Citizen brought action against mayor and councilmen of city seeking declaration that ordinance prohibiting possession of marijuana was invalid.

The Supreme Court of Georgia held that:

• Failure to perfect service warranted dismissal, and
• Citizen who had never been charged, or even threatened, with violating ordinance lacked standing to challenge its constitutionality.

After decedent was killed during the demolition of an abandoned house owned by the city, administratrix of decedent’s estate and decedent’s son brought action against city, asserting claims for negligence, negligent hiring, negligent supervision, breach of contract, and nuisance. City filed motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on grounds of governmental immunity. The trial court denied motion. City appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that city performed governmental function when it elected to demolish abandoned house and selected contractor to perform demolition, and thus, city was entitled to governmental immunity on plaintiffs’ negligence claims.

Police officer commenced action against municipality, alleging claims under the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the ADA.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• On question of first impression, Title II of the ADA does not cover disability discrimination in public employment;
• Officer waived issue on appeal of whether res judicata barred her claim under Title I of the ADA;
• Officer did not actually state that municipality had terminated her employment by reason of her alleged disability; and
• Officer’s “psychological problems” did not prevent her from performing essential function of her job.

An employer may fire an employee for engaging in unacceptable workplace behavior without violating the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act, even if the behavior was precipitated by a mental illness.

Police officer sought review of civil service board’s decision upholding city council’s termination of officer’s employment, stemming from incident in which officer allegedly injured middle school student when she improperly used and deployed stun gun in school classroom.

The Court of Appeal held that:

• All recordings of interviews from police employees and officers were required, and
• Evidence was insufficient to support trial court’s finding that investigating officer’s interview was recorded.

In order for termination of police officer under investigation for injury to student based on alleged improper use and deployment of stun gun in middle school classroom not to be rendered absolute nullity, full recordings of interviews from all police employees and officers were required, rather than only from officer under investigation, despite contention that officer under investigation did not have right to obtain recorded statement from investigating officer’s interview with police internal affairs board.  No exception was applicable to board’s interview with investigating officer.

Utility companies filed action against Commissioner of Maryland Public Service Commission (PSC), alleging that order directing Maryland utilities to enter into Contract for Differences with generator involving construction of new generation facility violated Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, and § 1983.

The District Court held that:

• PSC order was preempted by Federal Power Act (FPA) and void under Supremacy Clause;
• Order did not fall within the market participant exception to dormant Commerce Clause; and
• Locational requirement in order was not facially discriminatory.

Drivers received violation notices from the City of Ellisville alleging that they had violated Ellisville’s red light camera ordinance (the “Ordinance”) and challenged the Ordinance in an eight-count purported class action petition. The petition sought declaratory judgment regarding the Ordinance’s constitutionality, validity, and conformity with state law, as well as Ellisville’s authority to enact the Ordinance.  Drivers also asserted that the Ordinance violated procedural due process and the privilege against self-incrimination, and they alleged claims of unjust enrichment, money had and received, and civil conspiracy against Ellisville and American Traffic Solutions, Inc. (“ATS”).

Ellisville and ATS each filed separate motions to dismiss as well as a joint motion to dismiss, all of which were granted by the trial court.  Drivers appealed.

The appeals court held that the Ordinance was properly enacted pursuant to Ellisville’s police power for regulating public safety.  However the court concluded that the Ordinance conflicted with Missouri law on the same subject in violation of Section 304.120.3. Specifically, the Ordinance conflicts with Sections 304.281, the state statute governing traffic signal violations, and 302.225, and 302.302, the provision of state law relating to the assessment of points for moving violations.

Accordingly, the Ordinance is void and unenforceable as a matter of law.

City engaged in a pattern of conduct that made it clear that it desired to purchase developer’s property for use as parkland.  This conduct included a number of property designations, negotiations, and reports which occasioned considerable uncertainty and delay, but none of which resulted in an actual rezoning of the property.

Developer finally concluded that the city’s commitment to creating new parkland and the council’s prior actions, evidenced to him the city’s hostility to the plaintiff’s development application, and therefore rendered fruitless any continued attempt to develop the property.

Developer sued, alleging that the city’s actions deprived him of the property’s beneficial use, thus resulting in an inverse condemnation for which just compensation must be paid. Alternatively, he sought just compensation for deprivation of beneficial use on the theory of a temporary taking.

The court found that, while the city’s actions may have resulted in the plaintiff’s inability to develop the projects he was proposing, they did not otherwise deprive him of the beneficial use of the property, as tenants continued to occupy the building.

The judge further determined that plaintiff was not deprived of the beneficial use of its property such that a de facto taking had occurred. With respect to plaintiff’s argument that it should be compensated for temporary taking of the Property as a result of its application being tabled, the judge concluded that plaintiff had not been deprived of all of the beneficial use of the property, reasoning that the six or seven months involved were not significant.

7–Eleven and others brought an application to set aside a city ordinance adopted by the City of Camden. The ordinance regulated the hours of operation of certain businesses located within 200 feet of a residential zone.

Plaintiff challenged the ordinance as an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of the City’s police powers.  Plaintiffs claimed the ordinance bore no “reasonable and substantial relationship to the public interest to be advanced thereunder.”

Following a bench trial, the trial court found the Ordinance represented a valid exercise of the City’s police power and dismissed the action.  The appeals court agreed and affirmed.

Property owner sought review of decision by township’s board of adjustment denying request for a variance for construction of a multi-family residential development on property located in industrial zone.

The Superior Court, Appellate Division, held that inclusion of affordable housing units in development did not transform project into an inherently beneficial use for purposes of granting variance.

In 2010, School District’s Board of Education approved a district-wide plan to reorganize and upgrade the School District’s facilities at an expected cost of $9.9 million.  The Board contemporaneously approved a resolution which, subject to voter approval, authorized the issuance of bonds to finance the facilities project and voted to hold a special election to obtain voter approval thereof.

Petitioner filed a petition with Commissioner of Education challenging the School District’s approval of the bond resolution.

Petitioner’s primary contention was that the facilities project and bond resolution violated the School District’s constitutional and statutory debt limit, an argument that turns on how to calculate or classify indebtedness for debt limit purposes. That is, the issue is whether the authorization for bonds to be issued in the future to finance the facilities project are—for purposes of the debt limit calculation—included in the School District’s indebtedness at the time they are authorized, as petitioner argued, or when the bonds are actually issued, as respondents contended.

The appeals court concluded that indebtedness is not incurred for purposes of the School District’s debt limit until the authorized bonds are actually sold, i.e., issued.

Organizers of professional mixed martial arts events, as well as professional mixed martial arts athletes, brought action against New York state attorney general and New York county district attorney alleging that statutory ban on combative sports violated their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

The District Court held that:

• Live-performance mixed martial arts were not expressive conduct;
• Statute provision prohibiting profiting form combative sports was not overbroad;
• Organizers and athletes stated a claim for vagueness as applied to competitors;
• Statute was not vague as applied to bar owners and gym owners;
• Statute was not facially vague; and
• Statute did not violate dormant Commerce Clause.

Live-performance, professional mixed martial arts were not expressive conduct protected under the First Amendment such that a statewide combative sport ban did not violate the right of mixed martial arts athletes to engage in expressive conduct, even though the sport communicated a particular message including the fighters’ thoughts and feelings as to beauty, creativity, courage, skill and excellence in relation to the sport, as well as the fighters’ personal stories, where the particularized message was not likely to be understood by its viewers since it was typically viewed as a competitive sport rather than a public performance, and it was not an inherently expressive activity.

Allegations that New York statute banning combative sports was inconsistently enforced, that some events produced by exempted organizations were allowed while others were not, and that state officials were unclear as to whether the statute amounted to a total ban, were sufficient to state a claim that the statute was unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as applied to professional mixed martial arts events sanctioned by exempt organizations.

Petitioner sought review of the decision of the Board of Standards and Appeals of the City of New York (BSA), which upheld the New York City Department of Buildings’ (DOB) revocation of petitioner’s permits for an outdoor advertising sign.

The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that the BSA was required to hear evidence that petitioner constructed the sign in good-faith reliance on a prior determination of the Manhattan Borough Building Commissioner that the sign was a permissible replacement for a similar sign that was removed when a building on the property was demolished.

Country club that owned property on which a private, not-for-profit golf course was operated brought tax certiorari proceedings challenging property tax assessments. After a bench trial, the Supreme Court adopted the income capitalization approach utilized by country club’s appraiser, awarded a reduction in tax assessments, and directed that the assessment rolls be corrected and any tax overpayments be refunded, with interest. County appealed.

The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that country club’s valuation approach was acceptable and yielded a fair market value, and did not result in improper “double counting.”

Pedestrian, who tripped and fell on a public sidewalk that was uneven and replete with cracks, brought action against owner of property abutting the sidewalk and property owner’s commercial tenant. The trial court granted summary judgment to property owner and its tenant, and pedestrian appealed.

The Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that neither property owner nor its tenant owed pedestrian a duty to maintain the sidewalk abutting its premises.

Pedestrian’s injuries occurred on a public sidewalk that was not within the control or possession of property owner or its tenant, and any duty created by town ordinance, addressing maintenance and repair of sidewalks, inured to the benefit of the municipality and not to individuals.

Parents, whose biological children were subjected to “sexually reactive behaviors” by potentially adoptable children placed in their home, sued adoption workers for Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS), in their individual capacity, alleging negligence and gross negligence. Workers filed motion to dismiss, asserting defense of governmental immunity. The District Court denied workers’ motions, and they appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that the statutory extension of governmental immunity to acts of individual government employees acting within scope of their employment did not violate Open Courts provision of the Texas Constitution.

Texas Tort Claims Act extends governmental immunity to acts of individual governmental employees acting within the scope of their employment.

Open Courts provision in Texas Constitution prohibits arbitrary or unreasonable legislative action that abrogates well-established, common-law remedies. It ensures that citizens bringing common-law causes of action will not unreasonably be denied the right to redress in the courts.

To establish that legislation violates a litigant’s rights under the Open Courts provision, the litigant must show that (1) the statute restricts a well-recognized, common-law cause of action (the well-recognized prong) and (2) the restriction is unreasonable or arbitrary when balanced against the Act’s purpose (the balance prong).

Balance prong considers whether the legislature’s action was arbitrary or unreasonable by deciding (1) whether a substitute remedy was provided or (2) whether the legislative action was a reasonable exercise of the legislature’s police power in the interest of the general welfare.

Statutory extension of governmental immunity to acts of individual government employees acting within the scope of their employment was not arbitrary or capricious and, thus, did not violate Open Courts provision, even though the governmental entity’s liability was not expanded under the Act.  Legislation was a reasonable exercise of the legislature’s police power to achieve the societal goal of limiting claims against individual governmental employees.

Owner of alleged dominant estate brought action against city, city council, and owners of alleged servient estate, seeking declaratory judgment stating that it had vested easement over 30-foot right-of-way and seeking permanent injunction prohibiting erection of obstructions.

The Circuit Court decreed that owner of alleged dominant estate had vested easement and permanently enjoined owners of alleged servient estate from erecting any obstruction. Owners of alleged servient estate, city, and city council appealed. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed and remanded. On remand, the Circuit Court entered judgment in favor of city and alleged servient estate owner. Alleged dominant estate owner appealed.

The Supreme Court of Virginia held that:

• City’s acquisition of right-of-way did not extinguish easement, and
• Easement was not extinguished by fulfillment of its purpose.

Easement over right-of-way was not extinguished by fulfillment of its purpose when city acquired the right-of-way and converted it to a public street, since purpose of easement continued.  Deed stated that purpose of easement was to provide more easy communication with the public main streets, changing right-of-way did not result in a cessation of the purpose of the easement, but merely facilitated the easement in continuing to fulfill its ongoing purpose.

Cessation of purpose is essential to a finding of extinguishment of an easement by fulfillment of its original purpose; without cessation of the purpose for which the easement was created, an express easement does not end when its purpose is simply fulfilled or when it is no longer necessary unless its express terms so state.

City residents and users of tunnel that crossed river between that city and another city filed complaint against private entity and Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT), challenging constitutionality of a comprehensive agreement between the defendants regarding construction and operation of a new tunnel and other facilities.

The Supreme Court of Virginia held that:

• Tolls to be imposed pursuant to comprehensive agreement were not “taxes,” but, rather, “user fees,” for purposes of claim that General Assembly had unconstitutionally delegated its legislative power by enacting Public–Private Transportation Act (PPTA);
• State Corporation Commission (SCC) does not hold regulatory authority over toll rate setting in projects authorized by the PPTA;
• General Assembly could constitutionally delegate to VDOT, under PPTA, the legislative power to impose and set the rates of user fees;
• General Assembly could constitutionally empower private entity to assist VDOT in exercising legislative power to impose and set rates of user fees;
• Private entity’s involvement in imposing and setting rates of user fees was not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power by VDOT;
• PPTA satisfied constitutional requirement of providing specific policies and definite standards to guide an administrative agency to which legislative power is delegated; and
• Commonwealth’s police power was not unconstitutionally abridged by VDOT’s entering into comprehensive agreement or by terms of agreement.

Bar sought judicial review of a decision by the city not to renew its combined intoxicating liquor and fermented malt beverage license. The Circuit Court concluded that certiorari review was appropriate, and, applying this standard, affirmed the city’s decision. Bar appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. City sought review which was granted.

The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that:

• Certiorari review, rather than de novo review, was appropriate, and
• City acted within its jurisdiction and followed statute in deciding not to renew bar’s license.

Statutory certiorari review accords a presumption of correctness and validity to the prior decision; thus, the scope of certiorari review is limited to whether: (1) municipality kept within its jurisdiction, (2) municipality acted according to law, (3) municipality’s action was arbitrary, oppressive, or unreasonable, and represented its will, and not its judgment, and (4) the evidence was such that it might reasonably make the order or determination in question.

Certiorari review of city’s decision not to renew bar’s combined intoxicating liquor and fermented malt beverage license, rather than de novo review, was appropriate.  Lack of restriction on municipality decisions to grant or deny licenses was consistent with the historic view that the granting of a liquor license is a legislative function, certiorari review served to keep alcohol licensing decisions within the control of the municipality by according deference to its decisions, and permitting a circuit court to determine de novo whether a liquor license should be granted would, in essence, improperly transfer that legislative function from the municipality to the court.

Driver of large commercial truck, which struck fire engine that was following police squad car responding to an emergency call filed negligence suit against police officer who was driving squad car and city. Officer and city filed motion for summary judgment. The Circuit Court denied the motion. Officer and city filed petition for writ of mandamus.

The Supreme Court of Alabama held that officer was entitled to statutory and state agent immunity.

Officer was a peace officer who, at time of accident, was performing a function, i.e., responding to an emergency call, that entitled him to statutory immunity, and while officer did not make continuous use of siren in his squad car, but caused it only to “yelp” while continuously making use of his emergency lights, this constituted making use of an audible signal and visual requirements set forth in statute.

In 2007, the City of National City and its Community Development Commission (together, the City), approved an amendment to its 1995 redevelopment plan, ordinance No.2007–2295 (Amendment), that extended the time period authorized by the plan for the use of eminent domain powers within a 300–acre area, based on certain designations of physical and economic blight. (Health & Saf.Code, § 33000 et seq., the Community Redevelopment Law (CRL).

When their opposition to the City’s approval of the Amendment was unsuccessful, Community Youth Athletic Center (CYAC) brought reverse validation action in superior court to seek declaratory and injunctive relief and damages under several statutory and constitutional theories.

After a bench trial, the superior court issued a statement of decision and judgment in favor of CYAC, interested parties and the interested public. In the reverse validation proceedings, the trial court examined the administrative record and set aside the Amendment to the redevelopment plan, by issuing declaratory relief based on its findings of several violations of the CRL:

• 1) Contrary to the provisions of section 33457.1, the City failed to include in its mandated report, prior to the hearing on such Amendment, the maps required by section 33352, subdivision (b) that documented the physical and economic conditions of blight that existed within the project area,
• 2) The administrative record did not contain substantial evidence supporting the physical blight findings underlying the Amendment, and
• 3) Neither the City nor its retained private consultant had produced, on request by CYAC, two types of underlying raw data relied upon in consultant’s “Report to Council” (RTC) (i.e., consultant’s field surveys of blight conditions, or the City’s police department’s property-by-property crime data). The City had relied on those field surveys and crime data to support the enactment of the Amendment which extended the eminent domain redevelopment power, as they led to the RTC’s conclusions that physical and economic blight existed within the project area, but the record did not support that reliance.

Upon review the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, but reversed the grant of declaratory relief on the due process theory.

City of Irvine sued to compel County of Orange and the County of Orange Sheriff–Coroner (collectively, County) to set aside their decision to approve and submit an application for state funding to expand one of the County’s jail facilities. Irvine alleged the County’s application constituted a project approval under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) and therefore required the County to prepare an environmental impact report (EIR) analyzing the County’s plans to expand its jail facilities before approving and submitting the application. The trial court disagreed and denied Irvine’s petition for writ of mandate.

The Court of Appeal affirmed. The County’s application did not constitute a project approval under CEQA because it did not commit the County to a definite course of action regarding the expansion of its jail facilities. The application was merely a preliminary step in the state process for counties to seek funding for jail expansion. Indeed, the state’s process did not require the County to initiate a CEQA review of its expansion plans until after the County submitted its application and received conditional approval to fund the project.

Property owner brought action against excavation company seeking monetary damages, but not an injunction, caused by excavation of adjacent property. The Circuit Court entered judgment on a jury verdict in favor of owner, but denied request for attorney fees. Owner appealed.

The Appellate Court held that once property owner established that excavator violated excavation ordinance and she was awarded damages for the violation, there was no doubt that she successfully enforced the ordinance and was entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs pursuant to statute.

Banks sought damages for the breach of a Settlement Agreement between the parties arising out of an underlying lawsuit.  The dispute underlying the prior lawsuit arose out of a complex financial transaction involving the development of commercial and retail property known as The Meridian at Brentwood (the Meridian Project).  The Banks alleged that the City of Brentwood issued tax increment revenue bonds (the Bonds) to finance certain public improvements associated with the Meridian Project and to reimburse Defendant Eager Road Associates (ERA) for certain costs incurred by ERA in constructing such improvements.  In September 2011, the parties entered into a Settlement Agreement.

The Banks alleged that at issue were two provisions of the Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release, whereby Defendants were required to (1) tender to Plaintiffs $4.15 million to purchase a portion of the Bonds (the Developer Settlement Payment), and (2) provide a $1.35 million letter of credit (Developer Letter of Credit), payable in three years.

The Banks further alleged that the Settlement Agreement provided for Bond Refinancing, which involved either remarketing of Series 2007B Bonds or refunding both Series 2007A and Series 2007B Bonds and that, under the terms of the Settlement Agreement, delivery of the Developer Settlement Agreement and Developer Letter of Credit were conditions precedent to the Bond Refinancing.  According to the Banks, they have performed their obligations under the Settlement Agreement, but ERA has failed to meet its obligations as designated by the Settlement Agreement, including making the Developer Settlement Payment, delivering the Developer Letter of Credit, and completing the Bond Refinancing.

For purposes of this lawsuit, ERA disclosed Eugene Norber as a non-retained expert witness. ERA’s expert witness disclosure states that the subject matter of Mr. Norber’s testimony will be “payments made from trust accounts maintained” by Defendant UMB Bank. N.A., relating to the Series 2007B Bonds, “including, but not limited to, interest payments to bondholders from said accounts and payments for legal fees made from said accounts.”

The Banks sought to exclude Mr. Norber’s testimony on the grounds that (1) ERA incorrectly designated him as a non-retained expert rather than as a retained expert; (2) even if Mr. Norber was properly designated a non-retained expert, ERA’s expert disclosure does not properly comply with the requirements for non-retained experts under Rule 26(a)(2)(C); and (3) given the subject of Mr. Norber’s testimony, ERA failed to disclose any unique knowledge or expertise Mr. Norber has regarding trust accounts or payments made from trust accounts.

A retained or specialty expert is “an expert who without prior knowledge of the facts giving rise to litigation is recruited to provide expert opinion testimony.  A non-retained expert is one whose testimony arises from his or her involvement in events giving rise to the litigation.

“The Court finds that Mr. Norber was properly designated a non-retained expert. He was contacted and consulted to address an ongoing issue for which he has specialized expertise, and he was actively involved in financial matters related to the funding and development of Meridian Project. Because Mr. Norber was properly designated a non-retained expert by ERA, the Court finds that ERA’s expert witness disclosure regarding Mr. Norber was sufficient as it provided a ‘summary of the facts and opinions’ about which he is expected to testify, including payments made from trust accounts maintained by UMB relating to the Series 2007B Bonds.”

Consequently, the Banks’ Motion to Exclude Purported Expert Testimony of Eugene Norber was denied.

Vehicle owners, who received citations under the red light camera ordinance, brought class action against city and red light camera system operator seeking declaratory judgment regarding the ordinance’s constitutionality and conformity with state law, as well as city’s authority to enact the ordinance, and also claimed the ordinance violated procedural due process and the privilege against self-incrimination, and alleged claims of unjust enrichment and civil conspiracy by city and operator.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• Vehicle owners who received citations for violating city’s red light camera ordinance had an adequate remedy at law in their municipal court proceedings, precluding equitable relief;
• Genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether city enacted red light camera ordinance as a revenue generating tax measure, precluding summary judgment on action challenging validity of ordinance; and
• Owner’s payment of fine issued for violation of red light camera ordinance precluded owner from bringing unjust enrichment claim.

Vehicle owners who received citations for violating city’s red light camera ordinance had an adequate remedy at law in their municipal court proceedings, and thus, trial court lacked authority to issue equitable relief by declaring ordinance invalid or enjoining enforcement of ordinance.  Owners could assert the invalidity of the ordinance as a defense to the proceedings against them in municipal court.

Genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether city enacted red light camera ordinance as a revenue generating tax measure so that it fell outside of its police power, precluding summary judgment on vehicle owner’s action challenging validity of ordinance.

As the appeals court noted in its opinion, this case involved “recurrent issues facing shore communities and their residents.”  “We are asked, primarily, to determine whether a municipality’s failure to perform its part of easement agreements with owners of beachfront properties is due to reasonably unforeseen circumstances beyond its control so as to be relieved of its contractual duty, and, if so, whether these homeowners are nevertheless left without a remedy.”

In 1989, Ocean City participated in a beach replenishment and dunes restoration program.  In order to procure the requisite easements from oceanfront homeowners, the City proposed easements containing a restriction that the municipality would construct and maintain the dune system with a height limitation of no greater than three feet above the average elevation of the bulkhead.

Accretion caused areas of the dunes to grow in height and width, and the affected property owners began requesting that Ocean City comply with the dune maintenance provision in their easement agreements. By this time, however, Ocean City was required to apply for a CAFRA permit prior to performing dune maintenance to alter the size or height of any dunes within the municipality.  The DEP denied the permit.

Landowners subsequently filed claims against the City alleging breach of the easement agreements and inverse condemnation.

The appeals court agreed with Ocean City that it was entitled to the defense of impossibility.  “Not only were the CAFRA amendments and DEP’s subsequent disapproval of Ocean City’s permit application beyond the municipality’s control, they were also not reasonably foreseeable events.”

However, the court found that although Ocean City did not breach the contract, it did not automatically follow that the landowners were not entitled to monetary relief.

“Here, the parties agreed upon an exchange of performances and because of events not reasonably foreseen, Ocean City’s part of the exchange cannot now take place. Yet the fact remains plaintiffs surrendered their right to compensation in reliance on Ocean City’s promise to protect their ocean views. Absent that reliance, Ocean City would have had to pay plaintiffs for depriving them of their views. If Ocean City may retain the benefit of this bargain despite its failure to perform its promise — even if performance was impracticable — without consequence, the municipality would reap a windfall at plaintiffs’ expense and plaintiffs would have given something for nothing.  Equity, however, demands some relief for plaintiffs and, therefore, a hearing to determine a fair and just restitutionary amount is warranted.”

“The question remains how to measure damages for restitution in this case. Obviously, the fixing of an appropriate restitutionary amount must consider the value of that which plaintiffs have been deprived, including loss of, or interference with, their ocean views due to the accretive effects. But offset against the burdens suffered by plaintiffs are the potential gains conferred by the partial consideration performed by Ocean City to date, namely the non-speculative, reasonably calculable benefits arising from the municipality’s dune project. These may include the added wave/storm surge protection afforded by the accretive effect of the dunes.  We emphasize that the remedy we grant is an equitable one, and not a substitute for eminent domain, for which a jury trial is not appropriate.

The court concluded that the landowners are entitled on remand to a hearing to determine a fair and just restitutionary amount for performing their part of the bargain with Ocean City.

This appeal involved an initiative petition and proposed ordinance filed with the Camden city clerk, defendant by a Committee of Petitioners (the Committee). The ordinance was proposed in response to Camden’s decision to disband its municipal police department and join a newly-formed county police force. Plaintiffs – the Mayor and City Council president – filed a complaint seeking to declare the petition-initiated ordinance invalid before it was submitted to the City Council or placed on any ballot.

The Law Division judge determined that the proposed ordinance did not “unduly restrict” Camden’s “statutory authority” under N.J .S.A. 40A:14–118, which grants every municipality the right to “create and establish” a police force. However, the judge entered restraints prohibiting the city clerk from accepting the petition and proposed ordinance for filing because the proposed ordinance created an undue restraint on the future exercise of municipal legislative power, was invalid, and could not be placed on the ballot for voters to act upon.  The judge specifically refrained from considering whether the proposed ordinance was pre-empted by the Municipal Rehabilitation and Economic Recovery Act, N.J.S.A. 52:27BBB–1 to –75 (MRERA), and the Special Municipal Aid Act, N.J.S.A. 52:27D–118.24 to –118.31 (SMAA). The Committee filed an appeal.

The Committee claimed that the proposed ordinance was a valid exercise of the initiative powers granted by the Faulkner Act, and the judge erred by concluding the proposed ordinance impermissibly restrained future municipal legislation. The Committee also asserted that the initiative ordinance was not prohibited by N.J.S.A. 40A:14–118, nor preempted by the statutory regimes impacting local finance and budgeting in Camden.

Paragraph B of the initiative ordinance prohibited the city from disbanding the police force and joining any County police force, requiring that Camden “shall instead continue to maintain its own police department.”  The appeals court concluded that such general language certainly does not violate the expressed or implied terms of the Faulkner Act. It therefore reverse those provisions of the Law Division’s order that declared the proposed ordinance to be “invalid” and restrained its further consideration by the Council or the voters because it improperly restricted future municipal legislative action.

As to preemption by MRERA and SMAA – statutory regimes impacting local finance and budgeting – the appeals court remanded to the Law Division for further consideration of whether the various statutory schemes at issue preempted consideration by the voters of the proposed initiative ordinance in this case.

Historic preservation organization brought article 78 proceeding challenging decision of city’s design review commission to permit demolition of historic building. The Supreme Court denied the application, and organization appealed.

The Supreme Court, Appellate Division held that:

• Commission’s determination that owner’s demolition application satisfied city code’s requirement that such application include postdemolition development plans was not arbitrary or capricious;
• Commission did not impermissibly segment its State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA) review;
• Commission’s determination that structure was unsafe and could not be preserved was not arbitrary or capricious; and
• Commission member was not disqualified from reviewing owner’s application because of alleged conflict of interest.

Police officer who sustained bilateral knee injuries commenced article 78 proceeding to review determination of State Comptroller which denied officer’s application for accidental disability retirement benefits under Policemen’s and Firemen’s Retirement System.

The Supreme Court, Appellate Division held that:

• Officer bore burden of demonstrating his entitlement to benefits;
• Alleged incident in which officer responded to citizen complaint regarding drug activity and thereafter sustained injury while attempting to apprehend and subdue one of the suspects in question was not “accident;”
• Incident in which officer tripped over basket that was part of large commercial shredder was not “accident;”
• Incident in which officer tripped over wooden frame securing simulated telephone pole to ground was not “accident;” and
• Incident in which police officer slipped and fell while exiting his vehicle at fuel dock of local highway garage was not “accident.”

Incident is not “accident,” for purposes of accidental disability retirement benefits under Policemen’s and Firemen’s Retirement System, where underlying injuries result from expected or foreseeable event arising during performance of routine employment duties, arise from the injured employee’s own misstep or inattention, or occur during course of training program constituting ordinary part of employee’s job duties and normal risks arising therefrom.

Zigmond Brach and the Village of Kiryas Joel (hereinafter Kiryas Joel) are owners of certain real property located in the Town and Village of Woodbury. In 2012, Brach and Kiryas Joel submitted a petition to the Board of Trustees of the Village of Woodbury and the Town Board of the Town of Woodbury and the Town Board of the Town of Monroe, seeking to annex their property from the Town and Village of Woodbury into the Town of Monroe.

After a public hearing, the Town of Woodbury issued a determination denying the petition for annexation, determining that the petition failed to comply with the requirements of article 17 of the General Municipal Law, that annexation would violate General Municipal Law § 716(1) because it would affect state senate and assembly districts, and that the proposed annexation was not in the overall public interest. Shortly thereafter, the Village of Woodbury issued a determination denying the petition for annexation on nearly identical grounds.

In response to these determinations, the Town of Monroe, which had found the proposed annexation to be in the overall public interest, commenced the instant proceeding in this Court pursuant to General Municipal Law § 712 for adjudication and determination of the issue of whether the proposed annexation is in the overall public interest.

The Town of Woodbury and the Village of Woodbury moved to dismiss this proceeding.  The appeals court granted the motions to dismiss, without prejudice to the filing of a new petition for the same proposed annexation.

Plaintiff brought action against, inter alia, county, seeking to recover damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained when he tripped and fell on water cap protruding from sidewalk outside county courthouse.

Where a locality has enacted a prior written notice statute, it may not be subjected to liability for injuries caused by an improperly maintained street or sidewalk unless it has received written notice of the defect, or an exception to the written notice requirement applies.

Recognized exceptions to a prior written notice requirement exist where the municipality created the defect or hazard through an affirmative act of negligence, or where a special use confers a special benefit upon it.

In this case, the court found that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether “special use” exception to statutory rule requiring prior written notice applied, precluding summary judgment in plaintiff’s personal injury suit against county, seeking to recover damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained when he tripped and fell on water cap protruding from sidewalk outside county courthouse.

Owner of lakefront property filed article 78 proceeding, challenging the town planning board’s denial of owner’s request for site plan approval.

The appeals court held that town planning board lacked authority to grant or deny application submitted by the owner of lakefront property for site plan approval to construct a new pier and sundeck, where state owned the land under the lake, and state had not delegated its authority to review owner’s proposed construction to town, and thus, state had exclusive authority to grant or deny owner’s proposed construction.

When the state owns land under navigable waters in its sovereign capacity, its exclusive authority preempts local land use laws and extends beyond the regulation of navigation to every form of regulation in the public interest. Absent delegations by the state allowing local municipalities to regulate the manner of construction and location of structures in waters owned by the state in its sovereign capacity, municipalities bordering or encompassing such waters have no authority to issue such regulations.

Town police officers discharged after contacting the Governor’s office about corruption and misconduct by the police chief and others in the department brought action against town, town police chief, and town manager, alleging under § 1983 that defendants retaliated against them, in violation of their First Amendment rights, and asserting claim under state law for wrongful discharge.

The District Court held that:

• Fact issues precluded summary judgment as to First Amendment retaliation claims;
• Chief and manager were entitled to qualified immunity from First Amendment retaliation claims;
• Chief and manager did not have final policymaking authority; but
• Fact issue precluded summary judgment as to wrongful discharge claim.

To balance interests of public employee and government, for purposes of First Amendment retaliation claim, district courts undertake three-step inquiry: (1) whether employee was speaking as citizen upon matter of public concern or as an employee about matter of personal interest, (2) whether employee’s interest in speaking upon matter of public concern outweighed government’s interest in providing effective and efficient services to public, and (3) whether employee’s speech was substantial factor in employee’s adverse employment decision.

“The plaintiffs have offered sufficient evidence to support a jury finding that the Town fired them for reporting to the Governor’s office that the Mocksville Police Department was experiencing corruption and other issues. While the Town has offered evidence that the plaintiffs were fired for performance issues, that evidence does not entitle them to summary judgment. It merely creates a disputed question of material fact which a jury must decide.”

County board of assessment appeals sought review of order of the Court of Common Pleas granting summary judgment to city, as trustee under decedent’s will, acting by board of directors of city trusts, finding that certain investment property owned by trust was immune and exempt from taxation by county and its subdivisions.

The Commonwealth Court reversed. Board of directors of city trusts petitioned for discretionary review, which was granted.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that property owned by city as trustee for city trust was immune from local real estate taxation.

Property owned by city as trustee of city trust, which had been established by private party, and leased by the board of directors of city trusts to Office of Attorney General was immune from local real estate taxation pursuant to sovereign immunity, where legislature created board in order to establish in instrumentality of the Commonwealth to oversee the charitable assets of the trust that were bequeathed to the city and Commonwealth, and property had long been controlled by the Commonwealth on behalf of the city.

Columbia Gas is an interstate natural gas company subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Columbia Gas currently operates a natural gas pipeline that runs in and around York County, Pennsylvania. The pipeline has been designated “Line 1655.”

Columbia Gas wanted to replace and reroute a portion of Line 1655 away from the Line’s current location, which has become heavily populated. Columbia Gas envisions a new and improved Line 1655 that, at the widest point, diverts approximately a quarter-mile from the old one. This diversion in effect takes Line 1655 out from under the land where Columbia Gas currently has pipeline easements, and removes it some distance yonder to plots where Columbia Gas does not possess such easements.

Columbia Gas negotiated with distant landowners to obtain the easements necessary to construct the replacement Line 1655, but no satisfactory arrangement could be struck with respect to the property of at least four landowning couples (the “landowners”).  Columbia Gas filed suit in this Court, naming the land of the four couples and the couples themselves as defendants and asserting the right to take the easements by power of eminent domain.

Eager to commence and complete construction of the replacement pipeline, Columbia Gas filed a motion for partial summary judgment and for immediate possession of the necessary easements.

However, the Court disagreed with Columbia Gas’s position that replacement Line 1655 can be relocated approximately a quarter-mile away from the old Line 1655 to circumvent a population center and still be considered a “replacement” of an “eligible facility” pursuant to 18 C.F.R. §§ 157.202(b)(2)(i) & 157.208(a).

“For that reason alone, Columbia Gas’s motion for partial summary judgment must be denied, and because Columbia Gas has not established the right to condemn the necessary easements at this time, its motion for immediate possession must also be denied.”

Property owner brought action against Department of Transportation claiming inverse condemnation and constitutional torts. Following a jury trial, the Circuit Court entered judgment for property owner in the amount of $36,527, and the Department appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• Evidence was sufficient to support a finding that Department’s exercise of its power of eminent domain constituted a physical taking that extended for a period of 16 months;
• The Circuit Court was within its authority to allow property owner’s expert to testify as to his opinion of the interest rate property owner could expect to recover on an investment in rental property; and
• The more specific statute that expressed a landowner’s ability to receive attorney fees in an inverse condemnation action applied to property owner’s claim.

Evidence was sufficient to support a finding that bridge construction and related activities that blocked property owner’s easement for access to public road constituted an exercise of the Department of Transportation’s eminent domain powers, rather than a separate and distinct police power, and thus, constituted a “physical taking” that existed for a period of 16 months.  Property owner testified and provided pictures of constant disturbance and blockage across the access point to public road, further testified that when contractors were asked to move their equipment, other contractors would almost immediately move different equipment in the easement for access, and that his tenant left prior the termination of his lease because of the Department’s taking.

The more specific statute that expressly addressed a landowner’s ability to receive attorney’s fees and costs as a result of prevailing in an inverse condemnation case, rather than the general statute that addressed the award of attorney fees to a prevailing landowner in a condemnation action, applied to property owner.  By applying the prevailing party language of the condemnation statute to an inverse condemnation case would have placed a heavier burden on property owner, a result not intended by the legislature.

In this eminent-domain case, a jury determined that the City of Laredo’s condemnation was not for an authorized public use and awarded attorney’s fees and expenses to the property owner under Texas Property Code § 21.019(c). This fee-shifting statute authorizes the trial court to “make an allowance to the property owner for reasonable and necessary fees” and expenses to the judgment date, when condemnation is denied.

Of the lawyers who represented the Montanos, Richard Gonzalez was awarded $339,000 and Adriana Benavides-Maddox was awarded $37,000.

The City appealed the award, complaining about deficiencies in the property owner’s attorney’s fees proof under the fee-shifting statute.

As to Gonzalez, the Supreme Court of Texas determined that his testimony regarding his hours was devoid of substance and, thus, insufficient to support lodestar determination of attorney fees. He testified that he had reasonably accumulated about 1,356 hours in the case.  He came to this number by multiplying his 226 weeks of active employment by a factor of six, representing his estimate of average number of hours per week he worked case, although the record provided no clue as to how he came to conclude that six hours a week was a “conservative” estimate of his time in case, he did not appear to have known how much he was owed for his services until the calculations at trial, he conceded that, had he been billing his client, he would have itemized his work and provided this information, and similar effort should be made when adversary is asked to pay instead of client. As the Supreme Court noted, “Our puzzlement deepens when we consider Gonzalez’s testimony that he did not make any record of his time in the case or prepare any bills or invoices for the Montanos.”  The court remanded for further consideration, leaving open the possibility that Mr. Gonzalez would receive nothing more than the $35,000 he had previously been paid by the Montanos.

Although Ms. Benavides-Maddox appears to have kept no billing records either, the Supreme Court found that her testimony about her unbilled trial work was at least some evidence on which to base an award of attorney fees in because it concerned contemporaneous or immediately completed work for which she had not had time to bill, or presumably even record, in her billing system.  Billing inquiry involved contemporaneous events and discrete tasks—the trial and associated preparation for each succeeding day, it was a task the opponent witnessed at least in part, having also participated in the trial, and attorney’s charges relating to the trial were not questioned on cross-examination.

After receiving a petition for a sewer system improvement from property owners, the City passed an ordinance for construction of a vacuum system, specifying the cost would be approximately $11.7 million. When the City then expanded the improvement district to accommodate more parcels, the City determined the increased size of the district required construction of a gravity sewer system, which would cost approximately $19 million. The City did not pass a new ordinance specifying the material change in design and cost of the improvement; rather, it proceeded with construction and approved construction contracts by resolution.

Under RCW 35.43.100, the passage of the ordinance creating an improvement district triggers a 30–day window in which the affected property owners may file suit to challenge the improvement district.

Because the City did not pass a new ordinance after determining it would build a gravity system, the property owners did not have the opportunity to protest the substantially increased cost of the improvement under RCW 35.43.100. Rather, the appealing property owners had the opportunity to challenge the construction of the gravity system only after the assessments were imposed.

The appeals court annulled the assessments of the five parcels at issue, allowing the City to pursue a reassessment.

Church appealed Board of Civil Authority’s property tax assessment on its Christian summer camp property, arguing that the entire property was tax exempt because the buildings on the camp were either a church edifice, or a building used as a convent, school or home as defined in 32 V.S.A. §§ 3802(4) and 3832(2). The trial court found that no structure of the sort existed on the property for the purposes of tax exemption and that “the land surrounding these buildings is the exact opposite of an ‘edifice.'”  Church appealed.

“The parties do not dispute that the River of Life property is dedicated for pious use and that it is owned and operated by the Church as a nonprofit organization. The issue, then, is whether the property is excluded from the pious-use exemption of § 3802(4) by the language in § 3832(2). The Church argues that the camp property qualifies for exemption, primarily because everything that occurs on the property facilitates its religious ministry and that worship and service of the Believer in Christ takes place everywhere on the premises. ‘The entire property is dedicated and used for the religious mission of the Church,’ such that the use of the structures and the property is ‘exclusively religious.’ Under this belief, the Church maintains that the steel equipment building, the cabins, kitchen and the tent, are all church edifices. It defines ‘church edifice’ to be a ‘structure or facility that is used exclusively or primarily to propagate a religious message to persons who receive that message for a worshipful purpose.’ It posits that an overnight summer camp for religious purposes transforms the entire property into a place of worship and education. We disagree.”

The types and intended uses of properties that are eligible for the pious-use exemption under § 3832(2) are identified with specificity and includes convents, schools, orphanages, and hospitals. Id. § 3832(2). The list does not include church camps per se – meaning church camps are not exempt.

The Church tried to avoid the significance of the exclusion of church camps from the list of exempt properties by arguing that this church camp consists of a “church edifice” or collection of “church edifices.”

“With this, we emphasize the limited scope of our holding. We do not decide as a matter of law what structures can or cannot be a house of worship—be it a cabin, a tent, or a Quonset hut. Rather, our decision today rests solely on the fact that church camps are not among the real estate owned by a religious society that the Legislature has made expressly eligible for the pious-use exemption, and, in our view, describing a church camp as a ‘church edifice’ stretches the statutory term far beyond its ordinary meaning. Accordingly, we hold that neither the storage building nor the cabins that house campers nor the kitchen where meals are prepared nor the surrounding lands fit within the exemptions listed in § 3832(2), based on either the type of or primary use of these structures. When all is said and done, this property is a camp—a summer camp owned by a church. It is neither a listed structure nor does it encompass a listed use enumerated in § 3832(2) and therefore it is not entitled to property tax exemption.”

Lake of the Torches Economic Development Corporation is a corporation established under tribal law and wholly owned by the Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians, a federally-recognized Indian tribe organized under Section 16 of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (25 U.S.C. §§ 461 et seq.). In January 2008, Lake of the Torches issued $50 million in bonds and sold them to a brokerage firm, Stifel, Nicolaus & Company, Inc.  In turn, Stifel Nicolaus sold the bonds to plaintiff LDF Acquisition, LLC, a special purpose vehicle created by Saybrook Tax Exempt Investors, LLC, predecessor in interest to Saybrook Fund Investors, LLC.  Godfrey & Kahn, S.C., a law firm, advised the parties on this complex transaction.

The Transaction involved multiple written contracts. Among other contracts, these included the terms of the bonds themselves, a bond purchase agreement and a Trust Indenture Agreement, the latter of which provided a description of the means by which Lake of the Torches would repay its debt. The Trust Indenture Agreement designated plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank as the trustee. The Tribe and Wells Fargo also executed a Tribal Agreement, in which the Tribe guaranteed payment of the obligations of Lake of the Torches for payment of both principal and interest on the bonds.

Unfortunately, the various contracts included slightly differing versions of the Tribe’s waiver of sovereign immunity, as well as consent to the jurisdiction of the District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin and, should the district court fail to exercise jurisdiction, of Wisconsin state courts.

When Lake of the Torches allegedly repudiated the bonds in 2009, Wells Fargo brought suit against it in the Western District of Wisconsin for breach of the Indenture. In answering, Lake of the Torches alleged sovereign immunity as an affirmative defense, arguing that the Trust Indenture Agreement in which it had allegedly waived its sovereign immunity was void as an unapproved “management contract” that violated the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2721 (IGRA), and the corresponding regulations.  The District Court agreed, finding the Indenture void, although the opinion does not discuss what constitutes an unapproved “management contract.”

Although Wells Fargo voluntarily dismissed its suit, Saybrook and LDF took up the fight in Wells Fargo’s stead, filing a 24–count complaint in Waukesha County Circuit Court that asserted a breach of bond claim against Lake of the Torches and various alternative claims for misrepresentation, securities fraud, malpractice and equitable recission.

What followed was an incredibly complex jurisdictional puzzle involving the state, federal, and tribal courts.

In this particular action, brought in District Court, plaintiffs sought (1) a declaration that a Tribal Court for the Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over them and (2) an injunction preventing any further action by the Tribe and the Lake of the Torches Economic Development Corporation in a recently-filed matter against plaintiffs in that forum.

Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1).  Following a lengthy analysis, the court denied defendants’ motion because (1) the arguments defendants advanced went directly to the merits of the underlying disputes; and (2) neither logic nor law supported resolving the merits under the guise of a jurisdictional challenge.

The District Court concluded that it had jurisdiction, at least for the purpose of determining jurisdiction, and scheduled a preliminary injunction hearing for November 26, 2013, during which the parties could offer additional argument and stand on their paper submissions or offer additional evidence as they deem fit regarding the issue of the Tribal Court’s jurisdiction.

City and city councilors petitioned for a writ of mandamus directing the Jefferson Circuit Court, to dismiss a claim alleging bad-faith failure to pay legal bills and costs stemming from a complaint filed by former city councilor and law firm that represented councilor and to dismiss a racial discrimination claim brought by councilor.  Former city councilor’s claim against city for bad-faith failure to pay legal expenses was associated with criminal action alleging ethics law violations, of which councilor was ultimately acquitted.

The Supreme Court held that:

• Former city councilor’s claim against city for bad-faith failure to pay legal expenses was precluded by local-governmental immunity, and
• City councilors were not protected by legislative immunity from racial discrimination claim.

City Treasurer was summarily fired by the Mayor without notice or cause.  Treasurer brought action  alleging that Mayor and City violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Ark.Code Ann. § 16–123–105 (deprivation of rights) and Ark.Code Ann. § 21–1–601 et seq. (Arkansas Whistleblower Act) when they terminated him from his position. Specifically, he argued that he had a constitutionally protected property interest in his continued employment as City Treasurer, of which the defendants deprived him without due process.

The District Court noted that the essential question was whether, as a matter of law, Rogers Code § 2–234 – which requires cause and a 2/3 vote of the city council – provided the sole procedure for properly terminating a person in the position of City Treasurer.  If so, Treasurer could only be terminated for cause, and thus, he had a constitutionally protected property interest in continued employment.

To answer this question, the Court looked first to the Arkansas Code. Arkansas law allows a city of the first class with a mayor-council form of government (like the City of Rogers) to provide, by ordinance, for the election or appointment of its City Treasurer. Ark.Code Ann. § 14–43–405(2). It further allows the council of any such city to provide, by ordinance, for the removal of any appointive officer upon a majority vote of the council. Ark.Code Ann. § 14–42–109(a)(2).

Pursuant to these statutes, the City of Rogers enacted Rogers Code §§ 2–227 and 2–234. Section 2–227 states that the City Treasurer shall be appointed by the mayor and confirmed by a vote of two-thirds of the City Council. Section 2–234 states that the City Treasurer may be removed from office for cause upon a two-thirds vote of the City Council. These sections are found within Article III, Division 5 of the Rogers Code of Ordinances, which sets out all sections specifically relevant to the position of City Treasurer.

By stating that removal pursuant to § 2–234 must be “for cause,” it appears the City of Rogers has created a property interest in employment for the position of City Treasurer, which can only be deprived after due process. However, the defendants argue that § 2–234 was not intended to be the only vehicle for removing a City Treasurer. They contend that Ark.Code Ann. § 14–42–110 provides an alternate manner of removing a City Treasurer, without cause.

Arkansas Code Annotated § 14–42–110(a)(1) provides that a mayor of a city of the first class may appoint and remove all department heads, unless the city council votes, by a two-thirds majority, to override the mayor’s action. That this section (titled “Removal and appointment power”) is separate from the aforementioned § 14–42–109 (titled “Removal of officers”) suggests that the two sections are intended to apply to two different types of positions: officers and department heads.

The defendants argue that Treasurer was a department head and, as such, was subject to the removal provision in § 14–42–110. However, the Rogers Code itself contradicts that assertion.

Rogers Code § 2–228 requires a City Treasurer to take an oath of office. The ordinance references Ark. Const. art. 19, § 20—which requires all public officers to take an oath of affirmation before entering the duties of their respective offices-and Ark. Code Ann. § 14–42–106—which provides, in part, that all municipal officers, whether elected or appointed, must take the oath proscribed for officers by the Arkansas Constitution.  Likewise, Rogers Code § 2–229 requires a City Treasurer to give a good and sufficient surety bond to the city before entering the discharge of his duties. That section also references § 14–42–106, which further provides that a city council may require its officers to post such a bond. Ark.Code Ann. § 14–42–106(c).  Clearly, the drafters of the Rogers Code perceived the City Treasurer as an officer.

Based on the foregoing, the Court found that the Treasurer for the City of Rogers is an officer. The Court further finds that, since the removal of officers and department heads are treated differently under Arkansas law, the removal provisions for a department head in § 14–42–110 are inapplicable to the removal of the Rogers City Treasurer. Therefore, the City Treasurer can only be removed for cause pursuant to Rogers Code § 2–234.

As the City Treasurer, Treasurer could only be removed from office for cause, and only upon a two-thirds vote of the City Council. Thus, he had a legitimate expectation of continued employment, of which he could not be deprived without due process. Treasurer was not afforded a hearing prior to his termination. Therefore, the Court found that he was deprived—without due process—of a property interest in continued employment.

Condominium developer brought action to challenge city requirement that developer set aside 10 of 96 condominium units as below market rate housing and make a substantial cash payment to a city fund.

The Supreme Court of California held that requirement was an exaction such that 180-day Mitigation Fee Act statute of limitations on exactions imposed on a development, rather than 90-day Subdivision Map Act statute of limitations regarding the validity of a condition attached to an agency or appeal board decision, disapproving Trinity Park, L.P. v. City of Sunnyvale, 193 Cal.App.4th 1014, 124 Cal.Rptr.3d 26.

Program offered developer the option of either setting aside units or paying fee.  Imposition of the in-lieu fees was similar to a fee, and requirement that the developer sell units below market rate, including city’s reservation of an option to purchase the below market rate units, was similar to a fee, dedication, or reservation.

Plaintiffs brought due process and equal protection claims against City of Solana Beach based upon the decision of the City Council to deny Plaintiffs’ application for a development review permit for their property.

City contended that, as a matter of law, Plaintiffs were not deprived of a constitutionally protected property interest when the City Council denied their application for a development review permit, which is a special discretionary permit. Defendant contended that the denial of the discretionary development review permit based upon discretionary considerations cannot form the basis for a property interest. Because Plaintiffs cannot establish that they had a property interest in the special discretionary permit, Defendant contends that Plaintiffs cannot establish a constitutional violation.

The District Court agreed.  The undisputed facts of this case establish that the decision challenged by Plaintiffs was limited to the decision to deny the development review permit. There was no facial challenge to the municipal code establishing the development review provisions or to the application of the development review permit to the property. The express provisions of the municipal code accord significant discretion to the City Council in approving certain classes of development projects.

Under California law, “no protected property interest exists when there is significant discretion accorded the agency by law, regardless of whether or to what degree that discretion is actually exercised.” In this case, the municipal code provided the City Council with significant discretion in deciding whether to grant a development review permit.

No language in the municipal code conferred a right to a permit. To the extent that the municipal code required notice and hearing, the undisputed facts of this case show that the City Council complied with all requirements of the code and rendered a decision which was not favorable to the Plaintiffs based upon criteria set forth in the code. Under the undisputed facts of this case, Plaintiffs would have a federal jury second guess the City Council’s lawful exercise of discretion. Applying the law to the undisputed facts of this case, the Court concludes that the Solana Beach Municipal Code provisions for a development review permit do not create “the sort of entitlement out of which a property interest is created.”  The undisputed facts and the applicable law establish that Plaintiffs have not established a protected property interest required in order to prevail on the claim for deprivation of substantive due process.

Attorneys challenged the constitutionality of an ordinance adopted by the City of Dunwoody imposing an occupational tax on attorneys who maintained an office and practiced law in the city.  Attorneys argued in the trial court that the ordinance (1) operated as an unconstitutional precondition on the practice of law, as well as an improper attempt to regulate the practice of law in violation of OCGA § 15–19–30 et seq., and (2) violated equal protection requirements because it did not apply to attorneys practicing law outside the city limits. The trial court found in favor of city. Attorneys appealed.

The Supreme Court of Georgia held that:

• Ordinance did not constitute an unconstitutional precondition on the practice of law or an improper attempt to regulate the practice of law, and
• Ordinance did not violate equal protection.

Local governments are permitted to impose and enforce occupational taxes on lawyers so long as the tax is merely a means to generate revenue and does not act as a precondition or license for engaging in the practice of law, rendering it a regulatory fee.

City ordinance requiring attorneys with offices in the city to annually register their business location with the city, obtain an occupation tax certificate, and pay the authorized tax did not constitute an unconstitutional precondition on the practice of law or an improper attempt to regulate the practice of law  The ordinance did not give the city the power to suspend or revoke an attorney’s ability to practice law in the event of noncompliance, and any impediments resulting from action taken by the State Bar in response to being notified by city of an attorney’s failure to pay tax would be attributable to the proper regulating authorities and not the ordinance.

City ordinance imposing an occupational tax on attorneys who maintain offices and practice law in the city did not violate equal protection; it was reasonable for the city to require attorneys with offices inside city limits to help pay for city services from which they benefited, and all attorneys subject to the ordinance were taxed uniformly under its provisions.

Emory H. Bray owns real property in Coweta County which was subject to a condemnation action in which part of the property was taken for public road improvements. Bray was compensated for the taking pursuant to the eminent domain provisions of the Georgia Constitution. Bray’s brought a subsequent inverse condemnation action in which he sought additional compensation for consequential damages allegedly caused by the DOT’s negligent construction of the road improvements for which his property was taken.

The Court of Appeals noted in its decision reversing the trial court that, because Bray sought compensation for property negligently taken or damaged by the road improvements, he stated a cause of action under the constitutional eminent domain provisions not barred by the prior condemnation award for damages resulting from proper construction of the improvements. Damage to remaining property caused by negligent or improper construction in the course of a prior eminent domain project may be recovered from the condemnor by a separate inverse condemnation proceeding, and the condemnor cannot escape the constitutional duty to compensate the property owner for the damage by claiming that the negligent party was an independent contractor rather than the condemnor’s agent or employee.

Pensioner sought judicial review of decision of the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund (IMRF) Board of Trustees finding that he violated early retirement incentive (ERI) return to work prohibitions and was required to forfeit his early retirement and repay the IMRF the portion of his annuity attributable to his early retirement incentive.

The Supreme Court of Illinois held that:

• Pensioner was not an employee of city;
• Pensioner did not enter into personal services contract with city; and
• IMRF Board lacked authority to order forfeiture on basis that corporate contract was a “guise.”

Contract between corporation formed by pensioner, who had retired from his position as superintendent of the electrical department of city, and city for management and supervision of electrical department following pensioner’s retirement did not constitute employment with city within meaning of Pension Code’s ERI return-to-work prohibitions, where pensioner was employed by corporation, a separate legal entity, and the city hired and paid corporation, not pensioner.

Living Word Bible Camp, a tax-exempt organization owns approximately 273 acres located on Deer Lake in Itasca County. At Living Word’s request, the County classified the subject property as tax-exempt from 2001 to 2007. However, the County reclassified the subject property as taxable for the January 2, 2008 and January 2, 2009 assessment dates. Living Word challenged the reclassification for both years.

On remand from the Minnesota Supreme Court, the Tax Court addressed two issues: (1) whether Living Word was an institution of purely public charity on the assessment dates; and (2) whether the caretakers’ occupancy of the renovated cabin while conducting the affairs of Living Word and preparing the subject property for development makes the cabin parcel subject to property tax

After an exhaustive analysis, found that that Living Word satisfied all six North Star factors and therefore qualified as an institution of purely public charity for the time periods in question. Because Living Word was making sufficient progress towards the development of the subject property for its intended use as a bible camp, the property was exempt from property taxes payable during those period as well.

The Tax Court concluded that the caretakers’ presence at the cabin to conduct Living Word’s affairs—without remuneration—represents a valuable donation of their time and expertise. Their use of the cabin in connection with this donation is entirely incidental, and does not constitute a dividend of any kind.  The cabin parcel was also deemed tax-exempt on the assessment dates.

Low-income housing developments appealed county’s real property tax assessments.

The instant case arouse out of a dispute regarding local ad valorem taxes on real estate developments that use federal tax credits to construct and maintain restrictive properties that rent only to lower-income households. The question was whether local governments may include the value of federal tax credits in their valuation of the properties for tax assessment purposes.

In 2005, the Mississippi Legislature enacted Mississippi Code Section 27–35–50(4)(d). The statute requires local tax assessors to determine the true value of affordable rental housing by using the appraisal method set forth in the manual of the State Tax Commission and that such procedure shall implement the “actual net operating income” methodology.

Despite the new law, Humphreys County continued to include the federal tax credits through the “cost” methodology in its valuation of low-income housing development. The different types of valuation result in extreme variations. For example, using the income method as prescribed by the statute, the development would have paid nothing in taxes for 2009, but under the county’s approach, it would have owed $74,038.

The Supreme Court of Mississippi held that Mississippi Code Section 27–35–50(4)(d) prohibits local governments from including the value of federal tax credits in their valuation of the properties for tax assessment purposes.

Borough brought action to acquire property by authority of eminent domain to use as a public park. After a jury trial, the Superior Court entered judgment on verdict in favor of property owner in the amount of $5.25 million. Parties appealed and cross-appealed.

The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that:

• Trial court was required to hold a pretrial hearing to determine the admissibility of evidence regarding a zoning change affecting the property, and
• Owner’s experts failed to establish foundation for opinions that zoning change was reasonably likely.

In this matter, the jury was allowed to hear evidence about the probability of a zoning change that should have been ruled on by the judge both in advance and outside of the jury’s presence. Only if the court first determined that there was a reasonable probability that a zoning change would have been approved based on the standards governing such approval should the evidence have been presented to the jury for its consideration in connection with the jury’s evaluation of just compensation. The evidence that the jury heard on the likelihood of the zoning change in issue here was not assessed properly in accordance with that standard, and the quality of the evidence that the jury was allowed to consider undermined the soundness of the jury’s property valuation determination. The errors necessitate a new trial on the issue of just compensation

In an eminent domain condemnation action, during the jury’s actual determination of a just compensation award that takes into account a premium based on the reasonable probability of a zoning change, the jury first must value the property in its current condition, considering the zoning at the time of the taking, which establishes the base value; second, the jury may consider the probability of the future zoning change or variance approval in determining the premium a buyer and seller would fix to the property, which premium is added to the base value and includes an assessment of the risk of the change occurring or being approved.

Wrongful death/survivorship suit arose out of the untimely and tragic death of Tracy Hottenstein who, intoxicated at the time, fell off a public dock into the ocean below.  Paramedics who were dispatched to the scene called a physician at the local hospital and received an official pronouncement of death.

Pursuant to the New Jersey Charitable Immunity Act, hospital and medic defendants moved to limit damages at trial for any alleged negligent acts.

To fall within the protections of the Charitable Immunity Act, a defendant must demonstrate two elements: (1) that the defendant is a charitable organization that is organized exclusively for hospital purposes, and (2) that the plaintiff was a beneficiary of its services.

It was undisputed that defendant met the first element. Plaintiffs argued that because the defendants were called to the scene in order to pronounce Tracy deceased rather than to render aid, Tracy was not a beneficiary of the Defendants’ care within the statute.  Nonetheless, the court concluded that the rendering of a pronouncement is sufficient to create a beneficiary status under New Jersey law.

Mother of murder victim and the mother’s attorney brought § 1983 action against county, alleging the county delayed approving a settlement agreement arising out of the death of the mother’s daughter in retaliation for their First Amendment activities, namely her allegations that the murder was the result of inadequate police protection.

To plead a First Amendment retaliation claim a plaintiff must show: (1) he has a right protected by the First Amendment; (2) the defendant’s actions were motivated or substantially caused by his exercise of that right; and (3) the defendant’s actions caused him some injury.

The Court of Appeals held that county legislature’s delay in approving settlement did not constitute a concrete injury sufficient to confer standing to assert a First Amendment retaliation claim against the county.  Mother and attorney had no right to have the settlement approved by a particular date, as the settlement did not include a time-is-of-the-essence clause, and the legislature’s agenda was subject to its absolute discretion.

Son filed Article 78 petition for review of determination of New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal (DHCR), which denied son’s appeal from limited-profit housing company’s rejection of his application for succession rights to his parents’ rent-regulated Mitchell–Lama apartment.

The Court of Appeals held that DHCR acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying the appeal based on failure of mother, as tenant of record, to file, in the year before son’s high school graduation, an annual income affidavit listing son as co-occupant.  Evidence that the apartment was son’s primary residence in the two years before parents vacated the apartment was overwhelming, and there was no indication that the failure to file was related to son’s status as co-occupant or income-earner.

Supporters of constitutional measure that would have abolished property taxes brought action against numerous state and local government officials alleging violations of the Corrupt Practices Act and seeking injunctive relief. After the action was dismissed, the District Court granted sanctions against supporters for filing a frivolous action. Supporters appealed.

The Supreme Court of North Dakota held that trial court failed to adequately explain the basis for imposition of sanctions for frivolous filing.

If the district court fails to adequately explain the basis for the sanction or how the sanction was appropriately limited to what was necessary to deter future conduct, the Supreme Court is precluded from affirming the award of sanctions for a frivolous filing.

City brought nuisance action against property owner, and obtained order requiring owner to remove or properly maintain abandoned vehicles on his property. Several years later, city brought contempt proceeding, alleging failure to conform to the order. The District Court found owner in contempt, ordered him to remove the nuisance vehicles, and awarded city attorney fees. Owner appealed.

The Supreme Court held that:

• Sufficient evidence that property owner could have complied with the order supported contempt finding;
• Sufficient evidence that property owner willfully failed to comply with the order supported contempt finding;
• Trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law were sufficient; and
• Trial court’s receipt of post-hearing evidence from city was not reversible error.

Edward Verhovec made a public-records request of the city of Marietta by certified mail. When more than two months had passed and he had not received an acknowledgement or response from Marietta, he filed a public-records mandamus action under R.C. 149.43 and 2731.04. Soon thereafter, Marietta provided Edward with the requested records, and the trial court dismissed his action. Edward appealed, and the court of appeals remanded the case for consideration of Edward’s motion for attorney fees.

After the remand, Marietta moved the trial court for sanctions under R.C. 2323.51 and alleged that Edward had engaged in frivolous conduct by petitioning the trial court for a writ of mandamus.  The trial court held a hearing on the motion for sanctions and indicated that a ruling would be forthcoming.

Edward filed a claim in prohibition in the Fourth District Court of Appeals before the trial court ruled on the motion for sanctions. He sought to prevent the trial court from issuing a ruling on the motion for sanctions. Marietta filed a motion to dismiss, and the Fourth District granted the motion. Edward appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio.

The Supreme Court held that:

• Trial court in underling action had jurisdiction to rule on motion for sanctions, and
• Requesters had adequate remedy at law via appeal.

Sledder, who suffered broken neck when his sled allegedly struck object that looked like railroad tie while snow sledding down dirt pile mound at city park, and sledder’s mother brought negligence action against city.

The Supreme Court of Ohio held that:

• Sledder was “recreational user” under recreational-user statute, and
• Existence of single object resembling railroad tie in park’s dirt mound did not change essential character of park to something other than property that was open for recreational use.

Under recreational-user statute, the property must be viewed as a whole, and only where the essential character of the property has been altered to something other than an outdoor property on which outdoor recreational activities occur does immunity fall away.

Existence of single object resembling railroad tie in city park’s dirt mound, which was being used for snow sledding, did not change essential character of park to something other than property that was open for recreational use, and thus city was immune under recreational-user statute regarding sledder’s personal injuries.  Park was outdoor property with trees and grass and was open to public free of charge for picnicking, sporting activities, and other recreational activities.

Property owner sought review of zoning hearing board decision denying owner building permit to rehabilitate structure into three-unit dwelling.

The Commonwealth Court held that:

• Use of property as three-unit dwelling was lawful nonconforming use, and
• Use was not abandoned.

Mere absence of a certificate of nonconformance from the zoning officer does not deprive landowner of his right to continue lawful nonconforming use. Use of property as three-unit dwelling was lawful nonconforming use under zoning ordinance, even though property owner did not seek certificate of nonconformance from zoning officer and failed to register in accordance with non-zoning ordinance. Prior zoning map placed property in “A” district, which permitted apartments, assessment card showed property had been assessed as three-unit dwelling, and use as three-unit dwelling became nonconforming upon passage of ordinance zoning property “R1-A,” which permitted single-family or twin semi-detached homes.

John Barna brought suit seeking damages and injunctive relief against School Board “due to his removal and banishment from meetings of the School Board in violation of his federal constitutional rights to free speech.”

On April 8, 2010, Barna attended a public School Board meeting wherein he asked several questions concerning financial dealings of the School Board. Mr. Barna indicated that some of his friends similarly had concerns about financial dealings of the School Board.  In response to Plaintiff’s comments, Mr. Markovich, a School Board member, invited Barna to bring his friends to a subsequent School Board meeting, to which Plaintiff replied that his friends “carry guns, you wouldn’t want that.” Various members of the School Board responded with laughter to this quip.  Markovich responded that “Aah well, I’ll wear my bullet-proof vest.”

Two weeks later, Barna attended another public School Board meeting. At the inception of the meeting, Markovich requested that Mr. Barna leave the meeting purportedly based upon the above-referenced comments of Mr. Barna at the April 5, 2010 School Board Meeting because his comments could have been taken as a threat.  Plaintiff stated that he had been joking, but Markovich ultimately asked that Mr. Barna be removed from the meeting by a security guard.  As he was leaving, Mr. Barna, in response to commentary from audience members in attendance at the April 22, 2010 School Board Meeting, jokingly stated to the audience to the effect that he might come after all of them.  Mr. Barna was subsequently banned from all School Board meetings.

Barna filed suit and Defendants moved to dismiss.   The Court engaged in the traditional First Amendment analysis and concluded that it was not appropriate at this stage of the case to grant Defendants’ motion as Plaintiff was entitled to develop a fuller factual record in support of his claim that the School Board engaged in viewpoint-based discrimination.

In a public forum any restrictions as to time, place, and manner of speech: (1) must be unrelated to content; (2) must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest; and (3) must allow alternative ways of communicating the same information. As to the first prong, a disturbance may very well have been the reason for removing Barna, but Barna should be given an opportunity to show that the true motive for silencing him was the content of his speech.

As to the second prong, “there is a serious and substantial question in the undersigned’s mind as to whether a permanent ban on Plaintiffs attendance at all future Panther Valley School Board meetings and Panther Valley school property was ‘narrowly tailored’ to serve the undoubtedly compelling government interest in assuring the safety of other citizens in attendance at School Board meetings and on school property.”

For a number of years prior to 2006, Fulton maintained an institutional investment account with NatCity, for which NatCity acted as Fulton’s securities broker. Around 2005, NatCity allegedly recommended to Fulton that it invest in ARS, “in keeping with Fulton’s desire to invest in only the highest quality and safest debt investments.”  An unspecified portion of these ARS were from NatCity’s own inventory. Fulton currently holds $175 million in ARS. NatCity also allegedly acted as a CBD for a number of the ARS issues it recommended to Fulton, for which NatCity typically earned a yearly fee of 0.25 percent of the value of the transaction.  For transactions where NatCity was not the CBD, it received a portion of the CBD’s fee, a fact not disclosed to Fulton, for directing the Fulton trade to the CBD.

After the collapse of the ARS market, Fulton had been required to write down the value of its ARS by an amount in excess of $10 million. Fulton then brought the standard-issue ARS action against NatCity, making numerous allegations that state and federal regulators have determined that NatCity and the other major underwriters of ARS manipulated the ARS markets and deceived ARS investors. It also alleges that NatCity had special knowledge and expertise in the ARS auction markets that it did not possess. Because of its superior knowledge and role in the auction markets as Fulton’s BD, Fulton alleges that NatCity owed it fiduciary duties, as well as duties of fairness, honesty, disclosure of material information, and undivided loyalty.

NatCity contended that Fulton had failed to plead its fraud-based claims with sufficient particularity, and that Fulton could not have reasonably relied upon NatCity’s alleged misrepresentations.

The court found that Fulton had failed to allege specific facts to support the misrepresentation, scienter, and reliance elements of its fraud-based claims, and had also failed to plausibly allege the misrepresentation element of its negligent misrepresentation claim.  Consequently, it granted NatCity’s Motion to Dismiss the three Pennsylvania Securities Act claims, the negligent misrepresentation claim, the claim for common law fraud, and the claim for aiding and abetting fraud.

The court denied the Motion to Dismiss as to the negligence claim and the breach of fiduciary duty claim.

City is a third-class city organized and operating under a home rule charter. Pursuant to the Municipal Waste Planning, Recycling, and Waste Reduction Act (Act 101) and its powers under the Charter, the City adopted an ordinance regulating the collection, transportation, storage and disposal of solid waste and recycling and imposing separate fees for these services on persons owning property located within its borders.

In December 2010, the City filed a tax claim of $1,405.17 against homeowner for delinquent recycling fees due on his property for the years 1999 through 2008.

Homeowner asserted that the Solid Waste Management Act (SWMA) and (Act 101) preempt the City from imposing recycling fees.  Municipalities only have the power expressly granted to them through SWMA and Act 101. SWMA and Act 101 govern recycling and set forth a comprehensive plan for funding local recycling programs. According to homeowner these acts do not authorize a municipality to charge fees not expressly set forth in the statute. Thus, the City is not permitted to charge a fee for recycling.

The court agreed, finding that a careful review of SWMA and Act 101 reveals there is no mechanism for a municipality to charge a fee for its recycling services; rather, fees for recycling are set by the General Assembly.

Victim’s daughters brought wrongful death action against city arising from an act of domestic violence in which victim’s boyfriend stabbed victim to death within hours of service of protection order on him at girlfriend’s home. Following $1.1 million jury verdict solely in the estate’s favor, the Superior Court, King County granted daughter’s motion for new trial on damages. City appealed.

The Supreme Court of Washington held that:

• City preserved, for appeal, its objection to jury instruction regarding city’s duty to exercise ordinary care in service and enforcement of protection orders;
• Court of Appeals erred by holding that city failed to preserve, for purposes of appeal, the denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law;
• Harassment statutes imposed a legal duty on police department to serve the anti-harassment order; and
• Officer, who served anti-harassment order, owed girlfriend a duty to guard against the criminal conduct of boyfriend.

City owed two different duties to girlfriend, who had obtained anti-harassment order against her boyfriend, and those were a legal duty to serve the order and a duty to act reasonably in doing so, and the latter meant taking reasonable steps to guard against the possibility that boyfriend would harm girlfriend as a result of service of the order.  Officer, who served order, knew or should have known that girlfriend and boyfriend were both present and that officer’s service of the order might trigger boyfriend to act violently, and officer’s duty to act reasonably required him to take steps to guard girlfriend against boyfriend’s criminal acts.

Harassment statutes imposed a legal duty on police department to serve the anti-harassment order, and, under the legislative intent exception to public duty doctrine, if the city’s discharge of that duty constituted culpable neglect, it would bear liability in tort for death of girlfriend.  While statute imposed no duty to guarantee the safety of citizens, like girlfriend who obtained the order, it did impose on police officers a duty to serve anti-harassment orders, and legislature showed an intent to protect specific individuals in passing harassment statute.

Snohomish County agreed to let King County build the Brightwater sewage treatment plant in south Snohomish County. As part of the agreement, King County agreed to provide a substantial mitigation package for the local Snohomish County community near Brightwater. The cost of the mitigation was included in the capital cost of the plant. Capital funding for the plant came mostly from the sale of bonds that were primarily secured by sewage treatment fees and capacity charges imposed on new sewage hookups. Two local utility districts that contract with King County for sewage treatment filed a suit arguing that the mitigation package was excessive.

The Supreme Court of Washington began its analysis by ruling against the  districts’ contention that King County has trust or fiduciary obligations as to how it used the sewage utility fund, finding that no such relationship is created unless there exists an explicit agreement to do so. Based on this ruling, it followed that the districts, rather than King County, bore the burden of proof on whether the sewage funds were properly used.

The Court affirmed the lower court’s decision that the districts’ challenge to the “validity, legality, or enforceability of the Settlement Agreement, including any land use aspects of that Agreement,” were time barred under LUPA.

The Court also affirmed the lower court’s finding that the mitigation was proper, that it was properly part of the capital cost of Brightwater’s construction, and that it was properly paid for out of the Water Quality Fund.  In essence, the court found a sufficient nexus between the project and its mitigation.

The Court affirmed agreed that the credit enhancement fee paid by the King County conferred a benefit on ratepayers and that it was not a hidden tax.

School District and School Association had a collective bargaining agreement for the 2009–10 and 2010–11 school years providing that any disputes arising under the agreement would be submitted to an arbitrator for a final, binding decision. During the course of the 2010–11 school year, the School District discharged teacher. The Association challenged the discharge, and the dispute was submitted to an arbitrator in accordance with the agreement. The arbitrator found that the School District did not have grounds under the agreement to discharge teacher and ordered her to be reinstated and paid lost wages and benefits.

The School District appealed, arguing that the arbitrator was without jurisdiction to order reinstatement and back pay after the expiration of the parties’ agreement when a new state law was in effect that barred collective bargaining by school districts over employee disciplinary matters. The School District also challenged the award on its merits.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the circuit court and rejected the School District’s arguments. The change in state law had no effect on the existing collective bargaining agreement or the arbitrator’s ability to order a remedy for a violation committed during the agreement’s term. Additionally, the School District had not met its burden to overturn the arbitrator’s award.

City advertising and promotion commission, county, and city brought class action against online travel companies (OTC) alleging that the OTCs had failed to collect, or collected and failed to remit, full amount of gross-receipts taxes imposed by government entities on hotel accommodations. The Circuit Court granted class certification. OTCs appealed.

The Supreme Court of Arkansas held that:

• Commission was not required to exhaust any administrative remedies;
• County and city were not required to exhaust any administrative remedies; and
• Predominance requirement for class certification was satisfied.

Common issues predominated over individual issues, and therefore the predominance requirement for class certification was satisfied in declaratory judgment action by city advertising and promotion commission, county, and city concerning the applicability of their respective gross-receipts taxes to OTCs.  Although there may have been variances in the tax ordinances of the commissions, counties, and cities, each ordinance was derived from the same respective statutes permitting commissions, counties, and cities to levy such taxes.  Declaratory judgment as to whether the OTCs’ business transactions fell within the scope of the statutory language governing the tax was an overarching issue that could be resolved before a determination of whether the respective ordinances of each commission, county, or city contained the same language as the statutes on which they were premised.

A major creditor of the City of San Bernardino, the California Public Employee Retirement System (CalPERS), objected to the eligibility of the City to file a petition under chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code on the grounds that it did not desire to effect a plan of adjustment (§109(c)(4)) and did not file the petition in good faith (§921).

The court noted that is widely endorsed that “no bright-line test exists for determining whether a debtor desires to effect a plan because of the highly subjective nature of the inquiry under §109(c)(4).” So long as the evidence shows that the “purpose of the filing of the chapter 9 petition not simply be to buy time or evade creditors,” a bankruptcy court may properly find that the § 109(c)(4) requirement has been met.

The court concluded that the City took a number of actions of public record that objectively demonstrate that the City desired to effect a plan, including: presenting a budget report to city council; conducting open public meetings regarding the City’s financial future; voting to declare a fiscal emergency; preparing a cash flow analysis; preparing a fiscal emergency plan; and approving a pre-pendency plan.  These uncontroverted facts sufficiently show that after taking steps to cut costs and raise revenue, the City – faced with a 45.9 million dollar cash deficit – had little choice but to restructure its debt.

Section 921(c) provides that a court may dismiss a chapter 9 petition if the debtor did not file the petition in good faith.  Unlike the eligibility requirements of §109(c), the court’s power to dismiss a petition under §921(c) is permissive, not mandatory. As in many other considerations of good faith in the context of bankruptcy, the test is a totality of the circumstances where the Court is given the power to weigh the numerous factors in light of the circumstances as a whole in determining whether good faith is lacking. In this case, the court concluded that the City had met its burden by a preponderance of the evidence and shown that its chapter 9 petition was filed in good faith

“The purposes of chapter 9 are met by this proceeding. The integrity of the bankruptcy system is not offended by this proceeding. The City, its citizens, and its creditors deserve a chance to achieve an orderly financial future. The Court finds the City of San Bernardino eligible to proceed in its chapter 9 case.”

Blind voters alleged that in the last two elections, County failed to ensure that voting machines accessible to the blind and visually impaired could be activated and operated by poll workers, and therefore required these individuals to vote with the assistance of third parties in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, as well as California Election Code § 19227 and California Government Code § 11135.

County argued that plaintiffs failed to state a claim under Title II of the ADA or § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and filed a motion to dismiss.  Defendants contended that nothing in the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act creates a right to vote privately and independently, and because Plaintiffs allege that they were able to vote with the assistance of a third party, they fail to state a claim under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act as a matter of law.

Defendants argued that, with the assistance of a third party, plaintiffs were provided an equal opportunity to vote. However, the court agreed with plaintiffs that requiring blind and visually impaired individuals to vote with the assistance of a third party, if they are to vote at all, at best provides these individuals with an inferior voting experience “not equal to that afforded others.”

Accordingly, the Court found that Plaintiffs had sufficiently stated a claim under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act and denied County’s motion to dismiss.

The court found no merit in plaintiffs’ state law claims, dismissing both.

City of Los Angeles appealed from the judgment of $5,053,548 entered in favor of plaintiff for inverse condemnation based on damage caused when sewage backed up into his home.

The City argued the ruling of the trial court on liability was not supported by substantial evidence. According to the City, there is no evidence the City’s sewer system was designed or constructed in the manner described at trial or that the City, or any of its contractors, damaged or removed a portion of the sewer system. Also, there was no evidence that the City’s maintenance program of the sewer system contributed to the conditions on the date of the injury to the property. The City therefore contended that plaintiff did not prove causation, an essential element of inverse condemnation.

The Court of Appeal disagreed, affirming the judgment.  “Contrary to suggestions in the City’s brief that the trial court’s ruling was based on imagination, hunch, and a guesstimate, the record demonstrates the court was fully engaged in the fact finding process, questioning witnesses for both parties in an effort to resolve disputed factual issues, and reached a thoughtful conclusion amply supported by the evidence.”

Plaintiff was a volunteer firefighter for the City of Sierra Madre.  The City hires and fires volunteer firefighters, sets the rules and regulations for their work, requires them to work specific shifts and to arrive on time, and requires them to report to supervisors and to work within the framework of the Sierra Madre Fire Department (SMFD). Volunteer firefighters also receive training and are covered by workers’ compensation. The City keeps records of the volunteer firefighters’ service. It pays volunteer firefighters a stipend of $1 per day, paid every 90 days. It also pays voluntary firefighters approximately $33 per day when “hired out” with a SMFD strike team of firefighters sent to assist other agencies in fighting non-local large-scale fires.

Plaintiff filed a complaint with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging employment discrimination.   The EEOC dismissed the complaint on the ground that there was no employer-employee relationship and notified plaintiff of her right to sue.

Plaintiff sued the City.  As to the employment-related causes of action, the City argued that plaintiff did not receive “significant remuneration” for her services and therefore was not an employee and could not state causes of action for employment discrimination.  The Court of Appeal agreed with the City, stating that a municipality’s decision to provide volunteers with workers’ compensation coverage is not sufficient to confer employment status.

Homeowners appealed from decision of zoning board of appeals, which upheld zoning enforcement officer’s grant of permit to neighbor to build single-family residence on his lot, which had been previously owned by homeowners’ predecessor together with homeowners’ lot.

The Appellate Court held that board’s interpretation of term “separately owned,” in regulations providing that nonconforming lots, which could be used for single-family residences, were lots that were separately owned prior to enactment of town’s zoning regulations, was supported by substantial evidence.

Ashton Urban Renewal Agency (AURA) petitioned for judicial review of Board of Tax Appeals’ (BTA) order dismissing agency’s appeals from board of equalization’s (BOE) approval of tax exemptions for property owners located within agency’s revenue allocation area, ruling that agency lacked standing.

The district court ruled that AURA had standing to challenge the exemption. Property owners appealed.

The Supreme Court of Idaho took up the question of whether AURA is a “person aggrieved” under I.C. § 63–511, and therefore, may appeal the grant of the exemption to the Idaho Board of Tax Appeals (BTA).

Person is “aggrieved” by an order, such that person has standing to appeal, when order affects his or her present personal, pecuniary, or property interest.  Effect on the person’s interest must be more than a possible or remote consequence of the order.  Allocation of taxes actually levied on property owners to agency in absence of grant of exemption was hardly speculative or remote, but rather grant of exemption created real and concrete loss to agency’s revenue stream.

The Supreme Court of Idaho held that:

• As a matter of first impression, agency had pecuniary interest in BOE’s decision, such that it had standing to appeal as aggrieved person, and
• Property owners failed to preserve issue of notice for appeal.

Bicyclist brought negligence action against city, alleging that city had left a street in an unsafe condition during a resurfacing project, and that as a result bicyclist had fallen and suffered injuries. After a jury trial, the Circuit Court entered judgment in favor of bicyclist, and city appealed.

The Appellate Court held that:

• City’s special interrogatory on contributory negligence did not ask a single direct question, and
• Bicyclist was entitled to pursue a general negligence claim and was not required to prove elements of a premises liability claim.

City’s special interrogatory on contributory negligence, asking whether bicyclist’s contributory negligence was greater than 50% of the proximate cause of his injuries, did not ask a single, direct question, as required for city to be entitled to submission of special interrogatory to jury.  Special interrogatory was impermissibly compound because it would have required the jury to consider multiple questions relating to the cause of bicyclist’s injuries.

Bicyclist was entitled to pursue a general negligence claim, and was not required to prove elements of a premises liability claim, including that city knew or should have known of both a dangerous condition and the risk posed by the condition since bicyclist’s claim arose from city’s activities on its property.  Even if city employees were not actively working on resurfacing project at time of accident, resurfacing project was ongoing at the time of the accident and city was directly responsible for completing and overseeing the resurfacing activities.

Arrestee sued city and county law enforcement officers, as well as city and county sheriff’s office, alleging he was wrongfully assaulted and arrested by the officers, asserting claims for assault, battery, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. The District Court granted summary judgment to defendants on the basis of immunity under the Iowa Tort Claims Act (ITCA). Arrestee appealed.

The Supreme Court of Iowa held that officials’ enforcement of state law was not enough to bring them within the scope of the ITCA and its immunities.

Any immunity conferred by the ITCA with respect to claims against state employees for assault, battery, false arrest, and malicious prosecution did not protect county sheriff’s office and municipal law enforcement officials from being sued by arrestee under the Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act (IMTCA) for these same claims, even to extent the officers were enforcing state law, as the mere act of enforcing state law was not enough to bring these local officials within the scope of the ITCA and its immunities.

Dominion Transmission brought an action seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the Town of Myersville.  Specifically, Dominion sought a declaration that the Town’s local laws and zoning code are preempted by the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717 et seq., and an injunction to prevent the application of those laws to its plan to construct a natural gas compressor station in the Town.

The Court recognized the broad preemptive effect of the NGA, but limited Dominion’s remedy so as to afford the Maryland Department of the Environment the opportunity to address compliance with the Clean Air Act.

The Court did issue a declaratory judgment to the effect that those portions of the Town Code directly affecting the siting, construction, or operation of the natural gas compressor station are null and void as applied to Dominion.  The Court declined to grant injunctive relief.

Mother, individually and on behalf of student, her deceased son, filed a negligence complaint against school board after student committed suicide the day he was suspended from the high school wrestling team. The District Court granted school board summary judgment. Mother appealed.

The Supreme Court of Montana held that school board did not have a duty to prevent student from committing suicide after he was suspended from the school wrestling team.

Whether a party owes a legal duty depends largely on whether the allegedly negligent act was foreseeable. As it relates to the existence of a legal duty, foreseeability is measured on a scale of reasonableness dependent upon the foreseeability of the risk involved with the conduct alleged to be negligent.

In this case, the school board did not have a duty to prevent student from committing suicide, as the suicide was unforeseeable.  Student had a history of disciplinary problems at school and he had never harmed himself or exhibited dangerous tendencies following the imposition of prior discipline.  Student had no history of mental health problems or treatment, and there was no special relationship between school board and student.

Defendant was charged with participating in a bid-rigging scheme to control and manipulate the bidding process for municipal bond proceeds. In addition, the Indictment alleged that defendant and his co-conspirators agreed to make false entries in bank records by falsifying marketing profits on trade tickets.

Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the charges were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations.

With respect the wire fraud charges, the issue was whether the applicable statute of limitations was the ten year period by 18 U.S.C. § 3293(2). This provision extends the statute of limitations from five years to ten “if the offense affects a financial institution.”  The indictment alleged that a financial institution was affected in that Bank of America, one of the co-conspirators and defendant’s employer from 1998 to 2002, was made “susceptible to substantial risk of loss” as a result of the scheme and, in fact, the bank agreed to pay federal and state agencies over $137 million in settlements “as compensation for the losses incurred by those agencies and victims.”  Defendant contended that this allegation was insufficient to bring the charges under the ten year statute and requested that the court dismiss those charges as time barred.

Defendant’s principal argument was that exposure to risk of litigation expenses and settlement agreements did not constitute “affected,” for purposes of § 3293(2). According to defendant, wire fraud affected a financial institution only if the institution itself were victimized by the fraud.  The court disagreed with defendant’s interpretation and agreed with the government that the indictment successfully alleged that a financial institution was “affected” as contemplated by § 3293(2).

City eminent domain action to condemn a permanent easement of 435 square feet and a temporary construction easement of 474 square feet to connect its parcel to sewer pump station located on adjoining property.   City stated that once it acquired the easement and constructed the sewer line, it would be transferred to the local sewer district and operated in conjunction with the existing sewer system. Defendant answered, contending that City’s intended condemnation was not for a public purpose. City then moved for a determination of all issues other than damages under N.C. Gen.Stat. § 40A–47.

The trial court determined that the City’s proposed condemnation of an easement over defendant’s land was for a public purpose and the Court of Appeals affirmed, finding both a public use and a public benefit.

Student was rendered a paraplegic as a result of a vicious assault by a classmate.  Mother sued the school and the attacker’s mother, citing a lengthy, documented, pattern of bullying.   As the court noted, “Regardless of the legal merits of her claims, Roquet is rightfully aggrieved by the calamity that has befallen her son, Sam, at the hands of Sam’s classmate at the middle school, James.”

This case is notable in that it represents the most extreme case of bullying imaginable, and a very sympathetic court, yet resulted in a finding of not liability on the part of the school.

The mother’s allegations show that the school district defendants “might have done more” to protect Sam from James, not that they “created or increased the risk itself.”  Accordingly, the mother’s claim pursuant to the state-created danger theory of liability must be dismissed.

Taxpayer that rented out recreational park trailers as cabins on campground that it operated appealed from county’s assessment of the cabins as real property for purposes of ad valorem taxation.

The Supreme Court of South Dakota held that recreational park trailers were constructively affixed to the real estate and, therefore, constituted an “improvement to land” so as to be subject to ad valorem taxation as real property.

Factors relevant to determining whether property is a fixture, so as to constitute an improvement to land subject to ad valorem taxation as real property, and whether property is a realty improvement subject to the contractor’s excise tax, include: (1) annexation to the realty, either actual or constructive; (2) property’s adaptability to the use and purpose for which the realty is used; and (3) the intention of the party making the annexation.

Plaintiffs, a non-profit and concerned local citizens, opposed to the prospective development of a quarry and asphalt plant, challenged the heavy industrial zoning classification of a portion of the property on the basis that it was arbitrary and capricious, constituted illegal contract zoning, and, constituted illegal spot zoning.

The trial court found that Clinton had ample rational basis to render the zoning classifications of the property that it did and the appeals court affirmed.  After a very interesting discussion of the issue, the appeals court determined that this was not an instance of contract zoning, or spot zoning.

Natural gas purchasing agent brought action against city, seeking refund of taxes allegedly paid in error. The Superior Court entered partial summary judgment for purchasing agent and for city, granted mandamus relief requiring city to take action on refund claim, and, following a bench trial, entered judgment for purchasing agent. City appealed.

The Supreme Court of Washington held that:

• Exhaustion requirement was vitiated by city’s inaction, but
• Statute of limitations for tax refund also applied to taxpayer’s mandamus petition.

City’s inaction in response to natural gas purchasing agent’s utility tax refund request ended agent’s obligation, under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, to continue pursuing a remedy in that forum before filing a tax refund action in the Superior Court, even if city law established an appeal procedure for the refund request, and even though city sent agent a demand for payment of the utility tax attributed to a time period that was not covered by the refund request.

The three-year statute of limitations on natural gas purchasing agent’s claim for utility tax refund barred agent’s petition for a writ of mandamus to compel city to refund utility taxes paid outside the limitations period, since the mandamus petition in essence sought to use the administrative process to revive a claim otherwise barred by the statute of limitations, where agent filed a tax refund claim in the superior court before filing the mandamus petition.

Brown County and the City of Green Bay (collectively, the Municipalities) appealed an order granting a writ of mandamus to the Green Bay Professional Police Association, Ryan Meader, and the Brown County Sheriff’s Department Non–Supervisory Labor Association (collectively, the Associations).

The writ directed the Municipalities to comply with the health insurance provisions of their expired collective bargaining agreements with the Associations until new agreements were reached.

The appeals court concluded that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by granting the writ because the Associations failed to establish the elements necessary to obtain mandamus relief. The circuit court failed to apply the proper legal standard to the Associations’ motion for mandamus relief. The court did not address any of the four elements a petitioner must prove to obtain a writ of mandamus. The court’s decision to grant the Associations a writ of mandamus therefore constitutes an erroneous exercise of discretion.  The appeals court reversed.

The Town of Childersburg, with the approval of its Mayor and Town Council, contracted with Judicial Corrections Services (JCS) to provide probation and fee collecting services for Childersburg’s Municipal Court.

Pursuant to the agreement between Childersburg and JCS, any time a person appearing before the court is unable to pay the court costs and/or fines associated with the charges at issue, that person is automatically placed on probation using forms provided by JCS, regardless of whether a jail sentence was imposed. If an individual fails to pay a satisfactory amount, JCS then determines whether to revoke the individual’s probation (in which case the individual is jailed) or whether to impose additional fines and costs.  Childersburg personnel follow JCS’s recommendations regarding whether to incarcerate an individual or impose other bond requirements without conducting hearings to determine why an individual has not made payments, whether the individual may be indigent, or whether the individual is entitled to counsel.  JCS takes no action to determine indigency and has denied that it has any responsibility to make that determination.

Under the agreement between Childersburg and JCS, individuals are often responsible for fines that exceed the statutory maximum of $500 that municipal courts may impose.  In addition, the periods of probation imposed in order to collect fines and fees for JCS often exceed the two year statutory maximum.

Plaintiff probationers filed, on behalf of themselves and those similarly situated, multiple § 1983  claims against JCS and Childersburg.  Childersburg filed a Motion to Dismiss.

The District Court held that:

• Childersburg is subject to § 1983 liability;
• The Rooker–Feldman doctrine does not preclude subject–matter jurisdiction;
• Absolute judicial immunity is inapplicable to Childersburg;
• Federalism and comity concerns do not counsel in favor of dismissal;
• O’Shea v. Littleton’s bar on injunctive relief does not apply to Plaintiffs’ equitable claims;
• Childersburg is entitled to contract with a private company for the provision of probationary services to the Childersburg Municipal Court.

While the court held that a municipality has the general authority to contract with a private company for the provision of probationary services, and thus declined to void the contract at this stage of the proceedings, it did indicate that this action would be more appropriately considered at the summary judgment stage when additional materials had been submitted regarding the contract with JCS.

“Upset over the tax consequences of an upcoming bond proposal by the Town of Fountain Hills, Plaintiff Dina Galassini decided to exercise the rights of an ordinary citizen and organize a protest. Little did she realize that she was about to feel the heavy hand of government regulation in a way she never imagined. At center stage is Plaintiff’s challenge to the constitutionality of a 183–word sentence defining “political committee,” which raises the issue of whether a person of ordinary intelligence can understand the sentence’s meaning.”

Upon hearing that Plaintiff intended to protest against the bond proposal, the Town Clerk sent her a letter informing her that she would be required to register as a political committee prior to proceeding with any form of protest pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes section 16–901(19).

Plaintiff filed a Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief against the Town of Fountain Hills, the Town Clerk of Fountain Hills, and the Town Attorney of Fountain Hills. In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Arizona Revised Statutes section 16–901(19) is an unconstitutional burden on her First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and freedom of association. Thereafter, the State of Arizona intervened. Following a preliminary injunction hearing, the Court found that Plaintiff established serious questions going to the merits of her claim.  As a result, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, allowing Plaintiff to hold protests prior to the election on without first registering as a political action committee. The bond proposal was rejected by the Fountain Hills voters.

Thereafter, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint pursuant to 42 U .S.C. § 1983 against the Town of Fountain Hills and the State of Arizona. In her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that (1) Arizona’s campaign-finance laws impose unconstitutional burdens on free speech; (2) Arizona’s campaign finance scheme is overbroad in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution; and (3) Arizona’s campaign finance scheme is impermissibly vague in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

The Arizona Legislature then amended the definition of “political committee” as set forth in ARS section 16–901(19). The relevant portions of the current version of Arizona’s statutory scheme are set forth below. ARS section 16–901(19) was amended as follows:

“Political committee” means a candidate or any association or combination of persons that is organized, conducted or combined for the purpose of influencing the result of any election or to determine whether an individual will become a candidate for election in this state or in any county, city, town, district or precinct in this state, that engages in political activity in behalf of or against a candidate for election or retention or in support of or opposition to an initiative, referendum or recall or any other measure or proposition and that applies for a serial number and circulates petitions and, in the case of a candidate for public office except those exempt pursuant to § 16–903, that receives contributions or makes expenditures of more than two hundred fifty dollars in connection therewith, notwithstanding that the association or combination of persons may be part of a larger association, combination of persons or sponsoring organization not primarily organized, conducted or combined for the purpose of influencing the result of any election in this state or in any county, city, town or precinct in this state. Political committee includes the following types of committees:

Plaintiff, the Town of Fountain Hills, and the State of Arizona then moved for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff’s claims.

After concluding that Plaintiff had standing, the court next evaluated her claim that the term “political committee” was unconstitutionally vague.  They concluded that it was. The court also found that the definition of “political committee” in Arizona Revised Statutes section 16–901(19) was overbroad because it swept in a substantial amount of protected speech that the State did not have an important interest in regulating.

“Accordingly, the Court is prepared to issue an injunction that is consistent with its holdings in this case. Namely, this Court is prepared to issue an injunction that enjoins the enforcement of any statutes in Title 16, Chapter 6 of the Arizona Revised Statutes to the extent those statutes depend on the definition of political committee as set forth in Arizona Revised Statutes section 16–902.01(19).”

City initiated condemnation action against property owners. The circuit court granted owners’ motion for continuance of trial, but ordered owners to pay, within five days, city’s attorney fees and costs incurred in preparing for trial and court clerk’s expenses in summoning jurors for jury selection, and prohibited owners from filing additional pleadings until such fees and costs were paid. Owners then petitioned for writ of prohibition or in alternative for writ of certiorari requiring Circuit Court to rescind order.

The Supreme Court of Arkansas held that:

• Writ of prohibition was not permissible remedy for rescission of order already issued, and
• Writ of certiorari would issue to require circuit court to rescind order that was clear, gross abuse of its discretion, in violation of owners’ right of access to courts.

Although continuance was appealable, owners had no other remedy to challenge circuit court’s jurisdiction to issue those conditions of continuance and prohibition against filing additional pleadings.  Circuit court exceeded its jurisdiction and committed gross abuse by requiring payment of fees and costs as condition of filing additional pleadings, in violation of owners’ constitutional right of access to courts.

Taxpayers brought class action against county to challenge validity of Utility User Tax Ordinance. County settled with taxpayers by agreeing to submit a ballot measure to the voters in the next election. The Superior Court approved the settlement agreement, awarded attorney fees to class counsel, and denied a “motion to enforce the settlement” in which taxpayer argued that the election was not held “pursuant to applicable law.” The taxpayer appealed.

Two other taxpayers brought a putative class action challenging the legality of the ballot measure that had been agreed upon in the prior settlement, and moved to invalidate the measure. The Superior Court denied the motion. The taxpayers appealed. The cases were consolidated for disposition in one opinion.

The Court of Appeal held that:

• Settlement agreement waived taxpayer’s challenge to election adopting tax ordinance;
• Settlement agreement judicially estopped taxpayer’s challenge to election adopting tax ordinance;
• Ballot materials were not so misleading as to violate due process;
• Ballot materials did not violate “free election” provision of state constitution; and
• New tax ordinance was not a “special tax” requiring a two-thirds vote for approval.

Occupy D.C. protesters filed § 1983 action alleging that District of Columbia police officers falsely arrested and imprisoned them, violated their due process rights, engaged in civil conspiracy, and converted their tent.

The District Court held that:

• Municipal regulation prohibiting use of tents as temporary place of abodes was not so grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional as to preclude officers from asserting qualified immunity;
• It was not unreasonable for officers to believe that probable cause existed to arrest protestors for violating ordinance;
• Seizure of protestors’ tent did not violate First Amendment;
• It was not unreasonable for officers to believe that tent was evidence that they had violated ordinance;
• Officers did not violate protestors’ right to procedural due process; and
• Protestors stated conversion claim.

Disabled firefighter brought breach of contract action against city police and fire pension fund seeking increased pension benefits. Following a bench trial, the Circuit Court entered judgment for firefighter. The Circuit Court awarded appellate attorney fees. Board of trustees filed motion for review.

The District Court of Appeal held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by applying to the appellate attorney fees awarded to law firm that represented firefighter the same 1.5 fee multiplier it previously applied to the trial level attorney fees awarded to law firm, even though special appellate counsel was retained.  Law firm provided approximately 75% of the legal services performed on appeal, and multiplier was not applied to the fees awarded to special appellate counsel.

In an unrecorded trust indenture agreement for the issuance of tax-exempt bonds, Municipal Corrections, LLC (“Debtor”), the Chapter 11 debtor in possession in this case, “pledged and assigned” its interest in its real property to secure its obligation to pay the bonds. The indenture trustee for the bondholders is the defendant UMB, N.A. (together with Bank of Oklahoma, N.A., the original trustee, the “Bond Trustee”). The Bond Trustee is the legal holder of the security interest on behalf of the bondholders.

The Debtor sought a determination of the nature, extent, and validity of the Bond Trustee’s lien on the real property, contending that it has no such lien. In addition, they sought the avoidance of any lien the Bond Trustee has on the real property under 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3) on the ground that it is unenforceable against a hypothetical bona fide purchaser under Georgia law.

The dispute presented two questions arising under Georgia real estate law. The first is whether the “pledged and assigned” language in the indenture agreement created a mortgage in favor of the Bond Trustee. If so, the second question is whether other recorded documents and an order of the Superior Court validating the bonds provide constructive notice of the unrecorded interest or give rise to a duty of inquiry such that the unrecorded interest is nevertheless enforceable against a purchaser. If they do not, any interest of the Bond Trustee is avoidable under 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3), which permits a bankruptcy trustee (or a Chapter 11 debtor in possession with the powers of a trustee under 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a)) to avoid an interest in real property that a hypothetical bona fide purchaser could avoid under applicable state law.

The Court concluded as matters of law that the Indenture gave the Bond Trustee a mortgage on the real property and that it is enforceable against a bona fide purchaser under principles of constructive and inquiry notice that apply under Georgia law.

The good folks at Baker Donelson were kind enough to make available the entire Order Granting Indenture’s MSJ, which is available here:

https://docs.google.com/a/bondcasebriefs.com/viewer?a=v&pid=gmail&attid=0.1&thid=14179deee27d90f3&mt=application/pdf&url=https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?ui%3D2%26ik%3D22f94432e8%26view%3Datt%26th%3D14179deee27d90f3%26attid%3D0.1%26disp%3Dsafe%26zw&sig=AHIEtbRU-DBubdX0PuJ2SeCi1P_1Gwa89g

Tenured teacher whose contract was not renewed by the local school board, on grounds of insubordination, incompetency, and willful neglect of duties, appealed to the State Board of Education. The State Board reversed. Local board appealed. The Superior Court, Worth County, reversed the State Board and affirmed local board’s non-renewal of teacher’s contract. Teacher’s application for discretionary appeal was granted.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• Local school board did not improperly rely on evidence of teacher’s conduct from prior contract terms in reaching its decision not to renew his contract; and
• Letter provided to teacher by local board provided sufficient notice of the grounds for non-renewal of his contract under the Fair Dismissal Act.

Special taxing district municipalities filed petition under Local Option Sales Tax (LOST) Act, seeking resolution of impasse in negotiations with county for renewing LOST certificate authorizing municipalities to collect and distribute the tax. The Superior Court entered orders denying county’s motion to dismiss, upholding constitutionality of the LOST Act, and adopting the final and best offer of the municipalities in resolving the dispute. County applied for discretionary appeal.

The Supreme Court of Georgia held that the section of the LOST Act allowing superior court to determine distribution of tax proceeds in special taxing district violated separation of powers.  Issues relating to how tax revenues should be allocated were to be left solely to legislative discretion and were not matters for determination by the courts, absent any manifest abuse of power or failure to abide by constitutional or legislative directives regarding the purposes for which the revenues could be spent.

The Thorncreek apartment complex brought claims against the Village of Park Forest under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986, and Illinois law, arising from the Village’s denial of Thorncreek’s requests for licenses to operate a multifamily dwelling, denial of certificates of occupancy required to house new tenants, promulgation and allegedly discriminatory enforcement of an electricity ordinance, and denial of a conditional use permit for Thorncreek’s leasing office. Put simply, Thorncreek alleged that the Village targeted it because the vast majority of its tenants were African–American.

Thorncreek’s federal and state equal protection claims, conspiracy claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986, and ICRA claim survived the Village’s summary judgment motion and will proceed to trial.

Particularly charming, was an email from the Village Manager to the Village Police Chief regarding search warrants executed at Thorncreek, in which the Village Manager stated that, “I enjoy shoving it up their ass in a firm but diplomatic and professional manner.”  Firm but fair.

City Code Enforcement and Hearing Bureau appealed a decision of the City Civil Service Commission of New Orleans granting a bureau employee’s appeal from the 10–day suspension imposed by her supervisors for alleged dereliction in her duties.

The Court of Appeal held that Commission’s determination that bureau failed to establish good or lawful cause for disciplining employee was not manifestly erroneous.

On appeal to the City Civil Service Commission from a public employer’s disciplinary action against an employee who has gained permanent status in the classified city civil service, the appointing authority has the burden of proving impairment of the efficiency of the public service in which the employee in engaged by a preponderance of the evidence and must also prove the actions complained of bear a real and substantial relationship to the efficient operation of the public service.  While these facts must be clearly established, they need not be established beyond a reasonable doubt.

Teacher brought §1983 action against parish school board, board’s former superintendent, and principal for violation of First Amendment right to free speech, alleging that she suffered retaliation for speaking out against principal’s directive to raise students’ grades. The District Court for the denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. Defendants appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• Principal’s alleged retaliatory transfer of teacher to another school was cognizable as an adverse employment action;
• Teacher’s complaints about principal’s directive addressed a matter of public concern;
• Teacher failed to present evidence to defeat superintendent’s entitlement to qualified immunity; and
• Teacher failed to establish municipal liability on her § 1983 claim.

In order to establish the School Board’s liability based on an adverse employment decision in response to her protected speech, Teacher needed to demonstrate a policy or custom targeting the right that was violated (i.e., the right to engage in protected speech free from retaliation), rather than a policy concerning conduct about which she spoke (i.e., the changing of students’ grades).

Bank purchased $5.7 billion in Private Label Mortgage–Backed Securities and later brought suit against The Bank alleges that the rating agency defendants – Moody’s and S&P – knowingly engaged in practices that caused the AAA ratings assigned to PLMBS purchased by the Bank to vastly understate their risk and overstate their creditworthiness. The Bank asserted claims of fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and violation of Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 93A, Section 11.

The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). The Bank contended that the exercise of general jurisdiction is proper because of these defendants’ contacts with Massachusetts.

For our purposes, the interesting aspect of this case was that the court relied, in part, on the fact that both ratings agencies had rated 12,000 municipal bond issuances in the state to establish that Moody’s and S&P had benefitted from significant systematic and continuous contacts with Massachusetts, thus establishing general jurisdiction.

Abutting neighbors of Boston College brought action against Boston zoning commission and Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA), seeking injunctive relief to prohibit implementation of institutional master plan (IMP) for major expansion of college facilities, and alleging a violation of state constitution. College was allowed to intervene. The Superior Court entered summary judgment in favor of zoning commission, BRA, and college. Neighbors appealed.

The Appeals Court held that:

• State constitutional right to independent judges did not apply to IMP approval process because zoning commission and BRA did not engage in an adjudicatory or quasi-adjudicatory function in proceedings to consider IMP, and
• Approval of IMP was not arbitrary or capricious as the decision was made through a process that required communication and input from multiple sectors of state and local government and private parties in an effort to ensure that the amendment comports to the standards of the Boston zoning code, and approval of IMP by BRA did not bind zoning commission, which had authority to adopt, reject, or adopt in substantial accord the BRA recommendation.

In 2001 Minneapolis established a Vacant Building Registration (“VBR”) program. Through the program, owners of vacant properties are required to register the vacant property with the City and pay an annual fee. If a property owner fails to pay the fee, the City may levy and collect the fee as a special assessment against the property under the City’s provision for special assessments for nuisance conditions. This arrangement is authorized by a Minnesota statute, which permits cities to collect vacant building registration fees as a special assessment against the property. Minn.Stat. § 429.101, subd. 1(a)(12).

Such fees were assessed against DRB, LLC, which failed to appeal the assessments to the district court within the deadline in accordance with Minn.Stat. § 429.081.  The Magistrate Judge issued an R&R, recommending that the Court grant summary judgment for the City on all counts.

DRB objected to the R & R, raising three issues for the District Court: (1) whether the City’s Notices of its intent to assess the fees were deficient, (2) if the Notices were deficient, whether the appeal deadline properly applies, and (3) whether the appeal deadline applies to claims DRB characterizes as “non-special assessment causes of action,” such as fraud, unjust enrichment, and negligent misrepresentation.

The District Court concluded that the R&R was well-supported and reached the appropriate legal conclusions in these circumstances.  Accordingly, the Court overruled DRB’s objections and adopted the R&R.

Plaintiff appealed the judgment entered in accordance with a jury verdict in favor of City of Seneca on Plaintiffs personal injury suit for damages she alleged she suffered when she stepped into a City “water meter hole” that was located in a restaurant parking lot. Plaintiff claimed the “hole,” a water meter vault, was City’s property and that it constituted a dangerous condition, thereby qualifying as a statutory exception to the general rule that all money damages claims against municipalities are barred by sovereign immunity.

Plaintiff’s contended the trial court erred in giving the affirmative converse jury instruction because its definition of property was that over which City “had exclusive control, possession, authority and the ability to oversee, monitor and to exclude unauthorized persons.”

The Court of Appeals held that:

• Patron’s trial objection to affirmative converse jury instruction was not vague or different from objection on appeal;
• Patron was not required to offer substitute jury instruction;
• Patron made submissible case on theory of liability;
• Accurate definition of property would include property actually owned by city; and
• Substantial showing of prejudice existed as a result of instruction.

“Because we agree that the affirmative converse instruction misdirected the jury and there is a substantial indication that it resulted in prejudice to Plaintiff, we must reverse the judgment and remand the case for a new trial.”

Landowner argued that Township’s zoning resolution was invalid because it was not adopted in accordance with a comprehensive plan, as required under Revised Code Section 519.02.  Landowner argued that, under Section 519.02, “a comprehensive plan” covers more than just zoning. Rather, it is a township’s chief policy instrument which sets forth goals, policies, and objectives regarding zoning, streets, public facilities, public programs, and public lands. Apple argues that, because the Township does not have a comprehensive plan that is separate from its zoning resolution, the resolution is invalid.

Contrary to Landowner’s argument, this Court had previously held that a township’s failure to have a comprehensive plan “which is separate and distinct from a zoning ordinance does not render unconstitutional a zoning ordinance.” Reese v. Copley Twp. Bd. of Trustees, 129 Ohio App.3d 9, 15 (9th Dist.1998); BGC Props. v. Bath Twp., 9th Dist. Summit No. 14252, 1990 WL 31789 *4 (Mar. 21, 1990).

Landowner next argued that the Township’s zoning ordinance did not meet the requirements of a comprehensive plan and, therefore, it was not made “in accordance with a comprehensive plan” under Section 519.02.

The Court stated that a zoning resolution itself can satisfy the comprehensive plan requirement. Under the majority view, “the term ‘comprehensive” has three meanings: (1) comprehensive in terms of addressing an entire geographic area; (2) comprehensive in terms of having an “all-encompassing” scope; and (3) comprehensive as in a separate long-term planning document, as opposed to a temporary duration.

Upon review of the zoning resolution, the Court concluded that there was some competent credible evidence in the record from which the trial court could have found that it is “a comprehensive plan” under Section 519.02.

Regional sewer district brought action against member communities, seeking declaratory judgment that district had authority to implement particular regional stormwater management (RSM) program. Property owners intervened. The Court of Common Pleas denied motion to dismiss, granted partial summary judgment to sewer district and, after bench trial, entered judgment in favor of district. Communities and property owners appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• Statutes governing district did not grant district authority to promulgate regional stormwater management(RSM) program;
• Stormwater charge on property owners proposed by district to fund RSM program was unrelated to any use or services afforded to a property owner by a “water resource project” and thus was not authorized by statute; and
• RSM program was not authorized by district charter.

Sewer district’s RSM program was not authorized by sewer district charter defining purpose and scope of authority of district.  Expansive scope of the “regional stormwater system” as defined by district went far beyond scope of sewage treatment and waste water handling facilities under charter to encompass entire system of watercourses and stormwater conveyance structures, and district did not go through charter amendment process.

Norfolk sought review of an order of the Public Utility Commission (PUC) that allocated to railroad 15% of the cost for the removal of a rail-crossing bridge. Norfolk contended that any allocation to it would be unjust and unreasonable, since the company owned no property or facilities at the crossing site.  Norfolk also cited City of Chester v. PUC, 798 A.2d 288, for the proposition that the PUC lacked authority to allocate costs to a transportation utility which had no ownership interest associated with a rail-highway crossing.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that:

• Statutory provision that governed compensation for damages occasioned by the construction, relocation, or abolition of a railroad crossing invested the Public Utility Commission (PUC) with discretion to determine the proper proportions of costs to be allocated to concerned parties or the Commonwealth, but not to select parties who would be subject to the allocation on a discretionary basis, but
• In a matter of first impression, non-owner railroad was a concerned party for purposes of the PUC’s cost-allocation jurisdiction and authority, at least to the extent that it conducted regular operations at the crossing and could enforce an easement-based right of way, abrogating City of Chester v. Public Utility Com’n, 773 A.2d 1280.

Developer purchased property to develop a residential subdivision.  Developer then sold the lots to a home builder.

Developer sued City based on delays and changes to the development plan that increased its costs and reduced the sale price of the lots.

Developer argued it was entitled to compensation as a matter of law because the City failed to prove certain imposed exactions were roughly proportional to the projected impact of the development.

The appeals court stated that, “To resolve these issues, we must first determine whether each requirement was an exaction and, if so, whether the City established (1) an essential nexus to the substantial advancement of a legitimate government interest and (2) the rough proportionality to the projected impact of the development. Stafford Estates, 135 S.W.3d at 634.”  The court then engaged in a remarkably thorough analysis of each of the disputed exactions.

Based on this analysis, the court reversed certain of the lower court’s rulings on the exactions and sustained others.  The net result was an increase in the amount awarded to Developer, from $40,00 to $96,000, plus attorneys’ fees, although the Developer had sought $800,000.

Developer and developer’s agent brought action against town and town’s planning commission following years of obstruction and delays in developer’s application for preliminary plat approval.

The Supreme Court of Alabama held that:

• Issue of whether town and town’s planning commission acted negligently by failing to properly consider or grant the developer’s application for preliminary plat approval was for jury;
• Issue was for jury in developer’s action against town and town planning commission as to whether commission tortiously acquired jurisdiction over developer’s property;
• Municipal immunity did not apply to town that sought extraterritorial jurisdiction over the private property of developer so that the municipality could prevent development of that property;
• Personal-injury cap did not apply to action by developer against town for damages associated with town’s refusal to approve subdivision plat;
• Developer’s agent’s untimely complaint against town did not relate back to developer’s complaint so as to remedy agent’s violation of the municipal notice-of-claim statute; and
• Evidence was sufficient to support jury’s award of lost profits.

Property owner brought action against city seeking damages based on claims of negligent maintenance, continuing trespass, continuing nuisance, and inverse condemnation, all related to that part of the city’s storm-water-drainage system that abutted her property.

The Supreme Court of Alabama held that:

• Genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether deteriorated condition of drainage ditch caused several large sinkholes on property owner’s land, precluding summary judgment;
• Genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether property owner suffered damage from continuous migration of water and soil into the drainage ditch during six months preceding the filing of notice of claim, precluding summary judgment under municipal nonclaim statute; and
• Genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether problems with ditch had been brought to city’s attention, precluding summary judgment.

Parent brought Title IX action against city board of education, alleging that her daughter was sexually harassed by grade school custodian. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama, granted summary judgment in favor of board.  Plaintiff appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• School’s principal and superintendent did not act with “deliberate indifference” to actual notice of possibility that custodian might sexually harass student;
• Students’ and teachers’ complaints that custodian was continuously “undressing them with his eyes” did not give principal “actual notice” of possibility that custodian might sexually harass student; and
• Board of education did not act with “deliberate indifference” to actual notice of custodian’s alleged inappropriate touching of student’s buttocks and his violation of command to avoid contact with student.

A Title IX sexual harassment plaintiff must identify a school district official with the authority to take corrective measures in response to “actual notice” of sexual harassment.  The actual notice must be sufficient to alert that official to the possibility of the plaintiff’s sexual harassment, and that official must respond with deliberate indifference in order for Title IX liability to arise.

Creditor Westamerica Bank (the “Bank”) appealed the Order of the United States Bankruptcy overruling the Bank’s objection regarding Debtor Mendocino Coastal Recreation and Park District’s (the “District”) Chapter 9 eligibility.  At issue was whether the Bankruptcy Court erred in concluding that the District complied with 11 U.S.C. § 1 09(c)(5)(B)’s requirements for eligibility as a municipal debtor under Chapter 9.

The District Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s order determining Chapter 9 eligibility.

In 2008, the District entered into a lease related to a parkland property with a third party that subsequently assigned all of its rights to Bank, entitling the Bank to the lease payments.

In 2011, the District’s Counsel sent a “settlement outline and proposal” (the “Workout Proposal”) to the Bank’s Counsel, describing the District’s insolvent financial situation and notifying the Bank that if it could not work out a satisfactory alternative it would file a Chapter 9 bankruptcy petition. The Workout Proposal concluded by proposing three resolutions: (1) transferring the leased property to the Bank in full satisfaction of the lease obligation, (2) paying the Bank $1.1 million in full satisfaction of the lease obligation, or (3) entering into a forbearance agreement.  The Bank declined to accept, or even discuss, the Workout Proposal.

The District subsequently filed its Chapter 9 voluntary petition (the “Petition”).  The Bank objected to the Petition on the ground that the District failed to meet the Chapter 9 eligibility requirements in Section 109(c)(5)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(5)(B). The Bankruptcy Court overruled the Bank’s objection, holding that the Workout Proposal satisfied Section 109(c)(5)(B).

Section 109(c) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that “[a] n entity may be a debtor under Chapter 9 of this title if and only if such entity—” (1) is a municipality; (2) is specifically authorized to be a debtor; (3) is insolvent; (4) desires to effect a plan to adjust such debts; and

(5) (a) has obtained the agreement of creditors holding at least a majority in amount of the claims of each class that such entity intends to impair under a plan in a case under such chapter;

(b) has negotiated in good faith with creditors and has failed to obtain the agreement of creditors holding at least a majority in amount of the claims of each class that such entity intends to impair under a plan in a case under such chapter;

(c) is unable to negotiate with creditors because such negotiation is impracticable; or

(d) reasonably believes that a creditor may attempt to obtain a transfer that is avoidable under section 547 of this title.

The Bank and the District disagreed about whether the District “negotiated in good faith.”  The question on appeal was whether Section 109(c)(5)(B) requires more than what the District did.  The District Court concluded that Section 109(c)(5)(B) requires municipalities not just to negotiate generally in good faith with their creditors, but also to negotiate in good faith with creditors over a proposed plan, at least in concept, for bankruptcy under Chapter 9.

“From this body of law, the Court draws two conclusions. First, courts may consider, based on the unique circumstances of each case and applying their best judgment, whether a debtor has satisfied an obligation to have “negotiated in good faith.” Second, while the Bankruptcy Code places the overwhelming weight of its burdens on petitioners, the provisions that call for negotiation contemplate that at least some very minimal burden of reciprocity be placed on parties with whom a debtor must negotiate.

In this case, the negotiation contemplated in Section 109(c)(5)(B) never happened, and the fault for that lay primarily with the Bank. Had the Bank responded with even the slightest indication of a willingness to negotiate, or even merely requested more time to consider the District’s proposal, the door might well be open for it to claim that the District did not negotiate in good faith

This case did not present the issue of what must occur in a negotiation that satisfies 109(c)(5)(B). It presented the issue of what information, if missing from the debtor’s first attempt to negotiate, bars a municipality from filing from Chapter 9 even if a creditor rejects the overture and declines to negotiate. In answering that question, one bright-line rule suggests itself. The possibility of imminent bankruptcy proceeding must be disclosed in the first effort to communicate, in order to ensure that, as the Bankruptcy Court put it in the Order Below, the municipality does not “blind-side a creditor by failing to mention that a Chapter 9 filing is contemplated.”

Beyond that, the Court declined to prescribe any rigid per se rule for what qualifies as a good-faith effort to begin negotiations. That determination will depend on several factors, of which the Court here considered only three.

First, the greater the disclosure about the proposed bankruptcy plan, the stronger the debtor’s claim to have attempted to negotiate in good faith. A creditor might be justified in rejecting the overture of a debtor proposing a frivolous or unclearly described adjustment plan, but a creditor is less justified in ignoring a substantive proposal.

Second, the municipality’s need to immediately disclose classes of creditors and their treatment in the first communication will depend upon how material that information would be to the creditor’s decision about whether to negotiate.

Third, the creditor’s response, and the amount of time the creditor has had to respond, may also be factors. If a creditor has had a relatively short time to respond to the municipality’s offer to negotiate, a lack of detail in the opening communication might weigh against a municipality rushing to file. On the other hand, where a creditor has been apprised of the possibility of a debt adjustment and declined to respond after a reasonable period of time, or where the creditor has explicitly responded with a refusal to negotiate, its position as an objector is significantly weakened.

California Clean Energy Committee (CCEC) appealed from a trial court’s judgment in favor of respondent City of San Jose (City). CCEC filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging City’s certification and approval of an environmental impact report (EIR) analyzing the potential environmental effects of a proposed update to City’s general plan, titled “Envision San Jose 2040 General Plan” prepared pursuant to the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).  The trial court granted summary judgment in City’s favor, after finding that CCEC failed to exhaust its administrative remedies, as no administrative appeal was filed from City’s planning commission’s certification of the final EIR.

The Court of Appeal concluded that the EIR was not properly certified by the planning commission, as the planning commission could not be delegated the duty to certify a final EIR given that it is not a decisionmaking body with respect to the Envision San Jose project.  As the EIR was not lawfully certified by the planning commission, no administrative appeal need be taken to exhaust administrative remedies.

Plaintiff  brought an action against the Town of Hebron in recompense for injuries allegedly sustained as a result of Hebron’s closure of a public road that provided the only access to real property owned by Plaintiff.

The court initially concluded that the Plaintiff’s takings claims (counts one and three) under the Fifth Amendment were not ripe for adjudication in this pursuant to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). The parties agreed that Williamson County precluded the court from considering count three, alleging a violation of the just compensation requirement of the Fifth Amendment.

Plaintiff argued, though, that it had brought two distinct takings claims under the Fifth Amendment, of which count one must remain within this court’s jurisdiction. Specifically, Plaintiff stated that count three sought just compensation for the temporary taking of plaintiff’s property (a so-called “uncompensated taking” claim), and is thus not ripe in federal court, but that count one asserted that the Town’s ultra vires temporary taking of plaintiff’s property for an improper purpose violated the Fifth Amendment’s public use dictate (a so-called “bad faith taking” claim),” which is not proscribed by Williamson County.

Thus, a plaintiff alleging a bad faith exercise of a municipality’s eminent domain power pursuant to the public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment need not exhaust Williamson County’s ripeness requirements.  The District Court agreed, retaining jurisdiction.

Telecommunications service provider brought action against city, challenging the city’s denial of its cell tower application as in violation of the Telecommunications Act, and seeking an injunction compelling the city to grant it the requested permit. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia granted summary judgment in favor of provider and issued an injunction requiring the city to issue the permit. City appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that city’s denial of telecommunications service provider’s request for a permit to build a cell tower satisfied the requirement of the Telecommunications Act that a state or local government’s denial of a request for a permit to erect a cell tower be “in writing.”  City provided provider with a written letter clearly stating the city council had denied the request, that same letter informed the provider that the minutes from the hearing in which the city council denied the request could be obtained from the city clerk, and the minutes recounted all of the reasons for the action on the provider’s application along with the relevant discussion.  Moreover, the provider received, or at least could have received, an even more detailed written account of the city council’s decision from the transcript of the hearing.

A middle-school teacher brought action against school board and principal under § 1983 for violation of his right to free speech under the First Amendment after he was suspended without pay for five days for leading a classroom discussion on the word “nigger.” Defendants moved to dismiss.

The District Court held that:

• Teacher stated a First Amendment claim against school board;
• Teacher’s right to lead the discussion was not clearly established; and
• Teacher’s free speech claim precluded a substantive due process claim.

Under the First Amendment, the government is entitled to restrict employee speech that addresses a matter of public concern if it can prove that the interest of the employee as a citizen in commenting on the matter is outweighed by the interest of the government employer in promoting effective and efficient public service.

Under the First Amendment, in evaluating the balance of interests between an employee’s speech as a citizen and of the government employer in promoting effective and efficient public service, courts examine any relevant facts, like whether the speech disrupted relationships with co-workers; whether the speech got in the way of the employee-speaker’s performance of job duties; and the time, place, and manner of the speech.

Allegations by middle-school teacher that he was suspended without pay for five days for leading a classroom discussion of the word “nigger,” stated a claim under § 1983 against school board for violating his right to free speech under the First Amendment.  There was no indication that board had a set policy prohibiting such a discussion, or that the discussion was “abusive,” or a disruption to “orderly” classroom education such that it would have violated existing policy.

Landowner and Village entered into an annexation agreement and permanent utility easement providing for the annexation of a 145–acre tract of land owned by Landowner in exchange for the Village constructing sewer lines and a lift station on a 9–acre tract of land owned by Landowner. The annexation agreement and utility easement also provided for a $300–per–day fee if the construction was not completed within a certain time frame.

Landowner sued for breach of the agreements.  The Village argued that the contract was void because it had not made a prior appropriation of funds for this project, as required under section 8–1–7 of the Municipal Code.

Although the record did indicate that the agreements were approved by the corporate authorities and were properly recorded, the court concluded that any contract made in violation of section 8–1–7 of the Municipal Code is null and void.  The requirements of section 8–1–7 are mandatory. Therefore, the annexation agreement and the permanent utility easement were unenforceable against the Village.

Court declines to dismiss suit brought by trustee against guarantor in bond default, finding diversity of citizenship and no cause to stay and dismiss under the Colorado River abstention doctrine.

Wells Fargo alleged that it was the successor trustee (the “Trustee”) to the Amalgamated Bank of Chicago (the “Prior Trustee”) under the Trust Indenture between the Illinois Finance Authority and the Prior Trustee dated as of February 1, 2007 (the “Trust Indenture”).

Wells Fargo alleged that the Illinois Finance Authority raised $20 million through issuing and selling a series of revenue bonds.  The Illinois Finance Authority issued the bonds under the Trust Indenture and loaned the proceeds to LHC, LLC (“LHC”), an Illinois non-profit limited liability company, for the construction and operation of a hockey arena located in West Dundee, Illinois.

Pursuant to the February 1, 2007 Loan Agreement (“Loan Agreement”) and Guaranty Agreement (“Guaranty Agreement”), LHC was the borrower and Defendant Leafs Hockey was the guarantor.  Wells Fargo contended that LHC had failed to make the required payments, and thus is in default. Also, Wells Fargo alleged that Leafs Hockey, as guarantor, had failed to pay its obligations under the February 1, 2007 Guaranty Agreement. Accordingly, Wells Fargo brought breach of contract and contractual indemnity claim against Leafs Hockey.

Leafs Hockey moved to dismiss the lawsuit pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) arguing that diversity of citizenship did not exist, and thus, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. In particular, Leafs Hockey, a citizen of Illinois for diversity jurisdiction purposes, argued that Wells Fargo was only a nominal party and the true party-in-interest is either the Illinois Finance Authority, a citizen of Illinois, or the unidentified bond holders, who may or may not be citizens of Illinois.  The court concluded that Leafs Hockey’s argument was unavailing because, as Successor Trustee, Wells Fargo, a citizen of South Dakota, can enforce the Loan Agreement under the parties’ February 1, 2007 agreements.

The court also held that Wells Fargo’s state court foreclosure action against LHC and the present breach of contract action were not parallel under the circumstances. Because the federal and state court actions were not parallel, the Colorado River abstention doctrine does not apply.

Bicyclist filed complaint against city alleging negligence, stemming from injury-causing incident in which bicyclist struck pothole while riding in alleyway.

Bicyclist contended the circuit court erred in dismissing his third amended complaint where section 3–102(a) of the Tort Immunity Act did not immunize defendant from liability for his injury because he was an intended user of the alleyway.

The Appellate Court held that:

• City did not reasonably exercise its police power in arbitrarily eliminating bicyclist’s cause of action;
• Subsequent amendment to municipal code did not demonstrate bicyclists were intended users at time of incident;
• Bicyclist was permitted user, rather than intended user; and
• Bicycle was not vehicle for purposes of determining city’s liability.

In conclusion, because plaintiff was not an intended user of the alley in which he sustained injuries, defendant is immunized from liability pursuant to section 3–102(a) of the Tort Immunity Act.

Since 2000, Indiana–American Water Company (IAWC) has owned and operated the water utility that provides service in and around the Town of Mooresville. On July 23, 2012, Mooresville provided notice to IAWC and the public that it would hold a public hearing to receive public comment on a proposed ordinance “declaring that the public convenience and necessity require the establishment of a municipally owned water utility and for the construction or acquisition of water utility assets and facilities.”

On December 24, 2012, Mooresville adopted a second ordinance that authorized the acquisition of the IAWC operation by eminent domain, if necessary. This occurred after Mooresville’s offer to buy IAWC’s interest was rejected by IAWC. On December 27, 2012, Mooresville initiated an eminent domain lawsuit in state court.

IAWC filed this action seeking declaratory relief and damages against Mooresville, alleging that Mooresville violated due process and Indiana Access to Public Records Act in their quest to create a new municipal utility.

In this action the District Court dismissed IAWC’s federal due process and Fourth Amendment claims.  Having disposed of IAWC’s federal claims, the District Court declined to retain supplemental jurisdiction over its claims under state law.  “Here, it is clear that supplemental jurisdiction should be relinquished. As discussed earlier, this case includes substantial and unclear questions of state law. Under such circumstances, remand to the original state court to resolve the remaining state law claims is appropriate.”

Pedestrian filed suit against transit authority, alleging that transit authority was negligent in the hiring, training, supervision, and retention of bus driver who collided with pedestrian in crosswalk while operating transit authority bus.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• Transit authority would not be afforded sovereign immunity, and
• Transit authority was not entitled to governmental immunity.

Transit authority was more corporate than governmental, and thus would not be afforded sovereign immunity.  Statute addressing transit authority’s creation provided that transit authority was “a public body corporate,” with power “to sue and be sued,” and “to have and exercise, generally, all of the powers of private corporations.”

Transit authority did not carry out function integral to state government, but rather engaged in quintessentially local proprietary venture of providing transportation services, and thus was not entitled to government immunity for claims asserted against it.  Transit authority did not provide transportation infrastructure, facilitate state-wide transit, legislate, administrate, or otherwise predominately serve state-level concerns.

This action, like many similar actions that have been filed throughout the country, was triggered by the collapse of the auction rate securities (“ARS”) market in February 2008. In this case, the plaintiff, Tutor Perini Corp. (“Tutor Perini”) brought claims against its broker and investment advisor, Banc of America Securities LLC, now known as Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Incorporated (“BAS”), and BAS’s affiliate, Bank of America, N.A. (“BANA”).

Tutor Perini alleged that during the time period from September 2007 through February 2008, BAS, with the knowledge and acquiescence of BANA, invested hundreds of millions of dollars of Tutor Perini’s money in toxic ARS, including ARS that BAS had been holding in its own inventory, without disclosing the increasingly severe risk of illiquidity associated with such investments or the fact that BAS was engaged in a strategy to reduce its own inventory of ARS by foisting them onto its clients.

Tutor Perini claimed that the very risks which the defendants concealed from it materialized in February 2008, when the ARS market collapsed and ARS investors such as the plaintiff were unable to liquidate their holdings. Tutor Perini contended that as a result of the defendants’ conduct, it continues to hold nearly $100 million worth of ARS, which remain frozen in its account at BAS and will not mature for decades.

Tutor Perini asserted that the defendants committed securities fraud, in violation of section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and Rule 10b–5 promulgated thereunder, by making material misrepresentations and omissions regarding the risks of investing in ARS, and by selling it securities that were unsuitable in light of Tutor Perini’s investment objectives (Count I). In addition, Tutor Perini asserted nine separate state law claims against the defendants, which include claims for intentional misrepresentation (Count II), fraudulent concealment (Count III), negligent misrepresentation (Count IV), violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A (Count V), civil conspiracy (Counts VI–VII), violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 110A, § 410(a)(2) (Count VIII), breach of contract (Count IX), and conversion (Count X).

Defendants contended that Tutor Perini’s Exchange Act claims must be dismissed because the plaintiff has failed to comply with the heightened pleading standards of Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b) and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u–4(b), and has otherwise failed to allege facts sufficient to plead the elements of its claims. Similarly, they contended that each of Tutor Perini’s state law claims must be dismissed because the allegations supporting them are inadequate to comply with the pleading requirements of either Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b) or Fed.R.Civ.P. 8, and because Counts V and IX fail as a matter of law.

The court found that Tutor Perini had failed to state claims for civil conspiracy, breach of contract and conversion, but that its remaining claims were sufficient to comply with the applicable pleading standards and to state a claim for relief.  Specifically, the court recommended that Counts VI, VII, IX and X be dismissed, but that the motion otherwise be denied.

Plaintiffs brought an action in Superior Court, seeking reversal of a decision of the Zoning Board of Appeals of Manchester–by–the–Sea that granted a special permit to landowner.  The special permit authorized landowner to reconstruct a one family house upon a legally nonconforming lot.  Concluding that landowner had met his burden of showing that the removal of the existing house and garage and the construction of a new single family house would not be substantially more detrimental to the neighborhood, a judge affirmed the board’s decision. Plaintiffs appealed.

Under its standard of review, the Appeals Court will uphold a zoning board’s decision and that of the reviewing Superior Court if a rational basis for the decision exists which is supported by the record.  In this case, application of the stated standard of review lead the court to affirm the judgment.

The criteria for issuing a special permit to demolish and reconstruct a single family house, where, as here, the use is allowed by right, is set forth in § 6.1.2 of the town’s zoning by-law, which follows the language of G.L. c. 40A, § 6.  Pursuant to § 6.1.2, the critical question is whether the proposed changes are “substantially more detrimental or injurious to the neighborhood than the existing nonconforming structure.” The record fully supported the judge’s conclusion that the board correctly determined that the change at issue would result in substantial improvements.

Scott Nellis owns residential property in an area of Coon Rapids designated “Low Density Residential–2” (LDR–2).  The City Housing Inspector, received a call from a person known to her who reported that there was a large pile of shavings from animal cages in Nellis’s back yard. The caller described a strong and foul smell emanating from the shavings. The caller further stated that during a conversation with Nellis, Nellis said that he bred snakes and possessed about 100 snakes in his house.

Based on the Inspector’s investigation, the city obtained and executed an administrative search warrant As they entered Nellis’s house, ammonia in the air burned their eyes and throats. One officer became physically ill after entering the house and remained ill for several days. The remaining officers wore masks for their protection during the remainder of the inspection.

During the inspection, Nellis admitted breeding, raising, and selling reptiles. He said that he owned about 100 snakes, along with other reptiles. He further stated that he raised rodents to feed the snakes. The inspection revealed roughly 300 snakes and 400 mice, along with a cat, lizards, iguanas, cockroaches, rats, and various feed insects in the maggot, pupae, or larvae stage.

Nellis challenged City’s decision affirming a citation for the keeping of non-domestic animals, in violation of Coon Rapids, Minn., City Code (CRCC) § 6–503(1) (2011), and a citation for prohibited home occupation use in violation of CRCC §§ 11–703 (2011) and 11–603(5)(a) (2011).

The Court of Appeals held that:

• Probable cause existed to support the administrative search warrant;
• The execution of the search warrant was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment;
• CRCC § 11–603(5)(a) was not unconstitutionally vague;
• The board had the authority to order Nellis to “reduce the total square footage of his home occupation in the home to be no more than 25% of the habitable square footage;
• CRCC chapter 6–500 is not unconstitutional because it does not have a grandfather clause;
• CRCC chapter 6–500 does not violate the Equal Protection Clause;
• City had a rational basis for enacting CRCC chapter 6–500; and
• The board did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in affirming the two citations against Nellis.

Plaintiffs brought Federal and New Jersey State constitutional claims of against City.  Plaintiff was a New Jersey limited liability company, was formed to own and operate a restaurant and sports bar to be named “Buck Foston’s” in the City of New Brunswick. Plaintiffs claimed that City’s alleged delay in the review and then denial of Buck Foston’s LLC’s application for a liquor license transfer: (1) were in retaliation for Plaintiffs’ exercise of commercial speech protected by the First Amendment in naming their proposed restaurant “Buck Foston’s”; (2) deprived Plaintiffs of the equal protection of law under the Fourteenth Amendment by treating the application differently than those of other similarly situated bars/restaurants; and (3) violated the corresponding provisions of the New Jersey State Constitution (Article I, Paragraph 6, and Article I, Paragraph 1, respectively).

The District Court ruled that there was a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to survive Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs’ First Amendment Retaliation Claim.

Firefighter commenced proceeding under Article 78, seeking review of city and its fire and police board’s determination terminating his disability benefits.

The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that determination that firefighter’s disability was not causally related to his job duties was supported by substantial evidence, and, thus, fire and police board properly terminated his disability benefits.  Although firefighter presented evidence to the contrary, hearing officer was entitled to weigh parties’ conflicting medical evidence and to assess credibility of witnesses.

In reviewing a determination on a firefighter’s claim for disability benefits, the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, may not weigh the evidence or reject the hearing officer’s choice when the evidence is conflicting and room for a choice exists.

Buffalo Urban Renewal Agency (BURA) and the City of Buffalo entered into a contract whereby BURA, an environmental testing and remediation company, agreed to perform various services for homeowners who participated in the City’s “Rehab Program,” which provided funds to qualified homeowners seeking to improve their properties. The contract documents specified the fee to which BURA would be entitled for each of the three services provided by plaintiff to the homeowners. According to BURA, the City was obligated under the contract to retain it to perform between 220 and 260 lead paint tests, and an equal number of clearance tests and risk assessments. BURA contended that City breached the contract because it retained BURA to perform only 44 lead paint tests and no clearance tests or risk assessments.

The appeals court agreed with the City that the clear and unambiguous language of the contract provided only for a “fee for services” arrangement.  The fee schedule sets forth only the agreed-upon per-unit price for each of the three services to be provided by BURA to the homeowners; it did not state that City is required to hire BURA to perform any minimum number of services.

In hybrid proceeding, county sought declaratory relief and Article 78 review of village’s denial of sanitary sewer system in connection with proposed county correctional facility. The Supreme Court declared null and void village’s amendment to zoning ordinance, denied village’s motions to dismiss and strike, and reserved decision with respect to sewer and municipal services.

The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that:

• Record was inadequate to determine if county was immune from village’s amendments;
• Declaration that amendments were preempted by state law was unwarranted; and
• Amendments did not improperly concerned with owner or occupier of land.

Record was inadequate to make determination, based upon balancing of public interests, whether county was immune, with respect to its siting of proposed correctional facility, from requirements of village’s amendments to its zoning ordinances to exclude correctional facilities from zoning districts in which proposed facility was sited, thus warranting remittal to lower court for determination, based upon more complete record, regarding such immunity.

Factors to be weighed in making a determination as to whether an entity is immune from a municipality’s zoning ordinances are the nature and scope of the instrumentality seeking immunity, the kind of function or land use involved, the extent of the public interest to be served thereby, the effect local land use regulation would have upon the enterprise concerned and the impact upon legitimate local interests, the applicant’s legislative grant of authority, alternative locations for the facility in less restrictive zoning areas, alternative methods of providing the needed improvement, intergovernmental participation in the project development process and an opportunity to be heard.

Declaration that village’s amendments to its zoning ordinances were null and void on state preemption grounds, insofar as they excluded correctional facilities from zoning districts in which proposed county facility was sited, was unwarranted in county’s suit to challenge those amendments, in light of limitations of state legislative control over siting of county correctional facilities and absence of any comprehensive and detailed regulatory scheme.

Amendments to village’s zoning ordinance to exclude correctional facilities from zoning districts in which proposed county facility was sited were not invalid on ground that they violated principle that zoning should be concerned with use of land, not with identity of user, because amendments were directed at land use, not at entity that owned or occupied land.

Amendments to village’s zoning ordinance to exclude correctional facilities from zoning districts in which proposed county facility was sited did not constitute exclusionary zoning.

Pedestrian brought action against business owner and village, seeking to recover damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained in slip-and-fall on icy public sidewalk adjacent to business.

The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that:

• No provision of village code subject owner to liability;
• Special use doctrine did not impose liability on owner; and
• Hazard on sidewalk was not created by artificial means.

Under the special use doctrine, a landowner whose property abuts a public sidewalk may be liable for injuries that are caused by a defect in the sidewalk when the municipality has given the landowner permission to interfere with a street solely for private use and convenience in no way connected with the public use and the landowner fails to maintain the sidewalk in a reasonably safe condition. Special use doctrine did not act to impose liability on business owner in relation to pedestrian’s slip-and-fall on icy public sidewalk outside of business, because sidewalk was unencumbered by installation of any objects or by other variances in construction, and pedestrian submitted no evidence that sidewalk was constructed in special manner for benefit of owner.

The question presented by this case was whether New York State has the authority to condemn property owned by National Railroad Passenger Corporation, known as Amtrak, in the face of certain federal statutes that created Amtrak and govern the use of its property.

Amtrak brought an action against the Commissioner of the New York State Department of Transportation, asserting that the Commissioner’s effort to condemn Amtrak-owned property along the Bronx River is preempted by federal law. The State had already condemned six parcels of Amtrak property, and had plans to condemn one additional parcel, as part of the “Bronx River Greenway” project – a joint New York State, New York City, and federal redevelopment project to restore the riverfront, which includes the development of parks, bike paths, and running and walking trails along the Bronx River.

Amtrak had no interest in the subject property and was willing to part with it for the same amount of money that the State has placed in escrow for that very purpose. The only live issue was whether acquisition was properly effected by eminent domain, or whether the State had to buy the property from Amtrak. “Amtrak, having chosen not to raise the preemption issue in the eminent domain proceeding, belatedly brings it before this Court.”

The court concluded that Amtrak’s claims with respect to the Amtrak Bronx Rail Property are barred by the Eleventh Amendment (as to the six condemned parcels) and the statute of limitations (as to Parcel 178),

Doctor had operated a licensed medical practice since 2006.  In 2011, he began prescribing patients with opioid dependency a drug called Suboxone. Soon thereafter, a citation was issued to doctor for violating the Union Township Zoning Resolution for operating a “Suboxone Treatment Center” on the property without first obtaining a change in use permit.

Doctor then applied for a change in use permit, which was denied by the Planning and Zoning Director of Union Township.  The Zoning Director stated that a “Suboxone Treatment Center” is a substance abuse treatment center, which is not specifically listed as an approved function within the B–1 Business District where the property is located. The Union Township Zoning Resolution provides that uses which are not specifically permitted are prohibited, and thus the Doctor’s substance abuse treatment center was not permitted under the zoning classification. The Zoning Board of Appeals (“ZBA”) confirmed the decision and doctor appealed.

The Common Pleas Court found that doctor’s clinic fell within the practice of medicine, vacating the ZBA’s decision.  Consequently, the Court found that the treatment of patients with opioid dependency, including prescribing Suboxone, is within the scope of the Union Township Zoning Resolution allowing medical clinics in the B–1 Business District where Doctor’s property is located.

The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Common Pleas Court decision finding that a substance abuse treatment center falls within the definition of “medical clinic” in the Union Township Zoning Resolution is supported by a preponderance of reliable, probative, and substantial evidence.

The Debtors are residential real estate developers. They proposed a Chapter 11 plan wherein the equity owners would retain their interests. Because the plan did not propose to pay creditors in full, this posed absolute priority problems. The owners addressed that problem by making a “new value” contribution.  This contribution was in the form of real property, three phases (Phases IV, V, and VI) of the land referred to as Northgate. The Debtors had no interest in any of the three properties. The contribution of the Northgate phases to the plan constituted the “new value” necessary to satisfy the absolute priority rule and to obtain confirmation.

The mechanics of the transfer of the real estate are of central importance. The Northgate phases were contributed under a Transfer and Development Agreement (TDA).  Under the TDA, the Northgate phases were to be transferred to the Debtor on the Effective Date and then immediately transferred out, either to New Stream Real Estate, LLC, the lienholder on Northgate, or its designee.  The Debtors retained an ownership interest in Northgate to the extent of any net profits from Phases IV and V. Those profits would pay creditors under the plan.

New Stream designated an entity known as GSRE 25 LLC to receive the Northgate property from the Debtor.  GSRE 25 has commenced development and sale of the Northgate properties. Operating under the belief that no transfer tax applies, title companies have assisted in the sales without requiring payment of transfer tax.  This prompted the Township’s complaint.

The Township’s motion for summary judgment was granted.  Future transfers made by GSRE 25, LLC, or any other non-debtor third party grantor, to any third party purchaser/grantee of the Northgate subdivision are not exempt from applicable transfer taxes. Further, judgment was entered in favor of the Township in the amount of the uncollected local transfer tax for those properties already sold.

Town Council voted to approve a budget that eliminated the funding for the position of the Department of Public Works (DPW) Director.

Director argued that he had a constitutionally protected property interest in his job as DPW Director. Director pointed both to the Charter language establishing that his employment term ran concurrently with that of the Town Council and to the Town Administrator’s letter indicating that his job was permanent.

The District Court concluded that the position of DPW Director was mandated by the Town Charter and that the town council violated the Charter when they de facto eliminated the position.

Plaintiffs case sued Jordan Valley Water Conservancy District (the District) after one of its water pipelines broke and damaged their home. Following discovery, the District moved for summary judgment, asserting, among other things, that the plaintiff homeowners could not prevail on their negligence claim because they had failed to designate an expert to testify regarding the applicable standard of care. The district court granted that motion, and the homeowners appealed. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that expert testimony was unnecessary because the District itself had previously determined that the pipeline should be replaced – a determination that in the court’s view sustained a standard of care calling for replacement.

The Supreme Court of Utah granted certiorari and reversed the decision of the court of appeals. The District’s internal decision recommending replacement of the pipe did not establish that such a move was required by a standard of care. And because the question whether a pipeline needs to be replaced is outside the knowledge and experience of average lay persons, the homeowners had an obligation to designate an expert to establish a basis for such a duty. Their failure to do so was fatal to their negligence claim, and the district court was right to dismiss it on summary judgment.

Landowner purchased property, via a warranty deed, in Chesapeake, Virginia.  Pursuant to the deed, the property was purchased subject to the easements, conditions, and restrictions of record insofar as they may lawfully affect it, including two right-of-way (“ROW”) agreements in favor of Columbia Gas Transmission.

Since purchasing the property, Landowner has maintained a fence, an above-ground swimming pool and shed, which are situated on the ROWs.  Running across the property and below grade of the ROWs are two high-pressure natural gas transmission pipelines that are maintained and operated by Columbia.

Columbia filed suit against Landowner, claiming the above-ground swimming pool, shed, and fence are encroachments. It contended that these improvements impair its ability to maintain and operate its pipelines in a safe and effective manner, thereby posing a risk to person, property, and the uninterrupted delivery of natural gas to the Tidewater area of Virginia.

Landowner contended that the fence is not a “building” or “structure” as contemplated and expressly prohibited by the ROW.

After a lengthy analysis, the court concluded that the term “structure” as contemplated and expressly prohibited by the ROW encompasses fences.

The court was good enough to inform us that, “Columbia presents no evidence to support a contention that all objects, for example something as trifling as a garden gnome, placed on the ROWs impair its ability to maintain and operate its pipelines in a safe and effective manner, thereby necessitating that object’s permanent prohibition.”  Good to know.

This lawsuit stems from the offer and sale of $35 million in revenue Bonds used to finance the construction of a 5,000–seat Event Center in the Town of Prescott Valley.  The underlying facts of the case have been covered previously in this publication.  In this stage of the ongoing litigation, the court ruled on multiple motions for summary judgment.

Although there were a great number of rulings, we will focus on those concerning the claims brought against issuer’s bond counsel – Kutak Rock.

The court found that plaintiffs failed to show that Kutak’s drafting of the Bond Documents resulted in a flawed lien over the NOI in favor of the Bondholders. Thus, Plaintiffs had not demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact that the OS was misleading or omitted material information on this ground and summary judgment was granted.

The court found that Kutak was entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims that Kutak failed to ensure the Trustee would have a method of obtaining information on whether NOI would be sufficient to pay debt service, due to the inclusion in the Loan Agreement of a provision giving the Issuer and Trustee the right at all reasonable times to examine and copy the Borrower’s books and records regarding the financial performance of the Event Center.

Kutak was not entitled to summary judgment on claims that the Bond Documents were defective for reasons relating to an Escrow Account, which the Development Agreement stated was to be held in the name of the Town and the Indenture stated was to be held by the Trustee.  Plaintiffs submitted evidence that this inconsistency caused concrete problems for the Bondholders when the Town refused to turn over the Escrow proceeds. At a minimum, there existed a genuine issue of fact as to whether the failure of the OS to disclose this inconsistency and any subsequent problems that arose with payment of the Escrow proceeds constituted a misstatement or omission under § 44–1991(A)(2).

Kutak was entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims that no mechanism addressed Fitch’s concern that sales taxes from the Event Center be remitted directly to the Trustee from the Town with no intercept from the Borrower, as a Fitch analyst had testified that adequate legal provisions in place.

Kutak was entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claim that the TPT Revenues from the Event Center were not required to be deposited in the Revenue Account, as the Indenture requires the Trustee to immediately deposit into the Revenue Fund all TPT Revenues, as well as “any other payments or amounts required or otherwise specified.”

Kutak was granted summary judgment was on Plaintiffs’ claims based on Kutak’s alleged failure to disclose or implement the Town’s budgetary process and procedure.  A major point of contention for the Plaintiffs was the fact that the Bond Documents failed to provide a mechanism by which the Trustee could ensure that the Town would pay the pledged TPT Revenues while still complying with its annual budgetary requirements. According to the Plaintiffs, the OS was misleading in this regard because it simply stated that the Town would pay any deficiencies in debt service with TPT Revenues, without disclosing that the pledge was subject to compliance with the Town’s state-mandated budget requirements and procedure.  Kutak asserted that, as a matter of law, it was not required to disclose state statutes, and thus it could not be held liable for its failure to discuss the Arizona state budgetary law in drafting the Bond Documents and the court agreed.

Kutak was granted summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims that the Bond Documents were defective because the Trustee’s remedies were available only upon accelerating the Bonds, but the Indenture prohibits the Trustee from acceleration.  Kutak cited to the language of the Indenture, which in fact gives the Trustee broad permission to exercise remedies in the event of a default and does not require acceleration for those remedies to be available.

Kutak’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claim that Kutak failed to create a Lockbox Account was denied. Under the Development Agreement, the Town was required to pay certain amounts into a Lockbox Account. Kutak asserted that the obligation to create a Lockbox Account was imposed by the Development Agreement, which predated Kutak’s involvement in the Bond financing. In response, Plaintiffs pointed to evidence tending to show that, in fact, it was Kutak’s responsibility to ensure that the Development Agreement cohered with the other Bond Documents.  The court concluded that Plaintiffs had set forth sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact that it was Kutak’s responsibility to ensure that the Development Agreement worked with the rest of the Bond Documents, including ensuring that a Lockbox Account was created.

Kutak contended that it did not know, and could not reasonably have known, of the misstatements or omissions in the OS regarding projections or nondisclosure of demographic facts and thus is entitled to the affirmative defense provided by A.R.S. § 44–2001(B).  The court agreed, granting summary judgment on these claims.

The court found that Plaintiffs had shown a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a Fitch downgrade of the bonds was caused by risks concealed or misstated in the OS rather than by Prescott Valley’s economic downturn.  Consequently, Kutak’s motion for summary judgment was denied on its affirmative defense argument to the extent it pertained to loss correlating to the Fitch downgrade.

Kutak contended that it was entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ negligent misrepresentation because Plaintiffs failed to submit any evidence linking their loss to those misstatements in the OS regarding defects in the lien or security for the Bonds.   The court agreed, granting summary judgment on these claims.

LLC sought an order compelling the production of certain legal memoranda authored by the City of Richmond’s in-house and outside counsel. The City argued that the legal memoranda were subject to the attorney-client privilege and thus protected from disclosure.  LLC asserted that the City waived the attorney-client privilege as to the legal memoranda when a council member quoted a portion of their contents in a letter he sent to an outside third party.

City asserted that “a city council can only authorize waiver of the privilege by vote or other similar approval by the council as a whole—the unilateral, unauthorized acts of a single council member do not constitute a waiver.”  The court agreed, find that, “In short, the acts of a single councilmember, acting unilaterally and without the requisite authority, cannot erode the protections of the City Council’s attorney-client privilege.”

Planning and Zoning Commission denied City’s application for a special use permit to expand an existing landfill.  City appealed, claiming that the Commission’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence.  City argued that the Commission “gave only general, nonspecific reasons as the basis of unanimous denial” and that the superior court’s reliance on the defendant’s finding of intensification was improper and not supported by the record.

The appeals court disagreed, affirming the judgment of the superior court.

Section 7.5.B of the Wallingford Zoning Regulations sets forth the criteria for evaluating applications for special permits. Most relevant to this appeal is § 7.5.B.1.a, which provides that the defendant should consider “the size and intensity of the proposed use or uses and its or their effect on and compatibility with the adopted Plan of Development, the specific zone and the neighborhood….”  Thus, the Wallingford Zoning Regulations explicitly listed intensity of the proposed use as a factor for the Commission’s consideration when deciding a special permit application. The Commission stated that intensification, e.g., an unacceptable increase in the intensity of the current use, was the basis for denying the special permit application. Thus, the appeals court concluded that the record contained substantial evidence supporting this specific reason, and, thus, the City’s claim that the Commission provided only a general reason was without merit.

Deputy Chief of Police was terminated when Town eliminated the position due to budget cuts.

Deputy Chief sued, claiming that the Town deprived him of his Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process by failing to provide him with a hearing both prior to and after eliminating his position. The Town contended that because Deputy Chief’s position was eliminated as a result of budgetary issues, and not based on any charges against him, it was under no obligation to provide a pre- or post-termination hearing unless Deputy Chief specifically requested one.

For the purposes of its motion for summary judgment, the Town conceded that the officer had a constitutionally protected property interest in his position as Deputy Police Chief.  The Town also conceded that it deprived Deputy Chief of that interest when the Commissioners voted to eliminate the position.  However, the Town argued that this deprivation was not effected without due process, and that it did not fail to provide Deputy Chief with adequate procedural protections either before or after his termination.

The court found that, although officer failed to protest his termination before it occurred, under the circumstances here this failure does not prevent him from claiming a violation of his due process right to a pre-termination hearing. Because the Town provided him no notice prior to the layoff becoming effective, it did not afford him an opportunity to timely object, which is a prerequisite to waiver of one’s pretermination hearing rights. Therefore, Town’s motion for summary judgment was denied with respect to this aspect of its claim.

However, the court found that the Deputy Chief could not satisfy the criteria to show that he was unconstitutionally deprived of a post-termination hearing. In particular, he failed to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether he requested a post-termination hearing.

Former officer with city’s police department brought § 1983 action against city, police chief, and city manager, alleging that his termination constituted First Amendment retaliation based on his political speech and union activities, and that defendants caused him to be falsely arrested, imprisoned, and prosecuted.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• Municipal liability did not attach on First Amendment retaliation claims;
• Officer’s speech activities did not play substantial role in disciplinary and personnel decisions; and
• Officer’s false arrest, imprisonment, and malicious prosecution claims failed.

Local governments can be held liable under § 1983 for constitutional torts caused by official policies, but such municipal liability is limited to acts that are, properly speaking, acts of the municipality, that is, acts which the municipality has officially sanctioned or ordered.

In determining whether a local government’s policy or action represents official municipal policy, so that the government can be held liable under § 1983 for constitutional torts resulting therefrom, the court must determine whether the decision at issue was made by those officials or governmental bodies who speak with final policymaking authority for the local governmental actor concerning the action alleged to have caused the particular constitutional or statutory violation at issue.

City brought declaratory judgment action against political committee, as the main proponent and sponsor of initiative petition, seeking a declaration that two questions being put to the voters with regard to a convention center project were in accordance with the provisions of the city charter and general laws of the state.

Committee counterclaimed, seeking a declaration that lease approval question had been improperly placed on special election ballot. The circuit court allowed master developer to intervene, and entered judgment in favor of city and developer, and dismissed committee’s counterclaims for declaratory and injunctive relief for lack of standing. Committee appealed.

The District Court of Appeal held that:

• City waived issue of whether political committee had standing to raise counterclaims;
• Master developer was precluded from challenging committee’s standing;
• Voters were required to be provided with, and allowed to approve, material terms of lease pursuant to city charter provision;
• City charter provision was not intended to control the sequence of steps involved in approving lease agreement;
• Lease approval question as posed on ballot summary was insufficient to provide the voters with the information needed to intelligently cast their ballots to approve or disapprove the lease of certain property in the vicinity of convention center; and
• Ballot question violated the statutory requirement of clarity and accuracy, and had to be removed from ballot.

Voters who were empowered by city charter to approve the lease of certain property were entitled to receive the same essential information a commissioner would need to decide whether to approve such a lease.  While charter provision did not require that voters be presented with every single term or provision of lease, they were required to be provided with, and allowed to approve, the material terms of the lease pursuant to the charter provision.

Lease approval question as posed on ballot summary was insufficient to provide the voters with the information needed to intelligently cast their ballots to approve or disapprove the lease of certain property.  Lease approval question lacked material terms, including the amount of rent to be paid, square footage and exact location of the property to be conveyed to developer, height of any air rights to be transferred, and a statement of other additional consideration being given by the parties.

Not-for-profit organizations representing real property owners in two counties brought action against Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, the Department of Environmental Protection, city, and county, alleging that beach restoration project constituted a taking.

The District Court of Appeal held that:

• The Department and the Board waived their argument of improper venue, and
• The nature of plaintiffs’ inverse condemnation claim did not demand that it be treated like an eminent domain proceeding, which would have required it to be litigated in the county in which the affected land was located, as it involved question of subject matter jurisdiction, rather than venue.

This appeal arose from a bond validation proceeding in which the State of Georgia petitioned the Fulton County Superior Court for a judgment approving the issuance of certain taxable revenue bonds by the Development Authority of Fulton County (“DAFC”) and validating the bonds and various bond security documents.

After the state filed the petition validating the issuance, Sherman filed a document entitled “Notice of Becoming Party to Bond Validation Petition Proceeding,” in which he gave notice that he thereby became a party to the proceedings for purposes of stating his objections to the bond validation. DAFC moved to strike Sherman’s notice on the ground that Sherman was required to follow the intervention procedures of OCGA § 9–11–24(c) in order to become a party.

The trial court denied the motion to strike, finding that under the authority of Hay v. Dev. Auth. of Walton County, 239 Ga.App. 803 (521 S.E.2d 912) (1999), Sherman’s notice was sufficient to authorize him to participate as a party. Eventually, the trial court entered an order validating and confirming the bonds, and Sherman filed this appeal.

After the appeal was docketed, the court decided Sherman v. Dev. Auth. of Fulton County, 321 Ga.App. 550 (739 S.E.2d 457) (2013).  Overruling the contrary holding in Hay, supra, 239 Ga.App. at 804–805, the court held that a person must follow the intervention procedures of OCGA § 9–11–24 in order to become a party to a bond validation proceeding.

In this appeal, the court concluded that Sherman, 321 Ga.App. at 554–555(1), should be given retroactive application because the court did not state that its decision should be applied only prospectively and the equities favor retroactive application under the three prongs of Chevron Oil Co., 404 U.S. at 106–107(II).  Thus, Sherman lacked standing and the court dismissed his appeal.

Opponents of referendum regarding property annexation by town brought action against town seeking to enjoin referendum. The ultimate issue presented was what may be placed on a petition for referendum pertaining to land annexation under Maryland Code.  Additionally, the parties presented questions regarding a Town Manager’s authority to create procedures for the validation and verification of signatures on a referendum petition, whether the administrator in this particular case observed his own procedures, and to what extent, if any, the Election Law Article of the Maryland Code and Maryland common law should apply to municipal land annexation referenda.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• Referendum opponents could bring a common law mandamus action challenging town manager’s decision to approve petition for referendum;
• Inclusion of additional resolutions to petition for referendum pertaining to land annexation, which resolutions were nonreferrable, did not invalidate the petition;
• Town manager had the implied authority to create and publish guidelines for verification of signatures on petition for referendum; and
• Town manager’s publication of guidelines did not violate the general public’s due process rights.

Property owner challenged special assessments that city levied against its property for curb, gutter, and storm sewer improvements to an adjoining road.

Property owner appealed the Tax Tribunal’s order upholding the special assessments.  Citing the strong presumption that special assessments are valid, the appeals court held that the Tribunal did not commit an error of law or adopt a wrong legal principle, its factual findings were supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence, and the Tribunal’s lengthy delay in issuing its opinion did not deny petitioner its right to procedural due process.

Applicant brought declaratory judgment action seeking determination that application to heritage-preservation commission for a certificate of appropriateness was a written request related to zoning, such that city had only 60 days to approve or deny application.

The Supreme Court of Minnesota held that:

• Trial court had subject matter jurisdiction;
• Written request relating to zoning referred to written request that had a connection, association, or logical relationship to the regulation of building development or the uses of property; and
• Application to heritage-preservation commission for certificate of appropriateness was written request relating to zoning.

A written request relating to zoning under statute governing time deadlines for agency action, requiring agency to approve or deny request within 60 days, referred to a written request that had a connection, association, or logical relationship to the regulation of building development or the uses of property, rather than referring only to those requests that were explicitly authorized by an applicable zoning ordinance or statute.  The phrase “relating to” had been interpreted to encompass any connection, association, or logical relationship to the noun modified by the phrase, and statute said nothing about zoning statutes or ordinances.

Application to a heritage-preservation commission for a certificate of appropriateness was a “written request relating to zoning” under statute governing time deadlines for agency action, and therefore city had 60 days to approve or deny application, where a certificate of appropriateness involved a particular property and affected specific property rights, state’s historic-preservation-enabling laws recognized a connection, association, or logical relationship between heritage preservation and zoning, and city’s heritage-preservation ordinances identified a connection, association, or logical relationship between an application for a certificate of appropriateness and zoning. Heritage-preservation proceedings are akin to hearings on a conditional use permit directed at a specific property and related to specific property rights.

Non-profit corporation and its subsidiary filed tax appeals from municipalities’ refusals to exempt property owned by corporation under statute exempting properties actually and exclusively used in furtherance of a taxpayer’s charitable purpose.

The Tax Court denied non-profit’s appeal, finding an insufficient nexus between the housing provided and the services offered by non-profit to justify a charitable property tax exemption.

The Appellate Division reversed and remanded for a judgment granting non-profit the charitable property tax exemption. It determined that non-profit had fully integrated its housing and support services and satisfied the test set forth in Presbyterian Homes of the Synod of N.J. v. Division of Tax Appeals.  More specifically, the Appellate Division held that non-profit used the property for the charitable purpose of deinstitutionalizing the mentally disabled, thus relieving the government of having to provide for their housing and care.

The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that, as a matter of first impression, corporation and its subsidiary qualified for tax-exempt status.

Non-profit corporation and its subsidiary, which provided supportive housing and services for mentally disabled individuals, actually used their residences for the charitable purpose of promoting and providing permanent, normalized community living arrangements for psychiatrically disabled individuals, and, thus, they qualified for tax-exempt status.  Their charitable work spared the government an expense that it ultimately would have bore, the property was used in a manner to further the charitable purpose, they received substantial sums of money from federal and state agencies to purchase housing and deliver supportive services to the psychiatrically disabled, and they were addressing an important and legitimate governmental concern, namely the provision of both housing and substantial supportive services that fostered the prospect of independent and productive living in the community for the mentally disabled, and homeless, and they were not engaged in a seemingly commercial enterprise.

In this matter, the Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the Appellate Division’s invalidation of the most recent iteration of Council on Affordable Housing (COAH) regulations applicable to the third round of municipal affordable housing obligations (Third Round Rules). In the Third Round Rules, COAH proposed a new approach—a “growth share” methodology—for assessing prospective need in the allocation of a municipality’s fair share of the region’s need for affordable housing.

In invalidating the Third Round Rules, the Appellate Division expressed doubt about whether any growth share methodology adopted by COAH could be compatible with the Mount Laurel II remedy that “appears to militate against the use of” a growth share approach for determining a municipality’s affordable housing obligation.

The Supreme Court of New Jersey concluded that, unless the Legislature amends the Fair Housing Act (FHA), which tracks the judicial remedy in its operative provisions, the present regulations premised on a growth share methodology cannot be sustained. The changes in the Third Round Rules are beyond the purview of the rulemaking authority delegated to COAH because they conflict with the FHA, rendering the regulations ultra vires.

“Moreover, due to COAH’s failure to enact lawful regulations to govern municipalities’ ongoing obligations to create affordable housing under the FHA, we have no choice but to endorse the remedy imposed by the Appellate Division in order to fill the void created by COAH. COAH shall adopt regulations, as directed by the Appellate Division, without delay. As modified by this opinion, we thus affirm the Appellate Division’s judgment with respect to the invalidity of the Third Round Rules under the FHA.”

Landlord brought action seeking to compel New York City Housing Authority to reinstate Section 8 subsidy payments.

The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that the cause of action accrued, and four-month statute of limitations began to run, when landlord did not receive all of the rent owed.

The Supreme Court of Oklahoma took up a challenge to several projects concerning the “Master Lease Program” of the Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education authorized by 70 O.S.2011 §§ 3206.6–3206.6b.  This Act enables the Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education to provide lease financing for colleges and universities which are part of the Oklahoma State System for Higher Education. The Oklahoma Development Finance Authority (ODFA) sought the approval of the bonds which would be used to build various projects.

The court held that bonds issued by the Regents do not violate the balanced budget provisions because the Legislature has no authority to direct the entity’s spending decisions. Because these bonds are payable only by the Regents, they cannot become debts of the state as a matter of law. The Regents have the sole constitutional authority to disburse funds appropriated to them in a lump sum by the Legislature. The Legislature cannot be forced to appropriate funds to repay the bonds because it has no authority to dictate such a specific expenditure to the Regents.

Employee brought action against fire protection district alleging that he was wrongfully terminated for attempted to stop a training exercise.

The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that evidence was sufficient to support finding that employee was terminated in retaliation for opposition to unlawful and unsafe training exercise.

Plaintiff King was a paid firefighter for the Berryhill Fire Protection District and worked under the supervision of Fire Chief Downing. Chief Downing wanted to remove structures from real property he owned and had received an estimate for the demolition of structures on his property in the amount of $10,000. Rather than paying to have the structures demolished, Chief Downing began planning a live burn training exercise on the property even though gasoline tank batteries were located on nearby property on three sides of his property, trains operated on tracks on the immediate east side of his property, electrical lines were near the structures, and there was a large tree that could have caught fire. Further, there was no water immediately available at the proposed burn site. At trial, witnesses for both parties testified that the property was not an appropriate site for such a drill.

Driver sued police officer and city, alleging that officer in unmarked police vehicle hit her vehicle.

The City moved to dismiss the employee under section 101.106(e) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which provides: “If a suit is filed under this chapter against both a governmental unit and any of its employees, the employees shall immediately be dismissed on the filing of a motion by the governmental unit.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 101.106(e) (West 2012). The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the employee.

The City then filed a plea to the jurisdiction seeking its own dismissal pursuant to section 101.106(b), which provides: “The filing of a suit against any employee of a governmental unit constitutes an irrevocable election by the plaintiff and immediately and forever bars any suit or recovery by the plaintiff against the governmental unit regarding the same subject matter unless the governmental unit consents.” Id. § 101.106(b). The City argued that by suing the employee as well as the City, Driver had irrevocably elected to sue only the employee.

The appeals court concluded that although 101.106(b) may “immediately and forever bar any suit against the governmental unit,” this bar does not apply if  “the governmental unit consents.”  “Consent” as used in 101.106(b) includes the express waiver of municipal immunity in section 101.021 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code.  Under that section, a governmental unit is liable for certain damages arising from the operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle.

Property owner submitted a variance request. The Board of Zoning Appeals denied the variance request. Property owner appealed. The Circuit Court entered judgment in favor of property owner and rezoned the property. City appealed.

The Court of Civil Appeals held that:

• Property owner did not have a right to continue the nonconforming use of property, and
• The city’s denial of property owner’s request to change the zoning classification of property from residential to business was not arbitrary or capricious.

Property owner did not have a right to continue the nonconforming use of property, even though predecessor in title had previously used the property zoned residential for a business.  The property had previously been used by owner’s father as a gravel pit.  When owners’ parents divorced, owner’s mother acquired title to the property.  There was no evidence that the property continued to be used as a gravel pit after owner’s mother acquired title to the property, and thus the nonconforming use of the property had been discontinued for more than one year.

This suit involves the offering and sale of $35 million in revenue bonds (the “Bonds”) used to finance the construction of a 5,000–seat Event Center in the Town of Prescott Valley, Arizona.  The details of the case have been previously reported herein.

The claims subject to this particular Motion in the ongoing litigation were those of a number of individual Bondholders whose interests are represented by the Indenture Trustee of the Bonds, Wells Fargo. The Defendants in this case are numerous. They include the underwriters for the Bonds, attorneys for the underwriters, and the various entities that received the proceeds for the Bonds and built the Event Center.

• Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment was granted as to the claims of the 53 Bondholders who failed to return questionnaires.
• Wells Fargo was prohibited from bringing claims on behalf of any Bondholders not identified by the June 15, 2012 deadline.
• Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on the Arizona Securities Act (ASA) claims was granted as to the secondary market purchasers who did not purchase their Bonds from Defendants, however, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment was denied as to the ASA claims of all other Bondholders.
• Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on the negligent misrepresentation claims was denied as to those Bondholders who claimed to have relied on the Fitch Rating or the Official Statements (OS), however, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on the negligent misrepresentation claims was granted as to those Bondholders who relied only on their brokers or only received the OS without any indication that they relied on it.

Apprenticeship program and employers filed action against California agencies and officials seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, principally on ground that actions of California Department of Industrial Relations (CDIR) were inconsistent with federal regulations and hence preempted.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• Federal subject-matter jurisdiction existed over preemption claim;
• On issue of first impression, phrase, “Federal purposes,” under federal apprenticeship regulations referred to federal laws or actions that in some way addressed apprenticeship or made conformity with federal apprenticeship standards a condition of eligibility for the federal assistance at issue;
• Court did not owe Auer deference to interpretation of apprenticeship regulation by Department of Labor (DOL);
• Interpretation of apprenticeship regulation by DOL was entitled to Skidmore deference;
• CDIR could require contractors on projects funded by Build America Bonds and tax-exempt municipal bonds to comply with California’s apprenticeship standards;
• California “needs test” for approval of new apprenticeship programs in building and construction trades did not violate dormant Commerce Clause;
• “needs test” did not violate equal protection; and
• “needs test” did not violate substantive due process.

CDIR could require contractors on projects funded by Build America Bonds and tax-exempt municipal bonds to comply with California’s apprenticeship standards, since those bonds did not condition federal assistance provided on compliance with federal apprenticeship standards.

The City of Alameda offered of municipal bonds to finance the development of a cable and Internet system.  Several Nuveen entities purchased about twenty million dollars worth of the bonds and then lost money on the bonds when the City sold the system several years later. Nuveen brought federal and state securities claims against the City, alleging that the City misrepresented the risks to investors.

The Court of Appeals Nuveen held that Nuveen had not shown a triable issue of fact on the issue of loss causation. For its federal claims under Section 10b–5 and Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Nuveen’s theory that it would not have purchased the securities but for the City’s alleged misrepresentation of the risks went only to show reliance, or transaction causation. Missing was the necessary link between the claimed misrepresentations and the economic loss Nuveen suffered.

Although Nuveen pitched its appeal as novel because the notes were traded on an inefficient market, rather than a more familiar efficient market like one of the stock exchanges, this wrinkle did not change the result. Federal securities law requires proof of both transaction and loss causation.

The City had statutory immunity from suit on Nuveen’s state claims. California courts have applied § 818.8 of California’s Government Claims Act to immunize public entities from liability for misrepresentations sanctioned by those entities. The California Corporate Securities Act did not override that immunity.

Group homes for recovering alcoholics and drug users, a group home owner, and group home residents brought lawsuits against city challenging the enactment of a city ordinance having the practical effect of prohibiting new group homes from opening in most residential zones, alleging discrimination under the federal Fair Housing Act (FHA), the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Equal Protection Clause.

The United States District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the city. Plaintiffs appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• Fact issues precluded summary judgment on plaintiffs’ disparate treatment claims;
• Fact issues precluded summary judgment on group homes’ damages claim under the FHA; and
• Fact issue precluded summary judgment on one resident’s claim for emotional distress damages under the FHA.

Genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether city ordinance was enacted with the discriminatory purpose of harming group homes and, therefore limiting the housing options available to disabled individuals recovering from addiction, and whether the ordinance had an adverse effect on group homes and group home residents, precluding summary judgment on disparate treatment claims.

Police chief appealed a final order of the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission suspending his law enforcement certification for 18 months, to be followed by two years’ probationary reinstatement.

The District Court of Appeal held that dual roles played by attorney as staff counsel and prosecutor deprived police chief of an impartial hearing.

Dual roles played by attorney as staff counsel, in which capacity he offered advice and recommendations to Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission, and as prosecutor, in which capacity he advocated case against police chief and pursued the maximum administrative penalty, deprived police chief of an impartial hearing and required reversal of suspension order.  While the heightened staff penalty recommendation was not ultimately implemented, it was clear from the record that the prosecution was given enhanced access to the decision-making body, which undermined the Commission’s function as an unbiased, critical reviewer of the facts.

Employee filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and monetary damages against the city, which had treated his project manager position as if it was unclassified and had never created an eligibility list for the position.

The District Court of Appeal held that, because city charter did not list the position of project manager as an unclassified position, it was a classified position, and having failed to amend city charter to include project manager position in the list of unclassified positions, city could not refuse to afford employee, who was project manager, the benefits of the classified position because of the city’s lapses.  Thus, city was estopped from claiming any advantage based on its own acts and omissions.

Police chief of the City of Georgetown in Kentucky was removed from his position by the mayor. The chief alleged that he was terminated in violation of a City of Georgetown ordinance that stated that he could be terminated only for cause, and only by the city council.

The police chief contended that the local ordinance was preempted by the Home Rule Statutes, which provide that the mayor “shall be the appointing authority with power to appoint and remove all city employees, including police officers, except as tenure and terms of employment are protected by statute, ordinance or contract and except for employees of the council.”

The court of appeals found no conflict between the two regulations. The Home Rule Statutes give the mayor authority to appoint and remove all city employees, although the statute does not state that such power is solely left to the mayor. The Home Rule Statutes does not strip the mayor of his or her authority to appoint and remove the chief of police; rather, a plain reading of the local ordinance indicates that the city ordinance simply sets forth another option for a valid termination of the chief of police by the city council for cause.  The local ordinance does not state that the mayor is stripped of his or her removal authority, nor that the city council has the sole authority to terminate the police chief. Because the police chief was terminated by the mayor, which is authorized, his claims were properly dismissed.

As a result of Hurricane Katrina, the Property, which was the former location of the Lake Terrace Shopping Center (a strip mall), sustained extensive damage.  DMK purchased the Property for $1.35 million. At the time of the purchase, the hurricane damage to the Property had not been repaired.  The City awarded DMK an Economic Development Fund grant totaling $250,000, which was intended to help bring the Property back into commerce.

The City commenced a code enforcement proceeding against DMK.  The City alleged that DMK was in violation of its municipal ordinances prohibiting public nuisance and blighted property. The City’s administrative hearing officer (HO) found DMK guilty of the charged violations and imposed various fines.

DMK appealed, alleging procedural, statutory, and constitutional contentions relating to the administrative hearing, essentially: (i) witnesses not being required to testify under oath at the administrative hearing, and (ii) hearsay evidence being accepted and the inability to cross-examine witnesses.

The appeals court found no violations of DMK’s rights, upholding the judgment against it.

Wheelchair-bound school visitor who was injured when his wheelchair tipped while rolling over a speed bump in high school parking lot brought action against parish school board for negligence and violation of the ADA. The Nineteenth Judicial District Court awarded summary judgment to school board on the ADA claim, and designated its judgment as final for purposes of appeal. Visitor appealed.

The Court of Appeal held that school board did not intentionally discriminate against visitor, as necessary to support compensatory damages under the ADA.

Even if placement of the speed bumps violated an ADA guideline, nothing suggested that school board was aware of any such violation, there had been no prior accidents similar to that suffered by visitor, and school board set about removing the speed bumps after visitor’s accident.

County filed condemnation petition, and court-appointed condemnation commissioners awarded damages to property owners. Owners filed exceptions to award and requested jury trial. After jury assessed damages for owners of $1.3 million, the Circuit Court added $650,000 for heritage value to jury’s verdict.  County appealed.

Holdings: The Supreme Court of Missouri held that:

• Parties’ stipulation to the substance of nine unrecorded bench conferences eliminated any prejudice to county, and inaudible parts of trial transcript were not prejudicial to county;
• Heritage value statute was irrelevant to jury’s task of determining fair market value of subject property, and, therefore, exclusion of evidence of heritage value statute from jury’s consideration was proper;
• Purported statement by owner during hearing before condemnation commissioner, about amount for which he would have settled during negotiations with county, was not admissible at jury trial as a prior inconsistent statement or an admission against interest;
• Evidence regarding price that an owner of adjacent property received when, years after selling some of that property to real estate developer, he sold the portion of the property he had retained for his residence was inadmissible;
• Proposed opinion testimony by two city employees regarding effect that challenges to the development of subject property would have on its value was subject to the discovery rule regarding disclosure of expert testimony regarding facts known and opinions developed in anticipation of litigation;
• Substantial evidence supported jury’s award of $1.3 million as the fair market value of subject property; and
• Heritage value statute, requiring additional compensation of 50 percent of fair market value of property that has been owned by a family for 50 or more years, does not violate state constitution.

Heritage value statute did not violate constitutional prohibition against using public funds for a private benefit.  Primary object of the expenditure in the statute was to compensate a class of persons whose property was acquired through eminent domain for the benefit of the public, and, therefore the compensation authorized by that statute was legal, notwithstanding that it also involved as, an incident, an expense that, standing alone, would not be lawful.

Property owner brought declaratory action against town planning board challenging the imposition of an additional requirement, after the conditional preliminary approval of the subdivision plan, that owner submit proof of compliance with provision limiting transfer of sanitary flow credits or of a variance by county department of health services that was not based on the credit transfer. The Supreme Court found imposition of the additional requirement arbitrary and capricious. Board appealed.

The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that board could not impose additional requirement after granting conditional preliminary approval.

On appeal, the court was asked to determine whether a taxable transfer occurs under Tax Law § 1201(b) and Administrative Code of the City of New York § 11–2102(a) when a residential housing cooperative corporation amends its certificate of incorporation as a part of its voluntary dissolution, reconstitution, and termination of participation in the Mitchell–Lama housing program (see Private Housing Finance Law § 10 et seq.).

The court concluded that, that because there is no transfer or conveyance of any real property or an interest in real property under those circumstances, no taxable event occurs.

Mother, representing estate of her son who was murdered for providing confidential tip, brought action alleging that municipality and police officers were liable for her son’s death.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• Issue of whether municipality and police officers had special relationship with informant properly was submitted to the jury and
• Municipality did not acquire knowledge that inaction could lead to harm to informant.

To establish a special relationship beyond the duty that is owed to the public generally, in the context of a negligence claim under New York law against a municipality or its employees acting in a governmental capacity, four elements must be present: (1) an assumption by the municipality, through promises or actions, of an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the party who was injured; (2) knowledge on the part of the municipality’s agents that inaction could lead to harm; (3) some form of direct contact between the municipality’s agents and the injured party; and (4) that party’s justifiable reliance on the municipality’s affirmative undertaking.

Municipality did not acquire knowledge that inaction could lead to harm to informant, and thus informant’s estate could not establish a special relationship beyond duty that was owed to public generally on negligence claim under New York law against municipality acting in governmental capacity, where police officers who dealt with informant did not know that he was in danger.

Political candidate commenced proceeding to validate petition designating him as candidate in primary election for party’s nomination for office as member of city council, and to invalidate designating petition of opponent.  The Supreme Court entered final order validating candidate’s petition and declining to invalidate opponent’s petition. City’s board of elections and candidate appealed and cross-appealed.

The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that:

• Candidate’s petition substantially complied with statutory and regulatory requirements, and
• Opponent’s petition also satisfied statutory requirements.

Amended cover sheet of candidate’s petition substantially complied with statutory and regulatory requirements, despite candidate listing two volumes on his amended cover sheet which were not filed as part of his designating petition.  In any event, candidate was not actually notified of, and given opportunity to cure, purported “extra volumes” defect, as required by rules of city’s board of elections.

Designating petition submitted by candidate for position as member of city council complied with statutory requirements by indicating each signer’s respective street address and county within in which each signatory resided.

Parents of developmentally disabled student who died after suffering anaphylactic reaction to blueberries at private school, individually and as administrators of student’s estate, brought action against city and its department of education, school, and registered nurse, alleging that defendants negligently permitted student to become exposed to blueberries, breached their duty to monitor, supervise, and control student, failed to exercise reasonable care in protecting student from injury, and failed to properly diagnose, manage, and treat student’s allergic reaction.

The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that:

• Mandate to provide free and appropriate public education (FAPE) did not expand department’s duty of care;
• Department was not vicariously liable for acts of student’s private nurse;
• School provided adequate supervision of student;
• Deficiencies in school’s supervision of student was not proximate cause of his death;
• School responded reasonably to student’s anaphylactic reaction;
• Even if school’s nurse owed duty of care to student, she did not depart from good and accepted practice; and
• Private nurse did not depart from good and accepted practice.

Petitioners commenced proceeding under Article 78, seeking review of two determinations of town’s board of zoning appeals granting applications for certain area variances submitted by member on behalf of limited liability company (LLC) property owner. The Supreme Court granted the petition and annulled the determinations. Appeal was taken.

The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that:

• Board had jurisdiction over the applications, and
• Board’s determination had a rational basis and was not arbitrary and capricious.

Town’s board of zoning appeals had jurisdiction over applications for area variances submitted by member of LLC property owner, where: 1) board was clearly aware that LLC was owner of the property, and that member was acting on LLC’s behalf; and 2) each application was accompanied by an owner’s affirmation form which reflected that LLC was owner of the property, and that member was its agent.

Determination of town’s board of zoning appeals granting applications for certain area variances submitted by member on behalf of LLC property owner had a rational basis and was not arbitrary and capricious, where the board properly balanced the requisite statutory factors, and it found that benefit to the LLC outweighed detriment to the health, safety, and welfare of the neighborhood or community.

The City of Burlington entered into a Master State and Municipal Lease/Purchase Agreement (the “MLA”) under which it secured funds for the lease-to-purchase of telecom equipment and for the construction and operation of a city-wide fiber optic network. The City has used the network to provide voice, data, and cable television services through an entity known as Burlington Telecom (“BT”). After Burlington stopped appropriating funds to make payments under the MLA, Citibank N.A. filed a fifteen-count complaint raising a variety of claims against Burlington and McNeil, Leddy & Sheahan, P.C. (“McNeil”), which served as counsel to the City.

Burlington alleges that prior to entering the MLA, the City expressed concern that the MLA might prevent it from seeking financing from other lenders in the event that it required additional funds for BT’s expansion within the City and to surrounding areas. According to Burlington, it was provided assurances that CitiCapital would provide such financing in the event it was required. According to Burlington, CitiCapital in effect promised to proceed in good faith and work together with Burlington when the additional financing became necessary.

In February 2008, Burlington sought additional funding from CitiCapital.  At around the same time, though, Citibank entered negotiations to sell CitiCapital’s municipal leasing portfolio. In advance of the prospective sale, CitiCapital instituted a moratorium on new business and, according to Burlington, simply refused to negotiate new financing terms. Burlington did not obtain additional funds from CitiCapital, and after the credit market collapsed in the fall of 2008, no other financing options materialized.  Thereafter, Burlington stopped making payments under the MLA and this lawsuit ensued.

At the motions stage of the proceeds, the court analyzed whether a promise to negotiate in good faith is illusory or enforceable.  The court ultimately concluded that such promises may in theory be enforceable, but not under these circumstances due to the absence of anything other than the vaguest of assurances.

The court did indicate, however, that Burlington might succeed under a theory of promissory estoppel.

The court also ruled on a number of additional motions to dismiss and affirmative defenses and remanded for further proceedings.

City redevelopment and housing authority filed petition to condemn nonblighted property within approved redevelopment project. Owner of subject property filed answer and grounds of defense to condemnation. The Circuit Court granted redevelopment and housing authority’s motion to strike owner’s objections and affirmative defenses, and authorized taking of property by eminent domain. Owner appealed.

The Supreme Court of Virginia held that:

• Redevelopment and housing authority did not have statutory authority, after July 1, 2010, to acquire by eminent domain nonblighted property within redevelopment project by merely filing petition for condemnation prior to July 1, 2010, and
• Application of statute limiting exercise of eminent domain to eliminate blight to property that was itself blighted did not deprive redevelopment and housing authority of any vested right in nonblighted property.

In February 2008, the Homer City Council approved a bond proposition and issued an election brochure entitled “Questions & Answers about Homer Town Square and the New City Hall.” Homer resident Frank Griswold filed a complaint with the Alaska Public Offices Commission, alleging that the brochure constituted the use of municipal funds to influence the outcome of a ballot measure without an appropriation ordinance in violation of AS 15.13.145.1 The commission agreed with Griswold and fined the City $400.

Griswold filed a public records request with City Manager requesting any documents relating to the brochure. The City of Homer eventually produced all of the emails requested, except for privileged emails and deleted emails that could not be recovered without expensive software. Griswold sought review of city manager’s response to his public records request.  The Superior Court affirmed city council’s determination that manager had made good faith effort to comply with request. Griswold appealed.

The Supreme Court of Alaska held that:

• City manager made good faith effort to locate requested records;
• City did not destroy records in violation of Public Records Act;
• Trial court did not violate requestor’s right to a hearing;
• Trial judge did not indicate an appearance of partiality; and
• Award of attorney’s fees to city was reasonable.

City manager made a good faith and reasonable effort to locate records identified in requestor’s public records request for emails related to public bond proposition so as to comply with city code provision related to records requests.  City’s computer system manager explained that he spent 40-50 hours searching for the email records that were requested by requestor, he stated that he searched the backup system and computer hard drives, and he explained that he used state-of-the-art retrieval software.  The search did not obtain all responsive records, but the procedures necessary to obtain the remaining records would have required five to ten thousand dollars of additional forensic software and several additional weeks of work.

After city’s Zoning Board of Appeals affirmed city’s denial of property owners’ application for building permit to finish construction on partially constructed job that exceeded scope of previously issued permit, owners filed petition for writ of mandamus to compel city to issue permit.

The Supreme Court of Georgia held that:

• Exclusive remedy for obtaining judicial review of decision of Zoning Board of Appeals was by writ of certiorari, not writ of mandamus, and
• Owners had 30 days from date city Zoning Board of Appeals rendered decision affirming city’s denial of building permit to obtain judicial review of decision.

Families formed a committee pursuant to sections 7–1 and 7–6 of the School Code (105 ILCS 5/7–1, 7–6 (West 2010)), and filed a petition with the Regional Board of School Trustees seeking to detach 16 parcels within their subdivision (Territory) from the boundaries of Districts 58 and 99 and annex the Territory into the boundaries of Districts 53 and 86.

After an exhaustive analysis, the appeals court held that:

“In light of the evidence of the Territory’s connection to the Oak Brook community; the preference of Territory residents to attend the annexing schools; the closer distance of the annexing district’s elementary schools; the fraction of the detaching schools’ budget that would be affected by a boundary change; and the lack of effect the detachment would have on the ability of the districts to meet State standards of recognition, the Board’s conclusion that the overall benefit to the Territory and annexing districts from granting the petition clearly outweighs the resulting detriment to Districts 58 and 99 and the surrounding community is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Du Page County circuit court affirming the Board’s decision to grant the petition to detach the Territory from the boundaries of Districts 58 and 99 and annex the Territory into the boundaries of Districts 53 and 86.”

Former police officer sought review of decision of city public safety board terminating his employment for alleged excessive force and conduct unbecoming an officer.

The Court of Appeals held that city public safety board’s decision to terminate officer for use of excessive force and conduct unbecoming an officer was supported by substantial evidence.

In review of a municipal safety board’s decision, an appellate court does not conduct a de novo trial, but defers to the fact-finding of the agency, so long as the findings are supported by substantial evidence. “Substantial evidence” means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.  Neither the trial court nor the appellate court is permitted to reweigh the evidence or reassess witness credibility.

An aggrieved party who is attacking the evidentiary support for the agency’s findings bears the burden of demonstrating that the agency’s conclusions are clearly erroneous. An arbitrary and capricious decision is one which is patently unreasonable and made without consideration of the facts and in total disregard of the circumstances and lacks any basis which might lead a reasonable person to the same conclusion.

Officers were dispatched to nursing home after nurse called 911 and requested assistance to transport a combative patient to a hospital.  After ordering the staff to stay away, the officers entered the room of a sixty-four-year-old Alzheimer’s patient. They found patient sitting in a chair and staring straight ahead. He was naked except for his socks. The officers commanded patient to get on a gurney but he did not comply. Rather, he began “shuffling” toward officer.

Officer applied stun gun to patient five times with a total deployment time of 31 seconds, although patient was handcuffed after third stun gun application.

Two part-time city employees filed § 1983 civil rights action against city, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief with regard to provisions of city’s personnel policy prohibiting a city employee from seeking election to or serving on city school board, and from engaging on their own time in certain political activity in regard to school board elections

The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held that, as applied to the two employees, city’s personnel policy violated First Amendment protections of free speech.  Running for election to school board was speech involving a matter of public concern, and city failed to demonstrate an actual impact on municipal government operations that would outweigh employees’ First Amendment interest.  City could lawfully prohibit certain employees, including city manager, from running for the board, and it was best left to city officials than to Supreme Judicial Court to draw dividing line separating those employees who could lawfully be barred from running from those who could not.

Property owners brought action against Maryland National Capital Park and Planning Commission, alleging that Commission had wrongfully refused to issue addresses to homeowners, and against owners and developers of neighboring property, alleging that owners and developers had wrongfully attempted to prevent plaintiffs’ access and use of their properties, and seeing declaratory judgment that plaintiffs had an easement to use a road to access their properties.

The Court of Special Appeals held that:

• 180-day notice requirement of Local Government Tort Claims Act (LGTCA) applied to state constitutional action against Commission;
• Plaintiffs failed to show good cause to excuse notice requirement;
• Plaintiffs failed to join necessary parties, warranting dismissal of action.

A plaintiff in an action against a state agency has shown good cause to excuse compliance with the LGTCA notice requirement where the plaintiff: (1) prosecuted his or her claim with that degree of diligence that an ordinarily prudent person would have exercised under the same or similar circumstances, or (2) delayed because government representatives made misleading representations to the plaintiff.

Persons eligible to vote in Minnesota, and organizations representing such persons, brought action against various Minnesota state and county officials challenging the process by which the officials confirmed the eligibility of election day registrants (EDRs), and a provision of the Minnesota Constitution denying the right of persons under guardianship to vote, as well as the sufficiency of notice afforded to such persons under certain Minnesota statutes.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• Plaintiffs failed to state a § 1983 claim challenging the Minnesota election procedure;
• Plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge provision of Minnesota Constitution denying the right of persons under guardianship to vote; and
• Plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the adequacy of notice afforded by Minnesota’s statutory procedures for adjudicating wards’ voting rights.

Father of student filed action against school district pursuant to Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA), stemming from incident in which his son was injured during altercation following school-sponsored football practice.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• School district had ministerial duty to supervise students when returning to locker room, and
• Fact issue as to whether school district breached duty precluded summary judgment.

School district had ministerial duty under statute prescribing responsibilities of school personnel and under school’s handbook to supervise students returning to locker room after football practice, and did not possess discretion to exercise judgment regarding how to supervise students.  Statute required district to maintain discipline, and handbook defined affirmative duty imposed on school personnel to supervise students at all times during extracurricular activities, stating that personnel was responsible for conduct and control of students, for which there was no exclusion for teachers or coaches of football team.

The Kansas City Downtown Streetcar Transportation Development District was formed in 2012 pursuant to the Missouri Transportation Development District Act, §§ 238.200 to 238.280.2 The Streetcar District was formed for the purpose of constructing and operating a streetcar line to run for approximately two miles along Main Street in downtown Kansas City. The construction and operation of the streetcar line is to be funded, in substantial part, by special assessments on real property located within the District, and by a sales tax, not to exceed one percent, on retail sales within the District.

Property owners within the District sued, claiming that the real-property assessments and sales taxes imposed within the District are unlawful.

The circuit court entered judgment granting the Streetcar District’s motion to dismiss.  The court held that Appellants’ challenges to the real-property special assessments were “election contests” which were untimely under § 115.577, because Appellants did not bring their claims within thirty days of the certification of the results of the election approving the special assessments. The circuit court also held that Appellants were estopped from asserting any of their claims because they should have raised their challenges in the Formation Lawsuit, prior to the elections which authorized the District’s formation and the imposition of the sales tax and real-property assessments.

Appellants received red light camera tickets from city stating that they had committed a “Violation of Public Safety (Failure to Stop at a Red Light)” in violation of a city municipal ordinance (the “Ordinance”). Appellants challenged the validity of the Ordinance in a six-count petition. Appellants alleged the Ordinance violated their due process rights and the privilege against self-incrimination, sought declaratory judgment regarding the validity and constitutionality of the Ordinance and its enforcement, and asserted a claim of civil conspiracy against city and American Traffic Solutions (“ATS”).  Claims of unjust enrichment were also asserted against city and ATS.

The appeals court reversed and remanded that portion of the trial court’s judgment declaring the Ordinance valid and dismissing because it was enacted with proper authority and is consistent with state law. Appellants pleaded that city exceeded its authority under its police power to enact the Ordinance because the purpose of the Ordinance was to raise municipal revenue and not to regulate traffic or promote safety. Whether the Ordinance is a revenue-generating scheme advanced under the guise of city’s police power is a factual question not appropriate for resolution on city’s motions to dismiss.

In addition, Appellants adequately pleaded, and the appeals court held, that the Ordinance conflicts with Missouri law because it regulates moving violations without requiring the municipal court to report the violation to the Director of Revenue as required by Missouri statute. The appeals court reversed the judgment of the trial court dismissing Appellants’ claim for declaratory judgment because the Ordinance conflicts with state statutes regulating moving violations.

With regard to Appellants’ claims relating to procedural due process, Appellants adequately pleaded that the Ordinance denied them notice, a fair hearing and adequate procedural protections as required under Missouri Supreme Court Rules and Article I, Section 10 of the Missouri Constitution. Whether the Ordinance, as enacted or applied, violated Appellants’ procedural due process rights is a factual question that is not appropriate for resolution on city’s motions to dismiss. Appellants are entitled to pursue discovery and present facts in support of their properly pleaded allegations. Accordingly, the appeals court reversed that portion of the trial court’s judgment dismissing the allegations contained in Counts I and IV relating to the denial of adequate procedural protections, notice, and fair hearing, and remand those issues to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Requestor brought action against board of trustees of rural fire district alleging violations of open meeting law and rights to know and participate stemming from hiring of trustee as interim fire chief.

The Supreme Court of Montana held that:

• Challenge to illegal meeting was moot;
• Capable of repetition yet evading review exception to mootness doctrine did not apply;
• Voluntary cessation exception to mootness doctrine did not apply; and
• Board complied with records request in a reasonable and timely manner.

Pursuant to the open meetings law, a governing body can remedy the illegality of the meeting without judicial involvement by making a new decision that is not based on anything from the illegal meeting. Rural fire district board of trustees’ subsequent legal meeting rendered moot challenge to legality of previous meeting pursuant to the open meetings law, where the subsequent meeting’s compliance with the open meeting and public participation laws remedied any earlier violations of those laws.

Art-house movie theater appealed decision of the Metropolitan Court finding theater guilty of criminal zoning violation after it showed one or more erotic or pornographic films during weekend-long “Pornotopia” film festival.

The District Court held that theater had committed zoning violation, rejected theater’s argument that zoning ordinances were unconstitutional as applied to it, and imposed criminal fine of $500.

The Supreme Court of New Mexico held that theater was not an “adult amusement establishment” within the meaning of zoning ordinance prohibiting adult amusement establishments in zone in which theater operated.

Although films shown during “Pornotopia” festival qualified as adult “amusement or entertainment” under ordinance, theater was not an “adult amusement establishment” in the ordinary meaning of the term.  The presumed intent of ordinance was to regulate businesses of a clearly adult nature to avoid or quarantine negative secondary effects of adult businesses, and ordinance contained no indication that it was applicable to venues that only occasionally showed pornographic films.

Michael P. Hogan submitted an application to the Hauppauge Union Free School District seeking employment as a physical education teacher. In his application, which he certified to be true and complete, Hogan failed to disclose that he had previously held a probationary teaching position with another school district. The District claims that Hogan resigned from this previous position after allegations were made that he used corporal punishment and he was told that he would not receive tenure.

The District preferred three disciplinary charges against Hogan pursuant to Education Law § 3020–a. Charge No. 1 alleged that Hogan was guilty of misconduct because he had presented an employment application to the District which was false because he knowingly omitted the fact that he had been a probationary teacher at another school district, and that Hogan presented the employment application with the knowledge or belief that it would be filed with the District. Charge No. 1 further alleged that this conduct was in violation of Penal Law § 175.30, which defines the crime of offering a false instrument for filing in the second degree.

Hogan subsequently moved to dismiss Charge No. 1, contending that it was time-barred by Education Law § 3020–a, which provides that no disciplinary charge may be brought more than three years after the occurrence of the alleged incompetency or misconduct, “except when the charge is of misconduct constituting a crime when committed” (Education Law § 3020–a[1] ). The hearing officer designated as arbitrator granted Hogan’s motion, concluding that the District had failed to plead sufficient facts to establish that Hogan committed a violation of Penal Law § 175.30 by knowingly omitting his prior position as a probationary teacher from his employment application, and that the District could therefore not invoke the exception to the three-year limitations period that applies when the charged misconduct constitutes a crime. The District thereafter commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 and Education Law § 3020–a seeking to vacate the award dismissing Charge No. 1 on the ground that it was arbitrary and capricious, and lacked a rational basis. The Supreme Court granted the District’s petition and reinstated Charge No. 1.

The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that:

• Arbitration award dismissing one of three charges against applicant was a final determination subject to judicial review, and
• Arbitrator’s determination was arbitrary and capricious.

Arbitrator’s determination was arbitrary and capricious, where the charge contained allegations that applicant presented an employment application to school district which was false because he knowingly omitted fact that he had been a probationary teacher at another school district, and that he presented the employment application with knowledge or belief that it would be filed with the district.

Teacher commenced proceeding under Article 78, seeking review of school district’s determination terminating his employment.

The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that teacher did not acquire a tenured position by estoppel.

Tenure may be acquired by estoppel when a school board accepts the continued services of a teacher or administrator, but fails to take the action required by law to either grant or deny tenure prior to the expiration of the teacher’s probationary term.   In this case, teacher did not acquire a tenured position by estoppel, where he had agreed to extend his probationary period for an additional year and that additional probationary period had not expired when school district terminated his employment.

Twin City Hospital is a small rural acute care hospital located in Dennison, Tuscarawas County, Ohio. Twin City has served the community for over one hundred years.

On October 13, 2010, Twin City filed Chapter 11 Bankruptcy. The creditors of Twin City duly elected Appellant as Trustee, replacing the originally appointed Trustee. The proceeding under Chapter 11 was subsequently converted to a Chapter 7 proceeding.

Appellant subsequently filed a complaint in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court against Appellees – former board members of Twin City. Appellant asserted Appellees acted improperly by issuing approximately $17.3 million in tax exempt revenue bonds to fund new construction and renovations to Twin City and to refinance the hospital’s outstanding long term obligations while its finances were in poor condition.

The case was moved to the state court, which granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees. The trial court found Appellant had failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence any Appellee “was conscious that Board approval of the bond transaction would, in all probability, result in the failure of Twin City Hospital.”

Appellant appealed, contending that the trial court incorrectly held him to a “willful” – rather than “reckless” – standard of care, thereby requiring a higher threshold showing to overcome summary judgment. The appeals court agreed, reversing and remanding.

2009 Act No. 99 permits school district to impose an impact fee to be paid by developers on “new residential dwelling units constructed within the school district.”  The Board of Trustees of Dorchester School adopted the impact fee by resolution effective June 23, 2009.  An organization of home builders, brought a declaratory judgment suit seeking injunctive relief against the school district challenging the constitutionality of the Act under provisions of the state constitution requiring statewide uniformity (S.C. Const. art. VIII, § 14(6))1 and limiting special legislation (S.C. Const. art. III, § 34).

This case was an appeal from an order granting respondents’ motion for a judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), SCRCP, and dismissing appellants’ complaint. The Supreme Court found issues of fact raised by the complaint that must be resolved before the constitutionality of 2009 Act No. 99 could be determined, it reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Chris Hansen, a private investor, acquired land on which he proposed to develop and operate a new sports arena south of downtown Seattle. Hansen approached the city of Seattle and King County proposing that they participate in the development and ownership of the arena on his property. Last December, King County and the city signed a “Memorandum of Understanding” that contemplates the use of public funds for an arena on Hansen’s proposed site. The memorandum lays out the particulars of how the venture will be financed and operated if King County and Seattle ultimately decide to participate in it. Environmental review of the proposal as required by the State Environmental Protection Act (SEPA), chapter 43.21C RCW, is currently underway.

In this lawsuit, the International Longshore and Warehouse Union, Local 19 (ILWU), contended that by signing the memorandum before analyzing the environmental consequences of the project, the city and county had illegally stacked the deck in favor of the south Seattle location.

The trial court dismissed the suit on summary judgment and the appeals court affirmed. The memorandum did not predetermine where an arena will be built or even that an arena will be built at all. Whether the city and county will agree to Hansen’s proposal is a decision expressly reserved until after environmental review is complete. Because there has not yet been a government “action” as that term is defined by SEPA, the courts are not a forum for the union’s opposition to Hansen’s proposal.

Propane distributor brought suit against town, claiming that its rights under the First Amendment and the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment were violated when the town denied it certain zoning permits and issued a Cease and Desist Order requiring it to halt its wholesaling of propane.

The court concluded that propane distributor had failed to adduce sufficient evidence from which a rational juror could conclude that the actions of the defendants amounted to a violations of its rights under the Constitution of the United States.

Mobile phone service provider brought action claiming that city’s denial of its cell phone tower use permit applications violated the writing requirement of the Telecommunications Act (TCA). The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia ruled that the city violated the TCA and permanently enjoined it from denying phone service provider’s applications. City appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that:

• TCA provision requiring cell phone tower construction permit application denials to be in writing does not require decision to be in a separate writing, and
• City council hearing transcripts, letters, and hearing minutes pertaining to denial of mobile phone service provider’s cell phone tower use permit applications satisfied TCA writing requirement for application denials.

Under TCA provision requiring state or local government’s denial of cell phone tower construction permit application to be in writing and supported by substantial evidence, there must be reasons for the denial that can be gleaned from the denial itself or from the written record.  Provision neither expresses nor implies any requirement that the reasons for denial must be stated in the letter or some other document that announces the decision, if there is a separate document doing that, or prohibit having the reasons stated only in the hearing transcript or minutes.

TCA provision requiring state or local government’s denial of cell phone tower construction permit application to be in writing and supported by substantial evidence does not require decision to be in a separate writing, a writing separate from the transcript of the hearing and the minutes of the meeting in which the hearing was held, or a single writing that itself contains all of the grounds and explanations for the decision.  To the extent that the decision must contain grounds or reasons or explanations, it is sufficient if those are contained in a different written document or documents that the applicant can access, and all of the written documents should be considered collectively in deciding if the decision is in writing.

Planning commission and city council hearing transcripts, and city council letters and hearing minutes, pertaining to city’s denial of mobile phone service provider’s cell phone tower use permit applications, were sufficient to satisfy TCA requirement that application denials be in writing, even though denial was not announced or explained in a separate document. Hearing transcripts included recommendations and reasons for decisions, letters notified service provider of decisions on applications, hearing minutes recounted all of the reasons for decisions, and service provider had access to all of the documents before its deadline for filing its lawsuit.

Pursuant to the Illinois School Code (School Code) (105 ILCS 5/1–1 et seq.), parents filed a petition with the Regional Board of School Trustees of Du Page County (the Board) for detachment. The petitioners sought to detach the Timber Trails area from Districts 48 and 88 and have the area annexed into Butler School District 53 (District 53) and Hinsdale Central High School District 86 (District 86).

A dispute ensued regarding the validity of the signatures gathered in support of the annexation.

The appeals court set out the requirement for valid signatures, stating:

“We therefore turn to a consideration of the signatures that the petitioners submitted in support of their detachment petition. We note that there is a dearth of Illinois law on the subject of how such signatures should be analyzed. However, in considering existing Illinois law as well as foreign authorities, certain standards emerge. Substantial compliance will be found if the signature transposes the first name and middle initial (Board of Education of Wapella Community Unit School District No. 5 v. Regional Board of School Trustees, 247 Ill.App.3d 555, 560 (1993)), if the middle initial is omitted (People ex rel. Owen v. Dunn, 247 Ill. 410, 413 (1910)), if a suffix, such as Junior, is omitted (Morton v. State Officers Electoral Board, 311 Ill.App.3d 982, 985 (2000)), or if a common shortened version of a first name (such as Ray) is used instead of the full first name (such as Raymond) (Bonardo v. People, 182 Ill. 411, 424 (1899); In re Nomination Petition of Gales, 54 A.3d 855, 859 (Pa.2012)). Substantial compliance will not be found if one uses an initial for a first or last name. In re Nomination Petition of Flahery, 770 A.2d 327, 332 (Pa.2001). Similarly, if using an initial instead of a full first name is not substantial compliance, then omitting a first or last name completely is not substantial compliance. See id. Further, substantial compliance will not be found if the signature is printed rather than in cursive as it appears on the corresponding registration form. State ex rel. Rogers v. Taft, 594 N.E.2d 576, 579 (Ohio 1992).”

Following unsuccessful appeal to Attorney General, newspaper brought action against city under Open Records Act (ORA), challenging city’s denial of newspaper’s request to inspect and copy entire police file generated during homicide investigation.

The Supreme Court of Kentucky held that:

• Law-enforcement exemption under ORA is appropriately invoked only when the agency can articulate a factual basis for applying it, only, that is, when, because of the record’s content, its release poses a concrete risk of harm to the agency in the prospective enforcement action; and
• Mere fact that a law-enforcement action remains prospective is not enough to establish that disclosure of anything from a law enforcement file constitutes “harm” under law-enforcement exemption, overruling Skaggs v. Redford, 844 S.W.2d 389; but
• Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying newspaper’s request for attorney fees and costs.

Even if an agency, in response to an ORA, adopts the approach of identifying the generic kinds of documents for which the law-enforcement exemption is claimed, and the generic risks posed by disclosure of these categories of documents, agency must identify and review its responsive records, release any that are not exempt, and assign the remainder to meaningful categories.  A category is meaningful if it allows the court to trace a rational link between the nature of the document and the alleged likely harm to the agency.

An agency asserting the law-enforcement exemption in an action under ORA should provide the requesting party and the court with sufficient information about the nature of the withheld record, or the categories of withheld records, and the harm that would result from release of record to permit the requester to dispute the claim and the court to assess it.  If disclosure even to that limited extent would defeat the exemption, then in camera inspection may be necessary, but those cases should be the exception.

Former city police officer appealed decision of city police commissioner, terminating her employment after officer married a convicted murderer and prison gang member. The Circuit Court upheld officer’s termination, and officer appealed.

The Court of Special Appeals held that:

• Rational basis scrutiny applied to officer’s First Amendment challenge to regulation prohibiting officers from associating with persons of questionable character;
• Regulation was rationally related to legitimate city interest; and
• Substantial evidence showed that officer violated regulation.

Real property owners filed claims of negligence and inverse condemnation against state to recover for damage to their property allegedly resulting from procedures used by state to contain wildland fire. The District Court entered judgment on jury verdict awarding owners $730,000 in damages on negligence claim and denied owners’ posttrial motion for discovery sanctions. Both sides appealed.

The Supreme Court of Montana held that:

• Statement in owners’ trial brief, that it was a reasonable and necessary decision for state to let wildland fire move across owners’ property to flatter, more defensible space, did not constitute a judicial admission with respect to negligence claim;
• District court did not abuse its discretion in striking a defense under public duty doctrine that state first raised in its trial brief, filed three weeks before trial; and
• Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying owners’ posttrial motion for sanctions.

A public benefit corporation (Issuer) issued and sold $200,177,680 in municipal bonds to finance the extension of a toll road in Greenville, South Carolina (original bonds).  Under the trust agreement if the issuer files a voluntary petition in bankruptcy, it is an event of default which entitles a bond holder to pursue all its legal remedies.

Defendant, a financial guaranty insurance company, issued a number of secondary market insurance policies to guaranty the issuer’s timely payment of obligations under certain of the original bonds. The individual policies were evidenced by certificates of bond insurance (CBIs) which “wrapped” the particular bond defendant was insuring.

The CBIs were “noncancellable except in the event the holder or the Owner surrenders its interest in the Certificate of Bond Insurance or in the position … and waives its rights to receive payment from the Insurer under this policy pursuant to Sections 3.03(f)1 and 4.06(b) of the Custody Agreement.”

The toll revenues received by the issuer were substantially less than projected and, on January 1, 2010, the issuer defaulted in making payments on certain of the outstanding original bonds, none of which were owned by plaintiffs. On June 24, 2010, however, the issuer filed for Chapter 9 bankruptcy protection, which allows insolvent municipalities to reorganize their debts. Defendant was listed in the petition as one of the creditors holding twenty (20) of the largest unsecured debts. It was a “special notice” party and filed a proof of claim on its own behalf.

The bankruptcy filing had the effect of accelerating the claims on the original bonds. The CBIs, however, had no parallel acceleration requirement, except at the sole option of defendant, which it did not exercise.

As part of the bankruptcy, the issuer’s bond offering was restructured. The restructuring plan called for a mandatory exchange of the original bonds for new bonds and the consequent cancellation of the original bonds.

Defendant acknowledged that it would have been contractually obligated to pay for any loss suffered by plaintiffs under the original bonds when they matured, in the event of the issuer’s bankruptcy, but it claims that as a result of the restructuring plan that was adopted, the original bonds were cancelled, completely relieving it of any obligation to pay under the CBIs.

Bond holders brought action against insurer, seeking declaration that insurer was still obligated to pay in the event that issuer defaulted.  The appeals court agreed, finding insurer’s position inconsistent with the terms of the policies and contrary to law.

In two related actions, school bus driver and monitor on that bus brought action against town, driver and owner of colliding vehicle, and owners of property that was alleged source of icy road conditions, seeking to recover damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained in motor vehicle accident.

The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that:

• Fact issue existed as to whether water from property owners’ land contributed to icy condition;
• Driver and owner of colliding vehicle established prima facie entitlement to judgment as matter of law; and
• Fact issues existed as to whether town contributed to icy condition.

Private landowner may be liable for injuries sustained in a car accident that is proximately caused by an ice condition occurring on an abutting public roadway, where that ice condition was caused and created by the artificial diversion of naturally flowing water from the private landowner’s property onto the public roadway.

Driver and owner of colliding vehicle, moving for summary judgment in personal injury suit of school bus monitor, seeking to recover damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained in motor vehicle accident, established prima facie entitlement to judgment as matter of law by providing competent medical evidence that monitor’s alleged lumbar injuries did not constitute serious injury within meaning of no-fault automobile insurance law and pointing to monitor’s own testimony that accident caused her to lose only about one week of work.

Genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether town affirmatively created icy road condition through its own negligence, and whether town’s negligence at time road was repaired immediately resulted in existence of the hazardous condition, precluding summary judgment in school bus driver’s and monitor’s suit against town.

The Town of Midland condemned a portion of a planned subdivision for an easement in which to construct a natural gas pipeline and a fiber optic line.

A contractor employed by the Town drove vehicles and equipment and maintained construction staging areas on portions of the subdivision outside of the easement for a period of time during construction.

Defendant filed a counterclaim for inverse condemnation, claiming that: a) the contractor’s actions constituted a temporary taking of portions of the subdivision; and b) the Town had inversely condemned its entire tract by adversely impacting its rights to develop it in accordance with the previously-approved subdivision plan.

The appeals court held that: a) the trial court did not err in ruling there was an inverse taking with regard the parking of construction vehicles and the temporary construction of a road on the property outside of the assessment condemned by the Town’s contractor; and b) the trial court erred in concluding that there was a regulatory taking of the property in its entirety.

Student and her mother brought action against school district, alleging violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), the Rehabilitation Act (RA), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), contending that the school district misdiagnosed student as disabled for several years.

As matters of first impression, the Court of Appeals held that:

• IDEA did not create a cause of action for children misidentified as being disabled;
• Claims for compensatory damages under the RA and the ADA required a finding of intentional discrimination;
• Showing of deliberate indifference could satisfy the intentional discrimination element of a claim for compensatory damages under the RA and the ADA; and
• Plaintiffs failed to establish school district’s deliberate indifference to student being misidentified as having a learning disability.

This case concerned the constitutionality of a home-rule city’s ordinance which purported to regulate air pollution within that city’s borders. The BCCA Appeal Group, Inc. (the Group), a non-profit organization whose members own and operate industrial facilities in the Houston area, brought suit to enjoin enforcement of two air pollution control ordinances enacted by the City of Houston (the City)—City of Houston Ordinance Nos.2007–208 and 2008–414 (collectively, the Ordinance).

The Group asserted that the Ordinance was preempted because it claimed for the City several powers the Legislature granted exclusively to the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) in the Texas Clean Air Act (TCAA) and the provisions of the Texas Water Code (TWC) that govern enforcement of the TCAA. According to the Group, the Ordinance conflicted with the TCAA, TWC, and Article XI, Section 5 of the Texas Constitution which bars home-rule cities from enacting any ordinance that is “inconsistent with the Constitution of the State, or of the general laws enacted by the Legislature of this State.”

The Ordinance requires facilities to register with the City by filing an application and paying the applicable registration fee.  It is unlawful to operate a facility within the City’s boundaries that is not registered with the City. The Group argues that these sections are not only inconsistent with state law, but also make unlawful a condition or act approved or authorized under state law.

The Group argued that a facility’s lawful operation pursuant to TCEQ’s rules and orders would nonetheless be unlawful under the Ordinance, if that facility failed to register with the City or pay a registration fee.  Thus, according to the Group, the entire registration program created by the ordinance is preempted. If the Group is correct, then any concurrent regulatory scheme or permitting process by a municipality would be preempted. This does not appear to be the prevailing law in Texas.

In this case, the City was not attempting to hold an affected industry to a higher, more onerous standard than the one set forth by the state. On the contrary, the Ordinance was the City’s attempt to create a concurrent regulatory scheme or permitting process through which it will enforce the state’s existing rules and regulations. In fact, the City acknowledged that its decision to regulate and enforce the TCAA and TCEQ rules and regulations on its own in this case—rather than in cooperation with TCEQ—is due to what it perceives to be TCEQ’s lax enforcement efforts. According to the City, the Group is only challenging the constitutionality of the Ordinance because the industry “currently enjoys what it perceives to be a permissive regulatory approach from the TCEQ” and it fears regulation by “a vigilant watch dog” (i.e., the City).

The court concluded that the Group failed to show that the Legislature intended to preempt the Ordinance with “unmistakable clarity,” and thus, failed to meet its extraordinary burden to establish that the ordinance is invalid.

Appearing pro se, Plaintiffs filed a complaint raising several constitutional claims and several state law claims relating to city’s enforcement of certain municipal ordinances governing property maintenance.  In particular, Plaintiffs alleged that the city ordered discontinuation of electrical service at a home owned by Plaintiffs in violation of substantive and procedural due process, and that the city’s adoption of the Vacant Building Ordinance gives the city “arbitrary and discriminatory power to limit a property owner’s use of his or her property.”  Plaintiffs also alleged that criminal proceedings initiated by the city against Plaintiffs pursuant to the same municipal ordinances constituted the torts of malicious prosecution and abuse of process, and that city’s actions against Plaintiffs constituted both intentional infliction of emotional distress and civil conspiracy.

The court disagreed, granting city’s motion to dismiss.

Motorist filed negligence action against employee of Texas Adjutant General’s Office (TAGO), seeking recovery for injuries sustained in collision with vehicle driven by employee. Employee filed motion to dismiss under election-of-remedies provision of Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA), and motorist filed amended petition adding TAGO as a defendant.

The Supreme Court of Texas held that:

• Consent of a governmental unit to suit, under provision of Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA) stating that the filing of a suit against any employee of a governmental unit constitutes an irrevocable election and immediately and forever bars any suit by plaintiff against governmental unit regarding same subject matter unless governmental unit consents, is not limited to statutory waivers of immunity found outside the TTCA itself, abrogating City of Houston v. Esparza, 369 S.W.3d 238;
• A suit against governmental employee in his official capacity does not trigger the bar contained in election-of-remedies provision to subsequent suits against governmental unit regarding same subject matter; and
• Motorist, in filing amended petition adding TAGO as defendant in response to TAGO employee’s motion to dismiss, was not required to also dismiss employee before proceeding against TAGO as sole defendant.

More than ninety property owners filed a lawsuit against the Port of Houston Authority, alleging that its negligent operation of a container terminal along the Bayport Ship Channel constituted a nuisance that interfered with the use and enjoyment of their property and violated a municipal noise-control ordinance.

The Port Authority filed a plea to the jurisdiction, seeking dismissal based on governmental immunity.

The court of appeals held that the property owners’ claims did not fall within the scope of the limited waiver of governmental immunity stated in the Texas Tort Claims Act, and rendered judgment dismissing the property owners’ claims.

Residential subdivision developer brought claims against city for declaratory judgment and inverse condemnation, relating to city’s moratorium on permits for sewer connections.

The Supreme Court of Texas  held that:

• Developer was not required to submit sewer connection application before filing lawsuit;
• Property approved for subdivision is exempt from any development moratorium based on shortages of public facilities; and
• Fact issue precluded summary judgment on inverse condemnation claim.

City ordinance providing that applications for new sewer connections are not to be accepted for filing and are to be returned to the applicant as unfiled does not impose a requirement that a landowner aggrieved by the ordinance file an application to administratively exhaust the landowner’s claim.  Rather, it is a process by which the City will return any applications to the owner as unfiled.

Under city ordinance providing that applications for new sewer connections were not to be accepted for filing and were to be returned to the applicant as unfiled, developer was not required to submit a sewer connection application before filing its inverse condemnation and declaratory judgment action based on state law prohibiting municipalities from enforcing moratoria against approved development, since such attempted filing would be futile.

Because state law prohibiting municipalities from enforcing development moratoria resulting from shortages of essential public facilities against approved development defines “development” as subdivision or construction, such a moratorium may not affect property approved for subdivision or construction. A property need not be approved for both the subdivision and construction aspects of development to be insulated from such moratoria.

Genuine issue of material fact existed as to the extent of city’s intrusion on subdivision developer’s use and enjoyment of its property with a sewer connection moratorium which violated state law prohibiting municipalities from enforcing moratoria against approved development, thus precluding summary judgment for city on developer’s inverse condemnation claim.

City residents brought action challenging proposed language for referendum ballot title, asserting three challenges to the language: (1) the language failed to give a true and impartial statement of the purpose of the measure by failing to mention UTOPIA, a city-owned telecommunications network, (2) the title created an argument for the measure by minimizing the perceived burden on businesses, and (3) the wording was otherwise “unsatisfactory” in that it sought to hide from the voters the causal connection between the UTOPIA bond obligation and the requested tax rate increase.

The Supreme Court of Utah held that:

• Supreme Court’s review of a referendum ballot title encompasses requirements that the ballot title gives a true and impartial statement of the purpose of the measure, that the ballot title not exceed 100 words in length, and that the ballot title be submitted by the stated deadline; abrogating Walker v. Weber County, 973 P.2d 927, and
• Content of title satisfied requirement to present a true and impartial statement of purpose of resolution.

The former Anchorage Municipal Code provided for the creation of special assessment districts for public capital improvements. In 1996, the Anchorage Municipal Assembly (Assembly) enacted Anchorage Ordinance 96–77(S–I) to broaden “special assessment districts” to include the provision of services and to authorize business improvement districts. In 1997 the Assembly passed Anchorage Ordinance 97–51, which created the Downtown Improvement District (District) for a period of three years.

When passing this ordinance, the Assembly amended the boundaries of the proposed District to exclude some properties on K and L Streets. The building at 420 L Street, the property owned by appellant L Street Investments, was in the original proposal but subsequently carved out by the Assembly.

In 2000 the Assembly extended the life of the District for ten years. Beginning in 2009, the Anchorage Downtown Partnership canvassed businesses hoping to extend the life of the District again and expand the District to include businesses between I and L Street.

After the majority of business owners in the proposed District approved the extension and expansion, the Assembly extended the life of the District and expanded it to include businesses between I and L Streets, including the building at 420 L Street.

L Street Investments filed a complaint arguing: (1) Section 9.02(a) of the Municipality of Anchorage’s Charter does not authorize the Municipality to finance services within the District by an assessment—rather, the Municipality can finance services only by a tax levy; and (2) the District is a “service area,” and AS 29 .35.450(c) prohibits the expansion of a service area unless a majority of voters in the area to be added vote in favor of expanding the service area. The Anchorage Downtown Partnership intervened, and all parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.

The Supreme Court of Alaska concluded that Section 9.02(a) does not preclude the Municipality from levying an assessment for services because the language in Section 9.02(a) is permissive rather than mandatory, and does not expressly prohibit the Municipality from using an assessment to finance services. The Municipality, as a unified home rule municipality, enjoys broad authority to exercise all legislative powers not prohibited by law or Charter.22 The use of assessments to finance services is not prohibited by law or Charter and is therefore a valid exercise of the Municipality’s authority.

As the superior court stated, the legislative history of AS 29.35 .450 shows that the legislature was focused on specific types of service areas. It does not suggest that the legislature either contemplated or intended to impose the voting requirements of AS 29.35.450(c) on a business improvement district that does not primarily provide road, fire, or park and recreation services, but may provide some services in those areas. Neither the plain language nor the legislative history of AS 29.35.450 indicates that the District is a service area subject to its terms. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Alaska held that the District was not a service area subject to the voting requirements of AS 29.35.450.

Roxana is a small village in Madison County, Illinois that was formed around a petroleum refinery operated by Shell. Roxana was for many years a company town so that the city park is named “Shell Park” and the high school athletic teams are known as the Roxana “Shells.” The Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA) forced Shell to take measures to remediate the pollution coming from its refinery that threaten surrounding soil and groundwater.

Roxana then brough an action to enforce its own municipal nuisance ordinance against Shell.  Roxana started this action by filing 230 separate cases in state court. The complaint in each case described a separate property located within Roxana that was alleged to be contaminated by pollutants from the Shell refinery. Shell removed all 230 cases based on diversity of citizenship once they were consolidated. Roxana’s claims are based on an ordinance adopted in 1932 which makes it unlawful “to place, deposit, throw, leave or permit to remain, or to cause or permit to flow, any liquid, slops, animal or vegetable matter, filth, dirt or rubbish, or substance of any kind likely to become rotten, foul, nauseous, putrid or offensive” on any property or water in Roxana.

Shell argued that the ordinance did not cover petroleum byproducts that are “valuable commodities that its owner takes precautions to safeguard.”  This is a question of law that the parties agree is to be decided by Illinois rules of construction, as if the ordinance were a statute. The court disagreed with Shell, finding that the ordinance applied to the facts as alleged.

Roxana is a non-home rule municipality and as such may only exercise those powers enumerated in the Illinois Constitution or by implication conferred by a state statute. If a non-home rule municipality enacts an ordinance conflicts “with the spirit and purpose of a state statute,” that ordinance is preempted by the statute.  So, if Roxana’s ordinance conflicted with an IEPA permit or consent order entered pursuant to the Act, it must give way as preempted. The narrow question here was whether the Roxana ordinance conflicted with a 1989 IEPA permit that was renewed in 2010 or with a 1998 consent order. The court concluded that there existed no conflict.

Shell’s motion for summary judgment was denied.

After he was injured in an automobile accident, plaintiff cooperated with the other driver’s insurer in hopes of settling his claim. Nearly a year later, when settlement proved elusive, he hired a lawyer and filed suit. Only then did he learn that the other driver was employed by a political subdivision subject to the Indiana Tort Claims Act. Plaintiff cited several reasons to excuse his failure to comply with the notice requirements of that Act, including waiver, substantial compliance, agency, and estoppel. The court found the first three unavailing, but concluded he should be permitted to present proof of estoppel to the trial court, and the court reversed and remanded on that basis.

In addition, the Supreme Court of Indiana held that:

• Agency’s amendment of responsive pleading did not prejudice motorist;
• Notice to agency’s insurer did not constitute substantial compliance with notice requirement of Indiana Tort Claims Act (ITCA);
• Liability insurer of agency was not agent for purposes of notice requirement; but
• Genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether agency should have been estopped from asserting notice requirement as defense.

The crucial consideration when determining whether there has been substantial compliance with statutory notice requirement of the ITCA is whether the notice supplied by the claimant of his intent to take legal action contains sufficient information for the city to ascertain the full nature of the claim against it so that it can determine its liability and prepare a defense.

Genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether designated community action agency should have been equitably estopped from asserting defense of motorist’s failure to comply with notice requirement of ITCA in personal injury action against agency, and therefore summary judgment in favor of agency based upon failure to comply with notice requirement was precluded.  Motorist presented evidence that he was not aware that agency was a statutorily designated community action program and thus a political subdivision, neither agency not its insurer ever mentioned the ITCA or the notice requirement to motorist, and there was evidence that insurer’s agent told motorist it was in his best interest to wait until completion of medical treatment before asserting claim.