporates new settlements with retirees and public safety unions.

It’s the city’s fourth updated debt plan and disclosure statement. Detroit has continued to revise its bankruptcy exit plan as it secured a series of settlements with major creditors over the past several weeks.

Bankruptcy Judge Steven Rhodes approved the documents later Monday, allowing Detroit to begin sending out ballots to creditors next week, with a voting deadline of July 12. A trial on the confirmation plan is set to begin July 24.

The bankrupt city has yet to reach deals with its limited-tax general obligation bondholders, despite court-ordered mediation sessions last week, or holders of $1.4 billion of pension certificates of participation.

A plan to privatize the Detroit Water and Sewer Department, considered crucial to the city’s Chapter 9 exit, also remains elusive as does a settlement with holders of the city’s $5.9 billion of water and sewer bonds.

The 406-page debt plan includes a new deal with the Detroit Police Lieutenants and Sergeants Association and the Detroit Police Command Officers Association for new five-year contracts. The city’s largest police union has not signed onto the settlement and is reportedly challenging proposals to halt retiree health care benefits to police officers and pay new hires $14 an hour.

Also new is the city’s proposal that if it privatizes the Detroit Water and Sewerage Department within seven years, it would use 50% of the proceeds from the deal to restore pension cuts. All the proceeds previously were to go to the city’s general fund. The general employees fund would get priority over the police and fire pensions, according to the disclosure statement.

The plan also says the state of Michigan may give the city $195 million in a one-time lump sum to go toward its pension debt as part of the so-called grand bargain over pensions and city owned art. The state had originally planned to bond against its tobacco settlement funds to generate $350 million over 20 years. The smaller lump-sum plan is reportedly more politically palatable for state lawmakers as they prepare to vote on legislation in May or June.

Like the third version of the plan, the new one includes deals reached with the three insurers of the city’s unlimited-tax general obligation bonds, a court-appointed committee representing retirees, as well as its public safety and general employee pension systems.

Under current deals, the city’s police and fire pensioners would see no pension cuts and roughly 55% cuts to cost-of-living adjustments. General employees would see a 4.5% pension cut and elimination of COLAs. The Detroit Retired City Employees Association, which represents 8,000 retirees, agreed Friday to support the plan and recommend its members vote to approve it.

The city wants to pay retirees $450 million to cover a $4.3 billion other post-employment benefit liability, translating into a roughly 10% recovery for that debt, considered among the least secured.

Nearly all the settlements hinge on the grand bargain that has Michigan contributing up to $350 million over 20 years, or $194 million in a lump sum, to match private foundation funds and a $100 million contribution from the Detroit Institute of Arts. The money would be used for the city’s pension debt and would protect the city owned art from a sale, by transferring the museum to an independent authority. The bargain requires all retiree and pension creditors approve the plan, that they give up the right to sue the state, and that the plan itself be confirmed by Sept. 30, 2014.

The latest plan strikes a provision that would have required water and sewer bondholders who agree to receive new DWSD bonds to give up any rights to object to the plan on any grounds.

Detroit has not yet reached a settlement with limited-tax GO holders, despite court-ordered mediation held on May 1. The city is negotiating with Ambac Assurance Corp., which insures roughly $383 million of unsecured LTGOs.

BY CAITLIN DEVITT

MAY 5, 2014 3:04pm ET




Nossaman Posts Draft Model P3 Legislation for Public Buildings and Invites Comments.

As demand for government services continues to grow across the United States, federal, state and local government agencies must identify innovative and cost effective methods to deliver essential social infrastructure. While many agencies are interested in pursuing innovative P3 delivery models to procure public buildings, they often lack the clear necessary legislation to authorize P3 deals.

We offer below, for consideration and comment, a draft model social infrastructure P3 bill.  We developed the draft legislation based on our experience advising US public agencies using innovative delivery methods for other classes of infrastructure. This draft model legislation seeks to provide the authorizations that a public sponsor requires to engage in the P3 delivery of a social infrastructure project.  The draft model legislation is also intended to be a flexible instrument and as such it does not set out rigid rules that a public sponsor must follow in the execution of P3 project.

We invite you to review and consider our draft bill.

We are very interested in receiving your comments and suggestions.  Please send your comments by June 11, 2014 to Yukiko Kojima atykojima@nossaman.com or to Andrée Blais at ablais@nossaman.com.

POSTED ON APRIL 28, 2014 BY ANDRÉE BLAIS




Bond Insurance Then & Now: The Revival of an Industry.

If you’re new to the municipal market, you may not know what bond insurance is. And if you’re a veteran in the market, you certainly don’t recognize it. Bond insurance has undergone a makeover unlike any other segment of the municipal bond industry.

With the rapid dissolution of a then-$2.5 trillion business, the demise of the financial guarantors served as testament to the sprawling devastation of a financial crisis that left no asset class unscathed.

Exposure to toxic residential mortgage-backed securities that went bust with the pop of the housing bubble stuck the insurers with a fat tab to pay, with companies that had ventured into the collateralized debt end of the risk pool getting hit the hardest.

As industry leaders like Ambac, MBIA Corp. and Financial Guaranty Insurance Co. were stripped of their ostensible first-class triple-A ratings, the enormity of the mortgage crisis unfolded and restructurings permeated the bond insurance business. The number of municipal bonds issued with a guarantee plummeted, from as high as 57% before the recession to 19% in 2008, and to 3.5% in 2012.

The financial crisis incited a debate over the merits of insurance that sent market penetration by insurers into a free-fall that hasn’t shown signs of abating — until now.

With freshly upgraded ratings on Assured Guaranty and MBIA-owned National Public Finance Guarantee, the bond insurers are hoping rising interest rates will push more state and local governments this year to consider the savings that come with piggybacking on an insurer’s rating.

But where National, which plans to restart business, and Build America Mutual, the newcomer, see hope for rebirth from the ashes, many muni bond buyers see an antiquated model that’s had its time in the sun.

And then there are the rating agencies — chastised by some on Wall Street for not getting the downgrade ball moving fast enough — which come down somewhere in the middle.

One thing they can all agree on: bond insurance will never be the same.

CRISIS FALLOUT

In 2007, around half of all new municipal bonds carried insurance. A product that originated as a competitive enhancement had become a commodity, and few buyers of bonds were looking at the underlying issuer rating. When it became clear that many of the loans behind those structured transactions would inevitably default, the insurers unraveled.

Standard & Poor’s hit the industry with a slew of downgrades in early June 2008 and Moody’s Investors Service followed suit weeks later. Within a year, the stock price of Ambac, which introduced bond insurance to the muni market in the early 1970s, was barely worth more than a dollar. By 2010, Ambac and FGIC had filed for bankruptcy, other major players stopped writing new business and MBIA launched muni-only National.

Assured Guaranty, having acquired former league leader Financial Security Assurance, emerged as the only — and by default, biggest — bond insurer selling its product on the market. Assured continued business unchallenged, all the while fighting in courts against the banks that packaged the toxic policies in the first place.

In July 2012, former FSA veterans launched Build America Mutual, a mutual insurance company that promised it would only insure safer, essential public-purpose municipal bonds. In its first year, BAM took 39% of the total insured market by par amount.

Now, with National poised to write new business, competition is once more a word in the bond insurance vocabulary.

CRITICAL YEAR

National’s timing couldn’t be better. Bond insurers wrapped 3.6% of all new bond issues this past year, and while the rate remains less than a 10th of what it was before the financial crisis, it represents the first sign of growth in a decade.

“I believe it is the critical year for insurers,” Mark Palmer, an equity analyst at BTIG, told The Bond Buyer. “What we have now are all the pieces in place for an increase in demand for bond insurance.”

Those pieces were expectations for rising interest rates, S&P’s March rating upgrades of Assured and National to AA and AA-minus, respectively, and a Detroit-driven awareness in the market that if your defaulted bond is insured, you’ll still get paid.

“It’s a pivotal year,” John Dillon, chief muni bond strategist at Morgan Stanley Wealth Management, said in an interview. “Away from the upgrades, which I think are helpful, the bankruptcy of Detroit has proven the value of bond insurance.”

While most of the fixed-income investing community shudders at the thought of rising interest rates, the insurers embrace it. Higher rates mean higher costs for municipalities looking to sell bonds, who would then, in theory, be more willing to pay for insurance.

“If, as some believe, the 10-year is going to go from 2.6% to something in the mid-3% range, that would create an environment that would be great for bond insurers,” Palmer said.

Palmer is one of just a few remaining equity analysts actively following publicly traded Assured, MBIA and Ambac. One could say he represents the bullish side, with target prices on Assured and MBIA’s stock at 54% and 80% higher than they’re currently trading.

“The problem for the past couple of years has been it hasn’t made sense for a municipality to pay up for bond insurance when their funding costs are already so low,” Palmer said.

But the value proposition of bond insurance doesn’t seem to be a self-evident idea in the municipal marketplace. After all, newcomers to the buy-side only see three insured bonds come by their screen for every 100 new ones. And those who remember insurance from its glory days now see a very different product.

VALUE PROPOSITION

With the introduction of BAM and the July 2013 launch of Assured’s muni-only Municipal Assurance Corp., insurers now target the smaller traditional municipal issuers who don’t carry the name recognition needed to make a sale in the marketplace. For them, insurance provides not just cost savings, but liquidity.

Assured and National may occasionally wrap the larger, riskier transactions, but single-A credits are now the insurers’ bread and butter.

For an A-rated issuer selling bonds in the market as of April 1, wrapping with an AA-rated bond insurer would save the issuer 46 basis points on a 10-year bond, according to Municipal Market Data. On the 20-year bond, insurance would save the issuer 50 basis points. On the short end, insurers currently don’t add much value: the yield for an A-rated five-year bond was 1.44%, compared with 1.75% on AA.

The value of insurance has undeniably withered. In 2009, the same issuer would save 160 basis points on 10-year bonds by issuing along an insurer’s triple-A yield curve instead of their own single-A curve. No longer boasting the triple-A rating, insurers are waiting for an interest jump to buoy the business.

“Our business is countercyclical to rates. As rates go up our business grows,” Billy O’Keefe, co-head of public finance at Assured, told The Bond Buyer. “In the second half of last year, when rates picked up and spreads were wider, we had the best fourth quarter we’ve had in a while.”

The spread between single-A and double-A yields fell to a decade-low 41 basis points in April 2013. The gap has since grown closer to 50 basis points, but still remains well below 2009 levels, when the spread was 140 basis points.

The economy will continue to improve, quantitative easing will come to a close, and Federal Reserve Board chair Janet Yellen will eventually have to hike interest rates. Issuers will look to Assured, BAM and National to fill that gap, or so the story goes.

REBUILDING THE BRAND

But while credit spreads are tighter than in 2009, they’re actually well above pre-financial crisis levels, when insurance was booming. The difference between single-A and double-A yields today is almost four times what it was from 2005 to 2007, MMD data shows.

“I don’t buy the credit-spread argument,” Dan Heckman, a municipal strategist at US Bank, said in an interview. “I just don’t think buyers today put that much value in it. We’re happy it’s back but the reality is it’s going to turn few buyers from a non-buy decision to a buy decision.”

The challenge for bond insurers, buy-side analysts say, is in reclaiming the investor appeal that a guarantee once carried. While higher spreads may boost the value of the product for sellers, the benefit of insurance could be muted without receptive buyers.

“It’s hard to look at it simply at a spread basis,” Patrick Early, chief muni analyst at Wells Fargo Advisors, said in an interview. “The landscape is completely different now. There was reliance on insurers pre-crisis with buyers used to seeing those names — it was just the way things were done.”

In the post-crisis world, many investors now make decisions based on an underlying rating, regardless of credit enhancement. Insurers need to be proactive in approaching the institutional investor community as well as the issuers, analysts said.

“With the recent upgrades, this will certainly be a good year to see how well the insurers will execute marketing plans and expand penetration,” Patrick Early, chief muni analyst at Wells Fargo Advisors, said in an interview.

Insurers as a whole must rebuild the brand, and the reformed National will need to sell a new image that will put negative stigma attached to its parent company, MBIA, at rest.

NATIONAL’S RETURN

“They’re going to have to convince people that they were just rehabilitating the company during their hibernation,” John Mousseau, vice president and portfolio manager at Cumberland Advisors, said in an interview. “They’re not starting from scratch, but there will be a little pricing pressure on premiums.”

With the company eager to begin rebuilding its books, National is likely to be faced with issuers looking to get a cheap price on insurance. Issuers looking to take advantage of the resurrected company will be a challenge in the earlier phases, BTIG’s Palmer said.

National CEO Bill Fallon is well aware of the tactic.

“We’re not trying to cut price to win market share or anything along those lines,” he said in an interview, adding that serious inquiries are already coming. “We’ve had several calls for our insurance both on the secondary and primary side, and that’s without really doing a whole lot apart from people knowing about the S&P upgrade.”

For National, which hasn’t written new policies since the financial crisis, a string of settlements with Bank of America and Societe Generale in May 2013 for more than $2 billion was a turning point. The company found liquidity after being repaid on a $1.7 billion loan it made to parent MBIA; it was then just a waiting game for the rating agencies.

In March, the AA-minus rating came from Standard & Poor’s.

“Whereas in the old days it was a triple-A rating from two rating agencies, it appears nowadays that it’s a double-A rating by S&P that’s the requirement to do business,” Fallon said.

The waiting game continues for Moody’s, which rates National at Baa1 with a positive outlook. The rating agency has Assured at A2, the equivalent of an S&P single-A rating, which the company has openly contested.

“A lot of this depends on Moody’s,” said Howard Cure, director of municipal research at Evercore Wealth Management. “If they upgrade insurers it would help the business. The future of the industry depends on rating agencies.”

Moody’s plans to revisit its industry commentary, the rating agency told The Bond Buyer. And while National has a positive outlook, Assured’s rating remains stable.

“The sector has not recovered from the financial crisis but has stabilized, and it’s still a very small fraction of what we saw pre-crisis,” Stanislas Rouyer, associate managing director at Mooody’s, said in an interview. “It seems to show some increased penetration, but it’s too early to tell if it’s the start of a trend or not.”

$20 BILLION FOR EVERYONE

The addition of a third competitor could have mixed results on the market. Insurers are hoping National’s added business will invigorate the market, but increased competition could mean lower premiums for insurance. S&P reported in November that Assured and BAM were getting less compensation for taking on risk, with Assured’s risk-adjusting pricing ratio, a risk-versus-return measure of the company’s portfolio, falling to 3.55% from 4.46% in 2012. BAM’s was 3.46%.

“The new competition from BAM has not breathed too much life into the market,” Rouyer said. “It’s mostly just redistributed market share and not enlarged the pie.”

As National builds out its marketing strategy and takes hold in the market, so will BAM continue its effort to gain name recognition among investors.

BAM, which opened for business in July 2012, received its initial startup capital from White Mountains Insurance Group, a financial services holding company. White Mountains owns $503 million in BAM surplus notes, which accrue interest annually.

That interest was at $59 million as of Dec. 31, 2013, putting BAM at a GAAP operating loss of $79 million in 2013. But the interest isn’t compounded, and the insurer isn’t under pressure to begin payment on the debt until 2042.

BAM’s key insurance metrics — statutory capital and claims paying resources — were relatively stable through its first full year of operations, with statutory capital down $13.6 million to $470 million by year-end. Claims paying resources were unchanged as of March 31, at $583 million.

“There’s a very good playing field for BAM to come and extoll its values in this market,” Rick Holzinger, head of investor relations at BAM, said in an interview. “We have no legacy portfolio and none of the noise associated with one.”

With full registration in all 50 states, 2014 will be an important year for the startup insurer, which nabbed 39% of the market from Assured in 2013. With a rating now equal to BAM’s, Assured is looking to take some of that back.

Competition among three insurers, if premiums are kept at healthy levels, may indeed be the piece of the puzzle needed to get the market to animate investors once more. In the first quarter of 2014, market penetration continued its slow climb from last year, moving toward 5%.

“People are so focused on the old days when it used to be 50% penetration,” National’s Fallon said. “You don’t need $60 billion to make this business model work. You could do it at $20 billion. Now there are three competitors – if they each do $20 billion in par, the economics should work fine for everyone.”

BY OLIVER RENICK and MARIA BONELLO

APR 30, 2014 6:16pm ET




Detroit Strikes Tentative 5-Year Deal with 14 Unions in Bankruptcy Case.

Detroit has reached a five-year agreement with 14 of its unions, including AFSCME — the city’s largest union — in its bankruptcy case, according to a statement issued this morning by federal mediators who are assisting with the city’s restructuring.

The tentative agreement covering 3,500 workers is among a flurry of deals that Detroit has been able to reach in recent weeks as progress toward completion of its historic bankruptcy reorganization case has intensified.

“This agreement, in principle, offers an opportunity for the unions to provide regular input and guidance to city management,” Ed McNeil, chief spokesman for the Coalition of Detroit Unions, said in a statement.

The deal includes restoration of some pay for city workers who have faced wage freezes and a 10% pay cut in recent years, although details will vary by union, according to a person familiar with the proposal who wasn’t authorized to discuss it and spoke on condition of anonymity.

Other factors in the deal include work-rules concessions from the unions, the person said.

Detroit’s public safety unions, which have formed a coalition in negotiations with the city, are not part of the deal announced today, said Mark Diaz, president of the Detroit Police Officers Association. The public safety labor coalition also includes the Detroit Fire Fighters Association, the Detroit Police Command Officers Association and the Detroit Police Lieutenants and Sergeants Association.

Diaz said the public safety unions are still open to negotiating with the city, but proposed contract terms so far have been unacceptable. The city has been offering police officers wages starting at $14 an hour, Diaz said.

“What I’ve seen so far is, essentially, another pay cut. I understand the city’s in bankruptcy. But the reality is, the city is going to come out of bankruptcy, and they’re not going to have the debts they have,” Diaz said. “We’ll see what’s going to happen this week.”

U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Steven Rhodes commended the unions, retirees and other groups that have negotiated deals so far, calling the work, along with mediated efforts to rescue the Detroit Institute of Arts and city pensioners, “extraordinary and unprecedented in the history of bankruptcy.

“I once again strongly encourage those who are still involved in negotiations over settlements to continue to work hard and in good faith to achieve those settlements,” Rhodes said during a hearing on the city’s latest version of its bankruptcy exit plan, filed late Friday.

Exact terms of Detroit’s deals with the 14 unions were not disclosed, leaving open the question of whether the unions agreed to concessions that will help Gov. Rick Snyder gain support in the Legislature for the $350 million he has pledged for the city’s bankruptcy restructuring.

The collective bargaining agreement terms “between the city and the coalition unions are fair and balanced,” the federal mediators said in the statement. “They provide security for union workers and, at the same time, provide an economically feasible agreement for the city as it emerges from bankruptcy.”

But McNeil also warned against the drawbacks of privatization. This year, Detroit has hired private companies to handle trash collection and has asked for bids from private companies to operate the city’s water and sewer system.

“All too often, the city management looks to privatization as the answer, and all too often, privatization proves ineffective,” said McNeil, who also is special assistant to the president of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees Council 25.

Emergency manager Kevyn Orr’s office would not disclose additional details, saying that terms are still being finalized. “Because these negotiations remain subject to a federal mediation order, the city will refrain from issuing any statement about the details of the agreement until such time as authorized by the federal mediator,” Orr’s office said in a statement.

The tentative deals — reached with assistance from a mediation team led by Chief U.S. District Judge Gerald Rosen — must be approved by members of the unions and by Rhodes as part of the city’s Chapter 9 case.

Detroit’s unions are now among the last major groups of creditors to reach a framework agreement with the city.

The city has reached deals in recent weeks with its pension funds, its retiree committee, two banks and its general obligation bondholders.

“More good news today,” David Heiman, a Jones Day lawyer for Detroit, said this morning at the court hearing. “I think we have very much of a consensus building on these important issues. … We still have some lifting to do.”

Heiman said all of the parties that have reached agreements in mediation have “stretched themselves, including the city. We’ve come together to find common ground. … It was not easy. In fact, at some times it seemed impossible.”

One of the biggest issues that still must be worked out before the city can emerge from bankruptcy is a restructuring of the Detroit Water and Sewerage Department. Detroit initially proposed the creation of a regional authority with Oakland, Macomb and Wayne counties but was unable to reach an agreement after 10 months of negotiations.

Rhodes urged regional leaders to negotiate seriously for a regional authority to run the public utility and has asked the counties to try again with the help of mediators.

The results of mediation so far “certainly establish that, with hard work and good faith, nothing is impossible,” Rhodes said. “They should proceed on the basis that on the right terms a regional water authority is in everybody’s best interests.”

Terms of Detroit’s existing restructuring plan are contingent on the state Legislature’s approval of the $350 million Snyder pledged toward an $816-million rescue fund in a deal that would significantly reduce pension cuts and spin off the Detroit Institute of Arts. The deal is being backed by wealthy philanthropic foundations and the DIA. Without that money, pension cuts would be far deeper.

Rhodes this morning told city lawyers that, given questions about whether the Legislature will approve the state’s share of the deal, they need to create a clear way for retirees to vote in support of the city’s bankruptcy exit plan if the state money comes through — and for their votes to count against the plan if lawmakers balk.

House Speaker Jase Bolger, R-Marshall, has said that unions must contribute cash to the deal for the City of Detroit before the Legislature will act on Snyder’s funding request.

On Monday, Bolger congratulated the city and the unions and called the agreements a “good sign,” but reiterated his call for unions to contribute money.

“I hope the unions will join the state’s taxpayers in putting money that would otherwise go to legal bills into protecting their retirees,” Bolger said in a statement.

Last week, Senate Majority Leader Randy Richardville, R-Monroe, and Snyder have resisted a cash contribution from unions as a condition for support.

“We’re seeing very constructive progress on people coming to agreements,” Snyder said last week. “A settlement would be, by far, the best answer, so hopefully we can all work towards that.”

Rhodes asked the city and creditors to have a final draft of the bankruptcy plan filed by Friday.

By Brent Snavely, Matt Helms and Joe Guillen

BY  | APRIL 29, 2014

(c)2014 the Detroit Free Press




Pension Reporting Change Has Jurisdictions Reviewing their Funding Policies.

GASB Statement No. 68, Accounting and Financial Reporting for Pensions, is scheduled to take effect for the fiscal period that ends June 30, 2015. Once the standard goes into effect, the actuarial valuation report – which has always played an important role as the basic source document for information regarding actuarially determined contributions and the funded status of pension and other post-employment benefit plans – will play an even more critical role, as funding information for pensions will no longer automatically be provided in financial reports. In its Reviewing, Understanding, and Using the Actuarial Valuation Report and Its Role in Plan Funding best practice, the GFOA recommends that state and local government finance officials and others with decision-making authority carefully review and understand their actuarial valuation report and use the information it contains to make policy decisions that ensure that pension benefits are funded in a sustainable manner – as discussed in Core Elements of a Pension Funding Policy, another GFOA best practice. Core Elements recommends that jurisdictions adopt funding policies that ensure their defined benefit plans will be funded equitably and sustainably, and provides guidelines for doing so.



BondUnderwriter Rolls Out New Issue Muni Bond Platform for Individual Investors.

SAUSALITO, CA, Apr 29, 2014 (Marketwired via COMTEX) — BondUnderwriter, Inc. (BU) has expanded its proprietary online new issue municipal bond platform to allow retail investors to create advanced customized searches and access the primary bond markets.

“Tax-exempt bond buyers often find it difficult to access the marketplace, even though 70 percent of the $3.8 trillion municipal bond market is owned by individuals and 34 percent is held directly in individual accounts,” said M.P. Henderson, founder and CEO of BondUnderwriter, Inc.

Newly launched features allow bond buyers to sign up for a free weekly calendar to search, view and select upcoming U.S. state and local government bond sales online. And now, bona fide investors also can connect directly with participating syndicate members to ultimately purchase tax-free and taxable fixed-income securities in the primary market.

The user-selected brokerage firms will determine investment suitability, provide pre-pricing, open accounts and take customer indications of interest and orders in advance of the actual bond sale, allowing for increased investor participation.

The BU(TM) database currently monitors upcoming bond sales on more than 4,000 state and local government issuers. For no charge, potential investors can sign up for customized email alerts that give them early notification of upcoming sales, or can subscribe to a weekly municipal bond calendar electronically distributed once a week. Each week there are approximately 70 new issue listings, averaging a total of $7 billion in par value.

“By offering our clients access to multiple brokerage firms’ new issues, we provide a comprehensive, one-stop shopping site for new issue municipal bonds,” Henderson said.

Each deal-specific interactive ebondpage(TM) includes issue details, pre-sale documents and various links to relevant data and contacts.

“Our established bond-investor audience will give issuers the extra assurance that their financing is an open process to all investors. This is also a win for taxpayers since increasing demand for the bonds should result in lower borrowing costs for public projects,” Henderson added.

Additional information is available at http://www.bondunderwriter.com and on Twitter at @Bondunderwriter.

Broker-dealers interested in participating in the BU retail network may contact the firm athttp://bondunderwriter.com/Contact.aspx . A one-minute video for fixed-income investors is at http://bondunderwriter.com/investor_video.html . A video for issuers also is available.

About BondUnderwriter BondUnderwriter, Inc., a financial technology firm, provides online posting and pre-order conduit services for new municipal bond issues. It was founded in 2008 by Mary P. Henderson, a 30-year municipal industry veteran. She was formerly president and managing director of public finance for Henderson Capital Partners LLC, a West Coast municipal underwriting firm. Headquarters are in Sausalito, Calif.




Moody's: First-Quarter 2014 US Public Finance Rating Revisions in Line with Improving Credit Conditions.

New York, April 29, 2014 — Upgrades made up a growing share of US public finance rating changes during first-quarter 2014, says Moody’s Investors Service in a new report, consistent with the trend of improving credit conditions in evidence since the second half of 2013. In the report “Positive Trend of Upgrades Continues,” Moody’s also says some pockets of the country are still facing fiscal pressure and revenue stagnation, which contributed to downgrades in the first quarter again outnumbering upgrades, as they have every quarter since 2008. In general, however, Moody’s views credit conditions as improving.

Because there were downgrades of a few issuers with large amounts of rated debt during the quarter, the amount of debt downgraded during the quarter greatly exceeded the amount of debt upgraded. Specifically, the par value of the debt Moody’s downgraded came to $119.4 billion, while the amount upgraded totaled $14.4 billion.

“Most public finance sectors are seeing improvements in credit quality, which will contribute to increased upgrades if those trends continue,” says Analyst Chandra Ghosal. “However, pressured sectors and regions will weigh on overall rating activity, resulting in a larger number of downgrades for the remainder of the year in most sectors.”

During the quarter, the number of upgrades nearly doubled to 97, the highest number since third-quarter 2009. Nearly half of the upgrades resulted from Moody’s updating its US local government general obligation debt methodology in January.

There were also 150 downgrades, making up 61% of all rating changes.

By sector, downgrades accounted for 57% of the 180 rating changes in the local government sector, 70% of the 20 rating changes in the not-for-profit hospital sector, and 65% of the 23 rating changes in the higher education and other not-for-profit sector.

The most notable downgrades were the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico ($55 billion par value), University of California ($18.8 billion) and the City of Chicago ($11.6 billion). The largest upgrades were the California Department of Water Resources Power Supply System ($6.6 billion) and the City of Atlanta Airport Enterprise ($1.9 billion).

For more information, Moody’s research subscribers can access this report at https://www.moodys.com/research/US-Public-Finance-Rating-Revisions-for-Q1-2014-Positive-Trend–PBM_PBM169748.




Muni Commentary - Where's the Infrastructure Volume?

The municipal market continues to grapple with a limited supply in the primary market issuance. One of the frequent questions we get when talking with investors is “Where is the volume?” With historically low rates, why aren’t issuers taking advantage of this environment to access capital? We think this issuance malaise reflects a lack of issuer confidence exacerbated by uncertainty about federal policy and/or economic factors, such as weak sales growth. However, there are areas within the infrastructure space1 where issuance is on track with prior years. We also think there will be primary market deals in the infrastructure space to invest in later this year with more supply available in certain areas than others.

Read the full commentary here.




WSJ: A Discount on Muni Funds.

Many closed-end funds that own municipal bonds can be bought at a discount to the value of their assets, an opportunity for investors who are willing to wager that interest rates don’t soar and fiscal meltdowns such as the one in Detroit remain rare.

The funds issue a fixed number of shares that can be bought or sold on exchanges like stocks. In contrast to conventional mutual funds, closed-end funds can trade for more or less than the value of the underlying assets. The discount or premium depends on how investors view the risk of the investments held by the fund.As of March 31, the discount on the S-Network Municipal Bond Closed-End Fund Index, which tracks 84 municipal-bond closed-end funds, was 6.87%, down from 7.29% at the end of December, according to S-Network Global Indexes, an index publisher based in New York.

The potential to buy at a discount is one reason some investors are drawn to closed-end funds. In addition, investors often want the income the funds can generate. Many of the funds use borrowed money to increase their holdings, which typically results in higher yields.

Not for Everyone

Closed-end funds aren’t usually suited to short-term investors, because the discounts can persist and even widen. The use of borrowed money also can make share prices more volatile, by magnifying a fund’s gains or losses.

The municipal-bond market has been roiled by Detroit’s bankruptcy filing in July and Puerto Rico’s fiscal problems, which include a hefty debt of roughly $70 billion.

 

In addition, municipal-bond prices have taken a hit since May, when Ben Bernanke, then-chairman of the Federal Reserve, said the central bank could begin slowing its asset-purchase program. Mr. Bernanke’s statement led many investors to sell bonds, pushing down prices and driving up yields, which move in the opposite direction.

But some experts believe investors are selling bonds indiscriminately and note that yields on municipal bonds have historically been less sensitive to rising rates than Treasurys.

Fears that interest rates will rise further are damping demand for closed-end funds that hold municipal bonds, says Patrick Galley, chief investment officer at RiverNorth Capital Management, a Chicago-based investment firm that manages $2.1 billion.

A Buying Opportunity

Nonetheless, he says, “for those investors who have muni-bond exposure or other fixed-income-like exposure, this is a great time to invest” in the funds, because of the current discounts. Discounts will narrow as interest rates stabilize or perhaps even as they rise, “taking some air out of the fear in fixed income,” Mr. Galley says.

Investors who own municipal bonds in a mutual fund, for example, might want to consider selling and buying that same exposure at a discount through a closed-end fund, says Mr. Galley, who bought shares in the funds for his clients late last year and earlier this year.

Paul Winter, president of Five Seasons Financial Planning in Salt Lake City, bought a number of municipal-bond closed-end funds last year, focusing on those with lower leverage ratios, and he says he hasn’t sold any of them yet.

“It seemed like a great opportunity to rebalance clients out of stocks and into bonds,” he says.

Among the funds he holds are Western Asset Municipal High Income Fund, Invesco Municipal Income Opportunities Trust and Eaton Vance National Municipal Opportunities Trust, which traded at discounts of 9.79%, 6.43% and 10.15%, respectively, as of April 15, according to Chicago-based investment-research firm Morningstar.

Mr. Winter, whose firm manages $36 million, says he is reluctant to add to his holdings at current prices. But, he adds, “I’m still closer to being a buyer on weakness than a seller on strength.”

The Risk of Leverage

Closed-end funds aren’t appropriate for the most conservative investors, says Mariana Bush, who heads the closed-end fund research group at Wells Fargo Advisors.

Most of funds will suffer the additional volatility that comes with leverage, she says. And it may take some time for the discounts to narrow, a process that likely would be driven by the market feeling more comfortable about interest-rate risk, she adds.

Nonetheless, Nicholas LaVerghetta, a principal at NCM Capital Management, says he has been adding to his municipal-bond closed-end fund holdings over the past six months.

“There is interest-rate and leverage risk, but the 6% plus in tax-free income is compensating us for that risk,” says Mr. LaVerghetta, whose Ramsey, N.J., firm manages $82 million.

By

DAISY MAXEY

Updated April 18, 2014 8:37 p.m. ET

Write to Daisy Maxey at daisy.maxey@wsj.com




WSJ: Investors Embrace 'Catastrophe Bonds.'

Insurance companies are taking advantage of the appetite for high-yielding debt by selling bonds that can force investors to help pay for the cost of natural disasters.

With the U.S. hurricane season about a month away, insurers are issuing “catastrophe bonds” at the fastest clip since before the financial crisis. Insurers sell the bonds to help cover potential claims from hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes and other major insured risks. While losses on so-called cat bonds have been rare over the years, investors can forfeit both interest payments and their principal if disaster costs exceed designated levels, which gives insurers the right to tap the funds. The bonds have floating interest rates and are usually paid off upon maturity in three or four years.

Cat-bond issuance in the first quarter more than doubled from the year-earlier period, to $1.2 billion, and second-quarter issuance is expected to hit an all-time high above $3.5 billion, according to Willis Capital Markets & Advisory. More than $2 billion of deals have closed or been announced this quarter, Willis said.

Citizens Property Insurance Corp., the state-run insurer in Florida, this week boosted its latest cat-bond offering to at least $1.25 billion from $400 million, according to investors. It would be the largest single cat-bond transaction ever, according to Artemis, an insurance-linked data provider.

Yields on cat bonds, meanwhile, have sunk to their lowest level in nine years. The average quarterly yield dipped to 5.22% recently, from 9.61% in 2012.

Cat bonds historically have appealed to large pension funds but now are attracting a wider array of buyers, yield-hungry investors who otherwise might purchase corporate junk bonds, according to brokers, bankers and investors.

“Institutions of smaller and smaller size are becoming interested in the market,” said Brett Houghton, a managing principal at Connecticut-based Fermat Capital Management LLC, a long-standing specialist in catastrophe bonds, with $4.4 billion under management.

By

AL YOON And
LESLIE SCISM

April 23, 2014 6:44 p.m. ET




S&P: Why Local Economies Have a Greater Credit Impact on Local Governments than on U.S. Public Housing.

U.S. public housing authorities (PHAs) are mainly federally funded agencies that work in local communities to solve affordable housing problems. And while they function in a local government’s area, their ties to it can vary. Some have a tight reporting relationship with local government administration while others are entirely separate -– they just happen to serve in the same area. Also varying is the degree of policy coordination, which does not necessarily rely on a close administrative relationship.

Although a local government and a PHA both work to benefit residents of the same area, the factors that influence their respective credit quality differ greatly, resulting in divergent ratings. Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services rates 16 PHAs and 15 of the cities and counties in which these PHAs operate. City ratings fall into a wider range and are generally higher than the respective PHA ratings. This is because city and county governments typically have a stronger and more diverse revenue stream and greater control over revenues than do PHAs, which rely on federal funding that is largely beyond their control. (Watch the related CreditMatters TV segment titled, “How Standard & Poor’s Ratings On U.S. Public Housing Authorities And Their Local Governments Measure Up,” dated April 1, 2014.)

Overview

  • A PHA rating doesn’t necessarily move in tandem with that on its respective local government.
  • Local government and PHA revenue streams differ greatly.
  • PHAs that develop private housing can diversify their revenue sources, but they also become more vulnerable to shifts in the rental market.

Revenue Streams Are The Key Credit Difference

In general, cities have more flexibility in determining their revenue sources — whether they be through taxes, fees, or assessments. Of course, some of this mix depends upon the makeup of a local economy: A tourist-based economy may rely more on sales and use taxes, whereas a major city that is growing slowly may rely more on property taxes and assessments.

PHAs, by comparison, have virtually no control over their funding source — the federal government — nor how much they receive. A PHA’s federal funding is determined by Congress based on a formula determined by cost to operate a unit in a particular city although Congress can modify this. Those PHAs that have expanded into other lines of business, such as affordable nonpublic housing, have more flexibility but assume real estate market risk. As such, the ties to the local economy are stronger for PHAs with nonpublic housing development than for those that operate under the more traditional public housing model. However, among PHAs we rate, those with an emphasis on market-based development are located in cities with strong economies (Howard County, Md.) or have operated as nontraditional affordable housing providers with minimal disruption to revenues (Vancouver, Wash.).

Relative Economic Strength Affects Local Government More Than PHA Ratings

Under our local government criteria, released Sept. 12, 2013, the relative strength of a city or county local economy accounts for 30% of the indicative rating score. Although very weak scores on other factors, such as debt and pension liabilities or financial management, may ultimately constrain the rating, a higher general obligation (GO) rating in many cases indicates a strong underlying economic base linked to a broad and diverse metropolitan region. In these cases, the rating on the local government is likely higher than that on the PHA. In instances where the local economy is weak, the city GO rating may be closer to (or even below) that on the local PHA. Our economic analysis considers the health of the asset base on which local tax revenues rely, as well as the likelihood of demand for services that may arise as a result of economic deterioration.

Local governments can adjust their economy-dependent revenues . . .

Standard & Poor’s data suggests that 79% of municipal and county revenues are locally sourced while direct federal government funding represents just 4% of local government revenues, much of which is dedicated to capital spending. The historical stability of ratings in this sector, even throughout the recent economic downturn, speaks to the overall diversity and stability of local taxing entities’ revenue bases, as well as their financial flexibility relative to other sectors. This stability results from the way in which properties are assessed in many states, which effectively delinks tax base growth from overall market volatility. In addition, the lag between market cycles and their effect on revenues allows public officials to adjust rates to offset market effects. As the current economic recovery progresses, we expect local tax bases to stabilize and economically sensitive revenue growth to contribute to improving credit conditions for many local government entities (see “U.S. State And Local Government Credit Conditions Forecast: 2014 Will Be A Balancing Act,” published Dec. 17, 2013 on RatingsDirect).

. . .But pensions may be a weakness

Cities with ratings lower than those on their respective housing authority often have weak to very weak debt and contingent liability profiles, which account for 10% of the total score in our local government GO rating methodology. Large pension obligations pressure ChicagoNew Haven, Conn.; Bridgeport, Conn.; and Philadelphia. Among these four, only Philadelphia has presented a credible plan, in our view, to address these rising pension costs. While we view Chicago as having a strong economic profile, its four pension plans together are just 35% funded, and state legislation aiming to improve this funding status will cause Chicago’s current contributions to rise sharply in 2016 (see Chicago, published Feb. 24, 2014). In our opinion, Chicago’s lack of progress in making structural changes in pension funding is a significant negative credit factor. While high debt burdens can limit a housing authority rating, liabilities are typically limited to debt service, and retirement obligations do not present significant challenges. (We rate Chicago’s housing authority ‘AA’ and Chicago itself at ‘A+’.)

The local economy is less important to PHA ratings

For PHAs, which are federally funded, the local economy has a less direct influence on credit quality than it does for taxing entities. PHAs that we rate have waiting lists that may reach into the tens of thousands of households regardless of the economy. Vacancies are low, but so are rents, and subsidies are subject to federal appropriations, which are not correlated to the economy. In some cases, a strong economy results in a better subscore in economic fundamentals for a PHA, but that component contributes only 25% to the enterprise profile that we assign when rating a PHA. As other factors reduce the impact of a strong economy, no PHA receives a boost in its enterprise profile score to “extremely strong” from “very strong,” meaning that even an extremely strong economy cannot bump up the rating on a PHA. On the other hand, weak economies can affect a PHA’s rating. Two PHAs in adequate or vulnerable economies, Fall River, Mass. and Bridgeport, Conn., have “strong” enterprise profiles, which are one level down from the norm of “very strong” for PHAs. The resulting ratings are lower than they might be for Fall River Housing Authority and the Bridgeport Housing Authority, at ‘A-‘ and ‘A+’, respectively.

The main factors we use to determine the rating on a PHA are its level of federal government support, market position, financial performance, and debt profile. The economy figures into this only indirectly as the third most important of three factors that constitute the enterprise profile. The general mood for federal appropriations can vary, but not necessarily in accordance with that of the local area. Public housing appropriations are set by federal law, which are distinct from economic conditions or the demand for low-income housing. The condition of housing stock, the makeup of the programs the PHA offers (relative amount of Section 8 vouchers versus in-house development), and management strength are all factors that can augment or take away from the level of government financial support.

Reliance on the federal government boosts some PHA ratings but caps others

Because we consider PHAs to be government-related entities with a moderate likelihood of government support, a few PHAs benefit from this relationship in terms of the rating. The three lowest-rated PHAs — Bridgeport, Conn.; Fall River, Mass.; and San Francisco — have ratings higher than their stand-alone credit profiles would indicate because of the federal government support. However, significant reliance on the federal government can result in a cap on the rating to the U.S. sovereign rating. For example, just two PHAs we rate, Howard County Housing Commission, Md., and the Vancouver Housing Authority, Wash., receive less than half of their income from federal sources. Vancouver HA is one of five PHAs with the highest rating for the sector: ‘AA’. The revenues VHA has been able to generate resulted in a “very strong” financial profile score, one of only four at that level among the rated PHAs.

PHAs’ reliance on U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development dollars insulates them somewhat from local economic fluctuations but leaves them vulnerable to unpredictable federal funding decisions. Even when the national economy grows, appropriations for public housing often do not increase. There has been very little correlation between changes in spending on public housing and U.S. GDP (see chart). Tenant rental payments represent a small share of revenue and are not based on the rental market but on the resident’s income. Although strong demand for services enables housing providers to maintain waiting lists and reduce vacancy rates, their financial performance and credit quality ultimately depend on federal subsidies and rent payments from low- and moderate-income tenants, neither of which is strongly correlated with the local economy.

Download Chart Data

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Criteria Revisions Give Local Government Ratings A Boost, While PHA Ratings Remain Stable

In recent months, Standard & Poor’s has raised a significant number of city and county ratings based on our new local government GO criteria. As our review of cities and counties under the new criteria began in September 2013, the pace of rating actions across U.S. public finance spiked to nearly three times the historical quarterly average, and nearly six out of seven actions were positive. As we apply the criteria to more cities and counties, positive rating actions will likely continue to outnumber negative changes in this sector. We expect that PHA ratings will remain more stable than in the local government sector although we have made two rating changes in recent months based on financial performance. The recent upgrades of many local governments may amplify the divergence between local government and local housing agency ratings.

Standard & Poor’s baseline economic forecast calls for lower unemployment and stronger GDP growth in 2014 than in 2013 and both the baseline and pessimistic scenarios call for stronger GDP growth in 2015 (see table 1). Local economies could benefit from such growth to varying degrees while PHAs will probably not see much impact. Because PHA ratings are tied to that of the U.S. sovereign (AA+/Stable/A-1+), the U.S. sovereign rating is more likely to result in rating changes to PHAs than the state of the respective local economies.

Table 1  |  Download Table

2014-2015 Economic Outlook for U.S. Public Finance Housing
Forecast / Scenarios Actual
Downside Baseline Upside
2014 2015 2014 2015 2014 2015 2013
Macroeconomic indicators
30-year fixed mortgage rate (%) 4.09 4.41 4.63 4.98 5.40 6.49 3.96
10-year Treasury note yield (%) 2.00 2.41 3.03 3.30 4.18 4.85 2.32
Unemployment rate (%) 7.59 7.68 6.47 5.82 6.05 5.00 7.45
Real GDP (% change) 0.58 1.84 2.77 3.25 4.13 4.01 1.68
Total nonfarm payrolls (% change) 0.75 0.78 1.76 2.03 2.46 2.58 1.64
CPI (% change) 0.80 1.95 1.44 1.77 2.13 1.61 1.44
Households (mil.) 122.84 124.20 123.10 124.72 123.29 125.02 121.41
Median single-family existing-home price ($000s) 194.80 190.37 198.71 198.47 202.09 200.72 195.57
Median new-homes sale prices ($000s) 261.67 254.38 265.77 266.02 263.72 252.29 264.53
Existing single-family home sales (mil. units) 4.42 4.70 4.70 5.12 5.22 5.28 4.52
Single-family housing starts (mil. units) 0.56 0.74 0.82 1.05 0.90 1.19 0.62
Multi-family housing starts (mil. units) 0.26 0.33 0.35 0.43 0.36 0.49 0.29
Federal government spending (3.00) 0.10 (1.10) 0.00 (0.60) 0.90 (4.60)
Standard & Poor’s U.S. economic team’s forecasts are constructed using the Global Insight model of the U.S. economy. Forecasts are from the “U.S. Economic Forecast: Two Economies Diverged in A Wood,” published Dec. 5, 2013 on RatingsDirect. CPI–Consumer Price Index.

Table 2  |  Download Table

Local Area Economy And Public Housing Rating Factors
City or county Housing authority
Rating Analyst Stand-alone credit profile (SACP) Rating Social rent as a % of market rent* Analyst
Baltimore Housing Authority of Baltimore City
AA-/Stable Nicole Ridberg a+ A+ 18.4 Kib Park
Baltimore is a job center for the region with large education, health care, and government employers. At the end of fiscal 2012, the city had a $20.7 million surplus, increasing available reserves to a very strong 16.5% of expenditures. Management’s financial practices are “strong,” and its debt profile is low at 2.7% of market value. Offsetting factors include its large pension and OPEB liabilities, with annual costs at about 15% of expenditures. The Housing Authority of Baltimore City (HABC) ranks “very strong” in its enterprise profile and “strong” in its financial profile, resulting in an SACP of ‘a+’. The component rankings are typical of U.S. PHAs. HABC’s scores differ in that it has lower marks for financial performance but the highest possible marks for debt profile and liquidity. The authority also has the highest possible score for asset quality and operational performance. The average social rent as a percentage of market rent is 18.4%, among the lowest for rated U.S. PHAs.
Boston Boston Housing Authority
AAA Victor Medeiros a+ A+ 20.6 Stephanie Morgan
Boston has a deep and strong economy that historically has resulted in unemployment rates lower than those of the commonwealth and the nation. The city posted a $61.6 million surplus in fiscal 2012 (2.4% of budget). Debt service is 5% of total governmental fund expenditures, and the city’s net debt is low at 1.4% of market value. A long-term credit consideration involves the city’s pensions and OPEBs, but the city has improved its position through negotiations with unions and funding of obligations. The Boston Housing Authority (BHA) ranks “very strong” in its enterprise profile and “strong” in its financial profile, resulting in an SACP of ‘a+’. BHA’s scores differ from those of other PHAs in that it has lower marks for financial performance but the highest possible marks for debt profile and liquidity. The authority also has the highest possible score for economic fundamentals, due to steady population growth; average social rent as a percentage of market rent, at 17.6%; along with other ratios and qualitative factors.
Bridgeport, CT Bridgeport Housing Authority
A Victor Medeiros a A+ 17.9 Raymond Kim
Bridgeport has a weak economy, with per capita effective buying income at 69% of the U.S. and an unemployment rate of 12.2%. The city has weak budgetary flexibility with reserves equal to 2.3% of expenditures. Budgetary performance has been adequate, with a slight deficit of 0.7% in fiscal 2012. Debt and contingent liabilities are very weak, with governmental fund debt service representing 11.8% of total expenditures. Bridgeport has large unfunded OPEB and pension liabilities; it has been funding less than its full annual required contributions, and expenses will likely increase. The Bridgeport Housing Authority (BHA) is one of only two PHAs to score as low as “strong” in its enterprise profile, compared with other PHAs that we consider “very strong.” The low ranking is driven by the weak economy that also affects the city’s rating. Low population growth and a deflated housing market are key factors in the economic analysis. .
Chicago Chicago Housing Authority
A+ Helen Samuelson aa AA 16.9 Kib Park
Chicago has been downgraded over the past four years, reflecting very weak budgetary performance, a very weak debt and contingent liabilities position, and a weak institutional framework. On the other hand, the city has a broad and diverse economy; however, the Cook County unemployment rate is historically higher than that of the state and nation, and stood at 9.3% in 2012. The city ended fiscal 2012 with a $101 million general fund shortfall, and the funding levels of the four major city pension plans ranged from around 60% to only about 25%. The Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) ranks “very strong” in its enterprise and financial profiles, resulting in an SACP of ‘aa’. The financial ranking is higher than that of almost all U.S. PHAs, and its three-year EBITDA-to-revenue average of 33.6% is in line with the best-performing international social housing providers. Despite a debt portfolio of $340 million, CHA has a debt-to-EBITDA ratio of 1.1x, low among global social housing entities. CHA’s social-rent-to-market-rent ratio of 16.9% is the fourth-lowest among rated U.S. PHAs.
Cuyahoga County, OH Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority
AA Carol Hendrickson a+ A+ 16.44 Moraa Andima
Cuyahoga County benefits from the diverse economy of Cleveland, but we consider the economy weak given that the population has been declining at an annual average of 6.7% over the past 10 years, and assessed value decreased 7.1% in 2012. The county does have “very strong” management and has reserves of about 70% of general fund expenditures. The Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority (CMHA) has a “very strong” enterprise profile and “strong” financial profile, typical for U.S. PHAs. CMHA has the highest possible asset quality and strategy and management scores, with a slightly lower economic fundamental score due to its having the greatest population decline among the locations with PHAs we rate. Despite the declining population and the lowest home purchase price of any rated PHA, CMHA’s social rents as a percentage of market rents are similar to those in much more expensive cities.
Fall River, MA Fall River Housing Authority
A- Victor Medeiros bbb+ A- 27.76 Kib Park
Fall River has an adequate economy that has been vulnerable to economic downturns. In 2012, the city’s unemployment rate was 13%. The city produced an operating surplus of just 1% of expenditures. State aid represents 64% of revenues, which is a high proportion. The city has very strong liquidity based on low debt service from a small amount of outstanding bonds. The city appears to have improved its financial management, which previously received “material weakness” findings in its audit. Pension and OPEB liabilities remain a long-term risk. The Fall River Housing Authority (FRHA) is the only rated U.S. PHA to score as low as “vulnerable” in two categories in the financial profile category, leading to a financial profile score of “adequate,” lowest among PHAs. Most importantly, the PHA has a “vulnerable” subscore for liquidity. The social rent as a percentage of market rent is higher than average, at 27.8%.
Houston Houston Housing Authority
AA+ Russell Bryce a+ A+ 43.8 Stephanie Morgan
Houston has a large and diverse economy and fared better than many areas during the Great Recession. Unemployment in Harris County was 6.8% in 2012, below the national average. The city had general fund reserves equal to 9.4% of operating expenditures in 2013, and we expect that figure to remain fairly constant at 8.55% in 2014. Houston has a “strong” financial position with a budget surplus of about 10%. The debt and contingent liability profile is very weak, with total governmental fund debt service at 11.5% of total governmental fund expenditures and 151% of total governmental fund revenue. Still, the city’s financial position is improving, with projected growth in property tax revenues of 3.8% and sales tax revenues of 4.7% in 2014. We view Houston Housing Authority’s (HHA) financial performance as “vulnerable” mainly due to its volatile net operating income and depleting reserves to cover its ongoing housing cost voucher program deficit. The authority has one of the lowest EBITDA-to-revenues ratios at 11%, which contributes to its low score for financial performance. However, we still view its financial profile as “strong,” given other factors such as debt profile, liquidity, and financial policies. The second-highest population growth among localities of rated U.S. PHAs boosts HHA’s enterprise profile to “strong.” The percentage of social rent to market rent is high at 44%.
Howard County, MD Howard County Housing Commission
AAA Timothy Barrett a+ A+ 38.1 Kib Park
Howard County has a deep and diverse economy that benefits from significant employment opportunities in the county and throughout the Washington-Baltimore region. Income is very strong with per capita effective buying income at 165% of the national average, and the county fared better than many areas during the most recent recession. Unemployment has historically been well below state and national rates, about 5% in 2012. The county has reserves of about 9% of operating expenses. In addition, Howard County maintains a budget stabilization fund that contains another 15% of operating expenditures. Net debt is just 2% of market value. Howard County Housing Commission (HCHC) is one of only two rated PHAs that derives less than half of its income from HUD subsidies. Despite this, we still view HCHC’s financial performance as vulnerable due to its low EBITDA-to-revenue ratio of 20%. HCHC has a relatively high social-rent-to-market-rent ratio of 38%.
New Haven, CT New Haven Housing Authority
BBB+ Hilary Sutton a+ A+ 10 Kib Park
New Haven has a history of budget shortfalls, contributing to a downgrade in 2013. A number of revenue shortfalls led the city to draw $8 million from the general fund in 2012, leaving a balance of 0.7% of expenditures, which is below the city’s target of 5%. The significant presence of educational institutions in New Haven stabilizes the economy but depresses income indicators. Its May 2013 unemployment rate of 11.9% was significantly higher than the national rate. We consider the overall net debt burden moderately high at 6.4% of market value, and New Haven’s pension and OPEB liabilities are significant. The plans are 46% and 50% funded, respectively. The New Haven Housing Authority (NHHA) has financial scores similar to those of most PHAs with the exception of liquidity, which we consider adequate. NHHA is just one of two rated U.S. PHAs with a liquidity score that low, but its financial performance, also “adequate,” is better than that of most PHAs. The social rent as a percentage of market rent is among the lowest, at 10%.
Norfolk, VA Norfolk Redevelopment & Housing Authority
AA+ Timothy Barrett a+ A+ 44.9 Adam Cray
Norfolk has a strong economy based on the military sector with more than 83,000 regional employees, nearly two-thirds of whom are stationed in the city. The city has very strong budgetary flexibility with available reserves at approximately 20% of general fund expenditures. Overall net debt is moderate at roughly 3% of market value, and the city’s pension liability is about 80% funded. Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority (NRHA) has a very strong enterprise profile and a strong financial profile, which mostly reflect very strong demand for public housing in Norfolk, as well as the authority’s excellent strategic planning, very high liquidity, and low debt burden; however, a low EBITDA-to-revenue ratio (9.6%) and significant volatility in operating performance weaken NRHA’s financial profile score.
Philadelphia Philadelphia Housing Authority
A+ Hilary Sutton aa AA 15.4 Moraa Andima
Philadelphia’s economy is weak given high unemployment of 10.8% in 2012 and projected per capita effective buying income of 76.3% although the property tax base has been growing. Philadelphia encountered financial stress in the early 1990s, but state oversight has helped the city maintain strong budgetary performance and adequate reserves at 7.2% of expenditures. Management practices are strong. City pension and OPEB obligations were a high 13% of expenditures in fiscal 2012. We consider the strategy and management of the Philadelphia Housing Authority to be extremely strong, the highest-ranked indicator in its enterprise profile, which we rank “very strong.” Philadelphia HA also is one of only four U.S. housing authorities to rank “very strong” in its financial profile, with the highest possible rankings for debt profile and liquidity. The authority is one of the minority of PHAs that receives a ranking as high as “adequate” for financial performance. The PHA’s average rent is 15.4% of market rent, the third-best among rated U.S. PHAs.
San Diego San Diego Housing Authority
AA Misty Newland aa AA 70.5 Jose Cruz
San Diego has a very strong regional economy that has historically benefited from the presence of the high-tech, tourism, and military and defense sectors. Although unemployment in San Diego County remains close to the statewide level, assessed value in the city grew 4.3% from 2013 to 2014 following several years of modest declines and weak growth. The city’s debt profile, burdened by very large retiree benefit obligations, remains a credit weakness, and pending legal challenges to attempted benefit reform have the potential to thwart efforts to restructure these obligations. The San Diego Housing Commission (SDHC) ranks “very strong” in both its enterprise and financial profiles. We consider the management and strategy of the authority to be extremely strong, but the economic fundamentals have a relatively low ranking of “strong” despite an extremely expensive housing market. The reason for the comparatively low economic ranking is that SDHC operates only subsidized Section 8 housing, which charges higher rents than public housing. The average rent paid by an SDHC voucher recipient is 70.5% of market rent, among the highest of our rated U.S. PHAs, and exposes the authority to more market risk than do traditional PHAs. We also view the financial performance of SDHC as vulnerable because of a low EBITDA-to-revenue ratio of 14%, surpassing only three other rated U.S. PHAs. However, SDHC is the only PHA to achieve the highest ranking in the three other financial profile components.
San Francisco San Francisco Housing Authority
AA+ Misty Newland a A+ 11.6 Jose Cruz
San Francisco’s economic strength stems from its concentration of high-wage, high-skilled jobs in finance, business services, and technology, which have recovered quickly following the recession, as well as its status as a global destination for tourism and industry conventions. Employment and assessed value have begun to rebound, fueling recent revenue growth that has contributed to budgetary performance we consider adequate. The city and county’s finances are supported by very strong management conditions although relatively high pension and OPEB liabilities weaken its debt profile, in our opinion. The San Francisco Housing Authority has a lower enterprise profile ranking (“strong”) than most rated U.S. PHAs while the financial profile is strong like that of almost all rated U.S. PHAs. The main weaknesses of SFHA is its highly vulnerable financial performance and vulnerable strategy and management. The authority has the highest economic fundamentals ranking, based on a social rent as a percentage of market rent of just 11.6%, the strongest measure among rated U.S. PHAs by a significant margin.
Seattle Seattle Housing Authority
AAA Chris Morgan aa AA 36 Aulii Limtiaco
Seattle’s status as a regional economic center with deep ties to export markets and a number of major high-tech and manufacturing employers has supported its recent recovery, as unemployment in King County fell to 6% in 2013, and assessed value began to stabilize. The recovery has also led to a surge in economically sensitive and development-related revenue, which, together with management practices we view as very strong, has helped the city balance its budget and contribute to recent surpluses. The city’s debt burden is notably “very strong,” with moderate debt service carrying charges and low overall net debt relative to revenues. The Seattle Housing Authority’s (SHA) enterprise profile ranking of “very strong” reflects extremely strong management and strategy, and economic fundamentals, while the financial profile ranking of “strong” reflects a very strong debt profile and adequate financial performance that is better than most PHAs. SHA’s EBITDA-to-revenue ratio of 22% is stronger than that of most PHAs. Despite an average social rent of 36% relative to market rent, SHA scores high in economic fundamentals due to annual population growth of 2%, which is among the highest for rated PHAs.
Vancouver, WA Vancouver Housing Authority
AA Chris Morgan aa AA 64.5 Adam Cray
Vancouver’s location within the Portland-Vancouver metropolitan area provides a strong and stable employment base while its Columbia River port connects the Pacific Northwest agricultural regions to global export markets. Recent declines in market value have not yet stabilized although we expect a return to growth as early as 2014. Despite flagging revenues throughout the recession, the city expects balanced operations for the 2013-2014 biennium. Its credit profile is strengthened by financial management conditions we view as strong with a moderate debt burden. The Vancouver Housing Authority (VHA) is the only rated U.S. PHA to score at least very strong in every category under Standard & Poor’s social housing criteria. VHA is the only rated U.S. PHA to rank very strong in financial performance, based upon an EBITDA-to-revenues ratio of 41%, significantly above all other PHAs. This is the result of the authority’s limited reliance on federal subsidies, which represent only 44% of VHA’s revenues and makes VHA one of the few PHAs to receive less than half its income from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. On the other hand, the emphasis on workforce housing results in higher social rents in comparison to the market, 40%, which is the second-highest and exposes the authority to market risk.
*Social rent–Average rent charged by social housing providers or PHAs. OPEB–Other postemployment benefit.
Primary Credit Analyst: Lawrence R Witte, CFA, San Francisco (1) 415-371-5037;
larry.witte@standardandpoors.com
Secondary Contacts: Carol A Hendrickson, Chicago (1) 312-233-7062;
carol.hendrickson@standardandpoors.com
Sarah Sullivant, San Francisco (1) 415-371-5051;
sarah.sullivant@standardandpoors.com



S&P: U.S. Bond Insurers and the Financial Guarantee Sector Stand at a Crossroads.

We expect business volume for bond insurers to rise through 2015 and for the industry’s risk-adjusted pricing ratios to improve. Municipal bond market participants in the public finance arena we have spoken to generally feel that bond insurance has proven its worth during the past several years. (Watch the related CreditMatters TV segment titled, “Projected Higher Interest Rates And Spreads May Create Added Opportunities For U.S. Bond Insurers,” dated April 2, 2014.)

Overview

  • Municipal bond insurance is still necessary in the U.S. public finance market.
  • We expect business volume for bond insurers to rise through 2015 and for the industry’s risk-adjusted pricing ratios to improve.
  • If interest rates rise as expected and insured par volume does not increase or the increase in competition leads to poor pricing decisions, we could take rating actions on the bond insurers.

Business Prospects Are Likely To Increase

The prevailing lower yield environment and the spread compression it created hurt the financial guarantee market for much of 2013, making it difficult for bond insurers to attract insurable issuers and investor demand. Issuers already benefited from all-time low market yields. Investors searched for the highest-yielding fixed-income municipal assets available and were not willing to give up yield for the credit protection and liquidity provided by a financial guarantee.

If municipal yields widen by 50-75 bps through 2015 based on our analysis, there should be a corresponding increase the insurable primary U.S. public finance market, as bond insurers should be able to create yield savings that would make it economical for issuers to pay for insurance. We have asked bond insurers their expectations for the U.S. public finance market and the insurable market in 2014. In a period of rising interest rates, they expect total U.S. public finance new issue par to be $285 billion to $300 billion, including refundings of approximately $90 billion. The estimate for total new issue insured public finance par volume is $20 billion to $25 billion, equating to 7%-8% of total public finance issuance in 2014.

The bond insurers expect secondary market insured par to total $2 billion to $4 billion in 2014, depending on municipal market headline events, yield widening, and institutional investor capital market and hedging activities. In late 2013, insured secondary transaction picked up for the bond insurers as a result of Detroit’s bankruptcy filing, headline events about Puerto Rico, and general investor worries about the municipal debt market. There are still pockets of stress in the U.S. that might spur retail investors’ demand for secondary market insurance.

We believe the market can support three bond insurers with the reemergence of National Public Finance Guarantee Corp. (National). In fact, U.S. public finance market participants have indicated a demand for a third insurer for diversity. In the near term, expansion of the insurable market with the expected rise in interest rates, combined with the disparate underwriting strategies of the bond insurers, should lead to sufficient underwriting opportunities to support each company’s underwriting strategy. In the long term, as the bond insurers continue to prove the value of their product, the demand for financial guarantees should increase and the insured penetration of the U.S. public finance market should rise, but not to the same levels as prior to 2008.

To gauge demand for bond insurance, we spoke to various municipal bond-market participants who have different applications in the public finance arena. The findings of our discussions included the following:

U.S. Public Finance Macroeconomic Trends

The 30-year Municipal Market Data (MMD) ‘AAA’ benchmark yield rose to 4.5% in September 2013 after the Federal Reserve announced quantitative easing tapering and headline risk associated with Puerto Rico increased. The current 30-year yield is 3.7%–65 basis points (bps) less than its recent peak, and 35 bps less than in January 2014.

We expect a gradual increase in long-term interest rates, with U.S. municipal rates rising through 2014 and 2015 by 50-75 bps. Standard & Poor’s economists estimate a U.S. Treasury 10-year average yield of 3.0% for 2014 and 3.3% for 2015 (see U.S. Forecast Update: A Recovery Postponed Not Canceled, published Feb. 10, 2014, on RatingsDirect). This is a 30-bp widening for 2014 and 70 bps for 2015.

The correlation of U.S. treasuries to the ‘AAA’ MMD general obligation yield curve has historically been close to the 0.9x-1.0x range, except during 2007-2009 both on 10-year. We therefore expect yields to widen by 25-50 bps by year-end 2014 and an additional 25-30 bps in 2015, increasing in total by 50-75 bps by the end of 2015.

Bond Insurers Economic Trends

With credit spreads forecast to widen in 2014 and 2015, we expect the bond insurers’ risk-adjusted pricing (RAP) to improve from 2013 levels. We base this view on our assumption that the bond insurers will be able to capture a greater amount of the wider credit spread in the form of higher premium rates. We also assume that the rise in the premium rates will result in better pricing per dollar of risk as measured by our transaction capital charges and that the rise in premium rates will be greater than any rise in capital charges. In first-quarter 2013 when interest rates began to rise, this pricing dynamic was illustrated as the bond insurers experienced stronger pricing with relatively minimal change in underwriting risk. Interest rates in January 2014 began to decline toward the end of the month, but bond insurers were able to execute on strong pricing, with RAPs on primary and secondary market transactions higher than those in 2013.

Ratings Hinge On Future Developments

Although we believe there is still a need for municipal bond insurance in the U.S. public finance market, the next two years will be crucial in determining the health of the financial guarantee sector. If interest rates rise as expected and insured par volume does not increase, we would likely reevaluate all our ratings in the sector.

The reemergence of National has introduced another layer of competition to the pricing dynamics of the financial guarantee market. In this competitive environment, insurers must exercise discipline when pricing insured transactions. If the increase in competition leads to poor pricing decisions or the current spread compression persists and insurers’ RAPs are projected to fall and remain less than 4%, we could lower our ratings on the bond insurers.

19-Mar-2014

Primary Credit Analyst: David S Veno, Hightstown (1) 212-438-2108;
david.veno@standardandpoors.com
Secondary Contact: Marc Cohen, CFA, New York (1) 212-438-2031;
marc.cohen@standardandpoors.com





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